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Chapter 1
Introduction
Jordi Cat and Adam Tamas Tuboly
The Viennese-born polymath Otto Neurath died on 22 December 1945 in Oxford, a 
few months after the end of World War Two. A social engineer and sociologist of 
happiness, Neurath was not only a socially sensitive educator, advocating for any 
institute and organization that was concerned with the well-being of people; he was 
also a trained scientist and philosopher. Studying mathematics, economics, history, 
philosophy, and physics in Vienna and then in Berlin during the early years of the 
long twentieth century, Neurath became involved in many of the disputes among 
social and natural scientists that shaped the course of the fields.
Through sociological and historical inquiries about how actual science histori-
cally developed, Neurath unswervingly propagated in various forums his ideal of 
the socially relevant “unified science,” his fears about the dangers of over- 
systematization, his misgivings about the concept of neutral “data” and “facts” (also 
of a neutral “observation language”), and about putting too much weight on theo-
retical argumentations and logical calculation. There were no exceptions: Neurath 
debated and poked his friends, fellow logical empiricists and supposed or real ene-
mies with the same vehemence.
His character, style of writing and the priority he gave to social action over intel-
lectual contemplation resulted, however, in a fragile legacy, with no easy classifica-
tion or safe place in collective memory, whether in the media or in academia, 
sciences or humanities. This volume – with its essays, translations, and the edited 
1940–1945 scientific and personal correspondence of Neurath with Carnap – aims 
J. Cat (*) 
Department of History and Philosophy of Science and Medicine, Indiana University 
Bloomington, Bloomington, IN, USA
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2at furthering our understanding of Neurath’s life and works in order to see how 
scientific and philosophical ideas and social projects change over time and across 
places and what relevance they could still have in our time. The essays collected 
here also contribute a new range of perspectives and objects of study, from attention 
to physical objects and collections to attention to logic and its image.
1.1  Preliminary Remarks
How did Neurath’s life and writings regain interest, relevance and visibility? And, 
to whom? In 1947, Philipp Frank, the physicist-turned-philosopher and old friend of 
Neurath became the director of the Institute for the Unity of Science in Cambridge, 
MA that was after all a continuation of Neurath’s earlier Institute in the Netherlands. 
After Frank died on 21 July 1966 in distressing mental and physical conditions in a 
nursing home, the American pragmatist Charles Morris approached the Trustees 
and Committee members to “seriously consider the future of the Institute.” Morris 
also suggested that the Institute, “if this proves necessary, [should aid somehow] the 
publication of the Neurath volume which Mary [sic] Neurath and Robert Cohen 
have edited. The book has not yet found a publisher. We might contribute toward the 
publication or agree to buy and distribute as gifts a number of copies of the book.”1
Robert S. Cohen was the unrelenting driving force behind Otto Neurath’s resto-
ration to a former academic presence in the English-speaking world. He had 
announced already in 1963 – in the volume The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap (Open 
Court’s Library of Living Philosophers) – that the publication of the Selected Works 
of Otto Neurath was forthcoming (Cohen 1963, 151, n.113). And the volume, pre-
pared by Neurath’s widow, Marie Neurath, and Cohen himself, was promptly com-
pleted in 1966.2
Carnap had been “definitely in favor” of the publication of the Neurath volume, 
and after a meeting of the Institute in January 1967, Morris reported that “[t]here 
was unanimous agreement that the Institute should consider a sum of from $500 to 
$1000 as subsidization of the collection of papers of Otto Neurath […]. The manu-
script is now being submitted to publishers. Carl Hempel alone expressed some 
doubts about the publication of such a volume.”3 As it is well known, the book did 
1 Morris to Professors and Trustees, Institute for the Unity of Science, 25 August 1966 (RC 
102-48-18)
2 Given that most of the papers for the Carnap volume were delivered during the 1950s, the Neurath 
volume was presumably under construction already in the mid-1950s. See Morris to Carnap, 20 
April 1966 (RC 102-48-26).
3 Morris to Professors and Trustees, Institute for the Unity of Science, 25 January 1967 (RC 102-
48-12). On Hempel’s case see his letters to Ernest Nagel (2 and 7 September 1966, CH 28–02) and 
Nagel to Hempel, 3 September 1966 (CH 28–02). Hempel and Nagel were actually against another 
idea of Morris: to publish a selection of essays (invited and essay-prize style) on the history of the 
Unity of Science Movement. Both Hempel and Nagel claimed (in the aforementioned letters) that 
given the interest and commitment to publish the lectures of “John Hopkins Seminars in 
Philosophy” devoted to logical empiricism it “militates further against the idea of a volume of 
J. Cat and A. T. Tuboly
3not appear until 1973, under the title of Empiricism and Sociology as the first vol-
ume of the Vienna Circle Collection.
The first volume of Neurath’s essays was followed by a second (1983); but for a 
few reviews, the English-speaking academic world did not respond favorably to 
Neurath’s work or the attached memory of his political activities. Two things might 
be mentioned here. First, even though Neurath had published several monographs 
and brochures in English, many of them were simply unavailable to the average 
reader: his books on and using ISOTYPE (1936, 1937, 1939) were not republished 
for almost three decades. Though the monographs of the International Encyclopedia 
of Unified Science (with Neurath’s monograph on the social sciences) appeared as 
an oversize joint volume in 1971, the reputation of Unified Science was already in 
ruins.4 So, even though Neurath’s Einheitswissenschaft series was published in the 
Vienna Circle Collection under the editorship of Brian McGuinness in 1987, it did 
not help much towards the recognition and understanding of the movement.
Second, regarding the literature on Neurath, the Anglo-American scholarship 
was considerably thinner than the German-speaking world’s. While there were a 
few articles by Carl Hempel, Willard Quine, Donald Davidson and others, there 
wasn’t any monograph-length account of his work  (see Uebel 1991, 10–14). By 
contrast, by 1990 a number of books had been published on Carnap’s various phases 
and ideas.5
1.2  Phases of the English Neurath Reception
We will focus on the growing English-speaking reception of Neurath’s works 
over the last few decades.6 We distinguish five periods, each of them documenting a 
difference in the philosophical interest and the broader context of the Neurath 
reception.
The first phase opened with the publication of the English translation of Neurath’s 
selected sociological and political essays in the above-mentioned Empiricism and 
Sociology. The volume contained not only 80 pages of important memoirs, but clas-
sical papers, pamphlets and mini-monographs such as Anti-Spengler, Personal Life 
and Class Struggle, Empirical Sociology, the famous manifesto (“The Scientific 
Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle”), and many more items on pictorial 
essays on the Unity of Science.” The collection appeared in 1969 as Achinstein and Barker (1969), 
and without actually mentioning the unity of science.
4 Not just the whole project decayed slowly, but Neurath’s monograph was considered as the “black 
eye” of the series already when it was published. See Reisch (2003, 208).
5 See e.g. Kazemier and Vuyjse (1962), Schilpp (1963), Hausman and Wilson (1967), Butrick 
(1970), Hintikka (1975), Norton (1977), Runggaldier (1984), Proust (1989).
6 The German-speaking literature also has many interesting items about semantics, protocol-sen-
tences, pictorial education and about the socio-political context of Neurath’s philosophical world-
view. Nonetheless, since many of these works did not have a major and lasting influence on the 
secondary English literature, we will not discuss them here.
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4education, war economy, socialization and planning. This colorful mixture was tied 
together by the idea that Neurath’s scientific and scholarly work had not just a spe-
cial social and political context, but broader relevance as well. The content of the 
papers reflected the social embeddedness of his thought in an often elusive tangle of 
philosophy, science and politics that posed interpretative challenges for the general 
readers.
A certain A.S.C. (1974, 132) wrote a quite neutral descriptive review of the book, 
emphasizing that the “anthology displays a many sided character concerned with 
both conceptual clarity and human happiness.” The fact, however, that nothing of 
philosophical relevance surfaced in the review may have documented an interesting 
pattern of how scholars read the collection. Others were keener on pointing out the 
peculiar non-philosophical character of the volume. In another review, Alan Ryan 
(1976, 194) complained that “the selection of philosophical and sociological work 
is a bit strange; or, rather, it would be strange, if the audience for whom it is intended 
were an audience of professional philosophers.” The most radical was J.  W. N. 
Watkins on the pages of The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, who 
complained pointedly about the editors’ selection principles: why they included 
certain items and why they did not include others. Watkins (1974, 343) missed espe-
cially the philosophical papers of Neurath, (“[f]or the opening volume in a ‘Vienna 
Circle Collection’, there is surprisingly little of Neurath’s Vienna Circle work”); 
while on the other hand, he regarded the included items, or at least bigger portions 
of them, as “Marxist propaganda,” “near-banality,” or loose and sloppy revelations 
often prefixed as “to a certain degree,” “under certain conditions,” indicating some 
reservations as signs of scientific seriousness but lacking actual explanations.
The most important feature of Watkins’s (1974, 345) review was his unwitting 
“discovery” of a “persistent and striking parallelism, or rather linkage, between 
Neurath’s philosophical ideas and his political ideas.” He suggested four main sets 
of parallels: (1) physicalism and Marxism, (2) physicalism, socialism and economic 
planning, (3) unified physicalist language and proletarian socialism, (4) interna-
tional socialism and pictorial education/language. The general parallelism and cor-
respondence, and these particular strands have surfaced many times since in the 
secondary literature and are treated in detail by the contributors to this volume as 
well.
But the point was made: when the first portion of Neurath’s long awaited collec-
tion of essays finally appeared in 1973, the direct reception was more unfavorable 
than it might have been expected. The above-mentioned complaints document, 
however, an interesting trend: scholars repudiated Neurath as a serious philosopher 
due to the lack of formally or rigurously formulated theses and arguments and a 
politically neutral philosophical look on the world; a few years had still to pass until 
the English-speaking audience discovered that Neurath’s strength might be found 
exactly in those weaknesses that others did not hesitate to point out repeatedly.7
7 It should be noted as well, though, that Neurath’s reception might have been hindered by the lack 
of conscientious editorial work on his essay-collections. The reviewers of the volume complained 
that there were no editorial introductions: not a general one for the volume, or shorter ones for the 
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sophical relevance of Neurath’s ideas, initiated by the publication of his second 
selected writings, Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 1913–1946, edited again by 
Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath in 1983. The volume contained essays mainly 
on theory building, physicalism and the idea of unified science. The detailed elabo-
ration and commentary on these often short, ambiguous, puzzling, almost mysteri-
ous revelations would follow in the forthcoming years. The explanatory secondary 
literature was never meant to provide merely historical contextualizations; it consis-
tently aimed to emphasize the contemporary philosophical relevance of the mate-
rial. This came also in stages.
The very first monograph on Neurath’s work in English was Danilo Zolo’s short 
book, Reflexive Epistemology: The Philosophical Legacy of Otto Neurath, written 
originally in Italian.8 Zolo (1989, 167) aimed at showing one version of what he 
called – in Neurathian fashion – “pluri-Neurath”: it was a picture of an anti- positivist 
positivist who could be accepted also by most post-positivists. Utilizing Neurath’s 
famous nautical metaphor, Zolo presented Neurath as a thinker who merited being 
in the focus of research as much as Schlick or Carnap were, since, like them, he 
defended important and exciting theses on science, language and method. Though a 
great deal of the book contributed valuable scholarship, the volume did not receive 
a good reception overall. Zolo preserved Neurath’s ambiguous and somewhat cryp-
tic language thus he did not succeed in replanting Neurath’s ideas into the contem-
porary settings. While almost all the reviews welcomed the effort to rehabilitate the 
unforgotten Neurath, the first line of Richard Creath’s (1993, 359) (quite devastat-
ing) review summarized the general feeling well: “This is not a very good book, but 
it has its virtues.”
Two years later came a defining breakthrough in the Neurath literature: Thomas 
Uebel (1991) translated, edited and introduced a volume of papers about Neurath 
(Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle: Austrian Studies on Otto Neurath and 
the Vienna Circle), written by leading Austrian scholars in 1991. The papers by 
Rudolf Haller, Friedrich Stadler, Elisabeth Nemeth, Heiner Rutte, Eckehart Köhler, 
individual essays; no editorial notes except a few general ones; and there was no systematic state-
ment of purpose on their behalf regarding the selection principles and the general philosophical-
historical aim of the edition.
8 One interesting exception should be mentioned though: in 1966, the logician David L. Székely 
published a 66 pages long booklet in his monograph series (“Association for Unification and 
Automation in Science”) under the title “Otto Neurath and the Unity of Science Movement.” It 
contained some pages from Charles Morris and a reprint of his 1962 article, “On the History of the 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science,” along with some papers and remarks of Székely 
on Neurath and on his own ideas of unification. See Székely and Morris (1966). In 1967, Morris 
sent out a circular letter to the Institute for the Unity of Science, because Székely wanted to repub-
lish it with the help of the Institute to distribute it in America as well (Morris to the Institute, 20 
February 1967, RC 102-48-09). In return, Carnap answered that he was happy to have some of 
Morris’s papers in one volume, though Székely’s papers were quite weak, thus he did not support 
the republication of the volume with the help of the Institute (Carnap to Morris, 3 March 1967, RC 
102-48-08).
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were outstanding scholarly papers about the context, development, and significance 
of Neurath’s life and works.
A year later, Uebel published his own book-length philosophical appreciation of 
Neurath’s significance. The groundbreaking Overcoming Logical Positivism From 
Within (1992) was a major step in the philosophical articulation of Neurath’s 
thought: while the main line of bearing consists of the famous protocol sentence 
debate, Uebel’s effective contribution was far-reaching. Reconstructing the often 
implicit arguments in sophisticated epistemological terms and filling in the gaps of 
the various interrelated topics raised new questions, or at least raised them in new 
terms, about the nature of philosophy, science and their relation. Neurath surfaced 
as an exciting scholar who had to say something relevant also for our contemporary 
debates and discussions. Overcoming was as historical and philosophical: what 
Zolo aimed at was achieved by Uebel by relying on the same archival sources but 
using them as reconstructed items in painstakingly nuanced arguments.9
Uebel’s reconstruction and the essay collection set in motion a self-propelled 
machine. First off, several articles appeared about the positions taken by Carnap, 
Schlick, and especially Neurath in the protocol sentence debate. One approach 
deserves special attention: it was Thomas Oberdan’s (1993) Protocols, Truth and 
Convention that appeared in the same series of Studien Zur Österreichischen 
Philosophie in which Uebel’s was published a year before, though there is no refer-
ence to Uebel’s work in the book. Oberdan (1993, 2) argued that actually much of 
the “philosophical substance” in and around the protocol sentence debate “derives 
from the underlying conceptions of language.” Though Oberdan’s monograph could 
be read more profitably from the angle of Carnap’s development and provides a 
refined picture of Schlick (it is still underappreciated from these angles), Protocols, 
Truth and Convention presented another station towards the contemporary reread-
ing of Neurath and his context.10
While both Uebel’s and Oberdan’s projects started from the protocol sentence 
debate, they had a bigger aim and a broader perspective as well: namely placing 
Neurath on the map of twentieth-century intellectual history and putting his ideas 
back on the philosophical table. These motivations were picked up and developed 
by various authors in 1996, initiating thus the third phase of the reception. The new 
phase, however, had a quite peculiar twist in itself: they tried to combine both the 
socio-political and the philosophical angles of Neurath’s life and work.
9 Fifteen years later, building on an enormous secondary literature on logical empiricism, Uebel 
(2007) published an extended, updated and revised version of his book as Empiricism at Crossroads. 
For a longer review essay see Cat (2012).
10 In his review of Oberdan’s book, Thomas Uebel (1995, 312) called the reader’s attention to the 
consideration that “admirers of Neurath are bound to find their man less charitably treated then his 
ideas deserve.” A few years later Uebel (1996, 1999) and Oberdan (1998, 1999) had a debate (one 
of a few among the logical-empiricism scholars) over anti-foundationalism in the Vienna Circle: 
though that discussion centered mainly on the interpretation of Schlick, it has also relevance for the 
contextualization of Neurath as well.
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connected themes, thus marking the beginnings of the third period which connected 
Neurath’s political and philosophical ideas through the conception of unified sci-
ence. Otto Neurath: Philosophy Between Science and Politics was written jointly by 
Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck, and Thomas Uebel (1996). Besides pro-
viding the first detailed English biography of Neurath, and a detailed treatment of 
the context and philosophical significance of Neurath’s various famous ship- 
metaphors, the authors presented a complex and nuanced version of Neurath’s unity 
of science ideal. They argued that Neurath held a peculiar position regarding the 
nature and relevance of science: even though he was a pluralist with some relativis-
tic underpinnings, having a broad historical and sociological approach towards the 
contingency of scientific theories, he still firmly believed in the social and theoretic 
role of science, and aimed towards the unification and integration of the human and 
natural sciences accordingly. In the book, they emphasized distinctive features of 
Neurath’s project of unity, method and language and grounded them on a corre-
sponding emphasis on his political context and the inseparable commitments to 
social goals and the social sciences. In their narrative, this is a quite important and 
novel account, especially after the science wars and the age of post-modernism of 
the 1980s and 1990s.
The other book, Encyclopedia and Utopia: The Life and Work of Otto Neurath 
(1882–1945) was a collection of essays, edited by Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich 
Stadler (1996) as the 4th volume of the Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook series. It 
featured 22 essays from Neurath’s short biography, through his philosophical ideas 
to pictorial education and economy. Approaching Neurath’s work, which is “linked 
with each other on several levels” (p. xi.), the collection might be read as providing 
a more general context and application of the Cartwright-Cat-Fleck-Uebel volume.
During the same period, when Neurath’s philosophical papers were published in 
English, a new tendency appeared in philosophy of science, or at least got a bigger 
and more seductive voice: numerous scholars argued for the metaphysical and/or 
methodological disunity of science; this tendency culminated in John Dupré’s “The 
Disunity of Science” (1993) and Peter Galison’s and David Stumpf’s The Disunity 
of Science: Boundaries, Context, and Power (1996). Against this background, oth-
ers began investigating what Neurath had meant by such expressions as “unity of 
science” and “unified science.” As it turned out quickly and became evident in the 
1996 volumes, it both had a philosophical dimension (but since Neurath would have 
not used the word “philosophy,” it might be more apt to say that “scientific” or 
“technical” aspect) and a social dimension. The Unity of Science Movement – led 
by Neurath personally on the continent and through Rudolf Carnap, Charles Morris, 
and Philipp Frank in the United States – promised a pluralist and permissive alterna-
tive to the absolutism and reductionism of other unified and disunified 
conceptions.11
11 From the early 1990s on, it was George Reisch who published several articles about the Unity of 
Science Movement, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, and Neurath’s own “plan-
ning-account” of unified science. See especially Reisch (1994). Recently John Symons, Olga 
Pombo, and Juan Manuel Torres (2011) edited a volume on Neurath and the unity of science, 
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English bibliography of Neurath’s work at the end of his 1983 selected writings 
promised a volume of Neurath’s translated economical works, but it did not appear 
until 2004 under Thomas Uebel’s and Robert S. Cohen’s (2004) editorship (Otto 
Neurath: Economic Writings. Selections 1904–1945). The selection featured 19 
items from the time of Neurath’s doctoral dissertation until his 1946 posthumous 
writings, relating his most important works on economy, society and social theory. 
It was supplemented in 2007 by a volume of eight essays discussing Otto Neurath’s 
Economics in Context in the Yearbook series, providing some more explanatory 
remarks on the subject.12
The editors (Elisabeth Nemeth, Stefan W. Schmitz and Thomas Uebel (2007)) 
explained the renewed interest in Neurath’s economical thoughts by the fact that 
Neurath’s role in the socialist calculation debate with Ludwig von Mises and F. A. 
Hayek might have some interesting arguments and refreshing new insights into the 
current political-economic debates. His notions of moneyless economy and 
calculation- in-kind proved to be especially important for recent debates and strug-
gles over social and economic discussions. Finally, Neurath’s ideal of life- conditions, 
the pursuit of happiness and ecological economics are also promising fields of 
research both within the context of logical empiricism and outside.13
The fifth and so far final major shift in the reception history came in the late 
2000s. It was widely known that Neurath was not a regular philosopher after the 
linguistic turn, but he was keenly interested in pictures, pictorial education and he 
established (and also directed) various museums across the globe (among others 
from Vienna and Berlin through Moscow and The Hague, to Chicago and Mexico). 
Nonetheless, for a very long time, Neurath’s ideas on how one could utilize pictures 
and museums – in order to disseminate empirical information and emancipate those 
in need of help – were considered remarkable but cognitively irrelevant anecdotes 
of his life. Among many analytic philosophers, education was perhaps just a practi-
cal task beyond first-order theoretical investigation; at least the long neglect of the 
subject indicates something like that. In these shifts in perspective, new work on 
Neurath kept tracking broader changes in academic interests.
Such a “neglect” of the pictorial had been justified neither from a bibliographical 
nor from a philosophical point of view, but it could be explained by the alternative 
priorities. The surprising aspect is that Neurath’s international projection had long 
been based on his work on visual education. In fact, in the course of his lecture tour 
of England already in November 1933 (just one year after Schlick’s London lectures 
on “Form and Content” and before Carnap’s arrival), Neurath gave various talks on 
pictorial education and on the importance of his own Viennese method at Bristol’s 
though Thomas Uebel (2013) suggested that most of the volume should be treated with a grain of 
salt. On the relations between science and politics of Neurath see Cartwright, Cat, and Chang 
(1991) and (1996).
12 Though it should be mentioned that Thomas Uebel’s more than one hundred pages long editorial 
introduction to the selection of Neurath’s economical writings is still a landmark in the field.
13 On Neurath and the theoretical and practical idea of happiness see Whyte (2007), Stuchlik (2011) 
and Sandner (2019).
J. Cat and A. T. Tuboly
9Education Department of the Bristol Co-operative Society; at Fircroft College, 
Birmingham University and presumably other places as well, including London.14 
Later in 1937, the Dundee-based The Courier and Advertiser newspaper published 
a short summary of Neurath’s method, now under the name “ISOTYPE” as “You 
Draw This New Language.” Besides having a few pictures and a regular description 
of Neurath’s approach, the article ends with the followings: “Give it to a man in a 
ship’s fo’c’sle or an Einstein in his study and in a few minutes it will teach more 
than millions of words in an ordinary encyclopedia.”15
Neurath’s first visits to England were connected to the interest in his ideal of 
pictorial education and its practical context, and not in the theoretical philosophy 
and ideal of analysis of logical empiricism. Then, in the 2000s, the academic pres-
ence and influence of mass and visual media became even more widespread, interest 
in Neurath’s visual education got more and more intense. Neurath had named his 
new method of representing mainly statistical data as Vienna Method of Pictorial 
Statistics (Wiener Methode der Bildstatistik) after its geographical origins. Later, in 
the 1930s, when the whole business became internationally famous, he renamed his 
brainchild after his later third wife’s suggestion (Marie Reidemeister/Neurath) as 
ISOTYPE, that is, International System of TYpographic Picture Education. 
Representing statistical data visually became so easy and comprehensible, that 
Neurath believed that his ISOTYPE method could be applied also in the post-war 
reconstruction era since it does not require any specific linguistic capacities so it 
could reach a wider and broader fragment of society.
Fortunately, a number of illuminating volumes and monographs have appeared 
on Neurath’s ideal of how pictures, statistical data and museums could be related 
and integrated in order to yield the most available and standardized method for the 
dissemination of knowledge to emancipate the masses for the future. The specific 
method of creating ISOTYPE charts and transforming pure statistical data into pic-
tures was called “transformation” and Robin Kinross published a book on the pro-
cess (Kinross and Neurath 2009) that contains materials also from Marie Neurath 
and thus makes it an essential first-person reconstruction of the world of 
ISOTYPE. Another such recollection is Neurath’s (2010) long waited visual autobi-
ography that was published recently under the editorship of Christopher Burke and 
Matthew Eve. Certain extracts (Neurath 1946) were published already after 
Neurath’s death: they were edited by Marie Neurath and the famous British film-
maker Paul Rotha who also collaborated with the Neuraths during World War Two.16 
An important and unique collection of essays on the history of ISOTYPE (from the 
1920s to the 1970s when Marie Neurath retired from the Isotype Institute in 
14 Neurath’s lectures were advertised every day before the lectures at the local newspapers: Western 
Daily Press and the Bristol Mirror (2, 3, 6 November 1933). Neurath’s Birmingham lecture was 
interconnected with the 1933 Workers Educational Association’s National Conference.
15 In 1933 (17 November, Daily Herald), as it was claimed in a journal article, Neurath called his 
method as “The Mickey Mouse of Social Facts.”
16 On the significance of Rotha’s films in Britain and his relation to Neurath, see recently Boon 
(2016).
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England) appeared recently by Christopher Burke, Eric Kindel, and Sue Walker 
(2013).
Finally there are two monographs that especially aimed at the reconstruction and 
discussion of Neurath’s ideas of how knowledge-dissemination, democracy, pic-
tures and education are related: Hadwig Kraeutler (2008) published a book (actually 
the only one on the subject) on Neurath’s museum work and his contemporary 
museological relevance; the other (highly pictorial) treatise was published by Nader 
Vossoughian (2008) depicting Neurath’s ideal of the global polis. Both volumes 
depicted a range of Neurath’s interests long regarded as interesting side-events in 
his life without major theoretical or practical importance, worth careful and detail 
studies. Things keep changing.
1.3  Chapters of the Volume
In his editorial introduction to Rediscovering the Forgotten Vienna Circle, Thomas 
Uebel (1991, 4) pointed out that “[t]he case of Neurath […] presents both a puzzle 
and a promise.” We think that Neurath’s “case” (that is, his role in logical empiri-
cism, in the unified science movement, in ISOTYPE, and still-neglected remarks) 
still shows promise: presumably now more than ever. In the age of heavily question-
ing not just science or scientific procedure, but even the bare fact of “facts” and 
“truth,” one might raise the question with increasing scruples: how could science 
have any social and theoretical relevance? As it was emphasized by Nancy 
Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck and Thomas Uebel (1996, 3), even if some remarks 
of Neurath are “familiar in contemporary post-modern discourse […] Neurath had 
one striking difference from most post-moderns. Although he was a pluralist regard-
ing knowledge-systems and took seriously their historical and cultural roots, he 
trusted firmly in the power of science.”
Therefore the volume serves two aims. Firstly, by pointing out new perspectives 
on Neurath’s life and work, the various chapters will demonstrate how one can think 
and act in a society as a scholar without believing in “the science” or “the system of 
science,” or in “facts” and “truth.” The argument is also historical insofar as it fea-
tures an actual, thus possible, model, embedded in evolving sets of particular cir-
cumstances. Secondly, the essays collected here also point to where the fruitful 
puzzles in the life and work of Neurath were and still are, and, in passing, what 
makes them so.
Part I of the volume includes four essays and aims at a general introduction to 
Neurath’s life and work, emphasizing those elements that shed light on Neurath’s 
oeuvre from both familiar and new perspectives. In Chap. 2, the volume opens with 
Friedrich Stadler’s introduction to Neurath’s life of intellectual, literary and other 
sorts of risks, dangers and adventures. Stadler calls attention to Neurath’s libraries 
and collections. Already in his childhood, Neurath was fascinated by his father’s 
enormous library, where he was especially drawn to visual illustrations some dating 
back to Ancient times and the French Encyclopédie, and inspiring lifelong dealings 
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with pictorial communication. Cases in point are the founding of his Social and 
Economic Museum of Vienna and the invention of the so-called Vienna Method of 
Pictorial Language, later on renamed ISOTYPE.  During the flourishing “Red 
Vienna” period he added to his father’s library numerous books in several languages 
that he used as aids in his intense new life as a social reformer, teacher and museolo-
gist, philosopher, sociologist and historian of science. With his forced migrations 
from Vienna and The Hague, this most valuable collection of books and brochures 
was partly destroyed, dispersed, and also aryanized when Austro-Fascism came into 
power in Austria and Hitler’s troops invaded into the Netherlands. Fortunately, 
Neurath himself and a few family members and collaborators survived and barely 
managed to save parts of this unique collection of books that offers a different 
glimpse into the education and intellectual background of the polymath Neurath in 
Dutch and British exile. Also while in exile he bought and published books, amass-
ing some 3000 volumes, all in the process of continuing his activities for the causes 
of Logical Empiricism, the Unity of Science and Isotype. Stadler presents three 
typical case studies from the Neurath library provided spanning his interests eco-
nomics, philosophy and literature: Neurath’s annotations in books of Friedrich A. 
von Hayek, Karl Popper, and the writer Stefan Zweig.
Don Howard considers in Chap. 3 the question of philosophy’s relevance to 
extra-academic concerns that is still much with us today. Plato told us that once the 
philosopher has seen the truth in the full light of the sun, she must return to the cave, 
there to put knowledge to work in making a better world, even though, being tem-
porarily unaccustomed to the dark, she risks ridicule from those still in thrall to 
illusion. Howard reflects upon the life and career of Neurath as a modern exempli-
fication of this ideal of philosophical engagement. In spite of, or, perhaps, because 
of having never held an academic appointment beyond his early post at the New 
Vienna Trade School, Neurath made a considerable difference to the education and 
living conditions of many. The key components of what Howard terms Neurath’s 
“philosophy of science in action” are explicated in order to understand how that 
could be. Foregrounded are Neurath’s socialism, his own version of the thesis of the 
empirical underdetermination of theory by evidence, his anti-metaphysical stance, 
and his commitment to physicalism and the unity of science. The paper concludes 
with a discussion of the contemporary relevance of Neurath’s model of engaged 
philosophy of science.
In Neurath’s work, there was always a close relationship between science and 
politics; it is worth noting, however, that he also intervened in the politics of the day. 
In Chap. 4 Günther Sandner focuses on Neurath’s time in Revolutionary Bavaria 
and Red Vienna and analyzes his articles in two newspapers in the interwar period: 
the German periodical Economy and Order of Life (a supplement of the Art 
Guardian) and the Austrian socialist daily Worker’s Newspaper. The examination 
starts when Neurath became a socialist and member of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) after the war in Germany and ends shortly before his forced migration from 
Austria in 1934. The two series of articles differed in several respects. While in 
Economy and Order of Life Neurath focused only on socialization, he addressed a 
number of different topics in the Worker’s Newspaper. The question of his role and 
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self-image was a common theme in many of these articles. Beyond that, however, 
there were intimations to closely related themes that he developed more precisely 
only later in his life: the question of experts, citizens, and democracy. All of these 
provide new perspectives on Neurath’s life and works.
Finally, the general aim in Chap. 5 of Adam Tamas Tuboly’s essay is to give a 
biographical, historical, and philosophical reconstruction of Neurath’s final years in 
England. Besides reconstructing Neurath’s arrival in England, he argues that since 
the 1930s, Neurath was eager to promote further the brand and fortunes of logical 
empiricism. His conception of the brand was based not on attention to theoretical 
commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Using a detailed case 
study of Neurath’s relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge Karl 
Mannheim, Tuboly shows that the development of their connections documents 
how Neurath gave increasing priority to practical aims. The concluding section 
points to some further considerations on Neurath’s legacy.
Part II contains essays that are bound together by the idea that Neurath’s method 
and ideal of science are unthinkable without the social context and its social goals. 
In a paper, updated and extensively revised for this volume, in Chap. 6, Elisabeth 
Nemeth shows how two domains of Neurath’s broad and multifaceted work are 
intimately related: the concepts and methods he wanted to implement in political 
economics, on the one hand, and the methods of visualization that he and his inter-
disciplinary team developed at the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, on the 
other. Some of Neurath’s suggestions in both domains, as Nemeth argues in detail, 
seem surprisingly modern even today.
Neurath made unique contributions to the fields of museology and curation, 
which culminated in the founding of Social and Economic Museum of Vienna and 
its mobile exhibitions in the 1920s. But until today, Neurath’s involvement in the 
organization of portable “field exhibitions”  that predated those at the Social and 
Economic Museum by at least half a decade remains understudied. In Chap. 7, 
Sophie Hochhäusl argues that field exhibitions, which were informed by Neurath’s 
theories on war economy, are instructive in analyzing his overall curatorial ideas. 
Staged on the outskirts of the city in collaboration with allotment garden and settle-
ment cooperatives, these exhibitions utilized plans, diagrams, and pictorial statistics 
to convey social and political statements of facts but also everyday objects. By pair-
ing abstract graphic information with everyday objects, they invited inhabitants into 
a conversation about the material world as well the future drawing on personal expe-
rience. As such, field exhibitions created a communal environment for viewing and 
debating information and championed what she calls “a collaborative practice of 
seeing.”
Angélique Groß considers Neurath’s famous ISOTYPE and practical concerns 
related to pictures in Chap. 8. In relation to education, she argues, Neurath did not 
articulate a philosophy or a theory; he just practiced education and arranged it for 
employees institutionally, personally, didactically and methodically. In a similar 
way, his methodical procedure of transformation, which is manifested in the picto-
rial presentation system of ISOTYPE, was not based on an explicit theory of depic-
tion. Instead, according to Groß, Neurath developed a concept whose realization 
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evolved through a successful practice of transmission. However, in the practice of 
educational depiction, Neurath resorted to constants  that  are describable analyti-
cally as theoretical implications. In this respect, Groß’s contribution points out the 
context of the educational and descriptive practice and its evolution out of Neurath’s 
ideals and concrete standards.
In Chap. 9, Thomas Uebel draws attention to elements of Neurath’s economic 
works that make them relevant even to contemporary discussions. Uebel confronts 
Neurath’s controversial contributions to the socialist calculation debate with the 
criticism of two well-known opponents, Ludwig von Mises and Max Weber. Uebel 
examines each side’s arguments at a certain level of abstraction so as to allow what 
are lasting points of significance in Neurath’s proposals to shine through more 
clearly. While these points are closely interwoven with Neurath’s schemes for mar-
ketless socialism, they are conceptually independent. Suitably so, they have proven 
influential in just this independent capacity.
Neurath’s early work on the classification of systems of hypotheses in optics 
provided some of the key insights of Neurath’s later philosophy of science. In Chap. 
10, Gábor Á. Zemplén investigates how Neurath developed his theory of theory- 
classification in response to inconsistencies he stumbled upon while studying the 
historical theories. Neurath’s empiricism and thoroughgoing fallibilism, according 
to Zemplén, informed his mapping of the group of theories, locating “elementary 
notions” of theories and taking into account the “blurred margins” of theories. To 
replace false dichotomies the project provided a finer-grained analysis of theories 
and could be utilized to locate unconceived alternatives. Zemplén discusses the 
close links between Neurath’s optical essays, his notion of an “auxiliary motive,” 
and his attack on pseudorationalism in the “Lost Wanderers of Descartes” paper. He 
also provides a comparison of the two essays, with an extended table of the elemen-
tary notions Neurath listed, and discusses Neurath’s two-tier methodology for his-
torical reconstruction.
In the three essays of Part III, hitherto almost unknown or unfortunately neglected 
aspects and fields of Neurath’s works are taken up from new perspectives. In Chap. 
11, Jordi Cat introduces a broader intellectual context and sketches an integrated 
account with the purpose of examining the significance of Neurath’s attention to 
logic in early works and subsequent positions. In the process he draws attention to 
the significance of work by Olga Hahn and Susan Stebbing. The specific attention 
to algebraic logic is important in integrating Neurath’s own interest in mathematics 
and combining, since Leibniz, the ideals of a universal language and of a calculus 
of reasoning. The interest in universal languages constitutes a much broader, so- 
called tradition of pasigraphy that extended beyond philosophical projects. Cat 
argues (1) that Neurath’s works can be embedded in a richer intellectual landscape 
that includes developments in logic and their local reception in Vienna, and that his 
attention to logic developed a sustained symbolic standpoint – with semiotic and 
typographic expressions; (2) that specific aspects of the work in algebraic logic 
became a standard and a resource in subsequent work often thought independent, 
while its value was steadily challenged by the separate goal of empirical theorizing 
and practical application in social domains – including in the areas of economics, 
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history and visual communication; (3) that, in particular, the presentation of systems 
of algebraic logic by Neurath’s sources such as Stanley Jevons and Schröder was 
not isolated from discussions of political economy; and finally (4) that some of 
Neurath’s positions in matters of language, unity and epistemology in the articula-
tion of logical empiricism and its debates are better understood in terms of shared 
but diversified acquaintance with pasigraphy, formal standards and logical 
projects.
Carnap is still often portrayed as a “representationalist.” While the genealogy of 
this prejudice may not actually go back to Neurath’s response to Carnap’s embrace 
of Tarskian semantics, there is a continuity of motivation and rhetoric. However, 
based on a reading of the later Neurath-Carnap correspondence reproduced in this 
volume, A. W. Carus argues in Chap. 12 that the apparent dispute between them 
over semantics really was largely terminological, with certain differences of empha-
sis amplified by personality differences and the long interruption of personal con-
tact due to the war. Carus claims that their conceptions of a language of science can 
be reconciled. Carnap was neither a representationalist nor an anti- representationalist 
nor an inferentialist (though it may appear that he can legitimately be portrayed as 
any of these), since ultimately to embrace one of these positions is to endorse an 
“order of explanation” or ontological primacy, and, argues Carus, Carnap rejected 
ontology.
In Chap. 13 Derek Anderson argues for the centrality of syntacticism to 
Neurath’s physicalism, encyclopedism, and the unity of science program. He defends 
the intelligibility of Neurath’s opposition to semantics and underlines the role syntac-
ticism plays in his anti-metaphysical empiricism. As Anderson argues, Neurath was 
correct to fear that the semantic turn would spell the end of logical empiricism. Many 
of the most influential metaphysical arguments of the twentieth century turn on prem-
ises that would be undermined by a Neurathian rejection of semantics.
The last part of essays are devoted to the context and influence of Neurath’s 
ideas, emphasizing again topics and issues that were either rarely discussed in the 
secondary literature so far or, if they are well-known, they are represented under 
new lights also with regards Neurath’s legacy.
In Chap. 14, George Reisch examines selected writings of the American science 
writer Waldemar Kaempffert, Science Editor for the New York Times, in public sup-
port of Otto Neurath, his Isotype projects, and his Unity of Science Movement. His 
attention focuses first on Kaempffert’s writings in the 1930s, when some intellectu-
als, the American public, and their elected leaders were relatively sympathetic with 
Neurath’s quest to unify the sciences in ways that would advance and direct scien-
tific research toward practical goals. Then he turns to the 1940s to examine the 
debate over the nature, scope, and limits of wartime research and Vannevar Bush’s 
call for a national institution to support research. Against Bush, James Bryant 
Conant, and others, Kaempffert argued vigorously for a foundation that would 
adopt values and methods of the Unity of Science Movement, but he lost that argu-
ment as the National Science Foundation finally took shape. To suggest that this 
public debate influenced not only the decline of Neurath’s Unity of Science 
Movement but the scholarly development of history and philosophy of science after 
the war, the paper considers early writings and events in the life of Conant’s protégé 
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Thomas Kuhn, whose Structure of Scientific Revolutions helped shape that 
development.
Neurath’s version of functionalism is one that begins with people “as we find 
them,” a proposition first set out in his 1917 essay “The Converse Taylor System.” 
Any attempt to redesign the existing furnishings of everyday life must take into 
account “functions” that go beyond the obvious purpose of objects: functions that 
are to do with sociability, happiness, familiarity, the love of “coziness,” and that 
address the diversity and contradictoriness of people. In Chap. 15, Michelle Henning 
considers how Neurath applied and made use of these ideas about design in 1940s 
Britain, during and after his internment on the Isle of Man between 1940 and 1941 
and in talks, papers and correspondence from this period. Henning does not focus 
on the Isotype Institute, which would usually be considered his principal interven-
tion in design, but on his commentary on everyday objects and practices. In particu-
lar, Henning focus on four objects (if they can be called that)  – tennis courts, 
fireplaces, chairs and shoes – and through these elaborate some of the connections 
between Neurath’s ideas about the design of everyday life, and the significance of 
everyday practices, and his logical empiricism.
In Chap. 16, Antonia Soulez considers Otto Neurath’s late discussion of the 
political and social context of Plato’s Republic, especially how Neurath conceived 
them in the 1940s. Neurath’s argumentation is contrasted with the ideas of Karl 
Popper, both with regard to the latter’s reading of Plato and to his general methodol-
ogy. The distinction between Neurath’s treatments of epistemology and politics is 
also discussed, by highlighting how these two were interwoven in the discussion, 
and how they differentiated Neurath’s articles from Popper’s considerations in the 
Open Society.
Silke Körber (Chap. 17) picks up a rarely discussed episode in Neurath’s life, 
namely his relation to L. Susan Stebbing and their joint efforts to educate the “com-
mon reader.” Stebbing supported Neurath’s pragmatic ideas on the “humanization” 
of knowledge, and both of them were looking for ways to apply modern logic and 
linguistic analysis, not only to the transfer of information in science and teaching 
but above all in publication projects for the “common reader.” In 1941, Stebbing 
became the first president of the Isotype Institute in Oxford, which Neurath directed 
until 1945. Soon after ISOTYPE was founded, long-term relations began between it 
and the book-packaging company Adprint, managed by German-speaking emigrés 
in London, as well as its successors and British clients (publishers). A technically 
and organizationally sophisticated process for the production of illustrated non- 
fiction books was gradually established. Körber argues that the “picture-text style” 
developed by Neurath and epitomized in Modern Man in the Making (1939) was 
applied to non-fiction books and series with “integrated layouts,” then professional-
ized and successively transformed into a production model for illustrated books 
which enabled scientific information to be prepared for the mass market and the 
“common reader” – in the service of a modern, democratic (post-war) society.
Logical positivists had a very lively interest in the revolutionary science of their 
time, but also in modern art and especially in ‘international style’ architecture. 
Surprisingly they never published a representative volume or longer statement on 
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art and architecture. In Chap. 18, Hans-Joachim Dahms points out that it is not well 
known that Otto Neurath, the leading organizer and spokesman of logical positivsm, 
invited the (later on) eminent art historian and critic Meyer Shapiro (professor at 
Columbia University NY) to contribute a volume on art to the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Shapiro failed to deliver the promised book. But 
from the extended correspondence and some material in the Shapiro papers, Dahms 
describes the general direction the project might have taken. The correspondence 
deserves attention also because it also covers questions of the endangered peace and 
the approaching war, the academic scene in Europe and in the USA, and surpris-
ingly: Martin Heidegger. Neurath died in 1945, but, as Dahms points out, Shapiro 
came back to the Heidegger theme in 1968 when he wrote his famous harsh criti-
cism of Heidegger’s programmatic long paper “Das Kunstwerk” (the work of art) 
where he interprets one of Van Gogh’s shoe-paintings.
The volume ends with two appendices. Appendix 1 contains the English transla-
tion of Neurath’s logic papers: there are three papers with Neurath as the sole author, 
one co-authored with his wife-to-be Olga Hahn – the sister of his logical empiricists 
colleague and mathematician Hans Hahn –, and one whose sole author was Olga 
Hahn. The translations are completed with Jordi Cat’s editorial comments that aim 
to clarify and contextualize these important papers, which appear here in English 
for the very first time.
Appendix 2 contains the 1940–1945 Neurath-Carnap English correspondence. 
Though there are many (side) issues recurring throughout the letters, seven themes 
stand out as the core issues of Neurath and Carnap’s late correspondence.17 These 
are, in (sometimes overlapping) temporal order, the following: (a) emigration (b) 
the relation between Platonism in the history of philosophy and the oppressive 
German climate that lead to Nazism, (c) semantics, (d) Popper’s philosophy, (e) 
Russell’s philosophy, (f) Neurath’s Encyclopedia monograph,  and (g) Neurath’s 
own place in the movement.
After Neurath fled The Hague towards England in May 1940 he was interned on 
the Isle of Man as a so-called enemy alien. This “prison-experience” became fixed 
in Neurath’s experience of emigration more broadly, shaping the way he, for 
instance, evaluated comparatively British and Continental standards and experi-
ences of social life. Some of these events are reconstructed and discussed by Michele 
Henning (Chap. 15.) and Adam Tamas Tuboly (Chap. 5.). Also the fact that the let-
ters that make up the  correspondence were written in English constitutes a tell-
ing expression of Neurath and Carnap’s new life in exile. 
One of the last major preoccupations Neurath addressed in print and in private 
was the relation of Platonism and Kantianism to the so-called German climate, 
stemming from his reading and personal experiences before and during World War 
Two. Even though he published some papers under a pseudonym and under his own 
name with J. A. Lauwerys, his correspondence constitutes an even more valuable 
source of insight: it functioned as a reading diary as well, and Neurath commented 
17 The 1923–1940 Neurath-Carnap correspondence is being now transcribed and edited for publi-
cation by Johannes Friedl, Ulf Höfer, Christian Damböck, and Adam Tamas Tuboly.
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on many important events of his life. He described at various places in his letters 
how the irrational inclination towards the idealism and perfectionism extolled by 
Platonism and the relentless pressure from duties and imperatives of the Kantian 
doctrines contributed to a very special cultural climate that played an important role 
nourishing the broad adoption of oppressive ideologies in the 1930s. These ques-
tions are discussed in Antonia Soulez’s paper (Chap. 16.).
The absolutist elements in the history of philosophy are highlighted not just in 
the classical works of the field, but in Neurath’s contemporaries as well. He is 
unsparing towards Carnap’s new field of semantic investigations: while he addressed 
more technical epistemological and logical arguments against semantics from a 
pragmatist ground, Neurath’s main concern was more political. He was afraid that 
talking about “the truth” and “the meaning” of statements might easily lead to abso-
lutist conceptions in philosophy, and these conceptions could become new tenden-
cies that might be used (at the end of the slippery slope) for intolerant social and 
political views. Neurath’s arguments against semantics are discussed by André 
Carus (Chap. 12.) and Derek Anderson (Chap. 13.), while Jordi Cat (Chap. 11.) also 
considers the background of Neurath’s logical works that led finally to his mature 
views on formalism, truth, systematization, and semantics.18
Besides Carnap, Karl Popper and Bertrand Russell weren’t treated with any 
patience or sympathy either. Popper was the methodological boogeyman for Neurath 
since the early 1930s when the former came up with the idea of the Logik der 
Forschung book and Neurath reviewed it critically. He detected many pseudo- 
scientific and absolutist elements in Popper’s ideal of falsification, deductive- 
schemes and ambition towards systematization and lawfulness.19 On the other hand, 
though Russell was considered to be the grandfather of logical empiricism, in the 
1940s, he was viewed with much more skepticism: as he embraced the notions of 
“truth,” “meaning,” “semantics,” and “facts,” Neurath distanced himself even more 
from him. Though in his published articles we find only a few remarks and hints 
(Neurath 1941/1983), his correspondence with Carnap was centered often on the 
discussion of Russell’s new An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth. The movement was 
facing a crisis that pitted disagreement and change against the desire for a stable, 
visible and inspiring identity, or brand.
The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science was a grandiose enterprise 
that started in 1938 under the general editorship of Neurath, and as inevitably hap-
pens, its scope, standards and reception kept changing over time. Neurath’s own 
1944 monograph was perceived to be knotty by many: Carnap withdrew his name 
from the cover, indicating that he has nothing to do with this special volume. While 
the reason was that Carnap saw the page-proofs at too late a point and had too many 
objections to the contents, Neurath feared that darker motives hid behind Carnap’s 
attack and the ensuing (yet another) confrontation would not help either Neurath’s 
18 The political dimension of Neurath’s debate with respect to semantical analysis is taken up by 
George Reisch (2005, Chap. 15.) in his earlier book.
19 Neurath’s relation to Popper is discussed in details by Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996, Part 
3) and Cat (1995).
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leadership, friendship or the intellectual movement. The correspondence documents 
many such latter-day tensions between Carnap and Neurath. Their debates were not 
just personal, that is, not just a difference in attitudes is manifest in these letters: 
there were much more at stake, namely different conceptions of philosophy in gen-
eral, not unrelated to the difference in attitudes and politics, and the very future and 
fate of logical empiricism.
With regard to the nature and dissemination of the movement, Neurath also tried 
to clarify his own leadership role. The orthodox picture of Neurath presents him as 
a “dynamo”: who utilized half-baked arguments and showed much more agility in 
organizing, and thus become the “big locomotive” of logical empiricism, as once 
Carnap called him. The Neurath-Carnap correspondence, however, points to differ-
ent motives: Neurath considered himself as a theoretician as well, having in store 
important ideas on science and its methodology. In recent scholarship thus Neurath 
emerged as an original thinker, often ahead of his time: our difficulties in under-
standing him stems from the fact that much of Neurath’s writings were polemical, 
and thus needs much contextualization. These questions are taken up by Don 
Howard (Chap. 3.), Günther Sandner (Chap. 4.) and Adam Tamas Tuboly (Chap. 
5.), who argue for a middle-way picture that finds places the sought-after theoretical 
significance in Neurath’s practical efforts.
Otto Neurath is one of those few figures from the twentieth century who achieved 
various theoretical results and defended important intellectual and social positions 
that have been later taken up by others in numerous fields. Starting with history, 
economics, sociology, education, theory of pictures, housing and museums, along 
with logic, semantics, and general classifications of theories, Neurath could be seen 
as a special non-philosophical scholar. However, as the following chapters will 
make clear, there was always something deeply philosophical in how Neurath tried 
to extend his points of views outside the classical territory of philosophy. Still, even 
when assessing just Neurath’s intellectual significance, the philosophical investiga-
tion shouldn’t become the sole task and measure.
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Chapter 2
A Viennese Library in Exile: Otto Neurath 
and the Heritage of Central European 
Culture in the Anglo-Saxon World
Friedrich Stadler
Abstract Otto Neurath experienced an adventurous as well as dangerous life. 
Already in his childhood, he was fascinated by his father’s huge library. He was 
especially impressed by images and illustrations since Ancient times and the French 
Encyclopédie, which inspired his lifelong dealing with picture language. This 
became manifest with the founding of his “Social and Economic Museum of 
Vienna” and the invention of his “Vienna Method of Pictorial Language,” later on 
renamed ISOTYPE. In the flourishing period of “Red Vienna” he acquired a lot of 
books in several languages covering his research fields and practical activities as a 
social reformer, teacher and museologist, philosopher, sociologist and historian of 
science. With his forced migrations from Vienna and The Hague, this most valuable 
collection of books and brochures was partly destroyed, dispersed, and aryanized, 
when Austro-Fascism came into power in Austria and Hitler’s troops invaded into 
the Netherlands. Luckily, Otto Neurath and some members of his family and col-
laborators could survive and save parts of this unique collection of books which 
mirrors the education and intellectual background of the polymath Neurath in Dutch 
and British exile. Here, he again bought and published books continuing his activi-
ties for the Vienna Circle of Logical Empiricism as well as the Unity of Science and 
the Isotype movements covering some 3000 books in 1945. Three typical case stud-
ies from the Neurath library are provided covering economics, philosophy, and lit-
erature: Neurath’s annotations in books of Friedrich A. von Hayek, Karl Popper, and 
the writer Stefan Zweig.
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2.1  A Brief Overview of Neurath’s Life1
Who was Otto Neurath? William Johnston (1972, 192) had introduced him already 
in 1972 as “one of the neglected geniuses of the twentieth century.” Without doubt, 
he was a most productive and innovative intellectual with a wide range of interests 
and gifts, which he inherited from his social-liberal assimilated Jewish family in the 
Habsburg monarchy. Emancipation and Enlightenment were the pillars of this sig-
nificant education till the expulsion and destruction of Jewish life after the 
“Anschluss.” This was accompanied by an increasing “Cultural Exodus” with the 
culmination after 1938 between forced migration and the Shoah.
Otto was the first of two sons of Gertrud Kaempffert (1847–1914), a Protestant 
woman, and the Viennese social reformer and political economist Wilhelm Neurath, 
(1840–1901), who exerted an enduring influence on the young student in Vienna 
and Berlin. Wilhelm Neurath, together with his friends the social reformer Josef 
Popper-Lynkeus and the philosopher-scientist Ernst Mach, served as role model for 
Otto’s lifework.2 They all represented Viennese progressive liberalism and social-
ism with philosophy and science as an anti-metaphysical “scientific world- 
conception.” Especially, his father’s library with some 13.000 volumes turned out to 
become an intellectual cosmos for his son Otto, to be dealt with later on.
Otto Neurath attended the school in Vienna, studied mathematics, political econ-
omy, and history at the universities in Vienna and Berlin (at the recommendation of 
economist Ferdinand Tönnies). He completed his Ph.D. summa cum laude with the 
dissertation Zur Anschauung der Antike über Handel, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft 
(On Commerce, Trade, and Agriculture in Ancient Times) in 1906 under Eduard 
Meyer, which was published subsequently. In parallel, he submitted a second study 
as dissertation entitled Antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Economic History of Antiquity), 
which appeared in 1909. Already in his student years, Neurath became a member of 
the renowned “Goethe Society” for his edition and introduction of Faust by 
F. Marlow (= Ludwig Hermann Wolfram). In 1906 he completed his military ser-
vice and from 1907 to 1914 he taught political economy in the tradition of his father 
at the Neue Wiener Handelsakademie (New Vienna Trade School).
In 1907 Neurath married the social scientist, author and feminist Anna Schapire 
(1877–1911), who died from complications caused by the birth of their son Paul in 
1911. Paul Neurath became a successful sociologist (demography) after he escaped 
the concentration camps and could emigrate to the US, where he was advised by 
Paul Lazarsfeld (the founder of empirical social research) at Columbia University in 
N.Y.C. Only recently, we enjoy a double biography on Anna Schapire and her sister, 
the art historian Rosa Schapire (1874–1954), who escaped to the UK in 1939 (see 
Dogromaci and Sandner 2017).
1 This article is based on  two lectures which I  delivered at the  Bard Graduate Center, N.Y.C.: 
Library Lecture April 10 and  Brown Bag Lunch, April 11, 2018. I  am  grateful to  Dean Peter 
N. Miller for this invitation and the related discussion. Special thanks go to Adam Tuboly for his 
redaction and copy editing.
2 On Wilhelm and Otto Neurath, see Uebel (1995).
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In 1912 Otto Neurath married the blind mathematician Olga Hahn (1882–1937), 
the sister of the famous mathematician Hans Hahn, who became an important mem-
ber of the later Vienna Circle. They jointly published mathematical and logical 
articles before World War One.3 This period also encompassed the early philosophi-
cal and scientific activities in the so-called “First Vienna Circle” of Logical 
Empiricists with Hahn and the physicist and Einstein biographer Philipp Frank, 
with both of whom he kept private and scholarly contacts until the inter-war years.
Prior to 1914 Otto Neurath also published sociological studies, inter alia, on the 
so-called “theory of war economy” and on the economic situation in the Balkans, to 
which he took a number of study trips with the support of a grant awarded by the 
Carnegie Foundation for International Peace. Following the outbreak of World War 
One, Neurath served on the east front and was afterward appointed director Museum 
on War Economy in Leipzig, at the same time working in the war economy section 
of the war ministry in Vienna. In this period he developed his theory and practice of 
graphic representation of socio-economic relations and his models on economies in 
kind or in natura calculation (Naturalwirtschaft). He also completed his Habilitation 
and became private lecturer (Privatdozent) in political economy at the University of 
Heidelberg in 1917 – a position which, due to his war service and later his involve-
ment in the Munich socialist republic (Räterepublik) he was never to actively 
exercise.
In the revolutionary phase of the post-war period, Neurath became president of 
the Central Economic Planning Office in Bavaria, where as a “social engineer” he 
had unsuccessfully tried to carry out his vision of full socialization on the basis of 
his planned economy in 1919. After the movement was defeated by the Right mili-
tary troops, Neurath was sentenced to one and a half years imprisonment for “aiding 
high treason.” After 6 weeks of detention, he was able to travel to Austria on Otto 
Bauer’s intervention (who was then Secretary of State), but he was no longer per-
mitted to enter Germany (until 1926) and thus also lost his lectureship in Heidelberg.
After his return to Vienna, Neurath devoted his efforts to the housing and settle-
ment movement in Viennese communal politics, taking over the job of a secretary 
general of the organization for settlement movement. In 1923 he founded the 
“Museum for Settlement and City Planning,” which was the basis for the “Social 
and Economic Museum of Vienna” (Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in 
Wien, or GWM, 1925–1934), of which he was the founder and director till its dis-
solution in the Civil War of 1934.4 This new kind of institution, which was to be an 
“educational museum of the present day” for the knowledge and understanding of 
socio-economic correlations, ran regular exhibitions in the new city hall, as well as 
in the first and twelfth districts of Vienna. Up to 1933 thirty-six national and inter-
national exhibitions were organized there or supplied with material. The topics pre-
sented there convey an impressive picture of systematic encyclopaedism, the work 
3 For a discussion of the logic-papers, see Jordi Cat’s chapter in the present volume; for a transla-
tion of these papers, see Appendix 1. in the present volume as well.
4 On Neurath’s involvement in the Settlement and Housing Movement, see Sophie Hochhäusl’s 
chapter in the present volume.
2 A Viennese Library in Exile: Otto Neurath and the Heritage of Central European…
26
towards popular education that had been carried out in the spirit of social reform: 
health, women and children, social politics, housing and urban planning, peace edu-
cation, schooling, the workers’ movement, art, social security, architecture, etc. 
Along with this, there were independent touring exhibitions at home and abroad, as 
well as separate publications and articles in various periodicals and books.
In 1927, Philipp Frank’s brother, Josef Frank was acquired for the museum as an 
architect, and a year later Neurath employed the artist and designer Gerd Arntz, who 
drew the characteristic symbols and systematized the production techniques. The 
scientific department under Aloys Fischer, the “transformation” department under 
Marie Reidemeister (later Marie Neurath) and the technical collaborators completed 
the team.5 For several years the innovative Social and Economic Museum [SEM] 
cultivated a working partnership with Otto Glöckel’s social-democrat school- 
reform. This enabled the SEM to contribute to the cultural life of Vienna by making 
an impact on visual education. While the Vienna Method of Pictorial Statistics was 
relatively well known in its theoretical and practical application in school contexts, 
a parallel initiative in adult education received less attention: from 1931 to 1933 the 
SEM in Vienna regularly published the Fernunterricht (correspondence course/dis-
tant learning) as distance education booklets (retitled Bildstatistik from 1932) as 
subscription magazines, each dedicated to an individual topic. From today’s per-
spective, one can treat these brochures with their changing topics as elements in the 
field of social history. As it emerges from the preface, there was particular emphasis 
on user-friendly orientation and the invitation to provide feedback, which helps in 
creating an interest-oriented mode of communication that puts the participants on 
an equal footing. In these brochures, Neurath provides an account of the intercon-
nectedness between science and popular education, which, according to his think-
ing, could be brought about through the empirical view of science.
Additionally, in Holland in 1931 the “Mundaneum” was founded with the aim of 
intensifying international collaboration. Branches were set up in Berlin, Amsterdam, 
Prague, New York, London, and Moscow. Following this phase of productive work 
at home and abroad came the end of the SEM  after the political events of 12th 
February 1934. Several functionaries were arrested, and valuable fittings were con-
fiscated. The renamed “Austrian Institute for Pictorial Statistics” came under the 
control of the Austro-fascist corporative state until the National Socialists seized 
this institution for their own propaganda purposes. Despite these confiscations, 
Neurath was able to transfer a large number of valuable holdings to Holland.
The fundamental objective of the “Vienna method of pictorial statistics” was to 
represent socio-economic facts and correlations, particularly with regard to their 
historical development, in a simple, easily graspable system of symbolic figures. A 
range of real things and complex facts was to be represented by means of a fixed 
range of signs and symbols, in which the same sign would always be used for the 
same object. This method of visualization, therefore, arose from the coinciding of 
content and size as well as from a mapping of sets, such that a larger set of objects 
5 On the process of transformation, see Neurath and Kinross (2009) and Angélique Groß’s chapter 
in the present volume.
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was represented by a larger set of signs without perspective. In this way  – said 
Neurath  – the facts about society could be reflected quantitatively. The method, 
developed and improved following his emigration to Holland, was, with the change 
in circumstances, renamed the “International System of Typographic Picture 
Education,” with the acronym “Isotype” (which was also the Greek for “always the 
same sign”).6
The programmatic titles of Neurath’s specific writings alone convey a sense of 
the intentions and socio-political orientation of this conception, which became an 
international one from 1930. The pictorial representation of social facts with the 
help of “statistical hieroglyphics” would concisely and informatively explain soci-
ety in all its aspects with a view to improving “living conditions.” The scope of 
topics, therefore, extends from home, the reality of the world of work, housing and 
urban planning, to economic considerations on social welfare. From a modern-day 
perspective the monographs Bildstatistik nach Wiener Methode in der Schule 
(1933), International Picture Language (1936), and finally his most mature work 
Modern Man in the Making (1939) are of special interest. In these numerous publi-
cations, pictograms are used to treat the theory and application of picture language 
along with written language. In addition, with his essay “Museums of the Future” 
(1933/1973) Neurath laid out a program for a modern sociological and economic 
museum that remains impressive to this day, and which can be interpreted as an 
alternative to postmodern museums, the collections of devotional objects, and the 
contrived “total works of art” (Gesamtkunstwerke). As Neurath wrote in a paper 
originally written for the American Survey Graphic magazine:
From Comenius’ Orbis Pictus an uninterrupted movement leads to modern visual educa-
tion. A picture made according to the Vienna method shows at the first glance the most 
important aspect of the subject; obvious differences must be at once distinguishable. At the 
second glance, it should be possible to see the more important details; and at the third 
glance, whatever details there may be. A picture that has still further information to give at 
the fourth and fifth glance is, from the point of view of the Vienna school, to be rejected as 
pedagogically unsuitable.
Thus a new clarity and purposefulness is developing in communication that may be 
regarded as preparation for more incisive social planning. Teachers and other groups of 
people concerned in social education, directors of museums, and editors of periodicals are 
confronted with the responsibility of placing their energies at the service of this common 
international task. (Neurath 1933/1973, 223.)
Still in Vienna, Neurath attempted, in view of the emerging fascism and NS, to pro-
mote the internationalization of pictorial statistics by founding branches and institu-
tions abroad.7 After he had to emigrate in the wake of the events on February 12, 
1934 to the Netherlands, the “Foundation for Visual Education” in The Hague was 
to become the platform for the further activities of the encyclopedia movement and 
pictorial education. There, under the most difficult conditions, he continued his 
6 On pictorial education, the Viennese Method and on ISOTYPE see Angélique Groß’s, Elisabeth 
Nemeth’s, and Silke Körber’s chapters in the present volume.
7 In parallel, he entertained contacts with the German Bauhaus in Dessau and the CIAM movement 
of architects between the wars; see Dahms (2004).
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work on the project known as Isotype. His second wife Olga Hahn died in 1937 in 
Holland from complications after a kidney operation (Sandner forthcoming).
At the beginning of the 1920s, still during his Vienna years, Neurath resumed his 
philosophical work from before World War One and was actively involved in the 
Vienna Circle around Moritz Schlick and further circles in Neurath’s private apart-
ment together with Olga and in his museum. Important signs of these activities was 
the publication of the manifesto Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener 
Kreis (Scientific World-Conception: The Vienna Circle) in 1929, which he wrote 
together with Hans Hahn and Rudolf Carnap (1929/1973).8 In addition, he founded 
the “Verein Ernst Mach” (1928–1934), the society for the popularization of scien-
tific world-conception in the context of Vienna’s reform movements. Neurath was 
also active as a teacher at Vienna’s Workers’ University, in the labor union move-
ment, and at diverse adult education institutes. In philosophy of science, he was the 
main representative of the so-called “left wing” of the Vienna Circle (Uebel 2007), 
and he served as a leading figure for public relations and – increasingly after 1934 – 
for the internationalization of Logical Empiricism (1935–1941: e.g., with six 
International Congresses for the Unity of Science in Paris, Copenhagen, Cambridge, 
Harvard, and Chicago). In addition, in his Dutch exile, the untiring man founded the 
Institute for the Unity of Science in The Hague in 1937.
In 1940, when German troops invaded the Netherlands, Neurath and his long- 
term collaborator and partner Marie Reidemeister, had to flee again in a boat dra-
matically to England, where they were interned on the Isle of Man as “enemy alien.” 
After his release, he subsequently established another Isotype Institute together 
with Marie, whom he married in 1941.9 From 1941 to 1945 he served as a lecturer 
at the University of Oxford at the same time – a position, which he could have never 
achieved in Europe. And Neurath returned also back to his Viennese roots when act-
ing as a consultant of the city of Bilston with a bottom-up town renewal project 
(Nikolow 2004). Till the unexpected end of his life in England (he never thought of 
returning to Austria again) he wrote books and articles on Logical Empiricism and 
inspired by the six congresses he edited (together with Rudolf Carnap and Charles 
Morris) the book series International Encyclopedia of Unified Science from 1938 
on. His last monograph within this series was the contested book Foundations of the 
Social Sciences, which, by the way, led to the dramatic break with his good old 
friend Rudolf Carnap.10
In the age of 63 years, Otto Neurath died of heart failure on December 22, 1945, 
at his desk in Oxford, when he looked for a passage in Goethe’s “Iphigenie in 
Tauris,” a symbolic return to his literary interests some 45 years after his edition of 
Marlow’s “Faust.”
8 The manifesto was reprinted recently with its various translations and commentaries in Stadler 
and Uebel (2012).
9 On Neurath’s way to and work in England, see Adam Tamas Tuboly’s, Silke Körber’s, and 
Michelle Henning’s chapters in the present volume.
10 On Neurath’s break up with Carnap and the reasons involved, see André Carus’s chapter in the 
present volume.
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2.2  A Brief Overview of Neurath’s Work
The research on one of the most brilliant all-round intellectuals of Viennese moder-
nity amounts to a substantial sum total, which can hardly be given in a brief account. 
Neurath’s life and work between “encyclopaedia and utopia” points to the continu-
ities and breaks in social development since the turn of the century (during the 
struggle between revolution and reform) and the project of creating a scientific pic-
ture of the world in the spirit of the Enlightenment and in context of modern “civil 
society.” In dealing with this exemplary life-story of Austrian intellectual migration, 
there emerge here relevant and essential elements of his future work in education 
and understanding of science, which can be outlined only by a few key words: a 
non-hierarchical picture of science (for instance with the ship metaphor popularized 
by Quine, see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996) together with a relativistic 
and non-reductionist epistemology, an empiricism (naturalism) that regarded the 
difference between everyday and scientific knowledge as one of degree, an over-
arching perspective on knowledge in words and pictures, and, especially, research 
and education as the subject and object of a cooperative scientific praxis with a 
constant demand for societal change. Accordingly, this unfulfilled and fragmentary 
ambitious project of modernity is thematized, in all its facets, in the present day: in 
the philosophy of science and science studies, in the ecological perspective in politi-
cal economy, in architecture and the social housing movement, in modern commer-
cial art and typography, and finally in the present-day vision of museums as social 
“museums of the future.”
It is no accident that the most recent literature on Neurath’s life and work is 
international and inter-disciplinary and, similarly, lies at the points of tension 
between modern and postmodern narratives. These disparate perspectives, which 
demonstrate the absurdity of the long-prevailing quarrel about “positivism,” are 
gradually providing the building blocks for the conception of his life and research. 
It can be understood as a dynamic undertaking in his contemporary environment 
such that the “producers” of science were themselves made part of the epistemo-
logical process (the “Republic of Letters”). This was accompanied by abandoning 
an absolute meta-perspective. From this vantage point alone it is easy to imagine 
how this conception would have interfered in past debates on the “science wars” of 
the 1990s. Neurath’s approach means renouncing every secure system of science 
and knowledge, connected with thinking in alternative utopias of science/society, 
which certainly corresponds with a conception of possibility (Möglichkeitssinn) 
according to Robert Musil’s novel The Man without Qualities. This is the back-
ground to Neurath’s postulating a plan for the establishment of freedom, happiness, 
and prosperity – written against Spengler’s cultural pessimism. It seems that this 
also today in an age of globalization and planning corporations again, remains a 
highly topical demand, appealing both as an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism, 
and to a challenged New Economy following Hayek and the Chicago School.
For Neurath knowledge was always a collective enterprise embedded in a social 
context. Throughout his life, he never abandoned his enlightened view of a social 
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and cognitive totality.11 For him, the discovery and explication of seemingly dispa-
rate connections between phenomena, both in terms of text and image and the argu-
mentation based thereon was an essential precondition for all intellectual work. To 
view science as an end in itself was totally alien to him. He believed that knowl-
edge – even as part of a hardly predictable historic process – should serve life in all 
the areas between the poles of everyday life and specialist research activity. This 
concept of reflective science will be surprising only to those who have been influ-
enced by the ideologized so-called positivism debate of the 1960s. Both these dis-
tortions generalized single elements of Logical Empiricism and used them to form 
a hostile portrait by a dialectic magic. On the other hand, traditional academic meta-
physics, obsessed with the subtleties of meaning and oblivious to the consequences 
of material beings feels equally challenged by the radical and down-to-earth “scien-
tific world conception” of the neo-Enlightenment, which Neurath promoted so 
strongly.
It is not easy to approach the complex and highly diverse life work of Otto 
Neurath without getting lost in details, on the one hand, or without resorting to 
inadequate generalizing descriptions such as “positivist,” “physicalist,” “Austro- 
Marxist,” etc., on the other. How can one obtain an overview of a man, both of the-
ory and practice, who covered the entire spectrum of knowledge in about 300 
publications (including around 30 monographs and books), and who worked in 
many countries (mainly in Austria, Germany, The Netherlands, England) as a phi-
losopher, social scientist and teacher, a man who pursued a demanding profession 
(as museum director), yet also figured centrally in the Vienna Circle?
It seems that the answer to this question lies in Neurath’s principle of thinking 
and acting: to proceed from incomplete and unstable elements and its related prac-
tice, and to employ, under the constraints of uncertainty and mere probability, the 
criteria of empiricism without ever losing sight of the fragmentary starting point or 
the contemplation of a historical process. This approach in itself constitutes a criti-
cism of the idea of a fundamental and hierarchical system and at the same time an 
appeal to think in ways differing from those which prevail in society and the sci-
ences, an appeal to risk a concrete utopia and to contribute to the promotion of the 
common good by means of cooperative planning for freedom and happiness.
After World War One, Neurath envisaged an international “republic of scholars,” 
much in the tradition of the French Encyclopedists (Dahms 1996). Yet despite his 
optimism, he realized that the growth of Fascism and National Socialism threatened 
to end all these young democracies and he was not naïve enough to believe that the 
proper proportion of rationalism and empiricism alone reverse the “demise of rea-
son.” In his back then unpublished response to Max Horkheimer’s “The Latest 
Attack on Metaphysics” (1937/1972) Neurath, (anticipating the main arguments 
against the dialectic of Enlightenment), referred to the limitations of social criticism 
which result from the fragility of knowledge including sociology and its history:
11 On this idea in Neurath’s work, see Don Howards’s chapter in the present volume.
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That which has gone completely unnoticed at one time becomes conspicuous in another, 
what has been noticed but judged as unimportant, may become the center of important 
considerations in another time. […] One has to take into account here that “constructions” 
and “raw materials” are difficult to separate. Some of our observation sentences and percep-
tions [Anschauungen] turn out to be very stable, but – principally speaking – nothing is 
certain, everything flows. (Neurath 2011, 16.)
Moreover, claimed Neurath (2011, 21), that “we do not recognize a tribunal beyond 
science, with [sic] sits in judgment of science and investigates its foundations.” This 
means, there also is not available some form of transcendental reason. A central 
affinity to the standpoint of Wittgenstein’s middle and late periods is apparent: phi-
losophy is viewed as a language game, a game from which we cannot escape but 
about which we can certainly speak intelligently.
From the start, Neurath himself had underlined the unity of his thoughts and of 
actions. The methodological holism in philosophy of science (Duhem-Neurath- 
Quine principle) and naturalism extends to the “orchestration of the science by the 
encyclopedism of Logical Empiricism” (Neurath 1946b/1983). His interest in visual 
education and the Viennese method of picture statistics led up to Isotype. Loose but 
deliberate analogies can be found in Neurath’s original writings, as can attempts to 
apply his theoretical concepts to education, social reform and the politics of knowl-
edge. The following areas must be seen from this point of view: economy in kind, 
war economics, planning theory as well as his involvement in the Bavarian 
Revolution, the Viennese housing movement and town planning projects in England, 
not to mention his visual education projects and the founding of the “Social and 
Economic Museum of Vienna” as well as of the “International Foundation for Visual 
Education” in Holland (The Hague).
Thus, Neurath also emphasized several times, with a reference to Leibniz and 
Comenius, that the future encyclopedia did not aim merely at a standardization of 
the language of science but also at a standardization of the visual representation (he 
projected 260 volumes of text and a 10 volume “Visual Thesaurus”). This combina-
tion of text and pictures had already been realized in part in his publications 
Fernunterricht (1931–1933) and his successful book Modern Man in the Making 
(1939). Towards the end of his life, Neurath referred to the empiricist “mosaic of the 
sciences.” In the spirit of this formulation, we can arrive at an understanding of his 
work by means of a kind of collage, employing the regulative idea of the unity of 
science and society. Neurath’s encyclopedism also contains (long before C.  P. 
Snow’s well-known critique) an implied criticism of separated scientific cultures.
The biography of Otto Neurath is marked by the historical caesuras of 1918/1919, 
1934 and 1938/1940, which brought major interruptions to his work. The fact that 
he nevertheless carried on between destruction and reconstruction under the most 
trying circumstances can offer encouragement and indicate that, even in a hostile 
environment the humanization of knowledge can make a modest contribution to the 
democratization of society.
First, there is Neurath’s vision of a joint enterprise of science, which, poetically 
formulated as boat metaphor, reappears in different variations throughout his work: 
“We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are never 
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able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at 
once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by 
using the old beams and driftwood the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by 
gradual reconstruction” (Neurath 1921/1973, 199).
Then there is the ethos with which Neurath pursued this reconstruction. In the 
middle of the revolutionary post-war phase, Neurath (1919/1981, 137f) delivered an 
analysis of the Zeitgeist in his short article on “Utopien” which, particularly in our 
present times of change, gives us reason to reflect on utopias. And finally, there is 
the consistency and continuity of his thought. In his intellectual testament, Neurath 
states:
I always promoted monism as a means of empiricist communication and I promoted plural-
ism as an attitude in making hypotheses. I have contended with thinkers of all kinds who 
tried to declare one system as marked out before others and therefore I tried to convey the 
insight that we need a kind of “decision” wherever we have to make a “choice”, even when 
we are trying a scientific theory […]. One may evolve more than one theory of light starting 
from the same basis, as one may plan more than one holiday tour from the same starting 
point. (Neurath 1946a, 526–527.)
2.3  Otto Neurath: Visual Autobiography and His Library
Neurath’s posthumously published visual autobiography was written in the last 
2  years of his life in Oxford in parallel to his manuscript “Visual Education: 
Humanization versus Popularization” (1996). It was conceived of as a sort of picto-
rial atlas following his previous brochure International Picture Language (1936). 
The manuscript was extended and further developed as a special form of autobiog-
raphy, which is nicely commented on by Neurath himself reproduced in the volume 
of 2010: “The visual material presented in this book is to support the case for con-
sistent visual information by means of language-like technique. Since matters such 
as these involve the whole way of life in one way or another, it is hardly possible to 
conduct experiments” (reproduced by Burke 2010, xxii). And in the synopsis for the 
projected publisher Adprint, Neurath writes on the purpose: “The book will show 
different sources from which Isotype has evolved. It does not deal with visual edu-
cation as a whole. Even persons not interested in the question as such should be 
attracted by the combination of pictures and their explanations” (quoted from Burke 
2010, xxvi).
The reason why he wrote a visual autobiography reads nicely with a high topical-
ity: “Today an ever-changing visual stream flows before our eyes. […] How rightly 
can our period called the century of the eye” (Neurath 2010, 3). In order to evaluate 
Neurath’s writings on visual education and communication, we have to add, that at 
the same time he published the monograph Foundations of the Social Sciences 
(1944a) and worked on a manuscript entitled “Tolerance and Persecution.”
Let me now draw attention only to some passages of his visual autobiography, in 
which he refers to his father’s library – as a typical feature of Neurath’s oeuvre:
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I was brought up in a scholarly home in Vienna. Even as a child I was already looking at 
shelves and cupboards full of books, and the impression they made has accompanied me 
throughout my life. In the entrance hall of our apartment stood extraordinarily large glass 
cases crammed with books and pamphlets; bookshelves up to the ceiling covered all the 
walls of our drawing room, even the space between the windows. […]
I think I very soon started to count the number of books in the library. I believe I made 
at this time my first mathematical estimates […] I counted the number of shelves and the 
average number of books in each shelf – mostly arranged two rows deep. I reached a peak 
number of about 13,000 books altogether. They were all at my disposal, since I was allowed 
to rummage in the library to my heart’s content. (Neurath 2010, 23.)
In a footnote to this report (that is, to a part of it which was published in Empiricism 
and Sociology, Marie Neurath comments remarkably: “Otto had read most of Kant 
and other philosophers when he still enjoyed playing with tin soldiers” (page 80, 
note 2).12
It is no coincidence that it was in England, where the enlightenment fostered 
egalitarian concepts of education, that Neurath’s ambitions struck fertile soil. Thus, 
he was able to present the importance of visual education vis-à-vis popular educa-
tion in several articles in the periodicals of adult education organizations. E.g., the 
article “Visual aids in adult education,” Neurath (1944b) describes the range from 
Comenius to modern picture language and its role in the struggle against superficial 
knowledge, illiteracy and the confinement to simplistic reading material; his argu-
ment was supported by a web of various “visual arguments,” and ended with a 
realistic, but still unrealized mode of visual communication promoting an “atmo-
sphere of argumentative meditation and of some peacefulness.”
Current international research into the field of visual communication and general 
semiotics confirms to an impressive degree the viability of developing Neurath’s 
approach further. Following the subsequent development made in the Anglo- 
American world, slowly but surely in German-speaking areas, too, attention is turn-
ing to this innovative tradition of the “Vienna Method,” as demonstrated by the 
discovery anew, and the rediscovery, of Neurath’s life and work. And the question 
arises on significance in the digital age of Internet and Social Media.
When Wilhelm Neurath died in 1901, his rich library (located at Am Heumarkt 
4, later Marxergasse 34) with 13.000 volumes was still at the disposal of the young 
Otto. Nevertheless, we do not know exactly, whether he could save this most valu-
able collection given his financial problems as a student till his appointment as a 
teacher in 1907. E.g., we know that some 1000 volumes of this library were bought 
by the Marx-Engels Institute Moscow in 1926:
After Wilhelm Neurath’s death in 1901, the library was at his son’s disposal and he had to 
sell parts of it in 1904 to finance his meagre existence as a doctoral student in Berlin. He 
still possessed some of his father’s books during his years in the Netherlands and made 
inquiries about recovering them after the Second World War. But it seems that they did not 
survive the German occupation. (Burke 2010, xi.)
12 The all too early death of Neurath prevented the completion of his visual autobiography, which 
was published posthumously only in 2010 with Hyphen Press, London. Before that, only some 
minor parts were published at different places. See Neurath (1945/1973) and (1946b).
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After his return from Munich to Vienna Neurath had begun to establish his own 
library, additionally. He regularly bought books from a wide range of cultural, intel-
lectual and philosophical areas, mostly in German and English. During his Vienna 
Circle years up to 1934 his own books and those on the international movement of 
Logical Empiricism and later of the Encyclopedia project complemented this intel-
lectual collection. To date, we are not sure how many of the books from his Vienna 
time were transferred to The Hague after the Civil War in February 1934. Obviously, 
the later arrival of Olga and Marie enabled a restricted transfer, maybe facilitated by 
Otto’s son Paul, who could stay in Vienna till his imprisonment and deportation to 
the concentration camp in 1938. Paul himself reports vaguely on his father that “he 
finally organized from Prague the transfer of his Institute and his own belongings 
and family to The Hague” (P. Neurath 1973, 31). His memories on the first apart-
ment of the Neuraths in the Schlossgasse (fourth district Margareten) refer also to 
the library: “The place was enormous. It consisted essentially of five big rooms 
which my father transformed into six and a corridor, with the help of book shelves 
and partitions. He needed practically all of it, because of his large library, a good 
deal of which was inherited from his father” (P. Neurath 1973, 32). And he remem-
bers that the “whole room looked like Faust’s studio” (1973, 34).
It is evident from Marie’s unpublished autobiography that Neurath, given his 
untiring nature, again continued to buy books mostly in the many antiquarian book-
stores in the Netherlands. Given the adventurous flight from The Hague to England 
in 1940 all private belongings, the Isotype collection and the library had to be left. 
But his Dutch friends succeeded to store most parts of the valuable owning and 
Isotype collection even if other materials were confiscated by German troops (“Amt 
Rosenberg”) and later on re-appeared in Moscow archives. Paul Neurath (1973, 41) 
remembers that “three pictures and one or two smaller pieces were bought by friends 
of my parents at The Hague when the contents of the house were sold at an auction 
by the Nazis.” Luckily, Paul donated the old Chinese Gobelin to the Institute Vienna 
Circle. Parts of the Neurath estate came back from Moscow to the Archive of the 
Republic of Austria without books, while the Austrian National Library bought 
parts of the Marie Neurath archives. So, the puzzle of the fate of Neurath’s Nachlass 
is being solved gradually.
Again luckily, what remained in The Hague after 1940 was sent by friends to the 
Neuraths after the war before Marie moved from Oxford to London in 1948 (Mulder 
1985, 384). I had the pleasure to meet Marie (1981/1982) once in a nice typical 
British house in the beautiful neighborhood of Hampstead in midst of émigrés from 
Austria and Germany  – where also Anna Freud lived. The continuation of the 
Isotype movement and the donation of the Isotype collection was arranged by Marie 
Neurath with Michael Twyman from the University of Reading, Department of 
Typography and Graphic Communication, where the whole Otto and Marie Isotype 
collection is still located and researched in called “Isotype revisited”: https://isoty-
perevisited.org/.
From there the scientific books went back again to the Netherlands, this time my 
old friend, the Dutch scholar Henk Mulder in Amsterdam, who in parallel had con-
tacted Marie and established the Vienna Circle Archives with the estates of Moritz 
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Schlick (from Barbara van de Velde-Schlick) and Otto Neurath. In Amsterdam 
Henk Mulder founded privately the Vienna Circle Archives (Wiener Kreis Archiv), 
legally owned by the Vienna Circle Foundation, which transferred the whole 
archives via the Dutch Academy of Sciences to the Rijksarchief Noord in Haarlem 
(NL). From here, the Institute Vienna Circle received a collection of ca. 1350 books 
in 1995, now being available to the scientific community as the Neurath exile library 
(“Otto Neurath Arbeitsbibliothek”). This was a late and symbolic coming home of 
one of the most brilliant and impressive intellectuals of the twentieth century, a real 
humanist and polymath in very hard times.
To reconstruct Neurath’s English years, his personal library and books could be 
also useful. To see that, I will present three short case studies.
In the few years in England between 1940-45 good old contacts with a remark-
able intellectual and practical manifestation were re-established – and one is inclined 
to ask in the sense of counterfactual history: What would have been, if Neurath had 
survived the World War Two period? First of all, in Oxford, he initiated Central 
European disputes on plan vs. market or socialism vs. liberalism (with F. A. Hayek) 
and philosophical relativism vs. absolutism (with Karl Popper) again in the new 
context of the envisioned liberated postwar society. Therefore, their relationships 
significantly emerged already in the Viennese years, can be described as more or 
less conflict-ridden communication between family resemblance and distance. Let 
me allude to Neurath’s relation to Popper and Hayek before coming to his related 
library copies.
Besides sharing a rejection of Platonic social philosophy (Republic), seen as a 
legitimation for authoritarian and totalitarian ideas, including the Führerkult (which 
according to Hayek’s Plato-interpretation was also part of a specific English contro-
versy) there was the controversial encounter of both personalities that began in the 
early twenties. Neurath immediately criticized Popper after the publication of his 
Logik der Forschung, accusing him of being an advocate of an absolutist “pseudo-
rationalism “(Neurath 1935/1983) – as he, incidentally, also rejected the verification 
endorsed by the “Wittgenstein camp.” The option of “unity of science” or “unity of 
method” (which, by the way, was also refuted by Hayek) appeared as the main alter-
native. But there are also uncontested familiarities: it is just Popper’s appeal to plan-
ning for institutions in his exile publications The Open Society (1945) and The 
Poverty of Historicism (1957; originally published in 1944/1945), which highlight 
the differences with Hayek – marginalized by Popper facing Hayek’s total opposi-
tion towards any form of planning theory and practice.
Neurath bought the first edition of Popper’s The Open Society and its Enemies in 
1945 and wrote some annotations in his copy of the two volumes. Despite a lot of 
remarkable agreements, like on Plato, Hegel, Fichte, and Wittgenstein, he com-
mented critically the Marx interpretation of the author with reference to determin-
ism and predictions, regarding the sociology of knowledge: e.g., on Popper’s 
conclusion “a social technology is needed whose results can be tested by social 
engineering” (p. 210), he notes: “how making tests? One history!!”
And Neurath agrees with a thick “ON,” where Popper writes in the chapter “The 
Revolt Against Reason”: “The rational and imaginative analysis of the consequences 
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of a moral theory has a certain analogy in scientific method. For in science, too, we 
do not accept an abstract theory because it is convincing itself; we rather decide to 
accept or reject it after we have investigated those concrete and practical conse-
quences which can be more directly by experiment” (p. 220).
In the concluding chapter “Has History Any Meaning?” again Neurath confirms 
the statement “that all scientific descriptions of facts are highly selective, that they 
always depend on theories” (p. 247) and Popper’s claim that “the history of power 
politics is nothing but the history of international crime and mass murder” (p. 257). 
But in contrary, he also sees a totalitarian ideal in Popper’s reference to Christianity 
(p. 264) and misses arguments instead of names in Popper’s criticism of convention-
alists’ view of experiments.
Regarding the term “social engineering” Neurath mentions his own concept of 
“Gesellschaftstechnik” not mentioned by Popper (1945, 185) and he continues with 
the question why one should not employ “utopian engineering” as a viable method 
of social technology (p. 242). And it is not surprising that Neurath at the end of 
volume 1 underlines Popper’s footnote: “Money is one of the symbols as well as one 
of the difficulties of the open society. There is no doubt that we have not yet mas-
tered the rational control of its use” (p. 266; original emphasis).
To sum up, Neurath’s comments and criticisms seem rather mild (with the excep-
tion of utopianism and some Marx interpretation), given the preceding characteriza-
tion of Popper as an oppositional philosopher of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s, 
which is acknowledged by the latter in his short memories of Neurath, where we can 
read:
Neurath and I had disagreed deeply on many and important matters, historical, political, 
and philosophical; in fact on almost all matters which interested us both except one – the 
view that the theory of knowledge was important for an understanding of history and of 
political problems. Yet though we had disagreed so deeply about so many and so important 
matters, I shall always feel that he was one of the strongest personalities I ever met; a real 
original thinker, and an undaunted fighter who dreamt of a better and more humane world. 
(Popper 1973, 56).
Mainstream historiography obscures the difference of these “Ambivalent 
Brothers in Mind”: first, Popper’s insistence on the unity of method for natural and 
social sciences, second, his preference for a limited planning for institutions, third, 
his adherence to a socially oriented welfare economy in the tradition of Austrian 
social reform. Probably because of his personal indebtedness to, and acquaintance 
with Hayek, who essentially enabled Popper’s position at LSE, Popper himself 
played down his differences with Hayek’s social philosophy in New Zealand. This 
conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the published comments to Hayek’s 
“Scientism.” And although both directly/indirectly argue against Neurath under the 
(Cold War) labels of “objectivism,” “collectivism” and “historicism,” there can be 
no doubt about the shortcomings of the equation “Scientism = Historicism.” In this 
field we lack further studies on the renewed interaction and relation of the Austrian 
School and Vienna Circle after their emigration, taking into account the controver-
sial issues in “Red Vienna” between the wars.
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The life and work of Otto Neurath and Marie Reidemeister (-Neurath) continued 
in their second exile systematically with personal and scientific relations during the 
1930s. The memories of Marie illustrate their permanent efforts in the promotion of 
the Encyclopedic movement and adult education via the Isotype-movement, and 
also his initiatives continuing the housing and settlement movement in his Vienna 
days. Neurath renewed all contacts (with Friedrich Waismann, Rose Rand, Friedrich 
Hayek, and most importantly with Susan Stebbing) and for a short time pursued his 
academic ambitions with significant publications and research projects that 
remained uncompleted.13 A closer look at his exile library signals the continuity to 
develop the interwar plans including his experience with the fascist decade: his 
book projects on “International Planning for Freedom,” “Visual Education” and on 
“Persecution and Toleration” were again on the agenda. And he focused on Hitler- 
Germany education with reference to Plato and Kant – a topic which continued to 
be discussed in exile (see Sandner 2011 and Antonia Soulez’s chapter in the present 
volume). We realize Neurath’s cooperation in a newly founded Fabian Society, pro-
duction of Isotype-films with Paul Rotha (see Boon 2016) for the anti-Nazi educa-
tion and Isotype as a contribution to the fight against totalitarianism.
Karl Popper was aware of Neurath’s life and work after World War One, which 
becomes obvious from his autobiographical remarks  (1973). He remembered 
Neurath’s involvement in the Bavarian revolution (1919/1920) in the connection 
with a planned economy based on full socialization and with reference to the semi- 
socialization program of Josef Popper-Lynkeus. Popper was inclined to sympathize 
with the latter’s (utopian) project, who was a distant relative. Apart from differences 
in personality and mentality, on the one hand, the Marxist dissenter and politically 
oriented encyclopedist, and the critical rationalist philosopher on the other, Popper 
accused Neurath of having succumbed to utopianism, historicism and scientism as 
represented by the Vienna Circle and the Ernst Mach Society.
Popper was very flattered that Neurath published the criticism of his Logik der 
Forschung as “Pseudorationalism of Falsification” (1935/1983) and was not 
unpleased (“nicht unzufrieden”) with this honorable attack. Surprisingly, he never 
replied in a systematic way. Maybe because Neurath (1935/1983, 131) criticized in 
light of his methodological holism: “the absolutism of falsification […] is in many 
ways a counterpart against the absolutism of verification which Popper attacks” 
(original emphasis). Popper’s attempt to characterize Neurath’s Empirische 
Soziologie (1931) in the context of historical prophecy fails to assess the author’s 
foundation of social science. From the outset Neurath remained very skeptical of 
explanations on the basis of one method and one image of science without prag-
matically relativizing the field of “Prediction and Induction” (1946a/1983): “Unity 
of Science” as represented in the ambitious project of the International Encyclopedia 
of Unified Science or “Unity of Method” as explicated from Popper’s Logik der 
Forschung to the Open Society and the Poverty of Historicism seemed to be an alter-
native approach in the history and philosophy of science.
13 On Neurath’s relation to Susan Stebbing, see Silke Körber’s chapter in the present volume.
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The direct confrontation of both opponents in their still unpublished correspon-
dence shows a discussion in philosophy of science at a high level. (Stadler 
2001/2015, 243–276). At the same time, one might wonder whether Popper didn’t 
exaggerate the real differences between him and the so-called “positivists” – a des-
ignation which Neurath so strongly opposed as a cliché – and underestimate any 
form of scientific cooperation between the new “encyclopedists” (Cat 1995; 
Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996). In this connection it is, indeed, surprising 
that also Critical Rationalism can be a suitable tool for a planning methodology 
(Faludi 1986). And it is this aspect – namely Popper’s appeal to planning for free-
dom or institutions (in his Open Society and Poverty of Historicism), which high-
lights the differences which were overstated by Popper due to Hayek’s total 
opposition towards each form of planning theory and practice.
The convinced “Scottish liberal” Hayek was in earlier times fond of Mach’s epis-
temology and Schlick’s General Theory of Knowledge, before he then began to 
oppose the Vienna Circle because he thought its (philosophy of) social science was 
dominated by Otto Neurath. Hayek felt himself from the beginning of the 1920s on 
to be Neurath’s opponent regarding economics: inspired by the Carl Menger’s “con-
ception of the spontaneous generation of institutions,” by Ludwig von Mises’ 
Gemeinwirtschaft and by Popper’s anti-inductivist Logik der Forschung, he lobbied 
against the so-called “positivist economics” – with Neurath as the most appropriate 
target. The intellectual divorce centered on planning theory, in natura calculation, 
and generally speaking on the concept of value, which Hayek  – erroneously  – 
missed in Neurath’s social science.
All these indirect oppositions culminated in the short dispute in the 1940s in 
English exile (although Hayek had emigrated to London already in 1931). This 
conflict sheds more light on the alternative conceptions of social science and its 
methodology. Hayek’s articles on “Scientism and the Study of Society” (1942–
1944) in Economica and the subsequent publication of his Road to Serfdom (1944) 
was the starting point for a renewed Methodenstreit: two cultures (natural science 
vs. social sciences and the humanities) were the main options in the scientific enter-
prise. Neurath took the initiative, as of 1945, in communicating via correspondence: 
“Enclosing I am sending you a review of your book. I tried to discover, what we 
have in common  – unfortunately you are rather ‘absolute’ in your EITHER-OR 
attitude. On Plato you may find some remarks in the article enclosed.”14
Neurath (1945/2004) published in his last year a remarkably moderate review of 
Road to Serfdom, by showing that his Logical Empiricism is providing a “through 
and through” pluralist view towards “International Planning for Freedom” (Neurath 
1942/1973). In the short book review in the London Quarterly of World Affairs we 
read:
We agree with Hayek that there are people who like planning as a means of obtaining totali-
tarian leadership and there are others who unwittingly support fascism by promoting certain 
principles of planning. But we cannot go all the way with Hayek in his relegation of all 
planning to this category. (Neurath 1945/2004, 546.)
14 Neurath to F. A. Hayek, 11 January 1945; Otto Neurath Nachlass.
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And he concludes rhetorically:
What would Professor Hayek answer if the tables were turned on him? Is it so unlikely that 
some people, seeing only Hayek’s […] alternative of totalitarianism with full employment 
to a free market with the usual booms and slumps, will choose the former with tears in their 
eyes? Is it so unlikely that people who think of planning for freedom will be in a better posi-
tion, when stating their case against the painful market society of the past and against dic-
tatorial planning, based on totalitarian fascism? (Neurath 1945/2004, 548.)
But Neurath‘s personal annotations in his own copy of Road to Serfdom are much 
more critical and bitter: “His technique: Overstate a case, create car(r)ricature of 
it, then fight it and then kill it is either German or immoral etc.” He also wrote in his 
personal copy the following:
There is some danger that planning as a fashion/may/be used by totalitarian groups for 
weakening the democratic behavior, which implies – muddle. Democracy – muddle – and 
victory. But that is not the muddle of slums, distressed wars, depressions etc. but multiplic-
ity of decisions, freedom of societies, local authorities. The fascists try to discredit muddle 
and to praise order, unification, subordination as such, otherwise they cannot run the show!!
Therefore we need an analysis of planning with reckoning in kind plus muddle!
That lacks – therefore danger. (Original underlining.)
And he concludes at the last pages with the confession:
Not acceptable the hypothesis: that ‘exploitation’ as such creates business cycle (Marx). I 
can imagine a ‘crisis-free’ society with highest production and consumption plus 
‘exploitation’….
Reckoning in kind: a) democratic society Possible b) totalitarian society Possible.
As I indicated, there emerged also a controversy over the concept of “Scientism” 
between Hayek and Neurath, which later included Popper. There, Hayek dealt 
extensively with the applicability of the methods of natural science and “social 
engineering” to the problems of man and society (as directed against Karl Mannheim, 
Neurath and maybe also in some sense against Popper).
In his “Scientism and the Study of Society” (1942–1944/1979) – re-published in 
The Counter-revolution in Science – Hayek condemned the appraisal of natural sci-
ence methodology as the only “scientific method.” According to Hayek, this does 
not hold, because “facts” in the natural and social sciences are totally different: on 
the one hand causally explicable, on the other, they are mere unobservable “opin-
ions” of the actors producing their “objects.” Common sense via analogy is the 
central key for understanding in social science. These essays distanced Hayek from 
all forms of “objectivism,” “behaviorism,” directly referring to Neurath’s “physical-
ism,” accusing him of supporting in natura calculation (instead of calculation in 
terms of price and value) and taking “naïvely for granted that what appears alike to 
us will also appear alike to other people” (Hayek 1942–1944/1979, 79). What sur-
prises us, at first sight, is the lack of a critique of language and the merging of the 
theoretical and meta-theoretical levels of speaking about the external world. Despite 
of all these misunderstandings regarding “methods of science,” Neurath seems ulti-
mately willing to agree with Hayek’s conclusion, who quoted Morris R. Cohen that 
“the great lesson of humility which science teaches us, that we can never be 
2 A Viennese Library in Exile: Otto Neurath and the Heritage of Central European…
40
 omnipotent or omniscient, is the same as that of all great religions: man is not and 
never will be the god before whom he must bow down” (Hayek 1942–1944/1979, 
182).
Although Neurath tried to start a discussion in which he referred to theoretical 
contributions on social science, Hayek refused to enter into a detailed exchange: 
from Cambridge (where the London School of Economics had its wartime address), 
to Oxford, Hayek wrote that he is “by no means so much opposed to ‘Logical 
Positivism’ as you appear to think and with some members of your former group, 
particularly with Karl Popper, I find myself in complete agreement” and – alluding 
to physicalism and in natura calculation – he continued to articulate his skeptical 
position towards Neurath, at the same time agreeing “entirely with what you say on 
Plato. He certainly was the arch-totalitarian.”15 Hayek was busy with lecturing 
abroad and moved back to London only later. He was convinced that he had already 
dealt exhaustively with the issue of “Scientism.” Two weeks after Hayek’s last hesi-
tant letter, Neurath died unexpectedly of a heart attack at December 22, 1945: the 
started dialogue between the adherents of plan and market shimmered through in 
the ensuing Hayek-Popper communication.
For a better understanding of the lasting Methodenstreit in the 1930s and 1940s 
represented by the triangle Hayek-Popper-Neurath we first have to reconstruct the 
discussions in their socio-historical context, second to examine unpublished sources, 
third to distance ourselves from clichés about schools of thought and, finally to 
confront these results with today’s research. In doing so we could fully appreciate 
the historical background together with internal theory dynamics without producing 
myths of partisanship. This would provide a rational option, namely a pluralist way 
for positioning this unsolved debate in an evolutionary context of theoretical fields. 
And Neurath’s library provides a valuable additional source for these  Central 
European disputes in British exile.
Finally, a short note on Stefan Zweig (1881–1942), one of the most renowned 
authors and intellectuals of the twentieth century. He was a proponent of a typical 
Viennese and Central European culture covering biographical, fictional and histori-
cal fields up to his last remembrance book Die Welt von Gestern. Erinnerungen 
eines Europäers (Stockholm: Bermann-Fischer 1942)/The World of Yesterday 
(London: Cassell and New York: Viking Press 1943) – a sort of autobiography. This 
book is the story of the rise, glory, and fall of the European, mostly Jewish Culture 
in the period of Fascism and National Socialism. An impressive narrative of the 
destruction of human life and the decline of a civil society in a world of nationalism, 
racism and anti-Semitism which ended up in the Shoah. His last book was published 
before he consciously committed suicide with his wife Lotte in Brazilian exile 
(February 23, 1942) caused by his personal fate and the vanishing hope for a better 
world.
Neurath in Oxford was immediately puzzled by this book as a story on the world 
of his youth and his life in Vienna. He bought the English translation of this literary 
obituary on a lost culture and read it with increasing interest page by page with 
15 See F. A. Hayek to Neurath, 2 February 1945. (ONN).
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continuous handwritten annotations from the beginning to the end of this most influ-
ential publication, to be translated into many languages. Neurath was fascinated but 
also provoked as a historian and sociologist by the content of that autobiographical 
document which was, and still is appreciated also a historical study of the late 
Habsburg Empire and the First Austrian Republic till the rise Austro-Fascism and 
NS.  Given his intellectual background, this was not really surprising because 
Neurath had also written a critical monograph against Oswald Spengler’s most 
influential book Decline of the West already in 1921, entitled Anti-Spengler, mainly 
directed to Spengler’s cultural pessimism. I will call attention only to some selected 
pages as typical manifestations of the indirect review of this bestseller of Zweig, 
whom he most likely and surprisingly never had met in person: Zweig’s The World 
of Yesterday (1943) is a memory book (Erinnerungen eines Europäers) on the 
decline of the epoch of fin de siècle Vienna from Habsburg to Hitler. Till to the pres-
ent it is praised as a literary document of a vanished epoch and as a historical study 
of this epoch. Already on the first page Neurath notes:
Zweig usually speaks of writers, etc, etc no knowledge of social correlations; no reading of 
sociology. A human and kind pacifist, who, as a well-to-do, has no contacts with the masses 
knows writers, composers etc.
Unpleasant neighborhood Emil Ludwig, St. George, Elis. Förster Nietzsche, Rich. 
Strauß, Werfel, G. Hauptmann, Haushofer. Heine not mentioned! Not mentioned: Lagarde, 
Gobineau, Rembrandt als Erzieher Chamberlain but Spengler
Romain Rolland, Shaw, Wells, Duhamel the freedom-West.
And he continues on the back side harshly: “Always wrong in looking at men and 
world. P.60, 146, 148, 154, 156, 112, 214, 234, 313.”
In the Preface we read: “what kind of ‘flower’ 1840, 1850, 1860? Persecution!” 
And still in the last page: “always are purgatories and hells, but one does not think 
of them, Albigenses, Torquemada, Bartholomew, Armenia, China, India, Lynching, 
unemployment.”
Here it is worth mentioning that Neurath also purchased another book of Zweig, 
namely The Right to Heresy. Castellio against Calvin (1936), which was also a 
biographical story on 2 opponents, written as a coded fiction and analogy to Hitler’s 
rise and tyranny in Nazi-Germany.
Again, Neurath is commenting it from the historical and sociological point of 
view, e.g.: “what about the persecuted Albigenses etc.?” (p. 22.) or references to 
witch burning. But there is also the confirmation of Max Weber’s thesis on the 
Protestant origin of capitalism.
The background of his interest was certainly his own projected monograph enti-
tled “Tolerance and Persecution,” which he could not finish. But it seems, that – 
despite the many differences regarding the historiography of the last century, he was 
the complementing intellectual twin of Zweig. Both were right, the former as an 
author with his semi-fiction, the latter as a scholar and social historian.
At the end, I will note the fact that Neurath also read Bertrand Russell’s books 
from the beginning of the Vienna Circle days and he met him in connection with the 
unity of science congresses. As a social Epicurean Neurath was interested in 
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Russell’s Mysticism and Logic (1910/1932) and Conquest of Happiness (1930). 
Herein we find a paragraph in the chapter on competition as follows.
I think it should be admitted that an element of genuine though irrational fear as to the 
consequences of ruin frequently enters into a business man’s anxieties. Arnold Bennett’s 
Clayhanger, however rich he became, continued to be afraid of dying in the workhouse. I 
have no doubt that those who have suffered greatly through poverty in their childhood are 
haunted by terrors lest their children should suffer similarly, and feel that it is hardly pos-
sible to build up enough millions as a bulwark against this disaster. (Russell 1930, 49–50.)
Here Neurath wrote next to this paragraph simply “St. Zweig”!
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Chapter 3
Otto Neurath: The Philosopher in the Cave
Don Howard
Abstract The question of philosophy’s relevance to extra-academic concerns is 
much with us today. Plato tells us that, once the philosopher has seen the truth in the 
full light of the sun, she must return to the cave, there to put knowledge to work in 
making a better world, even though, being temporarily unaccustomed to the dark, 
she risks ridicule from those still in thrall to illusion. This paper reflects upon the 
life and career of Otto Neurath as a modern exemplification of this ideal of philo-
sophical engagement. In spite of, or, perhaps, because of his never having held an 
academic appointment, Neurath made a difference for the good in human affairs. 
The key components of what I term Neurath’s “philosophy of science in action” are 
explicated in order to understand how that could be. Foregrounded are Neurath’s 
socialism, his own version of the thesis of the empirical underdetermination of the-
ory by evidence, his anti-metaphysical stance, and his commitment to physicalism 
and the unity of science. The paper concludes with a discussion of the contemporary 
relevance of Neurath’s model of engaged philosophy of science.
3.1  Introduction: The Philosopher’s Return to the Cave
Plato’s allegory of the cave, presented at the beginning of Book VII in The Republic, 
is widely remembered as an evocative story of enlightenment. A person long held 
prisoner in a deep, dark cave, bound to see only shadows of silhouettes cast upon the 
wall of the cave, and knowing nothing more, takes those shadows to be reality. 
Then, one day, she frees herself from her chains, turns, is temporarily blinded by the 
light of the fire producing the shadowy images, regains her vision and has the illu-
sion revealed to her. She struggles in the semi-darkness to climb out of the cave, 
only to be blinded again by the light of the sun. When, finally, her eyes adjust to the 
daylight, ultimate truth and reality stand before her in plain view. This is the 
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aspiring philosopher’s path to the highest kind of knowledge, which, in Plato’s ver-
sion, is found in the heaven of the forms.
But the allegory does not end there, with the philosopher in happy, enlightened 
repose. Less well remembered is that, after seeing the truth in the full light of day, 
Plato’s true philosopher, the philosopher-king, descends back into the cave to 
enlighten the lives of the other prisoners with some small part of the truth that she 
has won. This turns out to be a difficult task.
And when he remembered his old habitation, and the wisdom of the den and his fellow- 
prisoners, do you not suppose that he would felicitate himself on the change, and pity them?
Certainly, he would.
And if they were in the habit of conferring honours among themselves on those who 
were quickest to observe the passing shadows and to remark which of them went before, 
and which followed after, and which were together; and who were therefore best able to 
draw conclusions as to the future, do you think that he would care for such honours and 
glories, or envy the possessors of them? Would he not say with Homer,
‘Better to be the poor servant of a poor master,’
and to endure anything, rather than think as they do and live after their manner?
Yes, he said, I think that he would rather suffer anything than entertain these false 
notions and live in this miserable manner.
Imagine once more, I said, such an one coming suddenly out of the sun to be replaced 
in his old situation; would he not be certain to have his eyes full of darkness?
To be sure, he said.
And if there were a contest, and he had to compete in measuring the shadows with the 
prisoners who had never moved out of the den, while his sight was still weak, and before his 
eyes had become steady (and the time which they would be needed to acquire this new habit 
of sight might be very considerable), would he not be ridiculous? Men would say of him 
that up he went and down he came without his eyes; and that it was better not even to think 
of ascending; and if any one tried to loose another and lead him up to the light, let them only 
catch the offender, and they would put him to death.
No question, he said. (Plato 1888, 216–217.)
Plato’s point is that the true philosopher recognizes an obligation to go back into the 
cave, however much she risks ridicule or even death. This is the role of the 
philosopher- king in the ideal state. One seeks the truth not merely for its own sake, 
but also for the purpose of an enlightened leadership of the polis. Would that the 
philosopher’s obligation to immerse herself in public affairs were more widely rec-
ognized and rewarded.
Otto Neurath was hardly a philosopher-king. He deliberately avoided political 
office and conventional party politics. His life and career nonetheless stand as mod-
els of socially and politically engaged philosophical practice. Moreover, unlike 
most of the professional philosophers who have held public office, figures like 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Tomáš Masaryk, José Ortega y Gasset, or Julián 
Besteiro,1 Neurath’s philosophy made specific and substantial contributions to his 
1 Radakrishnan served as Vice President and President of India after independence, 1952–1967. 
Masaryk was the first President of Czechoslovakia after World War One, 1918–1937. Besteiro was 
twice member of the Spanish Congress of Deputies, 1918–1923 and 1931–1937, and he served as 
President of the Congress from 1931 to 1933. Ortega was, likewise, a member of the Congress of 
Deputies, 1931–1933.
D. Howard
47
political work and was, in turn, constructed in part with an eye toward understand-
ing the place of politics in philosophy and science. The only other example known 
to me of a prominent philosopher whose philosophical and political work is so 
deeply entangled with one another is Neurath’s contemporary, György Lukács.2
How are we to understand Neurath’s compelling example of socially and politi-
cally engaged philosophy? This paper reflects upon Neurath’s life and career as a 
modern exemplification of this ideal of philosophical engagement. In spite of, or, 
perhaps, because of his never having held an academic appointment, Neurath made 
a difference for the good in human affairs. How did these contextual circumstances 
shape the content of his philosophical project? Did it make a difference to his phi-
losophy of science that his day job in the 1920s was that of the director of the Social 
and Economic Museum of Vienna, where he developed the “Isotype” system for the 
visual communication of information? And how did that philosophical program 
inform his social and political projects, from worker education to urban design? 
How did his broadly Duhemian, holist, underdeterminationist epistemology of sci-
ence shape his understanding of how science, especially social science, affects 
social reform? And does Neurath’s example have continuing relevance to contem-
porary discussions of possible roles for the socially engaged philosopher of science?3
3.2  Neurath in the Agora
Neurath’s entire life was devoted to public service. Early in World War One, he 
directed the Department of War Economy for the Austro-Hungarian government, 
after which he was appointed director of the German Museum of War Economy in 
Leipzig. In March of 1919, he was appointed as president of the Central Economic 
Administration of the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, which was overthrown 
in May, after which Neurath was tried, convicted, and sentenced to prison for the 
crime of assisting high treason. He was released from prison thanks to the interces-
sion of the Austrian Foreign Minister. Exiled from Germany, Neurath returned to 
“Red” Vienna, where, under the socialist municipal government that ruled for more 
than a decade, he occupied several prominent positions, starting with his serving as 
secretary of the Austrian Association for Settlements and Small Gardens, which 
played a role in developing new kinds of housing for the poor and the working class 
in Vienna.4
2 Lukács was the Minister of Culture for the post-World War One Hungarian Soviet Republic, from 
March until August 1919.
3 For the record, Neurath was not, himself, sympathetic with Plato’s conception of the ideal state in 
The Republic. Writing toward the end of World War Two, in February 1945, Neurath and Joseph 
Lauwerys (1945) emphasize the extent to which the totalitarian aspects of Plato’s state resemble 
Nazi Germany (Neurath and Lauwerys 1945). In a manner strikingly similar to Popper’s (1945) 
critique in his The Open Society and Its Enemies, Neurath and Lauwerys deplore Plato’s subordi-
nation of the individual to the collective.
4 For Neurath’s involvement and work in the Association see Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter in the 
present volume.
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In 1923, Neurath established the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, which 
he directed until his forced exile from Austria in 1934. This was his most significant 
exercise in public engagement and the one with, perhaps, the most enduring legacy. 
The museum functioned mainly as an institution for public education, intended to 
serve primarily, again, the poor and working class. It was in this setting that Neurath 
developed his later, world famous “Isotype” system for the visual communication of 
social and economic information.5 In 1928, Neurath and Moritz Schlick started the 
Ernst Mach Society in Vienna. Designed to disseminate new scientific ideas and the 
logical empiricist philosophy of science of the Vienna Circle to a broader public, 
including the working classes, the society also served as a forum for socialist 
intellectuals.
When Austrofascist dictator, Engelbert Dollfuss, began his violent suppression 
of the socialists in February 1934, the Ernst Mach Society was forced to close, and 
Neurath, who, by a happy accident was in Moscow, fled to the Netherlands, where 
he had already established a branch of the Social and Economic Museum, known as 
the Mundaneum Institute. Forced to flee again when the Germans invaded The 
Netherlands in May of 1940, Neurath sought refuge in England, where he founded 
the Isotype Institute in Oxford and did consulting work on a number of public proj-
ects. He died in December of 1945.6
Neurath’s commitment to public engagement is seen in his writings, as well. 
Much of his work was, of course, directed to an audience of professional philoso-
phers, economists, social theorists, historians, and educators. But some of his most 
impactful books were written for a public audience, such as his 1921 critique of the 
then-popular “decline of the West” analysis of Europe’s  post-war malaise, Anti- 
Spengler (Neurath 1921/1973) or his 1939 book Modern Man in the Making 
(Neurath 1939). Prominent among his hundreds of articles are the many essays that 
he wrote for political journals, especially Der Kampf, which was the official journal 
of the Austrian Social-Democratic party. Some of his most interesting work directly 
explored the connections between politics and science, his 1928 Lebensgestaltung 
und Klassenkampf [Personal Life and Class Struggle] (Neurath 1928/1973), being 
among the best.7
Lastly, Neurath was constantly in motion and on the move, lecturing, consulting, 
organizing, and collaborating. He enjoyed and excelled at building new institutions, 
establishing new journals and book series, and bringing people together, as with his 
crucial role in establishing and maintaining the Vienna Circle, itself. He seemed to 
be possessed of inexhaustible reserves of energy, enthusiasm, and force of will. All 
5 For more on “Isotype,” see Neurath (2010) and Vossoughian (2008). See Angélique Groß’s and 
Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter in the present volume as well.
6 The definitive biography of Neurath is Sandner (2014). Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996) is 
another excellent source. Very interesting are the biographical memoirs collected in Neurath and 
Cohen (1973). Stadler (2001/2015) is also helpful. On Neurath’s rather neglected English-period 
see the chapters of Michelle Henning, Antonia Soulez and Adam Tamas Tuboly in the present 
volume.
7 Neurath’s early political writings are analyzed by Günther Sandner in the present volume.
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of these attributes were on display in his leading the effort to launch yet another of 
his enduring legacies, The International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Neurath, 
Morris, and Carnap 1936–1969 – which, while never completed as planned, had 
a significant impact on the philosophy of science and other disciplines, and this not 
merely because it was the place where Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions was first published (1962).8
3.3  Science in Action: Neurath as a Theorist of Socially 
and Politically Engaged Science and Philosophy
Neurath’s career as a public intellectual, deeply and consistently engaging large and 
important questions of social and economic justice, war and peace, the rise of 
Fascism and the challenges thereby posed to democracy and freedom, was grounded 
in a theoretical analysis of the place of science and philosophy in society and poli-
tics. That theoretical understanding was shaped by Neurath’s experiences as an 
activist intellectual, and his activism was shaped, in turn, by the way he theorized 
science as a means to the betterment of humankind.
Many thinkers, from Francis Bacon to the leading minds of the French 
Enlightenment, from Auguste Comte to American progressives of the late- nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries have looked to science as a force for good in human 
affairs. But Neurath was not at all an Enlightenment intellectual. Both his philoso-
phy of science and his socialist politics left him deeply skeptical of naive notions of 
scientific truth and progress, especially for their neglect of the ineluctable social, 
economic, political, and historical embedding of science. But he was, at the same 
time, a critic of the “scientific materialism,” the Marxist materialism of Friedrich 
Engels and Lenin, that denied a leading role for ideas in social change. Neurath’s 
social-political philosophy of science is something sui generis and stands to this day 
as an inspiring alternative to neo-liberal views of science in the political arena, such 
as those of Philip Kitcher (2001, 2011), and to Marxist-inspired social studies of 
science deriving from the so-called “Strong Programme” of David Bloor and Barry 
Barnes (Bloor 1976; Barnes et al. 1996). What were the key features of Neurath’s 
distinctive theory of science, and the philosophy of science, in action?9
8 On the history of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, see Morris (1962), Nemeth 
and Stadler (1996), and Reisch (1994).
9 The unflattering contrast with Latour (1987) is intentional.
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3.3.1  Socialism
Neurath was a socialist, though not a Marxist of the Leninist variety. He was a prod-
uct of the distinctive political-intellectual tradition of “Austro-Marxism,” which was 
strongly associated with the Austrian Social-Democratic Party, the co-founder of 
which, Victor Adler, was one of the leading theorists of Austro-Marxism, a legacy 
carried on by his son, Friedrich Adler. Among the distiguishing features of Austro- 
Marxism is its critique of the naive notions of science and materialism that defined 
the scientific materialism of Engels and Lenin. Austro-Marxism came in two fla-
vors, a Kantian one and a Machian one (see M. Adler 1925 and F. Adler 1907, 
1918), but both versions of Austro-Marxism agreed that socialist theory required a 
more sophisticated philosophy of science than Engels had provided, and they agreed 
that socialist theory had to allow for ideas or theory to play a leading role in social 
change, as opposed to mere material circumstances, as had been argued by orthodox 
Marxist-Leninists. According ideas or theory, including scientific theory, a leading 
role in social change was necessary in order to legitimate social-democratic parties 
that sought change via electoral politics and parliamentary debate, by contrast with 
revolutionary Marxist-Leninists who sought change at the barrel of a gun. It is for 
this reason that Lenin (1909/1947) viciously attacked the Austro-Marxists, espe-
cially those of the Machian variety, in his book, Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, 
singling out by name Neurath’s friend and fellow member of the left-wing of the 
Vienna Circle, the physicist, Philipp Frank.10
While a product of the Austro-Marxist milieu in Vienna, Neurath came to his 
own commitment to socialism slowly and by a somewhat surprising route. It was 
really his work in war planning during World War One that led him to prize the 
advantages of a planned economy, not only for purposes of war but also for achiev-
ing social justice. And he put his training in economics to work in pursuing that goal 
in various settings in the 1920s and beyond. He was, of course, interested in experi-
ments in economic planning in the Soviet Union, but was not a communist, remain-
ing a Marxist social democrat to the end of his life.11
For our purposes, it is especially the distinctive Austro-Marxist theme of giving 
scientific theory – economic theory, social theory, psychological theory, even theory 
in the natural sciences – a leading role in social change that is important for under-
standing Neurath’s conception of science in action. Of course, even the scientific 
materialists prized the role of science in social change, but Neurath, like his fellow 
Austro-Marxists, theorized that role for science very differently than did Lenin. For 
Neurath, science is not simply driven by material circumstance and the class strug-
gle. No, scientific research and scientific theory play their own, independent role. 
Consider this remark from Neurath’s Lebensgestaltung und Klassenkampf [Personal 
Life and Class Struggle]:
10 Blum (1985) is a good source for more on Austro-Marxism.
11 On Neurath’s economics see Thomas Uebel’s chapter in the present volume.
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Nothing would be further amiss than to think that a Marxist-minded representative of the 
proletarian class struggle would respect only such scientific work which relates directly to 
the strategy of the class struggle. It is precisely Marxism that uncovers indirect relations and 
detours, and thus might ascertain that cultivating pure logic and the most general problems 
of mathematics and physics is especially favorable to revolutionary thinking. The Marxist 
will tend to regard it not as a mere accident that among the representatives of just these 
abstract disciplines ordinarily thought to be impractical, there are so many socialists as well 
as bourgeois in opposition, as for instance, the English logician and mathematician Bertrand 
Russell or the German physicist Albert Einstein. A cultivation of this kind of scientific 
thought seems almost a form of dissolution of metaphysical and half-theological thought, 
which under many disguises and masks is more alive today among the bourgeoisie than two 
generations ago. This is quite understandable, for bourgeois groups are closing ranks 
against the proletariat which has no traditions, and they must make their peace with the 
powers of yesterday, above all with clerical groups. […] The cultivation of scientific, 
unmetaphysical thought, its application above all to social occurrences, is quite Marxist. 
(Neurath 1928/1973, 295.)
While according science a leading role in social change, Neurath also appreci-
ated the social, political, and historical embedding of science. Bourgeois science 
was, for Neurath, importantly different from science in the service of the working 
classes. But even bourgeois science could, under some circumstances, advance the 
cause of progressive social change.
If then Marxists wish to maintain that Marxism is more scientific than bourgeois science, 
they might present this historically as follows: the better the proletariat grasps the social 
engineering relations of our order and surveys its own chances, the more successfully it can 
fight. One might think that the same is true for the bourgeois front. If it is correct that the 
changes of history will bring the decline of today’s order and the ruling classes, then the 
doctrine which maintains this truth is indeed suitable to provide the winners with courage 
and adherents, as long as they can grasp that they belong to the rising class; but it will 
weaken the front which contains groups that abandon this front because of the doctrine of 
the class struggle and its effects. (Neurath 1928/1973, 296.)
Among the reasons why, according to Neurath, Marxism is more scientific than 
bourgeois science is what, today, we would term a version of standpoint theory:
The workers who lack a rich bourgeois education, can become superior to the bourgeois 
precisely in the field of social life in that they have a greater understanding for social con-
nections and can apply even a smaller amount of knowledge more significantly. Marxism 
shows the proletarians who are engaged in the class struggle what is especially important to 
know; and it preserves adherents from the often disorganized educational endeavour of 
bourgeois enlightenment, which from the outset sees in merely increasing knowledge 
something worth striving for as such. (Neurath 1928/1973, 292–293.)
It is precisely the oppressed status of the working classes that affords them a 
privileged epistemic status, more clearly grasping social relations and seeing the lie 
in rationalizations of bourgeois privilege, rationalizations the falsity of which bour-
geois thinkers cannot see as lies because their class status places them in an epis-
temically disadvantaged state. They cannot see through those lies because their 
doing so would undermine the power and prerogatives of their own class.
Neurath’s philosophy of science in action thus paints a picture of politically 
engaged, indeed revolutionary science in service to the achievement of justice. But 
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how, exactly, does Neurath think that science can function in such a setting? If we 
put science in service to a political agenda, do we not risk fatal compromise to the 
objectivity and epistemic integrity of science?
3.3.2  Underdetermination and Pseudorationalism
Central to a more detailed understanding of Neurath’s philosophy of science in 
action is his version of the theory holism, semantic holism, and the associated doc-
trine of the empirical underdetermination of theory choice that is better known in 
the form that it was given by Pierre Duhem (1906/1954). Neurath (1913/1983) first 
elaborated these ideas in a remarkable 1913 essay, “Die Verirrten des Cartesius und 
das Auxiliarmotiv” [“The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive”].12
Neurath begins by recalling a passage from Descartes’ Discourse on Method 
where, in order to contrast theoretical and practical reason, Descartes considers the 
example of people lost in a dense wood. No evidence or reasons point to a way out. 
Instead, they have to make an empirically and theoretically ungrounded choice of a 
direction, any direction, and then keep moving in that direction with firm resolve. 
Otherwise they could wander about forever and die. The demands of life, in other 
words, require action. For Descartes (1637/1903, 26), this is the essence of practical 
reason. But for Neurath, theory and praxis are the same in this respect. It is the uni-
versal lot of reason in all of its forms, including in the sciences, that logic and evi-
dence do not suffice for theory choice. This is because, as thinkers and researchers, 
we do not and cannot occupy a view from nowhere. We are embedded in history, 
culture, and tradition:
There are fundamental objections to the Cartesian view. Whoever wants to create a world- 
view or a scientific system must operate with doubtful premises. Each attempt to create a 
world-picture by starting from a tabula rasa and making a series of statements which are 
recognized as definitively true, is necessarily full of trickeries. The phenomena that we 
encounter are so much interconnected that they cannot be described by a one-dimensional 
chain of statements. The correctness of each statement is related to that of all the others. It 
is absolutely impossible to formulate a single statement about the world without making 
tacit use at the same time of countless others. Also we cannot express any statement without 
applying all of our preceding concept formation. On the one hand, we must state the con-
nection of each statement dealing with the world with all the other statements that deal with 
it, and on the other hand we must state the connection of each train of thought with all our 
earlier trains of thought. We can vary the world of concepts present in us, but we cannot 
discard it. Each attempt to renew it from the bottom up is by its very nature a child of the 
concepts at hand. (Neurath 1913/1983, 3.)
It follows that even theoretical inquiry can go in various directions consistent with 
available facts:
12 Neurath’s paper is analyzed also in Gábor Zemplén’s chapter with regard Neurath’s ideas on 
optics.
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In order to make progress one very often finds oneself in the position of having to choose 
one of several hypotheses of equal probability. The necessity of provisional rules in the field 
of thinking is usually less clearly understood; this may be related to the fact that one can, so 
to speak, lead several theoretical lives simultaneously. […] Starting from the same initial 
point one can always develop different theories of light, just as one can undertake different 
excursions. But one should not overlook the fact that it is certainly of consequence which 
trains of thought one has once had before a certain investigation. (Neurath 1913/1983, 3.)
Choose we must among the alternatives available to us. But how do we choose? 
Sometimes, especially in exigent circumstances, we make a random choice. More 
commonly, however, we choose on the basis of what Neurath terms “auxiliary 
motives.” Sometimes it is custom or tradition, sometimes instinct, sometimes super-
stition, sometimes the authority of an esteemed figure, sometimes it is the view of 
the majority. Especially in the sciences, it is sometimes simplicity that decides. And, 
of course, it is frequently a political agenda that fills the void left by logic and 
evidence.
It is noteworthy that Neurath terms these factors auxiliary motives, not reasons. 
He means deliberately to make this an issue about the psychology of judgment and 
not pure reason alone. Neurath’s epistemology of science is a kind of naturalistic 
epistemology. What he gives us here are supposed to be psychological and, thus, 
scientific facts about how reason operates, not apriori norms. Still, our recognizing 
the role of auxiliary motives has normative implications because of the widespread 
failure to discern or admit the work that such motives do.
Neurath invents the term, “pseudorationalism,” to deride the view that unaided 
reason can lead us to the truth. The pseudorationalists are those who disguise and 
deny, consciously or unconsciously, the role of auxiliary motives. He would later 
level this charge not only against demagogues and apologists for greed and class 
interest but also against philosophers of science who promoted a naively decontex-
tualized view of the logic of science, as with his devastating review of Karl Popper’s 
Logic of Scientific Discovery (Popper 1934/1959; Neurath 1935/1983).
All of these themes – empirical underdetermination of theory choice, auxiliary 
motives, and pseudorationalism – were taken up again by Neurath in his 1921 book, 
Anti-Spengler:
The wish to found action on perfect insight means to nip it in the bud. Politics are actions, 
always built on an inadequate survey. But a world-view, too, is action; embracing the mani-
fold universe is an anticipation of unpredictable efforts. In the end, all our thinking depends 
on such inadequacies. We must advance, even without certainty. The only question is 
whether we are aware of it or not.
Our pseudo-rationalists dare not face this fact. Frivolity! they cry when it is found that even 
with the most developed insight more than one way remains open for important decisions 
and that casting lots can thus become meaningful. They will not admit, precisely when 
some great task is to be undertaken, that insight becomes awareness of its own limits. 
(Neurath 1921/1973, 158–159.)
It is intellectual humility and openness about underdetermination and the inelucta-
ble role of auxiliary motives that most advantages reason in action. In “The Lost 
Wanderers of Descartes,” Neurath (1913/1983, 11) described the auxiliary motive 
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as “the culmination of rationalism.” There is sweet irony in the idea that the cause 
of scientific objectivity is furthered by the frank admission of our biases and agen-
das. At the very least, when we are honest with one another about the work of the 
auxiliary motives, we can subject them to public, critical scrutiny.
In Anti-Spengler Neurath also deploys his famous “boat” metaphor, which nicely 
embodies all of the core ideas of his philosophy of science in action, and he here 
acknowledges Duhem as a progenitor:
Duhem has shown with special emphasis that every statement about any happening is satu-
rated with hypotheses of all sorts and that these in the end are derived from our whole 
world-view. We are like sailors who on the open sea must reconstruct their ship but are 
never able to start afresh from the bottom. Where a beam is taken away a new one must at 
once be put there, and for this the rest of the ship is used as support. In this way, by using 
the old beams and driftwood, the ship can be shaped entirely anew, but only by gradual 
reconstruction. (Neurath 1921/1973, 199.)
The implied contrast with Descartes’ often-used metaphor of rebuilding the edifice 
of knowledge on solid foundations is, of course, intentional.
For the purposes of understanding Neurath’s philosophy of science in action, 
what is most important is his argument about the role of the auxiliary motive, for 
this is what provides legitimation for Neurath’s politically engaged science. That 
politics can and in many instances should play a crucial role in science in no way 
demeans the intellectual integrity of science. On the contrary, since, in the end, we 
must choose on the basis of non-empirical factors, we enhance the intellectual 
integrity of science by frankly asserting the agendas that motivate science in action. 
Political agendas might have less bearing on theory choice in physics, but they very 
commonly can and must play a role in fields like economics and social theory, the 
fields in which Neurath was trained and the fields in which he acted.13
3.3.3  The Critique of Metaphysics
If there was any one doctrine that united all of the members of the Vienna Circle and 
logical empiricism, more generally, it was their repudiation of metaphysics. The 
best known argument was the one advanced by Rudolf Carnap (1931/1959) in his 
classic, 1931 essay, “The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of 
Language.” It was here that Carnap premiered his famous verifiability criterion of 
meaningfulness, according to which a proposition possesses “cognitive meaning” 
only if it is either analytically true or false or capable of empirical confirmation or 
falsification. The propositions of traditional metaphysics either fail to be expressible 
in a proper logical form in the first place, as with Martin Heidegger’s infamous 
assertion that “the nothing nothings,” or, if they can be so analyzed and expressed, 
they fail to satisfy the stated criterion. Ethical judgments likewise lack cognitive 
13 The question of political agendas and the concept formation, theory acceptance and rejection in 
physics was discussed in detail by Philipp Frank (1957).
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meaning, but they might still possess emotive meaning and be valuable as expres-
sions of emotional attitudes, as might some metaphysical claims. Carnap also notes 
that some metaphysical abstractions, such as “das Volk” [“the people”] have been 
put to use in the service of regressive or pernicious political agendas. Still, his main 
point is a logical one about the semantics of metaphysical discourse.
It was Neurath, however, who was best known within the Vienna Circle for his 
antipathy toward metaphysics. He famously proposed a list of prohibited metaphys-
ical words, the Index Verborum Prohibitorum (see Uebel 1992, 76), and it is said 
that Schlick grew so weary of Neurath’s interrupting meetings of the Vienna Circle 
to complain about their lapsing into metaphysics that Hans Hahn proposed that 
Neurath should just say, “M,” to which Neurath responded that it would save every-
one a lot of time if, instead, he said “non-M” on those rare occasions when the oth-
ers were not indulging in sin (Neurath and Cohen 1973, 82–83). But Neurath was, 
at the same time, highly skeptical of Carnap’s formalistic approach to eliminating 
metaphysics, holding that the ideal of perfect formal languages was a will-o’-the- 
wisp. What, then, were Neurath’s reasons for excoriating metaphysics?
Part of the answer is that, though this fact is not well remembered today, the 
elimination of metaphysics because of the baleful political work that it had long 
done was a major theme in Marxist theory. This is one of the most important issues 
pressed by Friedrich Engels in his Anti-Dühring (1878/1939) and it is echoed in 
Lenin’s Materialism and Empirio-Criticism (1909/1947). Engels and Lenin held 
that their own scientific materialism should not be seen as a damnable form of meta-
physics, precisely because it was scientific and dialectical, by contrast with the sim-
ply metaphysical materialism – Engels calls it “mechanical materialism” – of Julien 
Offray de la Mettrie, Ludwig Büchner, Karl Vogt, Jacob Moleschott, and Ludwig 
Feuerbach.14 The Austro-Marxists, especially the Machian Austro-Marxists dis-
agreed. They argued that even the materialism of Lenin was suspect, and, following 
the lead of Ernst Mach’s antimetaphysical philosophy of science, they urged a more 
metaphysically austere form of Marxism. The clearest voice on this point was 
Neurath’s Viennese contemporary, Friedrich Adler.
Particularly helpful for understanding the political context of the anti- metaphysics 
movement in Viennese socialist circles is Adler’s 1907 essay, “Friedrich Engels und 
die Naturwissenschaft” (1907/1925), which was reprinted in 1925 in a collection of 
papers, Marxismus und Naturwissenschaft, that was published to honor the thirtieth 
anniversary of Engels’s death (Jenssen 1925). The second section of Adler’s essay 
is entitled, simply, “Anti-Metaphysik” (1907/1925, 153–159). Adler here recalls the 
long history of Marxist critiques of metaphysics starting with Engels’s Anti-Dühring 
(1878/1939) and his “Ludwig Feuerbach und die Ausgang der klassischen deutschen 
Philosophie” (1886). The central point had always been that classical metaphysics, 
through its positing of static entities, is insufficiently dialectical. But Adler then 
traces the development of anti-metaphysical philosophy of science since Engels’s 
day to make the point that, at the beginning of the twentieth century, we had achieved 
14 For more on the history of mechanical materialism from a Marxist point of view, see Wittich 
(1971).
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still greater clarity about the nature and dangerous political tendency of metaphys-
ics in all of its guises. Two important socialist philosophers of science play the lead-
ing role in Adler’s story, the positivists, Richard Avenarius and Ernst Mach. Most 
significant for Adler are Mach’s historical-critical works on mechanics and the 
theory of heat (Mach 1883/1919, 1896/1986) and his late book, Kultur und Mechanik 
(Mach 1915). Adler argues that the historical-critical approach of Mach represents 
the culmination of the dialectical approach in a philosophy of science that eschews 
all metaphysics.
Adler was not alone among socialist, Viennese intellectuals in seeing the situa-
tion in this way. In a 1936 essay on “Logisierender Empirismus in der Philosophie 
der U.S.S.R.,” Neurath’s old friend, fellow student, and fellow member of the left- 
wing of the Vienna Circle, the physicist, Philipp Frank (1936/1949, 202), faulted 
dialectical materialism for “bear[ing] within itself the germ of idealism.” If dialecti-
cal materialism were really sincere about “waging war” against both idealism and 
mechanistic materialism,
it would have to avoid the description of matter as something existing objectively – which 
is also, in the last analysis, an idealistic conception – and instead would speak of intersub-
jective propositions. Then it would approach more and more closely the conception repre-
sented by logical empiricism, especially by the Vienna Circle. For these groups carry on the 
same two-front war, against the idealistic school philosophy and against the belief that 
Newtonian mechanics in its original form is a basis of all science. (Frank 1936/1949, 203.)
Given this context for the anti-metaphysical emphasis in Neurath’s thinking, it is 
instructive to read this early passage from the Vienna Circle’s 1929 manifesto, co- 
written by Neurath, Hahn, and Carnap, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der 
Wiener Kreis:
That Vienna was specially suitable ground for this development is historically understand-
able. In the second half of the nineteenth century, liberalism was long the dominant political 
current. Its world of ideas stems from the enlightenment, from empiricism, utilitarianism 
and the free trade movement of England. […]
Thanks to this spirit of enlightenment, Vienna has been leading in a scientifically ori-
ented people’s education. With the collaboration of Victor Adler and Friedrich Jodl, the 
society for popular education was founded and carried forth; “popular university courses” 
and the “people’s college” were set up by the well-known historian Ludo Hartmann whose 
anti-metaphysical attitude and materialist conception of history expressed itself in all his 
actions. […]
In this liberal atmosphere lived Ernst Mach (born 1838) who was in Vienna as student 
and as privatdozent (1861–64). He returned to Vienna only at an advanced age when a spe-
cial chair of the philosophy of the inductive sciences was created for him (1895). He was 
especially intent on cleansing empirical science, and in the first place, physics, of meta-
physical notions. We recall his critique of absolute space which made him a forerunner of 
Einstein, his struggle against the metaphysics of the thing-in-itself and of the concept of 
substance, and his investigations of the construction of scientific concepts from ultimate 
elements, namely sense data. […]
Roughly at the same time as Mach, his contemporary and friend Josef Popper-Lynkeus 
worked in Vienna. Beside his physical and technical achievements we mention his large- 
scale, if unsystematic philosophical reflections (1899) and his rational economic plan (A 
General Peacetime Labour Draft, 1878). He consciously served the spirit of enlightenment, 
as is also evident from his book on Voltaire. His rejection of metaphysics was shared by 
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many other Viennese sociologists, for example Rudolf Goldscheid. […] Marxist theory 
likewise was cultivated and extended with special emphasis in Vienna (Otto Bauer, Rudolf 
Hilferding, Max Adler and others).
These influences from various sides had the result, especially since 1900, that there was 
in Vienna a sizeable number of people who frequently and assiduously discussed more 
general problems in close connection with empirical sciences. Above all these were episte-
mological and methodological problems of physics, for instance Poincaré’s conventional-
ism, Duhem’s conception of the aim and structure of physical theories (his translator was 
the Viennese Friedrich Adler, a follower of Mach, at that time privatdozent in Zurich); also 
questions about the foundations of mathematics, problems of axiomatics, logistic and the 
like. (Neurath et al. 1929/1973, 301–303.)
These paragraphs seem clearly the work of Neurath, who first drafted the manifesto. 
Later paragraphs, reflecting Carnap’s editorial influence, stress the logical argu-
ments against metaphysics. But here Neurath focuses precisely on the manner in 
which the anti-metaphysical movement grew in the “liberal” political atmosphere of 
Vienna, and he highlights, by name, several of the prominent, Austro-Marxist intel-
lectuals who were among the leaders of the movement. As Neurath (1928/1973, 
295) wrote one year earlier in his Lebensgestaltung und Klassenkampf, “[t]he culti-
vation of scientific, unmetaphysical thought, its application above all to social 
occurrences, is quite Marxist.”
Thus, for Neurath, as for a number of other members of the Vienna Circle, the 
assault on metaphysics was not just an exercise in logic and the philosophy of lan-
guage. It was, instead, one of the key political commitments of logical empiricism.
3.3.4  Physicalism
Many first-time readers of Neurath and many who know about logical empiricism 
from secondary sources are puzzled by the fact that the great opponent of metaphys-
ics was, at the same time, a staunch supporter of physicalism. Why is that not an 
outright contradiction? The answer is that, while physicalism is a metaphysical the-
sis for many philosophers, the claim that everything in the universe is ultimately 
physical in nature, for Neurath, physicalism is a very different kind of claim, a claim 
not about substance, but about language.
Physicalism, for Neurath, is the proscriptive claim that we should adopt a physi-
calist observation language, or protocol language, for all of the sciences, meaning a 
language whose observational primitive terms putatively refer to medium-size phys-
ical objects. The contrast is with phenomenalism, which, like physicalism, is not a 
metaphysical thesis, but the proposal that we adopt a phenomenalist observation 
language, one whose primitive observational terms putatively refer to the subjective 
contents of immediate sense experience. The Vienna Circle’s famous “protocol sen-
tence debate” of the early 1930s was an argument between the proponents of these 
two views, with Neurath (1932/1983, 1934/1983) leading the physicalist side and 
Schlick (1934/1979) leading the phenomenalist side. Carnap (1931/1934, 1931/1987) 
stood in the middle, having already argued in his Der logische Aufbau der Welt 
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(1928/2003) that the choice between a physicalist or a phenomenalist basis for the 
construction of higher scientific concepts was a matter of convention, though he 
opted for a phenomenalist basis in the detailed execution of the project.
The seeming advantage of a phenomenalist protocol language was veridicality in 
our epistemic access to the subjective contents of immediate experience. Such a 
grounding in certainty had been a leitmotif of empiricism going all the way back to 
David Hume who, while denying certainty to all “matters of fact” held that all of our 
ideas must ultimately be grounded in simple ideas that are copies of the “impres-
sions” whose immediacy and vivacity guarantee their truth (Hume 1739–1740, 
1748). But Neurath argued that, even if we chose a phenomenalist protocol lan-
guage, the moment we try to form sentences out of phenomenal primitive terms 
those phenomenalist protocol sentences will already be deeply entangled in the web 
of belief and, thus, will lose whatever foundational status we might have hoped they 
would have possessed. As we saw above, as early as 1913 Neurath (1913/1983, 3) 
had been arguing that “the phenomena that we encounter are so much intercon-
nected that they cannot be described by a one-dimensional chain of statements. The 
correctness of each statement is related to that of all the others.” In the context of the 
early-1930s protocol sentence debate, he elaborates on that same theme:
There is no way to establish fully secured, neat protocol statements as starting points of the 
sciences. There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors who have to rebuild their ship on the 
open sea, without ever being able to dismantle it in dry-dock and reconstruct it from the best 
components. Only metaphysics can disappear without trace. Imprecise “verbal clusters” 
[“Ballungen”] are somehow always part of the ship. If imprecision is diminished at one 
place, it may well appear at another place to a stronger degree. (Neurath 1932/1983, 92)
He concludes: “The fiction of an ideal language composed of neat atomic state-
ments is as metaphysical as the fiction of Laplace’s spirit” (Neurath 1932/1983, 91). 
The fact that a protocol language is a language of statements means that it can never 
be grounded in phenomenal primitive experience. There might be such primitive 
experience, but it cannot be expressed in its primitive form.
If a phenomenalist protocol language is a metaphysical fiction, what is the alter-
native? Better, according to Neurath, to take as the universal, basic language of 
science one built out of terms referring to ordinary, medium-sized physical objects. 
At the very least, such a language has the advantage of speaking about publicly 
accessible objects rather than only privately accessible, subjective experience. 
Moreover, such a protocol language reflects the reality of genuinely human dis-
course. We can clean up ordinary language, purge the metaphysical elements, and 
strive for such precision and clarity as we can achieve. But complete clarity and 
precision is another Cartesian illusion, something in principle impossible to achieve.
Neurath’s emphasis on the public nature of physicalist protocols is a crucial part 
of his argument and another key element of his philosophy of science in action. This 
is because Neurath views science not as an activity pursued by individual scientists, 
but as a collective enterprise. In Lebensgestaltung und Klassenkampf he wrote: “It is 
not a single individual who can really think new notions through to the end, but only 
whole groups or generations. Thinking, too, is a collective occurrence” (Neurath 
1928/1973, 293). This emphasis on the collective nature of intellectual labor had 
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been prominent in the work of Marxist theorists from the earliest years of the move-
ment. It was a point central to the work of Engels (1878/1939, 96), who wrote: 
“What is human thought? Is it the thought of the individual human being? No. But 
it exists only as the individual thought of many billions of past, present and future 
men.” The idea of the collective nature of intellectual labor was also, at the time, 
well known on the left through the work of the now little remembered, German-
American, socialist philosopher, Joseph Dietzgen (1869), whose book, Das Wesen 
der menschlichen Kopfarbeit [The Essence of Human Mental Labor] was widely 
read and cited. For Neurath then, believing that science serves the interests of the 
class struggle, the language of science must facilitate scientific action that is collec-
tive and collaborative as is all striving for progress. Solving the problem of food 
production and distribution, for example, requires the efforts of scientists and engi-
neers from many different disciplines. How can they do that work if they do not 
speak a common language? How can the architect, the urban designer, and the econ-
omist solve the problem of public housing if they cannot communicate.
Neurath’s concern for a universal language that would facilitate inclusive, collec-
tive class struggle extended beyond science as a field of mere research to science in 
application, and this not merely application by technical experts but application 
involving directly those whose lives would be changed. This was the primary moti-
vation behind Neurath’s development of “Isotype,” the universal symbolic language 
for efficiently communicating social and economic information to the working 
classes and people more generally. The basic symbolic forms – silhouettes of facto-
ries, workers, tractors, and sheaves of wheat – are literally physicalist protocols. 
Providing crucial information to workers in this form enables them to participate 
democratically in the great scientific projects of eradicating poverty, educating 
everyone, and bringing peace and justice to the world (see Neurath 1927).
3.3.5  Unity of Science
Neurath’s advocacy of a physicalist protocol language is closely connected with a 
final prominent feature of his socially and politically engaged philosophy of sci-
ence, namely, his championing the ideal of the unity of science. As with his defense 
of physicalism, Neurath’s stress on the importance of the unity of science also occa-
sions serious confusion. There are many different unity of science theses (Cat 2017). 
One might seek a vertical integration, all higher-order sciences, from sociology and 
psychology, down through biology and chemistry, being said to be reducible, ulti-
mately, to physics. But Neurath dismissed this mode of unification as another case 
of metaphysics. One might seek a methodological unification of all of the sciences. 
This, too, Neurath repudiated as vestigal metaphysics. One might seek a lateral 
unification among different branches of science, say by subsuming them all under 
some one or a few fundamental laws, as when, in the nineteenth century, mechanics 
and thermodynamics were unified under the umbrella of the law of the conservation 
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of energy and the entropy law. There is nothing objectionable about such unification, 
per se, unless, as with the dream of total, vertical unification, one projects this as a 
goal for all of the sciences, in which case it becomes, again, metaphysics.
Unity for Neurath meant something strikingly different. It meant, first, the lin-
guistic unification afforded by the choice of a physicalist protocol language, one 
that could be spoken by everyone, from the particle physicist to the social psycholo-
gist. It meant, second, an encyclopedic unification, making the essential contents of 
all of the sciences universally available in the form of a comprehensive collection of 
accessible monographs authored by the best people in every field. This is the vision 
that stood behind the last great, unfinished project of Neurath’s life, the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science (Neurath et  al. 1938–1969; see also Neurath 
1936/1983, 1937a/1983, 1937b/1983).
Neurath always contrasted the ideal of encyclopedic unity with that of the sys-
tematic unity of science envisioned many years earlier by Auguste Comte. Like 
Neurath, Comte wanted to put science to use in the betterment of the human condi-
tion, a commitment that he shared with most of the utopian socialists of the first half 
of the nineteenth century. He envisioned as the culmination of scientific develop-
ment a “social physics,” that would establish the fundamental laws of social phe-
nomena as physics had done for mechanics. This social physics would stand atop 
the great systematic structure of all of the sciences and would be the key to the right 
ordering of society and the achievement of ultimate human well being. The striving 
for systematic unification was to become a hallmark of positivist thinking for many 
decades after Comte. But in this notion of systematization, Neurath saw yet another 
vestige of metaphysical thinking.
Neurath’s concept of encyclopedic unification is to be contrasted, as well, with the 
Soviet model of the centrally planned organization of science. Neurath understood 
that science thrived where diversity was promoted. This is a direct implication of the 
empirical underdetermination of theory choice. There is never one and only one right 
way forward in science. We must allow the exploration of different pathways. This is 
Neurath’s reason for believing that science requires democracy and freedom to flour-
ish. In one of his very last papers, published a few months after his death, Neurath 
replied to a lengthy, critical discussion of his notion of the unity of science by Horace 
Kallen (1940, 1946a) In the face of Kallen’s worries about the possible “totalitarian” 
implications of the “unity of science,” Neurath celebrated the “pluralism” of his own 
view, and invoked the musical metaphor of “orchestration” as a better way of express-
ing the implications of encyclopedic unification. While there is an overall harmony in 
the scientific enterprise, different groups of thinkers must be allowed their own 
voices. Even occasional dissonance can be for the better (Neurath 1946).
In every discussion of the encyclopedia project, Neurath stressed the value of 
encyclopedic unification for fostering more collaborative scientific work. Thus, in a 
1937 article introducing the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science in the 
journal, Philosophy of Science, Neurath (1937a/1983, 181) wrote: “Such an ency-
clopedia will show that scientists, though working in different fields and different 
countries, may nevertheless cooperate as successfully within this wide field as when 
they normally cooperate within such special fields as physics or mathematics.” We 
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see here the same emphasis on the collective nature of scientific investigation that 
was an important premise in the argument for a physicalist protocol language. For 
Neurath, then, the quest for encyclopedic unity in science was yet another essential 
feature of a philosophy of science designed to theorize, legitimate, and actuate sci-
ence in service of progressive political change.
3.4  Conclusion: Neurath Today
Neurath affords us an uncommon example of the philosophical life lived not in the 
clouds but in the rough and tumble of social and political action. In today’s jargon, 
we would call him an activist philosopher of science, someone whose paramount 
goal was to effect progressive, social and political change. Neurath thought that sci-
ence, properly understood, would play a crucial role in striving for that goal. I have 
reviewed, here, the central features of his philosophy of science in action so as to 
understand how, in Neurath’s view, science can play a transformative role in the 
quest for a just social order without compromising the objectivity and the intellec-
tual integrity of science.
Neurath’s vision was not that of a Soviet, scientific, managerial elite that too 
often simply subordinated science to a political agenda, as with the Soviet Union’s 
promotion of Trofim Lysenko to a leading role in the biosciences because the lead-
ership wrongly thought that Lysenko’s resurrection of Lamarckianism – belief in 
the inheritance of acquired characteristics – would facilitate their aim of producing 
the “new Soviet man,” which venture set back Russian bioscience by a generation 
(see Jarovsky (1970) and Sofer (1994)). Neurath’s vision was that of a Viennese 
democratic socialist in the broad tradition of Austro-Marxism. It was a pluralist and 
democratic vision, not a totalitarian one.
Neurath’s vision was also not that of the early- and mid-twentieth century critical 
theorists, such as Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno. They were socialists and 
shared with Neurath and the Austro-Marxists a dissent from Marxist-Leninist ortho-
doxy, along with the belief that ideas, in the form of critique, can play a leading role in 
social change. But, unlike Neurath, they indicted all of science as theorized in the 
empiricist tradition as implicated in the regressive work of merely “traditional theory,” 
by contrast with properly progressive “critical theory” (see Horkheimer 1937/1999 
and Dahms 1994), thereby totally misunderstanding the new, politically- engaged the-
ory of science that had developed on Neurath’s left wing of the Vienna Circle. Neurath 
and Max Horkheimer were in dialogue with one another, but Horkheimer’s blinkered 
view of empiricism as part of the legacy of the Enlightenment made it hard for him to 
grasp the new form of empiricism that Neurath was championing.
Lastly, as mentioned above, Neurath’s vision was neither the neo-liberal view of 
science in democracy promoted by Kitcher nor the neo-Marxist way of regarding 
science developed by strong programme sociologists of scientific knowledge. 
Neurath’s theory of science in action stands apart, as something radically novel in 
its own day and still radically novel today. Is its significance now merely historical, 
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or is it or should it be an integral part of the contemporary conversation about the 
social and political embedding of science and the role of values in science?
Elsewhere I have answered that last question with a resounding, “Yes” (Howard 
2009). Let me here briefly summarize the argument. It is gratifying to see the recent 
upsurge in literature on such topics as the role of values in science. Clearly philoso-
phers of science are once again feeling the need to make the discipline relevant to 
the social and political challenges of the day. Much of this work is first class, 
Heather Douglas (2009) and Kevin Elliott (2017) being two of the top thinkers in 
this space. But no one, in the contemporary literature, has produced the kind of 
highly-articulated, comprehensive, theoretical framework, spanning everything 
from the history of science to science communication, and embedded in both a 
sophisticated political theory and an equally sophisticated, fundamental philosophy 
of science, that Neurath produced. Nor has anyone, today, deployed such a theoreti-
cal framework, as did Neurath, in a wide array of scientific, technical, and policy 
arenas ranging from physics, economics, sociology, and psychology to architecture, 
housing, urban planning, and worker education. Moreover, no one thinker today has 
woven together as did Neurath specific conceptual resources of fundamental impor-
tance, such as the notions of the auxiliary motive, underdetermination of theory 
choice by evidence, pseudorationalism, physicalism, the unity of science, and the 
collective nature of scientific knowledge making. No, Neurath’s philosophy of sci-
ence in action still stands as an exceptional philosophical achievement.
Why did Neurath’s impact wane so rapidly in the post-World War Two era? 
Partly it was the accident of his untimely death in December 1945. The force 
Neurath’s personality was as important to his project as were any of the specific 
theoretical components. Philosophy for Neurath was not simply a body of theory, it 
was a way of life. More important, however, was the dramatically changed political 
climate in the post-war period, especially the tensions of the Cold War and the rise 
of McCarthying in the United States and strident anti-communist movements more 
generally. Neurath’s old friend, Philipp Frank (1957), did his best to try to carry on 
the legacy of Neurath, but the intellectual and political forces at work in the 1950s 
made this impossible.15
Others have argued for the continuing relevance of Neurath’s philosophical proj-
ect (see, for example, Cartwright et al. 1996, Nemeth and Stadler 1996, Uebel 2000, 
and Potochnik 2011). No one did more to revive Neurath’s legacy than the editor of 
his collected papers, Rudolf Haller (1981–1998). A few contemporary scholars have 
respected the enduring import of Neurath’s project sufficiently so as to have sub-
jected it to serious critique, especially the claim that the core methodological notions 
of underdetermination and the auxiliary motive provide the optimal framework for 
theorizing the place of values in science (see Brown 2013). Still, while Neurath’s 
work on Isotype is once again very much in vogue (see Neurath 2010, Vossoughian 
2008), his exemplary philosophy of science in action still does not draw the attention 
that it deserves. More’s the pity.
15 On the Cold War context see Howard (2003) and Reisch (2005). On Frank’s marginalization see 
Reisch (2005, Chap. 15) and Tuboly (2017).
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Chapter 4
Science and Socialism: Otto Neurath 
as a Political Writer (1919–1932)
Günther Sandner
Abstract In the case of Otto Neurath, there was always a close relationship between 
science and politics. It is worth noting, however, that he also intervened in politics 
of the day. The essay focuses on Neurath’s time in Revolutionary Bavaria and Red 
Vienna and analyzes his articles in two newspapers in the interwar period: the 
German periodical Economy and Order of Life (a supplement of the Art Guardian) 
and the Austrian socialist daily Workers’ Newspaper. The examination starts when 
Neurath definitely became a socialist and member of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) after the war in Germany and ends shortly before his forced migration from 
Austria in 1934. The two series of articles differed in some respects. While in 
Economy and Order of Life Neurath focused only socialization, he addressed a 
number of different topics in the Arbeiter-Zeitung (AZ – Workers’ Newspaper) rang-
ing from guild socialism over housing, architecture and settlement to education and 
the scientific world-conception. The question of his role and his self-image was a 
common theme in many of these articles. Beyond that, however, there were even 
approaches to closely related themes that he developed more precisely only in his 
later life: the question of experts, citizens, and democracy.
4.1  Intellectual Interventions into Politics
As most readers of this book would probably agree, Otto Neurath was the most 
effective political character among the Viennese philosophers of Logical Empiricism. 
Although there was a politicized left wing within the Vienna Circle (Carnap 1963; 
Uebel 2005), which included Rudolf Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn and – at its 
periphery – Edgar Zilsel, even among these, nobody ever played a role in politics 
comparable to that of Otto Neurath. His intellectual biography demonstrates that he 
had developed a strong profile in scientific and pedagogical fields such as the 
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history of economy and political economy, sociology, the philosophy of science and 
visual education, and even more (cf. Sandner 2014a). None of his scientific and/or 
educational projects, however, can be strictly separated from politics. In Neurath’s 
case, there was always a close relationship between science and politics. Politics, 
however, existed not only subcutaneously in his well-known intellectual projects 
such as unity of science or international picture language. Moreover, he actually 
intervened in politics of the day. He did so not only on a theoretical level but as an 
active part of political projects such as those in revolutionary Bavaria after the Great 
War or in Red Vienna of the interwar years. This is an obvious difference from both 
the other left-wingers in the Vienna Circle and many political philosophers and/or 
philosophers of science.1
This essay focuses on a particular category of Otto Neurath’s political publica-
tions: his newspaper articles from the interwar period. The examination starts when 
Neurath definitely became a socialist and member of the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) after the war in Germany (Neurath 1920/1973, 21; Sandner 2014a, 127) and 
ends shortly before his forced migration from “New Vienna” or “Red Vienna” in 
1934. In Vienna, he belonged to the Austro-Marxist intellectual group and played 
different roles in culture, education and politics (Sandner 2006).
Otto Neurath often and continuously published in newspapers and the daily 
press, starting as a young scholar and continuing more or less until the end of his 
life. A number of publications on the political Neurath have already focused on this 
issue (e.g. Sandner 2014a, b; Cartwright et al. 1996). This essay, however, concen-
trates on political writings in a narrower sense – on his role as a public disputer, and 
as someone who wanted to convince larger audiences as both an expert and a politi-
cal activist. These publications are little known, and they are not part of any edition 
of collected writings. In addition, they were never translated into English.2
The publications in question represent two different series of articles published 
between 1919 and 1932: Firstly, his contributions for a supplement of the German 
journal Deutscher Wille des Kunstwart (German Will of the Art Guardian) called 
Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung (Economy and Order of Life) in 1919. In this period 
of less than a year, Otto Neurath explained and defended his ideas of a future social-
ized economy. Most of these articles were published very shortly before Neurath 
became president of the Central Economic Office in Munich. Although he devel-
oped similar thoughts and ideas on the issue of socialization in books, booklets and 
scientific essays, there are some peculiarities of these articles due to this particular 
medium and its expected readership. Secondly, there are his contributions in the 
socialist daily Arbeiter-Zeitung (AZ – Workers’ Newspaper) in Vienna. The time-
frame is considerably longer, between 1919 and 1932, and Neurath addressed a 
number of different topics, such as guild socialism, settlement, education, and the 
1 On the political level of Neurath’s philosophical thought, see Don Howard’s chapter in the present 
volume.
2 The most important collections of Otto Neurath’s writings are the following: Neurath and Cohen 
(1973); Hegselmann (1979); Neurath and Cohen (1983); Haller and Rutte (1981); Haller and 
Kinross (1991); Haller and Höfer (1998); Uebel and Cohen (2004).
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scientific world-conception. Although his forced migration from Vienna in 1934 did 
not mean the end of his political writings, it effected a deep impact, even in his 
political life.3
On the one hand, the present essay shows the range of topics that Neurath 
addressed as a political commentator and analyst. In most cases, it is obvious how 
these articles relate to his scientific and philosophical writings. On the other hand, 
Neurath’s writings from these years reflect a theme that was starting to gain ground: 
the question of experts and citizens in a democracy. Of course, this was also a self- 
reflection on his role as an economist, philosopher of science and visual educator. 
Neurath’s contemporary writings on the subject, however, did not make things eas-
ier. He often, and in many different times and contexts, insisted on his role as an 
apolitical social engineer who always aimed to work on and realize his utopian 
ideas independent of political power. Was he exclusively an expert or a partisan 
political commentator? Or did he assume both roles? What exactly was his idea and 
definition of politics? What did he want to achieve, and how were his social and 
political aims related to his scientific program? Did he just translate the scientific 
and philosophical program into political statements and positions, or was there an 
interdependency between his fields?
Why these two particular periodicals? A few words on the criteria for their selec-
tion may be added: Otto Neurath published in many different periodicals, and even 
in many different socialist ones. His essays and articles in Red Vienna, for instance, 
appeared in a number of party political or syndicalist-related newspapers and jour-
nals, such as Arbeit und Wirtschaft (Labor and Economy), Bildungsarbeit 
(Educational Work) or Der Kampf (The Campaign). Although the intellectual level 
of the Arbeiter-Zeitung was remarkably high, its readership was much larger than 
that of Der Kampf, for instance, the programmatic and theoretical journal of the 
Social Democratic Workers’ Party (SDAP). The Workers’ Newspaper was the offi-
cial daily of the Austrian socialists. Founded in the nineteenth century, the newspa-
per became the party’s most important medium, despite being only one of many 
socialist periodicals in interwar Austria. In the mid-1920s, about 100,000 copies 
were published daily (Stadler 1990, 105; Pelinka and Scheuch 1989, 75–76). This 
implied a considerable readership, though not very large compared with the more 
than 700,000 party members at the end of the 1920s (Maderthaner 1995, 180). 
Anyway, it is fascinating to see in which ways Neurath developed his thoughts in his 
journalistic contributions and tried to impart knowledge in this political context.
The Kunstwart (The Art Guardian) had been founded in 1887 in Dresden and 
was edited by poet and publicist Ferdinand Avenarius (brother of philosopher 
Richard Avenarius). The frequency of its publication was mostly biweekly, some-
times only monthly. Although its circulation differed, there were never many more 
than 20,000 copies published (Kratzsch 1969). Its focus was on culture (and espe-
cially the arts), not on politics. It was definitely not a declared socialist or leftwing 
journal; it was targeted to the educated middle class and covered a wide range of 
3 The author has examined the “political Neurath” in both periods of emigration: Sandner (2011) 
and (2019a).
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political orientations, including German nationalist ones. Nevertheless, Otto 
Neurath used its supplement Economy and Order of Life and even exploited it with 
the help of his friend Wolfgang Schumann. During the first half of the year 1919, 
they used the medium to influence a politically interested and educated bourgeois 
readership. They decided to back their ideas for a wide-ranging socialization of the 
economy with the help of this periodical. Both Otto Neurath and Wolfgang 
Schumann had already been active with the traditional Der Kunstwart before.
4.2  Socialization, Social Economy and Socialism
4.2.1  The War Economist and Socialization Theoretician
Before the Great War, Otto Neurath was primarily known in the intellectual world 
as an economist. Although he had also addressed subjects in other academic fields, 
such as the philosophy of science or, as a young man, even German literature, it was 
his theory of war economy that drew broad attention to his intellectual work. In this 
context, his focus was twofold: He both examined war economy historically (his 
doctoral thesis was on the history of economy) and studied contemporary wars and 
their economic consequences, especially the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 (Sandner 
2017). Based upon this research, he developed his theory on war economy. In 
Neurath’s view, political economy had previously paid insufficient attention to war 
economy. Aside from obvious and undisputable negative effects, he was convinced 
that war could also stimulate an economy. To evaluate and systematize these differ-
ent effects of war on the economy, a special discipline of war economy was needed 
(as a sub-discipline of political economy). Although he was not the first to address 
the topic, as he himself admitted, he presented himself as the founder of this new 
approach as a special scientific discipline (Neurath 1913). Well-established scholars 
such as Max Weber respected and recognized him as an expert in this field, and 
economist Franz Eulenburg (1916/17, 1918) discussed his approach in the well- 
established journal Archive for Social Science and Social Policy (Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik).4 Franz Eulenburg, certainly, fundamentally 
rejected Neurath’s thesis. For him, war was nothing but a rare case in economics 
that neither delivered useful advice nor served as any role model for a well- 
functioning peace-time economy.
Neurath, in contrast, was convinced that the instruments of war economy such as 
planning and scientific expertise, calculation in kind, and the strong focus on effi-
ciency and productivity, were perfectly useful even and especially in peace. He was 
convinced that the future economy was an administrative and moneyless economy 
beyond the market. He insisted that there could always be a much better utilization 
of energies in the economy  – and in his view, it was the war economy that 
4 On Neurath’s economic ideas, see Jordi Cat’s, Elisabeth Nemeth’s, and Thomas Uebel’s chapters 
in the present volume.
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 demonstrated how this could be done. A peacetime economy that used these experi-
ences was the key for a better future society. This new economic order could achieve 
its most important aim: A higher quality of life for the people. Thus, paradoxically, 
it was the war that paved the way for human happiness.
During the Great War, Otto Neurath’s ideas of war economy were both exploited 
and institutionalized. Although he further insisted on his role of an expert, he sided 
politically, implicitly at least, with the Central Powers Austria-Hungary and 
Germany. Parts of the military were extremely interested in his research on war 
economy and tried to make use of it. After his deployment as an officer of the 
Austrian army on the Russian front, he returned to Vienna and became leader of a 
group in the Scientific Committee of War Economy (Wissenschaftliches Komitee für 
Kriegswirtschaft) in April 1916. Almost simultaneously, he got involved in the 
emerging Museum of War Economy in Leipzig, whose director he became in 1918 
(Sandner 2014a, 85–99 and 2014c, 389–394).
After the war, there was a widespread intellectual consensus that there must be 
changes in both the political and the economic order. In this time “war socialism” – 
the idea that war had prepared the conditions for socialism  – became popular 
(Krüger 1997; Sandner 2014a, 109–111). In some respects, at least, this concept 
was similar to Neurath’s approach. There was a widespread mood for change. In this 
context, the question of socialization was widely discussed, not only by representa-
tives of the radical left. Walter Rathenau, for instance, was among the references 
Otto Neurath often mentioned in his writings, as well as Rudolf Wissell, Wichard 
von Moellendorf and others (cf. Rathenau 1918, Moellendorff 1916).
Neurath systematically adapted his concept for socialization from his theory of 
war economy. Again, he tried to implement his economic ideas practically and to 
intervene directly into politics. The addressees, however, were no longer the mili-
tary powers of Germany and Austria. Now, he applied to the post-war revolutionary 
governments. Together with Wolfgang Schumann and Hermann Kranold, he 
designed the so-called Kranold-Neurath-Schumann plan in February 1919 (Neurath 
1919). They developed their idea for a total socialization5 and indicated concrete 
measures for its implementation. The booklet ended in 21 legislative proposals. The 
three men were convinced that socialist governed Saxony could be an ideal place to 
start with the necessary transformation of the economic order. Much to their regret, 
however, the left-wing government refused their proposals (Sandner 2014a, 
111–114).
Neurath’s ideas for socialization were anything but unclear. “The aim of social-
ization is to produce and distribute the final product socialistically,” he put it 
(1920/2004, 377). The year before, he had explained: “Of a complete realization of 
socialism, however, one can generally speak only when both the socialist distribu-
tion and the planned administration of production takes places through society” 
(1919/1973, 137). With thoughts like this, however, he tried to convince the reader-
ship of a well-established German periodical.
5 As Neurath (1920a, 7) pointed out, the term total socialization (Vollsozialisierung) was not his 
own but was introduced by Wolfgang Schumann.
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4.2.2  The Articles for the Supplement Economy and Order 
of Life
Beginning in 1908 and continuing through the prewar period, Otto Neurath wrote a 
number of articles for the Kunstwart, even addressing the subject of war economy 
in them (cf. Wilhelm 1911). Moreover, he became a friend of Wolfgang Schumann, 
the stepson of editor Ferdinand Avenarius. It was the beginning of a collaboration 
between Neurath and Schumann that continued for many years. Wolfgang Schumann 
not only contributed continuously to the journal, later acting as its editor, but was 
also a fellow-campaigner in another venture of Avenarius – the Dürerbund (Dürer 
League), an organization that was active in cultural policy (Kratzsch 1969).
Between October 1915 and March 1919 Der Kunstwart was published under a 
new name as Deutscher Wille des Kunstwarts (German Will of the Art Guardian). 
This name as well as the idea behind it was obviously related to the war. Addressing 
a “German Will” in times of war implied both ideological militarization and politi-
cization; it denoted the will to win the war, the German will to victory. According to 
the editorial concept of the Kunstwart, however, it was not only and even not neces-
sarily a war on material things (such as territories, population, industries etc.) but a 
war between national or ethnic communities that differed in character, spiritually as 
well as morally (Kratzsch 1969, 364–398).
After the war, the journal appeared in a new format, and with a new supplement 
called Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung (Economy and Order of Life). In January 
1919, it was presented as a joint venture between the traditional Kunstwart and the 
newly established Deutsches Wirtschaftsmuseum (German Economic Museum), the 
follower of the War Museum in Leipzig. Otto Neurath was still its director, and his 
museum was responsible for the supplement. The two parts of the journal, the 
German Will and its supplement, differed even in design: Old German lettering in 
one (Deutscher Wille des Kunstwart), alphabetic characters in Latin in the other 
(Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung). Even in its short history of nine months, the sup-
plement’s subtitle changed repeatedly. It was usually Papers of the German 
Economic Museum (Blätter des Deutschen Wirtschaftsmuseums) with or without 
the appendix Biweekly of economic understanding (Halbmonatsschrift für 
Wirtschaftsverständnis). Only in a few issues it was explicitly indicated that the 
periodical was directed by Otto Neurath and Wolfgang Schumann.
In an introductory essay, four men explained the character of the joint venture: 
Editor Ferdinand Avenarius and publisher Georg D.W. Callwey spoke for the tradi-
tional Kunstwart and, for the German Economic Museum, its director Otto Neurath 
and its general secretary Wolfgang Schumann chimed in (Avenarius et al. 1919).
On the whole, the supplement appeared in the journal’s issues 1–14 of 1919 
(published in the period between January and September). Due to the role of Otto 
Neurath, there was an obvious trend: The later the date of the publication of the 
supplement’s issue, the fewer his own contributions. He was extremely active in 
issues 1–6, but in the later ones, he published only a single article or nothing at all. 
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The journal as a whole was renamed Kunst- und Kulturwart (Guardian of Art and 
Culture) in April 1919, and the supplement continued for only a few months.
In the introduction to the series, Otto Neurath and Wolfgang Schumann stressed 
their idea of economic enlightenment without any party political bias. The supple-
ment’s idea, as they put it, was to transfer social and economic knowledge to the 
people, not to proclaim political doctrines (Neurath and Schumann 1919). This 
position corresponded with their view on socialization: Both men were convinced 
that the advantages of a socialized economy can be demonstrated and even be 
proven by science. Therefore, socialization needed to be discussed objectively and 
reasonably. It would not be political polemic but scientific evidence that would help 
to transform the economy.
In fact, the supplement had only a very few authors. Wolfgang Schumann and 
especially Otto Neurath were by far the most frequent contributors. In Neurath’s case, 
however, this was not obvious prima facie. It was the use of pseudonyms that con-
cealed the obvious staffing shortage. Otto Neurath wrote not only with his real name 
but also under two other identities, as “Fonsow” and as “Karl Wilhelm.” While the 
former name was not that easy to identify, the latter – a pseudonym he had used before 
and would use afterward – was obvious: The author’s full name was Otto Karl Wilhelm 
Neurath. Most of the supplement’s issues consisted of only eight pages and included, 
besides the texts of Neurath, Schumann and a few occasional authors, historical texts 
such as those of John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx or Karl von Vogelsang.
The supplement’s main theme was, naturally, socialization. Its key text was the 
four-part essay Zur Sozialisierung der Wirtschaft (Towards the socialization of the 
economy), in which Otto Neurath (as Fonsow) developed his idea of socialization 
and even discussed some problems that could face a future non-market economy. In 
the first part (Fonsow 1919a), he contrasts two different models of the economic 
order: The free market economy (Verkehrswirtschaft) on the one hand and the future 
socialist economy as an administrative economy followed by a plan on the other. In 
a socialized economy it is community, and not the individual entrepreneur as mas-
ter, who makes production decisions. In a free market economy, those enterprises 
were undertaken that yielded the highest money profits. In the administrative econ-
omy, in contrast, the plan replaces net profits in regulating the economy. In the end, 
the economy yields the same advantages to all and increased people’s happiness. 
Neurath eventually addresses some possible problems: If there is no profit, how to 
motivate individuals to collaborate in a “socialized society” (Fonsow 1919a, 4)? 
How can the danger of a dramatic decrease in production be prevented? In answer 
to this question, Neurath presents systems of premiums (i.e. gratifications for hard 
and efficient workers) in the second part of the essay. Premiums, as Neurath under-
stood them, would be related to the requirements of the community. That means that 
premiums even may be paid if noisy works are not undertaken or dust formation is 
avoided (Fonsow 1919b, 11).
In the third part, he explains the systems of premiums in more detail and then 
points out that a future economy needs to find out systematically exactly which 
humans are suited for which activity. What were the best activities to assign each 
individual? How can planners optimize the use of capabilities? How can planners 
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bring about a combination of people and jobs such that a maximum of happiness is 
achieved? The socialization’s aim was a socialized order of life, based upon 
improved efficiencies, but without any schematization of personal life. Probably, as 
Neurath prognosticated, there would even be greater diversification of ways of life 
in socialism (Fonsow 1919c, 22).
In the last part, Neurath portrayed the Central Economic Office as the decisive 
authority, shortly before he actually became president of exactly this institution in 
Munich, and he focused on the need for universal statistics and an economic plan as 
a basic principle. For Neurath, the ideal time for socialization was not sometime in 
the future, it was now. Socialization, he continued, could start even in a region 
smaller than a nation-state, and there was simply no need to wait for neighboring 
countries. In his view, socialization was the best system for the postwar economy 
because it could handle problems such as shortage and poverty with its strong focus 
on economic efficiency. In this context, he referred to the example of 3000 different 
pocketknives that seemingly existed at that time (Fonsow 1919d, 36). The setting of 
industrial norms and types implied the disappearance of many types that, in fact, 
nobody really needed. This could happen, however, without any decline in quality 
of life. Socialization, he continued, must be done without compromises. It always 
meant total socialization. To socialize or not was only a political question, he put it, 
but if a society decided on socialization, it needed to be done immediately, quickly 
and entirely (Fonsow 1919d, 37).
Beyond this core idea, he addressed a few other subjects. He explained, for 
instance, his concept of utopia (Neurath 1919) and stressed the importance of edu-
cation for a future society (Wilhelm 1919a).
Otto Neurath played different roles in the issues of the journal. In sum, he pub-
lished about 20 articles. As “Fonsow” he embodied the political economist, the 
established economic expert, who designed a future society, and discussed its per-
spectives and chances, as well as its possible problems. His argumentation was 
based on scientific evidence though not always beyond any party political bias. As 
“Karl Wilhelm” he examined some selected and concrete problems in greater detail, 
such as economy in kind and its effects on interstate relations, among others 
(Wilhelm 1919b, c, d). In comparison to Fonsow, who debated on principles, Karl 
Wilhelm was the empiricist who did little case studies. As Otto Neurath, he spoke 
officially, as editor of the journal and director of the museum. In fact, however, there 
was no clear separation between the authors, and, in the end, it was of course always 
Otto Neurath under different names.
Wolfgang Schumann, who published many articles in the journal, portrayed the 
German Economic Museum, for instance, that succeeded the Museum of War 
Economy in two parts (Schumann 1919a, b). Among the few other contributions, 
some of which are published anonymously, is one Neurath’s companion Herman 
Kranold wrote about economic activities with and without a plan. No surprise, the 
former approach is by far the better one, according to the author (Kranold 1919).
Politically, two things are remarkable. Firstly, Neurath criticized the Spartacus 
League (the forerunner of the Communist Party) for its idealized idea of man 
(Fonsow 1919b, 9), and he also repeatedly rejected the politics of the Bolsheviks. 
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He not only explained his approach as an economic expert but also envisaged and 
reflected on a future socialist society. In addition, he stressed the fact that socializa-
tion, a socialist order of life, was a question of political will. However, he obviously 
did not address a particular German Will, as the title of the journal suggests. It was 
the will of the proletarian masses to realize socialism. For Neurath, there was no 
better way of living than in a socialized economy and socialist society. And if one 
thinks there is a better way, he continued, it needs to be demonstrated through sci-
entific evidence (Fonsow 1919d, 37).
Although his essays did not represent a detailed analysis of his socialization 
theory (as he presented in some other publications) he delivered a summarized ver-
sion of it and even discussed some practical problems as contributions to public 
debate. The aim was to persuade an educated readership, including multipliers such 
as teachers and publicists, that a new economic order was unavoidable.
In the supplement’s last issue in September 1919, the revolutionary spirit had 
trickled away. Otto Neurath was no longer present, and Wolfgang Schumann 
(1919c) asserted the end of any effort to realize a planned economy, effective social-
ization and socialism. Interestingly, the dramatic events in Munich in spring and 
summer of 1919 played almost no role in Economy and Order of Life. Not in the 
supplement but in the journal Der Kunst- und Kulturwart, however, Wolfgang 
Schumann (1919d) touched on the subject. His article was, as the subtitle suggests 
(“personal experiences with the press”) about his experiences with media reports. 
He complained about many false reports in the post-revolutionary Munich press, 
including those which reported his own assassination (!), and also responded to the 
defamations of his friend Otto Neurath. Moreover, both Schumann (1919e, f) and 
editor Avenarius (1919) looked back to Munich in three articles in which they tried 
to adjust and even relativize Schumann’s role in revolutionary Bavaria.
Otto Neurath published only at rare intervals in the later issues of the journal’s 
supplement, obviously because of his activities in economic planning in Munich. 
He became president of the Central Economic Office on 27 March 1919 under a 
socialist-bourgeois government and remained in office under two short-term coun-
cil republics. After only a few weeks, he was dismissed in May 1919 and accused of 
high treason. After the trial and his condemnation to one and a half years of prison, 
he was instead extradited to Vienna in February 1920 thanks to the continuous inter-
ventions of the Austrian government, including and especially two social demo-
crats, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Otto Bauer and Chancellor Karl Renner (Sandner 
2014a, 132–143). In early 1920, his new career in Red Vienna started. In his booklet 
on Experiences of Socialization in Bavaria (Bayerische Sozialisierungserfahrungen) 
he recapitulated the past months as follows:
I think we need not give up hope that all those in opposition to capitalism could join forces 
to replace a capitalist order with a socialist planned economy, in a peaceful manner, without 
submitting to compromise. I still believe that we could introduce socialism in the near 
future if we definitely want it. Those who say this are being sharply attacked, even hated by 
many; this has to be suffered, but we should not react with counter-hatred and emotional 
distortion. Only by remaining dispassionate ourselves can we demand objectivity from our 
opponents, only then can we hope that the future will led in without bitter fight. Socialism 
will come anyhow; may it come, not with hatred, but with love. (Neurath 1920/1973, 28.)
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4.3  The Austro-Marxist
4.3.1  Back in Vienna
Back in his birthplace, Vienna, Otto Neurath began working feverishly. He orga-
nized schools and training sessions for members of the newly founded workers’ 
council in early 1920 (Sandner 2014a, 158) and became general secretary of a 
Research Institute of Social Economy (Foschungsinstitut für Gemeinwirtschaft), 
that consulted the Austrian commission for socialization and carried out economic 
studies (Sandner 2014a, 162–165). Despite the existence of workers’ councils and 
ongoing research on social economy, in fact, the Austrian efforts toward socializa-
tion ended, at the latest, in October 1920 when the Social Democratic Party lost the 
general elections and went into opposition. Only a very small sector of the Austrian 
economy was successfully socialized i.e. transformed into a social economy: the 
former corporations of the military apparatus in Vienna (Weissel 1976; Gerlich 
1980). For Neurath (1922e), however, this was not socialization but only “social 
capitalism” because these enterprises were still embedded in a market economy.
Nevertheless, he did not lose his ambitions and further developed his theoretical 
approach: He explicitly linked his socialization theory with guild socialism, and 
discussed the writings of British left-winger G.D.H.  Cole. Although he rejected 
some elements of Cole’s theory, he also combined its organizational idea with total 
socialization (see below). By 1921, Otto Neurath had become one of the settlement 
movement’s most important representatives and the mastermind of its unification 
and centralization. The settlement movement was based upon common property and 
thus represented social economy. Its organization was similar to the idea of guilds. 
Thus, Neurath became secretary of the social housing guild (Baugilde) and general 
secretary of the Austrian Association for Settlement and Allotment (Österreichischer 
Verband für Siedlungs- und Kleingartenwesen). The latter organized an exhibition 
on settlement in Vienna in autumn 1923 which resulted in the foundation of a 
museum for settlement (Sandner 2014a, 165–176).6 These activities paved the way 
for his most important institution, the Social and Economic Museum (Gesellschafts- 
und Wirtschaftsmuseum), the director of which he became in 1925. In addition, he 
was extremely active in adult education and was, among many other activities, one 
of the teachers in the socialist Worker’s University (Arbeiterhochschule), founded in 
1926. From 1924 onwards, the meetings of the Schlick-Circle (resp. Vienna Circle) 
took place. Thus, Otto Neurath was active in many Viennese intellectual and 
 educational fields. His numerous lectures and speeches demonstrate the astonishing 
variety of his themes (regularly announced in the periodical Arbeiter-Zeitung).
Otto Neurath was a member of the Austrian Social Democratic Workers’ Party 
(SDAP) and collaborated with the left-wing government of the city of Vienna. 
Although he was never a party official he published many articles for socialist 
6 For more on Neurath’s involvement in the Settlement movement, see Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter 
in the present volume.
G. Sandner
77
periodicals. It is worth noting that some of these socialist papers, including the AZ, 
frequently used picture statistics according to his Vienna Method (though they also 
used non-Neurathian picture statistics). In the election campaign of 1927, the Vienna 
Method of Picture Statistics was extensively used to promote socialist slogans such 
as “Einheitsschule statt Einheitsliste” (comprehensive school instead of unified list 
of candidates).7
4.3.2  The Articles in the Workers’ Newspaper
Between 1919 and 1932 Otto Neurath wrote 25 articles for the daily Workers’ 
Newspaper (AZ). Thematically, these articles can be divided into four different 
groups (which are, nevertheless, related to each other). The first group is on social-
ization and guild socialism: In fact, these show a smooth transition with respect to 
his publications in Economy and Order of Life. On March 27, 1919, the day he 
became president of the Central Economic Office in Munich, Neurath published an 
article on the question of total socialization vs partial nationalization (Neurath 
1919). Unsurprisingly, he clearly favored the first option and rejected the second. It 
included also a message for the Austrian socialists: Neurath developed the idea of a 
joint venture in socialization between Saxony, Bavaria and Austria that would, in his 
view, exert political pressure on the German Reich to finally implement and realize 
a serious socialization policy.
In February 1921, Neurath reviewed G.D.H. Cole’s book on guild socialism, 
introduced by Wolfgang Schumann and translated by his wife Eva Schumann 
(Neurath 1921a). Guild socialism was an important movement in the early twentieth 
century, especially in Great Britain, Germany and Austria. It implied (among other 
things) that different groups of employed persons (blue collar workers, white collar 
workers etc.) were to be organized as guilds in their particular economic sectors. 
Guild organization contrasts with the organizational model of the trade unions, 
which focused on the same groups of employed persons from different economic 
firms and economic sectors. In Neurath’s view, it was important to combine this 
organizational approach with an economic plan (and especially in this respect, he 
adapted or complemented Cole). A few months later, he explained in another article 
that, in fact, there were two different political formations of guilds: guild liberalism 
and guild socialism (Neurath 1921b), and he clearly favored the latter. In December 
1921, he reported on his activities in the settlement movement and the making of the 
housing guild (Baugilde) (Neurath 1921c).
7 “Einheitsschule“was the name for the socialist conception of school organization. It meant the 
same school for all children, independent of family background and social class. The “Einheitsliste” 
was a coalition of rightwing parties that ran successfully for the general election of 1927 against 
the feared socialist electoral victory. The Einheitsliste won more than 48% while the SDAP took 
only 42% (cf. Dachs 1995, 150). For the election campaign see the article “Wählt Einheitsschule 
statt Einheitsliste” (Vote for comprehensive school – not for the unified list of candidates), in: 
Arbeiter-Zeitung, 16 April 1927, 9.
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The development of the settlement movement in Vienna dates back to the time of 
around 1918, when the city was suffering from economic hardship and severe food 
shortages. In postwar Austria, the movement was a self-help initiative that became 
a kind of small-scale realization of a non-capitalistic, social economy. Nevertheless, 
the Austrian economy remained far from total socialization, and even in the social 
democratic movement, most intellectual debaters rejected Neurath’s ideas (Sandner 
2014a, 147–150). In July 1922, Neurath wrote an article on class struggle and guild 
socialism, in which he described an existing and growing polarization between the 
proletarian and the bourgeois “front” in Austria (Neurath 1922a). In his view, the 
guild was a decisive instrument for the former because it helped to integrate social 
groups beyond industrial workers, including manual workers, clerks, bookkeepers, 
physicians etc. Guilds included working people of an entire economic sector, and 
therefore they broadened the proletarian front. The housing guild, for instance, rep-
resented among others construction workers, tenants and settlers. Altogether the 
guild included about 250,000 members (Sandner 2014a, 169–170).
With respect to the heavy Marxist class rhetoric he used, it is interesting to note 
that Otto Neurath had his own problem with respect to the strong polarization 
between the bourgeois and the proletarian front. As a representative of the settle-
ment movement he published an article for the bourgeois liberal newspaper Neue 
Freie Presse (Neurath 1921d). The fact that a socialist author wrote for a non- 
socialist periodical was hereupon heavily criticized by an anonymous author in the 
AZ (Anonymous 1921), and Neurath had a hard time explaining why he had done so 
(Neurath 1921e; Sandner 2014a, 171–173).
Consequently, in August 1922, Neurath claimed that farmworkers and forest 
workers should be organized in the same guild and join this venture with the settle-
ment movement (Neurath 1922b). A few months later, he announced an interna-
tional meeting of the Baugilden in Vienna and developed some ideas on the 
unification or internationalization of national guild organizations (Neurath 1922c).
The second group of articles addressed the subjects of housing, architecture and 
settlement. In August 1922, Neurath intervened into debates on social policy and 
proposed a new measure against unemployment: Public funding for workers in par-
ticular economic sectors, for instance in cooperative housing estates. The idea was 
that communities, corporations etc. get the out-of-work benefits to create new jobs 
(Neurath 1922d). In the following year, he discussed the so-called one-kitchen 
house (Einküchenhaus). Its idea was that collectively organized meals for all tenants 
in a house reduced women’s housework and enabled them to do paid work. Neurath 
discussed the idea critically, because many working class families refused to live in 
such houses, he argued. In fact, it were mainly bourgeois intellectuals who favored 
this way of living. Nevertheless, he presented it as one possible way of proletarian 
living – as was living in the settlement (Neurath 1923a). In a later article, he argued 
for an architectural program for the rapidly changing city of Vienna (Neurath 
1923b). Consequently, he favored the idea of a general plan of architecture 
(Generalarchitekturplan) (Neurath 1923c). Especially in these articles, he demon-
strated that he had remained a planning enthusiast: Only an architectural plan could 
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bring the necessary architectural unity. Whether the city of Vienna followed this 
plan or not was a crucial question for the future standard of living of its people.
In January 1926, Otto Neurath reviewed two small books written by architects on 
proletarian architecture and proletarian houses of culture (Neurath 1926). He mostly 
agreed with the ideas of the authors and asserted affirmatively that a proletarian 
architecture is on its way forward. Class struggle, Neurath agreed, is also a cultural 
conflict, and the issue of architecture plays an important role in it. Otto Neurath was 
also active in the Viennese Werkbund exhibition of 1932. He published two articles 
on this topic in the AZ. In the first one (Neurath 1932a), he portrayed the Werkbund 
settlement as an adequate example for happy future living. The settlement of 70 
houses designed by different architects in an outward district of the city of Vienna 
was presented as a model for modern living. In the second article (Neurath 1932b), 
he formulated some closing words on the ending exhibition and came to an ambiva-
lent conclusion. Not everything planned was achieved. The project’s initial idea to 
make an exhibition of a communal housing estate could not be realized. Nevertheless, 
it represented an exhibition of many different model houses and put up the housing 
problem for discussion.
The third group of articles focused on questions of education. In this context, 
Neurath reflected on the school of the future (Neurath 1923d). The organization of 
the educational system was a crucial issue for the working class. Future public 
schools, he pointed out, have to be accessible regardless of social class. The existing 
schools, however, were based on a strict separation between bourgeois and proletar-
ian kids. He additionally stressed that the worldview or ideology of the existing 
teachers would also be decisive for future political development. Therefore, the 
question needed to be raised of how to exert appropriate political (socialist, he 
meant) influence on them.
Questions of school and education were among the strongest ideological con-
flicts in interwar Austria, pitting conservative-clericals (and/or German nationalists) 
on one side against liberals and Marxists on the other. In an article from 1923, 
Neurath reported on the case of educator Gustav Wyneken, who was accused of 
pederasty (Neurath 1923e). For Neurath, Wyneken was a bourgeois reformer, not a 
socialist, and therefore not an ally of the working class. He pointed out that 
Wyneken’s educational reform focused on the bourgeois youth, not the proletarian 
one.8 Nevertheless, he remained distanced not only with Wyneken but also with his 
critics, and did not join in the storm of protest against the educator. Moreover, he did 
not condemn pederasty at all. This lack of moral condemnation, however, was the 
reason for reactionary protests by rightwing periodicals such as Reichspost, which 
polemicized heavily against Neurath (Anonymous 1923). There was even an after-
math of this article in a libel case of a Catholic educational organization against a 
journalist of the AZ. In this case, Otto Glöckel, the former state secretary of educa-
tion and head of the Vienna school board, surveyed as a witness in the trial, was 
faced with Neurath’s article. What did he say to this article – did it represent the 
socialist perception he was asked? Glöckel replied only cagily (Anonymous 1924).
8 On Otto Neurath and the Youth Movement, see Sandner (2019b).
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Neurath also discussed the problem of career advice in a class society and 
stressed the fact that education and choice of career always depended on class, 
which was more important than individual capability and competence (Neurath 
1923f). He also focused on the differences between proletarian and bourgeois- 
liberal education reforms (the title, which denoted a “proletarian-bourgeois reform” 
was obviously an editorial mistake), and stressed the fact that this differentiation 
was a crucial issue for socialist policy (Neurath 1923g).
The fourth group of articles dealt with socialism and the scientific world- 
conception. Neurath reviewed a collection of essays of Ernst Mach, edited by his 
son Ludwig Mach. Ernst Mach was, as Neurath pointed out, not only an extraordi-
nary physician but also an important forerunner of a scientific world-conception 
(Neurath 1921d). Later he reviewed a book of the Jesuit Heinrich Pesch (Neurath 
1924). It was a book against socialism, including any Christian version of socialist 
thought. Neurath critically compared the author’s views with those of Karl Vogelsang 
and his writings in the nineteenth century. In contrast to Pesch, Vogelsang had dem-
onstrated, in Neurath’s eyes at least, strong sympathies with Christian socialism. 
The idea of his article was to demonstrate that contemporary Christian thought had 
moved away from their former social and socialist-friendly tendencies.
In the following year, he presented Epicurus, especially his lessons on happiness, 
as a forerunner of socialism and as a counterpart to Christian morality (Neurath 
1925a). For Neurath, Epicurus had paved the way to an ethics beyond theology. As 
in his later book, Personal Life and Class Struggle (Neurath 1928/1973), he subse-
quently interpreted Marxism as Social-Epicureanism.
A very remarkable example of Neurath’s contributions to the AZ is an article on 
the scientific world-conception (Neurath 1929). In fact, it is about scientific social-
ism, its development, its rise and its relevance. He claimed for an approach to work-
ers’ education based upon modern science. Neurath explained that historically, the 
scientific world-conception was a child of the eighteenth-century enlightenment. 
While enlightenment and materialism were supported by the educated bourgeoisie, 
in the twentieth century it was only the working class who was an ally of enlighten-
ment and scientific thinking. The bourgeoisie, in contrast, defended reactionary 
thoughts of theology and metaphysics. This article was printed shortly after the 
publication of the famous manifesto Scientific World Conception. The Vienna Circle, 
and only a few days after philosopher Moritz Schlick had received the booklet 
which was dedicated to him (cf. Mulder 1968/2012). Although the title was the 
same as that of the manifesto, its content differed considerably.
Beyond these four groups of articles, there was only one of Otto Neurath’s con-
tributions for the AZ that addressed a different subject: In a rather surprising article, 
he wrote on the Indian reformer and pacifist Mahatma Gandhi (Neurath 1925b). 
Obviously, India and ideas from the Orient were very popular in these years. 
Neurath’s article, however, was not uncritical. He criticized, for instance, Gandhi’s 
“unworldly” proposal of stopping to beget Indian children under colonial rule; how-
ever, the article was obviously written with strong sympathy with his fight against 
economic exploitation against the backdrop of the colonial history of India.
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Interestingly, and in contrast to many other periodicals, including socialist ones, 
Neurath never wrote about visual education and his Vienna Method of Picture 
Statistics in the AZ.
4.4  Intellectual Interventions into Politics
Between the two journals in question, Economy and Order of Life and Workers’ 
Newspaper, there was obviously a political difference. The supplement of the Art 
Guardian resp. German Will of the Art Guardian (Deutscher Wille des Kunstwart), 
was a joint venture of Neurath and Schumann with a heterogeneous and even bizarre 
ideological formation. It is questionable in many respects to what extent the politi-
cal opinions and ideas of both sides were matched at all. Both men, indeed, had 
worked for the Kunstwart before. In the midst of Neurath’s controversial article of 
1917 on “the reversed Taylor System,” there was an announcement of an Anti- 
British call to sign war bonds (Neurath 1917, 21). Moreover, the journal included a 
number of German nationalistic articles. How to remain objective, neutral and non- 
partisan? Although Neurath was neither a warmonger nor a nationalist, his idea of 
himself as an economic expert and a social engineer seemed to help him to bridge 
the resulting political gap.
The situation in Vienna was different. The AZ was a social-democratic, leftwing 
periodical. Neurath was only occasionally an author there and had no editorial role, 
but his articles were mostly in line with the editorial policy, even though the party 
did never follow his ideas on socialization. In fact, he was not only a political but 
also a party political writer.
Therefore, the two series of articles differed in some respects. While in Economy 
and Order of Life he focused only on socialization, he addressed a number of differ-
ent topics in the AZ. While in Economy and Order of Life he used pseudonyms, he 
published for the social democratic daily only with his real name. And while 
Economy and Order of Life was – at least in its first issues – also his periodical (he 
directed it together with Wolfgang Schumann), he only was one of many contribu-
tors to the AZ. Nevertheless, there were also common features and themes.
One of these subjects was the question of his role and his self-image. First and 
foremost, he was a social engineer, as he consistently revealed. But even as a com-
mentator and debater, as someone who intervened into politics, he insisted on his 
role of an expert. Obviously, he never saw his role in terms of politics. He was con-
vinced that science and politics could be separated clearly – and he was always on 
the side of science, even as a writer of articles for newspapers.
Beyond that, however, there were even approaches to closely related themes that 
he developed more precisely only in his later life: the question of experts, citizens, 
and democracy.
In his articles on socialization, for instance, he developed the idea that – although 
the economic plans were designed only by experts and socialization needed, in gen-
eral, a large number of experts – it is, in the end, the people who decide about 
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different options. Ordinary men, the proletariat, should choose the plan that will be 
put into practice. A similar idea appears in some AZ articles. Although the experts 
(architects, for instance) work out their concepts for a future way of life, it will be 
the working-class, the people who have to decide how they will live. The debates on 
the Werkbund settlement or the one-kitchen house are striking examples. If working- 
class families did not want to live in those ways, other options must be chosen.
It was only in his later life that he linked this approach systematically with visual 
education as an instrument that enables necessary collaboration between experts 
and ordinary people, presenting Isotype, the International System of Typographic 
Picture Education, as a way to bridge the epistemic gap (Neurath 1996).9
4.5  A List of Otto Neurath’s Articles
4.5.1  Otto Neurath’s Articles in Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung
Neurath, Otto, and Wolfgang Schumann. 1919. Zur Einführung. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (1): 1–2.
Fonsow (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Zur Sozialisierung der Wirtschaft. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (1): 2–4.
Wilhelm, Karl (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Zwischenstaatliche Naturalwirtschaft. 
Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung 1 (1): 4–5.
Nth. (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Utopien. Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung 1 (1): 5–6.
Fonsow (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Zur Sozialisierung der Wirtschaft. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (2): 9–11.
K.W. (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Volkswirtschaftliche Lehrerkurse. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (2): 13–14.
Nth. (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Der achtstündige Arbeitstag. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (2): 14–15.
Wilhelm, Karl (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Papiergeldhamstern und kein Ende! 
Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung 1 (2): 15–16.
Wilhelm, Karl (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Vom “guten Gelde.” Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (3): 20–21.
Fonsow (= Otto Neurath). Zur Sozialisierung der Wirtschaft. Wirtschaft und 
Lebensordnung 1 (3): 21–22.
Neurath, Otto. 1919. Kriegswirtschaft – Übergangswirtschaft – Verwaltungswirtschaft. 
Wirtschaft und Lebensordnung 1 (3): 23.
Wilhelm, Karl (= Otto Neurath). 1919. Steuernot, Hamsternot, Zahlungsnot. Über 
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Chapter 5
United by Action: Neurath in England
Adam Tamas Tuboly
Abstract The aim of this paper is to give a biographical, historical, and philosophi-
cal reconstruction of Neurath’s final years in England. Besides reconstructing 
Neurath’s arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduc-
tion at Oxford, I will argue that since the 1930s, Neurath was eager to develop a 
brand for logical empiricism. This brand was based not on theoretical commitments, 
but on practical considerations and decisions. Using a detailed case study on 
Neurath’s relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowledge Karl Mannheim, I 
show that the development of their connections documents how Neurath gave more 
and more priority to practical aims during his English years. Finally, the concluding 
section points to some further considerations on Neurath’s legacy.
5.1  Introduction
When Otto Neurath settled down in Oxford after his 8 months long imprisonment in 
1941, he arrived at a well-prepared field for logical empiricism.1 After he attended 
the Seventh International Congress of Philosophy (1930), Schlick was invited to 
deliver three talks at King’s College, London (1932). Just 2 years later, the British 
philosopher and logician Susan Stebbing invited Carnap to talk about “Philosophy 
1 This paper was supported by the MTA BTK Lendület Morals and Science Research Group; by the 
János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and by the “Empiricism 
and atomism in the twentieth-century Anglo-Saxon philosophy” NKFI project (124970), and by 
the MTA Premium Postdoctoral Scholarship. I am indebted to Amy Wuest for correcting many 
linguistic errors in the paper. I am also indebted to the Carnap Archive at Pittsburgh (Rudolf 
Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of 
Pittsburgh) and to the Otto Neurath Nachlass (ONN, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord- 
Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands) for the permission to quote the archive materials. All rights 
reserved. All the translations from the archive files are mine.
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and Logical Syntax.” Four years later, Cambridge University hosted the Congress 
for the Unity of Science, organized by Stebbing and Neurath.
In addition to these developments, individual scholars reached out to Viennese 
philosophers as well. A.  J. Ayer attended some meetings of the Vienna Circle in 
1932–1933 and published his famous text that determined the future course of logi-
cal empiricism in the English-speaking world for decades, Language, Truth and 
Logic in 1936. Max Black, who gave a talk at the Fourth Congress for the Unity of 
Science, wrote to Neurath in 1935 that he wanted to edit a collection of papers on 
“Logical Positivism […] partly by members of the Viennese Circle and partly by 
English and American writers of empirical sympathies.” Black named Ayer, Richard 
Braithwaite, Carl Hempel, Charles Morris, Hans Reichenbach, Schlick, Carnap, 
and Stebbing. Neurath was asked to write about physicalism, which he happily 
accepted; for unknown reasons though, nothing resulted from that project.2
Neurath started his new career in Oxford in the context of these communications. 
Nevertheless, he worked not with philosophers, but mainly with anthropologists, 
sociologist, and educators. Even though he published some academic papers and his 
monograph in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, he praised 
England mainly for its “muddle,” i.e. for its practice-oriented, pluralist, and tolerant 
worldview. This is also reflected by his legacy; while he was remembered by many 
as the developer of ISOTYPE works, a public intellectual in debates about Germany, 
his philosophical legacy was overshadowed by such oversimplified accounts of 
logical empiricism such as Ayer’s, which achieved a Bible-like status after the war 
in Oxford.
The aim of this paper is to reconstruct some cornerstones of this highly and 
unfortunately neglected period of Neurath’s life and works. Section 5.2 describes 
Neurath’s arrival to England, in the context of his life and philosophical introduc-
tion at Oxford. Section 5.3. argues for the thesis that since the 1930s, Neurath was 
eager to develop a brand for logical empiricism, which was based not on theoretical 
commitments, but on practical considerations and decisions. Section 5.3.2. gives a 
detailed case study on Neurath’s relation to the Hungarian sociologist of knowl-
edge, Karl Mannheim, who worked during the 1940s in London; the development 
of their connections documents how Neurath gave priority to practical aims during 
his English years. Finally, Sect. 5.4. points to some further considerations on 
Neurath’s legacy.
5.2  Arriving and Settling Down in England
Neurath was a traveler – sometimes by his own decisions, but occasionally he was 
forced to move throughout Europe. These events occasionally caused permanent 
troubles and resulted in significant personal difficulties for him as can be seen from 
his letter to Rudolf Carnap that was written with some emotional overtones in 1933: 
2 Max Black to Neurath, 16 November 1935 and Neurath to Max Black, 4 December 1935 (ONN).
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“I hope to see all of you before the possible longer separation begins. After the 
German revolution [1918/19] I did not see my friends for six years… That is a long 
time. It passes. […] Everything is awful and it is very difficult to keep up the hope 
which belief in the overall trend of history gives us.”3
In the letter, Neurath presumably had in mind those dramatic events that took 
place between fascist and socialist groups in Vienna during 1933 and 1934. After 
all, his nightmares came true when fascist forces took power after the short-lived 
civil war in February 1934. At that time, Neurath was in the Soviet Union and when 
he heard the news from Marie Reidemeister (later his third wife, then a collaborator 
on pictorial statistics), he was advised not to return to Vienna but instead to visit his 
friends – Philipp Frank and Rudolf Carnap – in Prague. Neurath was never able to 
return to Austria, and his forced exile just began: traveling through Poland and 
Denmark, he fled to The Hague where he settled with his second wife Olga Hahn, 
and Marie.
During his time in The Hague, Neurath did not rest, not even for a second. Rather, 
he immediately started to organize the International Congresses for the Unity of 
Science, arranged the publication of the International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science, and published popularizing accounts of his ISOTYPE-work for the English- 
speaking world (Neurath 1936, 1937, 1939). As the word spread about his work 
internationally, Neurath was invited to lecture about ISOTYPE and to establish fur-
ther ISOTYPE related museums and institutions around the world: he traveled to 
Mexico, the Soviet Union and to the United States. Nevertheless, his work in the 
Netherlands was interrupted – as he used to say – by the spreading “Nazi-plague.”4
5.2.1  From The Hague to the Isle of Man
On May 10, 1940, the Third Reich parachuted into the Netherlands. Neurath and 
Marie hid in their house where “[f]ood was brought to the door; many visitors even 
came to see [them]. In between [they] played chess and listened to the radio” 
(M. Neurath 1973, 68). Within 4 days, the little country, caught between Germany 
and Belgium, surrendered; when Neurath heard the news from the radio he knew he 
had to make a move. His fears were well-founded: he was half-Jewish and fre-
quently accused of communism, so he had to flee from The Hague as soon as 
possible.
Since the Netherlands was officially a neutral country, many Jews sought refuge 
there prior 1940. When the major cities fall on the eve of May 14th, a fishing harbor 
(and a district) of The Hague, called Scheveningen, was filled with desperate people 
3 See Neurath to Carnap, 13 March 1933 (RC 029-11-20). Quoted and translated by Thomas Uebel 
(2007, 300).
4 For more on ISOTYPE, see the chapters of Angélique Groß, Sophie Hochhäusl and Silke Körber 
in the present volume. On Neurath’s Holland-period see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996, 
82–85), Sandner (2014, 234–263 and forthcoming), and Marie Neurath’s memoirs (1973, 62–64).
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looking for any way to escape the advancing German troops. Neurath and Marie 
also reached the harbors that evening, but when they arrived no evacuation ship was 
left. According to Marie (1973, 69), Neurath said that “if we do not find a boat I am 
going on a piece of wood.” “After long searching,” Neurath wrote to John and Jet 
Pront, his friends from The Hague, that “a last corner [of the harbor] remained unin-
spected,” and they discovered one of the last boats, called “Seaman’s Hope” 
(“Zeemanshoop”), which was hijacked earlier that evening by a crew of four stu-
dents, led by their captain, Harry Hack.
With some help from the harbor and a bit of luck the crew was able to work the 
engines. Shortly after, people started to occupy the little boat, which was suitable 
for only 20–25 people. However, 44 people ultimately boarded the vessel. When 
Neurath and Marie discovered familiar faces, they “jumped into the boat from the 
wall, because it left just the shores.”5 None of the other accounts of the event 
describes a couple jumping to the boot after its departure, so it appears that Neurath 
may have exaggerated this detail. Nonetheless, after Neurath and Marie found their 
places at the back of the boat, a soldier fired a warning shot over the heads of those 
waiting to jump from the quayside, while others fell in the water.
The heavily overcrowded lifeboat pulled out from the harbor, into the dark, cold 
evening, heading directly to England and watching Rotterdam burn. With the usual 
exhilaration and trust in the future, Marie described the night as follows:
For us this was a great adventure indeed. We were immersed in the stories of the Huguenots 
and their flights in fog and night over the frontiers and the sea – so there we are, now we 
know how it feels. We were leaving behind us the burning Rotterdam in an occupied coun-
try about to suffer foreseeable agonies. Trusting our luck to this tiny nutshell of a boat, we 
felt extremely happy to have found it and to be alive together, shoulder to shoulder. 
(M. Neurath 1973, 70.)
With an uncertain engine and a useless compass, the tiny ship followed the stars. 
The boat carried entire families, including children and older people, and it even 
navigated through minefields. By the following afternoon, they completed two- 
thirds of the trip. At that time, a British Royal Navy destroyer called “Venomous” 
stopped them and picked up all the passengers to take them to Dover.
As many other refugees, Neurath and Marie had German passports, therefore 
they were treated as “enemy aliens,” representing the country that British soldiers 
were fighting against (Kochan 1983). Since he entered the country as on official 
enemy, Neurath was arrested immediately and brought to Pentonville Prison in 
London, and later to Kempton Park. He was kept – with nearly a hundred other 
men – in a racecourse, sleeping on mattresses on stone floors. After a few weeks, he 
was shipped to the Isle of Man. Marie was first kept at the Fulham Institute, where 
she was able to contact Stebbing. Later, she was placed in Holloway Prison before 
being taken to the Isle of Man.
On the Isle of Man, there were various internment towns, nonetheless men and 
women lived separately on different sides of the island. Many accounts exist about 
daily life, general conditions, and private feelings. Neurath and Marie were doing 
5 Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 30 June 1945 (ONN).
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their best to keep up their spirits. As Marie (1973, 71) later recalled, “Otto was most 
interested in experiencing prison life.” The interment, at least for the first few 
months, was like an international congress for Neurath: they lived in houses (Marie 
and Neurath were house captains in their homes), they met many scholars, made 
new friendships, and Neurath even gave at least one lecture to the fellow internees.6 
They went to the cinema where they could watch films “under military control,” and 
in the camp for men they organized plays in Neurath’s attic. He wrote to the Pronts 
that there was in the “attic no artificial light, therefore I used Christmas candles in 
masses, it was a great show. A dozen of them burning – and smelling.”7
The Neuraths were in a quite exceptional position; since they had a typewriter 
and other related materials, they “worked out Isotypes for the USA and got even 
money from there,”8 thus they were able to buy things and bring them to each other 
at the regular meetings. Men and women internees were allowed to meet at first 
monthly. Later, more regular meetings were permitted at the women’s camp. 
Neurath was in Onchan Camp, at the mid-east part, next to the island’s capital, 
Douglas, while Marie was interned in Port Erin, at the southwest corner. Neurath 
described one of these “love meetings either on a lawn or in a big dancing palace” 
as follows:
We crossed the island marching to a station, from where we had to reach our ladies. That 
was a day, this first meeting in this women town, imagine many thousands of women, nicely 
dressed assembled in one town. The railroad station overcrowded with waiting girls and 
women, partly in bathing suits …. I have never seen before such a mass of females together. 
Then we marching into the town in military order, getting ice cream from nice girls, female 
police in bobby uniform, and then gradually splitting up of people, who met their wives or 
fiancées, and then sitting down on a meadow with a view on the sea, couple shoulder on 
shoulder the next couple and the military authorities with dame Joana on the balcony of a 
big hotel looking down on this love garden ….. what a story. (Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 
28 July 1945. ONN.)
Altogether Neurath was pleased; when he arrived at the camp he only had slippers 
for shoes. Over time, he got new shoes, clothes, and books. He recalled other small 
luxuries, “cakes came and even Worcester Sauce, wonderful pyjamas […] complete 
suits and coats from the USA from one of the great department store owners” (ibid.).
Even though Neurath and Marie developed many new friendships that turned out 
to be quite fruitful for Neurath in England, they got bored after a while. “In the 
beginning,” he wrote to the Pronts, “we looked at all the imprisonment as at a kind 
of holidays or higher joke after the Dutch tension and the lifeboat flight….” (ibid.). 
As Neurath summarized the whole situation, “not tormented, not persecuted, just 
‘interned’” (ibid.).
The news about Neurath’s internment quickly spread, and after Marie notified 
Stebbing about their situation, the latter asked a Leonard Marsden, a lawyer, to help 
them get out as quickly as possible and arrange their marriage. (Though Neurath 
6 On Neurath’s lecture see Michelle Henning’s chapter in the present volume.
7 Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 28 July 1945 (ONN).
8 Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 28 July 1945 (ONN).
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and Marie were fortunate to be treated as a married couple on the Isle, they got mar-
ried only after their release). Marsden did everything he could: wrote applications, 
forwarded other’s messages and kept Neurath informed through the process. Despite 
the support, their release was not that easy. Neurath and Marie’s case was discussed 
in the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, in the British Academy 
Tribunal; their recommendation for release was forwarded to the Home Office on 
September 26, 1940. As Marsden wrote to Neurath, “[t]his seems a decided step 
forward and it ought not to be long now before you are both at liberty.”9
Nevertheless, the Home Office forwarded their case to another Advisory 
Committee and they only came to a decision about the release in early December. 
Then attention turned to the fight to expedite their actual release. After everything, 
their release only happened on February 7th (Marie) and 8th (Neurath) in 1941, 
after 8 months spent in various British camps. It is well known that Neurath’s appli-
cation for release was supported by Stebbing and Albert Einstein, but Marsden noti-
fied Neurath (on his request) about a much longer list of supporters: the evolutionary 
biologist Julian Huxley, Ernest Jäckh (the international director of the New 
Commonwealth Society, later a professor at Columbia), Felix Kaufmann, John 
Dewey, Ernest Nagel, Charles Morris, Egon Brunswik, Rudolf Carnap, Philipps 
Bradley, Edgar J. Kaufmann (a German-American businessman), G. J. Laing from 
the National Tuberculosis Association, the publisher Alfred A. Knopf, Neurath’s 
cousin Waldemar Kaempffert, and F. E. Compton & Co.10
After the Neuraths were released, they went to Oxford enjoying the hospitality of 
the socialist political theorist (and detective story writer) George D. H. Cole, who 
wrote the History of Socialist Thought in 7 volumes. At first, they also worked in 
Cole’s private library that was related to the International Institute of Social History 
in its exile,11 but then they rented an entire house overlooking the hills of Oxford. 
Later they had to move because the landlord came back, but their friends bought a 
similar house a few blocks away, which the Neuraths might have rented. They loved 
this new life: they grew vegetables and fruits, enjoyed visiting neighborhood cats 
and dogs. Their home allowed them to enjoy a view of the town and cows grazing 
on the surrounding meadows. In addition, their home featured nice furniture and a 
bathtub “which is really of my size,” Neurath happily reported: “usually I could not 
get my full pleasure, because I could not cover me … this is now possible.”12 They 
also rebuilt their library with the help of friends sending articles, clippings, reprints, 
duplicates etc. For someone living through the terrible consequences of World War 
One, the hunger of the years after the war and the Great Depression, this new 
9 Leonard Marsden to Neurath, 7 October 1940 (ONN).
10 See Leonard Marsden to Neurath, 13 December 1940 (ONN). On Kaempffert’s relation and its 
significance to Neurath, see George Reisch’s chapter in the present volume.
11 See Neurath to Carnap, 21 September 1941 and 29 July 1942 (RC 102-55-18 and RC 115-07-
58). See letters 7 and 13 in this volume. On Cole and Neurath see Günther Sandner’s chapter in the 
present volume.
12 See Neurath to John and Jet Pront, 25 July 1945 (ONN).
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 lifestyle meant a radical change (the Neuraths lived in poor conditions in The Hague 
as well):
In England [there] is plenty of food, if you are not so interested in particular types of food, 
bread is free, as you know, there are many vegetables and a real glut in milk, we enjoy it 
very much, dried eggs now from the US come etc we enjoy it, too. Fine fruit etc fish free (if 
not canned). Not the slightest similarity with the Central European situation in the last war. 
Not much meat, but you can get Vitamin[s] in various forms, e.g. as pills if you are very 
interested in these things. (Neurath to Carnap, 17 July 1942. RC 102-56-04. See letter 11 in 
the volume.)
What is to be noted here is the congruence of what Neurath emphasized frequently 
in the letters to his friends and his theoretical-economic ideas on the standard of 
living: “I want they [Neurath’s German friends] should drop the interest in order as 
such, in stressing ‘rights’ more than peace and happiness, in stressing ‘ideals’ 
(ecstasy, enthusiasm, arts, etc science etc impartiality, etc) more than the daily hap-
piness of the neighbours, the own happiness, the happiness of people more far 
away” (emphasis added).13
Neurath loved being in England: he quickly made a name for himself among 
many new circles, became as active as ever and enjoyed the walks, the community, 
as well as supporting the fight against Nazism. As he wrote to an old friend from 
Vienna, they “gradually become a kind of British Furniture” (quoted by Sandner 
2011, 73).
5.2.2  Oxford Lectures, Terminology, and Life in England
Neurath was absorbed in various projects after his release. Though he was able to 
reestablish the longstanding Isotype Institute in 1942 with the help of Stebbing, 
from a philosophical point of view the most important event was his lectures at the 
All Souls College, Oxford. The lectures provided both difficulties and opportunities 
for Neurath:
Then I had to lecture at Oxford University […], the Professor invited me and attended 
kindly the lectures is an anthropologist and therefore I spoke more of anthropology as I did 
usually. I liked it very much, but it needs some time to see how “functionalism” goes on, 
and how the discussion stands just at the moment. Of course I know the main lines be heart. 
I had to look through the history of anthropology as you had to look another day through 
the history of philosophy. (Neurath to Carnap, 1 April 1944. RC 102-55-05. See letter 26 in 
this volume.)14
Neurath was invited to give a course on “Logical Empiricism and the Social 
Sciences” by the social anthropologist Alfred Reginald Radcliff-Brown, who was 
13 See Neurath to Ina Carnap, 24 September 1945 (RC 102-55-13). See letter 35 in this volume.
14 The Oxford course was the only official academic appointment of Neurath: though he habilitated 
at Heidelberg in 1917, he never taught a course and his permission was suspended two years later. 
See Sandner (2014, 103–108).
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known for his structural-functionalist theory of social relations and actions. Though 
Neurath has dealt (sometimes critically) with the ideas of anthropologists (espe-
cially of Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and James Frazer) on magic, religion, technique and 
primitive mentality during the early 1930s (1930/1983, 1931, 1931/1973, 319–330), 
the Oxford atmosphere was different: Radcliff-Brown (1939) just published his 
“Frazer Lecture” on taboos, and his vocabulary on folklore might have been new 
and promising to Neurath’s ears.
In order to facilitate the discussion, Neurath had to dig into the newest achieve-
ments of anthropology. This task was somewhat challenging even though the dis-
cussions on anthropology and the social sciences were beneficial. Neurath adapted 
the terms and ideas and made use of them in his Foundations of Social Sciences 
(1944/1970) and in his last manuscript, “Visual Education: Humanisation versus 
Popularisation” (1996) written for Karl Mannheim.15
According to a letter to Cambridge University Press, he was already teaching on 
the 22nd of February (Hilary Term), and he continued with a discussion group 
through the Trinity Term between April and June. In the same letter, he asked for 
copies of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science sending them to the 
following scholars: the above mentioned Julian Huxley (London), the Nobel Prize 
winner physiologist Archibald Vivien Hill (London), Radcliff-Brown (Oxford), 
G. D. H. Cole (Oxford), H. H. Price (Oxford), and Edward Stuart Cartwright (who 
was the organizing secretary of the new tutorial classes committee until 1945  in 
Oxford).16 Though it is quite unlikely that all of these scholars attended Neurath’s 
lectures, it is still an impressive list of interested colleagues and acquaintances. 
Furthermore, it is known that the Neuraths wanted to participate at Price’s lectures, 
who gave them permission to attend.17
Through the lectures Neurath tried to reach out to possible collaborators, old and 
new friends, and sympathizers as much as he could. He even invited many of them to 
participate at the 1941 Chicago Congress for the Unity of Science. Due to the war, 
however, many European scholars were simply unable to attend a conference in the 
United States. For them, Neurath organized the “Terminology” workshop (often men-
tioned by him as “our Unity of Science meeting”) with Stebbing and the pedagogue 
Joseph A. Lauwerys (who later played an important role in developing UNESCO), on 
October 3–5 of 1941 in Oxford. Almost nothing is known about this conference. Yet 
there is evidence that demonstrates that Neurath invited the sociologist Karl Mannheim, 
the philosopher C. E. M. Joad, the aforementioned H. H. Price, Leonard Russell (pro-
fessor of philosophy in Birmingham), and presumably many others.18
15 Neurath has sent a copy of the Foundations to Radcliff-Brown, thanking him all the discussions 
and remarks. See Neurath to Radcliff-Brown, 13 January 1945 (ONN).
16 Neurath to Cambridge University Press, 22 February 1941 (ONN).
17 H. H. Price to Radcliff-Brown, copy to Neurath, 13 February 1941 (ONN). During the 1941 
Trinity Term Price lectured on Hume’s Theory of Knowledge after publishing a book on the sub-
ject (1940); though it is unknown in which semester did Neurath attend the lectures.
18 Neurath to Price, 13 September 1941 (ONN) and Neurath to Joad, 13 September 1941 (ONN). 
According to the hotel-room reservation plans, Stefan Vajda (mathematician), Martin Strauss (phi-
losopher), Patrick Meredith (lecturer in visual education), C. H. Waddington (biologist), Charles 
Henry Whiteley (philosopher), Leonard Russell, and a certain A. Pinsent were attending the event. 
See Neurath to Talbot, 25 and 29 September 1941 (ONN).
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The only indication of what might have happened at the terminology workshop 
comes from two articles that appeared shortly after the conference: “The Danger of 
Careless Terminology” (1941) and “Universal Jargon and Terminology” (1941/1983), 
though the same account was published later in the Foundations of the Social Sciences 
(1944/1970, 2–4). Terminology is the discipline that deals with terms, expressions, 
phrases and linguistic items. It might be regarded as Neurath’s own version of the 
linguistic technique that dominated English-speaking philosophy. In these works he 
argued that there are various forms of terminologies, e.g. empiricist and unempiricist, 
pluralist and anti-pluralist, scientific and metaphysical, and that the task of logical 
empiricism is to analyze these expressions, and, for example, to weed out non-scien-
tific terms. This task is a never-ending job since terminology “will always be in the 
making” (1944/1970, 2), thus even Neurath’s (1941, 147) index verborum prohibito-
rum will undergo constant revising (cf. Reisch 1996).
This process of linguistic analysis is not meant only to identify metaphysical 
terms in scientific papers. Neurath also wanted to call attention to the force of words 
by indicating how terminology might obscure or uncover ideologies and philosophi-
cal commitments:
[W]e propose to avoid praising and blaming words in articles and books on history: one 
man ‘kills’ another man, he does not ‘murder’ or ‘assassinate’ him. An additional state-
ments such as ‘this killing, was not in concordance with the rules of the group to which the 
killer belonged and was regarded as murder’ would be a historical one; and we would say 
the same of an additional statement such as ‘I – the writer of the book – and my group disap-
prove this actions as murder’. (Neurath 1941, 147.)
While in the case of normative terms, such as those given in this example, might 
seem to present a somewhat manageable task, the danger associated with normative 
language in purely scientific texts is harder to reveal. From Neurath’s perspectives, 
many of his fellow logical empiricists  – like Carnap, Herbert Feigl, and Carl 
Hempel – who worked on purely technical and formal logical issues, just tried to get 
rid of the practical side of science by building ideal languages with abstract rigor. 
Neurath explained that “sharp definition and pedantic speaking” will not help in 
understanding how science works, “certain vagueness is unavoidable, and a pseudo- 
clearness is even particularly dangerous” (1941, 146); or as he said in the other 
paper, presented to the Aristotelian Society, “formalization is no magic sieve” 
(1941/1983, 213).
This may be Neurath’s attempt to get closer to various British traditions: he even 
mentions Jeremy Bentham, Charles Ogden, I.  A. Richards, Stebbing and the 
Cambridge School of Analysis, and Bertrand Russell (even though Neurath was 
highly critical of Russell’s (1940) latest book). Neurath was likely well aware of the 
distinct British philosophy (relying on common sense, linguistic analysis and 
Moore’s ideas) that was becoming institutionally and professionally entrenched 
during the 1940s in Oxford and Cambridge. Thus “Terminology” bridged his 
Viennese work while also allowing him to reach out to his new colleagues in 
England.19
19 Neurath gave a lecture also in Cambridge (19 November 1941) under the title “Logical 
Empiricism and everyday problems” (ONN, K.50).
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5.3  Building a Brand for Logical Empiricism: 
From Reichenbach to Mannheim
Considering the wide range of published material of logical empiricists, such as 
brochures, pamphlets, monographs, articles, reviews and reports, one might come to 
understand the logical empiricists’ tradition as a unified and harmonized movement. 
There were, of course, internal debates, divergences and infightings. Many of these 
debates might have seemed to be signs of a progressive research program, rather 
than of a collapsing collaboration and a fragile, thin slide of ice, heated continu-
ously by hatred, social contempt, and disdainful mockery.
We should sit back for a moment, however, and think about the history of the 
Vienna Circle. Since Friedrich Stadler’s (2001/2015) reconstruction, the “(non-)
public phase” terminology has been rigidified in the academic literature. He locates 
the non-public, preparatory phase between the years 1924 and 1929, and the public 
phase after 1929 when Carnap, Hahn and Neurath’s joint manifesto appeared. 
Nonetheless, it might be interesting to note that Carnap taught in Vienna from 1926 
until 1931, then moved to Prague, where Philipp Frank was already a professor at 
the German University of Prague since 1912; as a result of his work there, he only 
participated in the meetings of the Vienna Circle occasionally. It is not surprising 
thus that many scholars of the Circle described him as just a really close outsider, 
who attended the meetings sometimes when he came home. After 1930, Neurath 
was continuously on the move, spending much of his time in the Netherlands and in 
the Soviet Union: in 1934 he fled to The Hague as I mentioned above. Feigl emi-
grated to the United States in 1930, while Menger first went to Amsterdam (1925–
1927) and later to America (1930–1931). Likewise Schlick traveled to North 
America: he went to Stanford (1929) and to Berkeley, California (1931–1932).
All of this resulted in the overturn of power relations within the Circle. Neurath 
wrote to Carnap in 1930 that if neither him, nor his wife, nor Menger, Feigl or 
Carnap is in the Circle (which was already quite usual), then Schlick and Waismann 
“announce to the true people, in the wreath of their two in-the-house- 
phenomenologists [Felix] Kaufmann and [Robert] Neumann. Hans [Hahn], the last 
member of ‘our group’ will not hold out long.”20 Gustav Bergmann (1993, 195) 
wrote to Neurath in 1938 (thinking about the Wittgensteinians), that “[t]he 
Boltzmanngasse group [i.e. the Circle], […] had, as I see it, already reached its 
highpoint in 1927/28, maintained momentum for several years and by 1931/32 
already showed clear signs of splintering and, as a consequence, declining.”
The Circle showed the signs of decline from Schlick’s point of view as well. He 
wrote to the English translator of his Fragen der Ethik in 1933: “I am not going to 
have any meetings of the ‘Wiener Kreis’ this winter. Some of our old members have 
grown too dogmatic and might discredit the whole movement; so I am now trying 
to form a new circle out of younger men who are still free from principles.”21 The 
20 Neurath to Carnap, 15 July 1930 (RC 029-14-14).
21 Schlick to David Rynin, 4 November 1933 (MSN).
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same ideas were suggested by Bergmann (1993, 199–200) as well: “the later Circle 
was of a completely different sort. […] From the original radical, rationalistic out-
look there was nothing remaining […]; mathematicians, physicists and the absent 
members of the old Circle were replaced, in growing numbers, by the pupils of Mr. 
and Mrs. [Karl and Charlotte] Bühler.” Due to the absence of the so-called “left 
wing” of the Circle, most of the attendants and visitors of the Circle reported about 
the enormous and quasi-religious influence of Wittgenstein on the remainders.22
According to Neurath, the situation did not get any better over time. The “real 
founder” of the Circle, Hans Hahn, died unexpectedly after a surgery. His sister 
(who was Neurath’s wife), wrote to Carnap almost desperately:
Our philos. front has lost a good soldier & what the Vienna Circle was earlier ceased to 
exist. [sic] Only [Heinrich] Neider left to counteract the Schlick-W. Group, but he is short 
of the mathematical-physical qualifications & with his sociological-historical knowledge 
he is unable to do much in this Circle. (Olga Hahn-Neurath to Carnap, 1 August 1934. RC 
029-10-41.)
In the same year, the Verein Ernst Mach was disbanded for political reasons. Carnap 
described Frank’s visit to the Circle in 1935 to Neurath as follows: “Frank’s visit to 
the Schlick Circle seems to bring its end. Waismann became so furious because 
Frank called him publicly a ‘scholastic’, that he does not want to appear in the pub-
lic anymore.”23
These reports do not show a harmonized or movement-like picture of the Circle: 
how did the unified “Vienna Circle” or “Logical Empiricism” narrative emerge, 
overcoming so much hatred, tension both in personalities, attitudes and theoretical 
commitments? Logical empiricism, as it eventually became known, especially its 
Viennese form, was a result of a massive, deliberate, and direct process of brand 
building. Logical empiricists had to fashion a common terminology and a seem-
ingly shared stance on many questions such that their shared philosophical project 
would be easily recognizable: one should have been able to tell who is with them, 
and who is not. Mapping the “us” versus “them” approach (Creath 2012) was also 
useful to safeguard their projects and fields of publication. For example, Neurath 
was often concerned that Reichenbach was taking too much power as co-editor in 
the Erkenntnis (the other editor was Carnap from Prague). Once he even wrote to 
Carnap that he is always angry when he sees that Reichenbach’s name appears on 
the front page of the journal with bigger characters.24
Neurath’s goal was to make logical empiricism “identifiable” and to show a pic-
ture of a working enterprise. The “brand” should have also guaranteed the quality of 
the work, since as Neurath wrote, “[w]e are known in the world as the ‘Vienna 
Circle.’”25 Being a fellow traveler would come with many advantages, thus Carnap’s 
22 This picture is drawn, for example, by Ernest Nagel, who participated at the meetings at the turn 
of 1934/1935. See Nagel to Carnap, 5 January 1935 (RC 029-05-16) and 6 March 1935 (RC 
029-05-14).
23 See Carnap to Neurath, 26 March 1935 (RC 029-09-66).
24 See Neurath to Carnap, 26 October 1932 (RC 029-12-17).
25 See Neurath to Carnap, 10 August 1932 (RC 029-12-36).
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wife wrote to Ernest Nagel that Popper’s way of overestimating the minor differ-
ences between himself and the Circle is “quite stupid, because he would have more 
success under the banners of the Wiener Kreis, quite well known and discussed 
now.”26 Because of the enormous, conscious and conscientious self-management, 
the intended readers were able to find the works of logical empiricists. Their unified 
appearance and purposeful cohesive strategy provided insurance for quality and 
sameness in appearance. By arranging their own translations, reports of their con-
gresses, commenting on their own works, logical empiricists aimed at dispelling 
misunderstandings and misinterpretations of their works.27
5.3.1  Early Attempts at Practical Unification
Building a brand did come with a price: to smooth things out, members of the move-
ment had to fight over the dominant themes, expressions, ideas, and goals. According 
to Carnap’s diaries, when Neurath saw Reichenbach’s invitation to the Prague 
Conference, he started to “inveigh against him” because Reichenbach used the word 
“philosophy.”28 Neurath took things into his own hands, and wrote a letter to 
Reichenbach, trying to persuade him not to use “Naturphilosophie,” since it is mis-
leading and points to a “philosophical,” “internal,” “introspective” conception of 
knowledge, which is not characteristic of the movement. Neurath did not suggest 
“exact philosophy” (“exakter Philosophie”) either since it sounds like an “ersatz” 
for the old philosophy.
Neurath did suggest the moniker “scientific world-conception,” but by 1932 he 
ceased to use the word “world.” So, after he left behind “worldview” because of its 
irrational connotations, and “world-conception” because of metaphysical implica-
tions, he had to develop with a new term. His preferred replacement was “unified 
science,” which indeed became internationally recognized and adopted.29
It is to be noted that Reichenbach persisted in using “Naturphilosophie”: in 
October 1929 (just after Neurath’s letter) he wrote a report on the Prague conference 
in which he discussed the tasks and aims of philosophy of nature. “[I]n addition to 
the individual sciences,” said Reichenbach (1929/1978, 258), “there exists a mode 
of treating and evaluating its subjects matter that is itself not scientific but philo-
sophical instead,” which is, after all, epistemological, since it explores the nature 
and essence of knowledge-processes.
26 Ina Carnap to Ernest Nagel, 23 January 1935 (RC 029-05-15).
27 Whether Neurath was successful after all, is a further question: he wrote to Carnap, 21 September 
1941, that “[s]uch is life, successively we [logical empiricists], the opposition become classics. 
Now we form a branch like others, as I learned from Laird’s Introduction to modern philosophy” 
(RC 102-55-18). See letter 7 in the present volume.
28 See Carnap’s diary entry, 15 July 1929 (RC 025-73-03).
29 Neurath to Reichenbach, 22 July 1929 (RC 029-15-15) and Neurath to Carnap, 9 October 1932 
(RC 029-12-24). Cf. Neurath to Reichenbach and Carnap, 17 January 1935 (RC 029-09-97).
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Despite the fact that Neurath was strongly opposed to the term “philosophy of 
nature,” the expression surfaced again in the title of Reichenbach’s 1931 brochure 
on the subject, “Aims and Methods of Modern Philosophy of Nature.” Even though 
Reichenbach opposed the idea that philosophy shall be a “super science,” or a sci-
ence that holds the key to fundamental and infallible knowledge, he devoted still 
more space to talk about philosophy and how to deprive it of its classic character, 
than Neurath could have tolerated.
Reichenbach’s brochure is an important document, not just because it reflects the 
core of a naturalization-debate, but because it was one of the first public and widely 
read attacks against what Reichenbach called “positivism.” By marking off his 
Berlin-view from the Viennese outlook, Reichenbach might have impeded the uni-
fied brand-building process of Neurath, and thus sabotaged the common cause.30 
Nevertheless, for example, Carnap took Reichenbach’s side and wrote in a letter 
that he “was especially happy because of the actual system-proposals” to be found 
in the “Wahrscheinlichkeitslehre.” Though Carnap contrasted the “system- 
proposals” with Schlick’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophical considerations 
(“Erörterungen”), his conception opposed Neurath’s attack on systems as well.31
Another example and form of brand building is provided by the series 
Einheitswissenschaft, edited by Neurath, Carnap, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, and 
Jörgen Jörgensen. In the usual historiographies and narratives, the series is depicted 
as a common effort in spreading the word, just like Erkenntnis and the Frank- 
Schlick series. Nonetheless, besides the formal editorial board, the origins of the 
series have an interesting lesson for us. In 1944, Neurath wrote the following to 
Carnap:
Your letter on my articles hardly acceptable for the Erkenntnis immediately induced me to 
create the series EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT, where I could publish my own stuff when-
ever I wanted to do it, without any consent from my strong teacher. Of course I did not 
insult you but invited you to be with me and to publish there, you by me highly admired 
giant of Logical analysis and a man who unveils the secrets of so many metaphysicians … 
(Neurath to Carnap, 18 November 1944. RC 102-55-06. See letter 28 in this volume.)
Given that the letter was written during an especially stormy period of their friend-
ship, one might warn that we should take this passage with a grain of salt. 
Nevertheless, considering Neurath’s intense and vehement character, it is not at all 
implausible to believe that he started the monograph series for himself, as an inde-
pendent forum, as I would say, for brand building.32 The fact that Neurath wrote two 
monographs (1933/1987; 1935/1987) and one article (1937/1987) for his new series 
seems to justify this idea.
The creation of Einheitswissenschaft was not enough in itself; Neurath left noth-
ing to chance! He tried to arrange some positive reviews of his first brochure 
30 Neurath to Carnap, 12 April and 28 June 1930 (RC 029-14-18 and RC 029-13-10); see further 
Neurath’s 14 April circular letter about his debate with Reichenbach (RC 029-14-17).
31 Carnap to Reichenbach, 1 February 1935 (RC 102-64-05).
32 On the history of the series see Hegselmann (1987, xiv–xviii). Cf. Neurath to Carnap, Frank and 
Hahn, 2 November 1932 (RC 029-12-15).
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(1933/1987), Hahn’s contribution (1933/1987) and Carnap’s submission 
(1934/1987). He suggested that Hempel review his monograph, Frank review 
Hahn’s paper, and Jörgensen review Carnap’s work. But it was too late since Kurt 
Grelling (1935) had already started to review Hahn’s work, and Carnap asked him 
to write about his and Neurath’s brochures. Neurath’s fears proved to be justified. 
He claimed that Grelling was “not standing entirely on their side” and his remarks 
in the review turned out to be quite negative – not helping the common cause.33
Building the brand of logical empiricism was a practical task, not a theoretical 
commitment for Neurath. This meant that after the early 1930s, he was willing to 
overcome philosophical conflicts, theoretical disagreements and oppositions for the 
greater practical good. A nice example of Neurath’s “united by action” attitude is 
provided by the case of his relation to Karl Mannheim.
5.3.2  Neurath and Mannheim: From Rejection to Cooperation
Neurath and Mannheim’s relation goes back to the turn of 1930 when the latter’s 
Ideology and Utopia appeared in German. The book contained detailed discussions 
on themes such as how thinking is shaped by social positions, how collective condi-
tions form the contents of experience, and how sociology and politics might become 
sciences. Ideology and Utopia is also considered to be one of the founding docu-
ments of Sociology of Knowledge as a discipline.
Neurath was happy in general with Mannheim’s approach and with the idea of 
the social determinateness of knowledge. His behavioristic analysis of scientists and 
his sociology of sociology (1944/1970) shared many common themes with 
Mannheim’s book. As Markus Seidel (2016) has recently pointed out that despite 
their different backgrounds, Neurath’s and Mannheim’s politicized philosophy and 
sociology of science have more in common than previously thought. Nevertheless, 
when Neurath (1930/1981) reviewed Mannheim’s book, he was quite critical of it.
Neurath’s criticism focused on a peculiar idea of Mannheim’s. According to 
Mannheim (1929/1936, 104), knowledge has both social and political determinants, 
it is existentially related:
It could be shown in all cases that not only do fundamental orientations, evaluations, and 
the content of ideas differ but that the manner of stating a problem, the sort of approach 
made, and even the categories in which experiences are subsumed, collected, and ordered 
vary according to the social position of the observer. (Mannheim 1929/1936, 130.)
Sociology of science aims at showing that not only our opinions, judgments, and 
commitments depend on our political and social status, but also what we recognize 
as facts, problems, or the content of experience! Thus “in the realm of politics,” 
Mannheim claimed (1929/1936, 131), “the only knowledge that we have is a 
33 Neurath to Carnap, 5 and 16 March 1935 (RC 029-09-78 and RC 029-09-70). See further Carnap 
to Neurath, 13 March 1935 (RC 029-09-72).
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knowledge which is limited by the position which we occupy.” (Neurath and Frank 
will say later, however, that all our knowledge – including logical and natural scien-
tific knowledge – has a substantial social and political dimension in Mannheim’s 
sense.)34
From different political stances and social positions, different values and com-
mitments arise, which always bring different perspectives into relief. Mannheim’s 
asked how can the various political perspectives synthetised in order to avoid shore-
less relativism and to enforce objectivity through the scientific perspective. In order 
to exceed individual and class interests, the intelligentsia will become “a relatively 
classless stratum which is not too firmly situated in the social order” – this is what 
Mannheim (1929/1936, 137) calls the “socially unattached intelligentsia.”
In Neurath’s eyes Mannheim was right in emphasizing the social embeddedness 
of thinking and arguing, but Neurath disagreed with Mannheim’s view that the sci-
entific perspective could be instantiated only by a “socially unattached” social stra-
tum. In his review, “Bürgerlicher Marxismus” (“Bourgeois Marxism”), published in 
Der Kampf, Neurath wrote about the synthesizing process as follows:
It is as if one thinks that 2 times 2 equals 7 since it is what the orbits say, the other that 2 
times 2 equals 5 since this is God’s decree, the third that 2 times 2 equals 8 since this cor-
responds to the cosmic view, whereas the scientist maintains that 2 times 2 equals 4. And 
now there is the one who synthesizes all four ‘one-sided’ viewpoints or takes the average 
viewpoint that consists in the claim that 2 times 2 equals 6. (Neurath 1930/1981, 352. 
Seidel’s (2016) translation.)
By making the intelligentsia’s synthesizing process equal with the mathematical 
counting of average, Neurath tried to ridicule Mannheim’s idea and rhetorically 
played into his own hands the vantage point. But even Mannheim (1929/1936, 135) 
claimed that such a simple “additive synthesis” (as presented in Neurath’s quote 
too) would not work.
So that critique of Neurath won’t be relevant against Mannheim simply because 
he did not say anything like that of which Neurath later accused him in the review 
with regard the mathematical counting of average. Two years earlier, however, in his 
Personal Life and Class Struggle, Neurath (1928/1973, 283) emphasized that “the 
shaping of life and world-view is closely linked with the social and economic order 
within which they arise.” That’s why he stuck to the idea that “the philosophy of a 
class depends on the position of the class” (1928/1973, 289). In his review, Neurath 
emphasized again and again that Mannheim’s considerations reflect only his bour-
geois stance: his neutrality is only pseudo-neutrality.
In Neurath’s eyes, Mannheim pursued metaphysics by talking about the socially 
unattached intelligentsia and its neutral perspective. Without going into the question 
34 It is quite probable that Mannheim’s position and ideas were transferred to Frank via the Harvard-
sociologist Robert Merton, who was a friend of Frank, and for a while also a collaborator on a 
“sociology of science” project (which included Ernest Nagel too). Frank discussed Mannheim, 
Lukács and other sociologists in an unpublished book manuscript, entitled Science, Facts, and 
Values (now in preparation for publication). On Frank’s relation to the sociology of science and the 
mentioned project, see George Reisch’s chapter in the present volume.
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of who was right, we might stress two interesting points: (1) In this one-sided 
debate, Neurath defended that position which became quite dominant in the second 
half of the twentieth century in the strong program of the sociology of knowledge: 
no one can erupt from social determinateness,35 and (2) Neurath’s rhetorical moves 
allowed him to translate theoretical questions into social ones, as the closing lines 
of the review suggest:
Mannheim looks for a comprehensive viewpoint, that aspect of the “world”, which is called 
metaphysics! Marxism, on the contrary, looks for the adequate statements about social pro-
cesses. Marxism predicts the fate of proletariat and other classes! Metaphysics against sci-
ence! Mannheim against Marxism, after all against friendship: the bourgeois front against 
the proletarian front! That is the old, very well known song! (Neurath 1930/1981, 356.)36
It is not known whether Mannheim was aware of this review; though in his later 
writings he tried to answer these charges. However, criticisms of Mannheim’s work 
that were similar to Neurath’s were already widespread and common so he might 
have become aware of them from other sources.
Nonetheless, viewing things from Neurath’s critical stance, some later events 
might be explained as well. In 1937, Charles Morris suggested doing a monograph 
about the sociology of science in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. 
He proposed the following authors: Louis Wirth (his colleague, the famous urban 
sociologist from Chicago), and Karl Mannheim.37 While Neurath asked for some 
papers from Wirth (presumably thus he did not know his work), in the case of 
Mannheim he was able to formulate a stronger opinion:
I have not read the last book of Mannheim. An older book of Mannheim is – what I would 
call – ful[l] of metaphysical formulations. But perhaps I would revise my opinion after my 
USA trip. I learned not always to act as a Torquemada. But I think we cannot decide this 
point in short time. (Neurath to Morris and Carnap, 12 March 1937. RC 102-51-60.)
Even though Neurath was exaggerating  – Tomás de Torquemada was the first 
Spanish Grand Inquisitor in the fifteenth century, responsible for thousands of 
deaths that time  – it is true that he was inclined towards harsh and extreme 
reactions.
By mentioning Hegel or Dilthey in a positive manner, Mannheim made an intol-
erable step towards metaphysics. In most cases, it is only Mannheim’s language that 
reveals his philosophical past and tradition, but Neurath had a good eye to catch 
those supposedly dangerous words. Though Carnap’s Aufbau does not belong to the 
tradition of Geisteswissenschaften, Neurath saw its allusion; Carnap wrote the fol-
lowings in his diaries: “With Feigl to Neurath. Neurath grumbled over my presenta-
tion of the ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ in the ‘Aufbau.’ This is too idealistic for him; he 
35 On Neurath and the strong program, see Uebel (2000); on Frank and the sociology of science see 
Tuboly (2017).
36 Recently Markus Seidel (2016) listed some reasons for thinking that Neurath’s considerations 
did not apply to Mannheim. Even if he is right, it does not affect my main points, which are based 
on Neurath’s internal (or so-called “emic”) perspective.
37 Morris to Neurath, copy to Carnap, 21 February 1937 (RC 102-51-63).
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had some points to attack: he gets to name Dilthey: ‘moral’, ‘state’, ‘manifestation.’”38 
Given Neurath’s well-known opposition to that tradition, Mannheim’s case was eas-
ily postponed for 2 years.
In 1939, however, something changed. With the increasing recognition of logical 
empiricism their congresses became more successful: after Prague, Paris, 
Copenhagen, and Cambridge, the next step was Harvard. Mannheim was invited to 
that Congress! He was happy to accept the invitation and proposed the following 
themes: (1) The Sociology of Valuations, (2) The Sociology of Knowledge and 
Logical Positivism, and (3) Specialization and Integration of Knowledge in the 
Social Sciences.39
Neurath liked all the three themes; the first could be related to John Dewey’s 
(1939/1970) Encyclopedia-monograph on valuations that appeared the same year. 
The second session could have helped in understanding the context of the move-
ment, and finally the third session would be a good match for the Social Sciences 
section. Mannheim promised, after all, to prepare a talk on the sociology of valua-
tions. Even though at the congress there was a special section for the social sciences 
(with Neurath) and another for “Science and Society” (with Wirth and Zilsel), 
Mannheim did not deliver a lecture.40
Two years later Neurath approached Mannheim again to give a talk at the Sixth 
Congress, now in Chicago – again, unsuccessfully. But he did not give up. Because 
of the various war-restrictions, many European scientists were unable to travel, thus 
Neurath organized the aforementioned “Terminology” workshop for them in Oxford 
(October 1941). Due to his other commitments, however, Mannheim was not able 
to participate at the Oxford gathering either.41
After these conference-invitations, the line of events became blurry, but Neurath 
wrote the following to Mannheim 1 year later:
I should like to meet you as far as our Encyclopedia is concerned. It is not urgent, you see 
we are now publishing the first 20 monographs, but on the other hand, we have to prepare 
carefully the next 60, too, and I should like to know a little, what, IN PRINCIPLE, of 
course, you would PERHAPS, assumed, you will have time, write on your own opinion as 
a representative one. (Neurath to Mannheim, 28 December 1942. In: Mannheim 1996, 183.)
Despite Neurath’s idiosyncratic English, one might see that at the end of 1942, he 
brought himself to get Mannheim for the Encyclopedia. Actually, the final 
Encyclopedia would contain more than 100 monographs, some of them discussing 
the relation of science to society. By writing this one, Mannheim would indeed be a 
nice fit and a valuable contributor given his growing international reputation.42 In 
Neurath’s life, however, the ideal of the Encyclopedia was never realized: authors 
38 Carnap’s diary entry, 19 December 1929 (RC 025-73-03). On the Aufbau’s relation to the 
Geisteswissenschaften, see Dewulf (2017) and Tuboly (2019)
39 Mannheim to Neurath, 20 April 1939 (ONN).
40 Neurath to Mannheim, 26 April 1939 and Mannheim to Neurath, 30 August 1939 (ONN).
41 Neurath to Mannheim, 12 June and 15 September 1941 (ONN); Mannheim to Neurath, 19 
September 1941, in: Mannheim (1996, 170).
42 On the Encyclopedia see Reisch (1994), Dahms (1996).
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were dropped, themes were changed, and monographs were delayed for years. 
Henceforth the discussions between Mannheim and Neurath were inconclusive. At 
the beginning Neurath planned for the Encyclopedia to have eight volumes, each 
volume consisting of ten monographs (that is eighty monographs), but only the first 
two volumes were published (twenty monographs in all), but only ten monographs 
in Neurath’s life. Thus even if Mannheim had accept the invitation, he would have 
had to wait decades for his work to be published (his monograph would fit volumes 
seven or eight). The delays would have quickly become irrelevant as Mannheim 
died in 1947.
The story of Neurath and Mannheim’s relation did not end here. Though 
Neurath’s efforts to recruit Mannheim were unsuccessful, Mannheim approached 
Neurath too. Neurath wrote the following:
I am also highly occupied, partly by writing books, partly by organizing our ISOTYPE 
INSTITUTE, which is now here at the British Institute of Visual Education. We are making 
educational Isotype Diagrams – Animated and illustrations for books and exhibitions. We 
think that the international educational situation after the war will need visual education 
much more than the prewar situation. And we think one should prepare something now. I do 
not speak of the visualization of my own ideas, but also of visualization of our contempo-
rary knowledge as a whole. (Neurath to Mannheim, 28 December 1942. In: Mannheim 
1996, 183.)
It is not known whether this letter kindled Mannheim’s interest in Neurath’s 
ISOTYPE (according to their letters, presumably they did not meet personally for 
months). However in March 1943 Mannheim wrote to Neurath to say that he is 
waiting for a detailed summary of Neurath’s promised new book to close the deal. 
He also suggested a title for Neurath: “Humanisation and Popularization. New 
Ways of Visual Education and Humanisation of Scientific Knowledge.” As 
Mannheim said, “[a] long title but provocative.”43
What was the book, and where did Mannheim want to publish it? In 1942, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul started its International Library of Sociology and Social 
Reconstruction (ILSSR) series. The general editor was Mannheim, who held the 
position until his 1947 death. The series became quite well-known and successful: 
“its books were an important part of what there was to read” and their dark green 
dust-jacket “made what people in Britain thought a sociology book looked like” 
(Platt 2014, 236). ILSSR emerged as a fundamental tool in British sociological 
education and in the discipline’s dissemination of knowledge. The particular books 
covered such themes as economic, town and country planning, sociology of crisis, 
art, and literature, criminology, foundations of thought, and, of course, sociology of 
knowledge.
Almost all of the ILSSR volumes were related to Neurath’s earlier and present 
interests as well. Neurath advocated “planning” (the key category in British sociol-
ogy) even before his active months in the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919.44 The 
43 Mannheim to Neurath, 10 March 1943. In: Mannheim (1996, 187).
44 For the significance and context of Neurath’s ideas on planning, see George Reisch’s and Thomas 
Uebel’s chapters in the volume.
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problems of planning and reconstruction turned out to be the two most important 
categories of British sociology during World War Two and even later. From that 
perspective, Neurath seemed to be a nice choice to publish a monograph in the 
series.
According to Mannheim’s letter, Neurath indeed started to write a book for him. 
As Mannheim said, “[t]he longer I think about your proposed book the more I like 
its idea. I also feel that it would fit into the educational section of the International 
Library of Sociology, and Social Reconstruction admirably.” Mannheim claimed 
that the book should be in agreement with the general idea of the series, namely that 
“from the platform of my Library the Educationalists and other people who will 
have to build up a new Europe should be informed about the best techniques.” To 
that project, Neurath would contribute with his visual education and pictorial 
statistics.45
Since Neurath died unexpectedly in 1945, none of his works appeared in 
Mannheim’s ILSSR, henceforth their common causes and aims surfaced only in 
their private correspondence. Nonetheless, a huge part of Neurath’s manuscript 
turned up and was published partly in 1973, and wholly in 1996 – under the editor-
ship of Juha Manninen – as “Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation” 
(Neurath 1996).
One might raise the question: why and how did Neurath change his mind regard-
ing Mannheim after the initial negative review? Since we cannot find any explicit 
trace of this in Neurath’s (un)published works, we could only guess. One such guess 
may be Neurath’s brand building as it was described in the previous two sections. 
In 1942, he wrote to Carnap:
Collecting material on the second series of monographs I am preparing a survey on people 
who are related to us, but have some ‘whims’ – as it were – they should have an opportunity 
to express themselves with intensity (the first series of monographs stresses, what we have 
in common). (Neurath to Carnap, 29 July 1942. RC 115-07-58. See letter 13  in this 
volume.)
Neurath mentioned Feigl, Hempel, Tarski, Reichenbach, and the British psycholo-
gist Tom Hatherley Pear (who was the President of the British Psychological 
Society). But given the fact the Neurath refers to the second series of monographs 
(that is everything after volumes one and two), we can assume that the above remark 
in the letter applies to Mannheim as well. Although Mannheim’s work fit into the 
tradition of Geisteswissenschaften by including metaphysical formulations, those 
differences (in theoretical commitments) could be overcome for the common goals. 
To give an example, see another letter by Neurath:
Reichenbach […] made me emotional, because I thought it not brotherly, how he treated 
you in the various cases, we had to discuss. And, I cannot deny, that his theoretical remarks 
looked perhaps more strange to me than they perhaps would do, if he were not so far away 
from brotherhood in a community, in principle. He is very often charming and I know very 
well how to go on with him in the nicest way ….. but I fear him, not as a scientist or debater, 
45 Mannheim to Neurath, 15 March and 18 August 1943; see further Neurath to Mannheim, 18 
September 1943. In: Mannheim (1996, 188, 192–193).
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but as a person, who is not interested in creating brotherhood in this world. (Neurath’s 
unsent letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945. RC 115-07-66. See letter 34 in the volume.)
Seemingly Neurath would get over some of the theoretical differences with 
Reichenbach if they are counterbalanced in actions and decisions, i.e. practical mat-
ters. Nevertheless, after Neurath charged Reichenbach with “sabotage,”46 even the 
ideal of common action, based on brotherhood, was lost. Reichenbach did not help 
the cause (that is, showing a unified and functioning picture of logical empiricism) 
by being reluctant to write a monograph for the Encyclopedia.
Mannheim, however, never hindered Neurath, but helped him during the English 
period. Education, pedagogy, social planning, organization, and finally reconstruc-
tion were such common ideas and ideals for both of them that made common work 
possible in a time that called for direct and planned action. Thus the case of Neurath 
and Mannheim, diverging between accusations of metaphysics, negative criticism 
and helping each other by various invitations, exemplifies nicely how Neurath’s 
brand-building project worked. Acting together for the greater good overcomes the 
theoretical differences.
5.4  The Story of an Unsuccessful Project
Erwin Dekker (2014, 116) was right in emphasizing that important changes occurred 
in Neurath’s approach to philosophical and scientific cooperation: “throughout the 
1930s Neurath himself moved away from [the] revolutionary idea of the reconstruc-
tion of society.” The reason for downplaying much of his radical socialist overtones 
was actually in support of a positive common cause: building the brand of logical 
empiricism for the greater good, i.e. reconstructing society from the bottom up 
using language and science on as many fronts and with as many comrades as 
possible.
These tendencies were hindered in the 1930s by in-the-house debates, published 
controversies, and personal attacks (which were often made behind each other’s 
backs). Even though Neurath was often ready for compromise, working out issues 
using compromises was simply too slow and often did not pay off for him. One such 
example was Herbert Feigl, a former member of the Circle, who emigrated to the 
United States in 1930. In 1943, Feigl published a paper about “Logical Empiricism” 
in Dagobert R. Runes’ Twentieth Century Philosophy: Living Schools of Thought. 
In his paper, he aimed at summarizing the main tenets and original ideas of the 
movement, with some historical notes and a bibliography. Though he mentioned the 
Unity of Science Movement, the Congresses, and Encyclopedia, he never indicated 
that they were Neurath’s core ideas. Neurath was mentioned only once, as one of the 
many non-philosophers who played an active role in the Circle. It is then not sur-
prising that Neurath commented on this as follows:
46 Neurath to Carnap, 22 July 1931 (RC 029-13-08).
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Feigl wrote a paper on Logical Empiricism. Do you think anybody reading this paper, will 
discover that I had a certain position in its history? […] Please, look to the article by Feigl. 
He just put me into SOCIOLOGY – that is all. He does not even mention me as the initiator 
and editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia. DO YOU THINK HE WOULD TREAT ME SO IF 
I WERE [A] PROFESSOR, not to ask the question, what he did with all that if I were 
Schlick. (Neurath to Carnap, 24 September 1945. RC 102-55-14. See letter 36  in this 
volume.)
It is not simply that Feigl did not give sufficient credit to Neurath. What was even 
worse for Neurath was that Feigl acted against the ideal of brotherhood: “I never 
complaint about Feigl. I am not regarding him as very important or influential, but 
for a long time I regarded him as a potential friend. I FEEL IRRITATED AS A 
FRIEND” (ibid.).
Neurath also recalled some meetings with Feigl in Europe, which were influen-
tial for the young Feigl but were never properly acknowledged. Neurath suggested 
to Hannes Meyer, the director of the Bauhaus, for example, that he invite Feigl to 
Dessau. Neurath also suggested that Feigl should participate at a pedagogical con-
ference in Geneva in order to increase his chances in finding a job – Feigl happily 
acknowledged this in a letter to Schlick.47
Even though Neurath did everything to become friends and close colleagues with 
Feigl, he was grieved by the (recurring) actions of the latter, especially by not get-
ting proper credit or help in disseminating Neurath’s point of view. Actually, when 
Feigl (1943, 401) listed those logical empiricists who worked on the social sciences, 
he mentioned only Hempel, Paul Oppenheim, Felix Kaufmann, Edgar Zilsel, and 
the American sociologist, George Andrew Lundberg. There was no mention of 
Neurath in that section at all.
The fact that Neurath was well-received in England should not surprise us, how-
ever. In his book on the cultural-political history of analytic philosophy, Thomas L. 
Akehurst (2010, 2), emphasized that “[t]here was a ‘deep seated similarity of atti-
tude and outlook’ among the British analysts; […] we can detect a clear pattern of 
cultural, political and philosophical beliefs shared by major British analytic phi-
losophers.” This shared worldview was centered partly on the idea that “a post- 
Kantian tradition of continental philosophy was the direct source of fascist ideology” 
(Akehurst 2010, 3). Relatedly, British philosophers had a positive program as well: 
the emerging analytic tradition was closely tied to liberalism and democracy. 
Neurath shared both of these characteristics.
In his last years, Neurath was busy with a larger project on Germany’s education 
after the war, dealing with the sources, contexts, and future of Nazism and their 
interconnections. He thought that “in German literature, we find many elements, 
which fit together may form a pattern in harmony with the anti-democratic attitude.”48 
47 Feigl to Schlick, 21 July 1929. Moritz Schlick Nachlass. The same event is recalled in Neurath’s 
unsent letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945 (RC 115-07-66) and in his 24 September 1945 letter 
(RC 102-55-14). See letters 34 and 36 in this volume. Though it should be admitted that later Feigl 
(1969/1981, 62) noted his debt to Neurath regarding the Bauhaus.
48 See Neurath and Lauwerys, “Plato’s Republic, German Education and Human Brotherhood,” in 
the Neurath Nachlass, ONN, K. 73. On Neurath and his fears of German education, see Antonia 
Soulez’s chapter in the present volume.
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Neurath tried to identify certain patterns and schemes in German literature, scien-
tific studies and traditional ways of argumentations. Emphasizing the role of Plato’s 
Republic, Kant’s categorical imperative, the ideal of the genius who is above all 
rules and customs, the inclination towards something “the” (like “the state,” “the 
rule,” “the nation,” “the race,” “the great past”), Neurath separated the German cli-
mate (or atmosphere) from the British (or more generally, the Western European) 
one:
The human climate of the western countries is different. Here a certain critical attitude plays 
its part, in Britain based more on certain traditional traits, in the continental West based 
more on certain rational arguments. But so or so, what grows up in the west are individuals, 
who think more of common happiness and of co-operation than of subordination under 
some super-human structure, THE STATE or THE RACE. Of course also here are collec-
tive traits of importance, but they never consummate the whole of a person. (Neurath, 
“Meeting, Belgium committee…,” ONN, K. 79.)
In that sense – even though he had some intense debates about Plato’s influence on 
the German climate and on German traditions after writing an article with Joseph A. 
Lauwerys (1945) – Neurath found eventually a cooperative, friendly and receptive 
attitude. He did not have to add much to the intellectual climate of British analysts 
with respect to their criticisms of continental thought and Nazism. He could add, 
however, his own experiences and practical works on how to re-educate people after 
the war. As he wrote to Carnap, “I like to be with the British in these hard days. 
Being in a new environment is rather thrilling and stimulating – I feel like a second 
youth here. On our life boat I thought of the future activity here.”49
Without emphasizing it much: democracy was indeed a major concern for 
Neurath throughout his entire life, but most explicitly during his English years. He 
stressed England’s own tradition in democracy (or at least its customs and ideas that 
created a supporting pattern for the democratic way of life):
In Germany there is a whole ideology of regulations. Not only do you have to have regula-
tions, but you have to admire them. In England, you admire your lack of regulations, your 
‘muddle’. […] Your Court procedure is based on the right of a single Judge to give a definite 
answer. Thus different solutions are admitted: you have more differences in local decisions. 
Differentiation is contrary to German feeling, because in Germany there are thirty different 
States, needing a common activity and a common basis. In England you have your common 
basis well-established, and therefore you do not fear differences. Thus you have a 
 democracy. The muddle is related to democracy. (Neurath, “Contributing features in the 
emotional and intellectual isolation of the German,” ONN, K.48.)
For Neurath, democracy came with pluralism, tolerance and ‘muddle’: both in theo-
ries and actions, an old theme, he issued already from his famous 1913 Vienna lec-
ture: “the lost wanderers of Descartes.”50
49 Neurath to Carnap, 22 December 1942 (RC 115-07-61). See letter 16  in this volume. On the 
British analysts and Nazism see Akehurst (2010, 16–52).
50 Actually Neurath emphasized this special continuity of his line of thought in “Universal Jargon 
and Terminology” (1941/1983, 216); but also in his “Argumentation and Action” manuscript 
(ONN, K39). See also Don Howard’s chapter about the continuation of Neurath’s thought regard-
ing the practical relevance of philosophy, starting around the time of “The Lost Wanderers” 
article.
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Neurath died on October 10, 1945, sitting, reading and laughing at his working 
desk after a usual walk in the streets around his house. In the recent literature, aim-
ing at his rehabilitation, he emerged as an original thinker, often ahead of his time. 
Nonetheless, there was one thing he presumably did not see coming. Someone – 
according to Ayer’s biographer, Ben Rogers (1999, 231), that someone was the jour-
nalist, Giles Romilly, who was the nephew of Churcill  – under the pseudonym 
“Oxonian,” described his experiences returning to Oxford in 1948:
Since the end of the war, Professor Ayer’s book [Language, Truth and Logic] has in Oxford 
acquired almost the status of a philosophic bible. […] There is of course, no direct connec-
tion between Logical Positivism and Fascism. Yet an anti-aesthetic Philistinism is encour-
aged by it, since it reduces intellectual activity to a kind of artisanship, in which one either 
has “skill” or hasn’t. And I would make this point, that a climate of opinion, in which a 
negative and rather arid philosophy of this type can rise to such pre-eminence is one more 
likely to favour Fascism than not; since Fascism steps into the vacuum left by an abeyance 
of concern with fundamental human values. (“A Visit to Oxford,” The New Statesman and 
Nation, June 26, 1948.)
Logical empiricists have been accused of many things: relativism, nihilism, intel-
lectualism, and dogmatism. In the United States, in a “Letter to the Editor” (The 
Saturday Review, 3 September 1949, p. 26) it was said that logical empiricists, as 
nihilists, are worse than communists since “communism (albeit in a perverted fash-
ion) holds some things to be good and others to be bad.” Neurath, running from 
fascism and Nazism, fighting them with all his efforts on the theoretical, educational 
and practical levels, could hardly imagine a worse outcome than his approach being 
accused of creating an atmosphere (in England!) supporting Fascism! He would 
have been even more surprised to find out that that C. E. M. Joad (1950) – who he 
invited to his Chicago Congress and Oxford conference in 1941 – has devoted an 
entire book of accusation, criticism, and disinformation to the “Fascism and Logical 
Empiricism” theme arguing in favor of the position first outlined by Oxonian.51
Throughout this debate A. J. Ayer’s book and thoughts were under suspicion: in 
the philosophical circles of England, Neurath was already forgotten. By 1941, he 
claimed to Carnap that “I think, if universities should be interested in me, it would 
be in connection with particular problems of social sciences, unified science or 
visual education.”52 Though his name surfaced for a few more years in the context 
of visual education (thanks to the efforts of his third wife, Marie), his other activities 
fell victim to various misleading and oversimplified accounts of his works and 
intentions.
51 It should be mentioned though, that in the United States Horace Kallen accused Neurath’s unified 
idea of totalitarianism already in 1939, and later in 1945. See Reisch (2005, 167–190).
52 See Neurath to Carnap, 21 September 1941 (See letter 7. in this volume.).
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Chapter 6
Visualizing Relations in Society 
and Economics: Otto Neurath’s Isotype- 
Method Against the Background of his 
Economic Thought
Elisabeth Nemeth
Abstract The article shows how two domains of Neurath’s broad and multifaceted 
work are related to each other: the concepts and methods he wanted to implement in 
political economics, on the one hand, and the methods of visualization that he and 
his interdisciplinary team developed at the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, 
on the other. Some of Neurath’s suggestions in both domains are surprisingly mod-
ern even today.
The economist, philosopher and political activist Otto Neurath is a well known- 
figure in the history of philosophy of science.1 He was a founding member of the 
“Vienna Circle,” a group of philosophers and scientists who developed their ideas 
during the 1920s and 30s in Vienna. The views of the group – known as “Logical 
Positivism” or “Logical Empiricism” – shaped essential parts of the philosophy of 
science of the second half of the twentieth century. Since the 1980s, Neurath’s 
unorthodox contributions to Logical Empiricism have been re-considered and 
1 On Neurath’s life and work see: P.  Neurath (1994), Neurath and Nemeth (1994), 
Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996), Nemeth and Heinrich (1999), Stadler (2001), Uebel (2005b), 
Cat (2014), Sandner (2014), and the essays in Part 1 of this volume.
This article is a revised version of a paper that was first published as “Socially Enlightened Science. 
Neurath on Social Science and Visual Education,” in Mélika Ouelbani (ed.), Thèmes de Philosophie 
Analytique, Université de Tunis, Tunis, 2006, pp.  83–112. A revised version was published as 
“Visualizing relations in society and economics: Otto Neurath’s Isotype-method against the back-
ground of his economic thought,” in Jean-Yves Béziau (ed.). La pointure du symbole, Paris: édi-
tions Petra 2014. For this volume the text has been revised and amended. Throughout the paper all 
translations from German to English are mine, and Neurath’s reprinted papers are quoted form 
Neurath (1981, 1991, 1998).
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 re- evaluated.2 His activities in Red Vienna during the 1920s and 1930s have been 
studied, and some of them have been documented.3 At present, Neurath’s work on 
picture statistics and visual education is attracting ever more interest.4 But so is his 
economical writing, which did not attract much interest after his death in 1945 but 
is now re-discussed by philosophers and economists. These discussions concentrate 
on Neurath’s ecologico-economical arguments, the concept of “standard of living” 
[Lebenslage] as well as on his heterodox ideas on socialism.5 In the following, I 
want to show how two domains of Neurath’s broad and multifaceted work are 
related to each other: the concepts and methods he wanted to implement in political 
economics, on the one hand, and the methods of visualization that he and his inter-
disciplinary team developed at the Social and Economic Museum, on the other. 
Some of Neurath’s ideas in both domains are surprisingly modern even today.
6.1  Re-considering the Basic Concepts of Economics
When Otto Neurath published his first scientific writings around 1910, he was a 
young political economist trying to convince the scholars of his time that their field 
of study should be redefined within a much broader conceptual framework than it 
had been until then. “In line with an ancient tradition,” he wrote, “we define wealth 
as the object of political economy.” While Neurath emphasized the venerated origin 
of this definition – Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics – he went on to explain his own 
understanding of wealth:
2 See, for instance: Nemeth (1981), Stadler (1982), Haller (1982/1991, 1985/1991), Uebel (1991, 
1992, 2000b, 2007a), Cartwright,  Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996), Nemeth and Stadler (1996), and 
Stadler (2001).
3 See, e.g., Stadler (1982), Novy (1983), Novy and Förster (1991), Blau (1999), Vossoughian 
(2008), and Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter in the volume.
4 See Twyman (1975, 1982, 1985), Kinross (1981, 1984), Mueller (1991), Leonard (2001), Stadler 
(2011), Hartmann and Bauer (2002), Hartmann (2005), Blau (2006), Kraeutler (2008), Vossoughian 
(2008), Neurath and Kinross (2009), Burke (2009, 2010a, 2011), Kindel (2011), Hochhäusl 
(2011), Nikolow (2011), Heinrich et  al. (2011), and the chapters of Angélique Groß and Silke 
Körber in the present volume. I want to draw special attention to two volumes: (1) the edition of a 
manuscript of the late Neurath which has not been published until 2010: From hieroglyphics to 
Isotype (see Neurath 2010) and to the excellent introduction by Christopher Burke (2010b). The 
volume includes the numerous illustrations intended by Neurath to accompany his text, and is 
completed by an extensive appendix showing examples from the rich variety of graphic material 
that he collected. (2) Isotype. Design and contexts 1925-1971, eds. Christopher Burke, Eric Kindel, 
and Sue Walker. London: Hyphen Press, 2013. The volume comprehends all periods of the devel-
opment of Isotype. It presents both new material and new insights concerning the beginnings in 
Vienna, Neurath’s time spent in the USSR (Izostat), developments in the Netherlands and America, 
the Isotype Institute in Oxford, Marie Neurath-Reidemeister’s collaborations with African coun-
tries, and her children’s books. It includes an enormous amount of new pictorial material. The 
quality of the reproduction of graphics and pictures is so high that looking at them feels almost like 
looking at the originals.
5 See Martinez-Alier (1987), O’Neill (1993, 1998, 1999, 2007), Uebel (2004, 2005a, 2007b), and 
his chapter in the present volume, Lessmann (2007a, b), Nemeth et al.  (2007), Nemeth (2007) and 
Stuchlik (2011).
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By ‘wealth’ we understand the totality of pleasure and displeasure that we find with indi-
viduals and groups of individuals. The term ‘pleasure’ has the advantage that in our use of 
language it comprehends complex and primitive facts at the same time. (Neurath 1911/1998, 
471.)6
According to Neurath’s definition, the phenomenon political economy attempts to 
explain should be understood as an irreducibly heterogeneous totality. In his view, 
the main intellectual challenge political economists face is finding a method to 
describe the components of that totality without reducing them to one unit of mea-
surement. Calculation in monetary terms, Neurath argued, never gives an adequate 
account of the complex phenomenon called wealth.7 It is important to note that the 
complexity Neurath identified manifests itself not only when we conceive of a 
group of individuals holistically, whose needs and preferences might differ, or even 
compete, but also when we think of an individual person.
When talking of the total situation of a person, we must consider that many factors are 
significant for choosing a profession, a place of residence, even such factors as the oppor-
tunity for artistic or religious satisfaction (remember the emigrations for the latter reason) 
[…].
In the end we have to consider a complex of pleasure and pain as a whole, if we want to 
characterise the entire situation of a person. The situation is the same if we want to describe 
the order of life [Lebensordnung] of a people, or of a temporal period, in order to infer from 
that its favourable or unfavourable conditions. Again we have to look at the entire situation. 
Here and at many other points as well, the calculus of value reaches its limits, because the 
value of a sum of goods is not derivable from the sum of the values of the individual goods. 
(Neurath 1909b/2004, 293.)
With these and similar reflections, Neurath contributed to the famous debate on 
method and values which had occupied German scholars in the social sciences from 
the eighties of the nineteenth century. This paper will present a very rough sketch of 
some of the assumptions and concerns Neurath derived from both the “Historical 
School” and the “Austrian School of Economics” in developing his own position, 
located somewhere in-between the two.8
At Ferdinand Tönnies’s instigation, Neurath left Vienna after his first year at the 
university to study economics in Berlin. In Berlin, Neurath studied with Eduard 
Meyer and Gustav Schmoller – both well-known representatives of the “Historical 
School” – and received his doctoral degree in 1906. It is thus not surprising that 
many of his ideas pertaining to economics can be traced to these influences. First of 
6 In a footnote, Neurath refers his use of the term “pleasure” (as comprehending complex and 
primitive facts at the same time) to Gustav Fechner’s Vorschule der Ästhetik.
7 In a similar line of argument, Neurath also criticized Utilitarianism for (at least implicitly) sug-
gesting a sort of a pleasure calculus (Neurath 1912a/1973) as well as Kautsky’s idea to use “labor 
time units to calculate the cost and benefit of production and regulate distribution” (see Thomas 
Uebel’s chapter in the present volume).
8 The following rough sketch of Neurath’s position in the Methodenstreit draws heavily on Uebel 
(2000a, 2002, 2004, 2005a) and Cartwright’s, Cat’s, and Uebel’s detailed analysis of the debate in 
Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel  (1996).
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all, Neurath inherited their interest both in the history of economic systems and the 
history of economic thought.9 Neurath also adopted the view that economic struc-
tures cannot be understood without taking into account political and cultural fac-
tors.10 He also held that a systematic comparison of specific historical constellations 
of human social existence should be the central focus of scientific inquiry (Neurath 
1911/1998, 471). Finally, for Neurath, the task of economics was to analyze in their 
totality the life conditions of a specific population.
However, Neurath’s views owed something to the work of the “Austrians” too 
(Uebel 2004, 2007b). Two aspects of this work are especially important in the pres-
ent context.
First, Neurath shared both the Austrians’ concern for scientific standards and 
their view that economics was yet not a true science. But for Neurath this did not 
mean that economists should search for universal laws. On the contrary: he believed 
that certain features of the Austrian School’s concept of true science were based on 
an anachronistic ideal of natural science that had reappeared in social science in a 
vague, misconceived form. One of the principal tenets of this ideal was that true 
science had to search for universal laws. Another was the assumption that without 
calculation (i.e., without measuring processes and relations on the basis of one sin-
gle unit), no precise and reliable results could be obtained. Neurath held this ideal 
of scientific method and precision to be fundamentally mechanistic and therefore 
outdated, and wanted it to be replaced by the concept of knowledge that had emerged 
in modern physics and mathematics. The main points of reference in these advanced 
fields of modern science were Gregorius Itelson’s definition of mathematics as the 
“science of ordered objects” on the one hand,11 and Ernst Mach’s descriptionist 
concept of science on the other.
Second, Neurath shared the Austrians’ view that goods have no inherent value 
but are valuable only to the extent that human beings derive “pleasure” from them. 
When Neurath claimed that the “life conditions of the population in its totality” 
were to be the main focus of economics, he always added that this totality was to be 
seen as a complex of individual pleasure and well-being (see Neurath 1912a/1973). 
For Neurath, thinking of “society as a whole” never meant conceiving it as an entity 
in its own right, nor could the structuring principle of “society” be defined without 
reference to the states and actions of individuals. On the contrary, Neurath followed 
other modernists who defended individualism against the authoritarian tendencies 
of the time, like Ferdinand Tönnies, his father Wilhelm Neurath, and especially 
Josef Popper-Lynkeus (1923), who saw the unconditional respect for the individual 
as being the only possible principle of ethics and social philosophy.12
9 See Neurath’s Antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte (partly available in English as Neurath 1909a/2004), 
and his Ph.D. thesis on the history of interpretation of Cicero’s De Officiis (1906/1998).
10 See, for instance, Neurath’s interest in the sociology of religion on the Balkan states: Neurath 
(1913/1998, 1914/1998), and in English as (1912b/2004).
11 See Buek (1926). On Itelson’s influence on Neurath see further Jordi Cat’s chapter in the present 
volume.
12 On Tönnies’ individualism see Ringer (1969, Ch. 3.). On Wilhelm Neurath see Uebel (1995). On 
J. Popper-Lynkeus see Belke (1978).
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Seen from this perspective, Neurath’s project really seems to be an attempt to 
square the circle: On the one hand, he defended the “Historians’” view that “the 
concept of life in its entirety” should be the central focus of economic theory. He 
pointed out that one of the founders of the “Historical School” had stated that “the 
life of a nation is a whole, the manifestations of which are intimately connected” 
(Neurath 1909b/2004, 294). On the other hand, Neurath defined the object of eco-
nomic theory as analyzing pleasure and displeasure as experienced by individual 
human beings. Hence, from Neurath’s point of view, the “life of a nation as a whole” 
is the totality of experiences of a plurality of individuals. In this sense, Neurath’s 
highly ambitious methodological project (called “calculation in kind”) was to com-
bine holistic and individualistic elements and thereby enlarge the theoretical frame-
work of political economy. From the very outset, that theoretical project struck 
many of his contemporaries as rather strange. And when, after 1918, Neurath sug-
gested several models of socialist economy, his social-democratic friends found 
them too radical and technocratic.13 Nonetheless, during the twenties and thirties, 
Neurath’s theoretical approach figured significantly in the debates on whether or not 
a socialist economy was possible – albeit mostly as a negative point of reference: 
“economy in kind” was referred to as a radical but illusory version of planned econ-
omy.14 After 1945, Neurath’s economic theory disappeared altogether. Yet, remark-
ably enough, since the 1980s this has changed. Some recent theoretical 
approaches – especially in the field of ecological and welfare economics – show 
surprising parallels with the questions Neurath sought to address, and even with the 
conceptual framework he developed. In order to show that Neurath’s ideas are by no 
means as old-fashioned as had been assumed, we will say a few words about Martha 
Nussbaum’s and Amartya Sen’s concept of well-being.
‘And he said, Now, this schoolroom is a nation. And in this nation, there are fifty millions 
of money. Isn’t this a prosperous nation? Girl number twenty, isn’t this a prosperous nation, 
and a’n’t you in a thriving state?’
‘What did you say?’ asked Louisa.
‘Miss Louisa, I said I didn’t know. I thought I couldn’t know whether it was a prosperous 
nation or not, and whether I was in a thriving state or not, unless I knew who had got the 
money, and whether any of it was mine. But that had nothing to do with it. It was not in the 
figures at all,’ said Sissy, wiping her eyes.
‘That was a great mistake of yours,’ observed Louisa.
Nussbaum and Sen open their book The Quality of Life (1993) by quoting the above 
excerpt from Charles Dickens’ Hard Times. And they stress that Sissy Jupe’s prob-
lem has yet to be solved.
When we inquire about the prosperity of a nation or a region of the world, and about the 
quality of life of its inhabitants, Sissy Jupe’s problem still arises: How do we determine 
13 See, for instance, his debate with Helene Bauer in “Der Kampf” in 1923.
14 See Uebel (2004, 51–7), and his chapter in the present volume; cf. Chaloupek (2007).
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this? What information do we require? Which criteria are truly relevant to human ‘thriv-
ing’? Girl number twenty quickly discerns that just knowing how much money is available 
(the analogue of GNP per capita, still widely used as a measure of quality of life) will not 
take us very far. For we also need, at the very least, to ask about the distribution of these 
resources, and what they do to the people’s lives. (Nussbaum and Sen 1993, 1.)
Nussbaum and Sen go on to emphasize that the problem is still more complex: “we 
need to know not only about the money they do have or do not have, but a great deal 
about how they are able to conduct their lives” (1993, 1). Information of a different 
kind is required: about life expectancy, healthcare, medical service, education (“not 
only about its availability but about its nature and quality”), about labor (“whether 
it is rewarding or grindingly monotonous, whether workers enjoy any measure of 
dignity and control”). We need to know about political and legal privileges, family 
relations and relations between the sexes.
In short, to think well about Sissy’s problem, we seem to need a kind of rich and complex 
description of what people are able to do and to be. […]
Economists, policy-makers, social scientists, and philosophers are still faced with this prob-
lem of measurement and assessment. They need to know how people are doing in many 
different parts of the world, and they need to know what is really involved in asking that 
question. When they face the problem well, they face it, so to speak, with wonder […]; with 
a sense, that is, of the profound complexity of assessing human life, and with a desire to 
admit, at least initially, the widest possible range of accounts of how one might go about 
this, and what indicators one might trust.
Of course, it is possible to wonder not at all – to stick to a mechanical formula that is easy 
to use and which has been used before. The unasked question does not have to be answered. 
(Nussbaum and Sen 1993, 2.)
Remarkably, Nussbaum and Sen (1993, 2) also believe that Aristotle’s philosophy 
may help us “to face the problem well:” Aristotle gave a pluralistic account of what 
we mean by conducting our lives in a good way and thereby developed “a kind of 
rich and complex description of what people are able to do and to be.” The sophis-
ticated theoretical framework Sen developed in order to introduce rich descriptions 
of human life into economics shows strong affinities with Neurath’s: first, the view 
that the concept of “well-being” is (and should be recognized as) a legitimate object 
of economic study; second the definition of well-being as a set of “functionings” 
which includes – to use Neurath’s terms – “complex and primitive facts at the same 
time.”15 Thirdly, Sen’s approach also integrates “holistic” and “individualistic” fea-
tures. In the framework Sen suggested, “the total situation of a group of people” is 
conceived as a totality of unequally distributed social conditions of freedom in liv-
15 In Sen’s (1985, 197f.) terms: “The primary feature of well-being can be seen in terms of how a 
person can ‘function,’ taking that term in a very broad sense. I shall refer to various doings and 
beings that come into this assessment as functionings. These could be activities (like eating or 
reading or seeing), or states of existence or being, e.g., being well nourished, being free from 
malaria, not being ashamed by the poverty of one’s clothing or shoes (to go back to a question that 
Adam Smith discussed in his Wealth of Nations). I shall refer to the set of functionings a person 
actually achieves as the functioning vector […].”
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ing one’s own life. They determine the choices individual human beings are in a 
position to make. “A person’s capability set can be defined as the set of functioning 
vectors within his or her reach” (Sen 1985, 200; emphasis added).16 Hence, the 
“functioning and capability approach” suggests that a theory of social and economic 
development should describe to what extent people have (or achieve / lose) access 
to the social conditions under which they are able to conduct their lives in the way 
they choose – and how choices and opportunities are distributed between women 
and men, young and old people, urban regions and the country-side. Obviously, 
Sen’s theory is much further elaborated than Neurath’s and has the advantage of 
taking the social and political experiences of the twentieth century into account. 
Neurath paid less attention “to the freedom ‘to do this’, or ‘to be that’ that a person 
has,” than Sen does. Nevertheless, the indicators of “well-being” Neurath suggested 
also include access to political and social freedom. He emphasized the right of each 
individual to take part in all human activities, to participate in shaping the “order of 
life” [Lebensordnung] concerning housing, nourishment, clothing, and medical care 
as well as law, morals, love, family, religion, and art (Neurath 1921/1981, 197; 
1917a/2004, 1938).17
Let me give one more example to show that Neurath’s views of human well- 
being and ill-being anticipated some approaches which became influential only at 
the end of the twentieth century. The Human Development Report (1997, 17) 
focused on poverty. In it we find the following list of “Criteria of ill-being.”
The following criteria, drawn from various participatory studies, were used by local people 
in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa for defining poverty and ill-being:
 – Being disabled (for example, blind, crippled, mentally impaired, chronically sick).
 – Lacking land, livestock, farm equipment, a grinding mill.
 – Being unable to decently bury their dead.
 – Being unable to send their children to school.
 – Having more mouths to feed, fewer hands to help.
 – Lacking able-bodied family members who can feed their families in a crisis.
 – Having bad housing.
 – Suffering the effects of destructive behaviors (for example, alcoholism).
 – Having to put children in employment.
 – Being single parents.
 – Having to accept demeaning or low-status work.
 – Having food security for only a few months each year.
 – Being dependent on common property resources.
16 “In examining the well-being of a person, attention can legitimately be paid to the capability set 
of the person and not just to the chosen functioning vector. This has the effect of taking note of the 
positive freedoms in a general sense (the freedom ‘to do this’, or ‘to be that’) that a person has” 
(Sen 1985, 200).
17 Given the fact that Neurath was highly critical of Aristotelian Metaphysics (see for instance his 
letters to Carnap in the present volume), the Aristotelian features in his conception of the subject 
matter of economics might seem to be inconsistent. Yet, Neurath referred his approach to econom-
ics to the Nicomachean Ethics which is arguably independent of Aristotelian Metaphysics. 
Aristotle’s Ethics is actually to a large extent empirically informed. Neurath could, in my view, 
quite easily be sympathetic to the empirical orientation of much of Aristotle’s work and at the same 
time reject his Metaphysics.
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In my opinion, this illustrates perfectly what Neurath regarded as the starting 
point of a truly empirical account of the life situation of a given population. The list 
presents a picture of the entire situation of a group of people, relating the individual 
components, which cannot be captured by a single unit of measurement, in different 
ways. It also asks social scientists and politicians to think about poverty by using the 
categories poor people themselves had used to describe their experience.18
Let us now return to Neurath’s attempt to redefine the object of economics: 
according to Neurath, wealth was to be described as a heterogeneous complex of 
pleasure and displeasure of individuals and groups of individuals. Yet, this is only 
one aspect of what Neurath considered the object of scientific economics to be. We 
also have to ask how the changes in life situations are brought about. Neurath also 
stressed that what he was suggesting was by no means completely new. On the con-
trary: here, too, he wanted to recapture the complexity and richness of an ancient, 
though neglected scientific question.
Political economists have always been interested in the processes that make people wealthy 
or poor. As long as this happened by cultivation of land or operating a plant it was treated 
as basically a technical question, but soon it was realised that it was the system of contracts, 
the system of taxes and duties, that were of decisive importance: thus the systems of organ-
isations themselves became objects of inquiry. The classical school of economics has exam-
ined one unique form of such systems of organisation, free competition, and it has praised 
it just like the mercantilists praised theirs. In the course of examining the free market sys-
tem as a cause of the growth of the population, one had to look into its structure in detail 
and so came across issues that did not have anything to do with wealth directly, e.g. one 
observed falling or rising prices entirely independently of whether this was conjoined with 
an increase or a decrease in wealth. Since it involved measurable quantities, just as with 
crop yields etc., that were easy to establish unambiguously, price theory soon became a 
discipline that was practised particularly eagerly. The question whether the system of 
organisation at issue would foster wealth or not receded in importance or was neglected 
altogether. Partly this was related to the idea that monetary calculation adequately reflected 
the distribution of wealth. (Neurath 1910b/2004, 272.)
Hence, Neurath called for a radical widening of the scope of economic studies on 
two levels: on the one hand, he assumed that there was a heterogeneous totality of 
the well-being and ill-being of individuals, and on the other hand, a heterogeneous 
totality of factors that both influence that complex structure of individual states and 
also transforms them (“the system of contracts, taxes, systems of organisations”). 
Economists, in Neurath’s view, should describe and compare the effects of certain 
shifts on the individual states. (From an historical perspective they should examine 
shifts in the past. From a “purely theoretical” perspective, the effects of any possible 
shift should be investigated and compared with others.) Neurath tried to elaborate a 
method to address this highly complex situation in a precise way – the method he 
called “calculation in kind.” In 1935 he described in a nutshell what this method was 
all about:
18 See also Alkire (2002) for a comprehensive account of the concept of “multidimensional devel-
opment” and Alkire and Santos (2010) and Alkire (2011) for the methodological issues involved in 
measuring multidimensional poverty.
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Economic theory deals with the influence particular institutions and actions have on the 
standard of living. (Neurath 1935/1987, 96.)
Note that this broad framework of “calculation in kind” includes analyses of mar-
kets, albeit from a specific point of view. Free competition is seen as a very specific 
type of organization. Its effects on life situations can and should be compared to the 
effects other “institutions,” “actions” and their combination would have on the stan-
dard of living of a given population.
In itself, calculation in kind does not represent any one socio-political or economic stand- 
point, it is merely a way of looking at things. Economic institutions and whole systems of 
economic organisations can be investigated by the in-kind calculus and it may be found, for 
instance, that under some circumstances the free market is more efficient than the planned 
economy. […] What is essential is how we formulate the problem to be solved. The focus 
does not lie on the change of prices, of the interest rate, of wages, but on their influence on 
the satisfaction of needs. Even economic orders that make no use of these concepts may be 
examined on their efficiency. (Neurath 1917b/2004, 244.)
It is important to see the difference between the concept of “calculation in kind” and 
the concept of a “planned economy in kind.” Before World War One, Neurath devel-
oped the calculation-in-kind-framework for theoretically exploring diverse forms of 
economic organization and their impact on the standard of living. He was however 
convinced that a socialist economy was a planned economy in kind and would 
therefore necessarily rely on some sort of calculation in kind. This was a crucial 
subject of the “calculation-debates” of the 1920s and 1930.19 The highly political 
connotation that “calculation-in-kind” got after World War One should not make us 
forget that the concept was initially a theoretical concept and part of a highly ambi-
tious academic project of research. Since Neurath’s engagement in Munich in 1919, 
he was excluded from Academia and therefore not able to develop his ambitious 
methodological project further. Yet, even in its rather rudimentary form it enabled 
him to point at surprisingly modern theoretical topics of economics.20
19 See Thomas Uebel’s highly interesting reconstruction of Neurath’s arguments concerning the 
possibility / unavoidability of in-kind-considerations in economics and politics (be it socialist or 
non-socialist) in the present volume.
20 The economist Mooslechner emphasized an interesting example: Neurath who is till this day 
notorious among economists for his plead for a moneyless socialist economy, suggested in 1909 to 
investigate various monetary systems regarding their productivity: “[H]e did not rule out at that 
time that differences in the type of monetary organization will lead to corresponding differences in 
real productivity. ‘The questions of productivity of monetary organization […] are thus granted 
full legitimacy […]’ (Neurath 1909b/2004, 296)” (Mooslechner 2007, 105).
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6.2  Making a Scientific Way of Looking at Society Accessible 
to the Public
Let us now make a big leap from the pre-World War One period, when Neurath still 
envisioned himself as a future university professor of political economy who wished 
to contribute to modernizing economic theory, to the mid-nineteen twenties, when 
Neurath was the director of the Social and Economic Museum of Vienna, one of the 
main institutions for adult education in Red Vienna. At the museum Neurath, 
together with an interdisciplinary team, developed the “Vienna method of picture 
statistics” which was meant to become a new and effective tool for “disseminating 
social enlightenment” (Stadler 2001, 700).
Enlightenment, in Neurath’s definition, was “social” in the dual sense of the 
word. First, it was to show how the life conditions of broad masses of people depend 
on the social and economic order. Second, it was to give the broad masses of people 
access to that knowledge. In other words, it was to create the social and intellectual 
conditions under which knowledge about society would be produced for society.
Most people first want to learn how it is that in periods of highest technological develop-
ment, privation and poverty prevail. […] When coffee is burnt or thrown into the sea, when 
cotton is destroyed, when machines are scrapped and millions of unemployed starve, enjoy-
ment of life and health is restricted to a much greater extent than can be remedied by apply-
ing technical and hygienic methods. The social and economic order is the fate of broad 
masses of people who find it difficult to get an idea of how production, consumption, and 
the economic order are related to each other. (Neurath 1933/1991, 232.)
Note that the challenge, as Neurath saw it, was not only to present certain statistical 
data but to create special tools to visualize a type of relation we are not able to see 
as such with the naked eye. The challenge was to create special tools for discovering 
and revealing social facts.
We need special tools to disseminate social enlightenment. In the age of the visual, primar-
ily museums and exhibitions, pictures, and films should be the focus of our attention. While 
technical and hygienic correlations may be illustrated to some extent by photographs and 
models, social processes demand new special methods. We must try to show how the 
amount of production and consumption changes, how the reduction of employment is cor-
related to rationalization. The social engineer has to teach us how – as a result of birth and 
death, immigration and emigration – masses of human beings increase and decrease, how 
infant mortality and tuberculosis mortality of entire cities may be reduced by improvements 
in public housing. (Neurath 1933/1991, 234.)
Note that, in Neurath’s view, the Vienna Method of Picture Statistics was a sophis-
ticated tool for elaborating the “way of looking at things” he had advocated in his 
economic writings, and for making this “way of looking at things” accessible to the 
public. For Neurath, the museum was not a place where scientific truths about soci-
ety and economy were conveyed to the layman. He rejected the idea of “populariza-
tion of knowledge,” if by this is meant translating information “from the complicated 
to the simple” (Neurath 1996, 257; cf. Stadler 2001, 2011). The museum was to be 
a place where people – most of them without higher education – could learn to look 
at social issues in a new way and practice doing this.
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What distinguished the “Vienna Method of Picture Statistics” from other ways of 
visualizing statistical data?21 The most important principle is very nicely summed 
up in the term Marie Neurath22, Otto Neurath’s third wife, coined during their exile 
in the Netherlands: Isotype, which stands for “International System of Typographic 
Picture Education.” Isotype combines the two Greek words “isos” (the same) and 
“typos” (type, symbol), indicating the methodological principle of visualization that 
Neurath (1931/2017, 110) thought was crucial: “A larger quantity of things is to be 
represented by a larger quantity of speaking [sprechenden] signs” (original empha-
sis) – and not, we should add, by symbols of different size. The Isotype representa-
tion repeats symbols of the same shape and size, thereby constructing visible 
quantities and visible differences between smaller and larger quantities. Very often 
the tables produced by the Isotype teams show a juxtaposition of longer and shorter 
rows of symbols (women, men, houses, ships, fruits, etc.). The most famous symbol 
is that of the unemployed (Fig. 6.2).
In this context it is most interesting to see how Neurath explained what he saw as 
the main advantages of his system of visual representation (Fig. 6.1).
Here Neurath presents four methods for visualizing quantitative data: squares, 
circles, rectangles, and figures. In all four cases, the same quantities are compared. 
And in all four cases there are two levels of comparison: 1 and 2, A and B. Neurath 
demonstrates in a most fascinating way that by using different methods of visualiza-
tion we can make very different amounts of information accessible to the persons 
looking at them.23 In the first case – the squares – we can only say: 2 is bigger than 1, 
21 On the development from the Vienna Method to Isotype see Neurath (1945/1973, 214–78) and 
the beautiful new book Neurath (2010). See also Angélique Groß’s chapter in the present volume.
22 Marie Neurath, born Reidemeister, played a crucial role in the whole process. She was the most 
important “transformer” of statistical data into pictorial graphics. (On the concept of the “trans-
former” see Neurath and Kinross 2009; see also her memories in Neurath and Cohen 1973, 56–64). 
She was also the author of numerous highly original books in picture language for younger readers 
(see, for instance, Kindel 2011). After Neurath’s death she continued to develop the method fur-
ther. It is due to her that the Isotype material came to the University of Reading (see Twyman 1982) 
where highly significant research on Isotype is going on. See: http://www.isotyperevisited.
org/1981/01/isotype-and-the-university-of-reading.html
23 Edward R. Tufte (1983, 61) stresses a very similar point: “The confounding of design variation with 
data variation over the surface of a graphic leads to ambiguity and deception, for the eye may mix up 
changes in the design with changes in data.” The examples of bad graphics Tufte (1983, 69) gives are 
amazingly similar to those Neurath (1936, 75; 1991, 381) had in mind. It is a pity that Tufte does not 
seem to be aware of Neurath’s work. I did not find any reference to Neurath in Tufte’s writings. In any 
case, his conceptual framework seems strikingly similar. Remarkably enough, the subject of one of 
Tufte’s early books is the political control of the economy. Here he described the “interplay between 
politics and macroeconomics in the United States and other capitalist democracies” and tried to “find 
specific links between political and economic life” (Tufte 1978, p. IX). At the end of his book he 
stressed that “those who write about national economics” bear a special responsibility. “That respon-
sibility is to improve the level of public understanding so that voters can evaluate and repudiate cor-
rupt economic policies” (1978, 154). Obviously, there is a link to graphic representation of quantitative 
data (and the “lie factor” – see Tufte (1983, 57) – that may be found there). In Neurath’s early writings 
on national economics there is a strong emphasis on the impact public understanding of economic 
and social issues has on the advancement of democracy. See for instance Neurath (1908/1998, 
1910a/1998), and Neurath and Schapire-Neurath (1910).
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and B is bigger than A. Visualization by means of circles give us some more infor-
mation – at least concerning the inner structure of 1 and 2. However, for the com-
parison between 1 and 2 we are still left with “2 is bigger than 1.” In the third case, 
we use rectangles composed of unities, which enable us to see that 2 is twice 1 and 
gives us a more precise idea of the difference between A and B, namely A is ¾ of 
B. Finally, when we use groups of figures instead of rectangles, the information we 
receive is still richer, although not about the quantities. Now we see that the quanti-
ties represent women and men which makes it easier to remember what the com-
parison is all about.
Remember what we called Neurath’s early attempts to square the circle between 
“holism” and “individualism”: his search for a method of conceptualizing the life of 
a nation as a totality of individual human well-being. Already at that time, Neurath 
emphasized that symbolic representation would open up new avenues for comparing 
Fig. 6.1 Methods of Visualization
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Fig. 6.2 Unemployed in Berlin
heterogeneous entities in a precise way without calculating them in units (either 
monetary or any other kind). And also at that time, Neurath described the proce-
dures he had in mind by reminding us of how we proceed when we compare 
pictures.
One cannot compare two states by comparing them bit by bit, say first the constitution, then 
the climate etc.; each of them has to be comprehended as a whole. After all, neither can we 
compare pictures in this way, nor can we do this in respect to the machines. The very idea 
of a calculus, however, consists of deriving a complex from the individual elements. 
(Neurath 1910b/2004, 280.)
6 Visualizing Relations in Society and Economics: Otto Neurath’s Isotype-Method…
130
Picture statistics make it easier for us to understand what Neurath meant in this 
early text. To compare two states as Neurath suggested, the “pictures” of the com-
pared states have to be constructed in a specific way. When we construct the com-
parison as in the first example (as a comparison of squares), we can only conclude 
that there is an absolute difference of size between them. If we wished to attain a 
higher level of precision, we would have to carry out a calculation which would not 
be difficult in this case (we would have to measure the sides of the squares and cal-
culate the areas and the difference between them). But the greater precision would 
be based on a procedure that is completely independent of the comparative proce-
dures of our visual judgment. The calculation would end up with one very precise 
figure: the difference between the areas expressed in square centimeters. And in a 
more complicated case, it would be best if the calculations were made by an expert – 
a scientist trained in mathematics – or a computer.
Neurath’s Picture Statistics, by contrast, elaborates a way of looking at things in 
which the steps we take to reach a higher level of precision are of a very different 
kind than calculation. Neurath’s pictures should prompt those looking at them to go 
back and forth between at least two constellations (normally more than two) of ele-
ments, figuring out for themselves what the comparison is all about. Note that the 
visual representation as Neurath conceived it could by no means replace the verbal 
expression. On the contrary: only in the first case of visual representation – the one 
Neurath did not accept (comparison between squares and circles) – we are able to 
grasp the information immediately, so to speak at a glance: larger / smaller. And if 
we want to understand it more precisely, we have to change the level and the media – 
or trust in some expert. Isotype pictures, by contrast, are constructed in a “discur-
sive” way: we are led to deliberate upon the different components, relate and 
compare them, so that we ultimately construct the “whole” we are looking at.24
It is important to keep the discursive nature of Neurath’s picture language in 
mind in order to avoid a rather widespread misunderstanding. It consists in assum-
ing that the criterion of a successful visualization according to Neurath lies in the 
speed with which its content can be grasped. One of the sources of this misunder-
standing is a passage by Neurath (1936, 27) himself.25 “A picture making good use 
of the system [of ISOTYPE, E.N.] gives all the important facts in the statement it is 
picturing. At the first look you see the most important points, at the second, the less 
important points, at the third, the details, at the forth, nothing more – if you see 
more, the teaching-picture is bad.” Some interpreters deduce from this passage that 
an optimally visualized statement would be “recognizable at first glance” (Hartmann 
and Bauer 2002, 49). They overlook that the context of the passage is the production 
of a good teaching picture. Immediately after the passage quoted above Neurath 
24 This “discursive” procedure by Isotype forms the basis of what C. Burke (2011, 51) called “an 
early move away from ‘mechanical objectivity’ towards ‘trained judgment’ in scientific visualiza-
tion.” The “discursive” method is also a core element of what Neurath called “the scientific atti-
tude” (see Nemeth 2011 and the quote at the end of this article).
25 It is not the only case in which Neurath’s all too catchy formulations were rather misleading. The 
same can be said of the terms “physicalism,” “physicalist language,” “unified science,” “unified 
language,” “index verborum prohibitorum.”
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(1936, 27) continues: “A good teacher is able to keep out all unnecessary details. 
For the selection, a clear sense of the needs of education is important, and a good 
teaching-picture may only be produced with the help of a good teacher.” Thus the 
passage refers to the selection of information in the process of production of a 
teaching-picture. The “three glances” play the role of a checking procedure to be 
applied by the designers of the visualized table: Does the design include any bits of 
information that do not contribute to the content of the visualized statement (and 
would therefore distract the attention from the content that should be communi-
cated)? The case of geographical representation might help to make the point clear.
See, for instance, the teaching-picture that visualizes the main export products of 
Latin America. (Fig. 6.3) It shows the shape of the continent and borders of coun-
tries but does not contain any additional information of physical geography (moun-
tains, plains etc.). Only if it is the aim of the picture to show a relationship between 
specific physical geographical features and specific social or economic issues, the 
representation of mountains, plains etc. is justified. Otherwise the picture would 
invite a “forth” look and thereby distract the attention from the statement that the 
teaching-picture aims to visualize. 
The table “Automobile Industry” (Fig.  6.4.)  clearly illustrates the discursive 
nature of the Isotype pictures. At first glance we are struck by the enormous differ-
ence in car production between Europe and America. We almost automatically 
begin to count how many cars are produced in America and Europe, and then go on 
to do the same for the number of workers. On a third level, the table offers a means 
to help us think about the factors that lay behind this amazing difference: in the 
background of the American workers we see the assembly line.
The Vienna Method, Neurath (1996, 257) argued, could relieve less educated 
people of the humiliation and “inferiority complex” they often experience when 
they are confronted with written texts or the verbal presentation of abstract argu-
ments. “Words separate – Pictures unite” was one of the slogans posted on the wall 
of Neurath’s office at the museum. Again, this does not mean that we need no verbal 
deliberation when we try to figure out what a particular table represents. On the 
contrary: it is one of the advantages of visual representation, Neurath (1996, 259) 
argued, that it supports and initiates group discussion.26 Yet, words do “separate,” in 
Neurath’s sense, in all the cases we use them in order to “hand on knowledge” from 
one person to the other. The “handing on of knowledge” orally presupposes that the 
person who wants to “tell or show” something speaks the same language as the 
person he or she addresses: the same national language, but also the language of the 
educated social strata. And this latter barrier might even be more difficult to over-
come than the national one: the language of educated people not only includes 
class-specific jargon that can have an intimidating effect. The language of educated 
people is also based on a specific attitude to language and verbal communication. It 
is rooted in the teacher – student relation of secondary and tertiary education in 
26 See also Angélique Groß on the “activation of the addressee” in her contribution to the present 
volume.
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Fig. 6.3 Latin America’s main products of export
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which the student is trained to follow the teacher’s train of thought and to accept 
reproducing it in his or her mind.
In Neurath’s conception of visual education, verbal communication assumes a 
different role.27 Since Neurath’s pictures cannot be grasped immediately but only by 
relating the components to each other and thereby constructing the entire complex 
step by step, the pictures even necessitate discourse (both subjective and inter- 
subjective discourse). But the person who looks at them is in a position to find her 
or his own words, to tell the story in his or her own language. She is also not obliged 
to “read” a picture by following a certain direction. There is no right direction. It 
was even one of Neurath’s main concerns that the presentation of the material in a 
quantitative order in the pictures should not suggest the direction of reading and 
comprehending the data. On the contrary, these pictures should invite people to start 
at the point they find most striking or personally most interesting. Neurath (1996, 
258) asked his team to use “narrative materials” and he pointed to the “relatively 
sovereign position” people who look at the pictures should be able to assume. Note 
again that it is not possible to assume a “relatively sovereign position” when the 
information presented can be grasped at a glance (Fig. 6.5).
However, Neurath wanted the individual symbols to be immediately accessible. 
He wanted them to “speak” to us directly. In the case of the unemployed, for 
27 Silke Körber shows in her chapter in the present volume how Neurath developed during his years 
in exile the “discursive” dimension of his visualization method further. She calls it 
“picture-text-style.”
Fig. 6.4 Automobile industry
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instance, the symbol speaks in an almost physical way: shoulders hanging down, 
hands in the pockets, we can almost imagine unemployed people standing in line. 
Many symbols are (thanks to Gerd Arntz and other artists) even aesthetically 
 appealing.28 They catch our eye and our attention. We understand immediately what 
they stand for. And this is why they are so well suited as public signs, labels, posters 
etc (Fig. 6.6).
However, as soon as these individual symbols are used to make social structures 
visible, our perception takes on a very different function. It becomes the starting 
point and the vehicle of a process of reading that we ourselves must initiate.
Let us consider another example – one that is relatively well known in Austria.
(Fig. 6.7) It shows how the compiled “narrative materials” relate several dimensions 
and thereby try to make “social facts” visible. The table “Infant Mortality and Social 
Conditions in Vienna” juxtaposes two periods, the years from 1901 to 1905 and the 
period from 1925 to 1929. At the same time, two districts of Vienna are compared: 
a middle-class area and a well-known labor district. In all four pictures we see 
twenty babies and a certain number of small coffins covering over some of the 
babies. Each coffin represents one baby that died during the first year of its life. We 
see that during the first period, 3 of 20 babies died in the “better-off” district while 
4 of 20 babies died in the poorer district. 25 years later, only 1 of 20 babies died in 
the better-off district, 2 of 20 in the poorer one. We see immediately that the situa-
tion has dramatically improved. Looking at both districts, we see that there had been 
a more than fifty percent decline in deaths. Yet on closer scrutiny we see that the two 
28 On the great importance of Gerd Arntz see Stadler (1982).
Fig. 6.5 Symbols
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Figs. 6.6 Public signs (the 
one with the cars)
Fig. 6.7 Infant mortality
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areas did not benefit to the same extent from the improvement. In both districts 
infant mortality has decreased by 2 of 20, to put it in absolute numbers. However, 
this means that in the poorer district infant mortality is reduced by half, and in the 
better-off district even by two thirds.
There are many questions that can be raised. First, what has brought about this 
dramatic improvement of the situation? Here we can imagine the visitors to the 
museum discussing the effects of medical science and hygienic measurements. 
Second, how can it be explained that the improvement affected the population so dis-
proportionately? In this context we can assume that people think about differences in 
nutrition, availability of medical care and hospitals, about working hours of women, 
access to education etc. The pictures themselves provide several clues: in the back-
ground of the “better-off” babies we see a large, bright apartment whereas the poorer 
babies live in small, dark apartments – even the windows are shown to be smaller. At 
the same time, our attention is drawn to the huge housing problems Vienna faced after 
World War One – and to the political decisions the Social Democratic Government of 
Vienna took in order to solve them. In this sense, the pictures produced by the Museum 
were appropriate tools for demonstrating both the problems and the improvements 
that had been achieved by the Social Democratic government.
In this particular case, it is obvious that the deliberations and discussions the 
pictures initiate inevitably have some political impact. Yet, the same ultimately also 
holds for pictures addressing more general social problems. All Isotype pictures 
basically require that we think about the life condition of human beings in a way 
that in Neurath’s view is the only scientific one. They demand that we ask how par-
ticular institutions and actions influence the well-being (and ill-being) of a group of 
people. Insofar as sociology is (or is becoming) a truly scientific enterprise, Neurath 
believed, it makes visible the relationship between the standard of living of a given 
population and the totality of institutions and actions that influence it. Of course, we 
are dealing with something empirically given: the pleasure and displeasure of 
human beings, new techniques, systems of organization, political decisions. 
However, which elements of well-being are specified and drawn to our attention 
depends on the persons who are considering these social issues, on their imagina-
tion, social responsibility and their constructive work. The same imaginative and 
constructive work is needed to specify the institutions and actions that are integrated 
into the representation. Picture language can, according to Neurath, help us develop 
this type of relational reasoning on social issues even further – in social science, in 
public discourse, and between science and the public: “If one starts with visual aids, 
one does not even get the feeling that there are two fields, science and non-science. 
There is a basis for common visual material” (Neurath 1996, 262). Finally, visual 
education can help social scientists, philosophers and the public become aware of 
the fact that scientific reasoning, as Neurath (in the tradition of Ernst Mach) con-
ceived of it, has an enormous social and political impact.
In one of his last writings, Neurath argued that visual education could play a 
crucial part in what he called the “transfer of a scientific attitude,” and that democ-
racy would not be able to survive without an educational system that systematically 
supported the “transfer of a scientific attitude.” As far as I can see, Neurath’s insightful 
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remarks on scientific attitude and democracy are no less significant today than they 
were in 1945:
Education is not only the handing on of knowledge, it is also concerned with the ability to 
analyze observations and to find out something and contemplate all the matter under discus-
sion from all sides. Let us use the expression “meditation”. Education advocates a medita-
tive mood. […]
The transfer of looking at more than one possibility, to be prepared to alter statements, is the 
principle of the scientific attitude. The social pattern, which permits more than one opinion 
etc. is the “democratic pattern”.
Part of education deals with the evolution of one’s own judgement, of a “scientific attitude”, 
a quality not restricted to scholars only; there are laymen who have it, and there are laymen 
who do not have it. The transfer of the scientific attitude is not mainly concerned with 
knowledge but also with the creation of certain habits, sincerity of research and integrity of 
arguing. That implies not only thinking of how to pass examinations but also of deliberating 
on various possibilities or arguments, in short how to become ‘meditative’ on certain sub-
jects. (Neurath 1996, 260.)
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Chapter 7
Traveling Exhibitions in the Field: 
Settlements, War-Economy, 
and the Collaborative Practice of Seeing, 
1919–1925
Sophie Hochhäusl
Abstract Over more than four decades, the Austrian economist, sociologist, and 
philosopher, Otto Neurath made unique contributions to the fields of museology and 
curation, which culminated in the founding of the Social and Economic Museum of 
Vienna and its mobile exhibitions in the 1920s. But until today, Neurath’s involve-
ment in the organization of portable “field exhibitions,” which predated those at the 
Social and Economic Museum by at least half a decade remains understudied. In 
this essay, I argue that field exhibitions, which were informed by Neurath’s theories 
on war economy, are instructive in analyzing his overall curatorial ideas. Staged on 
the outskirts of the city in collaboration with allotment garden and settlement coop-
eratives, these exhibitions utilized plans and diagrams to convey social and political 
statements of facts through pictorial statistics and everyday objects. By pairing 
abstract graphic information with commonplace objects, they invited inhabitants 
into a conversation about the material world as well as the future by drawing on 
personal experience. As such, these field exhibitions created a communal environ-
ment for viewing and debating information and championed what I call “a collab-
orative practice of seeing.”
7.1  Introduction
Surrounded by corn crops people are gathered to listen to a speaker who lectures 
from the balcony of a make-shift building. Just visible in the background are the 
tracks of a field train, rows of bricks, and stacks of wood. The distant view of bleak 
firewalls characteristic of Vienna, signals both the edge of the city and the presence 
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of the metropolis. The photograph’s focus, however, is an architectural exhibit 
staged prominently along the front façade of the central building. With his arms 
folded over the top of the balcony, Otto Neurath observes the onlookers below and 
the scene before him. Though the panorama is invisible to the photograph’s contem-
porary viewer, it would have revealed fields broken open by excavations, ditches, 
and foundations, from which rose modern buildings (Fig. 7.1).1
This image of construction at Siedlung Hoffingergasse was not uncharacteristic 
of social life on Vienna’s outskirts in the early years of the 1920s, when gardening 
and settlement cooperatives banded together to construct homes with allotment 
1 For this research, I have relied on the visual archives of a number of still existing Viennese coop-
eratives and associations. I would like to extend my gratitude to Karl Sedlak, Chairman of the 
Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf cooperative and Sylvia Wohatschek, clerk woman of the Austrian 
League of Allotment Gardeners for opening their archives to me and for revealing materials previ-
ously believed to be lost or missing. I would like to acknowledge the Graham Foundation’s support 
for this research, which allowed me to digitize these rare materials and I thank Ádám Tuboly and 
Günther Sandner as well as my Harvard research partners Elizabeth Keto, Spencer Glesby, and 
Lara Teich for their commentary and feedback on this work.
Fig. 7.1 Otto Neurath sitting on the balcony of a communal building at the Hoffingergasse settle-
ment during a speech by Adolf Müller, Vienna, 1921. (Source: Archives of the 
Cooperative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf)
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plots to alleviate pressing resource and housing shortages after World War One.2 
Indeed, the photograph was representative of the endeavors of the Österreichischer 
Verband für Siedlungs- und Kleingartenwesen (ÖVSK), a centralized association of 
Austrian settlers and allotment gardeners, whose primary task became the coopera-
tive construction of row houses throughout Vienna in the early 1920s.3 Otto 
Neurath’s presence in the photograph – although a rare visual document – was noth-
ing out of the ordinary either, given that he had become the secretary of the ÖVSK 
in 1921. As Klaus Novy, Robert Hoffmann, Eve Blau, Nader Vossoughian and oth-
ers have observed, Neurath was instrumental in the shaping of the ÖSVK along the 
lines of Gemeinwirtschaft or cooperative economy in Vienna.4
Yet the photograph and the staging of the architectural exhibition on the outskirts 
of the city reveal critical and little studied links between Neurath’s work in the 
ÖVSK and his earlier theories on war economy, as well as his later conceptions of 
modern museology, that I set out to explore here. In fact, Neurath’s early writing on 
labor and war economy, an area of study which he promoted as director of the 
Deutsches Kriegswirtschaftsmuseum zu Leipzig (German Museum of War Economy 
in Leipzig) during World War One (Sandner 2014, 81–89), defined his view on the 
production of housing and the making of community. In turn, field exhibitions, 
which were part of the production of housing, informed later curatorial practices at 
the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschafts Museum in Wien (Social and Economic Museum 
of Vienna) founded by Neurath between 1924 and 1925. Studying these field exhibi-
tions, therefore, illuminates an understudied prehistory of the Social and Economic 
Museum that uncovers how small-scale self-organized displays came to reinforce 
and define a materialist theory of museology. This theory sought to synthesize 
depictions and objects of everyday life into legible assemblages of social and eco-
nomic statements of facts.5 Utilizing abstracted depictions of social statements such 
as charts, tables, and plans alongside quotidian objects, this distinct approach drew 
both on reproducible visualizations and concrete material things  of and for the 
everyday to spur debate among viewers.6 Based on the use of objects of the physical 
2 For the history of war-time resource shortages and alimentation in the city of Vienna see Healy 
(2004).
3 Different acronyms and translations have been used for the Österreichicher Verband für Siedlungs- 
und Kleingartenwesen. Where possible, I have relied on Eve Blau’s (1999) translations.
4 Neurath became involved in the affairs of settlement and allotment garden cooperatives in 1920 
and assumed leadership in the Hauptverband für Siedlungs- und Kleingartenwesen in January of 
1921, representing the affairs of settlers and – though to a lesser. In October of 1921 Hauptverband 
für Siedlungs- und Kleingartenwesen was unified with Zentralverband für Kleingärtner und 
Siedlungsgenossenschaften, henceforth operating as ÖSVK with Neurath acting as Secretary. For 
Neurath’s involvement in the ÖVSK see Novy (1981), Hoffmann (1982), Blau (1999, 89–133), 
Vossoughian (2008, 27–44), Sandner (2014, 165–171).
5 By the mid-1920s, Neurath frequently used the term Tatbestand, which I have translated as state-
ment of fact, to describe what was exhibited as ISOTYPE picture statistics at the Museum. See for 
example Neurath (1925, 18), (1929, 8), (1930, 29).
6 There has been some previous interest in elucidating Neurath’s engagement with the “everyday.” 
See, for example, the work of McElvenny (2013) and Michelle Henning’s chapter in the present 
volume.
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world,  this approach  implied a theoretical  alignment with a distinctly Austro- 
Marxist view on historical materialism that captured lived experience and everyday 
life.
Scholarship on Neurath has emphasized his commitment to the abstraction of 
social and economic information and has placed the invention of his International 
System of Typographic Picture Education or ISOTYPE firmly at the center of 
research.7 Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Neurath asserted that his approach of 
abstracting information transcended the museums of the past, which were “primar-
ily cabinets of rarities and curiosities” and ushered in museums of the future, which 
“might be copied everywhere without loss of value.”8 He went on to declare that 
established museums “put on view separate things of special value or attraction, 
things of which there is only one in existence” (Neurath 1936, 70). Furthermore, he 
insisted that conventional curatorial strategies have “come down to us from the past, 
when rulers or churches got together works of art and strange things which were the 
property of one person only” (Neurath 1936, 69–70). What has been overlooked, 
still, is that in their stead Neurath not only placed abstracted information as 
ISOTYPE, but also quotidian objects that were of significance for particular groups 
of people including urban workers and citizens. At the Social and Economic 
Museum, Neurath facilitated communication about the importance of everyday life 
steeped in a materialist conception of history. This conception built on his experi-
ence in the ÖSVK where distinct constituents were invited to partake in debates 
about housing for the first time, prompted by field exhibitions. The basic premise of 
pairing reproducible charts with everyday objects aimed at arriving at individually 
and collectively interpretable statements about the material world. Such exchange 
of statements within the ÖSVK extended from conversation to collaborative events 
and unified actions.
Studying these exhibitions, then, contributes to a vast body of scholarship on 
Neurath’s activities in the fields of architecture, exhibition making, and the theoriza-
tion of Bildpädagogik or picture education. At the same time, this research expands 
and pushes against some established narratives by placing the exhibitions within the 
context of the cultural, political, and social objectives of settlement and allotment 
garden cooperatives.9 Today, for example, it is commonly accepted that Neurath’s 
ISOTYPE began to travel in the late 1920s when organizers at the Social and 
Economic Museum began to think about internationalism and new architectural dis-
play standards that allowed exhibitions to become mobile. Field exhibitions, which 
circulated within Vienna between 1921 and 1923, predate these “first” mobile 
7 Nader Vossoughian has suggested that “there was nothing ‘real’ or ‘authentic’ about the Museum 
of Society and Economy’s collection,” (2008, 79) and Hadwig Kraeutler (2010, 165) further 
showed that Neurath’s ideas about museology allowed putting objects on view that escaped sim-
plistic divisions low and high art as well as a long-valued culture of connoisseurship.
8 Letter by Otto Neurath to Anton Weber, August 7 (1924), Papers of the Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsmuseum, Verein für Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung; cf. Neurath (1936, 70).
9 On ISOTYPE, see Angélique Groß’s, Elisabeth Nemeth’s, and Silke Körber’s chapters in the pres-
ent volume.
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 exhibitions at the Social and Economic Museum at least by half a decade and 
slightly dislocate the argument about internationalism. While exhibitions at the 
Social and Economic Museum in the 1930s sought to transcend borders and cul-
tures (Vossoughian 2008, 90–110) and Neurath hoped that “the same charts [would] 
be utilized in different countries” (1933a, 209), earlier  portable field exhibitions 
provided a local forum for conversation. These discussions drew allied constituents 
together to discuss practical questions and anxieties about housing, gardening, and 
urban food provisioning.10 What is at stake here, is not an argument about the role 
of international versus local communication in Neurath’s theoretical framework for 
mobile exhibitions – arguably one of the characteristic features was their reliance on 
local audiences while visualizing widely understandable statements of facts – but 
rather the central importance of facilitating conversation itself. The objective of the 
field exhibitions and the Social and Economic Museum by extension then was not 
the mere display of social realities, but their contemplation through picture statistics 
as well as objects of everyday life by involved audiences. The assemblage of these 
objects, abstract and material, was intricately linked to the goal of fostering discus-
sion, or nurturing what I will call a collaborative practice of seeing.
I use the idea of a collaborative practice of seeing in dialogue with communica-
tion historian Fred Turner’s (2013, 5) concept of the democratic surround, which 
showed that multi-media exhibitions in the twentieth century rehearsed “the politi-
cal process of knitting oneself into a diverse and highly individuated society,” by 
providing viewers with self-determined, “individuated experiences” of seeing. This, 
according to Turner (2013, 9), was “not only a way of organizing images and 
sounds; it was a way of thinking about organizing society.” The claim that the orga-
nization of visuals can have societal analogs with real political consequences, is 
crucial for my analysis of field exhibitions as well. What I understand as the col-
laborative practice of seeing, however, relied heavily on simplified display strate-
gies and easily-accessible information that placed humans at the center of viewing. 
A collaborative practice of seeing prompted individuals, groups, and societies to 
synthesize and make meaning while conversing about materials on display. Neurath 
thus championed a phenomenological or experiential reading of and engagement 
with the everyday – both individual and shared – much earlier than many of his 
twentieth century colleagues. ÖVSK members, furthermore, built connections and 
conversations around displays that reflected cooperative systems and economies. 
Neurath and his colleagues hoped that this cooperative practice of seeing invited 
involved viewers to debate the representations of the material world and its gaps, 
thus initiating possibilities to collaboratively envision alternative futures and per-
haps even to resist dominant forms of power in action. Arriving at this approach, 
required engagement with diverse fields and led Neurath from theorizing war econ-
omy to politicizing education, and from organizing housing cooperatives to curating 
exhibitions (Fig. 7.2).
10 The citation leads up to one of Neurath’s most well cited aphorisms “words divide – pictures 
unite.”
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7.2  Human Forms of Organization: From War to Communal 
Economy
A diagram at the entrance of the 1918 exhibition “World Blockade and War 
Economy,” Neurath’s first and only exhibition as Director of the German Museum 
of War Economy, relayed graphically how a rabbit’s fur could be utilized as substi-
tute for cotton and how its meat, in the absence of beef and pork, could become a 
valuable source of food during wartime (Vossoughian 2008, 53).11 Another chart in 
the exhibition explained how advanced industries could draw on still-available 
resources during periods of shortage and how workers employed in such industries 
could potentially adopt “nude labor” to contribute to saving stocks of clothing that 
were needed at the front (Vossoughian 2007). It is clear from the selection of themes, 
“World Blockade and War Economy” focused on military concerns, but the displays 
also described and sought to direct attention to the “circumstances of life” of ordi-
nary people – anticipated as a department on its own merits in the museum (Sandner 
2014, 96). To attain this goal, Neurath deployed two strategies in the exhibition: 
first, he built curatorial concepts around his theoretical texts on war economy (writ-
11 The same idea of utilizing materials in various ways and of how museums shall represent these 
could be found also in “Museums of the Future:” “Isn’t it curious: we are constantly told that we 
are living in the age of technology, and yet when we enter a modern museum of natural history, 
there is no sign of it. […] A huge whale hangs in the middle of the hall; but we do not learn how 
the ‘beard’ is transformed into oldfashioned corsets, how the skin is transformed into shoes, or the 
fat into soap that finds its way to the dressing room of a beautiful woman” (Neurath 1933b, 459.)
Fig. 7.2 Construction at Rosenhügel settlement designed by Hugo Mayer, Vienna, 1921. (Source: 
Archives of the Cooperative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf)
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ten as early as 1909) and, second, he popularized economic and scientific findings 
by rendering them legible and concrete (see e.g. Neurath 1918/1998).
To depict the commonplace rationing of foodstuffs and the use of substitute 
materials during wartime, Neurath gathered charts, diagrams, reliefs, and geograph-
ical and geological maps that showed statistically where resources came from and 
where they were needed. Whenever such abstractions were not used, Neurath made 
conscious decisions to use common items and objects including the role played by 
paper, pencils, or toys in wartime economies (Vossoughian 2008, 54). In fact, 
“World Blockade and War-Economy” synthesized material objects and their depic-
tions into easily-legible displays of wartime scarcity. As a brochure stated, “mov-
able maps and models will be efficient in illustrating as instructive presentation of 
increasing housing shortage, the quantity of food according to its official designa-
tion and real amount, and the use of accumulated resources of all sorts” (Das 
Deutsche Kriegswirtschaftsmuseum 1918, 8). This curatorial strategy set deci-
sive precedents for Neurath’s subsequent exhibitions, their pedagogical aims, and 
the materials they utilized. Displays, furthermore, illustrated his distinct belief that 
“war did not imply negative economic consequences.” As Günther Sandner (2014, 
96) has suggested, in Neurath’s view, war could in come cases “become […] an 
instrument for increasing economic prosperity. Such optimism might appear care-
less, considering the horrors of World War One, and Neurath’s  contemporaries 
indeed warned against hopeful interpretations. Yet his ideas reflected a dire need for 
narratives of new beginnings that could be foregrounded and forged from the 
conflict.
Another intellectual, who theorized the power of new beginnings  after World 
War One, was Neurath’s close colleague and friend, Josef Frank (Botstein 1996; 
Welzig 1998; Long 1996, 2002; Meder et al. 2008). “The war has brought us into 
the long-awaited situation of being able to start anew, and we are looking for a way,” 
Frank (1931a, b, 1) wrote in an essay entitled “After Wars.” This argument was not 
an unfamiliar one at the time, when figures at the Bauhaus among others, were grap-
pling with new beginnings and how wartime technologies could be utilized for 
peaceful ends.12 But Frank’s argument quickly pivoted, introducing the potential of 
under-development into debates about modernization.
The great experience was to realize that nothing has to be as it is and that everything can be 
different. That there must be no bread, that money has no particular value, and that we could 
find ourselves in a never imaginable situation. We have been wrenched out of our usual 
plans for the future, of our habitual calm and our regular doings, and we have lived an idle 
life for 4 years. We have met people of whose existence we had previously only vague 
suspicions and thus we have discovered a larger world. (Frank 1931a, b, 1.)
Over the next five years, Neurath, Frank, and many others set out to theorize, design, 
and eventually build this world, which brought them in contact with new people and 
with a debate about the material consequences of war economy. Others, such as fel-
low socialist, Emmy Freundlich (1921, 227), cautioned against overestimating the 
positive aspects of war economy. She signaled that “not because one wanted, but 
12 Peter Galison (1990) explored Neurath’s involvement in Bauhaus debates.
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because one had to, one was organized and took ration cards, circumventing the 
entire economy with all laws and regulations.” Neurath, by contrast was optimistic, 
hoping that the lessons of war economy could be translated into peacetime 
measures.
In a series of texts written between 1910 and 1918, Neurath elucidated this view, 
positing that war allowed envisioning new economic orders. At stake was imagining 
economy beyond capitalism, as one that was planned or socialized (Hoffmann 1982, 
140). Indeed, according to Neurath, the conflict had already led to a form of natural 
or barter economy, that, if planned, could give rise to full socialization. “The present 
urges us to create everywhere institutions for natural economy, which include the 
organization of natural exchange,” Neurath (1916, 425–426) wrote in 1916 at the 
height of World War One. In a subsequent article published in Der Volkswirt in 
1917, he envisioned a tiered system of natural income within a planned economy – 
Naturaleinkommen statt Realeinkommen, or natural income rather than real 
income – in which buyers with lower income would “pay a lower price than pur-
chasers with a higher income for the same goods” (Neurath 1917b/2004, 249). 
Finally, in 1919, Neurath published the book Durch die Kriegswirtschaft zur 
Naturalwirtschaft (Through War Economy to Natural Economy), a feverish plea for 
the recognition of goods’ use value (rather than their exchange value) and for the 
establishment of an economic system – i.e. socialization – based on it.13
With the end of World War One and the ensuing social and economic upheaval, 
it seemed possible that some of these ideas could come to fruition in countries such 
as Austria and Germany, where century-old monarchies had collapsed. After the 
overthrow of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919 – and Neurath’s brief imprison-
ment for his participation in it – it quickly became clear that full socialization would 
not become a reality in Weimar Germany or the newly founded Austrian Republic. 
But in Vienna the Social Democratic Party won an absolute majority in municipal 
the elections of 1920 making Austria’s capital a fertile testing ground for left-wing 
ideas.14 In this political context, Neurath advanced the idea, that individual sectors 
of the economy with strong cooperative organizations could provide unique avenues 
to prepare for future statewide socialization (Nemeth 1982/1991, 286) (Fig. 7.3).
At the time, the allotment garden movement represented one of the most potent 
sectors of the Austrian economy and its association Zentralverband der Kleingaertner 
und Siedlergenossenschaften counted 30,000 members and hundreds of existing 
clubs.15 Throughout the war years this Zentralverband had formed a number of sig-
13 For an analysis of Neurath’s economic writings and the concept of a use-value centered economy 
see Neurath (1919), Uebel (2004, 9), and the chapters of Thomas Uebel and Elisabeth Nemeth in 
the present volume.
14 In the federal Austrian legislative election of 1920, the Social Democratic Party lost their lead to 
the Christian Social Party taking 36 and 41.8% of the vote respectively. In the Austrian 
Constitutional Assembly of the previous year, 1919 the results had been almost in reverse with the 
Christian Social Part taking 35.9% of the vote and the Social Democratic Party 40.8%. In the 
municipal elections in Vienna, in 1919, Social Democrats won with an absolute majority of 54,2%, 
followed by the Christian Social Party with 27.1%. The stark difference between capital and the 
federal states, defined political rifts throughout the progressive period known as Red Vienna.
15 These numbers slightly vary, but Adolf Müller (1923, 19) and Otto Neurath (1923a, 19) cited that 
there had been between 30,000 and 40,000 members of allotment garden communities in 1923.
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nificant bodies and committees, which were critical in shaping communal life in 
Vienna during a period of extreme shortage. From 1915 onwards Zentralverband 
maintained commissions for buildings, water, infrastructure, leases, and land, and a 
group publicizing lectures and events. It established an economy commission that not 
only acquired seedlings, building materials and tools, but also clothes and affordable 
household items. The allotment gardener’s periodical, founded in 1915, frequently 
published on questions of food provisioning and the creation of cooperative stores 
and supermarkets. By 1920, the periodical prided itself that wholesale contracts with 
the city had made their goods “cheaper than anywhere else,” although available items 
varied slightly from month to month due to persisting resource bottlenecks.
A critical tool in attaining municipal support already during wartime, was allot-
ment gardeners’ display of modest harvest festivals on the outskirts and, once annu-
ally, at Neues Rathaus, Vienna’s City Hall. These exhibitions represented unique 
platforms to lobby the support of politicians and the Viennese public and to meet 
with other cooperatives and their representatives for organizing purposes. In annual 
produce competitions, municipal officials awarded allotment gardeners prizes for 
their self-sufficient production of foodstuffs in times of scarcity. At allotment gar-
den fairs held in individual facilities on the outskirts, Viennese citizens purchased 
much needed fruit, vegetables, and honey products. Staged at allotment gardeners’ 
so-called Schutzhäuser – buildings that functioned as communal gathering places 
Fig. 7.3 Organized allotment gardens on the outskirts, Vienna, 1919. (Source: Austrian 
Horticultural Society)
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for discussions, cultural activities, and cooperative affairs – these vegetable shows 
were not only commercial and promotional events, but venues that enabled conver-
sation about collective achievement. By 1917, allotment gardeners also showcased 
modest abodes at the annual harvest fair at City Hall. After the end of the war, all of 
these established debates and institutions – allotment gardeners’ cooperative orga-
nization, the existing discourse on alleviating food scarcity, and the pressing call to 
transform facilities into locales for more permanent housing – drew Neurath to the 
cause. In joining the effort, he sought to expand the organization by further develop-
ing strategic institutions and a central association based on communal economy.
What constituted communal economy? Principal among Neurath’s achievements 
in founding the ÖSVK was the establishment of a new Hauptverband für Siedlungs- 
und Kleingartenwesen in January of 1921, representing the affairs of settlers and – 
though to a lesser degree – allotment gardeners to the city.16 In October of 1921, the 
Hauptverband merged with allotment gardeners’ longstanding centralized associa-
tion, the Zentralverband, combining the interests of both allotment gardeners and 
settlers in the ÖSVK. This allowed the association to pool resources and begin to 
draw on a substantial network of institutions for cooperative work. A considerable 
attainment in establishing engines for a communal economy within and beyond the 
ÖSVK, was the creation of the Gemeinwirtschaftliche Siedlungs- und Baustoffanstalt 
(GESIBA) in 1921. The GESIBA was a collectively owned development company 
administered by the state, the city, and the ÖSVK and was charged with the produc-
tion and distribution of materials for the construction of settlements.17 By 1922 the 
ÖSVK also controlled its own Building Bureau alongside a Warentreuhand, an 
organization that selected furniture for settlers in local stores.18 An organizer in the 
German Garden City movement and expert on its cooperative institutions, Hans 
Kampffmeyer, became the head of a newly founded municipal Settlement Office 
and the Viennese architect, Adolf Loos, its chief designer (Kampffmeyer 
1926, Rukschcio and Schachel 1982, 229–297). The female architect, Margarete 
Lihotzky, worked in the ÖSVK’s Building Bureau and headed the Warentreuhand 
(Lihotzky 1923, 9). By 1923, Josef Frank – the brother of Neurath’s fellow logical 
empiricist, Philipp Frank – represented one of at least half a dozen architects work-
ing regularly in the ÖSVK.  Neurath and the cooperative representative and city 
councilor, Adolf Müller (the man lecturing from the balcony in the photograph 
heading this text), moreover, helped to materialize thousands of housing units in 
16 The ÖSVK had emerged from the Forschungsinstitut für Gemeinwirtschaft (Research Institute 
for Social Economy), an organization founded by Neurath and socialist Käthe Pick, dedicated to 
translating the principles of war economy into socialization debates. At the time, Pick was involved 
in establishment of a Betriebsräteschule or work council school and a member of the Austrian 
Committee for the Socialization of Industry. The Research Institute’s role was to support the com-
mittee and provide guidance and promotion in questions of communal economy (Hoffmann 1982, 
142). The ÖSVK was from the beginning equally informed by debates about how to counteract the 
adverse economic circumstances through socialization as it was by socialist education discourse.
17 For a history of the GESIBA see Banik-Schweitzer (1972) and Feller (1996).
18 For primary commentary about the activities of Warentreuhand see Anonymous (1923a) and 
Lihotzky (1923, 9).
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dozens of sites between 1921 and 1923. These physical spaces as well as the orga-
nized exhibitions and demonstrations elicited the participation of up to 50,000 peo-
ple, illustrating the success of the principles of communal economy (Anonymous 
1921a, 5; Müller 1921, 261–263; Loos 1921, 10–11; Neurath 1921a) (Fig. 7.4).19
Economic planning in the context of the ÖVSK thus aimed not at theorizing life-
less organization, but at heightening the experience of life for all involved. Neurath 
had already pointedly made a similar argument in the essay “The Converse Taylor 
System” in 1917. In the text, he noted that many people feared that Taylorism – the 
scientific study of efficiency and the organization of work processes based on it – 
leads to the “general mechanization of being” or Mechanisierung des Daseins – and 
the subjugation of human labor to technology (Neurath 1917a/1973, 130). But then 
he proclaimed that the opposite could become a reality, since the Taylor System could 
transform itself into “a principal force of a new humanism” that would put people 
before all else (Neurath 1917a/1973, 131). Rhetorically turning the very idea of 
Taylorism on its head, Neurath stated:
But all this is avoided if we also use the “Converse Taylor System”, which, unlike the hith-
erto usual Taylor System, does not seek to regard the professions as something given, but 
puts men themselves in the foreground, and then examines the possible professions and 
forms of organization as to how far they correspond to men as we find them. Perhaps exist-
ing professions and forms of organizations are inadequate; perhaps in order to achieve full 
19 The largest ÖSVK sponsored protest staged in April of 1921 elicited the participation of 50,000 
settlers.
Fig. 7.4 Construction at Siedlung Hoffingergasse designed by Josef Frank, Vienna, 1921. (Source: 
Archives of the Cooperative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf)
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humanity and the best use of all energies towards each envisaged goal, we must create new 
forms of profession and organization. (Neurath 1917a/1973, 131–132.)
In order to organize such  a “full humanity,” Neurath asserted that the Converse 
Taylor System would have to take into account the structural economic and social 
factors preventing people from entering the labor market. Any serious attempt to 
provide appropriate solutions would introduce systemic change, including the 
reduction of work hours or the very reconfiguration of occupations themselves 
(Neurath 1917a/1973, 133–134). Neurath was attentive to the need to adapt occupa-
tions to individuals’ own circumstances. Of particular concern were the discourag-
ing labor prospects for those with physical and mental disabilities as veterans 
returned to Vienna after World War One (Fig. 7.5).
War veterans had in fact founded many cooperatives. They were the ones who, 
based on their military service, had been the first to claim material contributions for 
the production of settlements from vast demobilization efforts in 1919. With the 
goal of building hundreds of housing units, by 1920, a cooperative of war- 
wounded veterans, the Kriegsbeschädigte Lainzer Tiergarten, began to collaborate 
on a settlement with Loos, Kampffmeyer, and Lihotzky at the former imperial 
 hunting grounds at Lainz.20 Although the plan was only partially realized, the work 
20 For an analysis of the ÖSVK activities with war-veteran cooperatives see Blau (1999, 104–106), 
Klaus Novy, Wolfgang Förster & Verein für Moderne Kommunalpolitik (1991, 140–145).
Fig. 7.5 Construction at Siedlung at Lainz designed by Adolf Loos and Margarete Lihotzky, 
Vienna, 1921. (Source: Archives of the Horst Zecha, Siedlung Friedenstadt)
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and housing program for wounded workers was considered successful by its inhab-
itants. Built with materials on site, Franz Sekera, a new settler and a member of the 
Hauptverband, commented positively on the collective work completed by the dis-
abled veterans. “A strong tie binds the members of the cooperative, both as settlers 
and as wounded soldiers,” he wrote in the periodical Der Siedler (The Settler). 
“They hope to heal their bodies, wracked with heart, lung, and nervous diseases, in 
the fresh air, sun, and healthy, decent housing” (Sekera 1921, 92). Neurath’s theory 
of the Converse Taylor System, which projected how impaired workers could be 
advanced in the labor process, provided a theoretical complement to the coopera-
tives’ on-the-ground efforts to employ wounded veterans.  In addition, his ideas 
raised important questions about the organization of labor in the context of the set-
tlement movement overall (Figs. 7.6 and 7.7).
In the context of the ÖSVK, for example, Neurath developed a radical theory of 
a labor- and use-value-centered economy, following his hypothesis that “existing 
professions and forms of organization” were perhaps inadequate for human beings. 
Directly applying an aspect of his ideas on war economy to the realities of post-war 
settling, he advocated that a contribution of 1500–2000 hours of labor time should 
be counted towards the down payment on a house in the ÖVSK. In the absence of 
advanced building technologies and the abundance of work seeking settlers, he 
championed the implementation of labor-intensive construction practices such as 
the extraction of materials and the burning of bricks on site. These labor-intensive 
Fig. 7.6 Construction with Pax bricks at Siedlung Hoffingergasse designed by Josef Frank, 
Vienna, 1921. (Source: Archives of the Cooperative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf)
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building practices soon  became common for housing endeavors in Vienna more 
broadly, where until the 1930s even large-scale housing projects were built in brick. 
This system of organizing labor created and strengthened local community: 
ÖVSK representatives logged hours and familiarized settlers with self-help building 
techniques based on readily available materials.
One of the most important sites for developing this cooperative approach, was 
Siedlung Hoffingergasse, spearheaded, constructed, and later inhabited by the coop-
erative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf under the leadership of Müller. As its architect, 
this cooperative chose Josef Frank, who would later collaborate with Neurath at the 
Social and Economic Museum. Drawing on ideas from Neurath’s “The Converse 
Taylor System,” Frank avoided forms of construction that required heavy machinery 
and methods of prefabrication at Siedlung Hoffingergasse, since no technologically 
advanced construction industry existed in Vienna at the time. Instead, settlers com-
pleted basic bricklaying and carpentry work, excavated foundations, and utilized 
local cooperative workshops, for what would become more than 280 housing units. 
Furthermore, settlers chose to use regular bricks and so-called Pax Ziegel, for which 
materials were salvaged in situ.
For these practical purposes, row houses could not be tailored to each individual 
family’s needs, but according to Neurath and Frank, the uniformity of design 
strengthened the collective identity of the settlement. As Neurath wrote about 
Siedlung Hoffingergasse,
[t]he similarity of the units (types), the similarity of the building’s parts (norms) is an 
expression of modesty, but also an expression of the sense for equality, which roots in both, 
fraternity and envy alike. Not one singular building is the subject of design, but the collec-
Fig. 7.7 Construction of row houses at Siedlung Hoffingergasse with allotments in the foreground 
and background, designed by Josef Frank, Vienna, 1921. (Source: Archives of the 
Cooperative Altmannsdorf-Hetzendorf)
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tivity of all houses. The singular building is like the brick within a house. A new community 
is created from the class solidarity of the labor-forces. (Neurath 1923a, 34)
Frank, too, insisted that settlements had to exhibit equality and similarity, rather 
than heterogeneity for the sake of picturesqueness.21 According to Frank, the settle-
ment’s egalitarian objective distinguished it from the garden city, where architects 
had illustrated inhabitants’ social and class differences through the design of com-
munities that included “enhanced and disadvantaged houses” (Frank 1924, 26; 
Bojankin et  al. 2012, 213). Siedlung Hoffingergasse’s uniformity, by contrast, 
exemplified commonality, community, and cooperation.
Settlements’ architecture indeed varied slightly from site to site, but row houses 
within each community adhered to a shared spatial organization and a common 
formal language. All settlements typically incorporated a number of social and 
communal spaces. Frank designated playgrounds, a cooperative supermarket, and a 
daycare center in Siedlung Hoffingergasse’s general plan. A communal building, 
the Genossenschaftshaus (the equivalent to allotment gardens’ Schutzhaus and the 
heart of the cooperative), inscribed community into  social life of the settlement. 
These communal facilities were the center of cooperative life and the place for con-
versation. Neurath, who regarded Siedlung Hoffingergasse as one of the settlement 
movement’s most critical achievements, stressed its capacity to symbolize the prin-
ciples of cooperative economy. “Here, something like a new way of life is emerging, 
slowly and gradually […]. The individual will no longer be lonely, but will feel 
carried and held by the whole to which he belongs,” he wrote (1923a, 35). Using 
these methods with the support of the GESIBA, between 1920 and 1923 Neurath, 
Müller, Kampffmeyer, and others managed the construction of more than 20 settle-
ment facilities, amounting to thousands of housing units.
Presenting the ÖSVK’s achievements to a popular Viennese audience in a publi-
cation accompanying an exhibition in 1923, Neurath proudly highlighted the indi-
visible connection between economic order and the overall experience of life that 
had emerged from the settlement movement. “The Austrian organization of the 
allotment gardeners and settlers is based on the fundamental idea that the movement 
it serves is part of a tremendous upheaval, which […] affects our entire life, our 
economic order as well as the feelings and thoughts of humans,” he wrote (Neurath 
1923a, 31). Such achievements – the possibility of rethinking the fundamental eco-
nomic order through the construction of settlements and vice versa – were substan-
tial, especially when considering that they emerged from adaptive responses to 
wartime deprivations and severe conditions of underdevelopment (Fig. 7.8).
21 See Frank (1924), which was originally published in Der Neubau. I want to thank Christopher 
Long for sharing the text with me. In 2012 the text appeared in Tano Bojankin, Christopher Long, 
and Iris Meder’s edited volume and translation Josef Frank: Writings. I have used both, this vol-
ume’s as well as my own translations in some quotations above. Below I have indicated when my 
own translations have slightly deviated from official translations. For example, I translate the title 
of the essay “Die Wiener Siedlung,” as “The Viennese Settlement” while it appears as “The 
Viennese Housing Settlement,” in the translated volume. I have utilized this title, because it is clear 
from the context of this essay, that settlements are a distinct form of housing and the word “hous-
ing” did not appear in the original German title Cf. Bojankin et al. (2012, 211–222).
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7.3  Traveling Exhibitions as Education and Conversation: 
On the Limits of the City, at the Heart of the Metropolis
In the fall of 1923, the much-anticipated Allotment Garden, Settlement, and Housing 
Exposition opened at Vienna’s City Hall, Neues Rathaus. With contributions from 
municipal offices, commercial exhibitors, the GESIBA, the ÖSVK and hundreds of 
cooperatives and individuals across the city, the exhibition featured planning docu-
ments, full model homes and visual data alongside vegetable and animal displays. 
This striking assemblage of objects – from data to living things – sought to illustrate 
that a modest culture of making-do, had made significant impacts on the urban 
economy in recent years. “When in 1918 more than 1,000 wagons of produce had 
yet to be imported, such importation by 1919 had become superfluous as a result of 
allotment work,” Neurath (1923a, 10–11) wrote optimistically in a publication 
accompanying the exhibition. But exhibition organizers and participants were not 
content with solely advancing economic arguments. Charts, plans, and objects were 
carefully assembled to make educational statements about the material world and 
exhibited buildings put visions of social life on display and into circulation.
The question of communication and education had long played a key role in 
allotment garden and settlement debates. As discussed above, throughout the war 
years sharing horticultural and agricultural knowledge was critical for the survival 
Fig. 7.8 Visitors at the allotment garden, settlement, and housing exposition in front of core 
houses with fully functioning allotment gardens. The crowd reaches back to the Ringstraße, 
Vienna, 1923. (Source: Austrian League of Allotment Gardeners)
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of urban citizens, and expertise and insight were disseminated communally, in lec-
tures, workshops, and in the periodical Der Siedler. Since 1918, the Hauptverband 
had organized hands-on activities open to all members in settlements and plant 
nurseries. The municipal Settlement Office at Parkring, where Loos and 
Kampffmeyer worked, handled dozens of individual queries and appointments 
daily, which consisted of personal and cooperative advice.22 Starting in 1921, three 
times per week settlers could request conversations with more than half a dozen 
experts, including Frank, at the ÖSVK offices at Möringgasse in the fifteenth dis-
trict (Anonymous 1921b, 117). Moreover, individual cooperatives could invite any 
of the ÖVSK experts to deliver instruction and presentations locally. International 
guests, such as the British architect Raymond Unwin and the German landscape 
architect Leberecht Migge, came to speak in Vienna on the invitation of Kampffmeyer, 
Loos, and Neurath.23
Lihotzky, who, together with Neurath was involved in numerous events, later 
recalled the dire necessity of these didactic activities. At prominent urban locations 
such as the Urania and Universum cinemas, she showed slideshows and, as of 1923, 
even short films to urban audiences. After lecturing in communities on the outskirts, 
she noted the devastating conditions of existing homes and gathering spaces for 
workers, where she gave lectures and provided advice (Anonymous 1923b, 1924). 
“By the light of candle stubs and dull oil lamps, I spoke in smoky taverns and far-off 
restaurants, and with the help of our drawings, explained to the people how they 
could create the buildings we had planned and typified, from the simplest alcove to 
the finished house, by means of self-help and mutual support and with our assis-
tance, and thus how they could obtain a decent, humane framework for their lives,” 
she remembered (Schütte-Lihotzky 2004, 87).
With the inauguration of a settlement school in the winter of 1921 and 1922, 
which offered 19 themed lectures at an adult education facility, the ÖSVK under-
took the formalization of its educational programs (Anonymous 1921e, 125). Topics 
covered at the settler school targeted cooperative leaders and organizers and included 
planning and architecture, gardening and horticulture, and economic questions. 
Kampffmeyer, Loos, and Lihotzky lectured on interior design, and Frank provided 
advice in a series of talks dedicated to building with substitute materials.24 Paul 
Vogt, the inspector of the ÖSVK’s garden section, and Alois Zipfinger, the former 
head of the Zentralverband, spoke about the praxis of settlement and allotment 
gardening respectively, emphasizing the continuing need for food production. These 
22 The volume of inquiries and the intensity with which Kampffmeyer and Loos worked with indi-
vidual settlers and cooperative representatives is reflected in the agenda ledgers of the municipal 
Settlement Office of the years 1921 and 1922, which have – if partially – survived in the Vienna 
City and County Archives.
23 For a discussion of Leberecht Migge’s lectures and his connections to Adolf Loos see Haney 
(2010, 121); Anonymous (1921c) and Anonymous (1921d).
24 Kampffmeyer offered instruction about garden cities and the settlement, Adolf Loos lectured on 
“the settlement as educator,” and Margarete Lihotzky on furniture and interior design. Josef Frank 
provided instruction in economic building techniques and a settler named Garder lectured on 
adobe construction.
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very practical talks on design, construction, and urban agriculture were contextual-
ized by instruction in economic topics: Otto Neurath lectured on the settlement 
movement’s economy, and his colleague, Friedrich Bauermeister, presented find-
ings on its finances. A band of legal and political experts, such as municipal politi-
cians Max Ermers and Ludwig Neumann, taught courses on the culture and 
organization of the settlement movement. Adolf Müller provided instruction in the 
cooperative work of the settlement (Anonymous 1921e, 125). Overall, these courses 
offered material-theoretical instruction about the settlement movement’s socio- 
economic character and potential. Moreover, the thematic breadth of the sessions 
illustrated the advantages provided by the association of the ÖVSK after 1922. 
While the settlement school was ongoing, individual experts continued to lecture 
around the city in settlers’ clubs.25
It is important to note here that adult education at the settler school, which 
addressed cooperative representatives, was based on complex educational theory 
that Neurath and others had formulated since 1920. The settler school was in fact 
not unlike a Betriebsräteschule or work council school, which Neurath and the 
socialist Käthe Pick had founded concurrently to the creation of the ÖSVK (Leichter 
1997).26 In the 1921 essay “Educational Tasks of Socialism,” Neurath posited
[…] what can an economic plan affect and what does the creation of centralized associa-
tions of production matter, if they are not […] controlled and influenced on all levels in a 
socialist sense? Effective socialist organizations today only exist in trade unions and works 
councils. Increasingly, however,  they are becoming the bearers of the socialist order. 
(Neurath 1921b, 9.)
Delving fully into the finer points about processes of socialization that could occur 
through the transformation of individual sectors of industry, Neurath helped found 
a system of higher education in the work council schools. This system set out to 
grant access to solid professional development for people of all backgrounds accord-
ing to their chosen occupation. In this manner, advanced instruction would not 
become exclusive to those with university degrees, but could extend to cooperative 
representatives, leaders of corporations and industries, as well as councilmen and 
women, regardless of their previous scholastic training. Thus, Neurath supported 
the organization of politics and labor in Vienna that relied on leadership by a cross- 
section of society, not on a few chosen functionaries. Writing about past eras, he 
stipulated:
The firm framework of the school and curricula structure was predetermined by the goal, 
above all, to educate from a small class of urban intellectuals a leading elite. But now comes 
the new time. The masses do not want to recognize a previously preferred group whose 
power was inherited. Everyone who is suitable should be able to become an ‘expert,’ and 
the expert should be supported by the will of all. (Neurath 1921b, 9.)
25 A number of articles in Arbeiterzeitung publicly announced ÖSVK experts’ activities and lec-
tures throughout the years of 1922. See for example Anonymous (1922).
26 Käthe Pick and Neurath frequently wrote for the journal Der Betriebsrat, founded to promote the 
cause of the work councils. They also frequently lectured in work council schools.
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According to Neurath, only when a group of work councilmen and women were 
granted access to such education, could a new order of planning and theorizing life 
come into being. Such a theortical study of life, however, necessitated a professional- 
philosophical inquiry into humanity, a general Menschheitskunde and Lebenskunde, 
as he understood it (Neurath 1921b, 11). This meant, that the organization of the 
economy was an attempt to understand  and improve the organization of peo-
ple’s everyday life. Indeed, in 1921 and 1922 work council schools were established 
in Vienna, where Pick and others provided thematic instruction with the purpose of 
bridging the gap between economic theory and making change on the ground (see 
L. 1921). The settler school in this context was a related attempt to organize a didac-
tic apparatus in the branch of housing and construction that would provide instruc-
tion about real-life concerns.
While work council and settler schools relied on relatively formalized structures 
of education and targeted the transformation of the movement from within, educa-
tional exhibitions served the double role of communicating to members internally 
and to the public externally. This function of communication had existed since the 
days of the allotment garden movement, when the staging of produce fairs had taken 
place in the Schutzhäuser. But Schutzhäuser in allotment garden facilities had 
deeper historical genealogies and were related to activities such as the social hike, a 
practice which had originated in turn-of-the-century Social Democratic activities. 
Groups such as the Austrian Naturfreunde posited then that the experience of nature 
should be enhanced by conversation and engagement with politics. Hikes and over-
night stays in so-called Schutzhütten  – alpine huts that functioned as communal 
centers – became the unlikely venue for the debate of urban politics, and the very 
idea of the Schutzhütte in turn became the model for settlers’ cooperative 
Genossenschaftshaus.
To understand the political nuances undergirding the Genossenschaftshaus, it is 
helpful to consider Social Democratic politician Max Ermers’s assertion that this 
communal space was “the heart and the brain of a settlement, simultaneously a town 
hall and a home for recreation […].”27 Ermers further explained the socio-political 
significance of the Genossenschaftshaus,  stating that through occupation of the 
communal building, “the otherwise narrow mind of the allotment gardener and of 
the inhabitant of the single-family house grows into the social, the universal, and the 
important.  Here the ideology of the settlement as a social category is born and 
spreads over the whole of its parts. Here is the seat of the freely elected administra-
tion, of political fights, of the diffusion of knowledge, or artistic experiences, of 
celebrations,” Ermers (1924) argued. Events at Genossenschaftshäuser were incu-
bators for conversation, activities, and cooperative life.
Therefore, when the architectural exhibition in the fields at Hoffingergasse was 
staged in front of the make-shift Genossenschaftshaus, the displays were not only 
meant to solicit viewers, but to stimulate conversation. Indeed, throughout the sum-
mer months of 1921 architectural displays were mounted regularly in settlements 
27 I have used Eve Blau’s existing translation for this passage. For a careful analysis of the role of 
the Genossenschaftshäuser also see Blau (1999, 112).
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and allotment gardens across the city  on site. The workers’ newspaper, 
Arbeiterzeitung  and Der Siedler promoted these events, suggesting that they 
addressed local cooperatives, and the Viennese public as well.28 While visual docu-
mentation of these exhibitions is extremely sparse, it can be inferred that by 1921 
presentations were not standardized – neither in the depiction of their content nor in 
their display. Nonetheless, they did embody a distinct strategy of showcasing archi-
tectural and (to a lesser degree) economic and social relationships that were steeped 
in Neurath’s theories of museology and communal economy. Crafted and exhibited 
with modest means, these diplays aimed at great communal impact and consisted of 
plans and photographs that were prepared by architects and artists working directly 
with cooperatives. They  were commissioned through local organizations  includ-
ing the Settlement Office, and the ÖSVK’s own Building Bureau. As the image in 
the introduction of this essay illustrates, they were slightly decorated with garlands 
and twigs (reminiscent of harvest celebrations) and arranged in an unassuming but 
clearly comprehensible manner. There were neither moving parts nor complex exhi-
bition infrastructure, but the individual sections and displays were easily accessi-
ble for an audience of laypeople. With photographs serving as introductory images 
for technical drawings – “lead images,” as Neurath would later term them – site 
plans, floor plans, and elevations became effortlessly legible, even to an illiterate 
reader. Photographs, moreover, were usually enlivened with people, and showcased 
buildings in the process of construction (rather than in their completed state), thus 
highlighting the communal ideas undergirding the projects. Finally, no new settle-
ment was presented in isolation, but rather in an assemblage of graphic materials 
illustrating diverse facilities across the city, showcasing them in their greater social, 
economic, and cooperative context.29 Staged alongside celebrations, speeches, and 
foundation stone ceremonies, these traveling exhibitions therefore were carefully 
curated within collective settings and as part of conversations between individual 
settlers, cooperative representatives, architects, and politicians, (as the presence of 
Neurath and Müller at Siedlung Hoffingergasse showed). This conversational qual-
ity and the possibility of debating cooperatives’ futures based on visual information, 
embodied what I consider a collaborative practice of seeing.
Neurath’s individual contribution in these exhibitions is hard to discern, but he 
was invested in them as a speaker, commentator, and organizer throughout the early 
1920s. In 1922, for example, the ÖSVK secretariat under Neurath’s leadership 
issued a promotional statement about the fourth Allotment Garden, Settlement, and 
Housing Exposition, an event directly expanding the tradition of produce competi-
tions at Vienna’s City Hall. The statement proudly highlighted the presence of the 
Settlement, Housing, and Construction Guild of Austria at the exhibition (another 
28 By 1922 Der Siedler featured a rubric that informed readers of lectures throughout Vienna as 
“News from the Organizations.” See for example Anonymous (1921f). Also see Anonymous (1922).
29 A potential fourth aspect of visual display was the use of lantern slides, which accompanied 
lectures starting in 1923. They were, however, predominantly utilized at more prominent urban 
locations, such as the Urania and Universum cinemas, or the Austrian Chamber of Labor, which 
commissioned Neurath and Lihotzky to hold lectures for their women’s association in 1924.
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one of the institutions Neurath helped found). It lauded the Building Bureau’s pre-
fabricated cooking niche, which Lihotzky had designed, and the work of the 
GESIBA, which had allocated one allotment garden hut as prize for a local tombola. 
Announcements in Arbeiterzeitung emphasized the participatory nature of the 
event, and solicited contributions from cooperatives to the exhibition in form of 
produce and graphic materials. “It is the duty of every allotment garden society and 
each settler cooperative to provide the best yields from the garden economy, in pic-
tures, plans, sketches, and models of all kinds. It is the responsibility of every orga-
nization to donate a tribute [of produce],” the statement concluded (Anonymous 
1922, 6).
It was in the fifth Allotment Garden, Settlement, and Housing Exposition of 1923 
that all these curatorial strategies, conceived and tested on the outskirts by coopera-
tives, representatives, and individuals, finally converged in the center of the city on 
an unprecedented scale. “It has become practice to show what has been done on the 
limits of the city during the year in the field of allotment gardening, settlement and 
housing through a large-scale exhibition at the heart of the metropolis in City Hall 
when the autumn months begin,” wrote the prominent Viennese mayor Jakob 
Reuman (1923, 3) in a guide explaining the 1923 exposition. But in this particu-
lar exhibition hundreds of allotment gardeners from dozens of organizations staged 
living things and objects  for the first time. The exposition included  fruit and 
 vegetable displays, animal shows of rabbits and doves, and a wall of flowers, pre-
sented in a large open-air section of the City Hall arcades. Just like in earlier fairs, 
they were accompanied by prize ceremonies and public lectures, but now they were 
also complemented by musical events and performances. Due to the size of the 
presentation, the coordinating exhibition architect Ludwig Michael was mindful of 
the overall design of the open-air section and its unified layout. “Where will I 
exhibit?” he asked rhetorically in materials promoting participation. “This question 
has to be answered […] in the sense that vegetables can only be accommodated in 
the vegetable group” (Michael 1923, 2). From the beginning, the exhibition targeted 
a coherent layout that built on the collective achievements of cooperatives and their 
representative institutions (Fig. 7.9).
The greatest attraction to popular audiences was shown on the main square in 
front of City Hall. Here seven full model homes could be viewed and visited. A col-
laboration between the GESIBA, the municipal Settlement Office, and the ÖSVK’s 
own Building Bureau, these buildings showcased settler homes in all their varieties: 
from a tiny, but fully designed allotment hut of approximately two square meters, to 
a finished house of fifty-seven square meters (Neurath 1923b, c). Four of the build-
ings sponsored by GESIBA had the ability to be built in phases, “growing” from a 
small core outwards (Schütte-Lihotzky 1923b). These so-called core houses were 
planned by Lihotzky in collaboration with other Building Bureau architects and 
were intended to resolve settlers’ still-substantial liquidity problems through design 
(Hochhäusl 2013). They extended previous questions of scarcity into a slowly 
recovering economy, while relying on conventional models of home financing. A 
main commentator on the “core house campaign,” Neurath lauded the buildings’ 
ability to accommodate still frail economic circumstances. “This difficult campaign 
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could be tackled with the prospect of success because the ÖSVK’s Building Bureau 
and the Settlement Office of Vienna’s municipality have created types, which can be 
built with relatively small funds” (Neurath 1923c, 3).
Importantly, by enabling visitors to see these seven varying buildings with com-
mon principles, it was here that Viennese audiences were introduced not only to the 
visual, but the experiential qualities of settlements as types. This notion of the type 
had long occupied German and Austrian architects in a unified attempt to define 
“convincing architectural solutions” to the task of designing a small house – while 
avoiding both universalist tendencies and nativist nationalism.30 In Vienna’s settle-
ment movement, types had been defined as row houses with standardized but slightly 
variable floor plans and measurements. While architects had established standard-
ized sets of plans, many of them conceived from brick and wood, by 1923 the 
GESIBA had also made available standardized windows, door frames etc. But as 
visitors moved through GESIBA homes at City Hall, they witnessed for the first- 
time what types meant theoretically. With slight modifications of similar layouts, 
they saw not just how unified the allotment garden and settlement movement had 
become, but also how diverse it was. Viennese citizens experienced for themselves 
30 Josef Frank’s and Otto Neurath’s converging ideas on the type were first discussed by Eve Blau 
(2006, 256), which are part of the concluding remarks of this essay.
Fig. 7.9 Members of the exhibition committee in front of the flower exhibit at the allotment gar-
den, settlement and housing exhibition. Neurath third on the left, back, Adolf Müller, second on the 
right, back, Kampffmeyer fourth on the right, front, Vienna, 1923. (Source: Austrian League of 
Allotment Gardeners)
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the benefits of utilizing the same windows, doors, and other basic building elements 
which brought down prices and communicated cooperation. And they could test 
type furniture from the cooperative store Warentreuhand, designed by Lihotzky 
while envisioning making a life in these homes.
From an experiential perspective, if visitors decided to rest on the sun porch of 
the core houses, they could enjoy the modest luxuries that the settlement movement 
afforded its residents. They could smell wet soil when moving through rows of veg-
etables with proper irrigation systems, and they could hear the sounds of chickens, 
doves, and other animals, all right in the center of the city. The display therefore 
constituted an immersive experience that exemplified the unifying principles as well 
as the individualizing tendencies that underwrote the practice of settling. Finally, on 
the outskirts, at Siedlung Heuberg, entire streets of differentiated row houses 
designed by Loos, Lihotzky, Frank and the municipal architect Adolf Meyer were 
open to visitors. There, in conjunction with the exhibit, Viennese citizens could wit-
ness communal life first hand.
Architectural critics and popular audiences embraced core houses, celebrat-
ing  them for their experiential qualities and their “amazingly convenient” design 
(Wilson 1923, 6). Francesca Wilson (1923, 6) of The Manchester Guardian high-
lighted that “the great advantage of the Austrian movement has over similar move-
ments in other countries, is that houses are being built by the people themselves for 
themselves, and not by contractors, whose first object is money. That is the reason 
why the convenience and comfort of the settlers is the first consideration, inside the 
house as well as outside.” Neurath similarly attested that core houses embodied the 
possibility of alleviating housing shortages even in a state of emergency through 
large-scale cooperative organization. He also pointed out that a number of other 
architects had already adapted core house designs which made it a fundamentally 
collaborative endeavor. “None of these designs is the invention of an individual, but 
the result of many efforts,” Neurath (1923c, 6) stated. By contrast, visitors at previ-
ous exhibitions had disappointedly remarked on the lack of sanitary conditions ask-
ing “How will I cook here?” and “What, to fetch water, I have to go outside?” 
(Altmann-Loos 2002, 106). 
The space that most directly occasioned Neurath’s curatorial involvement at the 
1923 exposition, was the architectural and planning section in the ceremonial hall 
Volkshalle. Here GESIBA, the Settlement Office, and ÖSVK had collaborated  to 
provide an immersive experience, showcasing a plethora of drawings, architectural 
models, and statistics. Unlike the produce displays, this section presented abstract 
planning materials, statistics, and data, appealing to viewers’ intellects and imagina-
tions. GESIBA materials featured an extensive selection of core house models and 
plans, which contextualized and expanded the experiential aspect of visiting the 
homes outside City Hall by providing financial and technical data points. Linking 
the construction of homes to urban economy, GESIBA also provided statistics on 
citywide building initiatives and how construction wages had been influenced by the 
introduction of the cooperative developer (Ermers 1923, 40–41). The municipal 
Settlement Office’s contribution to the section focused on aerial plans, floor plans of 
buildings, and renderings of approximately twenty different settlements, thus illus-
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trating how organizations across the city collaborated, shared information, and built 
collective expertise. A large site model of the Atmannsdorf-Hetzendorf’s facility 
and illustrations of three of its settlements further invited viewers to picture com-
munal life and networks of solidarity that had been built between these groups 
(Fig. 7.10).
Crucially, under Neurath’s direct leadership the ÖSVK presented four aspects of 
its activities; the ÖSVK Building Bureau showcased the designs of housing and 
furniture and the ÖSVK’s garden section highlighted schemes and charts about gar-
den design and intensive produce production (Ermers 1923, 39). Under the rubrics 
“activities” and “movement,” charts provided information about all of the ÖSVK’s 
civic services (from Warentreuhand to educational and legal advice) alongside sta-
tistics. These illustrations were the first attempts at combining material-lived expe-
riences into what Neurath would soon call “statements of social and economic 
facts.”31 Furthermore, all of these displays were crucial in facilitating a conversation 
with the broader Viennese public because they recorded numbers as picture statis-
tics. Even illiterate people in the audiences at the exhibition could now compare the 
number of allotment garden huts in Vienna, the sizes of their plots, and the number 
of allotment gardeners who kept animals for the first time coherently in three charts. 
An additional organizational diagram of the entire settlement and allotment garden 
program synthesized the vast economic undertaking into a single drawing. This last 
31 See note 5. in this essay for Neurath’s use of “statements of facts.”
Fig. 7.10 Displays by GESIBA (on the left) with core-house models in City Hall, Vienna, 1923. 
(Source: Austrian League of Allotment Gardeners)
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display reaffirmed Neurath’s approach from “World Blockade and War Economy” 
and foreshadowed consequent pictorial work in Vienna. Displays from the 1923 
Allotment Garden, Settlement, and Housing exhibition overall became the primary 
collection for the emerging Social and Economic Museum (Fig. 7.11).
The resonances between the temporary Allotment Garden, Settlement, and 
Housing exhibition and what would become the permanent Social and Economic 
Museum of Vienna were multiple and manifold. Yet, I find their creative and intel-
lectual underpinnings most clearly pronounced reading a chart by the municipal 
garden section at the exhibition in conjunction with a produce display of the allot-
ment garden cooperative Rosenthal. Placed in the midst of the beekeeping display, 
the chart had been organized by cooperatives and apiary schools and was entitled 
“The Development of the Allotment Garden Movement and Its Material Results.” It 
illustrated how many allotment gardeners operated in the city and how they had 
increased their production over the years. It did so by utilizing a language of picture 
statistics that was not yet systematized, as it deployed the multiplication and scaling 
of pictorial symbols at the same time. The chart captured the distinct material basis 
for the graphic displays, since it positioned visual representations of production in 
the midst of actual objects on display. It thus established real legible relationships 
between the conveyed information and the lived world while placing the viewer in 
a central role. Through this assemblage, abstraction and the material world were 
brought into conversation (Fig. 7.12).
Fig. 7.11 Chart of allotment gardeners’ material achievements compiled by the municipality’s 
garden section in the midst of beekeeping display, Vienna, 1923. (Source: Austrian League of 
Allotment Gardeners)
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This idea was further exemplified in produce displays in the arcades of City Hall. 
Here, cooperative display strategies had always mandated that produce should not 
be exhibited as individualized items, but in groupings (cucumbers, tomatoes, cab-
bages, for example) that would render them into legible sections and products of 
common achievement. A photograph of such a cooperative produce section by 
Rosenthal allotment gardeners makes the leap from a material to a materialist con-
ception of existence visible. It illustrates aggregations of things of the material 
world (groups of vegetables) and links them to their statistical depictions (pictorial 
statistics of vegetables).32 In fact, the Allotment Garden, Settlement, and Housing 
exhibition of 1923 took place at a figurative moment when objects (living things 
included) were presented next to their scientific abstractions. Neurath would later 
coin the term physicalism (instead of materialism) for this very idea, which sought 
to describe “concrete events ordered in space and time processes” and which 
“emerge dialogically from everyday life rather than from a predetermined meta-
physical system (Law 2015, 124).”33 This way of seeing also presupposed an indi-
32 These vegetable displays foreshadowed the idea of transformation, a process crucial for the 
creation of picture statistics, in which multiple of kind were translated into a single symbol.
33 For Neurath’s ideas on physcialism see Uebel (2007) and Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996). 
Also see O’Neill (2007); Neurath (1931c/1973), (1931b/1973), “Physicalism, Planning and the 
Social Sciences: Bricks Prepared for a Discussion V.Hayek,” July 26, 1945, Otto Neurath Papers, 
Haarlem, 202, K 56.
Fig. 7.12 Grouping of various vegetables presented by allotment gardeners of the Rosental coop-
erative in the courtyard of City Hall, Vienna, 1923. (Source: Austrian League of Allotment 
Gardeners)
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visible connection between displays and their viewers, which had been so central in 
all ÖSVK exhibitions. Cooperative exhibitions were inherently social and they elic-
ited not a need for viewing but for exchange, or seeing together. This centrality to 
study neither humans themselves nor their production, but rather the social relation-
ships that bind them together, persisted at the Social and Economic Museum, even 
as Neurath shifted focus from illustrating cooperative economy to illuminating 
global and societal interconnections. So, too, would the culture of education and 
conversation: that collaborative practice of seeing, which relied on human coopera-
tion (Fig. 7.13).
7.4  Conclusion
By the end of 1924, Neurath established the Museum für Siedlungs und Städtebau 
(Museum for Settlement and Town Planning) in Vienna which would be renamed 
and reconceived as the Social and Economic Museum in 1925. The lion’s share of 
the museum’s initial materials was secured from the Allotment Garden, Settlement, 
and Housing exhibition. Providing commentary in anticipation of the Allotment 
Garden, Settlement and Housing show in 1923, Neurath already remarked that the 
Fig. 7.13 Otto Neurath 
presenting the Atlas for 
Society and Economy to 
Viennese mayor Karl Seitz, 
Vienna, 1930. (Source: 
Otto and Marie Neurath 
Isotype Collection, 
University of Reading 
N-Files, N 958b)
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exhibited displays were worth preserving. “This will become an exhibition, that 
embodies a museum for 1 week in a certain sense,” Neurath (1923b, 135) wrote in 
Österreichische Städtezeitung (Austrian Cities’ Newspaper). It will be “educational 
and pleasant for the eye and the mind at the same time, because it outlines an image 
of a mass movement, to create […] a freer and happier existence” (Neurath 1923b, 
135). Didactic techniques and strategies based on human forms of organization had 
opened avenues  towards more optimistic approaches  of living life as a fuller 
humanity.
In conclusion, I want to offer some final points that warrant reflection and con-
nect the 1923 Allotment Garden, Settlement, and Housing Exposition with more 
enduring displays at the Social and Economic Museum in the later years of the 
1920s. As noted above, already by September 1923 Neurath conceived of the exhi-
bition as the basis for a permanent collection, but throughout the fall he further 
outlined the focal themes, competences, and curatorial strategies the Social and 
Economic Museum would adopt in the following years. In the article “Permanent 
Retention of the Exhibition – A Settlement Museum” published in Arbeiterzeitung 
he wrote:
The remarkable result, that the Fifth Allotment, Settlement and Housing Exhibition has to 
offer, created the desire to preserve the truly instructive and valuable exhibition material 
and to complement it in the future. While, so far, the laboriously designed panels, graphs, 
models and other displayed items were scattered in all directions at the end of an exhibition, 
this time, the ÖVSK will found a Settlement Museum to keep the most important objects 
and to make them accessible to the individual districts and federal states through traveling 
exhibitions. It should be shown everywhere, what the organized work of the municipalities 
and housing cooperatives can accomplish. (Neurath 1923d, 8.)
Such  curatorial work  on mobile exhibitions, he further asserted, was important, 
because it brought  political work to specific engaged audiences in travel across 
regions.
Along with announcing the founding of the Museum, by the end of 1923, Neurath 
provided explicit instruction about the objects to be included in the new museum. 
He noted how such objects related to the institution’s educational goals and to the 
urban visitors invited into conversation at the museum. One way to engage constitu-
ents was to provide them with the experiential qualities that had just been tested at 
the fair. Thus, not only abstractions of material objects should be shown. Full model 
homes and furniture – the material world in the making, now standardized and com-
monplace – would be incorporated as well. “Above all, models, charts, and over-
views are exhibited. It is also planned to show fully furnished model houses” 
Neurath wrote (1923d, 8).
A part of the museum will show in living rooms the objects that are conveyed by the 
Warentreuhand of the ÖSVK to those persons who want to supplement their household 
contents after expert advice. In this way, the Settlement Museum will serve general educa-
tion to the widest extent and will certainly become within a short time a very popular insti-
tution. (Neurath 1923d, 8.)
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This mission to provide experiential displays as a common educational platform 
within the context of a museum could be further strengthened by the use of a visual 
archive, Neurath argued. By the mid 1920s, the representation of information itself 
was reproduced by the Social and Economic Museum with the introduction of lan-
tern slides and film already tested in ÖSVK lectures. The link between visual dis-
plays, conversation, and education, as well as the potential to transform politics 
through exhibitions, became ever more pronounced in the following years. It is no 
coincidence, for example, that after 1927 the Social and Economic Museum moved 
its permanent headquarters to City Hall. Exhibitions were staged in the same 
Volkshalle where the earlier settlement displays had been shown. Nader Vossoughian 
(2008, 72) has suggested the continued significance of this location, stating that 
City Hall constituted “the political heart of Vienna and could thus draw enormous 
crowds,” a fact that the prized vegetable ceremonies foreshadowed.
Besides the central museum location at City Hall, Neurath organized displays at 
secondary locations, which reflected his belief that people wanted to see exhibitions 
“near their apartment,” and “in connection with a lecture” (Neurath 1927, 3–4). The 
exhibition space located at the large communal housing project, Fuchsenfeld, pro-
vided a venue where workers, in particular, could think through information together 
within the context of a distinctly metropolitan community. The new site at Parkring, 
where Neurath opened the smaller “Zeitschau” exhibit in 1928, also fulfilled this 
goal by displaying graphic information in a storefront in one of the busiest transpor-
tation hubs at the center of the city. According to Neurath, the “Zeitschau” enabled 
people to converse about picture statistics while waiting for public transportation. 
By doing so, they would together consider the illustrated information and what it 
meant for their personal lives (Neurath 1936, 73). As Neurath would remark much 
later, the educational purpose of ISOTYPE was “the teaching of how to argue” 
(Blau 2006, 255). No longer was this the case only in a familiar, cooperative envi-
ronment, but in one that, by extension, connected strangers as society. The main 
objective to encourage and preserve the culture of conversation that had been essen-
tial in ÖSVK exhibitions – learning how to see – had become teaching how to argue 
(Fig. 7.14).
In the following years, Neurath further theorized the meaning and purpose of 
Bildung or education in the context of the museum. Having permanently established 
the Social and Economic Museum in 1925, by 1927 he gave statistical courses in the 
Wiener Arbeiterhochschule, an extension school for adult workers administered by 
the Social Democratic Party  (and  similar in kind to the work council schools) 
(Stadler 1982, 231). He advocated bringing adult education to the museum, instat-
ing a program for work advice in the latter part of the 1920s (1931a, b, c, 125). The 
platform was initiated through a collaboration between the Work Advice Office of 
the City of Vienna and the Austrian Chamber for Labor. Although much larger in 
scope, adult education at the museum provided work advice and functioned simi-
larly to the Settlement Office’s capacity to consult on housing. For example, in a 
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series of photographs the museum offered information about popular professions 
and was “dedicated to the enlightenment of students released from school and to 
their parents” (Neurath 1931a, b, c, 125). The program offered a local consultation 
and evaluation office where those seeking work were given information about the 
potentials and duties of various occupations. Because it was directed at young men 
and women who had bypassed higher education in favor of joining the work force, 
this program extended the goal of the work council schools to engage those Viennese 
who had previously been precluded from access to higher education.
This educational section relied more heavily on photographs, lantern slides, and 
film, while the majority of pictorial production in the Social and Economic Museum 
sill consisted of picture statistics. Neurath often remarked that social facts cannot be 
photographed (Blau, 2006, 256; Neurath 1933b, 462). As such, the education 
department continued to bring the material world into the museum and into its vast 
archive, classified in a special category, called n-files or “nature files.” These n-files 
made up an almost equally expansive collection at the Social and Economic Museum 
as the t-files, tafel or “chart files,” reserved for picture statistics and diagrams. 
Although often regarded as secondary or merely documentary, I argue that these 
“nature files” carried value, not only because they offered deeper insight into the 
physical and cultural landscapes of Vienna, but because they illuminated a dedica-
tion to the material world and the efforts Neurath and his colleagues undertook to 
render it legible in various ways in the museum (Fig. 7.15).
Fig. 7.14 Worker making shoes, Vienna, 1925–1932. (Source: Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection, University of Reading N-Files, N 175)
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Certainly, in conceiving ISOTYPE, Neurath extensively theorized processes of 
abstraction, and counted on citizens to debate the gaps between pictorial statements 
of facts. However, even as ISOTYPE evolved, he continued to bring depictions and 
objects of the everyday into the Museum, encouraging each visitor to draw on per-
sonal experience. One such experiential exhibition, depicted laborers while work-
ing; a series of photographs captured the goods they produced – shoes, tools, brushes 
and the like. But the photographs also conveyed the visceral experience of labor. 
They shed light on the daily tasks of cutting hair, the everyday engagement with a 
customer over the counter, and they even exemplified the heat of a workshop.
Speculating how picture statistics would lend themselves to other thematic 
museums in International Picture Language, Neurath (1936, 68) wrote as late as 
1936, “What will an ISOTYPE museum of natural history look like? Certainly, it 
will have in it a number of birds, fishes, etc. But some account will be given of their 
living conditions, and other facts about them, such as their distribution over the 
earth, and their relations to man and society will be made clear.” He continued,
[a]n ISOTYPE museum of natural history will have not only animals and plants on view, 
but maps, number fact pictures, examples of things made from different animals and plants, 
their part in our existence, etc. So such a museum would be like a great ISOTYPE picture 
Fig. 7.15 Production of socks, Vienna, 1925–1932. (Source: Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection, University of Reading N-Files, N 176)
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made up of natural things. The things have to be not separate, but in some relation to one 
another and in some relation to the experience and the knowledge of the on-looker. So the 
new knowledge will come into its right place. An ISOTYPE museum has to give the chance 
to every comer to make his selection himself. A great museum, specially, has to give a 
number of different chances. It is important to make this clear to everybody by the order of 
things, by the system of building. (Neurath 1936, 68–69.)
This last point elucidates not just the similarities between ISOTYPE and architec-
ture, but also the parallel objectives of architecture and education. Indeed, in 
International Picture Language Neurath famously claimed that ISOTYPE muse-
ums were “nothing but a simple cover for simple teaching-material” (1936, 68–69). 
The relationship between architecture and ISOTYPE was similarly intertwined. 
Discussing the work of Frank and Neurath in her article “Isotype and Architecture 
in Red Vienna,” Eve Blau (2006, 256) has shown that just as Neurath’s picture sta-
tistics aimed at “giving a number of chances” to viewers to make their own connec-
tions and apply their own experience, Frank, particularly at Siedlung Hoffingergasse 
“provide a scaffold, a framework for dwelling.” She also noted, that “modern archi-
tecture conceived in this way leaves enormous scope for agency and decision in the 
everyday life of the individual.”
In this regard, it is relevant to highlight as a final point, that it was Josef Frank 
who at the Social and Economic Museum at City Hall developed a series of wooden 
panels that allowed the easy assemblage and rearrangement of existing displays. 
These panels and their frames relied on the standardized proportional system of 
measurements, which had become necessary due to the need for a unifying display 
strategy that fluidly facilitated pairing the ever-increasing amounts of charts. Frank’s 
modular designs eventually also allowed the entire Museum to travel. More impor-
tantly, however, this display system was an extension of the standardized windows, 
frames, and parts that had been championed in settlements and by the GESIBA. 
Based on systematized, but not equal measurements, these panels created diversity 
and unifomity. They were, in addition, informed by the idea of the type in the settle-
ment movement, which Frank and Neurath had so admantly studied and commented 
upon throughout the 1920s.
In conclusion, it is then important to emphasize that there was a deep, complex, 
and multifaceted connection between the production of housing and the practices of 
creating exhibitions. In fact, it would be no overstatement to say that the relation-
ship between the staging of produce and Neurath’s theories on war economy was 
not unlike the link between the construction of modern settlements in Vienna and 
the visualization of social and economic statements of facts in exhibitions at the 
Social and Economic Museum. It could even be argued that ISOTYPE itself was 
related to the settlement house as a type. Both ISOTYPE and type abstracted the old 
and built the new while underscoring heterogeneity and communality: statement by 
statement, earth heap by earth heap, brick by brick, house by house, and community 
by community (Fig. 7.16).
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Chapter 8
Generating Cognitive Tools: Neurath’s 
Educational Ideal and the Concept 
of ISOTYPE
Angélique Groß
Abstract Neurath was a practitioner and organizer in many ways. In relation to 
education, he did not express a philosophy, a theory of education. Neurath just prac-
ticed education, he arranged it for employees institutionally, personally, didactically 
and methodically. In a similar way, his methodical procedure of transformation, 
which is manifested in the pictorial presentation system of ISOTYPE, was not based 
on an explicit theory of depiction. He rather developed a concept, whose realization 
evolved due to a successful practice of transmission. However, in the practice of 
educational depiction, Neurath resorts to constants – instead of all gradual evolution 
and instead of all crudities – which are describable analytically as theoretical impli-
cations. In this respect, the present contribution points out the context of the educa-
tional and descriptive practice and its evolution out of Neurath’s ideal texture on the 
one hand, out of the Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. In comparison to the educa-
tional landscape of Vienna on the other hand, commonalities and demarcations are 
illustrated to expatiate on the novelty of Neurath’s legislating. In addition, the evo-
lution of ISOTYPE will be retraced to define different levels of progression and to 
elaborate its principles and structure. In conclusion, there are factors described with 
regard to his educational ideal that illustrate the aim of education, the didactics 
used, the impact of the transmission method and the addressed form of reception. 
With regard to his concept of depiction, there are factors described that illustrate the 
principles of ISOTYPE, the addressed form of cognitive pattern and the intended 
field of validity.
A. Groß (*) 
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8.1  Introduction1
The manifesto published by members of the Vienna Circle (Wiener Kreis) as 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung in 1929, was partly drafted by Otto Neurath in 
cooperation with his fellow campaigners and partly quite specifically further devel-
oped2: for him, it is a comprehensive structure of thought which frames his entire 
creative work as an educator of the people and of the working population and from 
which his enlightenment concept, his educational idea and his transmission approach 
are derived.
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung is based on a socio-political question, namely 
the question of the ways and means to achieve a socio-political way of life which 
fulfills the expectations of the people who inhabit it and in which the people are 
therefore happy (Neurath 1929a/1991, 139; 1912/1973, 122). In this respect, it 
stands for a configuration program for social and political life. It links science, on 
the one hand, with society on the other and uses enlightening education as the medi-
ating authority for the two dimensional and reflexive connections: It distributes sci-
entific findings and makes them exploitable for improving living conditions The 
way of life in society therefore becomes scientific. At the same time, science is 
assigned a constitutive role in social life (see Fig. 8.1).
Enlightenment carries science with its structural characteristics as far as possible 
into society and, at the same time, it does justice to society’s educational needs. In 
this context, it becomes relevant, on the one hand, to basically open science for 
society and, on the other, to reduce obstacles within society and create access to 
science.
1 The paper was  translated from  German by Morag Paul. Neurath’s German papers are quoted 
from his collected works with the original dates and the page numbers of Haller and Rutte (1981), 
Haller and Kinross (1991), and Haller and Höfer (1998).
2 On the production history of the Vienna Circle’s manifesto see Uebel (2008).
Fig. 8.1 Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung
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8.2  Neurath’s Concept of Enlightenment and His 
Educational Ideal
Enlightenment constitutes unity of thought and action which integrates the primacy 
of reason into the field of practice. The result is a holistic structure, which, with the 
aid of the utopian idea – the alternative reality concept which has been captured in 
thought (Nemeth 1994, 111) – creates a dialectic connection between theory and 
practice (Haller 1993a, 156; Uebel 2000, 27, 332). Enlightenment seeks to promote 
independent thinking, that is the intellectual handling of scientifically generated 
knowledge and classification of knowledge within the individual value system, sov-
ereign processing and reflection (Neurath 1933b/1991, 273; 1936/1991, 361; 
1928a/1973, 251–252). It therefore applies “[…] to fashion cognitive tools for 
everyday life, […] for the daily life of all of those who in some way join in working 
at the conscious re-shaping of life” (Neurath et al. 1929/1973, 305, translation mod-
ified). Since the recipient himself decides the extent to which content becomes rel-
evant for action or not, the moment of independent thought is coherent with 
independently responsible action.
Enlightening education therefore only provides the informational basis and 
leaves it up to the individual if and how he deals with this information from a judg-
mental and behavioral point of view. It merely stands for the creation of individual 
cognitive tools and only influences the will of the individual indirectly via the effect 
on the individual’s insight (Neurath 1914/1998, 423). In this respect, although uto-
pias may be intersubjectively scientifically founded constructions, they are very dif-
ferent from one individual to another (see Fig.  8.2). They mark the boundary 
between conveying the intersubjective, empirically generated finding and the sub-
jective, judgmental and individually specific decision to act, between abstract, sci-
entific information and concrete, committed practice. The unity of thinking and 
acting can therefore only be a subjective one.
Enlightenment becomes socially relevant when decisions to take action within a 
political context become effective. Because a democratically structured social sys-
tem allows and requires that all citizens, no matter from which social level, partici-
pate in the development processes, creating them according to their utopias, 
Neurath’s enlightenment aims are democratic in their implementation (Neurath 
1929a/1991, 139; 1912/1973, 122). Vice-versa, democratic decisions on creative 
action taken by the enlightened and self-determined individual are substantiated by 
a scientific-utopian basis.
The content of such enlightening education can only be value-free information 
which logical-empirical science generates as findings with its strict, standardized 
processes (Neurath 1926a/1991, 56; 1936/1991, 396).3 In order to come close to 
3 For this reason, the educational content is material, intersubjectively verifiable, formulated lan-
guage-critically, antimetaphysical and relativistic. Detailed explanations of the logico-empirical 
scientific theory of Neurath and the Vienna Circle can be found, among other sources, in Haller 
(1993b), Stadler (1993), Nemeth (1982) and Uebel (2000).
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taking account of the connection within democratic decision-making environments, 
it is primarily socio-scientific statistical content which is to be conveyed (Neurath 
1908/1998, 120; 1910/1998, 423f).
Of those to be addressed, it is largely the workers who come into the focus of 
Neurath’s enlightenment addresses, insofar as the disadvantage related to their 
social level needs to be compensated on several educationally (and therefore con-
figuration-) relevant levels (Neurath 1928a/1973, 248, 258).
Both orientations not only lead to specification of the enlightenment concept but 
also to specification of the transmission method within this enlightenment concept. 
Because the enlightenment technique to be used is regarded as a moment which 
decides on the success or failure of the appropriation processes, it is assigned a 
constitutive role. Neurath therefore generates a pictorial pedagogy which, due to its 
special form, illustrates the structure of scientific knowledge schematically and 
meets the requirements of those who are addressees (Neurath 1928b/1981, 280).
One aspect of educational theory which is closely linked to the aspiration to 
reach the workers as the group of addressees is that of Activation of the addressee. 
This point is dealt with on several levels, firstly that of motivation, of attracting the 
addressee in order to initiate a process of appropriation and further pursue it. The 
moment of activation is furthermore connected to the promotion of an (active) ques-
tioning attitude in the recipient: Through schematic shortening of what is presented, 
there are multiple capabilities for connecting the received content which opens up a 
Fig. 8.2 Structure of the concept of enlightenment
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random number of interlinks and thus induces independent cognitive treatment of 
the material conveyed (see Sect. 8.3.2). If interlinks are now created which go 
beyond what is directly shown, the creation of a questioning attitude is promoted in 
the recipient which can lead to the continuation of educational interests. The third 
form of activation is that of association: since socio-scientific quantities are pre-
sented where the connection is only generated by correlation on behalf of the recipi-
ent, it is the recipient himself who creates meanings through his cognitive 
constructional efforts (Neurath 1925a/1991).4
In this respect, Neurath‘s enlightenment concept presents itself as the intellectual 
education of workers in which socio-economic content with the aim of self- activated 
appropriation is neutrally demonstrated (Groß 2015, 73).
Derived from this, it can be seen in the interlinking of materials and formal edu-
cational principles that education according to Neurath is the methodically struc-
tured, independent appropriation of empirical-rational content for the purpose of 
intellectual development of the personality (Groß 2015, 269).
8.2.1  Neurath and the Educational Landscape of Vienna
But why does Neurath see a need to develop his ‘own’ special practice of enlighten-
ment when, at the time, there are already two established Viennese Educational 
Movements in Vienna, the popular education by the Bourgeoisie and the socialist 
education of workers?5 So how do Neurath’s theory and practice differ from the 
other educational concepts?
When comparing educational theory, there are similarities and differences: the 
popular education by the Bourgeoisie, for example, − institutionalized in the popu-
lar university lectures, in the Volksheim (house of the people), popular education 
association and the Urania – promotes the neutral transmission of scientific content 
in much the same way as Neurath in order to support intellectual abilities and com-
petence in democratic organizational activities (Uebel 2000, 295f). The socialist 
worker education movement, on the other hand – institutionalized in the educational 
center, the Viennese Workers’ School, the Viennese Union School and the Workers’ 
University – besides scientifically orientated education of functionaries, in view of 
the masses, constitutes education in workers’ culture, above all. The proportion of 
culture and festival and vacation culture shows a significant predominance towards 
the education of the masses in conveying of content (Weidenholzer 1981, 71) to 
correspond to the theoretical significance of culture as a tool for creating a  proletarian 
4 Here, basic formal human capacities are addressed: Since, as anthropologically dispositioned 
constants, curiosity, visual perception and the formation of associations are used as tools of aware-
ness and in their activation function of cognitive structures (see also Riedl and Parey 1980).
5 Even if there are close interdependencies in Vienna between national civil education and social 
education of workers, both movements are dealt with separately here in order to underline their 
different basic constructs.
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class consciousness and a class-conscious competence to act. For Neurath, however, 
instead of the formulation of party political educational aims, neutrality is indis-
pensable as a category of mediation: Only where judgmental dealings with the con-
tent conveyed are not laid down in advance is independent thinking promoted.6
In formal respects, Neurath’s educational concept therefore integrates educa-
tional aims of both Viennese educational movements. From the point of view of 
material, on the other hand, he tends rather to conform to the popular education by 
the Bourgeoisie (Altenhuber 1999, 74; Filla 1992, 93) and to exclude judgmental 
content with a party political perspective as well as cultural content.
Also in a comparison with the concepts of the established Viennese educational 
structures, there are various similarities and differences. In the practice of popular 
education by the Bourgeoisie, in spite of the aspiration to be scientific, the convey-
ing of cultural content plays almost equally significant a role as scientific content 
(Filla 1998, 83; 1996, 91; Glaser 1981, 335).7 Neurath, on the other hand, exclu-
sively teaches philosophy of science and scientific findings at the Verein Ernst Mach 
(Ernst Mach Society) and at the Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum (GWM, 
Social and Economic Museum) and consistently realizes his claim of scientific 
integrity on a didactical level.
The conceptional efforts to involve the working community in educational mat-
ters are common to both educational movements and to Neurath. However, Neurath’s 
primary practical focus is on the education of the proletarian masses (and not on the 
education of party functionaries), so that he obtains a differentiated perception of 
the needs of the working masses and, in connection with this, the identification of a 
problem regarding transmission. Due to the fact that the two Viennese educational 
movements fail to question their transmission methods (Neurath 1929a/1991, 139), 
it can be assumed that they could not reach anyone other than German-speaking and 
literate workers and that this failure constitutes one of the reasons why they are 
hardly able to integrate the workers.8 The identification of this mediation problem 
6 Although Neurath also emphasized the necessity of a class-conscious, democratic competence to 
act, the socialist worker education for Neurath is only defined via the addressee and not, for exam-
ple, via a close ideological guidance of educational aims and their didactical or methodical imple-
mentation: in 1908, he claimed that the current enlightenment was not objective enough because it 
was “clouded by the vigour of the party political fight” (Neurath 1908/1998, 120). Neurath’s own 
utopia, however, is indeed socialist-revolutionary, the desire, as it were, to determine how enlight-
ened workers are to deal with the knowledge conveyed to them. Detailed treatment of the ideas and 
biography of the political Neurath is provided by Günther Sandner (2014). See also Sandner’s 
chapter in the present volume.
7 The restriction to scientifically generated content only takes place in lectures of the popular uni-
versity which increasingly lose significance, however.
8 According to Langewiesche (1979, 265) 1901/02, of a total audience of 33,221 at the popular 
university lectures, 30% were worker. Filla (2001, 87) notes that, in the 1920’s, 40,000–50,000 of 
participants in courses offered by the adult education center “Volkshochschule” were also recruited 
to one third from the group of the working population. Consequently, education at the 
Volkshochschule is dominated by the middle classes in spite of the relatively large high proportion 
of workers and is only accessible for an active minority of the total of 580,000 workers (Filla 1999, 
107; 1998, 85; 2001, 87). Petrasch (2007, 85, 94), on the other hand, speaks of Urania reaching 
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leads Neurath to inevitably seek a radically different approach in spite of a similar 
aim being formulated by the Viennese educational sphere: the education of workers 
cannot be carried out in the same way as civil education has been conducted until 
now. The popular methods of mediation using word and letter as passed down from 
civil education are replaced by the pictorial pedagogy which was not passed down 
from popular education (see Fig. 8.3).
Neurath’s theoretical principles are therefore partially to be found in both of the 
established Viennese educational movements. However, the methodological proce-
dures used differ greatly from the conventional ones and close a gap which Viennese 
educational practice makes apparent. For this reason, the novelty in the structure of 
enlightenment according to Neurath is rather more to be found in practice than in 
theory.
8.3  Neurath’s Educational Practice. The Concept 
of ISOTYPE
Neurath makes various demands of the transmission method of pictorial pedagogy 
if it is to fulfill its purpose in the context described.
440,561 adult visitors in 1917/18. Since Urania does not try to attract workers and there are no 
social statistics with information on the proportion of employees, it can be assumed that, in this 
connection, too, one can hardly speak of broad inclusion of workers.
However, in socialist worker education, too, with the institutional focus on the education of 
functionaries, only a small proportion of workers participate in educational seminars. A survey 
from 1931 suggests that only 9.6% of the worker population frequents educational programs 
(Kuleman 1979, 28f).
Fig. 8.3 Specification of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung
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On the one hand, these requirements concern methodical moments of the preser-
vation of the structure of scientific knowledge, namely correctness (Neurath 
1944b/1991, 601; 1932/1991, 211; 1925b/1991, 3; 1927/1991, 118; 1937/1991, 
401) and neutrality i.e. lack of association and suggestion (Neurath 1929b/1991, 
134; 1930a/1991, 153; 1931b/1991, 195; 1933a/1991, 260).9 Furthermore, they 
contain a moment of opening of an ordered, scientifically logical handling of the 
knowledge conveyed (Neurath 1933b/1991, 273; 1936/1991, 361). The depiction of 
correlations therefore takes on a double function here in which, on the one hand, it 
allows scientifically correct presentation of factual relationships and, on the other, 
ensures the order of a network-type, logical and flexible way of thinking (Neurath 
et al. 1929/1973, 305; and Neurath 1944b/1991, 601). An essential requirement of 
Neurath of the educational method is therefore that of its scientificness.
Further standards of Neurath aim at the direct, cognitive effect of using pictures 
to convey information. The aim is to achieve optimization of reception through 
activating the recipient (Neurath 1929a/1991, 143; 1931a/1991, 185) and, at the 
same time, by using anthropological dispositions with only few prerequisites 
(Neurath 1933c/1991, 235; 1933b/1991, 298). In addition, the content to be pre-
sented is to result in optimization of storage by using recognized cognitive storage 
mechanisms (Neurath 1931a/1991, 184; 1935/1991, 342). Therefore, a further nor-
mative principle is the efficiency of transmission.
Finally, there are requirements by Neurath of pictorial pedagogy to provide emo-
tional, psychological incentives. As an initial impetus, these incentives serve to 
awaken human curiosity and attract attention in order to gain access to education. 
Furthermore, they serve to maintain an intrinsic interest in education which remains 
effective in the long-term (Neurath 1936/1991, 378). Neurath’s last normative prin-
ciple is that of motivation.
Since it is not possible to fall back on a functioning pictorial pedagogy with sci-
entific character, efficiency of transmission and motivation, it becomes necessary 
for Neurath to generate this. These individual principles are too abstract, however, 
and not meaningful as concrete instructions for generating pictorial pedagogy: 
“Therefore: Pictures! But this insight alone is not enough, it is necessary to know 
how to make correct use of the pictures” (Neurath 1926b, 57). Here, normative 
principles (only) serve as target factors for the construct of pictorial pedagogy and 
they are bound by the derivation from specific operational rules for construction.
8.3.1  The Levels of Progression of ISOTYPE
The creation of the equivalent of abstract target principles and concrete conventions 
does not take place as a theoretical construction and also not as a direct, stringent 
process or even as a one-off invention. Neurath rather conducts this performance of 
translation within the practice of transmission without a methodical-theoretical 
9 For more considerations in the secondary literature see Runggaldier (1979, 246).
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foundation according to the principle of “trial and error.” At the beginning there is 
only the idea of pictorial pedagogy and its implementation means years of improvi-
sation, evaluation and modification so that only little by little is improvisation 
replaced by a reflected method of transmission (Hartmann 2002, 58; Neurath 
1931c/1991, 205; 1926d/1991, 74). In the overall developed enlightening context, 
this protracted genesis of pictorial pedagogy applies as an approach to a solution for 
the recognized problem of educating workers which, itself, is full of deviations.
Henceforth the efforts regarding the development of conventions for pictorial 
pedagogy are at the center of the enlightenment concept and are correspondingly 
institutionalized: The GWM subscribes to being collectively responsible for the 
whole process of evolvement and presentation. It bundles several functions of the 
network of experts within itself and is (1) the institution for generating the tech-
nique for enlightenment using pictorial pedagogy, (2) the institution for enlighten-
ment using this technique and (3) the institution for international distribution of the 
concept of enlightenment using pictorial pedagogy (Neurath 1931b/1991, 195).10
Since 1923, there have been pictorial representations whose connection is referred 
to in 1925 as the Viennese Method of Pictorial Statistics and which is renamed 
ISOTYPE in 1934 thus shortening International System of TYpographic Picture 
Education as an acronym.11 Whereas many of the concrete construction rules must 
first find themselves within the graphic and draft-related field, in the statistical con-
text, there are however already two conventions that are fixed from the start: statistical 
quantities are represented by “speaking,” i.e. self-explanatory symbols which repre-
sent a defined quantity (Neurath 1931a, 180). And: these symbols are repeated in rows 
as often as the statistics require “verlangt” (Neurath 19250/1991a, 22).
Many other methods of implementation are just starting to evolve: where the 
symbols are three-dimensional at first and naturalistic, they later soon become two- 
dimensional and more and more stylized into types.12 Only with growing experience 
is it possible to integrate the isomorphy and reduction of the subject information. 
The symbols slowly become module-type elements which are conventionally put 
together. The tables are two-dimensional from the start in order to create a construct 
which emphasizes the information by doing without three-dimensional aspect. 
Whereas the pictures are still arranged at the beginning using grid lines, later only 
axes are explicitly drawn in until these too are eliminated and it is apparent which 
letters belong to which group only from the smaller or greater distance between 
them.
10 Due to the required emigrations, several institutions in sequence make efforts at generating picto-
rial pedagogy: the GWM in Vienna (1925–1934), the International Foundation for Visual Education 
in Den Haag (1934–1940) and finally the Isotype Institute in Oxford (1940–1945). Cf. Neurath 
(1931b/1991, 113). Neurath’s museum pedagogy is described by Kraeutler (2008) and Groß (2015, 
65ff).
11 An extensive description of the genesis with regard to transmission methodology in institutional 
and personal interrelationships has been written by Groß (2015, 91ff). A graphic perspective of the 
genesis is detailed by Kinross (2013) and Groß (2015, 91ff).
12 In semiotic terminology, the symbols constructed by Neurath are icons. Neurath himself uses 
various terms for the symbols: signs, signatures, types, isotypes and letters.
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Guiding images are often only used at the beginning so that it can be recognized 
what a table refers to even without knowledge of language. They are then used less 
and less frequently and then finally only used if they are a reference quantity as part 
of the statistical representation. While the pictures of the first few years are extremely 
focused on writing, with increasing certainty, the proportion of writing in the sym-
bol and image constructions becomes significantly less and only more again at the 
start of experimentation with abstraction. At the beginning, the number of symbols 
and rows of symbols is very large and can only be considerably reduced after the 
first few years. In an attempt to convey scientific content factually and logically cor-
rectly, at the beginning the detailed factual description dominates. This is only 
restricted by slowly developing courage to reduce this in favor of the reception 
capability of the pictures.13 The diversity of the first few years on almost all levels 
of presentation is therefore successively suppressed by increasing uniformity.
The limits of the material presented become increasingly broader with regard to 
content: from concrete, matter-of-fact topics such as civic education and health, 
becoming partially supplemented by more abstract subjects such as machine power, 
the power of resistance and history of art and later being extended to include abstract 
natural sciences such as chemistry. In the tables, which are mainly social science- 
related, over the years various types of picture are developed such as statistical 
tables, statistically utilized cartograms, map tables and organizational charts.14 In 
health education, statistical tables and multiple step progression schemes are used.15
In the context of constant evolvement of ISOTYPE, the standard works can be 
used to determine individual watersheds and stages of development. The early days 
of the method (from 1923) are determined by a simultaneous, diverse juxtaposition 
of tables, each of which characterizes different stages of experimentation (see 
Fig. 8.4).
In the children’s book Die bunte Welt (The Colorful World) from 1929, signifi-
cant changes can be seen in that there is a uniform concept on a rough level that 
implies some contradiction in concrete terms (see Fig. 8.5).
The Atlas Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft (Society and the Economy) from 1930 
marks a significant watershed for the first time: experience gained until now has led 
to a relatively closed system and to the sure mastery of the trade (see Fig. 8.6).
13 Whereas at the beginning, correct scientific knowledge which is accurate in every detail and a 
reduction in the diversity of statements seem to be contrasting elements which are difficult to 
incorporate, they become ever more compatible in the course of development.
14 Kinross (2013) illustrates which different forms of statistical tables are used.
15 Within the context of presentation, the tables are given priority. However, because their illustra-
tive performance is as special as it is limited, other media are used in a presentation. These, too, are 
not used without reflection and adherence to rules: it is attempted to use models, basic English, 
picture-text-style and film for reflecting and arranging in similar moments as with the tables. 
Extension of the rules of pictorial pedagogical tables, in the sense of transferability to a more 
comprehensive system of transmission, are therefore included in the thought process and the 
beginnings of the implementation are realized. Nonetheless, within Neurath’s lifetime, the main 
focus remains on the pictorial pedagogy created using Isotype.
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Fig. 8.4 Polizeiliche Einschreitungen in Wien im Febr. 1925. (© Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection, University of Reading)
Fig. 8.5 Völkergruppen der Erde. (© Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection, University of 
Reading)
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The folder Technik und Menschheit (Technology and Humanity) from 1932, on 
the other hand, is more systematic and goes one step further: due to the routine in 
dealing with the method, attempts are made here to create pictures of more abstract 
objects and to free oneself from hitherto strictly adhered-to pictorial constructs. In 
particular, the tendency to grade the tables in stages of perception which make it 
possible to integrate a further level of assertion: details are now included which do 
not endanger the perception of the main assertions and which hold potential for 
explanation (see Fig. 8.7).
With the book Modern man in the making from 1939, once again a development 
step can be registered. Now experiments are conducted in order to find alternative 
statistical methods of presentation that are significantly more abstract than the pre-
vious ones. Admittedly, in doing so, the infringement of basic requirements is 
accepted: with increased abstraction, the symbols used are less isomorphic and 
iconic and consequently no longer self-explanatory. Quantities are no longer inevi-
tably presented by the repetition of these symbols. At the same time, the dependence 
on transmission using written language is increased in the pictures so that more 
written elements become necessary (see Fig. 8.8).16
16 Kinross (2013) provides an alternative description of the genesis of Isotype. Here, the graphic 
developments are clarified in detail so that, within formal setting of topics and their content, pic-
tures are described in chronological comparison. As watersheds in the development, the periods 
“1925,” “1926,” “1927,” “1928,” “1928–29,” “1929–30” and “from 1930” are deduced so that, on 
the one hand, there is a differentiated description of the early years and, on the other hand, an 
undifferentiated description of the later years.
Fig. 8.6 Kraftwagenbestand der Erde. (© Österreichisches Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum, 
Wien)
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Fig. 8.7 Rationalization and reduction in the number of workers. (© Otto and Marie Neurath 
Isotype Collection, University of Reading)
Fig. 8.8 Death-rate/Suicide-rate. (© Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection, University of 
Reading)
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8.3.2  The Principles and Structure of ISOTYPE
In the course of the genesis of ISOTYPE, operational construction rules are derived 
from the formulated normative principles of scientificness, efficiency of transmis-
sion and motivation. They concretize the transformation, the translation of one con-
tent of a system of symbols to another, from that of mathematics into that of 
ISOTYPE (see Fig. 8.9).
The construction rules developed partially affect the aspiration of methodical 
standardization and imply generally applicable, uniform principles for the presenta-
tion of the symbols, the coloring and the lettering used (Neurath 1942/1991, 591f; 
1930b/1991, 144).17 Accordingly, they create their coherence dictionary, grammar 
and style and constitute ISOTYPE as a stringent system of language (Neurath and 
Kleinschmidt 1939/1991, 423). In this respect, the first operational principle is that 
of systematization.
Furthermore, there are regulations which are in effect for the emphasis of the 
material to be conveyed, the elaboration of its essential core and which characterize 
the difference between the relevant and the irrelevant (Neurath 1935/1991, 343). 
This differentiation is demonstrated on different levels of complexity in that ele-
mentary characteristics are presented in emphasized, concise symbols (Neurath 
1935/1991, 344; 1933b/1991, 270; 1926c/1991, 67) and in emphasized, concise 
pictures, schematic assertions are presented (Neurath 1936/1991, 377, 381; 
1945/2010, 54; 1933b/1991, 285). The moments of elementarization and schemati-
zation have one basic construct in common which can be termed the principle of 
reduction.18 The principle of reduction utilizes the human capacity to form associa-
tions in various respects: on the level of symbols, due to the elementarization, that 
17 For more details in the secondary literature see Hartmann (2002, 83f).
18 Since reduction refers to the formal aspect of the content, it is not a didactical reduction alone but 
also and above all a methodological reduction.
Fig. 8.9 Transformation
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which is presented is as concise as possible in order to invoke an unambiguous 
association with the known subject. On the level of the picture, that is the assembly 
of symbols, the schematization allows an active linking of information to form a 
cognitive network of knowledge (Hartmann 2002, 45).
In the sense of a unique distinguishing feature, the two elementary principles of 
systematization and reduction constitute the structure of ISOTYPE in their 
synthesis.
The presentation concept of ISOTYPE therefore corresponds to a methodical 
structuration which, using the principle of systematization, provides clear allocations 
of visualization and, using the principle of reduction, provides concentration on the 
essential and, based on the human capacity for creating association, is valid for a nor-
mative set field of conditions consisting of efficiency of transmission, motivation, a 
scientific way of thinking and statistically correlative content (see Fig. 8.10).
8.4  Summary
Based on the normative overall content of Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung, 
Neurath realizes a concept of enlightenment, an educational idea and a presentation 
concept which he does not grasp theoretically. However, they can be analytically 
derived and explained from the specific realization. It becomes particularly 
Fig. 8.10 Operation of ISOTYPE
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noticeable that he recognizes that there is a transmission problem with this pictorial 
enlightenment concept for workers and he places central importance on the method 
of transmission: a large number of the educationally disadvantaged working popula-
tion is not literate or German-speaking, they have no command of this cultural tech-
nique. At the same time, the established Vienna educational movements use the 
German language both orally and in writing and, for this reason, they do not reach 
the target group formulated. However, there is no adequate method of transmission 
which does not require a cultural technique. Since this is decisive Neurath decides 
on a radical approach to solve  it: Only if he generates a method of transmission 
himself which follows on from an anthropological constant and which can therefore 
directly be adopted, is the problem of transmission solved and the aspirations of 
Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung can be realized.
The extent to which he and his team are successful in doing so remains to be 
tested in educational science. It seems that certain conditions are emerging which 
differentiate the scope of validity of the pictorial method ISOTYPE and therefore of 
the whole endeavor.
With regard to the content to be presented, it can be said that the visualization of 
indirect content such as quantitative correlations, scientific knowledge content and 
thoughts lead us to assume a rather more abstract scope of validity for ISOTYPE.
However, here the method can obviously connect the aspiration of consistent visual-
ity with that of reduction whereby the thoughts to be presented relate to physical 
objects with natural figurativeness.19
With regard to the addressees, the limits of performance seem to exceed Neurath’s 
original one by far. Although initially it was exclusively conceived as a method for 
the disadvantaged working class, trials in nursery schools and schools involve the 
children from an early age. The educated bourgeoisie are also soon integrated into 
the efforts of the Volksbildungsinstitut für soziale Aufklärung, (Adult Education 
Centre for Social Enlightenment) as the GWM was subtitled. Thus the partially 
conceived starting point for the genesis of ISOTYPE, which was based on the prin-
ciple of enlightenment, becomes subject to an increasing degree of generalization: 
“The educated and the uneducated are both capable to roughly the same degree of 
grasping the main points of visual information and argumentation” (Neurath 
1944a/1991, 596).
A comprehensive modification of the ISOTYPE concept seems to accompany 
this. Deduced from the specific, socially pedagogical enlightenment context, 
19 For purposes of relativization, it should be emphasized that ISOTYPE functions for scientific 
knowledge, as Neurath defines it, namely for statistical-correlative knowledge. For example Bühl 
(1984) and Mittelstraß (2001) define scientific knowledge as being more complex than hypotheti-
cal and open and able to take criticism. In this case, the structure of scientific knowledge cannot be 
formed as correlation alone.
The striving for abstraction which has been formulated cannot mean the distancing from or 
detachment from figurativeness through presenting complex scientific knowledge. It can only 
imply the formal separation of the relevant out of the entirety. In this respect, the concept of 
abstract as used by Neurath is not to be understood as didactic but rather as closely linked to the 
formal principle of reduction.
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ISOTYPE becomes more and more a tool for international understanding and for 
‘mass information and mass education’ (cf. Vossoughian 2008). In this context, it 
can be stated that, even in Neurath’s time, the possibilities for the use of ISOTYPE 
become increasingly independent and lead beyond the context of its generation.
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Chapter 9
Rationality and Pseudo-Rationality 
in Political Economy: Neurath, Mises, 
Weber
Thomas Uebel
Abstract In this chapter Neurath’s controversial contributions to the socialist cal-
culation debate are confronted with the criticism of two well-known opponents, 
Ludwig von Mises and Max Weber. Each side’s arguments are considered at a cer-
tain level of abstraction so as to allow what are lasting points of significance in 
Neurath’s proposals to shine through more clearly. It is argued that while these 
points are closely interwoven in their presentation with his schemes for marketless 
socialism, they are conceptually independent of them. Suitably so, they have proven 
influential in just this independent capacity.
Many philosophers are likely to consider Otto Neurath’s work in economics, if they 
are aware of it at all, to be of specialist interest only, like his work on visual education 
or in museology.1 To show that matters are otherwise, this paper will review Neurath’s 
contribution to the socialist calculation debate and bring into focus what broadens its 
significance and makes it relevant to political economy generally. In doing so we can-
not, however, rely on the received wisdom of mainstream economics for in this field 
too Neurath is controversial and remembered mainly as the advocate of a particularly 
radical form of socialism. What makes worthwhile our doubly uphill struggle is the 
view we will get from the top. That is not a detailed working out but, just as important, 
a clear enough outline of the fundamentals of Neurath’s conception of how to think 
about an alternative socio-economic order (and some of the struggles it takes to reach 
them). This conception also, I believe, informed other members of the left Vienna 
Circle in their shared efforts to free philosophical thought from its fruitless preoccupa-
tion of double-guessing science as to the nature of reality and to reorient it towards the 
provision of tools to make its surface more humanly bearable. Reconceptualizing 
1 For work that shows, contrary to the first impressions one might have, the implications of 
Neurath’s work in visual education and museology for his comprehensive modernist enlighten-
ment agenda, see, e.g., Burke et al. (2013) and Groß (2015) and her chapter in this volume on the 
former and Kraeutler (2008) for the latter.
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significant stretches of economics was an instance of the task they chose – “to fashion 
intellectual tools […] also for the daily life of all those who in some way join in work-
ing at the conscious reshaping of life” and “to rationally transform the social and 
economic order” (Carnap et al. 1929/2012, 81).2
There are two aspects of Neurath’s contribution that we must consider for pres-
ent purposes. Both concern the seemingly devastating criticisms directed at his pro-
posals for the total socialization of the national economies of Germany and Austria 
after their defeat in World War One by Ludwig von Mises and Max Weber. 
Independently but along similar lines they argued that Neurath’s proposals were 
simply unworkable in developed complex industrial societies. What was long lost in 
the subsequent calculation debate that turned into a wholly different direction and 
focused on the provision of prices in the absence of a market, was that while Mises 
and Weber had important points to make, so did Neurath. Nowadays this is no lon-
ger news to those ecological economists who oppose as fundamentally mistaken the 
methodology employed by neoclassical or Austrian economics to deal with issues 
of sustainability and environmental degradation  with arguments pioneered by 
Neurath.3 What therefore can be saved from his original argument for the ages at an 
abstract level  is perhaps more important, certainly of greater practical relevance 
than what his interventions had originally intended. The implications of Neurath’s 
insights for economic thought about human welfare are, in any case, radical and 
give the lie to the long-standing myth, promulgated for generations by self-styled 
critical theorists, that social science informed by logical empiricist sensibilities is 
bound to conform to “positive” fact and cannot challenge the existing order.4
9.1  Neurath’s Argument
The socialist calculation debate was a long-running dispute over the economic foun-
dations of socialism that stretched from the last third of the nineteenth century to the 
last quarter of the twentieth.5 The possibility of economic calculation under social-
2 Compare Carnap’s remarks on “scientific humanism” and socialism in his intellectual autobiog-
raphy (1963, 82–4). Neurath’s views on economics do not appear to have had much influence out-
side of the left wing, not even on Karl Menger, the son of the originator of Austrian economics, 
who edited, much to the displeasure of that tradition’s third generation, a second expanded edi-
tion of his father’s foundational text (1923).
3 For discussions of Neurath’s role in the socialist calculation debate and the development of eco-
logical economics see, the pioneering work of Martinez-Alier (1987/1990, 1995) and since then 
O’Neill (1996, 1998, 2004, 2006), Uebel (2005, 2007a, 2008, 2018), O’Neill and Uebel (2015); for 
an overview of the development of Neurath’s own thought in and on economics, see Uebel (2004) 
and of logical empiricist philosophy of social science in general, Uebel (2007b).
4 See Dahms (1994) and (1997) with reference particularly to Horkheimer (1937/1972) and Adorno 
et al (1969/1976). For a critical assessment of Horkheimer’s original charge see O’Neill and Uebel 
(2004).
5 For accounts of the debate see Lavoie (1985) and Steele (1992), albeit with an emphasis on the 
later stages when the debate had moved to Anglophone publications. For supplementation with 
regard to the Austrian debate in the 1920s, see Chaloupek (1990).
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ism, of accounting for the best possible use of given resources, was put into question 
already in Albert Schäffle’s Die Quintessenz des Sozialismus (which also warned of 
reduced productivity due to motivation deficits and infringements of the sovereignty 
of labor and consumption). With the labor theory of value unable to allow for the 
proper mediation of supply and demand and no replacement in sight, supply and 
demand “would fall into a hopeless quantitative and qualitative discrepancy” 
(1875/1892, 87).6 Schäffle’s book – large parts of which set out to clarify the social-
ist doctrines against their distortion by opponents – was widely discussed at the 
time.7 Leading theorists of German Social Democracy tended to ignore his criticism 
under the guise of rejecting utopianism, like Karl Kautsky who continued to merely 
gesture towards the unspecified use of labor time units to calculate the cost and 
benefit of production and regulate its distribution “on the morrow of the revolution” 
in (1902/1907).8 By contrast, Neurath, as we shall see, took the bull by the horns.9 
While the goal of immediate implementation of market- and moneyless economy 
was also announced by the Bolsheviks in the years of “war communism” but not 
systematically implemented and later discarded, it was Neurath’s writings in 1919 
on how new forms of planned administrative economies were about to emerge from 
the German and Austro-Hungarian war experience that prompted Mises’ and 
Weber’s interventions (which provoked many more responses in turn).10
Neurath’s motivating reasoning possessed undeniable force and was effectively 
presented in numerous pamphlets. During World War One planned production for 
perceived need was seen to have replaced production for profit alone; what if the 
goals set by war aims were replaced by the goal of satisfying the needs of the popu-
lation in peacetime?
Let us ask first: is this economy as efficient, as “productive” as it could be in light of the 
available raw materials and energies? That it is not! The supporters of the free economy do 
not even in principle want to produce as much as possible. They rather want to earn as much 
as possible, according to the declared principle of this form of economy, they want to 
achieve maximum “net profit”. […] Moreover we ask whether the free market economy is 
6 Schäffle’s criticism concerned the practice of socialism and so differed from the critique of the 
consistency of Marx’s system launched by Böhm-Bawerk (1896/1949), a former student of his.
7 According to an obituary in Berliner Volkszeitung (quoted in Small 1904) one banker bought 
10,000 copies of Quintessenz for distribution amongst the educated public to stimulate discussion. 
Schäffle, it may be added, was not an apologist for the existing capitalist order: the second edition 
of his Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers (1896) outlined numerous measures of state interven-
tion to ameliorate “the social problem” that were curtly dismissed by Mises (1925) in the course of 
his review of Cohn (1920) who also showed sympathies for Neurath’s position; for an informed 
appreciation of Schäffle’s work, see Hodgson (2013).
8 Kautsky’s (often reprinted) Delft address stirred Nicholaas Pierson, an economist and former 
Dutch prime minister, to publish a riposte (1902/1935) which was lionized some 30 years later in 
Hayek (1935) but until then had remained untranslated and so was much less known than Schäffle’s 
three main criticisms which soon became standard warhorses.
9 For remarks on Neurath’s “scientific utopianism” (see his 1919b/1973) in different contexts, see 
Uebel (1996) and (2008).
10 Prior to the publication of Neurath’s socialization plans Mises’ and Weber’s arguments against 
socialism lacked the argument(s) they were deploying against Neurath; see Uebel (2007a).
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as economical as an economy should be in the light of the limited resources of the earth and 
our limited lifespans – and as it could be given at least the same output. That it is not! In the 
first place, it wastes raw materials. […] We do not even stop to think whether we should 
conserve materials for the sake of future generations, but let the decision be made by the 
desire for net profit on the part of a few of our contemporaries. Secondly, the free market 
economy also wastes human powers. […] But machines would be “more expensive”, 
human labor “cheaper”, so net profit decides that humans will suffer, fall ill and die early 
for the entrepreneur would be less well-off with machines. Thus prompted we ask, thirdly, 
whether the free market economy is rational, that means, whether it employs technological 
inventions wherever possible, whether it produces the greatest yield for the least effort. […] 
It is rational only to that degree precisely which is conducive for net profits. (Neurath and 
Schumann 1919, 13–18.)
Neurath thus argued that the dysfunctional “anarchy” of the market could be over-
come by a “planned economy” that would be organized along entirely different 
principles. According to his proposal for a marketless socialism, not only power 
relations with regard to economic decisions had to change from the existing order 
but also the very way economic decisions were being taken. By rejecting the free 
market one rejects the organizing principle of production for profit and thus the 
“rule of money.” Neurath’s “economy in kind” (or economy in natura) required a 
“calculation in kind” (calculation in natura) so as to develop an appropriate “eco-
nomic plan.” In this way alone, Neurath argued, was it possible to realize an econ-
omy the direction of which was determined by planned social need satisfaction.
Let us clarify Neurath’s terms. “Economy in kind” means “a large-scale economy 
in kind, […] a socialized economy, [where] money no longer is a driving force. No 
longer is there a ‘net profit’ for which production occurs. Money could remain at 
best as a token for a claim on all sorts of goods and services which the individual 
consumer is given to enable him to arrange his consumption” (Neurath 1919a/1973, 
145). “Calculation in kind” means “there are no units that can be used as the basis 
of such a [production] decision, neither units of money nor hours of work. One must 
directly judge the desirability of the two possibilities” (1919a/1973, 145). Needless 
to say, a great challenge hides in this conception. But Neurath was adamant:
To many it seems impossible to proceed in this manner, and yet it is only in this field that 
we are not used to it. For even in the past one has not started from units of teaching or sick-
ness in order to decide whether new schools or hospitals should be built; rather one directly 
set over against one another, even if only at general outlines, the totality of changes caused 
by schools and those caused by hospitals. (Neurath 1919a/1973, 146.)
As we can see, it was the incommensurability of the values involved (health, 
education, etc.) that called for both calculation in kind and economy in kind. What 
was rejected was not just calculation in units of specific goods or services but any 
universally applicable unit of a means of measurement. Calculation in kind had to 
be developed more or less from scratch. The replacement of “capitalist profit calcu-
lation” with “socialist utility calculation” by an economic plan required the devel-
opment of a new and comprehensively organized form of statistics in kind. It had to 
assess, on the one hand, the social need in food, housing, clothing, health and 
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 education provision, etc., in natura and, on the other hand, it had to assess, again in 
specific quantities, the available or required raw materials and machinery etc., as 
well as the amounts of labor it would take to transform the raw materials into the 
desired goods, etc. On the basis of such a “universal statistics” (Neurath’s term) a 
variety of economic plans were then to be drawn up which specified what social 
needs could be satisfied at what cost in terms of other social needs remaining unsat-
isfied etc. It was then up to the populace to choose, either directly or through its 
representatives, which of the plans was to be implemented as that which satisfied 
the most pressing social needs etc.
9.2  Mises’ Response and Neurath’s Rejoinders
Mises pointed out that use values were subjective and did not allow for an objective 
measure of the economic efficiency of actions (or at least not one that was intersub-
jectively intelligible) and so did not allow for the appropriate coordination of indi-
viduals’ actions. Such a measure was only afforded by money prices for goods and 
services. Since he also assumed it to be the essence of economic thinking to maxi-
mize the utility of expended effort, Mises is easily seen to have argued that without 
a commensurate cardinal measure of value like money, objective economic calcula-
tion was impossible. Since socialism precluded markets and money, no such calcu-
lation was possible.
Against this it is immediately and rightly objected that it is often possible to 
make rational decisions about how to direct one’s expenditure of effort even if no 
exact commensurate measure is available but only comparative assessments of the 
satisfaction of incommensurable values can be attempted, however vague. Against 
this counter, Mises had no argument but he had never intended to dispute the point. 
Mises’ argument was rather that the distinction between lower- and higher -order 
goods, between consumption and production goods, is of crucial importance. 
(Consumption goods can be consumed right away, production goods are inputs into 
processes making consumption goods.) Concerning lower-order, consumption 
goods it was indeed possible to arrive at a reasoned judgment concerning the merit 
of their relative utility by ranking and comparing them with the effort required for 
their procurement without reference to a neutral measure like money. Mises’ point 
concerned higher-order, production goods: modern capitalist economies are simply 
too complex to allow the economical use of production goods to be assessed in 
terms directly related to the use-values of consumption goods.
Calculation in natura, in an economy without exchange, can embrace consumption-goods 
only; it completely fails when it comes to deal with goods of a higher order. And as soon as 
one gives up the conception of freely established monetary price for goods of a higher 
order, rational production becomes completely impossible. Every step that takes us away 
from private ownership of the means of production and from the use of money also takes us 
away from rational economics. (Mises 1920/1935, 104; cf. Mises 1922/1951, 119.)
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Once the relevance of the distinction consumption/production goods is observed, it 
seems that Neurath’s plans can  only make sense within the circumference of a 
directly surveyable household economy. Rational calculation in modern capitalist 
economies required the medium of a universally commensurate measure: money. 
Since without a market, it is meaningless to speak of prices, what is needed there-
fore is a market in production goods – just what socialism precludes.
By the end of the year in which Mises’ counter appeared, Neurath had published 
his plans in numerous other places.11 His response to Mises’ objection seemed to 
remain opaque for a long time. Neurath reiterated that it would be possible to assess 
the efficiency of production goods in non-monetary, namely “technical” terms, by a 
comparative statistics establishing average yields, labor expenditure and production 
times for given quantities of goods. And he also pointed again to areas in which in- 
kind calculation was long in use in the administration of public health, security and 
education. But did these sectors face the very same problems a moneyless economy 
faced? To start with, public health, security and education were clearly demarcated 
areas reserved for the state to deal with; as long as they remained embedded within 
a market economy, the means to achieve their goals carried a price it was thought 
worthwhile to be paid. Whether this in-kind reasoning could be extended to the 
whole economy was just the issue.12
So what did Neurath’s “official” argument establish? That money calculation 
was not necessary for economic rationality, that no market was needed at all, does 
not follow from the mere fact that in some cases production decisions are under-
taken for social need, not profit. Call the idea that the rational employment of pro-
duction goods could be ensured entirely by in-kind considerations the “strong 
in-kind calculability assumption.” It says that alternative uses of production goods 
can be assessed as fully as is required for rational decision making by quantitative 
in-kind labor and production technology statistics – money calculation is not neces-
sary for any rational economic decision making. Did Neurath have any good argu-
ment for the strong in-kind calculability assumption? It would appear that, at best, 
his universal statistics was an ongoing research program.
But this was not Neurath’s only argument. In the same year which saw publica-
tion of his Wirtschaftsplan und Naturalrechnung (Economic Plan and Calculation 
in Kind, 1925a/2004), a remarkable small book that combined a restatement of his 
conception of a socialized economy with some not wholly convincing asides against 
Mises, an equally contentious Marx-exegesis and a very moving humanist pathos, 
Neurath also published a brief article in the theoretical journal of the Austro- 
Marxists which was either missed or disregarded by his critics, but which spelt out 
in greater detail his fundamental reasoning.13
11 See, e.g., besides Neurath and Schumann (1919) also Neurath (1919, 1920a/2004, 1920b/2004).
12 That Neurath (1925a/2004, 429) was able to point to a passage where Mises (1922/1951, 389) 
himself adverted to concept of wealth divorced from money and prices does not establish this point 
either.
13 Incidentally, neither Neurath’s reading of Marx nor his socialization plans remained uncontro-
versial among Austro-Marxists: see, e.g., Helene Bauer (1923), Käthe Leichter (1923a) and Otto 
Leichter (1923b).
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The socialist economy […] is concerned with “utility”, with the interest of the social whole 
and the welfare of all of its members with regard to housing, food, clothing, health, enter-
tainment, etc. To this end it seeks to employ the given sources of raw materials, the extant 
machines and labor power etc. Right at the start it must be determined what this is, the 
“interest of the social whole”. […] One has to find the best way to achieve a non-wasteful 
exploitation of [natural resources], to ensure the health of the next generation, etc. Now how 
can this “best use” be calculated in a socialist economic order? For a socialist calculation 
there does not exist a unit of the sort which capitalism finds in “money”. (Neurath 
1925b/2004, 468.)
To convince us that commensuration by a single unit will not work, Neurath asked 
three rhetorical questions: “Some had the idea to introduce a certain amount of labor 
as a unit. But how could this make it possible for the excessive exploitation of a 
coalmine to figure as a negative entry in the balance? How could a quantity of elec-
tricity which a river provides us with be entered as an increase in amounts of labour 
units? Or the increase in wind power used in the running wind mills?” (Neurath 
1925b/2004, 468.) Neurath addressed all candidates for that single commensurating 
unit: any such candidate is meant to be ruled out.
Consider how ecological incommensurabilities figures here: “the excessive 
exploitation of a coal mine” involves the “intergenerational context” with the cru-
cial problem of having to determine “the rate of discount needed to weigh future 
costs and benefits”. Inevitably, “[w]e need a political decision, therefore, on the rate 
of discount and the time-horizon” (Martinez-Alier 1987/1990, xxi). No objective 
facts are available that could determine this rate of discount. Inasmuch as the second 
and third examples trade on assessing present-day but counterfactual costs and ben-
efits, the argument seems weaker: why could “shadow-pricing” or “contingent valu-
ation” (two terms for the monetization of non-monetary goods used by environmental 
economics) not work here? The reasoning is similar: here too shadow-pricing “from 
above” requires a political decision about the value of the type of labor at issue, and, 
more generally, a hierarchy of needs. However, such an assignment of value to labor 
is neither objectively determined nor is there anything timeless about the hierarchy 
of needs. On the other hand, contingent valuations “from below” are subject to dis-
torting framing effects and differential resource constraints, and so also cannot 
count as objective.
Neurath drew the obvious conclusion: the automaticism of the market does not 
work here. Indeed the point can be generalized: against the claim that monetary 
algorithms could overrule incommensurability stands the realization that they would 
require a prior non-algorithmic weighing up of competing needs etc. and their deter-
mination in monetary values. It is this thought that justified for Neurath the view 
that socialist calculation is moneyless: socialist economic plans are designed by 
multi-criterial evaluation. So when it came to showing that the very logic of capital-
ism consists in the wrongful absolutization of the profit motive as definitive of eco-
nomic action, Neurath invoked ecological incommensurability. Call this reason the 
‘weak in-kind calculability assumption’: monetary calculation is not sufficient in all 
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cases for rational economic decisions.14 So Neurath’s best response to Mises’ coun-
ter was all along that in-kind calculation was unavoidable in any responsible eco-
nomic decision making concerning non-renewable resources, the allocation of 
exhaustible resources – whether a market remained in place or not. On pain of fail-
ing this ecological dimension of economic reasoning altogether, economic rational-
ity was bound to do without or go beyond calculation with monetary units – even 
when it came to production goods.
9.3  The Neurath-Mises Debate Reassessed (with Hayek 
in the Mix)
Mises never engaged with Neurath’s incommensurability argument. His defenders 
may point out that he too rejected the idea of assigning money prices to extra- 
economic values. He wrote that monetary calculation “can never obtain as a mea-
sure for the calculation of those value-determining elements which stand outside the 
domain of exchange transactions,” like the “beauty of the waterfall which the 
scheme [for erecting a waterworks] might impair” (Mises 1920/1935, 98–9). Of 
course, one could try to capture some of the value of the beauty of the waterfall in 
terms of the monetary value of “the diminution of tourist traffic or similar changes” 
its removal would bring about (ibid.), but that would not be valuing its aesthetic 
appeal. Instead these extra-economic values can “be embraced straightaway within 
the ambit of our judgement of values” because “all those ideal goods are goods of a 
lower order.” So when Mises went on to declare: “Once we see clearly how highly 
we value beauty, health, honor and pride, surely nothing can prevent us from paying 
a corresponding regard to them” (1920/1935, 100), he suggested that comparative 
in-kind valuations will determine for us personally the opportunity cost we would 
be willing to incur so as to enjoy the extra-economic values in question. Mises’s 
waterfall example illustrates “extra-economic’ elements” that are “not substitutable 
against each other on the market and therefore do not enter into exchange- 
relationships” (1920/1935, 99).
But this admission does not work against Neurath’s ecological argument for that 
deals in the impact the ecological gain or loss has on the proper deployment of 
 production goods. To allow for rational calculation concerning environmental goods 
at all Mises must insist that they be brought into the market more directly and for 
real (as by the assignment and enforcement of property rights over them in “free 
market environmentalism”).15 Since Austrian economists reject the equilibrium 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, make-believe markets can never replace 
real markets and non-market valuations via shadow-pricing etc. can never play the 
14 Note that this argument was already implicit in the passage quoted above from Neurath and 
Schumann (1919).
15 As latter-day proponents of Austrian economics indeed suggest: see Cordato (1992) or Sagoff 
(2008).
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indispensible signaling role of prices. This strategy remains barred for Mises also at 
the level of production goods. (The same holds for Hayek, who also overlooked 
Neurath’s ecological argument.) In sum: Neurath’s ecological incommensurability 
argument supports his “weak in-kind calculability assumption” by establishing the 
insufficiency of capitalist monetary calculation for purposes of economic 
rationality.
What about Neurath’s “strong in-kind calculability assumption?” For Mises, at 
least as he is naturally read, the central point is that rationality in complex econo-
mies requires commensuration of all values onto a common one. The possibility of 
just that, of course, is what is denied by Neurath’s ecological argument: rationality 
is not renounced just because we have to make do with merely partial orderings of 
alternatives, moreover, with a plurality of those. What was a presupposition of ratio-
nal action for Mises was for Neurath but a recipe for “pseudo-rationalism.”16 The 
very determinacy of action that Mises appeared to insist on, was anathema to 
Neurath in that it set an illusory standard that was rarely if ever met. This is a good 
counter-charge, but does it save the strong in-kind calculability assumption? Here 
Hayek’s development of Mises’ argument becomes important.17
Hayek stressed that comprehensive rational planning requires the concentration 
of what is dispersed and often only tacit knowledge amongst many agents in the 
head of the planner and that this is an unrealistic assumption.
In a centrally planned society the selection of the most appropriate among the known tech-
nical methods will be possible only if all that knowledge can be used in the calculations of 
the central authority. This means in practice that this knowledge will have to be concen-
trated in the heads of one or at best a very few people who actually formulate the equations 
to be worked out. It is hardly necessary to emphasize that this is an absurd idea even in so 
far as that knowledge is concerned which can properly be said to ‘exist’ at any one time. 
(Hayek 1935/1948, 155; cf. Hayek 1940/1948, 202.)
To assume all the knowledge to be given to a single mind in the same manner in which we 
assume it to be given to us as the explaining economists is to assume the problem away and 
to disregard everything that is important and significant in the real world. (Hayek 1945/1948, 
91.)
This “information problem” also refutes Neurath’s appeal to the future “universal 
statistics” in the light of which planning decisions were to be made. With it falls his 
strong in-kind calculability assumption and his hope that for rational economic cal-
culation it is not even necessary to have money calculation.18 But Hayek’s argument 
does not overcome the weak in-kind calculability assumption.
16 For Neurath’s argument against pseudo-rationalism in various guises see (1913/1973) and 
(1935b/1983).
17 For discussion of another methodological difference between Mises’s and Hayek’s argument that 
matters for empirical social science, see Uebel (2017).
18 Note that this conclusion is established only as far as Neurath’s proposals for calculation in kind 
are concerned. Whether Hayek’s argument holds against more recent elaborations of suggestions 
first made by Oskar Lange that computing machines should be able to effect the calculations 
needed, namely that V. Kantorovich’s method of linear programming be employed for the task 
(Cockshott 2008), or that Hayek’s own argument has limitations that speak against the across-the-
board applicability that it is often credited with (O’Neill 2012), cannot be discussed here.
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What can be concluded as a result so far then is this. Neurath claimed that mon-
etary calculation (not only private ownership of the means of production) was not 
necessary in order to run a complex economy. Mises countered that monetary cal-
culation (and private ownership etc.) was not only necessary but sufficient for run-
ning a complex economy. But both Neurath and Mises seem to be mistaken. 
Monetary calculation and markets are necessary but not sufficient for running a 
complex economy in a “rational” fashion.
9.4  Weber vs. Neurath
Now let us turn to the debate between Neurath and Max Weber.19 This will highlight 
an important feature of Neurath’s perspective that complements his partial success 
over Mises. That is the claim that not only is monetary calculation not sufficient for 
a well-ordered economy, but also that calculation in kind is necessary for such a 
well-ordered economy.
Recall that calculation in kind considers how perceived needs of a population in 
real terms (food, housing) could be met by determining the cost of production in 
terms of input quantities of material labor, and also provides comparisons of alter-
native uses in terms of quantities of different outputs. Calculation in kind is essen-
tial for an economy in kind. Unlike monetary calculation in a market economy 
which guides, even directs investment decisions by means of a cost-benefit analysis 
and the criterion of maximum profit, calculation in kind provides the data (by a 
material input-output analysis of production possibilities) for decisions about the 
allocation of resources in an economy in kind. But there is also a still further dimen-
sion of calculation in kind: that it provides criteria for assessing economic out-
comes. Calculation in kind not only deals in quantities of raw materials and products 
and so requires inventories thereof, but also deals in all aspects of human “life con-
ditions” and so requires “inventories of standards of living.” Neurath (1931/1973, 
401) mentioned “shelter, food, clothing, health, books, theatres, friendly human 
surroundings, all this belongs to the conditions of life, even the quantity of malaria 
germs that menace […].”)20 It is this further use of calculation in kind that becomes 
of great importance in the debate with Weber.
Weber’s criticism of Neurath paralleled Mises’ only in part: Weber recognized a 
dimension of Neurath’s argument that Mises missed altogether. Weber (1921/1978, 
101) shared Mises’ overall conclusion, in his own words: “the comparison of differ-
ent kinds of processes of production, with the use of different kinds of raw materials 
and different ways of treating them, is carried out today by making a calculation of 
comparative profitability in terms of money costs. For accounting in kind, on the 
other hand, there are formidable problems involved here which are incapable of 
19 Some of this debate is virtual, as we’ll see, as Weber died in 1920. For some live interaction 
between them see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996, 54) and Neurath (1910b/2004, 295).
20 For elaboration see Neurath (1917/2004) and (1937/2004).
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objective solution.” Weber stressed particularly that calculation in kind was unable 
to deal with what had become known as the “imputation” problem: how to assign 
differential value to individual parts of the production process. Thus Weber 
(1921/1978, 103) concluded: “We cannot speak of a rational ‘planned economy’ so 
long as in this decisive aspect we have no instrument for elaborating a rational 
‘plan.’”
Weber and Mises strongly differed, however, in recognizing different kinds of 
rationalities. Unlike Mises who only recognized instrumentally rational action, 
Weber recognized four types of social action: instrumentally rational, value- rational, 
affective and traditional.21 “Instrumentally rational” (zweckrational) action is deter-
mined by the purpose, the means and consequences of acting, with satisfaction of 
one’s goals of overriding importance. “Value-rational” (wertrational) action 
is  determined by belief in the unconditional intrinsic value of certain behaviors, 
independently of any instrumental success attained.22 “Affective” action is deter-
mined by emotions and feelings and “traditional” action is determined by lived 
custom or habit. Closely related to these four types of social action are two types 
rationality of economic action.
The term “formal rationality of economic action” will be used to designate the extent of 
quantitative calculation or accounting which is technically possible and which is actually 
applied. The “substantive rationality”, on the other hand, is the degree to which the provi-
sioning of given groups or persons (no matter how delimited) with goods is shaped by 
economically oriented social action under some criterion (past, present or potential) of 
ultimate values, regardless of the nature of these ends. (Weber 1921/1978, 63; emphases 
added.)
Note that what is substantively rational in the specific context of economic action 
responds to what is value-rational in the general context of social action – resulting 
in a mixed form. The substantive rationality of economic action represents one of 
the mixed forms of instrumental rationality Weber allowed for: here pure means- 
ends reasoning is modified by the recognition of intrinsic values that need to be 
observed.
With these categories in hand consider Weber’s charge that one “cannot speak of 
a rational ‘planned economy’” as long as the imputation problem has not been 
addressed and solved. What follows is that what renders calculation in kind defi-
cient – less than fully “rational” – as an instrument of economic action is not that it 
is not pure instrumental rationality. Given “both calculation in kind and in money 
are rational techniques,” calculation in kind fails because it falls short in its formal 
prowess. Now this is not a minor problem: the “fact that the problem of imputation 
21 Mises (1929/1960, 85) wrote that “everything that we regard as human action […] is instrumen-
tally rational: it chooses between given possibilities in order to attain the most ardently desired 
goal.” In this quotation “instrumentally” is restored from the original German: Mises evidently 
considered it universal and exclusive and explicitly rejected Weber’s distinctions.
22 Note that the goals and means of an instrumentally analyzed situation could be subjected to 
consideration from the perspective of value-rationality and the decision made on purely instrumen-
tal grounds could be modified  – but from instrumentalist perspective, Weber (1921/1978, 26) 
noted, “value-rationality is always irrational.”
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of the part contributed to the total output of an economic unit by the different factors 
of production and by different executive decisions is not capable of the kind of solu-
tion which is at present attained by calculations of profitability in terms of money” 
is fatal for Weber (1921/1978, 104). Calculation in kind fails to account for “pre-
cisely the process of provision for mass demand by mass production” which is 
central for modern industrial economies.
Importantly, however, Weber (1921/1978, 105) conceded that formal rationality 
has shortcomings too. “It is naturally entirely correct that mere money accounts […] 
tell us nothing whatever about the nature of the real provision of a given group with 
what it needs; namely, real articles of consumption.” Weber thus concluded that in 
this “complete indifference of even the formally most perfect rationality of capital 
accounting towards all substantive postulates, an indifference which is absolute if 
the market is perfectly free,” lies “the ultimate limitation, inherent in its very struc-
ture, of the rationality of monetary economic calculation” (1921/1978, 108; empha-
sis added). Weber went even further and issued what can only be regarded as a tragic 
diagnosis of modernity. “Substantive and formal (in the sense of exact calculation) 
rationality are, it should be stated again, after all largely distinct problems. This 
fundamental and, in the last analysis, unavoidable element of irrationality in eco-
nomic systems is one of the important sources of all ‘social’ problems, and above 
all, of the problems of socialism” (Weber 1921/1978, 111; emphasis added). This is 
surely a stunning twist to Weber’s argumentation: having declared a method of eco-
nomic calculation lacking in rationality that fails to solve the imputation problem, 
he now implicated the very method that can solve it in an irrationality that appar-
ently pervades economics as whole.
9.5  A Neurathian Response
A defender of Neurath can reject Weber’s parallel between monetary and in-kind cal-
culation (that both aim for a kind of profit). True, both aim to determine what are 
better and worse investment decisions. But there are differences great enough to dis-
count any talk of a straightforward analogy: monetary cost-benefit calculation will 
offer an optimal solution, it provides an algorithm, an automatic decision procedure. 
By contrast, calculation in kind only produces proposals for what could be done with 
given resources for different ends or for how different possible resources could be 
employed in pursuit of a given end. Calculation in kind was an aid for deliberation, 
not a determinative algorithm. Since calculation in kind was never meant as a tool for 
formal economic rationality as Weber understood it, calling it inadequate as formal 
rationality is to miss its very point. This is not, of course, to say that it is adequate as 
formal rationality in Weber’s sense: at least in market economies the imputation prob-
lem remains. But noting the point missed by Weber allows bringing into focus what it 
is that calculation in kind does. And that is precisely what monetary calculation can-
not do: serve considerations of substantive rationality. So while Weber claimed its 
insufficiency for implementing in full one type of economic rationality, Neurath can 
stress its indispensability for another type.
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In other words, whereas Weber charged that calculation in kind was insufficient 
for formal rationality (incapable of achieving the formal rationality of economic 
action required in modern economies), Neurath claimed that it was necessary for 
assessing substantive rationality (required to establish the substantive rationality of 
economic action). Three things are notable about this response. First, that Weber 
could not really have disagreed; second, that Neurath not only could have answered 
as envisaged, but actually did so; third, that the Neurathian response did not go 
unnoticed either (his influence on ecological economics worked largely via 
K.W. Kapp – but that’s another story).23 To go straight to the second point. Neurath’s 
Was bedeutet rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung? (“What is Meant by Rational 
Economic Theory?”) signals by its title his (re-)engagement with Mises’ and 
Weber’s old charge. But readers are not told so. Instead Neurath wrote that he 
decided, “in the interest of calm and tranquility” to forego the “discussion of par-
ticular theses by particular authors” (1935a/1987, 71): the title is the only, still 
rather oblique reference to the opposition he addressed.24 Like his better response to 
Mises, his considered reply to Weber found itself handicapped, coming some 15 
years after the original exchange, by a distinct lack of visibility.
To be sure, readers expecting to find an explanation of how calculation in kind 
can deal, after all, with the problem of imputation and capital accounting that Mises 
and Weber claimed it could not, are bound to be disappointed. That was precisely 
the kind of problem Neurath did not solve. Instead, not for the first time, Neurath 
pressed the point that the basic categories of economic thought require rethinking. 
Note also that his title speaks of “Wirtschaftsbetrachtung”  – not “Theorie der 
Wirtschaft”: his expression designates more of a reflective evaluative assessment of 
an economy than a set of universal conditionals, let alone of mathematical equa-
tions. (Likewise, when he spoke of “Erfolgsbetrachtung” he did not mean a “theory 
of success” but a consideration of what makes for success.) So when Neurath asked 
“wie man eine logisch konsequente Wirtschaftsbetrachtung aufbauen kann,” he did 
not ask “how to construct a consistent economic theory” but rather: how can we 
develop a logically rigorous way of rationally considering an economy? Everything 
now depends on what is considered “rational” – and Neurath was fully aware of the 
contested nature of term.
Neurath began his paper by noting one agreement between defenders and detrac-
tors of the free market: “that we can ascribe to certain institutions an influence on 
human living standards; and this already seems to give us the logical foundation we 
need for a comparative Wirtschaftsbetrachtung” (1935a/1987, 67–8). By contrast, 
he bemoaned the commensurabilist consensus shared even by fellow socialists and 
he rebuked them for failing to clarify “that this widely touted monetary calculation 
cannot be advocated on theoretical grounds as a form of economic calculation, even 
if it may have to be used in practice as a socio-technical expedient” (1935a/1987, 
23 For elaboration of the third point, see O’Neill and Uebel (2015) and Uebel (2018).
24 Note, incidentally, that the talk of “rationality” with regard to economic calculation was initiated 
by Mises and Weber and that Neurath here reacted to it.
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68).25 His aim by contrast was “to show that the Erfolgsbetrachtung relevant to our 
field cannot be constructed on the basis of a single unit.” What then was the criterion 
of “success” that Neurath used? It was the institution’s “influence on human living 
standards.” Rather than aim for an imaginary convergent value of assessments of 
components of conditions of life Neurath insisted to speak of “silhouettes” of condi-
tions of life or standards of living to which each component made a distinctive and 
discernible contribution. Different silhouettes, representing the projected outcome 
of alternative economic plans, could be compared with regard to individual compo-
nents but had to be assessed holistically.26
Consider now Neurath’s position on the imputation problem (which so bothered 
Weber and Mises):
The calculations in kind of an in-kind macro-economy proceed from the economy as a 
whole, and the economic value of an individual concern can be determined only within the 
framework of an economic consideration of the whole. If we want to find out whether a 
certain way of managing a concern would be preferable to another, we must examine ulti-
mately how it would change the output of the whole economy. Not so in a monetary econ-
omy. Here the balance sheet of each concern is autonomous but it states something only 
about the profits and nothing at all about economic value. We cannot therefore say that a 
money economy comes equipped with an instrument for estimating the value of individual 
concerns, whereas an in-kind macro-economy has to do without one. (Neurath 1935a/1987, 
104–5. Terminology slightly altered; last emphasis in the original.)
Add to this that Neurath took it as established that a money economy comes 
unequipped with an instrument for measuring economic value for society as whole 
and we do not go too far in regarding Neurath’s talk of “economic value” here as 
engaging with Weber’s distinction of formal and substantive rationality. Neither do 
we go too far, I believe, in having Neurath say that Wirtschaftsbetrachtung by means 
of monetary calculation would miss the point. It is calculation in kind that is neces-
sary to assess whether certain criteria of substantive rationality have been met – 
here, the raising of human living standards.
Like his 1925 journal article, Neurath’s 1935 monograph strikes me as a neglected 
classic of the calculation debate. To be sure, there is much in it that he had com-
25 Neurath made this comment still before he could have known of the market-socialist model of 
Lange (1935–36) which subsequently dominated the socialist calculation debate; whether he knew 
of Taylor (1929/1964) is unclear as well, but he certainly was acquainted with the German-
language discussion following Mises’ intervention in which virtually all contributors adopted 
money for its commensurating role in economic calculation, including Polanyi (1922) and (1924).
26 Already in 1909 Neurath (1910a/2004, 294) stated: “If we want to compare the orders of life of 
two nations with each other, we cannot describe them as the sum of some elementary constituents 
and compare these individually. We cannot reach a sum by saying: more meat is eaten in the one 
country, fewer clothes are worn in the other. Neither do we compare the artistic achievements of 
architecture so as to say: this hall is more functional than that one, but less beautiful; let us add up 
advantages and disadvantages. In comparing two works of art we look at one as a whole and look 
at the other as a whole.” Some 28 years later he stated about the concept of standard of living: “We 
cannot regard it as a weight made up of the sum of the weights of the various parts. We cannot even 
specifically enumerate all the things which might be counted in the standard of living. Nevertheless, 
it can be shown that this concept suffices for both our theory and practice” (Neurath 1937/2004, 
516).
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mented on before. Indeed, substantive rationality itself was what Neurath had 
understood economics to be concerned with all along – albeit not under this head-
ing. As he had stated already in 1910, so in 1935 he reiterated that “we go back to 
the oldest tradition if we try to delimit economics as a discipline concerned with 
‘welfare’, ‘wealth’, and ‘happiness’ as the product of certain institutions” (Neurath 
1935a/1987, 71; cf. 1910b/2004, 272). But just as his earliest arguments for his 
socialization proposals contained an incommensurability argument that became 
foundational for ecological economics, so his more or less last return to the debate 
in print engaged with Weber’s reflections about rationality in economics.27
The confrontation with Weber shows that the criterion by which Neurath mea-
sured the adequacy of solutions to economic problems was all along what Weber 
called substantive rationality. This constitutes a notable, if partial, agreement with 
Weber and encourages an instructive parallel between Neurath’s positions in the 
socialist calculation debate vis-à-vis Mises and Weber. Just as Neurath’s argument 
against Mises’ and Hayek’s market fundamentalism succeeds independently of his 
argument for marketless socialism, so does his argument for calculation in kind. 
Calculation in kind is necessary to assess whether in running an economy certain 
criteria of substantive rationality have been met. This complements his argument 
that monetary calculation is not sufficient for running a well-ordered economy. Both 
points are surely of major methodological significance for political economy. That 
these points are nowadays discussed mainly in the debates between ecological and 
environmental economists does not mean that their relevance is limited to these 
applications: they generalize to all of welfare economics. Complementing each 
other, Weber’s and Neurath’s concepts of substantive rationality and calculation in 
kind provide a framework for attempts to enrich the vocabulary and concern of wel-
fare economics generally. On just this count Neurath’s approach joins forces, per-
haps unexpectedly, with the campaign waged by Amartya Sen and Vivian Walsh and 
Hilary Putnam, albeit in its substantive methodological, not its rhetorical respects.28
9.6  Conclusion
Specifically with regard to Neurath we can conclude that neither Mises nor Weber 
show his alternative approach to economic calculation irrational in toto. They 
are  correct that marketless socialism is highly problematic, at least given the 
27 In very his last monograph Neurath (1944/1970, 40) wryly commented on his views of monetary 
calculation and calculation in kind being regarded as “left deviation” in the Soviet Union.
28 For discussion of the substantive convergence see O’Neill and Uebel (2008) and a highly inter-
esting comparison see Lessmann (2007). Needless to say, still beyond Putnam and Walsh’s anti-
positivist rhetoric there are  some substantive disagreements about Weberian methodology and 
meta-ethical matters that remain which must, however, be resolved on another occasion.
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arguments provided by Neurath. But Mises was and his followers are wrong in 
holding monetary calculation and market rationality to be sufficient for a well-
ordered economy. Indeed, Weber himself appears to have suspected this by detect-
ing a paradox at the heart of formal economic rationality. Neurath’s own concept of 
calculation in kind – however much in need of further elaboration29 – provides a 
common denomination for the tools required to assess substantive economic ratio-
nality when environmental or common welfare provision issues are at stake. To be 
sure, the limitations of calculation in kind are clear: it provides data, not decisions. 
This contrasts with the algorithmic rationality of formally rational money calcula-
tion. But this limitation also has a clear benefit for, with a view to wider political- 
institutional implications, we may add: whether criteria of substantive rationality 
are adequately met, indeed which criteria of substantive rationality are appropriate, 
cannot be done by algorithm but requires deliberation.
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Chapter 10
Neurath’s Theory of Theory Classification: 
History, Optics & Epistemology
Gábor Á. Zemplén
Abstract Otto Neurath’s early work on the classification of systems of hypotheses 
in optics provided some of the key insights of Neurath’s later philosophy of science. 
The chapter investigates how Neurath developed his theory of theory-classification 
in response to inconsistencies he stumbled upon while studying the historical theo-
ries. Neurath’s empiricism and thoroughgoing fallibilism informed his mapping of 
the group of theories, locating “elementary notions” of theories and taking into 
account the “blurred margins” of theories. To replace false dichotomies the project 
provided a finer-grained analysis of theories and could be utilized to locate uncon-
ceived alternatives of a domain. The first sections discuss the close links between 
Neurath’s optical essays, his notion of an “auxiliary motive,” and his attack on pseu-
dorationalism in the “Lost Wanderers of Descartes” paper. The last sections provide 
a comparison of the two essays, with an extended table of the elementary notions 
Neurath listed, and discuss Neurath’s two-tier methodology for historical 
reconstruction.
10.1  Neurath’s Historicism: Balancing the Empirical 
and the Normative
After the formative University years in Berlin the young Neurath embarked on a 
number of research projects as an assistant teacher at the Neue Wiener 
Handelsakademie. Of these his early economic work has received significant 
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attention, while some, like the research on logical calculus with his second wife, 
Olga Hahn (on this see Jordi Cat’s chapter in the present volume), or his lectures and 
articles on the history of optics have been less studied. Neurath’s two papers dis-
cussing the history and classification of optical theories were published after his 
work on war economics, the papers on the pleasure maxim, and on Schröder’s logic. 
The most important precursor to the historical study of optical theories was the 
paper on the auxiliary motive (the “lost wanderers” of Descartes, discussed in more 
detail in Sect. 10.2).
Before the outbreak of the war Neurath delivered a lecture at the Philosophical 
Society of the University of Vienna on 2nd March, 1914 that was printed in the 
yearbook of the Society (“Zur Klassifikation von Hypothesensystemen,” Neurath 
1916/1983). In July 1914 he finished and submitted another manuscript to the young 
but prestigious journal of the Berlin Society for the History of Science and Medicine, 
the Archiv für die Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik. This paper 
appeared in the fifth volume of the journal as “Prinzipielles zur Geschichte der 
Optik” (Neurath 1915/1973). I will quote from the English translations, the longer 
Viennese lecture “On the Classification of Systems of Hypotheses’ (With Special 
Reference to Optics)” printed in (Neurath and Cohen 1983: 13–31) and the latter 
article in the Berliner journal “On the Foundations of the History of Optics” printed 
in (Neurath and Cohen 1973: 101–112). I sometimes add in square brackets key 
notions in German, and refer to the two essays as KH and PO (see Neurath 1981, 
pp. 71–84 for PO and pp. 85–101 for KH).
This chapter provides an analysis of the optical essays and outlines Neurath’s 
particular method of (partial) reconstruction of theories, one that is acutely sensitive 
historically and thoroughly naturalistic. The significance of these investigations for 
Neurath’s developing views on scientific theories is easily overlooked, even though 
some of the important insights gained during his intense period of study often reap-
pear in later years, providing stock examples, ‘Neurathian tropes’ in many key 
papers, closely linked to analysis of economic theories and the continuing quest for 
a framework for a unified science. The choice of topic and the tool-kit developed for 
the analysis of optical theories shows a conscious effort to construct a normative 
historicist agenda. The fallible and communitarian epistemological approach com-
bines an anti-philosophical attitude rejecting a priori considerations as much as pos-
sible with an empirical stance towards the history of scientific developments, and 
proposes a minimal formal framework, some form of logical analysis. The approach 
is directed against certain undesirable social processes standing in the way of sci-
entism, e.g. epistemically detrimental polarisation of opinions, and certain philo-
sophical stances, like types of foundationalism.
The optical essays are intimately linked to the famous 1913 paper investigating 
situations in which two or more alternatives are equally rational, (“Die Verirrten Des 
Cartesius Und Das Auxiliarmotiv (Zur Psychologie des Entschlusses),” Neurath 
1913/1983). The essay on “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary 
Motive (On the Psychology of Decision)” extended a classical problem (choice 
without preference) to the domains of ordinary decision making, and has received 
considerably more attention than the optical essays. The paper (henceforth VC) 
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already used an example from the history of optics, but, as Michael Stöltzner (2000, 
25) notes: “it is most surprising that in VC Neurath does not provide any example 
[of] how the auxiliary motive is applied within science. Rather, VC is concerned 
with the various aspects of the social implementation of the auxiliary motive. To my 
mind, the missing examples can be found in his subsequent works on the history of 
optics (PO, KH).”
What exactly Neurath does in these early works is not a trivial question, since the 
texts contain elements from many traditions and, thus, are not typical representa-
tives of any style or field of investigation. The papers from this early period are at 
once celebrated early examples of theoretical pluralism (Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, and 
Uebel 1996) and a starting point to reconsider the role of values in science (Howard 
2006), or an attempt to develop an anti-Cartesian – epistemological as opposed to 
methodological  – programme (Mormann 1996). Rheinberger (2010) reckons the 
optical essays among the early examples of pre- World War One historical episte-
mology, outlining a method of reconstruction and interpretation in an attempt to 
plug epistemology into history instead of adding an historical dimension to 
epistemology.
I first revisit the “Lost Wanderers” paper (Sect. 10.2) and Neurath’s take on pseu-
dorationalism via endorsing a thoroughgoing fallibilism, as well as empiricism 
(Sect. 10.3). I investigate how Neurath developed his theory of theory-classification 
in response to inconsistencies he stumbled upon while studying the historical theo-
ries. His approach took into account the “blurred margins” of theories, and devel-
oped a method of locating “elementary notions” of theories. Neurath considered 
optics as a model discipline (Sect. 10.4), and his project was aimed at providing a 
finer-grained analysis of theories to replace false dichotomies. At the same time his 
mapping could locate unconceived alternative theories of a domain.
The last sections compare the two essays in detail. They provide an extended 
table of the elementary notions that Neurath discussed to show the development of 
Neurath’s mapping of the group of theories (Sect. 10.5), and introduce Neurath’s 
two-tier methodology of historical reconstruction (Sect. 10.6) As many themes re- 
appear in the 1930s, some citations from the mature works of Neurath are included 
to show the long-lasting influence of the constrained period and topic, his attempt to 
map optical theories and to develop a historicist epistemology.
10.2  Pseudorationalism, the Auxiliary Motive, and False 
Dichotomies
In his recent review of the discussions on transient underdetermination and values 
in science, Justin Biddle (2013, 131) describes Neurath’s auxiliary motive as “any 
factor that fills the gap between ‘insight’ and decision; some of these factors might 
properly be characterized as values, while others clearly are not.” For Neurath, a 
proper attitude for rationalism is to recognize the limits of actual insight, and he 
develops a minimal framework where “‘insight’ is insufficient to determine uniquely 
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what to believe; some other factors, which he called ‘the auxiliary motive,’ will 
inevitably play a role” (Biddle 2013, 131). As Biddle notes, Neurath’s point is to 
emphasize the presence of an auxiliary motive, as ignoring it amounts to 
“pseudorationalism”:
One of the lessons that can be drawn from Neurath’s work for the current discussion of 
“science and values” is that there are a wide range of different factors that can fill the gap 
between “insight” (i.e., logic, evidence, and epistemic values broadly construed) and deci-
sion making in science. These factors might be sociological in nature (e.g., in one particular 
scientific sub-discipline, one set of norms are typically employed for evaluating research, as 
opposed to some other set, which are employed in some other sub-disciplines); they might 
be consciously adopted ethical or political values; they might be unconsciously held subjec-
tive preferences or ideological assumptions, and so on. Some of these factors, again, are 
properly described as values, while others are not. (Biddle 2013, 131–132.)
An important characteristic of Neurath’s early work is that it develops a fallibilist 
framework bracketing the question of values, but leaving room for them. The attack 
on “pseudorationalism” points to scenarios, where we are “lost in the forest,” that is, 
we need practical action without proper justification of the decision: “[t]here is not 
the slightest reason to doubt that a great military leader like Napoleon is frequently 
incapable of deciding by means of reflexion exactly what he should do” (Neurath 
1913/1983, 5). In these cases a rationalist has to admit that the only rational strategy 
is to resort to a decision-maker, and to find resolution via an auxiliary motive that 
might be just instinctive or even random, a substitute for button-counting [Surrogate 
des Knöpfeabzählens].
Neurath’s naturalistic approach connects the problem of choices without prefer-
ence to social, economical, or psychological considerations, acknowledging all 
these as potential contributing factors playing a role in theory-choice. His early 
anti- foundationalism tackles the problem of “logical” foundations of empirical sci-
ence from a very particular point of view, that is, ultimately considering coin- tossing 
as (practically) rational. Theory-choice in philosophy of science is therefore seen as 
having much in common with real-life decisions under time-constraints, in need to 
be optimized for an economical use of resources. For Neurath (1913/1983, 11) the 
coming stage of development of the world, after the ages of “Instinct,” “Authority,” 
and “Pseudorationalism,” is the dawning era of the “Auxiliary motive” (see Don 
Howard’s chapter in the present volume).
Mormann (1996, 93–95, see also 1999) triangulated Neurath’s anti-Cartesian 
approach to accounts of language as calculus and as universal medium, describing 
the position as treating humans neither as hostages of language, nor as fully able to 
master language. And Stöltzner (1996, 2001) provided an analysis of Neurath’s 
paper on the auxiliary motive with an in depth study of the Machian roots of the 
project, and the novelties of Neurath’s approach as well as their relation to the opti-
cal essays. He traced the lineage that connects Neurath’s lost wanderer all the way 
back to Buridan’s Ass, and noted that in a pragmatic sense Neurath’s auxiliary 
motive represented a significant addition to scientific methodology:
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Thus, for Neurath, decisions between principles and elementary experiences could be made 
not just on the ground of economy as Mach had recommended but by any rational criterion, 
though ultimately through an auxiliary motive. The same holds for the comparison between 
already established systems of hypotheses or parts of them. Here the difference from 
Mach’s concept of a theoretical system becomes evident. If a theory were only an economi-
cal arrangement of facts, there would be only one rational criterion deciding between two 
compelling theories: their respective economy.
Though unspecified, the auxiliary motive is a formal procedure that can be used in such 
a way that mathematical hierarchies are respected as long as they are not elevated into an 
ontology. But if the ontology is “smeared out” throughout the system, then the comparabil-
ity condition can be well met and human decisions made. (Stöltzner 2001, 110.)
The 1913 “Lost Wanderers” outlines Neurath’s radical pragmatist starting point, 
and the optical essays work out the application for historical analysis and recon-
struction of scientific theories, with policy-relevant observations. As VC had its par-
ticular target, “pseudorationalism,” the optical papers KH and PO target the warlike 
spirit behind spurious “dichotomies” that are pervasive in the controversies of sci-
entists and standard histories. Neurath recognized that many of the classifications 
based on dichotomies, like particle vs. wave theories are crude, that is, a way sci-
ence is often portrayed and taught hampers scientific development. Just as the aux-
iliary motive extended a traditional problem of choice to the sphere of scientific 
theory-choice, the optical essays localize the problem in the natural sciences:
Dichotomies, however, are not only crude intellectually, but also mostly the product of 
scientific pugnacity. One characterises the opponent as pungently as possible for the pur-
pose of beating him down as forcefully as possible. At such occasions transitions are only 
troublesome. Thus dichotomies are a result of a warlike spirit. I do not want to examine in 
detail here how far dichotomies, precisely through their deficiencies, have a stimulating 
effect on scientific life, as pointed out by Vaihinger. Even if that were the case, they would 
be useful for science perhaps, but themselves unscientific. (Neurath 1916/1983, 15.)
Inconsistency in grouping theories is what struck Neurath first, as he read years 
before these papers were written the German translation of William Whewell’s 
(1840) history of the inductive sciences. The author classified Descartes’ theory as 
a first form of emission-theory but the translator Joseph Littrow (director of the 
Observatory in Vienna) added a note that corrected Whewell, and stated that the 
theory is a wave theory in a “vague way.” The contradictory classification of the 
same theory in a single volume indicated a problem that Neurath could resolve: 
Whewell’s reading has support in the Dioptrics and the Meteora, and Littrow prob-
ably means the Principia philosphiae. Yet the enigma remains, as both sides of the 
divide are present to some extent in the works of one individual.
To evade fiascos like this one, the ideas of the scientists should be presented in a 
more fine-grained manner. Instead of classification based on one symbolic property, 
following a (potentially false) dichotomy in ordering rival theories, Neurath pro-
posed a less crude system, where a number of aspects, a whole set of important 
properties was investigated. The need to develop a theory to classify theories was 
also connected to problems of the public understanding of science, as talking of past 
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theories using the corpuscle/wave and right/wrong dichotomies was widespread 
(and still is). To solve these problems Neurath developed a calculus for science 
without ontological dead weight. He provided a radical perspective in the spirit of 
the Vienna Circle, namely, developing a novel conception of the social role and task 
of (social) science, working towards the radical democratization of science, con-
necting science, education, and everyday life (see Ibarra and Mormann 2003, 245).
If in the “Lost Wanderers” Neurath discussed the auxiliary motive in abstracto, 
in the optical essays he did in concreto. The “auxiliary motive” of the VC paper 
allowed Neurath to criticize Cartesian foundationalism, but also to endorse the 
Cartesian recipe for practical action in the Principles of Philosophy: follow the 
usual laws and customs, “act energetically even if insight is insufficient,” and change 
yourself “rather than the world – a view which is, on the whole, of a stoical charac-
ter” (Neurath 1913/1983, 2; see also Stöltzner 1996, 114; and Koterski 2018).
In these essays Neurath fused a probabilistic and mathematical approach with a 
praxis-centered one concerning the psychology of decision, and introduced an 
extra-logical motive relevant for real-life decision-processes. And he worked him-
self into a field, where the individual agendas of researchers can be studied, and a 
procedure for theory-classification can be developed and tested. The application 
mapped disunity in the field, a set of competing driving ideas, combinable in many 
forms, and showed that historically only some combinations were actualized.
Neurath’s continuing fight against pseudorationalism went hand in hand with his 
communitarian epistemological perspective to help underdogs, the theories not 
unambigously classified in the primitive system [Übergangsanschauung] and that 
are generally appreciated less. The first exemplar of the field, the “Cartesian optical 
theory” already displayed the problem of “mixed theories” [Mischtheorien], and 
Neurath (1916/1983, 14) saw here a general character of science, as we “frequently 
encounter situations like this.” He did not condemn Descartes, and took ambiguity 
to be a characteristic of other fruitful theories, like Newton’s.
Before investigating in detail the analysis of elementary notions of optical theo-
ries, first Neurath’s theoretical position is revisited. Rejecting the Cartesian tradi-
tion, the only sane choice for Neurath was anti-foundationalism:
Whoever wants to create a world-view or a scientific system must operate with doubtful 
premises. Each attempt to create world-picture by starting from a tabula rasa and making a 
series of statements which are recognised as definitively true, is necessarily full of trick-
eries. […] We can vary the world of concepts present in us, but we cannot discard it. Each 
attempt to renew it from the bottom up is by its very nature a child of the concepts at hand. 
(Neurath 1913/1983, 3.)
But how to build an empiricist project in the time-constrained world of researchers 
acknowledging the plurality of views typical of “science in the making,” and also 
the interpretative difficulties of theory-reconstruction? His essays on the history of 
optics construct the outlines of a descriptive and normative project with an “empty 
hand.”
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10.3  Neurath’s Cool Hand: Empiricism in a Fallibilist 
Framework
In the influential re-appreciation over twenty years ago (Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and 
Uebel 1996, 4) the authors suggested that the relatively late debates on data- 
reporting and on the proper form for protocols (and a Marxist debate on the materi-
alist conception of history) gave rise to Neurath’s radical position and his rejection 
of scientific method as well as his anti-foundationalism. In contrast to this apprecia-
tion of the development of Neurath’s views, by now we have more evidence that 
science needed no ideal method and no secure foundations for Neurath already 
before World War One. To recall the line from the later prison drama, “sometimes, 
nothing can be a real cool hand,” as pervasive fallibilism was not a weakness of 
Neurath’s position, but rather an asset in his fight against “apriorism” and 
“pseudorationalism.”
Neurath did not focus on justification (that will at one point become pseudora-
tional), but on the potentials of the inductive sciences. He built his case not from the 
icy slopes of logic, but rather the murky waters of history, bracketing the question 
of foundations and acknowledging that natural science is always surrounded by the 
richness of experience. This stance is echoed in the “Scientific World-Conception” 
paper, where he contrasts our historically shaped means of expression and our rich 
language and script with logic as a doctrine of tautological transformations (Carnap 
et al. 1929/1973, see also Jordi Cat’s chapter in the present volume for integrating 
the sources). His position is at once radical, and at the same time it endorses the 
creative potential of the non-formal aspects of theories. For the progress-bound 
inquiry development was a paramount concern, and Neurath devised a framework 
exploiting analogies, novel concepts and creativity.
Even an inconsistently used piece of fiction [Phantasiebild] can be a driving idea, 
for Neurath admitted not just inductive reasoning as his auxiliary motive, but any 
creative burst. Empirical science can develop by figments of mind [Phantasiebilder] 
or analogies, some of which, if pursued intensely can have benefits, like leading to 
novel formalisms later. The potential of the “elementary notions” wane with gradual 
formalization, so Neurath did not want to limit the investigation to abstract sym-
bolic aspects of theories. A view of theories that takes them to be equations or 
proposition leaves no room for the “blurred margins of analogies, which leads the 
scientist to further assumptions” (Neurath 1916/1983, 29).
In this world any actor can only meaningfully follow a few insights, so world-
view differences and our own agenda mean that any researcher can only go his own 
way: “only the belief in the correctness of a definite analogy or a group of analogies 
can create the energy that is needed to overcome all difficulties” (Neurath 1916/1983, 
29). To develop a partial insight a whole life may be needed, and therefore a certain 
diversity of opinions is recognized as a typically beneficial characteristic of disci-
plinary development. As a result, Neurath started off with disunity, and prescribed 
energetic action, as an exploitable partial insight or potential analogy can best be 
justified by pursuing it.
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As Neurath went “bottom up” when looking at the theories, he deliberately relied 
on a broad conception of what a theory can be. It might be simple to claim, with 
Heinrich Hertz, that Maxwell’s theory is just his system of equations, an example he 
explicitly cites, but this clearly leaves out many of the important aspects of a theory 
that can have an impact on our world-view. It is a mistaken assumption that theories 
could generally be equated with equations or propositions. Theories are, instead, 
complexes with abstract symbolic, visual, analogical aspects. Neurath’s project 
tackles heads on the complexity of science (including visuals) and all the interpreta-
tive difficulties:
We must try to see clearly how a physical theory hinges on the images used, and how far on 
those features that actually carry the argument. Perhaps we cannot grasp some develop-
ments unless we consider the images and pictures; in other uses we must rely on what 
governs the mathematical treatment of phenomena; or, maybe, both ways of looking at it 
are steps. At all events, the latter analysis has not yet become current among historians of 
physics. (Neurath 1915/1973, 102.)
Some modern physicists, who, like Poincaré or Duhem, are reckoned among conventional-
ists, allow that the mathematically important features are relevant to classification and 
analysis. But this leaves open the philosophical question. Those who wish to give more 
weight to the imagery of hypotheses (as I believe one must in some cases), may without 
contradiction add this to the analysis. (Neurath 1915/1973, 102–103.)
Neurath analyzed some optical theories in detail, most notably Newton’s Opticks, 
both with respect to language use, and the pictorial means of theory-propagation, 
his diagrams. The papers show his expertise in historical research and optics, many 
examples display knowledge and sensitivity to details of the theories in question. He 
recognized that the analyzability of these historical theories is limited. For Neurath 
not just the analogies, but also the theories were “blurred:”
Each system of hypotheses, even if its formulations are of the utmost precision, has, to use 
this expression, a blurred margin. This always and necessarily exists. The amount of diffi-
culties can grow through new insight; at best we can approach it asymptotically. A complete 
mastery of the whole multiplicity seems an impossibility to us. (Neurath 1916/1983, 24.)
Historians of science face ambiguities and potential inconsistencies when attempt-
ing the classification of systems of hypotheses. This is a problem that has more or 
less been disregarded by philosophies of science after the linguistic turn (see 
Meheus 2002, where Kitcher’s paper mentions Neurath, and Cat 2005). Neurath’s 
project assumes that as these theories have proven their merit, the theory in toto was 
some achievement, but also that the theories are unsharply bounded entities so jus-
tification of the content is both unnecessary and full of trickeries. The interpretation 
and method of comparison pose real challenges, as already a simple classification 
can be problematic. Neurath discussed techniques of appropriation: slight rephras-
ing can make a view look more akin to our current notions (Malus speaks of “emit-
ted magnet-like corpuscules,” stressing “emitted corpuscles” distances him from 
modern notions, while “magnet-like” approximates him, Neurath 1916/1983, 30). 
His attempt is directly linked to the historical observation that inconsistency can be 
stimulating:
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We now have to deal with Newton (1642–1727); as he does not have as consistent a central 
idea as Huyghens, he therefore operates with a much greater wealth of elementary notions. 
It was precisely his inconsistency that was highly stimulating and gave posterity an oppor-
tunity to form hypotheses of many kinds, many of which have proved fertile. According to 
his words he attaches little weight to the character of light, but in fact he is very dependent 
on the notions that he forms of it. Actually he expresses them several times. (Neurath 
1916/1983, 20.)
Neurath talks about systems of hypotheses, but does not even differentiate between 
hypothesis and reality [was man als Hypothese, was man als Realität bezeichnet], as 
in the case of Optics hypothesis and experience [Erfahrung] are colorfully inter-
twined. The difficulty of their separation is shown in Goethe’s polemic against 
Newton. Goethe notes that the description of observational facts in Newton’s text 
shows a mismatch with the depiction of the experiment. The diagram of an observa-
tion in Newton’s Opticks shows the fuzzy edges of the displaced image, and Goethe 
notes that an explanation is offered by Newton later, but the text neglects features of 
the visual representation of the observations at this experimental level of descrip-
tion. In the example of the displaced colored strips the description of the “brute 
facts” is different for Newton and Goethe. Underlying it, we find a different math-
ematical idealization: for Newton two displaced rectangles, and for Goethe one 
(Zemplén 2018). Neurath (1916/1983, 24) discusses the blurred margins interpreted 
differently, and reproduces part of Newton’s diagram (Fig. 10.1):
For Neurath this is a clear case where different languages neglected different 
aspects of the observations, and the selection of ‘facts’ was driven by theoretical 
findings. The Polemical part of Goethe’s Farbenlehre provides an example1 for the 
1 This example has been analysed in detail in Zemplén (2006). Recently the problem of underde-
termination with respect to Newton and Goethe’s competing views on color has been taken up by 
Olaf Müller (2015) in detail. His decidedly Quinean approach (Müller 2016) has also been criti-
cally scrutinized (Lampert 2017).
Fig. 10.1 Neurath’s (1916/1983, 24) diagram of and commentary on blurred margins
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introduction of the Neurath Principle,2 the extension of Duhemian holism to all sci-
ences, ‘observation statements’ included (Haller 1982/1991; Zolo 1989). In case of 
conflict between statements of facts and theories we are unable to tell which part of 
the theory is to be blamed, and cannot even tell whether to revise the theory or reject 
the new statement as useless or even false (Neurath 1932/1983). In his “The Unity 
of Science as a Task” (Neurath 1935/1983), the mature Neurath again cites an 
example from the history of optics:
But even the initial statements of successful science are not fixed, since one could begin at 
the beginning with different unified languages that cannot be translated into each other 
straight away. And even if the unified languages were more or less fixed – in fact the state-
ments of yesterday and today, appearing at the beginning and at the end of a book, belong 
to often slightly differing languages – nevertheless, to make good predictions, we could set 
out from different observation statements that we select from the large number at our dis-
posal that can be steadily increased. What one person neglects as unimportant – and then he 
shapes his concepts accordingly – may seem essential to another for the predictions. For 
example, Goethe strongly criticised Newton for omitting certain blurred margins of the 
spectrums as unimportant, whereas he himself started from this very point.
This is how matters stand in every ‘layer’ of scientific work, not only in the narrower 
sphere of systems of hypotheses, as Poincaré and Duhem have pointed out with such inten-
sity. (Neurath 1935/1983, 116–117; original emphasis.)
Historical research had a decisive impact on the young Neurath’s views on the 
building-blocks of empirical science, and his thoroughgoing anti-foundationalism, 
stressing that any description of phenomena fail at “capturing the whole multiplic-
ity.” In these papers Neurath cares little about constraining any of the potentials of 
empirical science. Instead, he focuses on mapping the conceptual space of align-
ments and misalignments, in a quest to explore unconceived possibilities.3 For 
Neurath the “exploratory” aspect is closely connected to recognizing that various 
languages can be developed to talk about the world. To carry out the task of the 
historian it is important to find the facts that are neglected and disregarded in the 
descriptions. Systems of hypotheses connect and also select the facts:
One should always indicate which facts have been neglected, which favoured. The systems 
of hypotheses of physics, like all other systems of hypotheses are an instruction directing 
not only the connectedness, but also the selection of facts. (Neurath 1916/1983, 24; original 
emphasis.)
2 The Neurath Principle extended the problem of underdetermination to observation reports: 
“Science is ambiguous – and is so on each level. When we have removed the contradictory groups 
of statements, there still remain several groups of statements with differing protocol statements 
that are equally applicable; that are without contradictions in themselves but exclude each other. 
Poincaré, Duhem and others have adequately shown that even if we have agreed on the protocol 
statements, there is an unlimited number of equally applicable, possible systems of hypotheses. We 
have extended this tenet of the uncertainty of systems of hypotheses to all statements, including 
protocol statements that are alterable in principle. (Neurath 1934/1983, 105, translation from 
Howard 2006, 11)
3 Although coming from very different angles, an impressive amount of commonality can be estab-
lished between the early Carnap and Neurath. Before Carnap was working on logically conceiv-
able models of the world (Stone 2010), Neurath worked out a method to localize logically 
conceivable theories of a domain (for the sources see Jordi Cat’s chapter in the present volume).
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For a phenomenal domain well-confirmed alternatives can be conceived, in fact are 
conceived in a given period, and Neurath’s mapping project helps identify further 
alternatives. He thinks of a way to make “artificial” theories, utilizing the “natural,” 
historical ones as assets. This approach has numerous overlaps with Kyle Stanford’s 
more recent take on the historical record of scientific inquiry and on the problem of 
unconceived alternatives (Stanford 2006).
Neurath’s history of the optical theories is sensitive to variation as a resource for 
selection. The perspective is intimately tied to an evolutionary view. Heterogeneity 
is ever-present where living organisms are in pursuits of goals, both on the level of 
individual preferences, and on the level of communities, like the pursuing influence 
of scholasticism and other large scale differences in culture. The comparison (a 
theme also important for Mach) provides some mapping of the investigated theories 
based on properties with yes/no values, but with no clear ontology and no precise 
identification of the theories “proper.”
10.4  Optics as a Model for the Mosaic of Science
Why did Neurath study the historical theories of optics? His interest in optics was 
first sparked by the pictures of crystals in polarized light, found in a mineralogical 
atlas (Neurath 2010, 33).4 While many members of the Vienna Circle, like Carnap, 
Reichenbach, and Moritz Schlick had an early interest in general relativity, Neurath 
focused on optics (and, to some extent, mechanics), subjects very dear to Mach 
(and, to some extent Schlick). With some exaggeration, the optical essays could be 
seen as a token of appreciation towards Mach, written by an enthusiastic apprentice. 
As Neurath’s letters testify, he approached Mach with intent to work further on the 
subject,5 and promised sending him KH. Mach finished his book on the subject in 
June 1913, and manuscripts were circulated, but his treatment is significantly differ-
ent. After Mach’s Prinzipien der Physikalischen Optik appeared (1921), Neurath 
returned to the topic in a 1922 lecture on January 21. It is probable that the area 
intrigued him for decades to come. For example, as Carnap left for the USA in 1936, 
Neurath mentions in a letter that he would be happy to continue working on the his-
tory of optics, to develop their position [Betrachtungsweise].6
The history of optics as a field of investigation could provide Neurath a testing 
ground for a model of empirical science and for his theory of theory-classification. 
Several cues suggest that he had carefully picked his domain of investigation. He 
did not want to lose the complexity of the subject (science as a whole), or the his-
torical perspective, so picked a field that utilized mathematical abstractions and 
4 I thank Ádám Tamás Tuboly for pointing out this passage to me, as well as the later cited letter to 
Carnap.
5 One of the questions raised in the optical essays and also addressed to Mach is the history of the 
sound-light analogy, one of the main themes of the informed history of optics by Darrigol (2012).
6 See Neurath to Carnap, 30 April 1936 (RC 102-52-29). Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, 
ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, University of Pittsburgh) All rights reserved.
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symbolic representations as well as analogies, and played a role in shaping our sci-
entific world-view. When he delineates the domain, he stresses the partial indepen-
dence as well as the embeddedness of the field:
The subject I choose for my comments is the history of optics from the beginning of the 
seventeenth to the beginning of the nineteenth century. The reasons for the selection of this 
discipline and this period are mainly the following: the subject of optics was rather clearly 
fixed at a relatively early time. Advances were made successively by representatives of the 
most different trends. At one time this trend, at another time that trend achieved important 
results. The wealth of elementary notions and elementary hypotheses is large enough to 
make a sufficient number of combinations possible.
Acoustics, for example, would have been all too simple; its most important principles 
were already stated in final form early on, and everything that came later was an improve-
ment. On the other hand, the theory of electricity displays too much confusion. […] The 
history of optics is suited for our comments only up to the middle of the nineteenth century, 
before the union of electrical and optical theories. After that, one has to take all physical 
notions into account to do justice to optics; its relative isolation reached its end. (Neurath 
1916/1983, 16–17.)
Neurath created a simple framework to ameliorate the problem of “primitive” anal-
yses, stressing a single characteristic of theories. His optical essays developed a 
methodology to classify theories according to a number of “elementary notions,” 
their lack or presence in a theory. The framework gives us a mapping-possibility for 
the not-fully-rational choices in science that nevertheless yielded significant gains 
in a scientific domain.7 For Neurath, this is a more scientific way of talking about 
theories, than the common practice (Fig. 10.2):
This already shows what difficulties arise from dividing existing views into two types. Such 
dichotomies occur in all disciplines. They really belong to a primitive form of concept for-
mation, which any theory bent on perfection must try to shed as fast as it can. Dichotomies 
might perhaps do, if the two types could be described as A and non-A, but this is almost 
never so. Usually each outlook received its hallmark separately, without examination 
whether the two might not be compatible. Suppose a theory rests on three elementary 
notions, a, b, c, with contradictories a*, b*, c*. The following constellations may occur: 
(Neurath 1915/1973, 104; original emphases.)
7 “[In KH and PO] Neurath asserts that the historian of science as well as the scientist should 
attempt a classification of systems of hypotheses arranged according to logical alternatives which – 
or so I shall argue – could ultimately be resolved by an auxiliary motive. Within Neurath’s radical 
pragmatist conception of science, ‘on board of his boat’, the auxiliary motive also plays a role in 
establishing such a system of hypotheses. In the latter case, the auxiliary motive acts in the same 
way as inductive or abductive modes of inference. It replaces them if there is no basis at all for their 
standard application due to lack of relevant information or if they only yield equally probable 
alternatives” (Stöltzner 2000, 25).
a b c
a b c*
a b* c
a b* c*
a* b c
a* b c*
a* b* c
a* b* c*
Fig. 10.2 Constellations 
of theories
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Neurath picks a neutral stance, a multi-element charting of the theories to decrease 
hostility and to dissolve tensions between factions. He does not assume that the 
theories necessarily have a definitive structure, only that they can be classified. He 
notes that some “elementary” notions are linked, nevertheless he takes care to show 
how decoupling is possible for some of the items (e.g. for periodicity and interfer-
ence, linked in modern optical theories). His scheme is coarse, but his eye is that of 
a trained philologist. He starts from some mapping of the theories, never wants a full 
redescription of any of the theories. The complexity (long texts combining dia-
grams, words and mathematical abstractions) is only tackled to reach the depth 
where some significant results can be obtained.
The analysis is open-ended, and the two essays show how he approximated the 
model to “historical reality.” The tables offer much less than the text of the papers 
discussing the theories in more detail, but they offer enough to show the applicabil-
ity of the scheme and help Neurath highlight its availability for general use. His 
solution draws on a chemical analogy for the history of ideas: the old chemistry was 
characterized by single elements, but with the development of modern chemistry we 
now use names that are typical for the composition (KH 14). Finding the “composi-
tion,” however, is only an analogy, Neurath does not fully embrace atomism, his 
charting of the theories is only a tentative approximation.
It is easy to read later passages as continuing the same research project that was 
first developed and tested in Neurath’s short-time dabbling with the history of 
optics. In his “Unified Science as Encyclopedic Integration” Neurath (1937a, 4) 
gives an example from optics (Huyghens’ principle and Euler’s theory) before mov-
ing on to economics (Smith, Ricardo, and Sismondi), and finally concluding: “[o]
nly a complicated comparative scheme could show the amalgamation of various 
elements, the common and different features of various theories.”
What became known as “Logic of science” was for Neurath at first a “History of 
Ideas,” but all the same carried out by a social engineer, taking into account the 
practical difficulties, including the lack of impartial procedures. To optimize the 
functioning of the scientific community Neurath developed a fundamentally com-
munitarian epistemological framework and outlined a project for future historians 
of science to help society by a more nuanced way of talking about theories, their 
merits, and their potentials. Scientific progress requires a co-ordination of multiple 
composite perspectives, an enormous number of elements that he later described as 
a “Mosaic.”
10.5  Comparison of the Optical Essays KH and PO
The essays show commitment to a number of theoretical views characteristic of the 
early Neurath, like the shared ideals of the natural and the human sciences. They 
stress the need for autonomous concept-formation for the History of Science, and 
several similes and metaphors point towards the non-reductive naturalization of the 
social sciences. The texts employ a wide range of examples, and not just from 
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optics. The analysis minimizes metaphysical ballast as it should not be biased 
towards any particular philosophical stance. Neurath does not want to introduce a 
distinction between hypothesis and reality, and the method for analyzing historical 
theories as composites of elementary notions acknowledges a hermeneutic diffi-
culty that is linked to vagueness, the “blurred margins” on every level of the inves-
tigation (later congestions or cluster-concepts [Ballungen]). Neurath discusses the 
early thinkers generally in isolation, at time linking some of these individuals, and 
for the nineteenth century he tends to group them (Brewster, Biot, Malus; Young 
and Fresnel), alluding to factions of the opinion-polarization of the field (emission- 
and wave-theories). So the framework is not narrowly individualistic.
The KH and the PO contain many overlaps, but the stresses are placed differ-
ently. The same key figures are investigated in both texts (see Table 10.1), and there 
are differences in accent. The analysis proceeds according to the same order, but 
with different excursions and historical details in the two papers. The shifts in 
Neurath’s take between the two versions are probably due to both the historical 
development of his views, and to the different positioning of the enterprise for dif-
ferent audiences (in Vienna and Berlin). Before the analysis of content, it is instruc-
tive to compare the beginnings of the papers, easily portrayable as an example of 
twentieth century Naturgeschichte (KH) and Naturphilosophie (PO):
Everyone who takes up theory of science or the history of the sciences feels oppressed by 
the profusion of facts. Early on, a start was already made with the classification of stones, 
plants, and other objects. […] Of course groupings of complexes of ideas were formed, but 
this was not always preceded by sufficient analysis. There were wild growths of new clas-
sifications when the traditional ones were altogether abandoned. There was no continual 
cooperation of scholars in the field of the history of science. (Neurath 1916/1983, 13.)
History of science, if seen as more than a mere chronicle of findings and biographies, is a 
young discipline. It can aim much higher: like the history of any field of enquiry, it may try 
to shed light on the psychology of the enquirer; besides, it may exhibit the logical structure 
of theories, and from it derive how they may develop. To follow how such possibilities hap-
pen to be realized by this or that enquirer is an especially engaging task. (Neurath 1915/1973, 
101; emphasis added.)
In the earlier finalized KH the paper builds the argument from the historian’s per-
spective, and there is an outline of a two-tier theory of reconstruction, introduced in 
more detail in the next section. KH discusses the “pugnacity” of scientific debates 
and false dichotomies (meaning-polarization) in more detail, and offers a clear 
example for the extension of Duhemian holism that has come to be known as the 
Neurath-principle, and, presumably linking the discussion to Mach in the Viennese 
context, has more on the role of analogies. In the natural history focus of the KH, 
the historian has the same problem of classification as the Biologist with plants, the 
Chemist with molecules. For Neurath the “Views of Physics” [die Anschauungen 
der Physik] are objects for contemplation, analysis, and grouping [in Gruppen brin-
gen]. Just as not all chemical combinations are found among minerals, similarly not 
all possible theories show up in the world. To override passion, the project takes its 
start with the enumeration of neutral logical possibilities, acknowledging that there 
is a need for the impartiality of a scientists gaze on its object, unfortunately lacking 
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Table 10.1 Neurath’s elementary notions discussed in KH and PO
KH elementary notions PO elementary notions
– – Descartes +Wave (?) +Emission (?) +Wave + Emission
–Polarisability –Polarisability
–Periodicity, (+?) –Periodicity
+Diffraction +Diffraction (theoretically)
– – Grimaldi +Sound +Sound
+Diffraction +Diffraction
+Interference +Interference
+Periodicity (vibration)
+Fluidatio (current)
+Undulatio (wave motion), etc.
– – Malebranche +Sound (–Interference) +Sound (appr. = HP)
+Periodicity +Periodicity
+Diffraction (physical model)
+ + Huyghens +Sound (–Interference) +HP +Sound +HP
–Periodicity (–Diffraction)
+ Polarisability –Periodicity
+/– Diffraction (theory- 
experience tension)
+Polarisability
–Emission –Interference (like X-rays)
+ + Newton +Periodicity (theory of “fits,” 
like X-rays)
+Periodicity (like gamma rays)
+Emission –Sound –Wave (–
HP) (+ether)
+Diffraction
+Diffraction –Interference
–Interference +Polarisability
+Polarisability (to support 
+Emission)
–HP (light particle has poles)
+ – Euler +Wave + Sound [+HP] + Periodicity
–Emission (today redundant 
objection)
+HP
+Periodicity (abandons HP)
+ +Young Fresnel +Periodicity +Sound +Wave +Interference +Wave
+Interference (both light and 
sound)
+Diffraction
[+HP, – Emission] [+Periodicity, +Polarisability, +HP]
– – Biot Brewster 
Malus
–Wave + Emission +Periodicity (surges)
+Polarisability –Interference
(+using statistics) + Emission +Polarisability
+Periodicity (for both 
emission and wave)
(+using statistics) (magnetic analogy) 
(light particle has poles)
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in the history of science, and even impacting our public understanding of science 
via the way science is taught.
In the PO Neurath (1915/1973, 105) introduces natural combinations, which 
occur in nature (i.e in history), and artificial ones, potential but nonexistent outlooks 
derivable from a set of elementary notions. He knows that a fully impartial scheme 
is unrealistic, the analysis has to pick some perspectives that are not self-evident, 
and any abstract scheme will have its limitations in a world of real, “mixed” theories 
that resist easy classification (Jordi Cat in this volume discusses sources for the 
issues of classification and imprecision). He is cautious, and is not trying to disen-
tangle the intertwining of facts and hypotheses:
The variety of views in the history of optics stems partly from the different ranges of find-
ings and partly from different ways of accounting for them. For a clear picture, we must 
group the elementary observations on which the various outlooks rest. In practice this is 
rather difficult, because scientists often omit important things; sometimes actual findings 
are deliberately or otherwise neglected. Our analysis would aim less at finding what scien-
tists knew but rather at stating, for each theory, the essential parts of experience.
To show on what kind of classification of outlooks a systematic historical treatment 
would have to rest, let us confine ourselves to periodicity, polarization, interference and 
diffraction, leaving aside whether in any instance these are elementary findings or elemen-
tary notions. Findings and notions are usually equal in number. Most often hypotheses are 
richer than the known range of facts. (Neurath 1915/1973, 105.)
After introducing the abstract mapping scheme, the KH lists elementary notions 
that are phenomena known via observation and experiment, and are linked to con-
ceptual developments in the field,8 starting with periodicity (Newton’s rings and the 
colors of thin plates), interference (split rays by reflection), polarisability 
(tourmaline- crystal), and diffraction (light sent through a hole). The text then con-
trasts the individual theories, introducing a number of other elementary notions 
(“fruitful analogies,” like wave, emission), while finally in the table three aspects 
are investigated: periodicity, Huygens’ principle, and emission, with four physi-
cists, Huygens (n,y,n), Newton (y,n,y), Euler (y,n,n), and Young (y,y,n). In PO, in 
contrast, a scheme is printed with four properties and three thinkers: periodicity, 
polarisability, Huygens’ principle, and interference; Huygens (n,y,y,n), Newton 
(y,y,n,n), Young (y,y,y,y).
Similar classificatory schemes, or, as he came to call them “chessboards” abound 
in Neurath’s oeuvre, several times on topics connected to pseudorationalism and 
mapping models of social order, so it is quite safe to assume that the classificatory 
pattern developed here became a general device for organizing theoretical com-
plexes for Neurath. His chessboards are flat, the list-items of the schemes have no 
direct ontological implications, and the “structure” of the comparison has no hierar-
8 A first list of “elementary notions” could simply have been derived from the table of contents in 
(Whewell 1840) that Neurath consulted.
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chies.9 Later tables usually also end with a line containing only “yes,” so by 
Neurathian standards the PO table is final (enough), it shows Young as endpoint 
incorporating all three mentioned (clear) examples of elementary notions, display-
ing the progress in the field.
Neurath’s history is revisionistic, driven by an Enlightenment agenda (see 
Angélique Groß’s chapter in the present volume). The historical data, however, 
obstruct the execution of the project. Both papers publish tables, but these are dif-
ferent, and the textual analysis shows that as the research progressed, Neurath 
refined his take on the individual theories. Assignments of theory-properties change 
between the versions, some theories have multiple and/or contradictory values. 
Some of the items can be linked, and this suggests coupling and hierarchical rela-
tions with respect to some “elementary” notions, like the ‘analogy with sound’ and 
the “employment of Huygens’ Principle.” Table 10.1 gives a more detailed compari-
son of the texts of KH and PO. This extended table of Neurath’s analysis shows the 
mentioned properties and some of the classificatory problems and the links he notes 
(in brackets), and items that are only in his tables, not discussed in the text [square 
brackets]. Before the names +/− signs show presence in the published chessboards 
in KH and PO. HP refers to Huyghens’ principle.
The comparison shows that Neurath’s analysis improves, and his historiographi-
cal input gradually refines the systemized output. Importantly the elementary 
notions link not just to parts of experience, but to models, methods, ontologies. 
Neurath obviously consulted some available histories of the subject, as well as 
many of the main texts of his protagonists. A few of his historical observations are 
odd, and it is curious, for example, how he did not exploit the deep tension between 
Newton’s and Huygens’ theories that his analysis reveals. Some elementary notions 
that were crucial for the development such as “Emission” and analogy between light 
and sound (waves) do not appear in the tables, but are used for the broader catego-
rization of factions.10 Neurath makes interesting observations tracing these analo-
gies, like “the wave theorists displayed a greater uniformity of hypothesis formation 
than the emission theorists, who needed a special hypothesis for almost each new 
phenomenon treated by wave theories” (Neurath 1916/1983, 21). The distances of 
views can show surprising connections (Brewster is closer to Fresnel than to Euler, 
see Neurath 1916/1983, 30). The later PO more directly points to development, a 
fusion of the two research programs organized along the ‘wave’ and ‘particle’ 
party-lines.
9 See Neurath’s unpublished essay, “Argumentation and Action,” in the Otto Neurath Nachlass 
(K.39–41), and the “CHESSBOARD OF ATTITUDES” and the “CHESSBOARD OF THREE 
SOCIAL QUALITIES” there. Otto Neurath Nachlass, Wiener Kreis Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord- 
Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands. All rights reserved.
10 Recognizing Newton’s vagueness on the issue could also have been a reason for dropping the 
“Emission” rubric in the second table. Neurath in later works often revisited the role of contradic-
tions: they do not destroy the entirety of a system, and might be useful asset for a later (consistent) 
set.
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10.6  Neurath’s Two-Tier Historicist Epistemology: 
Naturalizing the Genius
In the early period, history was an important (possibly nomothetic) discipline for 
Neurath, his revisionist and historicist project offers an empirical and pragmatic 
approach to epistemological problems (for overviews see Cat 2014, Uebel 2000). 
Classifying theories based on too crude dichotomies is deemed problematic, and so 
Neurath provides a mathematical framework to do more justice to the plurality of 
positions. Neurath’s program is agnostic about “the world of facts,” and fallibilism 
allows for no secure foundations either in the theoretical domain or in the world of 
elementary experiences. Varieties breed new ideas more quickly, the previously 
unknown implication of a combination of basic ideas is progress, as fruitful science 
is an incorporation of more and more unknown in the community of knowers.
The optical essays show the young Neurath’s acute sensitivity to social processes 
(like the formation of research traditions, opposing scientific camps), highlighting 
and criticizing scientific “pugnacity.” The essays pay special attention to the epis-
temic relevance of visuals, and cite several examples of ‘blurred’ representational 
content. The optical essays touch on many of the core issues of his epistemology. 
They fuse Duhem’s holism with Machian considerations, but the agenda has no 
ontological preference for sensations over theories (like Mach’s sensory intuition), 
and no containment of the set of theoretical statements like Duhem. Later justifica-
tory approaches aimed at raising confidence in a theory, but Neurath is deflationist, 
as Reisch (1997, 449) noted. His target in the optical essays is to decrease the over-
confidence in any single solution  – and the confidence that it is easy to grasp a 
theory.
He develops the systematics of unsharply bounded theories, an analysis sensitive 
to structural relations but one that has no mathematical hierarchies and no clear 
metaphysics/ontology. Without the need to say exactly what the historical theories 
are, Neurath develops a way to compare them, as he re-describes a group of theories 
as conglomerates of elementary notions. Neurath at the end of the first paper notes 
that an actual scheme cannot be impartial, and the analyst has to prioritize some of 
the historical theories:
Our comments have shown that a comparative study of systems of hypotheses, which has to 
be regarded as the basis of all historical research, can proceed in two stages. As a first stage 
a pure analysis of the system has to be proposed that leads to a grouping of elementary 
views. We saw that in this way, without special general considerations, some useful insight 
can be gained already within the specific field of research, within physics, chemistry or any 
other science. Schemes of this kind allow us to indicate what the contributions of individual 
scholars have been. By not giving preference at first to any elementary notion, all groupings 
of hypotheses are taken into account with the same intensity; the usual, and often unjusti-
fied, neglect of transitory systems – called like that mostly on the basis of crude dichoto-
mies – is avoided. For a best possible mastery of historical development it is desirable to 
make a preparatory survey of all groupings of individual views that are possible in princi-
ple. Maybe the start can be made from the theory of greatest power, if there is one of this 
character. (Neurath 1916/1983, 30.)
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Neurath separates two stages of the historical research. The methodology first pre-
pares the ground for a more refined appreciation of the scientific theories in ques-
tion, theories that are messy, and not like Maxwell’s. The systematic completion of 
the first stage would lead to a greater insight into the character of systems of hypoth-
eses through preparatory historical work, and could be used to create a routine 
through which many could be qualified for profitable work. The first stage of analy-
sis, the charting of the elementary notions of a field, is for the craftsmen, promoting 
a fuller democratization.
The second phase of analysis is for the inquisitive specialist, willing to commit 
significant resources to studying individual creativity.11 This stage does not culmi-
nate in a justificatory enterprise, but rather in an inquiry to find the driving ideas of 
an individual [die treibenden Ideen aufzufinden], the fuller exploration of the insight 
suspecting order, where before no one suspected:
The second stage needs a premise of general considerations. In it one can no longer recog-
nise the significance of certain hypotheses with the help of reflections within the individual 
sciences. Our reference to a total world-view becomes a duty. Only with special gifts and 
after comprehensive previous studies can a man satisfy such demands. Historians of physics 
in this sense will therefore be either philosophically trained physicists or philosophers 
trained in physics. (Neurath 1916/1983, 31.)
An important feature of progress in both the natural and the social sciences is that 
some people with special gifts can grasp hidden connections. Although Neurath 
attacked non-empirical ‘empathic’ practices, his pragmatic project is not hostile to 
idealist thinking.12 His early historiography reserves a place for the agent of surpris-
ingly swift progress both in natural science and in the history of ideas, and his 
hermeneutics can naturalize the problem:
In my cursory remarks about the history of optics, I have already emphasised a significant 
analogy. A number of physicists, such as Malebranche, Huyghens, Euler, etc., expressed the 
opinion that light is something like sound. In connection with this analogy it is remarkable 
that the authors mentioned did not know anything about interference of sound or of light. 
The thinkers who analysed light were influenced by the advances of acoustics, just as those 
occupied with acoustics were by the advances of optics. Only Young was simultaneously 
concerned with interference of both light and sound. The theory of interference of sound 
was later developed by W. E. Weber in the first third of the nineteenth century. Such occur-
rences in the field of scientific thinking have given rise to the idea that a principal task of 
genius consists of acts of empathy with the world. The genius is supposed to be able to 
recognise whole complexes of facts as related, even if he is not consciously aware of all 
elements of the two analogised views. It is just the non-formulated part of the analogy that 
contains, as it were, a driving force. (Neurath 1916/1983, 26.)
11 “By philosophical assumptions of a very general kind about the structure of the world we can 
possibly obtain foundations for the classification of systems of hypotheses but, as can be seen at 
once, this assumes much intellectual preparation” (Neurath 1916/1983, 27).
12 The revival of early nineteenth century German Idealism, and Weimar Classicism has not only 
impacted Neurath from the Vienna Circle. For example, on Schlick and Schiller see Ambrus 
(forthcoming).
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The “scientific attitude” of Neurath in the 1930s can be roughly described as a com-
promise between empiricism and materialism (Mach and Marx), and in the optical 
essays as a reconciliation of empiricism and idealism (Mach and Goethe). The 
Romantic connection was tuned down in later years as Neurath saw how regimes 
and ideologies can subvert the ideals. But all in all there is much continuity in his 
work. As he writes in the 1937 papers on Unity of Science and its Encyclopedia:
The program of the unification of scientific language requires a logical analysis of science. 
The history of science shows the importance of such an analysis for the progress of scien-
tific work.
The technique of such logical analysis was gradually perfected and employed con-
sciously. As a consequence, feats of logical analysis which were heretofore possible only to 
men of genius may now be taught systematically to scientists of ordinary attainments. This 
method of analysis is the subject matter of the new discipline called the Logic of Science. 
(Neurath 1937a, 5, 1937b, 268.)
His critique of stable structures as timeless models of science is closely linked to his 
historicism, and the early recognition that the blurred margins are a necessary part 
of science and of scientific progress (see e.g. Neurath 1941). Neurath’s study of the 
history of optics provided a rich resource for his fight against “a priorism” and 
“pseudorationalism” just as for his later physicalism.
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Chapter 11
Neurath and the Legacy of Algebraic Logic
Jordi Cat
Abstract In this paper I introduce a broader context, and sketch an integrated 
account with the purpose of examining the significance of Neurath’s attention to 
logic in early works and subsequent positions. The specific attention to algebraic 
logic is important in integrating his own interest in mathematics and combining, 
since Leibniz, the ideals of a universal language and of a calculus of reasoning. The 
interest in universal languages constitutes a much broader, so-called tradition of 
pasigraphy that extended beyond philosophical projects. I argue (1) that Neurath’s 
works can be embedded in a richer intellectual landscape that includes developments 
in logic and their local reception in Vienna, and that his attention to logic developed 
a sustained symbolic standpoint – with semiotic and typographic expressions –; (2) 
that specific aspects of the work in algebraic logic became a standard and a resource 
in subsequent work often thought independent, while its value was steadily 
challenged by the separate goal of empirical theorizing and practical application in 
social domains  – including in the areas of economics, history and visual 
communication –; that (3), in particular, the presentation of systems of algebraic 
logic by Neurath’s sources such as Stanley Jevons and Schröder was not isolated 
from discussions of political economy; and finally (4) that some of his positions in 
matters of language, unity and epistemology in the articulation of logical empiricism 
and its debates are better understood in terms of shared but diversified acquaintance 
with pasigraphy, formal standards and logical projects.
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11.1  Introduction
The historical construction of Neurath’s intellectual figure has long pitted him 
against the background, preferences, standards and positions of more canonical fig-
ures.1 Against traditional philosophy, it has pitted a declared antagonism to meta-
physics shared with fellow logical empiricists, also their related goal of a unified 
demarcation of the sciences. Against other logical empiricists’ penchant for philo-
sophical theorizing, the construction has pitted his social activism; against other 
scientific philosophers’ commitment to the conceptual and methodological stan-
dards of the exact natural sciences, his theoretical and practical interest in the social 
sciences; against their theoretically normative project, his empirical version of rep-
resentation and practical rationality; against their reductionistic theoretical model of 
unification of the sciences, his anti-reductionistic and social encycopedia model; 
against their commitment to the value of precision and organization exemplified in 
symbolic logic and its application in logicism, his pictorialism, his informalism and 
attention to the consequences of unavoidable imprecision of expression. The dialec-
tic is also borne out by records of Neurath’s own acrimonious personal exchanges, 
in a permanent tension between building consensus and momentum – through asso-
ciations and movements – and introducing critical dissent.
This historical construction has been extremely valuable in its task of differenti-
ating and integrating Neurath’s views and activities in broader intellectual and 
social contexts and projects. But it has succeeded, as any model necessarily does, at 
the expense of features that require alternative accounts. In particular, it has left out 
the differentiating and integrating role of Neurath’s symbolic standpoint and his 
sustained attention to symbolic logic.2
With this in mind, the established historical construct renders positively surpris-
ing a number of notable records and testimonies. For instance, Popper (1973, 51) 
begins his reminiscences of Neurath as a pre-1919 public figure with a reference to 
economics papers in his father’s library, education papers read to the Social- 
pedagogical Society of Vienna and, last but not least, a paper read to the Philosophical 
Society at the University of Vienna: “I think it was on Schröder’s Algebra of Logic.” 
Similarly, the mathematician Karl Menger (1994, 61) – who led the Mathematical 
Colloquium in parallel to the meetings of the Vienna Circle – began his intellectual 
portrait of Neurath by referring to the fact that “Neurath had written a few papers on 
Boolean algebra.”
If those records suggest idiosyncratic personal references, others, attempting to 
establish a new project and consensus in the history of logic, hardly can. The 
Harvard logician C.I. Lewis (1918, 389) listed in his survey of 1918 “titles of all the 
positive contributions to symbolic logic and logistic in the strict sense” and 
1 I have in mind, for instance, Uebel (1992) and (2007), Cartwright et  al. (1996), Nemeth and 
Stadler (1996), Stadler (2001), Reisch (2005), Vossoughian (2008), Burke et  al. (2013) and 
Sandner (2014).
2 An early valuable discussion by Eckehart Köhler (1991) is otherwise cursory, dismissive and, 
equally significantly, isolated from his discussion of other work by Neurath.
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supplemented works of his acquaintance with some he borrowed from bibliographies 
of Venn and Peano. Alongside works by the likes of Boole, Cantor, Cayle, Dedekind, 
De Morgan, Frege, the Grassmanns, Hilbert, Jevons, Peano, Peirce, Russell, 
Whitehead  and Venn, among others, we find listed Neurath’s and Olga Hahn’s 
papers. In fact, two of Hahn’s papers, her dissertation on the logical significance of 
coefficients in systems of logical equations and one with Neurath on dualism, Lewis 
indicated with an asterisk, marking those “considered the most important 
contributions to symbolic logic” (ibid.). References to Neurath’s and Hahn’s papers 
were included also by Alonzo Church (1936, 165) in his equally canonical 
bibliography of symbolic logic in The Journal of Symbolic Logic.
In this paper I introduce a broader context, and sketch an integrated account with 
the purpose of examining the significance of Neurath’s attention to logic in early 
works and subsequent views. The specific attention to algebraic logic is important 
in integrating his own interest in mathematics and combining, since Leibniz, the 
ideals of a universal language and of a calculus of reasoning. The interest in universal 
languages constitutes a much broader, so-called tradition of pasigraphy that 
extended beyond philosophical projects. I argue (1) that Neurath’s works can be 
embedded in a richer intellectual landscape that includes developments in logic and 
their local reception in Vienna, and that his attention to logic developed a sustained 
symbolic standpoint – with semiotic and typographic expressions –; (2) that specific 
aspects of the work in algebraic logic became a standard and a resource in subsequent 
work often thought independent, while its value was steadily challenged by the 
separate goal of empirical theorizing and practical application in social domains – 
including in the areas of economics, history and visual communication –; that (3), 
in particular, the presentation of systems of algebraic logic by Neurath’s sources 
such as Stanley Jevons and Schröder was not isolated from discussions of political 
economy; and finally (4) that some of his positions in matters of language, unity and 
epistemology in the articulation of logical empiricism and its debates are better 
understood in terms of shared but diversified acquaintance with pasigraphy, formal 
standards and logical projects.
In Sect. 11.2., I introduce the project of algebraic logic as the specific project and 
set of resources that Neurath engaged most directly and explicitly. In Sect. 11.3., I 
examine Ernst Schröder’s own project and its relation to mathematics and political 
economy, with attention also to Jevons. In Sect. 11.4., I focus on the culture of logic 
and psychologism in Germany and Austria, especially around the University of 
Vienna. In Sect. 11.5., I introduce Neurath and Olga Hahn, their education and more 
personal circumstances and Neurath’s pre-1909 work and projects. In Sect. 11.6., I 
survey the products of their collaboration in the study of algebraic logic, especially 
Schröder’s works. In Sect. 11.7., I track the occurrence and changing role that the 
specifics of Neurath’s engagement in symbolic logic played in subsequent work in 
the human and social sciences and their philosophy. Finally, in Sect. 11.8., I trace 
the occurrence and changing role in his contributions to the inseparable projects of 
logical empiricism and the unity of science.
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11.2  History of the Project of Algebraic Logic: The Path 
to Schröder
The late nineteenth century and the turn of the twentieth offered logicians and math-
ematicians developments and innovations that placed formalism at the heart of both 
disciplines but also pitted one against the other in those terms, probing their own 
and each other’s foundations. Not surprisingly, we find the first presentations of 
symbolic logic and logicism, by, among others, Louis Couturat (1905/1914), 
C.I. Lewis (1918), Susan Stebbing (1930/1942) and Rudolf Carnap (1929), with a 
performative agenda to document and establish a new consensus and to emphasize 
its modernity.3 And they do so by looking to the history of logic since Aristotle as a 
history of the discovery of the symbolic and formal essence of reasoning and a 
history of logic’s relation to the parallel evolution of mathematics.
A cursory selection of highlights, mainly from Lewis’ substantial survey, might 
prove helpful to introduce the reader to a legacy of problems and resources and the 
standards adopted from it. Carnap and Neurath themselves would not be alien to the 
same rhetorical and pedagogical use of historical narrative and, on logic, they would 
follow suit and refer to some of the key historical figures.
The validity of Aristotle’s syllogistic arguments, it is noted, depended on the 
symbolic expression of the form of subject-predicate propositions and of the form 
of the argument, that is, independently of the specific words describing subjects or 
predicates. Similarly, mathematical knowledge required axiomatic systems that 
rested on definitions presenting necessary truths about certain objects in intuition 
(see especially Stebbing 1930/1942).
Within such a tradition, Leibniz featured prominently as a turning point and the 
source of the algebraic project, although not without occasional references to the 
medieval project of universal science, mathesis universalis – a project conceived in 
the Middle Ages by Ramon Llull and given a rationalist articulation by René 
Descartes. Leibniz noted the similarity between definitions and algebraic formula, 
that is, mathematical equations introducing quantities and fundamental concepts or 
else identity statements. He upheld the goal of the characteristica universalis, in the 
image of algebra, as the cornerstone of the possibility of knowledge of the world, as 
both a rational and universal symbolic language and the basis for a calculus of 
reasoning, calculus ratiocinator. Symbols for fundamental simple concepts (the 
‘alphabet of human thought’) instantiated in reality could be combined according to 
rules of combination, in the ars combinatoria, to form symbols for complex 
concepts. In the universal mathematics, the intellect understands reality, since, for 
Leibniz, truths of thought (reason) capture truths of reality as conceived intellectually 
and created by God. Together, then, the constitution of language and the calculus 
formed a program for a general science.
3 Lewis, expounding on Couturat’s narrative – and his narrow focus on Huntington’s recent formu-
lation –, provided the main source for other authors.
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Leibniz’s language and calculus admitted of two equivalent interpretations: rela-
tions of intension, such as inclusion, between concepts and relations of extension, 
also such as inclusion, between individuals and classes. Thus A + B expressed both 
‘A and B’ in intension, and ‘either A or B’ in extension. One calculational challenge 
consisted in interpreting addition (+) and subtraction (−) as also inverse logical 
operations. To introduce negative predicates, Leibniz had to take advantage of the 
Aristotelian model.
The adopted resulting standard was effectively this: Algebra provided a mathe-
matical model of symbolic language and of reasoning; according to the model, the 
construction by symbols would take place, as Llull had imagined, according to 
mechanical rules of combination by operations, a ‘universal calculus.’ As a matter 
of application, two old methods and goals were equally preserved and presented in 
the new logical terms, namely, analysis and synthesis: the analysis of predicates in 
the intension of subjects and their synthesis, or art of invention (Lewis 1918, 5–9).
Other researchers such as Gottfried Ploucquet, Fréderic de Castillon and, espe-
cially, Johann Heinrich Lambert investigated a calculus of logic, unaware of most of 
Leibniz’s ideas. They explored analogies with arithmetical relations that often 
lacked any logical interpretation such as the use of coefficients other than 0 and 1 – 
at least within an intensional perspective that considers things within the broader 
domain of possibility.4
The consolidation of the algebraic project was initiated in English-speaking 
nations visibly led by William Hamilton in Britain, alongside George Bentham, 
followed by Augustus de Morgan in the 1840s, George Boole in the 1850s and 
Stanley Jevons in the 1860s along with Hamilton’s students William Thomson and 
Thomas Baynes. By then, British mathematics had undergone a major change with 
the introduction of the Leibnizian notation of the calculus through the early 1810s – 
by John Herschel, George Peacock and Charles Babbage, founders of the 
undergraduate Cambridge Analytical Society –, followed by the general formulation 
of algebra as a science of combination of symbols by Peacock in 1830, and a general 
calculus of operations by Duncan Gregory in 1840 (see Peckhaus 1999, 430–440).
This British revival of studies in logic sought to work within the tradition of 
Aristotelian logic, adopting its linguistic model of subject-predicate statements and 
can be characterized by the contribution of new symbolic notations (symbolic 
creativity, also diagrammatic, tracking old and new conceptions), the quantification 
of the predicate (extending the applicability of mathematical symbols and 
operations) and generally an extensional interpretation. Without adopting algebraic 
symbols, de Morgan included a treatment of the equivalence (and distribution) of 
operations of conjunction and disjunction.
Boole’s mathematical recasting of logical reasoning rested on replacing the 
Aristotelian tradition of non-symbolic logic with a more psychologistic project, 
both more empirical and more formal, and still both descriptive and normative. This 
project consisted in determining and expressing laws of thought in terms of rules for 
operations on so-called elective symbols, symbols for selections from the universe 
of conceivable objects. From a formal standpoint, the rules corresponded to the 
4 Lambert was the most explicit in his analysis; see Lambert (1764) and Lewis (1918, 23).
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algebra of operations on numbers 0 and 1 (see Boole 1854 and Lewis 1918, 51–52): 
‘=’ symbolized the relation of equality between classes with the same membership, 
or, equivalently, concepts with the same extension; ‘x + y’ represented strict 
disjunction, symbolizing the class of things members either of x or of y, but not 
both; ‘+’ and ‘-’ could be interpreted as strictly inverse operations; ‘x-y’ represented 
the class of members of x that are not members of y; ‘x.y’ or ‘xy’ represented the 
class of things members of both x and y. The operations, and their logical 
interpretation, satisfied properties such as commutativity and distributivity. Elective 
symbols, the variables, but not any coefficients, satisfied the so-called index law, 
x2 = x. For Boole, then, logic provided the interpretation of algebraic relations that 
enter the system or calculus.
Without a relation of inclusion, from the extensional perspective the application 
of the equality sign to represent the ‘is’ connecting predicates and subjects required 
expressions for the quantification of the predicate, x = vy (see Lewis 1918, 56–57). 
Similarly, the logical interpretation of more complex functions of x, y or both, 
suggested the use of coefficients in the terms of the function’s perturbative 
expansion. Algebraic methods allowed Boole to use logical equations to express 
one class as a function of the any relevant others (Lewis 1918, 68). Applied to 
propositions, symbols x or y represented the times when some proposition X or Y is 
true, but without any symbol for implication relation. The only option was to 
quantify the equation between times of truth for different propositions, x = vy.
It is worth noting that de Morgan and Boole used the algebraic treatment of logi-
cal relations of classes to express a further parallelism, namely, to the numerical 
relations between probabilities. Boole (1854, 259) presented the statement of 
parallelism between the two kinds of relations in a dual display of parallel columns 
of algebraic relations. With a new meaning, this format would become a graphic 
tool of algebraic thinking especially in Schröder and Neurath (see below).
Whereas Boole’s interests lay mainly in mathematics, Jevons was interested in 
economics and mental and moral philosophy (see Sect. 11.3., below). Closer to 
those more psychological disciplines, thus, Jevons intended his logical calculus to 
be a calculus of terms in intension, that is, of meanings. Also in contrast to Boole, 
he interpreted the sum of terms as a disjunction of non-exclusive classes or meanings. 
The interpretation allowed Jevons to retain the relation a + a = a, which for Boole 
held no logical meaning (constrained by the arithmetical meaning). Jevons 
symbolized the negation as –A, rather than as Boole’s (1-a). In these terms he 
introduced a principle of duality: a thing must either be or not be (Jevons 1869). In 
the relation a = b, a means the same as b (extensionally, a is identical with b). The 
relation supports his first principle of reasoning, the procedure of ‘substitution of 
similars’ (it should not be confused with the substitution for variables of their 
values). The product ab expressed the conjunction of meanings and it was 
commutative, ab = ba. The sum and the multiplication satisfied also a distributive 
relation, a(b + c) = ab+ac (see Jevons 1864 and Lewis 1918, 73–75). Jevons also 
discarded inverse operations such as subtraction and division.
Peirce, son of the mathematician Benjamin Peirce, integrated his interest in rea-
soning with the mathematical techniques of probability and statistics he applied in 
his work for the US Coast Survey and the Department of Weights and Measures. 
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Accordingly, he followed Leibniz in conceiving symbolic logic as the general 
science of mathematical form, but focused its application on relations characteristic 
of logical classes or else on the calculus of probabilities (for instance, arithmetical 
operations multiplication and division). He extended the mathematical formalism to 
relative terms (from an extensional standpoint, an ordered pairs or triads, etc. of 
individuals), turning a calculus introduced by de Morgan into a systematic 
mathematical theory. He also introduced the relation of inclusion, being as small as, 
or material implication, equivalent to the meaning of ≤ and symbolized by –< so 
that x –< y reads ‘if x is true, y is true.’ With it, Peirce introduced nine principles 
about it and its relation to the operations of sum and multiplication (see Peirce 1867, 
1880 and 1885; Lewis 1918, 79–83).
Following Boole, he also noted the algebraic parallelism between the logical and 
probabilistic relations, which he introduced by means of the two-column display. 
The distinction rested on the distinction between logical identity and numerical 
equation. The former, represented as a ≡ b, states that classes a and b have the same 
membership, all a’s and all b’s; the latter, a = b, states that the number of members 
is the same. The relation of proportion or frequencies of members is the basis for the 
calculus of probabilities (Peirce 1880).
In his survey, Lewis noted that, according to William James, Peirce’s series of 
articles “Some Illustrations of the Logic of Science” (1877–78) are the sources of 
pragmatism.5 While this connection might seem paradoxical, it might also make 
less surprising the relation in Neurath between attention to formal reasoning and the 
practical rationality of individual and social decision-making and calculation.
Schröder integrated his Leibnizean interests in algebra, reasoning and universal 
language into a neo-Leibnizean system of algebraic logic. He developed his system 
in the footsteps of not just Boole’s, but Grassmann’s efforts, linked to Grassmann’s 
more familiar contribution to arithmetic, and to Peirce’s developments. By the 
second decade of the twentieth century, only a few years after the posthumous 
publication in 1909 of the Abriss der Algebra der Logik, a helpful summary his 
compendious earlier 1890s Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik, Schröder’s 
work  (1890a, 1891, 1895, 1909) constituted to logicians such as Couturat 
(1905/1914) and Lewis (1918) the culmination of the algebraic tradition. Lewis 
(1918, 111) referred to it as the Boole-Schröder algebra, systematizing and extending 
earlier contributions on three fronts: the algebra of classes, the algebra of propositions 
and, after Peirce, a calculus of relations or relative concepts. The third development 
would provide the grounds for Russell’s logicism with its alternative relation 
between mathematics and logic.6
5 Lewis (1918, 79 n. 121). Lewis cited the title incorrectly as “Some illustrations of the Science of 
Logic;” the series consists of the essays “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make our Ideas 
Clear,” “The Doctrine of Chances,” “The Probability of Induction,” “The Order of Nature” and 
“Deduction, Induction and Hypotheses.”
6 I am grateful to Volker Peckhaus for a helpful discussion of the significance of Schröder’s 
contributions.
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Like Peirce, and Jevons before him, also Schröder introduced his discussion of 
logic in the idealized language of mathematics and presented it as a critical 
development of Boole’s ideas. Whereas Boole and Jevons had introduced their 
calculus of reasoning in the context of mental philosophy, or psychology normatively 
understood, Schröder introduced his ideas first in the context of mathematics, in 
particular, in his pedagogical efforts to systematize the science of numbers in 
general (see Sect. 11.3., below). He organized his compendium around seven 
algebraic operations. With them in mind he criticized Boole’s use of algebraic 
relations to represent logical ones. With Jevons he criticized Boole’s strict 
interpretation of addition, +, and the logical use of subtraction and division.
Central to Schröder’s development of the logical calculus, in Boole’s tradition, is 
the extensional interpretation of numbers and concepts, in such a way that the 
logical interpretation of the calculus reduces to the algebraic by adopting numbers 
as classes (with parts and wholes) and then concepts as classes to which they apply 
and propositions in relation to classes that render them true. The two logical calculi, 
of concepts and propositions, are reduced to one (Couturat 1905/1914, 3–4). The 
same approach led him to contribute to set theory (the so-called Schröder-Bernstein 
theorem about mappings between sets and the ordering of their respective cardinality; 
see Carnap 1929, 51).
Contributors and commentators alike have actively constructed the project of alge-
braic logic as a historically connected project. This is how commentators have assessed 
the significance of Schröder’s work, as he did himself, only adding future- oriented 
claims about precedence and inspiration (for instance in O’Connor and Robertson 
2009). Specifically, the two main dimensions of significance of algebraic logic are the 
relation to Leibniz’s project and the evolving history of logic in relation to mathemat-
ics. This framework applies not just to Schröder’s own assessment of the significance 
of his project, but also to Carnap’s and Neurath’s, including the project articulated in 
the Vienna Circle Manifesto and subsequent exchanges between them.
In this historical narrative, the project of a universal characteristic had preceded – 
that is, anticipated – logicism, while the universal calculus had preceded symbolic 
logic. Leibniz’s project had anticipated also the analysis of relations and the arbitrary 
character of the choice of primitive concepts (Lewis 1918, 11).
Leibniz constituted the source reference for situating subsequent work, including 
Schröder’s, in relation to either of his two connected symbolic projects forming the 
organon for a general science: the calculus ratiocinator and the lingua characteristica 
(or characteristica universalis). Thus, Jourdain (1914, v) and Couturat (1905/1914, 
93) declared that the calculus of reasoning had been developed by Boole, De 
Morgan, Jevons, Venn, Peirce, Ladd-Franklin and, most systematically, by Schröder, 
while the universal lingua characteristica had been developed by Frege, Peano, 
Russell and Whitehead. They also admitted the caveat that Frege himself – although 
the lesser-known figure with little acknowledgment from his contemporaries prior 
to Russell  – had explicitly pointed to Leibniz’s precedent and intended his own 
symbolism to contribute to both projects, playing the connected roles of universal 
language and calculus of reasoning.
Subsequently, Jean van Heijenoort (1967a) developed the theme as a matter of a 
linking two strands in the history of logic, logic as calculus and logic as language. 
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Replying to Schröder’s criticism in 1880 of Frege’s Begriffsschrift, Frege himself 
pointed to Leibniz and Boole, and contrasted Boole’s project of a calculus 
ratiocinator with his own project, closer to Leibniz, aiming also at a universal 
lingua characteristica.7 Not surprisingly, Frege’s new analytic method, philosophy 
of mathematics, logical calculus, logical notation and philosophy of language are 
inseparable. Russell’s case and even Wittgenstein’s are arguably similar, partly due 
to Frege’s contribution. The notion of logic as a calculus expressed by Frege’s 
propositional calculus rests on the conception of logic as a language, not just the 
mathematical standard of a formal system from axiomatics, with a regulated system 
of signs that enables his theory of quantification.  It is along similar lines that 
Schröder’s extensional calculus would bridge the gap between the models of 
axiomatics and set theory before Löwenheim’s contributions – in the wake of the 
projects of axiomatization of set theory and the logicism of the Principia 
Mathematica.8
Below, I will emphasize the same connection between both projects in Schröder 
and then Neurath, who will place a sustained and stronger emphasis on the linguistic 
one. More broadly, Schröder’s accomplishments and the significance of algebraic 
logic have been appreciated further in connection with the evolving and creative 
relation between logic and mathematics.9 From this conceptual and historiographical 
perspective, logic is no longer an exclusive branch of philosophy developed by 
philosophers or rhetoricians (Peckhaus 1999).
In this regard, Grattan-Guinness (2004) has distinguished between two traditions 
within symbolic logic: algebraic logic and mathematical logic. Each evolved by 
engaging different developments in mathematics, or else by engaging them 
differently. And since the adopted ideal of mathematics was itself informed by 
logical virtues – e.g., in axiomatics –, the relations between logic and mathematics, 
whether in the pursuit of logic or the foundations of mathematics, were 
meta-logical.
The algebraic tradition, the one to which Venn had originally applied the label 
‘symbolic logic,’ originated with the project a powerful representation of syllogisms 
in terms of symbols regulated according to mathematical theory. And mathematical 
theory extended to evolving algebraic theory, from arithmetic operations to differ-
ential operators, functional equations and group theory.
Operating with the Aristotelian focus on syllogistic reasoning, the algebraic proj-
ect paid attention to the linguistic elements associated with the roles of subjects and 
predicates, and the copula binding them in propositions. But it also extended its 
7 See Frege (1879), Schröder (1880), van Heijenoort (1967a) and (1967b, 1–2), and Peckhaus 
(2004, 599).
8 In Principia Mathematica, Whitehead and Russell pointed to both dimensions of Schröder’s con-
tribution: his notation as one, alongside those of Frege and Peano, which they will adopt and 
modify as convenient, and to his calculus, for instance, his explanation of the proposition that ‘p 
and not-q imply r’ is equivalent to ‘p implies q or r’ (Whitehead and Russell 1910, vol 1, viii and 
123). In the wake of reviews by Venn, Husserl, Peano and Peirce’s students, for instance, Whitehead 
and Russell’s mention might have drawn an even wider international attention to the work of the 
isolated teacher at a provincial German technical college.
9 See Couturat (1914), Lewis (1918), Dipert (1991), Grattan-Guinness (2000), Hailperin (2004) 
and Peckhaus (2004).
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scope with the introduction of relations, or relatives, and the quantification of the 
predicate. In addition, it settled on their extensional classification in terms of classes, 
parts and wholes, eventually reaching out to set theory proper. On such interpretation, 
together with the algebraic focus on equations, logical connectives centered on 
relations of conjunction, disjunction, equality and logical equivalence, eventually 
extended by Peirce and Schröder with the asymmetric relations of inclusion and its 
logical expression in implication.
The central role of mathematicians in this tradition tracks the ascent in Europe of 
the intellectual authority of scientific practices through the nineteenth century, 
without its reduction to the new experimental status of psychology (Peckhaus 1999, 
438–39). By the end of the nineteenth century, Schröder, a mathematician, had 
come to be considered both the leading representative of algebraic logic in Germany 
and the mathematician responsible for completing the Boolean project.
If algebraic logic was concerned with mathematics at the service of logic, math-
ematical logic was, by contrast, concerned with logic at the service of mathematics. 
The latter project emerged out of concurrent efforts by Frege and by Peano’s Italian 
school to craft a new and more precise logical notation to further the logical rigori-
zation of mathematics, in its concepts, its proofs and the systematic (axiomatic) 
organization of its statements. Alongside the new treatment of arithmetic and set 
theory, the inspiration came from the project of rigorization of analysis, primarily in 
the hands of Cauchy and Weierstrass. It was the rigorous and precise new language 
and rules of logic, at least the considered desirability and possibility of crafting and 
applying such standards, that enabled the project of logicism, initiated philosophi-
cally by Frege in the late 1870s and early 1880 and developed systematically in the 
1910s by Russell and Whitehead. With their attention focused on proofs, they placed 
implication at the center of the logical project applied in logicism. It is worth noting 
that in 1913, during the same period, Norbert Wiener was awarded his doctoral 
degree for a dissertation comparing Schröder’s and Russell’s projects, especially on 
relations (Grattan-Guinness 1975). Schröder died in 1902, when Hilbert and 
Russell’s ideas were setting new grounds. Renewed interest in his project was 
briefly facilitated by the posthumous edition of the relatively reduced survey of his 
compendium in 1909.
11.3  Schröder’s Algebra of Logic: Calculus of Reasoning 
and Universal Language
11.3.1  Schröder from Algebra of Numbers to Algebra of Logic
In this Section I draw attention to Schröder’s specific place in the history of sym-
bolic logic by drawing attention to the following features: (1) his earlier founda-
tional interest in arithmetic and algebra; (2) his historical self-awareness placing his 
project within the algebraic tradition he traced back to Descartes and especially 
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Leibniz and more immediately to the British project of Boole and Jevons; (3) his 
commitment to the two connected ideals of that tradition, namely, a universal 
language (pasigraphy) and a rational calculus; (4) his Machian naturalistic approach 
straddling a line between psychologism and logicism; (5) the close relation to 
mathematics strengthening the relation of logic to a more scientific philosophy and 
to exact empirical sciences; (6) the surprising but sustained role since Boole and 
Jevons of economics in the presentation and significance of algebraic logic; and (7) 
more technical aspects such as the quasi-axiomatic approach, the extensional 
interpetation, the centrality of relations and subsumption, status and interpretation 
of identities, the significance of univocality, and the principle of duality, or dualism.
In this subsection I emphasize the role of the foundational attention to mathemat-
ics as the context for the introduction of concepts such as equality, duality and uni-
vocality – that is, determinateness or precision – and the ideal of pure form that 
would play a role in the project of algebraic logic. I begin with a brief account of 
Schröder’s academic life (see Dipert 1991 and O’Connor and Robertson  2009). 
Schröder’s father, Heinrich, was born and educated in Munich and, after graduating 
from the University, became a physics teacher in different high schools in the 
Southwest of Germany, first in Munich and, when his son Ernst was born in 1841, 
in Mannheim. In 1860 Ernst graduated from the University of Heidelberg, where he 
had studied mathematics with Otto Hesse, physics with Gustav Kirchhoff and 
chemistry with Robert Bunsen. Two years later he received a doctorate for work 
under Hesse on the extension of the application of fractional powers in algebra to 
geometry, e.g., p/q-sided polygons. Next, after spending two more years studying 
mathematics and physics, in Königsberg, he qualified to teach mathematics and 
natural sciences in German gymnasiums and to lecture at the Eidgenössische 
Technische Hochschule in Zürich, where taught as Privatdozent until 1869. Back in 
Germany, he was appointed to teach mathematics and natural sciences at the 
Realgymnasium in Bade-Baden.
In 1874 he was appointed full professor at the Technische Hochschule in 
Darmstadt and in 1876 in Karlsruhe, where he stayed till his death. It was in the 
processes of developing his lectures in mathematics that by 1873 he had completed 
his comprehensive school textbook Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra für Lehre 
und Studirende (1873) and, prior his move to Darmstadt, a corresponding brief sur-
vey, Abriss der Arithmetik und Algebra für Schüler an Gymnasien und Realschulen 
(1874a) and a more abstract programmatic text, also for students, Üeber die Formale 
Elemente der absoluten Algebra (1874b). In Karlsruhe, after his move to the local 
Polytechnische Schule, he wrote Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls (1877), his 
directorial speech Über das Zeichen (1890b), the equally criticized and hailed mon-
umental Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (exakte Logik) (3 vols.,1890–1895) 
and “Über Pasigraphie” (1898a).10 The brief ouline of his system, Abriss der Algebra 
der Logik (2 vols.) was edited by Eugen Müller and published posthumously in 
1909 and 1910.
10 See Schröder (1877, 1890a, 1890b/1892, 1891, 1892, 1895 and 1898a, b).
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Schröder’s evolution from work on the calculus of algebra to work on the calcu-
lus of logic has not been sufficiently appreciated in a way that exhibits the role of 
mathematics11: it’s the path from Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra (1873), 
Abriss der Arithmetik und Algebra (1874a) and Über die Formalen Elemente der 
absoluten Algebra (1874b) to Operationskreis des Logikkalkuls (1877).
Schröder intended the texts on arithmetic to serve a pedagogical function associ-
ated with his teaching positions. Yet, they are distinctively ambitious in document-
ing higher-level modern developments and in attending to foundational issues such 
as the principled and sophisticated conceptual systematization of the discipline, its 
distinctive scope, its scientific status and its ideals (partly in the axiomatic tradition 
of geometry set by the Euclidean system as a model of science and education).
In Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra his sources featured more advanced 
recent textbooks on arithmetic and number theory by H.  Grassmann (1844), by 
Bertrand and Lejeune-Dirichlet and by Hankel. Grassmann, in particular, had 
introduced in 1844, in Die lineale Ausdehnungslehre, two connections between 
extensive magnitudes, a synthetic connection (a∩b) and an analytic connection 
(a∪b). Schröder’s early extension of the discussion of mathematical operations to 
rules of logical reasoning was accompanied by another work, by another Grassmann. 
In 1872, Hermann's brother Robert introduced in a series of short books under the 
title Die Formenlehre oder Mathematik the idea that any object of thought was 
composed of (mental) pegs satisfying relations of identity, =, non-identity, ≥, and 
subordination, < or >, which Schröder adopted as well. In the second booklet, Die 
Begrieffslehre oder Logik, Grassmann introduced the algebraic notation applied to 
concepts, not classes (in the Aristotelian German tradition since Leibniz and 
especially Lambert, whom he cited; see R. Grassmann 1872, and Grattan-Guinness 
2000, 157–58).
Schröder (1873, 1) advanced his conception of pure mathematics as the science 
of numbers in general (‘Lehre von den Zahlen’), not of magnitudes (‘Grössenlehre’). 
Algebra is general arithmetic and an instance of the presumed more general and 
abstract discipline he called absolute algebra. In this regard, Schröder’s interests 
were clearly formal and systematic, well within the tradition of axiomatics, which 
by this time was starting to expand beyond geometry.
In On the Formal Elements of the Absolute Algebra (1874b, 26) Schröder 
addressed the ideal of a complete system of formal algebra introduced in the 
handbook of 1873, such that we can determine directly and with certainty whether 
for two arbitrary formulas, one implies the other, they are equivalent or they are 
mutually independent.12 Logic didn’t meet the formal standard and could not address 
the formal decision problem without adopting a semantic indirect path through a 
real domain. Schröder’s view was that absolute algebra must be strictly formal. In 
the handbook he already distinguished the domain of the formal – or absolute – 
from the domain of the real; and formal algebra is a theory of pure connections 
11 But see relevant remarks in Grattan-Guinness (2000) and Peckhaus (2004).
12 Yet again, this text was surprisingly appended as a supplement on recent algebra to the Baden-
Baden gymnasium program.
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(Schröder 1873, 180–181). From that standpoint, for Schröder (1874b, 27) the logi-
cal calculus was only an interpretation of absolute algebra. And within this frame-
work he would develop Peirce’s calculus of relatives (ordered n-tuples), that is, for 
relative concepts, and introduced matrices to tabulate them. It was ultimately abso-
lute algebra, the formal theory of connections that makes logic and mathematics 
possible, that remained his ultimate goal (Peckhaus 2004, 566).
As a remedy for the problem of completeness, he suggested the project of com-
pleting the methods of logic so that the consequences of any set of premises may be 
proven to be derivable. The project of contributing to algebraic logic, then, grew out 
of the formal considerations of algebra he had initiated in his handbook of 1873. To 
pursue it, he had to follow Boole in the assumption that equations were premises in 
a deductive chain and operations were logical operations acting on concepts 
(Schröder 1874b, 6). Thus, he explicitly points to the road paved by Robert 
Grassmann in 1872 and, especially, Boole 1854 (see Schröder 1874b, 7), and to the 
goal, he declared again in 1877, of offering the foundations and the technique of a 
completed logical calculus.
Central to his presentation of the logical system was the conception of signs. The 
fundamental role of the concept of number, rather than extensive magnitudes, as 
proper object of mathematics pointed to the level of representation. Schröder 
focused on the expressive elements. According to Schröder, signs expressing 
numbers may be either numerical (‘numerisch’), or digital (his own English 
translation of ziffrig), – such as 1874, 5 or 6.13/2–7– or literal (literal) – such as a, 
5x + 3, ab-2c, containing at least one letter (Schröder 1874b, 6; 1873, 357).
In turn, according to Schröder, the emphasis on signs, including letters, placed 
his conception of algebra, and the connective, formal ideal of absolute algebra, 
under the Leibnizian ideal of the scientific characteristica universalis, the universal 
symbolic language of ars combinatoria. In his review of Frege’s Begrisffschrift and 
the introduction to the Vorlesungen, he would call it the logical ideal of a pasigraphy 
and the linguistic ideal of a world language (such as the popular Volapük) (see 
Schröder 1880, 81 and 1890a, 93–94).
The linguistic and intellectual (rational) dimensions of the calculus were linked 
to the focus on operations; and he subtitled the arithmetic books accordingly, Die 
Sieben algebraischen Operationen (The Seven Algebraic Operations). In particular, 
he focused on the intellectual manipulation of symbols through the regulated 
application of operations (the rules of application and definition were effectively the 
same). When he considered the commutativity of operations such as multiplication, 
he analyzed it into two non-commutative operations, left-multiplication (or 
composition) and right-multiplication (Schröder 1890a, 139). In the footsteps of 
Galois, commutativity expressed the place of group theory in algebra, and the 
assumption that groups were groups of permutations and their compositions.
One fundamental principle regulating the universal symbolic language con-
cerned the univocality of the relation between numerical signs, and the operations 
establishing it: “two units can be connected to each other in only one way” (Schröder 
1873, 17). More specifically, he added, “[w]e call the units of two quantities 
unambiguously connected to each other if each unit on one quantity is uniquely 
assigned to a unit of the other” (1873, 19). Univocality identified the rigor or 
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precision that rendered the algebraic language a standard for others and it served the 
calculus by facilitating the use of operations as rules of inference and substitution – 
equations. Schröder’s extensional approach is clear from the application of the 
criterion to collections or sets of objects (‘Menge von Objecten’): “we call the units 
of two sets univocally connected if each unit in one set is uniquely assigned to a unit 
of the other” (1873, 19). He contrasted the univocal and the ambiguous mappings in 
two diagrams paired together side by side (1873, 20), which will set the visual 
example for the parallel, double-column presentation of dual sets of expressions. 
From the notational and presentation standpoint, the graphic application of duality 
expressed the Jevonsian, contrasting meaning.
The heart of Schröder’s system lay in the extension from univocal equations to 
numerical comparisons and inclusions (subsumption, ‘Subsumtion,’ or 
subordination, ‘Unterordnung’) – after Robert Grassmann’s (1872) development in 
1872 of his brother’s doctrine of extension of 1844. Schröder took mathematics as 
fundamental, and, with it, despite the formal ideal of absolute algebra, the primacy 
of domains of objects and the part-whole relation. This establishes his extensional – 
“real”  – interpretation of concepts, and thereby its application to connections 
between propositions as a calculus of logical conclusions. Univocal relations of 
equality between concepts, he then objected, may be misleading and lead to false 
conclusions: by the algebraic properties of the relation of equality symbolized by 
‘=’, the equations ‘metal = silver’ and ‘gold = metal’ imply ‘silver = gold’ (Schröder 
1873, 26). Just like numbers may satisfy relations of inequality and ambiguity at the 
conceptual level, √9 = +/−3, identity must be distinguished from what he called 
logical subordination, or subsumption (1873, 26). Equivalently, substitution (opera-
tion or rule) must be distinguished from inclusion (1873, 32).
The extension of algebra to a logical calculus of reasoning required, then, extend-
ing relations of numerical comparisons to relations of logical subordination. For this 
purpose Schröder introduced the corresponding sign, €, so that a symmetric relation 
of coordination, like the case of composition and multiplication, may be decom-
posed into asymmetric relations of subordination. For instance, in the relation 
between concepts of metal and silver, silver € metal, or between numbers √9 € −3 
(Schröder 1873, 27–29). As a mode of conceptual analysis, this is the meaning of 
the copula connecting subject and predicate in propositions or judgments of the 
form ‘A is B’ (1873, 30).
The relation is the basis for representing thought processes in a logical calculus. 
Among the basic principles he listed characterizing the relation of inclusion or 
subordination was the relation of transitivity that modeled after a classic syllogism: 
if A € B, and B € C, then from these premises it followed that A € (ibid.). Another 
important one connected the coordination with equality: if A is subordinated to a 
univocal, single-valued term B (B = b), then A = B. Similarly, if A € B and B € A, 
then A = B (1873, 30). The binary relation of equality was, then, clearly derivative. 
Note that Schröder introduced the symmetric sign without reversing the order of the 
terms A and B, hence expressing the asymmetric nature of the relation.
In his treatment of algebra in the mathematics handbook the relation of subordi-
nation already emerged as the fundamental relation in a calculus, to which he would 
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devote first a small book mapping algebraic operations to logical operations, Der 
Operationskreis des Logikkalküls (1877), and then the celebrated comprehensive 
systematization and development of Boole’s and Peirce’s systems in the Vorlesungen. 
An entire system of logic, thus, emerged from the presentation of algebra in the 
Lehrbuch of 1873 by means of the application of operations and relations extended 
from numbers to propositions and inferences.
A related central idea was his conceptions of equations: two numbers are equal 
“if they represent the sum of one” (1873, 22), and “the sign = (read: equal) between 
two expressions was thus to be used only to say that these are (different) names for 
the same number” (1873, 23). Elsewhere he expressed the idea in more algebraic 
terms: “if one of the numbers can be matched with the other without residues” or “if 
they are ‘identical’, i.e., only (different) names for the sum total of one” (Schröder 
1874a, 4). He gave the example of two hands each finger in one matching a finger 
in the other; a fundamental principle of number theory is that the number is 
independent of the order in the counting (1874a, 4). Different names, different 
hands. Each number is equal to itself.
Next, Schröder offered the following classification of equations: numerical, 
either correct, in accordance with the definitions of the numbers – 2 + 3 = 5 – or 
false – 2 + 3 = 4 –; literal, either synthetic, stipulated for some values – x + 1 = x –, 
or analytic (formal), applying to all values – a(b + c) = ab+ac. He distinguished the 
relation of equality, as identical intension and extension, from the relation of 
correlation, symbolized by ‘(=),’ to indicate in the identity of a value of domain 
member.
Synoptic tables and two-column presentations appeared first in the discussion of 
mathematics. Schröder introduced the dual format generally to present a synoptic 
classification into mutually exclusive kinds, for instance a nested classification of 
kinds of numbers (determinate/indeterminate, and then known/unknown and 
partially/fully, respectively) and a nested classification of kinds of equations 
(numeric/literal, and then right/false and synthetic/analytic, see Schröder 1874a, 
358–359).
He introduced the two-column dual format to present a particular dichotomy, 
two sets of algebraic operations, from among the seven he identified in total, in an 
inverse relation: to the set formed by addition, multiplication and exponentiation he 
opposed the corresponding set formed by subtraction, division and root/logarithm 
(1873, 119). This is the generalized algebraic expression of duality, or dualism, that 
would provide a distinctive organizing principle in his systematic formulation of 
algebraic logic.
The total number of operations assumed another duality, between non-commut-
ing operations such as left- and right-multiplication that compose each commutative 
operation. The inverse relation was important for the purpose of calculation and 
inference when the goal was to express an unknown value in terms of known ones. 
Like substitution for Jevons, the elimination of unknowns provided the central 
methodological correspondence, with its limitations, that Boole and Schröder 
postulated between the method of reasoning and the algebraic method of solving 
equations for unknown variables. Even despite the omission of degrees and the 
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logical formulas of tautology and absorption that challenged the fundamental role 
of algebra, we can see at least how the determinateness or univocality of the solution 
was central to the project.
Having completed his school handbooks on mathematics, he turned to logic. 
Recent notices on the algebraic calculus of logic by Arthur Cayley in 1871 and 
James Ellis in 1873 came to Schröder’s attention and enabled him to put his project 
of absolute algebra first and foremost within what was effectively Boole’s British 
tradition of mathematical logic. First in On Formal Elements of Absolute Algebra 
(1874), Schröder embraced his ideal of a formal and complete system of logic and 
announced the plan to complete Boole’s calculus. Next, in connection to the system 
of algebra in the handbook, he laid out the first definitions and axioms of his system 
of logic (without inclusion). In the 37-page monograph Der Operationskreis des 
Logikkalküls (1877) (The Circle of Operations of the Logical Calculus) he made 
sure to draw a connection also to the older and German precedent, Leibniz. 
Afterward, he would become aware of Peirce’s own work in the British tradition and 
even corresponded with him. Peirce actually used Schröder’s Operationskreis to 
teach at Johns Hopkins (Grattan-Guinness 2000, 161).
In the three volumes of Vorlesungen üeber die Algebra der Logik that took up the 
rest of his life, Schröder pursued the project of algebraic logic in the footsteps of 
Leibniz, the Grassmanns, Boole and Peirce. In line with the growing adoption in 
mathematical research of the axiomatic ideal, already in Operationskreis Schröder 
extended its application to the logical calculus. In addition, joining the English- 
speaking tradition led him to introduce English terminology and English transla-
tions of his own terms.
11.3.2  Schröder’s Algebra of Logic
Schröder’s hailed systematization and extension of a certain constructed tradition 
were based on the fundamental role he gave the relation of subsumption and the law 
of duality. Along with the basic definitions and axioms, in Operationskreis Schröder 
introduced the principle of duality (‘Dualismus’), which he considered empirical 
(‘empirische’) in nature. Subsequent discussions suggest he meant a synthetic 
general statement based on instances. It is also a constructive instrument, in the 
classical conception of postulates. He replaced as the fundamental binary relation in 
the system that of equality with the asymmetric relation of inequality for numbers, 
inclusion for classes, subsumption for concepts and implication for propositions. 
The sequence tracks the roots of his system of algebra of logic to the relations and 
operations in algebra (see below). Notice that also in the Lehrbuch, the main axiom, 
of inherence of signs, tracking countable things as units, was inductive (Schröder 
1873, 16–17). The law of duality, or dualism, established the systematic 
J. Cat
257
correspondence between theorems in terms of + and 1 and theorems in terms of x 
and 0; and it serves the methodological task of deriving new theorems.13
Within mathematics, especially geometry, a tradition of attention to formal dual-
ity, reciprocity, and higher-level formal analogies was developed in projective 
geometry, especially by French mathematician J.V.  Poncelet, J.D.  Gergonne and 
M.  Chasles in the 1820 (with reciprocal theorems about points and lines). The 
inspiration for a broader methodological dual perspective has been traced in the 
case of the physicist James Clerk Maxwell (see Harman 1998, 159–161). Moreover, 
Grassmann’s Die lineale Ausdehnungslehre (1844) was a key source of Schröder’s 
treatment of arithmetic and algebra and provided a more philosophical context for 
the introduction of duality. Grassmann’s conceptual framework included the dualist 
philosophy of polarity in the Kantian tradition and the post-Kantian tradition of 
Naturphilosophie, along with Schelling, Ritter or Schleiermacher. But dualism ran 
through the so-called algebraic tradition in the more specific notion of inverse 
operations such as addition and subtraction, multiplication and division. For 
instance, Jevons’ calculus, after Grassmann’s and even Boole’s, exhibited more 
explicitly a duality between logical addition and multiplication (Peckhaus 2004, 
570); but Jevon’s work came to Schröder’s attention only after his original 
introduction of the law of duality in 1877.
Schröder had then two mathematical sources, geometric and algebraic, but it is 
the algebraic one exhibited in Peirce’s logic that Schröder emphasizes (also as part 
of his own conception of the historical significance of his project; see Grattan- 
Guinness 2000, 164). From a conceptual standpoint, the distinctive philosophical 
consideration that Schröder attached to the principle includes its “empirical” or 
inductive status; it is not proven a priori but derived from its application in restricted 
(synthetic) cases.
Commentators such as Couturat (1905/1914, 20) and Lewis noted, after Neurath 
and Hahn, the methodological value of the formal symmetry in the law of duality 
for the derivation of theorems. According to the principle of duality, from each valid 
general formula in a system of logic, another true one may be derived by exchanging 
signs for operations of addition and subtraction with signs for multiplication and 
division, and the symbol 1 with 0 (see Schröder 1877, 3).14 Based on the principle, 
the axioms, definitions and theorems are organized in dual columns. Despite the nod 
to axiomatic standard, the application is rather loose, especially by contrast with 
formalizations by Peano, borrowing Schröder’s symbolic notation, and then 
Hilbert.15 Schröder would give the parallel presentation of dual statements a central 
place in the Vorlesungen (Fig. 11.1.).
13 Peirce (1867, 251) had noted in passing such parallelism between the laws of union, or disjunc-
tion, and intersection, or conjunction, and was stressed by his student Christine Ladd (1880).
14 Schröder (1873, 146) noted that the key notion was contained in the statement about the general 
character of the product of indeterminate quantities, in the Lehrbuch.
15 Peckhaus (2004, 585–588) calls Schröder’s geometry-inspired approach quasi-axiomatics; 
unlike derived principles, especially inductive ones such as duality, axioms are formal to the extent 
that they are derived from self-evident intuitions.
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Among the axioms and definitions three are fundamental (Schröder 1873, 5):
 – Definition of equality (between two or more class symbols): two symbols are 
equal if they are different names for the same class.
 – Axiom (of reflexivity): every symbol is equal to itself.
 – Axiom (of transitivity of equality): if two symbols are equal to a third, they are 
also equal to each other.
Other axioms introduced the operations of addition and multiplication, their 
separate commutativity and associativity and their joint distributivity, the identity 
operation (aa = a, a + a = a) and the complementary or negation symbol (aa1 = 0 and 
a + a1 = 1). Schröder’s axiomatic approach to establishing the independence and 
primitiveness of propositions appeared clearly in his proof of Peirce’s law of 
distributivity for (logical) addition and multiplication, a(b + c) = ab+ac, arguing that 
the reverse direction cannot be proven and hence must be introduced as a separate 
axiom.16
Among the theorems is the so-called Schröder’s theorem: xa + ya1 = 0 is equiva-
lent to xy = 0 and a = ux1 + y, with u an arbitrary class. Alternatively, for ax+bx1 = 0, 
the indeterminate concept x lies between a1 and b (see Couturat 1905/1914, 39).
This system derived directly, but only partially, from the system of algebra he 
would call in the Vorlesungen the ‘identical calculus’ (Schröder 1890a, 157–167). 
On the algebraic model that had inspired the system in Operationskreis, equality by 
definition – nominal definition – became reduced to equalities between terms as 
rules of substitution that, like the kinds of equations in the Lehrbuch he had classified 
as formal, analytic equations, in the extensional interpretation meant they are just 
equalities valid for all values (Schröder 1873, 359).
Along with the identical calculus and the principle of duality – and the dual pre-
sentation for operations + and x –, in the Vorlesungen Schröder reintroduced the 
relation of subsumption, the asymmetric meaning of the copula in ‘a is b’  – 
‘gold = metal’ – he had introduced in the Lehrbuch along with the symbol for it, € 
(and its mirror image, for ‘metal = gold’). The relation completed the foundation of 
the system of logical calculus. Like the relation of equality, it was grounded in the 
16 Schröder presented the proof first at the 1883 meeting of the British Association of the 
Advancement of Science along with a summary of the laws for algebraic operations he had estab-
lished in 1877 (see Schröder 1884a and 1884b).
Fig. 11.1 Dual statements in Vorlesungen (1890a, 196), vol. 1
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following principles Schroder introduced as theorems (see also Peckhaus 2004, 
573):
 – Principle of identity (his term) (or of reflexivity): a € a.
 – Principle (of transitivity): if a € b, and b € c, then a € c.
 – Principle (of distributivity): if bc = 0, then a(b + c) € ab +ac.
The extensional relation of equality became derivative in the algebraic way he 
had introduced in the Lehrbuch: if a € b and b € a, then a = b (Schröder 1890a, 184). 
The algebraic roots introduce a tension, noted by Husserl in his extensive review 
and more recently Grattan-Guinness, insomuch as Schröder insisted again that the 
subsumption symbol denotes both inclusion and equality, thus challenging the 
independence of subsumption from equality, if not its primacy. But this is only a 
notational inadequacy rooted in the analogy with Grasmmann’s general relation of 
non-identity, symbolized by ≤. In fact, in the Vorlesungen Schröder provided 
frequent examples of propositions and their relations in terms of inequalities. From 
the logical, not linguistic standpoint, subsumption became a model of inference 
between valid propositions, or in Schröder’s innovative term, the foundation of the 
propositional calculus.
After devoting the second volume of the Vorlesungen to the logical calculus of 
propositions (Schröder 1891), in the third volume Schröder (1895) developed the 
algebra of relatives, that is, relational concepts or elements in the domain of thought. 
For instance, the first domain of thought is represented by a logical sum, or 
disjunction, over all it elements. Then a second domain can be constructed out of 
pairs of elements, i/j from the first in a certain ordered relation and represented by 
the sum over the pairs. The general form includes coefficients, aij, with values of 
either 0 or 1 that, for the purpose of solving a problem involving systems of equations 
for a system of relatives, Schröder represented with matrices.17
The representation of relatives would allow the formal and systematic represen-
tation and calculation of basic concepts not just in mathematics, but also in the logi-
cal analysis – and calculus – of human relations in, for instance, political economy 
and jurisprudence.18
Based on its relevance to two connected projects, the significance of relatives is 
twofold. First, attention to the formal representation and calculation of relations was 
the basis for strengthening the relevance of (modern) logic to (modern) mathematics, 
especially, as Frege, Russell and Whitehead showed, in the project of logicism. For 
Schröder, the algebra of relatives would ultimately support a logic of relatives; both 
were interpretations of the formal general theory of connections or absolute algebra 
as a foundation for all of science. In line with Frege’s own project, Schröder 
extended the application of the calculus of relatives to arithmetic and declared as a 
goal the logical definition of number as a relative – ‘number of’ – and the deduction 
of all propositions about the concept. Pure mathematics would become “only one 
branch of general Logic” (Schröder 1898b, 46; see Peckhaus 2004, 597–598).
17 See Dipert (1978, 287–318), Grattan-Guinness (2000, 170–72), and Peckhaus (2004, 591–96).
18 By this time, discussions of logic included examples of human relationships and even a calculus 
such as Alexander Macfarlane’s, extending Leibniz’s combinatorial discussions; see Peckhaus 
(2004, 596, n.54).
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Second, also in relation to Frege and more important for this paper, there is the 
relation to the tradition of artificial universal languages. Interest in such languages 
was revived in the seventeenth century mainly for religious and intellectual reasons 
and especially popular in Europe at the turn of the twentieth century for intellectual 
and political ones. For Schröder, the symbolic representation and formal 
understanding of basic relative concepts in the different sciences aimed at the con-
nected ideals of an absolute algebra and a scientific universal language.
11.3.3  Logic Meets Political Economy. From Boole and Jevons 
to Schröder’s Algebra and Pasigraphy.
In this section I examine how Jevons’ and Schröder’s attention to language and 
reasoning set a standard for the connection of mathematics, logic and economics so 
that Neurath’s own case will become more persuasive and also more distinctive.
In relation to Leibniz’s ideal of general science and theory of signs (ars combi-
natoria), with the combination of universal rational language (characteristica uni-
versalis) and the mechanical calculus of reasoning (calculus ratiocinator), 
Schröder’s theory of relatives sought to provide both the semantical part, the 
symbolic language, and the syntactical part, the calculus (Peckhaus 2004, 
598–599).
Already in the introduction to his school handbook, Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und 
Algebra (1873), Schröder had introduced the science of number in terms of the 
construction and manipulation of a sign language (‘Zeichensprache’). Then, in Der 
Operationskreis (1877), the emphasis on the logic of operations associated Leibniz – 
and Boole – with the logical calculus; he was relying on an account of Leibniz’s 
theory of signs by the philosopher and philologist Adolf Trendelenburg (1867).
Also Frege (1879) appealed to Trendelenburg’s account of Leibniz’s ideal in the 
preface to the Begriffsschrift. Frege pointed to Leibniz’s ideal of a general calculus 
ratiocinator, noting that it depended on a general system of clear and precise 
notation. The language would exhibit how the structure of propositions could 
express meaning (van Heijenoort 1967a). It is from Trelendenburg’s text that Frege 
borrowed the term ‘Begriffsschrift,’ or conceptual script or notation, for his more 
limited version, for arithmetic, of Leibniz’s project.19
In 1880, Schröder (1880, 81) published a review of Frege’s book in which he 
shared Frege’s Leibnizian ideals but criticized him for concentrating on the logical 
calculus at the expense of the universal characteristic, the universal theory of signs 
expressing the universal classification that included algebraic signs and he now 
referred to as Leibniz’s ideal of pasigraphy (general script). Frege replied defending 
the language component of his project in terms of the Leibnizian distinction, this 
time borrowing Trendelenburg’s term lingua characterica (see van Heijenoort 
1967b, 1, and Peckhaus 2004, 599).
19 See van Heijenoort’s introduction to the translation of the Begriffsschrift in van Heijenoort 
(1967b, 1 n. b).
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In the first volume of the Vorlesungen, Schröder emphasized, again in relation to 
Leibniz – and now also Descartes –, quoting Trendelenburg, the significance of a 
symbolic language for algebra and logic as a sign language that constituted a 
scientific universal language and expressed Leibniz’s the logical ideal of pasigraphy. 
The latter he distinguished from the linguistic ideal of a world language such as the 
popular Volapük (Schröder 1890a, 93–95).
The same year, he gave a formal address at the technical school in Baden-Baden 
titled “Über das Zeichen.”20 There he combined Trendelenburg’s history of 
philosophy with accounts from philology, psychology and biology (Darwin’s among 
others) to defend the general claim that human intelligence and civilization, with the 
reach of intellectual and practical goals, depended on the designative or symbolizing 
human activity, their use of signs standing for things. In particular, Schröder 
claimed, language and reason are inseparable.21 This capacity, he claimed, animals 
possess in a much lesser degree.22 In particular, the valuable use of linguistic signs 
stems from their introduction by the mind through the exercise of the capacities of 
association (similarity) and abstraction (selection or isolation) (see Schröder 1892, 
3442). In the ideal language, borrowing words from Trendelenburg quoted in the 
Vorlesungen, signs stand in a more perfect and law-governed connection with 
things:
A designation of this character, if extended over the whole field of the objects of thought, 
will, in contrast to the verbal sign, in its present greater or less indifference to the contents 
of mental images, be a figurative language of the ideas of the mind, an ideographic language, 
and, as opposed to the special languages of the nations of the world, a universal language of 
the thing, a pasigraphy. (Schröder 1892, 3444; original emphasis.)
For Schröder, however, Leibniz’s ideal of pasigraphic science remained that, an 
ideal. He made the point in relation to Frege’s Begriffsschrift and in the same terms 
in reply to Peano’s optimistic statement, introducing his Formulaire de Mathématique 
in 1894, that “le problème proposé par Leibniz est (donc) resolu” (quoted in 
Schröder 1898b, 45). While, interestingly, Frege and Peano present their respective 
projects in relation to Leibniz’s, Leibniz’s problem, according to Schröder, remained 
the following:
[E]xpressing all the notions which it comprises, adequately and in the concisest possible 
way, through a minimum of primitive notions, say “categories,” by means of purely logical 
operations of general applicability, thus remaining the same for every branch of science and 
being subject to the laws of ordinary Logic, but which latter [sic] will present themselves in 
the shape of a “calculus ratiocinator.” (Schröder 1898b, 46; original emphasis.)
In terms of language, he added, for “the categories and operations of this ‘lingua 
characteristica’ or ‘scriptura universalis’ easy signs and simple symbols, such as 
20 See Schröder (1890b), which appeared translated in The Open Court in 1892 as “Signs and 
Symbols,” see Schröder (1892).
21 Here he was following both Lambert and the philologist Max Müller.
22 The essay deserves close comparison with the symbolic, or semiotic, approach in both Mach’s 
Contributions to the Analysis of Sensations, of 1886, and Peirce’s subsequent writings on 
semiotics.
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letters, are to be employed, and – unlike the ‘words’ of common language – they are 
to be used with absolute consistency” (Schröder 1898b, 46; see also Schröder 1880, 
81–82).
My purpose in this subsection is not to highlight only the way Schröder’s project 
of algebraic logic was inseparable from his commitment to Leibniz’s (and 
Descartes’) philosophical ideal of a universal language. I want to highlight the 
neglected relation of Schröder’s presentation of his language and calculus of logic 
to ideas in political economy.23 Both dimensions set an enabling precedent for 
Neurath’s own projects and, in particular, for the significance and limitations of ide-
als of universal language and rational calculation.
The relation of algebraic logic to economic theory preceded Schröder, as he him-
self noted. In An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854), Boole had stated that 
propositions connecting universal terms, as in the case of scientific definitions, their 
symbolic expressions can be connected by the equality sign; in other words, the 
proposition can be expressed by an equation. Then mathematical operations help 
explore conceptual relations. According to Nassau William Senior, wealth “consists 
of things transferable, limited in supply, and either productive of pleasure or preven-
tive of pain” (Boole 1854, 59). If w = wealth, t = things transferable, s = limited in 
supply, p = productive of pleasure and r = preventive of pain, then w can be expressed 
as w = st (p + r(1-p)) (see Boole 1854, 60, 106 and ff.). The mathematical manipula-
tion of variables allowed Boole to derive different conclusions about w.
The case of Jevons is more telling and would find a place both in Schröder’s and 
Neurath’s projects.24 Jevons’ interest in logic was inseparable from the question of its 
relation to mathematics, as he had learned from Boole and De Morgan. They had 
looked to algebra and the differential calculus and attempted to make the former the 
basis for the logical calculus of reasoning. In the same algebraic tradition of Leibniz, 
Jevons also linked the project of logic to the linguistic project of a universal symbolic 
language that would underpin logical reasoning and its application in the empirical 
sciences. He called this universal system of symbols first, in 1874, the logical abece-
darium and subsequently, in 1877, the logical alphabet (Jevons 1874 and 1877).
Also after Leibniz’s example, the universal language could be manipulated 
through permutation and combination in an ars combinatoria that rendered logic an 
objective mechanical science (Jevons 1874, vol 1., p. 198). With the right rules, this 
would in turn contribute to the mechanization of logical operations in the model of 
previous attempts to mechanize mathematical operations in the form of calculating 
machines.25 Thus he referred to a logical abacus and more generally the logical 
machine (Jevons 1874, 119–129). Schröder himself followed Jevons on many 
23 Also in this respect Schröder’s writings should be compared to Mach’s and his appeal to a prin-
ciple of economy of thought, rejected by philosophers such as Husserl and Jerusalem as an expres-
sion of psychologism, especially in matters of logic, the paradigmatic case of a priori; see Kusch 
(1995).
24 I am grateful to Margaret Schabas for drawing my attention to the role of logic in connection to 
mathematics and its application in economics.
25 The project was much in line with the standard set by the optimistic industrial culture of machines 
and engines prompted by the Industrial Revolution and placed at the heart of the economy. Jevons 
mentioned attempts by Blaise Pascal, Arthur Colmar, Charles Babbage and Alfred Smee (Jevons 
1874, 123–124).
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points, emphasized the mechanical nature of logical and mathematical calculations 
and the value of substitutions and, especially, elimination for the sake of solving 
logical problems by analogy with solving mathematical equations; and he explicitly 
discussed and applied Jevon’s combinatorial method.26
What Jevons sought was a mechanical method of acquiring scientific knowledge 
from experience that stood between the informal inductive logic defended differently 
by Mill and Whewell and the formal deductive logic defended and articulated by 
Boole and De Morgan (Schabas 1990, 54). The difficulty stemmed from adopting 
the algebraic formulation of logic and the assumption that mathematics – and the 
other sciences – was somehow founded on logic (Jevons 1874, vol. 1, p. 154)27: 
“The mathematician is only strong and true as long as he is logical, and if number 
rules the world, it is logic which rules number.” Quality precedes quantity, he added.
Logic was for Jevons both normative, and, after Leibniz, a precondition of rea-
soning, and also, after Boole and physical psychologists David Hartley and 
Alexander Bain, a branch of psychology grounded in the empirical study of the laws 
of thought. After Leibniz’s precedent, the normative character of logic, and of 
mathematics, was inseparable from its connection to reality and the possibility of its 
knowledge. The relation is mediated by the linguistic dimension and rests on the 
respective empirical connections between signs and thoughts and thoughts and 
things, so that Jevons (1874, vol. 1, p. 9) could claim that the immediate object of 
logic, and of mathematics, are signs and the indirect ones the others.
For Jevons, the psychological laws of thought stem from the exercise of powers 
of the mind, after Bain, namely, identity, discrimination and retention. Accordingly, 
Jevons (1869) would introduce as basic the laws of identity (whatever is, is), 
contradiction (a thing cannot be and not be) and duality (a thing must either be or 
not be). The central place for the concept of equality  – whether in the form of 
similarity or identity – Jevons expressed symbolically, after Boole, with the equality 
sign from algebraic equations.
The role of equations placed as a central principle of logic and mathematics the 
principle of substitution of similars in thought and language: reasoning in general, 
proceeds by the substitution of logically equivalent terms – and thoughts – as in 
mathematical calculation equations between signs substitute equivalent numbers, 
variables or functions. The principle also served the process of reasoning by 
deduction understood by Boole as a process of elimination of known terms, which 
in the analogy to mathematics, implied the elimination of known quantities in order 
to determine the value of the unknown quantity.
Logic and mathematics here rely on an extensional interpretation. And Jevons 
could apply the law of duality in a series of combinatorial substitutions to generate 
mechanically the logical space fixed by 2n combinations of logically possible terms, 
26 See, for instance, Schröder (1890a), Lesson 40, sect 26 and especially Appendix 6.
27 The tension between the roles of mathematics and logic is discussed in Schabas (1990, Ch. 4.), 
and in Mosselmans (2007, Ch. 4.). The value of Boole’s system, according to Jevons, lied only in 
an analogy between mathematics and logic, so that logic is the algebra of two terms, 0 and 1 
(Jevons 1874, vol. 2, 293).
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positive and negative – the logical abacus. The result, Jevons hoped, was a ‘natural 
classification’ that supported and unified proper empirical knowledge.
The path from quality to quantity, from logic to mathematics, depended on the 
path from intension to extension through his problematic analysis of the notion of 
number. Also here the symbolic or linguistic dimension becomes prominent as is the 
psychology of experience. The application of signs alongside the extensional 
interpretation of terms provides the framework for his doctrine of units distinguished, 
psychologically, in space and time and named accordingly. Unity is an abstraction 
that a general term applies to each object in the extension. Schröder would adopt a 
similar view. And Frege, seeking a rigorous articulation of logicism, criticized them 
both accordingly:
If we use 1 to stand for each of the objects to be numbered, we make he mistake of assigning 
the same symbol to different things. But if we provide the 1 with differentiating strokes, it 
becomes unusable for arithmetic. (Frege 1884/1968, 50.)
Frege criticized Schröder explicitly also on account of the particular psychologi-
cal role of symbols in his account of mathematics Schröder introduced in his so-
called axiom of Symbolic Stability: “it guarantees us that throughout all our 
arguments and deductions the symbols remain constant in our memory – or prefer-
ably on paper” (Frege 1884/1968, xxi).28 Nevertheless, the criticism stood alongside 
Frege’s own commitment to the ideal of universal language, the characteristica 
universalis, of the Leibnizian project of the logical calculus. In particular, it must be 
considered in relation to his own project of a logical notation, the Begriffschrift 
(Frege 1879), and, finally, in his own philosophy of language, with a distinction 
between sense and reference that sought to prevent relations of identity from col-
lapsing into relations of symbolic equality and rules for substitution (Frege 
1892/1980). Instead, it was Neurath who would allow for such a collapse from a 
psychological, typographic standpoint (see below).
The relevance of logic to Jevons’ political economy followed the relation of logic 
to mathematics and the unity of the sciences: “logic is the superior science, the 
general basis of mathematics as well as of all the other sciences” (Jevons 1874, vol. 
1, 156). In order to think of economics as founded in logic, Jevons sought first to 
understand economics as a mathematical and not just a logical science, that is, based 
on considerations of occurrence and absence and of reasoning that are quantitative, 
and not just qualitative, matters of degree (Jevons 1871, 8). Therefore, a theory of 
economic quantities required a mathematical science. Mathematics, then, facilitated 
the logical foundation of economics as a rational calculus.
Even if Jevons intended economics as an empirical science, a logical foundation 
would justify the application of algebra (besides the calculus), which, in turn, 
facilitated deductive reasoning and a quasi-axiomatic construction after the 
application of the geometrical standard of deductive structure to mechanics (that is, 
28 Before his Leibnizian commitment to pasigraphy, Schröder had embraced this symbolic and 
typographic standpoint in the Lehrbuch der Arithmetik und Algebra (1873).
J. Cat
265
along the lines of Mill’s methodological monism). Jevons’ concerns clearly followed 
in the footsteps of British methodologists such as John Herschel, J.S.  Mill and 
William Whewell. Both pure mathematics and its application in physics and 
economics are based on the mechanical nature of objective formal logic and, in 
particular, on the ideal of a natural classification, which for Jevons rested on the 
application of the general principle of substitution of similars through the use of 
equations (see Schabas 1990, Ch. 5. and especially Mosselmans 2007, Ch. 4.). The 
application of substitution was relevant because it was general, and it was general 
because it was ultimately a general conceptual, qualitative activity underpinning the 
very method of inquiry, acquisition and application of general scientific knowledge: 
“The whole value of science consists in the power which it confers upon us of 
applying to one object the knowledge acquired from like objects” (Jevons 1874, 1).
Then the logical framework licensed the use of analogies between physics and 
economics as well the bridge between qualities and quantities by adopting units of 
economic experience: pleasure and pain. The extensional interpretation of terms 
raised the additional issue of relating variables representing quantitative features of 
individuals to features of groups that embody general quantities and general 
relations between them. The solution involved the application of concepts and 
techniques involving probabilities and statistics such as the so-called fictitious mean 
and the law of large numbers.
Indeed, economics, wrote Jevons, is the ‘calculus of pleasure and pain’ quanti-
fied along the dimensions of intensity and duration of feeling – the psychology of 
utility from Bentham. And utility was the net outcome of pleasure minus the pain in 
the relation between a commodity and its consumer. Jevons formulated the theory 
of economic exchange, the fundamental phenomenon in his theory, in terms of rela-
tions of inequality between utility values of something to someone, which he 
expressed by means of the symbols of equality and inequality (like Fechner 
expressed the psychophysical relation of stimulus intensities in similar terms). 
Prices for a certain quantity express the relation of balance and equality in the mind, 
and, as a result, economics, according to Jevons, was a branch of mathematical 
psychology. Still, the methodology of economics, its so-called logic, was based, as 
it was for Mill, on the physical, or concrete deductive method. For its application, 
Jevons (1871) relied on indirect measurement of utility and analogies to phenomena 
of equilibrium and motion in classical mechanics (see also Schabas 1990, Ch. 5. and 
Mosselmans 2007, Ch 4.).
Schröder introduced both an economic standpoint on the role of symbolic lan-
guage and economic illustrations of the application of his algebraic formalism. As I 
have suggested above, he was partly following Mach’s bio-economic analysis of 
cognition. With intelligence, Schröder, declared, comes the possibility of dishon-
esty and fraud. And the use of a sign, he added, is ‘an artful act of dishonesty,’ 
namely, we replace the thing with a name or sign, much like we exchange the thing 
for a bank note (Schröder 1892, 3441). In order to avoid fraud, he continued, we 
need to establish a form of equivalent compensation, a form of mental equation so 
that the sign “is equalised by its user substituting in thought for the sign at the 
proper time the thing itself; by his constantly associating with the sign, with absolute 
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logical consequence, the notion of the thing” (ibid.). Any departure from logical 
consequence is, in that sense, “like a declaration of insolvency by a bank or by a 
merchant who does not cash on presentation the notes or drafts issued by him.” In 
other words, it is a form of “intellectual bankruptcy” (ibid.). Once the reliable 
mechanism of coordination (denomination) is in place, the art of describing reality 
can benefit from an increase in the number of signs or terminology. In a later essay, 
“On Pasigraphy,” he called it ‘capital of denotation’ (in the original, 
‘Bezeichnungskapital’), with the added note in the English version stating that 
“‘Capital’ is here to be taken in the sense of Adam Smith and Political Economy,” 
namely, the part of someone’s stock expected to afford him revenue (Schröder 
1898a, b, 55).
Economic terminology appeared also throughout the Vorlesungen. There he used 
again the terms ‘Beweiskapital’ (Schröder 1890a, 310), ‘wissenschaftliches Kapital’ 
(1890a, 378), ‘Wort-Kapital’ (1895, 172) and ‘Erkenntniskapital’ (1895, 217), since 
the logical benefit relies on investing the capital of signs (“Kapital order Vorrat an 
Zeichen, über welche der Kalkul verfügt,” ibid. 196). With an appropriate system of 
signs, correct logical inference and separating truth from error become best exercised 
with “the greatest possible saving of mental labor’ and ‘provident economy’” 
(Schröder 1892, 3443).
In the Vorlesungen, Schröder also engaged in the application of the symbolic 
universal language and its rules to economic concepts, even for the purpose of 
rational calculation and potential decision-making. But this is hardly alien to his 
own predecessors in his constructed historical tradition of pasigraphy and algebraic 
logic.
Explaining the practical value of signs, he quoted Leibniz at length describing 
the social value of signs in communication and the individual value in the convenient 
internal management of a large number of thoughts, or mental images of things. 
Leibniz presented the situation as a sort of mental economy, by analogy with the 
practice in large trading cities of not exchanging even money (‘Geld’), but symbolic 
tokens such as stamps or records (Schröder 1890a, 40).
With the use of the symbolic language of mathematical signs, the calculus of 
reasoning aims to formulate conceptual problems in logic as algebraic problems to 
be solved through the application of rules governing algebraic operations. Among 
his examples, Schröder (1890a, 557–558) included Boole’s analysis of the concept 
of wealth discussed above.
Schröder contributed problems of his own that sought to show how the manipu-
lation of symbolic language could clarify or simplify instructions in order to enforce 
them. One of them concerns a practical matter of political economy in relation to 
wartime: “On a strategic railway, it is forbidden for a certain time to transport all 
goods except those which may serve war purposes if they are explosive or not 
intended for the coal and steel industry, and those which are intended for the coal 
and steel industry if they are not explosive or not useful for war purposes. The trans-
port ban is to be simplified” (Schröder 1890a, 376–377). His solution involved the 
introduction of variables a = useful for war purposes, b = explosive and c = intended 
for the mining industry. Then, applying Peirce’s law of distributivity, the transporta-
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tion rule is a(b + c|) + c(b| + a|), where ‘|’ indicates negation. Applying a dual theo-
rem, he then derived the expression a(b + c|) + c(b| + a|) = a + c (Schröder 1890a, 
377).
11.4  Vienna, on the Foothills of the Icy Slopes of Logic
In this section I examine briefly and more broadly the rising relation of logic to 
psychology in the German-speaking academic landscape, especially in Austria. My 
purpose is to extend the record of intellectual sources with authors such as Mach, 
Petzoldt, Wundt and Stöhr and of academic opportunities such as the philosophy 
curriculum at the University of Vienna all of which paved the way for Neurath’s 
acquaintance with logic, his research and his sense for its empirical application − 
especially challenging in the human sciences –, also  the rhetorical use of its 
historical protagonists and its broader methodological value – especially in relation 
to the role of logical analysis in the context of logical empiricism.
In the wake of Hegel’s death in 1831, the rise of psychologism (on its path to 
experimental psychology) marked the rise of scientific philosophy in opposition to 
speculative philosophy in mental sciences such as logic, epistemology, ethics and 
aesthetics. This form of naturalism replaced more generic forms of materialism in 
philosophy, urging that philosophical questions and answers be engaged on the 
grounds of “results” from empirical psychology and cultural history. For instance, 
an explanatory, genetic method aimed to replace the normative, critical, 
transcendental method in the Kantian tradition and to reformulate its problems 
accordingly: Helmholtz, Sigwart, Mach, Brentano, Wundt, etc. (see Kusch 1995). 
Perhaps the most contentious case was the application of this program to psychology. 
Psychologism, as critics labeled it, concerned the controversial process of an 
increasingly problematized relationship between experimental psychology and the 
discipline of philosophy.
It was Wilhelm Wundt who, besides having been recognized as responsible for 
the institutionalization of experimental psychology, has been considered the most 
important figure in the institutionalization of psychologism in relation to philosophy 
(Kusch 1995, 125–134). Out of his laboratory came, for instance, most experimental 
psychologists holding chairs in philosophy at German universities. For Wundt 
(1906), philosophy was devoted to the study of the genesis and systematic structure 
of scientific knowledge. The first volume of his Logik begins precisely engaging the 
late-nineteenth century debate over the unity of the sciences, natural and human – 
‘Naturwissenschaften’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ –, now extended to their own 
relation to philosophy. Wundt adopted a monistic perspective related to Mach’s, 
claiming that the interrelation of different forms of knowledge simple expresses the 
diversity of perspectives on the common domain of experience. It is worth noting 
that to the third edition of Logik he added a third volume devoted to the logic of the 
human sciences, which would be decisive in Neurath’s methodological thought 
(Wundt 1908).
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Unlike Mach, whose principle of economy of thought Wundt (1907, 301) pre-
sented in the second volume, Wundt considered psychology as an empirical human 
science, coordinated with the natural sciences such as physiology, but not reducible 
to them. From that standpoint, psychology provided the grounds for establishing of 
general laws of thought from psychological facts and logic, part of the same induc-
tive process, presents them in their regulative objective form: “Logic has to account 
for the laws of thought which are effective in scientific knowledge” (Wundt 1906, 1; 
quoted in Kusch 1995, 128).
As quantification was central to his defense of the scientific empirical nature of 
psychology, mathematics, especially algebra, provided a model that extended to 
logic itself. It is not surprising, then, that in this spirit he devoted a chapter to the 
algebraic tradition, focused on the quantification of concepts and logical equations. 
Along the way he mentioned its main protagonists, from Leibniz to Boole, Jevons, 
Venn, Peirce and Schröder. In the first edition, Wundt (1880, 221) mentioned 
Schröder’s Logikkalkuls, while in the second and third, he cited the Vorlesungen 
(Wundt 1893, 250 and 1906, 249). Schröder himself had followed partly in Wundt’s 
footsteps, consistent with the psychological underpinnings of Boole’s project, and 
cited the first edition of the Logik.29
In Austria, as well as in Germany, the end of the nineteenth century marked the 
consolidation of experimental psychology as a discipline and its intellectual 
visibility and authority grew with the proliferation of alternative schools and projects 
such as psychophysics, child psychology, Gestalt psychology and psychoanalysis. 
Authors labeled – or denounced as – psychologists up to 1910 included Brentano 
and his school (Stumpf, Meinong, Höfler and others), members of the empiriocritical 
school (Mach, Avenarius, Petzoldt) and even the object theorists (Meinong, 
Ehrenfels, Höfler).
Philosophy in Vienna became taught and promoted in the areas of metaphysical, 
historical and scientific philosophy. The central academic positions became chairs 
in natural philosophy, history of philosophy and psychology. Stadler (2001, 78) has 
stressed the intellectual and academic roles of a fundamental polarization between 
scientific and metaphysical philosophies. The rise of scientific philosophy took 
place alongside the rise in prestige and success of scientific disciplines such as 
biology, physics, experimental psychology and the social sciences. From a 
methodological standpoint, this approach to philosophy combined different 
empiricist standards and formal standards, with attention to logic, mathematics and 
language, especially linguistic analysis and criticism.
In addition, on the philosophical front, the rise of scientific philosophy took 
place alongside the Catholic intellectual tradition emphasizing metaphysics, 
scholasticism and history, free from a (Protestant) sustained tradition of idealism 
and its later expression in neo-Kantianism, Herbatianism – or ‘psycho-philosophy’ – 
and radical versions of phenomenology.
It was the interest and precedents in the form of subjectivism and speculative 
metaphysics that would prompt the application of scientific philosophy with new, 
29 Partly in association with Mill; see Schröder (1890a, 177).
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critical forms of objectivism and realism, most visibly first by the rationalist Bernard 
Bolzano inspired by Leibniz and grounded in exact logical and linguistic standards, 
and then his followers such as Robert Zimmermann and Kasimir Twardowski. 
Zimmermann applied the formalist standpoint to aesthetics and Twardowski applied 
it to phenomenology and, after leaving Vienna for Lwów, encouraging the 
development of logic (and the formation of the influential Lwów-Warsaw school of 
logic). Subsequently, the new objectivism became gradually grounded on more 
empirical scientific standards, visibly first by Brentano, in the footsteps of Bolzano 
and Leibniz, and his followers, and then by Mach and his followers in Vienna and 
also in Berlin such as Joseph Petzoldt. By the end of the century, in Vienna, other 
influential thinkers in those constellations included Alois Höfler, Friedrich Jodl and 
Adolf Stöhr.30
At the University of Vienna scientific philosophy gained a stable position. Franz 
Brentano taught at the University of Vienna from 1874 to 1895 (demoted to 
Privatdozent in 1880 on account of his marriage). His work was launched and 
informed by traditional intellectualist interest in Aristotle and Leibniz, combining 
metaphysics and logic, alongside interest in the new experimental philosophy. Thus, 
Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (1874) was a leading contribution to the 
new psychologism, especially through his doctrine of intentionality of mental acts 
intending objects that might lack existence, which was perceived as a critical 
deflation of metaphysics. For Brentano, philosophy’s intellectual role was 
fundamentally of guidance and synthesis, in a formal Leibnizian sense. This position 
set a legacy of replacing subjectivism, scholastic speculative metaphysics with a 
synthesis of formal and empirical, traditional and modern, philosophical and 
scientific, specifically, through attention to Leibniz and experimental philosophy.
Meanwhile, educational reform around the mid-nineteenth century paved the 
way for the academic autonomy of philosophy and its social significance. For 
instance, the possibility of writing doctoral dissertations on philosophical topics 
since 1872 and their requirement as a criterion of academic appointment freed the 
discipline from clerical control. In addition, the new autonomy facilitated in turn the 
development of scientific philosophy and its role in social and political reform. Here 
education became particularly salient. The growing perception of the instrumental 
value of education beyond the growth of disciplinary autonomy and disciplinary 
resources led to a growing interest in education in relation to formal tools for 
thinking and as a subject matter in relation to experimental psychology. It led also 
to the proliferation of education projects and associations with shifting intellectual 
and social significance, e.g., the increasing emphasis on its use for social reform the 
distinctive culminating, in the wake of the Soviet Revolution, in the Red Vienna 
period, with its cultural associationism, child psychology and adult education.
Besides formal teaching and publications, scientific philosophy was established 
and popularized also through the activities of the Philosophical Society of the 
University of Vienna. It was founded in 1888 around followers of Franz Brentano 
30 For a general overview see Johnston (1972), Schorske (1979), Janik and Toulmin (1973), 
Blackmore et al. (2001) and Stadler (2001).
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such as Twardowski, a student of Brentano and Zimmermann, and Höfler, who 
trained as a physicist under Boltzmann, as a philosopher with Brentano and as a 
psychologist with Brentano’s student Alexius Meinong, and eventually occupied 
academic posts in Prague and since 1907 in Vienna as professor of science education. 
For instance, his book on logic was a psychological introduction to logic, originally 
titled Grundlehren der Logik (1896), but as a subtitle indicated, it was actually 
intended as an introductory textbook to philosophy, the so-called propaedeutics in 
philosophy (‘philosophischen Propädeutik’); a later edition was titled Grundlehren 
der Logik und Psychologie (1906). He nevertheless defended the notion that logic 
and mathematics were a priori forms of knowledge and, as a matter of psychology, 
only their application, but not their exact formulations or justification, might be 
determined by experience. Similarly, he defended the intellectual value of 
metaphysics to address unsolved scientific problems. As part of his educational 
efforts, Höfler also penned, for instance, a number of textbooks in physics. He 
considered it a discipline whose practice involved the empirical application of 
mathematical knowledge and was not informed by philosophy (see Blackmore et al. 
2001, 237–276).
The Philosophical Society was recurrently led by Höfler, until 1922, with periods 
of leadership by Zimmermann (1890–1898) and Friedrich Jodl (1903–1912). Höfler 
and Jodl shared a naturalistic emphasis on the philosophical value of science, 
especially the role of psychology, which for Höfler extended to the science of 
pedagogy and pedagogy in the sciences, and for Jodl extended to a monistic and 
evolutionary view of intellectual, ethical and religious life (Blackmore et al. 2001, 
especially 276–314). Höfler’s discussion of a lecture on comparison in physics by 
Mach in 1895 would help secure Mach’s appointment to Brentano’s chair. Later, 
after 1907, Hahn, Frank and Neurath, all likely to have been instructed by Höfler at 
some point, would be regular speakers.31
Despite the Society’s enabling role if the development of scientific philosophy, 
there was a sustained interest in idealism is exhibited by the fact that by 1927, under 
the neo-Kantian Robert Reininger, the Philosophical Society acted as part of the 
German Kant Society (Blackmore et al. 2001, 281; Stadler 2001, 79).
In 1895 the physicist Ernst Mach was appointed to Brentano’s old philosophy 
chair, renamed chair of ‘philosophy, in particular history and theory of the inductive 
sciences’ (Stadler 2001, 120). Mach stopped teaching in 1898 following a disabling 
stroke. In Analysis of Sensations (1886), Popular lectures (1896) and Knowledge 
and Error (1905), Mach introduced an avowedly anti-metaphysical, anti-subjectivist 
general scientific philosophy, centered on cognition, including science itself. His 
influential view postulated the existence of certain natural elements of psychological 
life (apprehended as sensations) and their representation by signs  – with the 
distinctive role for language, logic and mathematics –, and was framed within a 
combination of energeticist, economic and evolutionary biological perspectives. 
This framework was widely shared by Schröder, Stöhr and others, facilitating fur-
ther Neurath’s adoption of similar perspectives and an appreciation for logic.
31 For a record of titles for lecture delivered at the Philosophical Society see Reininger (1938) and 
Blackmore et al. (2001, 283–98).
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The physicist Ludwig Boltzmann returned to the physics professorship he had 
obtained at the University of Vienna in 1873, and left in 1876, eventually succeeding 
his teacher Joseph Stefan in 1894; leaving again in 1890 to return in 1902 to take 
over also Mach’ philosophy course, and effectively taking over Mach’s chair until 
the year of his suicide, in 1906. For Boltzmann philosophy was ultimately philosophy 
of science to the extent that it was already part and parcel of scientific practice, for 
instance, in physics, the attitude towards atomism as an issue that separated 
physicists themselves. He adopted a psychological attitude to the concept of atoms 
as pictures and fictions rather than mere signs or real entities (Planck’s position).
In the footsteps of Mach and Boltzmann, Adolf Stöhr, at the University of Vienna 
since 1885, was appointed to Mach’s chair in 1911 and occupied it until 1921. In the 
new tradition of scientific philosophy, psychology was central to Stöhr’s work, 
especially Mach’s psychology and anti-metaphysical critique of language. 
Perception was a matter of psychology grounded in physiology and physics; 
philosophy, including ethics and logic, rested on psychology and philosophy of 
language. From this standpoint, Schröder, Höfler and Stöhr placed the analysis of 
names at the heart of formal knowledge. Like Schröder, Stöhr also adopted the 
example set by the use of symbols and operations in algebra and, without referring 
to Schröder, used the title Algebra of Grammar (1898).
He collected his lectures in a textbook with the emblematic title, in the footsteps 
of Brentano and Höfler’s own, Lehrbuch der Logik in Psychologisiender Darstellung 
(1910). Stöhr’s text benefited from the posthumous publication in 1909 of the first 
part of Schröder’s Abriss, but he also referred to earlier texts and introduced key 
notions and symbols of Schröder’s formulation, including the extensional 
interpretation of logical equation and identity equation in terms of the application of 
different names to identical individuals or classes (Stöhr 1910, 128–130). In a 
special chapter on logical calculus he introduced principles and operations of alge-
braic logic such as mathematical substitution and places it within the history of a 
symbolic tradition in deductive logic, with references to Leibniz, Boole, Jevons, 
Peano and Venn (Stöhr 1910, Ch. VI.). Stöhr, we may say, was closely following 
Wundt’s Logik, which he referred to.
In Austria, as well as in Germany, then, also logic fell within the scope of psy-
chologism. The commitment to the methods and concepts of the sciences as intel-
lectual standards was reaching through the nineteenth century beyond the scientistic 
commitment to the resources of mathematics in Boole and others: logic as applied 
psychology or a branch thereof. The influence in this case of British empiricism 
became more powerful than the British appeal to mathematics in algebraic logic. 
From this standpoint, logicism, from Frege to Russell and Whitehead, would be 
considered a form of anti-psychologism.
Despite his teacher Bolzano’s attention to mathematical logic without psychol-
ogy, Brentano continued in the tradition of Aristotelianism and the psychological 
foundations of logic (both present partly in Boole and Schröder). Thus, Brentano 
introduced a phenomenological approach to judgments in logic. It included a theory 
of existential judgments with symbolic representation after Boole (‘+A’, A exists, 
and ‘–A’, A doesn’t exist), as well as his central concepts of mental presentation and 
intentionality.
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As I mentioned above, both Höfler and Stöhr followed Brentano’s example with 
different treatments, especially associating psychology and the more formal analysis 
of language. Logic found its renewed place in the development and the teaching of 
scientific philosophy, that is, as experimental and formal, associated with scientific 
concepts, methods and results. The emphasis on science and language connected 
doctrines old and new, from Aristotle to Leibniz, Boole and Schröder. In Höfler’s 
case, it is emblematic that he intended the teaching of logic and psychology to 
constitute the introduction to the discipline of philosophy. In Stöhr’s case, the 
references to Schröder’s works prior to 1909 suggests he would have been teaching 
ideas of algebraic logic in his logic lectures prior to the publication of the textbook. 
But his bibliography aimed also to include recent work, and thus it included, for 
instance, the paper by Olga Hahn and Neurath on Schröder’s discussion of Dualism 
(see below, and Stöhr 1910, 425 and 427; Hahn and Neurath 1909). Both Neurath 
and Hahn had likely already been by then in contact with Stöhr (see below).
From the standpoint of the visibility of logical treatments in relation to algebra 
and psychology, the first decade of the twentieth century closed with several 
landmark publications: the first volume of the third edition of Wundt’s Logik 
appeared in 1906, the second in 1907, the third in 1908; then Schröder’s posthumous 
Abriss was published in 1909–1910 and in 1910, Stöhr’s Lehrbuch.
The teaching of logic became part of curriculum that reflected the new intellec-
tual landscape, in which discussions of logic, mathematics, psychology and phi-
losophy were inseparably entwined. The register of philosophy lectures for the 
same decade shows that logic was taught through a system of rotation among the 
faculty that included Höfler, Jodl, Stöhr and Laurenz Müller.32 Müller was a Catholic 
priest teaching and writing in theology and philosophy of religion, but also inter-
ested in the philosophical significance of science, especially religious controversies 
such as the cases involving Galileo and Darwin’s theory of evolution. Among them 
four professors, logic was taught regularly, almost every year:
• Winter semester 1901/02: Logic and Epistemology (‘Erkenntnistheorie’), by 
Höfler.
• Summer semester 1902: Logic and Philosophy of Science (‘Wissenschaftslehre’), 
by Jodl.
• Summer semester 1903: Logic with Attention New Reform Attempts, by Müllner 
(and History of Philosophy, by Jodl).
• Summer semester 1904: Logic with Attention New Reform Attempts, by Müllner.
• Summer semester 1905: Logic and General Theory of Method (‘allgemeine 
Methodenlehre’), by Jodl, and Natural Philosophy, by Boltzmann.
• Winter semester 1905/06: Natural Philosophy, by Boltzmann and Stöhr.
• Summer semester 1906: Logic for Teacher Candidates (‘Logik für 
Lehramtskandidaten’), by Stöhr.
• Summer semester 1907: Logic and Theory of Method, by Jodl.
32 I am indebted to Professor Karl Sigmund for providing the information; see Öffentliche 
Vorlesungen an der k.k. Universität zu Wien, Archiv der Universität Wien.
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• Summer semester 1908: Logic with Attention New Reform Attempts, by Müllner, 
and Logic for Teacher Candidates (‘Logik für Lehramtskandidaten’), by Stöhr.
• Winter semester 1908/9: Logic with Didactics (‘Logik mit Didaktik’), by Höfler.
• Summer semester 1909: Jodl on Logic and General Philosophy of Science 
(‘allgemeine Wissenschaftslehre’), by Jodl.
• Summer semester 1910: Logic for Teacher Candidates, by Stöhr.
11.5  Enter Neurath and Olga Hahn
In this section I place Neurath and Olga Hahn mainly in the academic context out-
lined above and lay out Neurath’s early intellectual evolution prior to their work in 
logic in 1909–10. Besides the role of his personal and intellectual relation with Olga 
Hahn and her gradual loss of sight, I draw attention to Neurath’s acquaintance with 
logic as part of his polymathic education alongside interests in mathematics, natural 
sciences, languages and history, and his participation in more foundational and 
methodological debates about the sciences, especially in relation to the human or 
social sciences. Besides the question of the distinction between natural and human 
sciences, his work in political economy placed him in a conflict between, on the one 
hand, historical approaches to the human sciences and, on the other, formal – exact – 
and psychological approaches. His attempts and reasons to resolve the conflict 
would set the stage for his incipient considerations of the methodological roles of 
both history and scientific logic and their synthesis at the service of rational empiri-
cal theory and practical decision-making.
Neurath’s polymathic intellectual life and his inseparable commitment to social 
reform began at home. Otto Neurath’s father, Wilhelm Neurath (1840–1901), was a 
Hungarian Jew that, like so many Jews living within the confines of the diverse 
Austro-Hungarian Empire, sought a new life in to the more liberal capital. He 
earned two doctorates, one in philosophy at Vienna and the second in 
Staatswissenschaften at Tübingen, turning into a prolific author of works in political 
economy and teaching back in Vienna first at the Technische Hochschule and later 
at the Hochschule für Bodenkultur. His scholarship guided his social activism – 
which included the value of education. Most prominently, he proposed economic 
reforms that were grounded in an ethical and social criticism of the neo-classical 
concept of marginal utility, which he understood to undermine the realizability of an 
economy that prioritized the use-value of goods and aim at social welfare 
(M. Neurath and Cohen 1973, 1–4; Johnston 1972, 192–193; and Uebel 1995).
His intellectual and academic outlooks are reflected in a letter submitted to the 
University of Tübingen with his doctoral dissertation where he suggested references 
from the social historian Wilhelm Roscher, the museologist and advisor to the 
Ministry of Trade Franz Migerka,33 and the Rector of the University of Prague, 
33 Migerka was the organizer of a special exhibition on women at work at the Vienna World Fair of 
1873 and married Otto Neurath’s future maternal aunt.
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Ernst Mach (see M. Neurath and Cohen 1973, 1). Wilhelm Neurath’s ethical stand-
point in his theoretical work was much in the spirit of an anti-religious emphasis on 
personal and social values urged by the new Ethical Movement of Wilhelm Jerusalem 
and Friedrich Jodl. All in all, his son Otto had in his father a model of polymathic 
versatility, encyclopedic learning and reforming zeal (Johnston 1972, 192–193). 
These features characterized his father’s 13,000-volume library and father-son 
interactions (Neurath and Cohen 1973, 5).
Otto Neurath (1882–1945) began University studies in the fall of 1902. In fact, 
Neurath spent only two semesters at the University of Vienna, the 1902–3 winter 
semester and the 1903 summer semester. From the proportion of courses he enrolled 
in, it could be stated that his interests were mainly in mathematics and philosophy; 
but his voracious curiosity reached further.34 In his choice of subjects he replicated 
the polymathic education of his recently deceased father.35
During the first semester, his more than 40 h per week included lectures in math-
ematics, history of philosophy, moral theology, physics, chemistry, forensic psy-
chiatry, Greek mythology, comparative grammar (both in Indo-European languages 
and Arabic), and nineteenth-century literature.36 During the summer semester he 
took Müllner’s Logic with Attention New Reform Attempts, Jodl’s History of 
Philosophy, Müllner’s history of Philosophy of the Middle Ages, moral theology, 
experimental chemistry, world geography, European geography and an advanced 
course in Arab grammar.
During this period he became close with fellow students Hans Hahn and his sis-
ter Olga, already friends, Philip Frank and Anna Schapire, a student of history of 
German literature who would become Neurath’s first wife in 1907 (Neurath and 
Cohen 1973, 6).
He would soon be moving to Berlin after the summer of 1903 at the suggestion 
of his father’s friend the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies, and added political economy 
to his subjects in a combination with history characteristic of the so-called Historical 
School represented by Gustav Schmöller, Eduard Meyer and others (see Uebel 
2004, 12–30). The encounter with Tönnies and the decision that followed took place 
at the summer academy in Salzburg in 1903.
A report on the lectures and discussions was, significantly, Neurath’s first publi-
cation and an expression of his interest, in his father’s footsteps, in political econ-
omy, with distinctive combination of features that he considers interrelated: a 
historical perspective, a focus on “the connectedness of the social,” an expectation 
of logically consistent foundations and the attribution of technical value in the solu-
tion of social problems.37
34 The emphasis on mathematics is Marie Neurath’s in her note to Neurath’s memories (Neurath 
and Cohen 1973, 7). In a letter to his son Paul, Neurath placed the emphasis on the natural sciences 
to tell of his additional interest in the social sciences; see Uebel (2004, 16).
35 See W. Neurath’s autobiographical sketch, in Neurath and Cohen (1973, 2). W. Neurath died in 
March 1901.
36 I am indebted for this information to Karl Sigmund; see Otto Neurath’s Nationale for winter 
1902–3 and summer 1903, Archiv der Universität Wien.
37 Neurath (1903); see especially the translation of the first and last paragraphs in Uebel (2004, 16).
J. Cat
275
Tönnies’ advice that Neurath study under Meyer and Schmöller in Berlin was 
prompted by a seminar essay that Neurath wrote around the same time and succeeded 
in publishing early in 1904. The essay applied a historical interest in antiquity to the 
question, which had interested his father, of interest on money, that is, the price of 
credit.38 From a methodological standpoint, Neurath adopted a familiar approach: 
he declared that questions about the spread in the adoption of the practice of 
demanding a fixed percentage of borrowed capital required both a comparative 
study and the use of several sciences (Neurath 1904/2004, 112). His attention did 
not focus only on different relevant social conditions for the different introductions 
of interest practices, including Egyptian “provision in kind.” Another aspect stands 
out: the very topic concerns the decision to set a certain percentage as the calculation 
of a measure of value, loosely combines his growing focus on issues in economics 
with the longstanding interest in mathematical calculation and reasoning – the focus 
of algebraic logic.
In the same essay, Neurath also hinted at the broader issue of language from the 
standpoint of the textual analysis of historical sources and risk of anachronism in 
comparative analyses. The representation of facts required the sort of interpretive 
activity that philogists such as Augustus Böckh had introduced in historical method 
(Neurath 1904/2004, 111). By then German historicism had fully followed in the 
footsteps of critical history in the hands of philologists and Biblical interpreters. A 
decade later he would further remark that the task was no mere deductive matter of 
inferring facts and intentions from an author’s principles and, once in involved in 
logical empiricism defended the values, would continue defending the 
methodological values of interpretive methods such Weber’s Verstehen, although 
understood within the framework of empirical physicalism, free from metaphysical 
connotations.39 Of course, this was another example in which informed judgment 
had to tackle ambiguity and supplement mechanical calculation.
In 1906 in Berlin he wrote a dissertation under Eduard Meyer – and secondarily, 
Gustav Schmoller  – on the economic history of antiquity, with an emphasis on 
Greek and Roman economies, and a separate discussion of Cicero De Officiis, his 
treatise on moral obligations, especially of politicians. Already here Neurath 
introduced another methodological resource: having noticed that systematic patterns 
of economic reasoning emerge beyond legal reasoning and philosophical inquiries, 
he settled on the prior identification of possible forms of economic organization, not 
unlike the introduction of definition in the foundations of an axiom system, and then 
tracked their realization through antiquity. Any such possibilities might be actualized 
in historical recurrence, yet without controversial historiographical pitfalls such as 
anachronism or the search for general laws of development or cycles.
His Berlin period provided the opportunity for strengthening his appreciation of 
formal tools in addition to historicism. In the Lebenslauf submitted along with his 
1906 dissertation in Berlin, Neurath mentioned three teachers and thinkers: Tönnies, 
38 See Wilhelm Neurath’s textbook, W. Neurath (1896).
39 Uebel (forthcoming) elaborates on this apparent inconsistency in Neurath’s position and its con-
flict with the established accounts of logical positivism in Uebel.
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Simony and Itelson. Oskar Simony was a colleague of his father’s at the School of 
Agriculture engaged in research on topics as varied as algebraic topology, 
mathematical forestry and radiation. Gregorius Itelson was, according to Marie 
Neurath, “probably the strongest influence upon him at that time” (in Neurath and 
Cohen 1973, 7).
A Russian-born Socratic and encyclopedic figure, Itelson was the earliest trans-
lator of Einstein into Russian and a philosophy teacher to Russian immigrants in 
Berlin, tragically killed by the same anti-semitic violence that he fled after Russian 
pogroms of the 1880s (Freudenthal and Karachentsev 2011). Neurath described 
Itelson in a letter to Tönnies of 1906 praising his stimulating dialectical, Socratic 
attitude and his multidisciplinary scholarship, while lamenting his isolating bache-
lorhood (quoted in Freudenthal and Karachentsev 2011, 113). His dialectical 
approach to philosophizing opposed the practice of solipsistic reflection through 
monologues.
Concomitantly, Itelson adopted an objective, universal and aprioristic conception 
of logic and mathematics. Logic is the science of all objects, actual and possible, 
and not a theory of empirical laws or normative rules of thought, lacking in necessity 
in one case and truth in the other. Even Husserl, he declared, ended up in the hold of 
psychologism. He expressed these anti-psychologistic views publicly in two 
lectures, “The Reform of Logic” and “Logic and Mathematics,” before the attendants 
of the section “Logic and Philosophy of Science” at the International Congress of 
Philosophy of 1904  in Geneva. Mathematics, Itelson declared, is the science of 
ordered set-like objects. With these lectures, and his position on the scope of 
mathematics and logic, Itelson entered the debates on psychologism and the unity 
of science, and was later criticized accordingly by Husserl and Windelband 
(Freudenthal and Karachentsev 2011, 115–117). To mark his view, he introduced, 
along with Couturat and others, the term ‘logistic’ to designate technical symbolic 
logic – and also misleadingly suggesting logicism.
Itelson’s apriorism extended to the interpretation of relativity theory, in which 
space-time and causality involve the application of logical elements and relations to 
an empirical world. He assumed that empirical science would be unified by psycho- 
physics, albeit subjected to a neo-Kantian idealist critique. In the same vein, 
metaphysics could be criticized through a logical analysis of language within the 
framework of science, a critical development of Leibniz’s rationalism. For his 
doctrine he introduced the term “empirical rationalism.”
It’s not surprising that Neurath declared Itelson’s philosophy a close forerunner 
of the tenets of logical empiricism, at least as presented in the Vienna Circle's 
Manifesto. For Neurath (1937b/1983, 191) it represented the dual role of experience 
and formalism in the critique of rationalist metaphysics. With more general and less 
formal developments, it reinforced Neurath’s preoccupation with the terms of the 
unity of science debate, especially through the critique of metaphysics and this by 
means of a regimented universal language – that is, engineered and controlled in the 
pragmatic, technological attitude that for him connected thought and intervention –, 
something like his later index verborum prohibitorum (M. Neurath in Neurath and 
Cohen 1973, 7).
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It is significant that Neurath would choose to refer to Itelson to acknowledge the 
value of logic as well as mathematics. For instance, in relation to the unity of science 
in the scientific worldview, he noted that “it was important to develop an account of 
all the sciences using only one kind of ‘style’” and he “became convinced of the 
possibility of speaking about stars and about men with the same logical techniques 
and with the same scientific dispassionateness” (Neurath 1937a/1983, 178–179).
In relation to logical empiricism, more generally, Neurath emphasized the value 
of Itelson’s logical and mathematical critique of rationalism:
The “rationalism” that we rejected as metaphysical principle, as a supreme judge in Leibniz, 
is descending as it were to the level of science. The extent to which the auxiliary means of 
logic and mathematics are applicable when we wish to make predictions is shown to us 
precisely by experience. “Formal logic,” which is mocked so much, will now become a 
major tool of committed empiricists who, what is more, are setting out to conquer the whole 
domain of science and reserve no propositions for that which one once called “metaphysics.” 
Gregorius Itelson aptly named this attitude “Empirical Rationalism” in contradistinction to 
former “Metaphysical Rationalism.” (Quoted in Freudenthal and Karachentsev 2011, 119.)
In Berlin Neurath might have become acquainted also with the work of Mach’s 
follower Joseph Petzoldt, later founder of Berlin’s Positivist Society. Petzoldt had 
written in 1895 an influential essay defending Mach’s empiricist principle of 
causality in mechanics from Wundt’s critique. Like Itelson later, and Einstein 
himself after both of them, Petzoldt adopted a formal approach in the tradition that 
associated causality with determinism, namely, in terms of a law of univocality 
(Eindeutigkeit).40 In fact, this was part of a broader discussion of the application of 
mathematics through different uses and meanings of univocal equations, just as for 
Schröder it had been a formal matter of mathematical calculation and symbolic 
reasoning (see above). In the determination of physical events, according to Petzoldt, 
there is no ambiguity.
As Neurath’s intellectual perspectives became densely enriched, so were his 
experiences of empirical conditions and the decision to represent them for theoretical 
and practical uses. On his return to Vienna, in 1906 Neurath acquired his first 
military experience serving in the voluntary army corps (see Neurath and Cohen 
1973, 7–10). It would be his first exposure to military organization and its relation 
to war conditions, at least prior to his study of the Balkan Wars and the subsequent 
experience of World War One. This acquaintance added wartime situations to the 
historical laboratory of economic organizations and famously led him to the study 
and defense of economies in kind, that is, without recourse to universal monetary 
units for the calculation of economic equivalences and rational decisions. Meanwhile 
he undertook postdoctoral studies with Friedrich von Wieser and Eugen von Böhm- 
Bawerk, representatives of the Austrian School, on the formal marginalist doctrines 
of Johannes Heinrich von Thünen (see Uebel 2004, 28). On 5 March, 1908, Neurath 
gave his first lecture at the University of Vienna’s Philosophical Society: “War and 
Moral Principles” (Reininger 1938, 29; Blackmore et  al. 2001, 289). The title 
40 Petzoldt (1895) and (1900); on its influence on Einstein’s development of the general theory of 
relativity see Howard (1996).
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indicates the abstract and universalist perspective on the war situation consistent 
with his technical economic interest.
Through his early economic writings, Neurath was progressively but rapidly 
engaging the three foundational debates animating the development of the social 
sciences: the fin-de-siècle debates over method, or Methodenstreit, − inductive 
historicism of the Historical School vs the a priori realism of the Austrian School – 
and over the unity of the sciences – natural vs human sciences –, and the brewing 
debate over the role of values, or Werturteilsstreit.41 About method, Neurath was 
aiming at a holistic synthesis of inductive historicism and Austrian a priori 
decisionism. The latter was based on abstractions – whether Aristotelian intelligible 
essences or ideal types – in abstract, deductive theories. Here, I suggest that his 
interest in mathematics and logic informed his technical focus on calculation and 
decision-making, and was reinforced by it in turn. More distinctively, the same 
interest played a role in how Neurath promptly acknowledged limitations in the 
empirical and practical applicability of formal rationality, especially in a theoretical 
and practical setting that was characterized also by his attention to historical 
conditions. The latter consideration, I want to suggest, would become the source for 
his most distinctive contribution to the Vienna Circle debates, but, I suggest, it 
cannot be separated from his sustained attention to projects based on formal 
calculation and reasoning.
In 1907 Neurath married Anna Schapire and during the following 7 years he took 
a job as teacher of political economy at the New Vienna Academy of Commerce, 
Neue Wiener Handelsakademie. It is during this period when he began writing his 
intellectually original and socially ambitious works in economics, beginning with 
three historical textbooks, in his father’s footsteps, serving both pedagogical and 
social purposes: Antike Wirtschaftsgeschichte (Neurath 1909c), Lehrbuch der 
Volkswirtschaftslehre (Neurath 1910d) and the collection of readings co-edited with 
his wife, Lesebuch der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Neurath and Schapire-Neurath 1910). 
The historical framework considered and used history as a laboratory of possibilities 
represented by what in his dissertation he had first called “ideal limit forms,” which 
could be multiply instantiated, with contextual differences, in different geographic 
areas and historical periods. We can note here aspects of both historicism and the 
Austrian-School abstractionism. With Anna he also edited a translation of Francis 
Galton’s Hereditary Genius, a historicist, evolutionary and naturalistic exploration 
of both social Darwinism and planned interventionism, much in line with Neurath’s 
own social and economic outlook.
During the same period, on his return to Vienna, Neurath began assisting his old 
friend Olga Hahn (1882–1937), who had recently lost her sight. According to 
Neurath’s son, Neurath had already met the Hahn siblings at their summer villa 
around 1898, while accompanying on of his Gymnasium teachers who was a family 
friend (Neurath and Cohen 1973, 29). Olga lost her sight during the period Neurath 
lived in Berlin (ibid. 29–30). As many of her friends began neglecting her, Neurath 
41 Uebel develops this point in Uebel (2004, 12–15).
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stepped in. It is after 1906 that his assistance and their companionship intensified, 
especially over shared intellectual interests and soon led to another fruitful 
intellectual collaboration. Her blindness would only have intensified the intellectual 
focus on their more abstract shared interest in mathematical and logical subjects she 
was already familiar with, far removed from the visual world of her painter sister 
Louise. Either Neurath himself or someone else would have been responsible for 
reading out new texts, identifying the symbolism, and typing up the papers resulting 
from their discussions.
Upon graduation from a Viennese Gymnasium, Olga registered as auditor at the 
Faculty of Philosophy of the University of Vienna for the winter 1902–3 semester – 
also Neurath’s first term. Also according to her curriculum vitae, submitted with her 
application for a doctoral degree, her subjects were philosophy and mathematics; 
then she engaged in private studies and left the university in 1910 after receiving an 
Absolutorium in April (the Absolutorium certified having attended classes, without 
passing any final exam).
11.6  The Logic Papers
In this Section I introduce Neurath’s papers on algebraic logic and his collaboration 
with Olga Hahn. I will show how the papers are related and draw attention to their 
focus on the themes of axiomatics, equality, univocality and dualism that I consider 
significant in at least three ways: they exhibit Neurath’s technical engagement with 
the tradition of algebraic logic, also his adoption of a symbolic standpoint that 
includes semiotic and typographic dimensions, and they constitute some of the 
resources that are to play a future role in subsequent work, empirical, historical and 
methodological – his “philosophy.”
Algebraic logic fell precisely in the overlap of Olga’s subjects and in 1909 the 
posthumous publication of Schröder’s Abriss followed the release in 1908 of 
Wundt’s third and last volume of the third edition of his Logik. Stöhr’s own logic 
text came out in 1910 for his semester teaching. Between 1909 and 1910 her studies 
led Neurath and Olga to collaborate in the joint writing of one paper, while each 
published others separately: three by Neurath and two by Olga. The following are 
the titles in the complete series, in order of publication:
*”Ernst Schröders Beweis des 12. Theorems: Für die identischen Operationen gilt 
das ‘Kommutationsgesetz’” (“Ernst Schröder’s Proof of Theorem 12, that the 
Law of Commutativity holds for Identical Operations”) (Neurath 1909a).
*”Zum Dualismus in der Logik” (“On Dualism in Logic”) (O. Hahn and O. Neurath 
1909).
*”Eindeutigkeit und Kommutativität des logischen Produktes ab” (“Univocality and 
Commutativity of the Logical Product ab”) (Neurath 1909b).
*”Zur Axiomatik des logischen Gebietkalkuls” (“On the Axiomatics of the Logical 
Calculus of Domains”) (Hahn 1909).
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“Definitionsgleichheit und symbolische Gleichheit’ (‘Definition Equality and 
Symbolic Equality”) (Neurath 1910a).
“Über die Koeffizienten einer logischen Gleichung und ihre Beziehung zur Lehre 
von den Schlüssen” (“On the Coefficients of a Logical Equation and their 
Relation to Theory of Conclusions”) (Hahn 1910).
They all addressed primarily Schröder’s results and their interrelation is marked 
by corresponding citations. For instance, in the last of his papers, 
“Definitionsgleicheit…,” Neurath cited not only his first two, but also quoted from 
Hahn’s own “Zur Axiomatik…,” which in turn cited Neurath’s first, “Ernst 
Schröders…,” and their joint paper “Zum Dualismus….”
In February 1911, Olga submitted her last paper as the thesis required to earn a 
doctoral degree. The work was evaluated and praised by Stöhr, who had included a 
survey of algebraic logic, including Schröder’s system and was also that year’s logic 
instructor. Olga’s contribution was a method for solving systems of (logical) equa-
tions for connecting relatives, extending the results in Schröder’s treatment, also 
from a historical standpoint, considering earlier presentations by Lambert and more 
recent work by Peirce’s student Ladd-Franklin (Hahn 1910).42
One might assume that Olga’s interests might have been somehow linked to 
work by her mathematician brother Hans, but during the same period, Hans Hahn 
was working on problems in the variational calculus, instead. The timing and subject 
of her research can be best understood in relation to her and Neurath’s shared 
interest in logic and to an academic context in which algebraic logic resonated with 
the standards and interests of mathematicians as well as philosophers (even from the 
standpoint of psychologism). The academic context reflected the interest of German- 
speaking mathematicians in Schröder’s work, and not work by the philosophers 
Frege and later Russell – both defenders of logicism. Similarly, I believe, the timing 
of Neurath’s own attention to algebraic logic amidst his intense dedication to 
economics teaching, research and writing, can be better understood in relation to the 
timing of the new publications and Olga Hahn’s studies.
What I am drawing attention to is ultimately the broad and connective character 
of Neurath’s logic work, that is, over and above the technical meaning and value of 
his particular results. The articles place Neurath’s intellectual life and work within 
the shifting mathematical and philosophical cultures of the turn of the century: (1) 
mathematics deepening and extending its claim to rigorous foundations and 
philosophy developing a new relation to the emerging experimental psychology; 
and (2) a specific tradition that integrated both, since Leibniz, around the linked 
projects of algebraic logic and universal language.
On the one hand, logic work tracks his personal relation to these cultures through 
his own education and his personal relation to the Hahns – part of a lifelong pattern 
of serial integration of intellectual and erotic bonds, first with Anna Schapire, then 
42 For the supporting documents, see “Ansuchen um Zulassung zu den Rigorosen”, Rigorosenakt 
Olga Hahn, Archiv der Universität Wien, Sig. PH RA 3111 and “Beurteilung der Dissertation Olga 
Hahn (von Adolf Stöhr)”, Rigorosenakt Olga Hahn, Archiv der Universität Wien, Sig. PH RA 
3111. I am grateful to Karl Sigmund, Johannes Friedl and Christoph Limbeck for assistance.
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Olga Hahn and last Marie Reidemeister. On the other, the articles on logic establish 
the disciplinary connection to the German-speaking mathematical and psychological 
communities, especially in relation to logic. What was at stake there is the application 
of the symbolic language and calculus of mathematics, embodying a certain standard 
of representation of the empirical world and of rationality of thought and action. 
Indeed, the disciplines of mathematics, logic and psychology provided the medium 
of intellectual production as much as its social content and context.
Neurath’s intellectual activity was informed, I suggest, by a path that would take 
him rapidly from the icy slopes of logic to its foothills. In the next sections, below, 
I will argue that far from being an isolated episode, working in algebraic logic 
proved significant for his subsequent work and relation to fellow logical empiricists. 
The themes can be traced in the domains of economics and politics, including the 
project of pictorial languages, and in his shifting endorsement, positions and critical 
attitude within the projects of logical empiricism and unity of science.
Neurath’s own three papers addressed the symbolic relation of equality and the 
property of commutativity of the logical operations sum and product applied to 
terms representing classes.43
In the first paper, ‘Ernst’s Schröder’s Proof of Theorem 12, that the Law of 
Commutativity holds for Identical Operations,’44 Neurath considered Schröder’s 
dual proofs – equivalent according to the principle of duality – that ab = ba and a 
+ b = b + a. From the extensional perspective, Schröder’s Venn diagrams make clear 
that the logical product represents the intersection of classes, or domains, and the 
sum represents the union. Neurath is particularly concerned with Schröder’s sym-
bolic notation representing the product, ‘ab’, which omits a multiplication sign.45 
The products ‘ab’ and ‘ba’ are defined identically and are to be considered the 
“same” product.
The key to Schröder’s proof is the introduction of both the logical (Boolean) 
operations and the identity relation in terms of the extensional relation of 
subsumption (see translation in the Appendix).
For instance, for the definition of identity:
If a € b and simultaneously b € a, it is said that a = b; and, if a = b holds, so must a 
€ b and b € a.
For the product:
If c € a, c € b, so holds c € ab; and, if c € ab, so hold c € a and c € b.
And for the sum:
If a € c, b € c, so holds a + b € c; and, if a + b € c, so hold a € c and b € c.
43 In his brief and dismissively critical overview, Köhler (1991, 109–112) somewhat misleadingly 
refers to sets and set-theoretic operations, whereas Schröder’s extensional approach, following 
Boole, is based on part-whole relations rather than membership.
44 Neurath (1909a/1981, 1–3) and Appendix in this volume, 489–492.
45 Here Köhler (1991, 110) speculates that the absence of the sign motivated Neurath to declare that 
one can “equate symbolically” ‘ab’ and ‘ba.’
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Unlike Schröder and Neurath, one can, with Köhler (1991, 111), introduce the 
definition of the left and right products (and sums) in terms of subsumption. Then, 
Schröder and Neurath applied the expressions above to the dual theorem
ab a, ab b and a a + b, b a + b. 
Neurath was thus assuming the commutativity of the conjunction, and concluded 
that ab = ba, independently of the resulting commutativity of the product opera-
tion.46 To conclude that the two products are identical, Neurath effectively proved 
that they are logically equivalent. But, are they logically identical? Neurath made 
this metatheoretical assumption, but effectively he adopted an explicit notational 
(semiotic), symbolic standpoint, stating that the asymmetric order of signs is an 
artifact of a linear, one-dimensional notation.47 Then he concluded that the sign ‘ab’ 
for the product rendered redundant the ‘symbolically equal’ sign ‘ba.’ The equality 
‘ab = ba’ is precisely what he called in the third paper, “Identity of Definition and 
Symbolic Identity,” a symbolic identity, a notational relation.48
Following Schröder in his discussion of identity and equality (see above), 
Neurath distinguished the two interdependent elements: expression and denotation. 
Identity is based on the doubling up of symbolic representations – signs – of the 
same object or domain. The redundancy, and hence the difference between the 
terms, is expressive, symbolic, notational. From that standpoint, Neurath was in a 
position to advance an explanation for the asymmetry in the order of signs – the one-
dimensionality of the typographic mode of construction of expressions also marked 
by the equality sign. Redundancy rendered only one forced choice notationally 
helpful and semantically meaningful. He was also in a similar position to critique 
Schröder for conflating mathematical and logical standards for the manipulation of 
signs, namely, an inadequate “reliance on mathematical nomenclature in logic.”49
Neurath upheld the role of symbolic identity in elimination and substitution, that 
is, a regimentation of a symbolic logical language to form rules at work in its 
associated calculus. The focus on the symbolic level, however, undermined the 
logical, and algebraic, utility of equations as expressions of properties of operations 
such as commutativity.50 From a calculational standpoint, and its application to the 
46 Köhler (1991, 111) introduces the symbol ‘&’ for conjunction, which Schröder and Neurath, 
after him, didn’t use, and he himself has noted the notational role in Neurath’s argument.
47 This typographic standpoint is of course a matter of both types and concrete visible token marks.
48 See Neurath (1910a/1981, 19–21), and this volume 509–511. Köhler (1991, 111) notes, despite 
the asymmetry in the definitions of ab and ba, that Neurath seems to think that the equality ‘ab = ba’ 
is the same as ‘ab = a.b’.
49 Neurath (1909a/1981, 3) and this volume, 492.
50 According to Köhler (1991, 111), it undermines the expressive power, namely, for representing the 
properties of operations. As a criticism, he also points to alternative treatments of the question of equal-
ity he considers more enlightening and influential such as Frege’s (1892) “On Sense and Reference.” 
Later, Carnap (1947), committed to his teacher Frege and to logicism, would offer also an intensional 
account of asymmetric identities in Meaning and Necessity. A different source is Waissmann’s 
(1936/1977) Wittgensteinian defense of redundancy in language and the treatment of identity.
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axiomatic construction of a system, the symbolic standpoint undermined the old 
conception, from Boole to Schröder, of equations as rules of substitution.
Still, the expressive, symbolic standpoint in algebra and logic belongs squarely 
in the Leibnizian tradition of a privileged universal language for the dual purposes 
of reasoning and knowledge of reality (with the demand that symbols express 
elementary real concepts). However, unlike for Schröder and Frege, Neurath’s 
notational or semiotic focus on signs pitted against each other the two faces of the 
Leibnizian algebraic project: the language against the calculus. In Neurath, this 
standpoint would reappear in subsequent linguistic projects: the semantics of a 
picture language for statistical information and the structural public nature of his 
physicalism and syntacticism about language, especially the basic universal lan-
guage for the unity of the sciences.51
Now, what’s so significant about the property of commutativity in the application 
of a logical operation? The case of commutativity provided the occasion for address-
ing the complex nature of the relation of equality as the meaning of equations, and, 
in particular, of equality signs. It’s easy to see in relation to both developments in 
logic and mathematics the broader significance of identities at the heart of the philo-
sophical projects concerning language and knowledge, from idealism to logicism, 
namely, in relation to the notion of analyticity – not aprioricity – and the method of 
analysis. The latter would play such a central role in the debates among logical 
empiricists, especially as figures such as Carnap, Schlick and even Waismann devel-
oped earlier contributions of Frege, Russell, Hilbert and Wittgenstein. Schröder him-
self took up the issue, even before Frege did, in relation to the general and formal 
nature of general algebra in his Lehrbuch of 1873 and again throughout the first vol-
ume of the Vorlesungen.52 Neurath’s discussion continued in two follow-up papers.
In the second paper, “Univocality and Commutativity of the Logical Product ab,” 
Neurath (1909b) turned to Schröder’s more recent statements in the Abriss. On this 
occasion he insisted on the contrast between the arithmetical asymmetry between 
numerical factors from the mathematical operation of multiplication and the logical 
symmetry. The latter, he noted, is masked by the accidental “one-dimensional 
descriptive ordering” in the sequence of signs forming “the two names” for equally 
valid statements – that is, semantically equivalent, after Schröder, in terms of shared 
domain, whether this is operating as referent or truth-maker.53 Neurath’s pursued the 
question at the symbolic level with a proposal reported by the mathematician Karl 
Menger (1994, 61): the proposal consisted in an alternative, symmetrical expression 
of the product with a vertical arrangement of the symbols for each term, one above 
and the other below the symbol representing the product.
Neurath’s attention to commutativity led him, beyond the purely symbolic level 
of presentation and representation of logical identity, to probe the relation in 
Schröder’s system also at the level of conceptual structure. For Neurath, Schröder 
effectively relied on the more fundamental relation of univocality (see my discussion 
51 On the relation between syntacticism and physicalism, see Derek Anderson’s chapter in the pres-
ent volume.
52 The first volume of the Vorlesungen includes a full section on the topic.
53 Neurath (1909b, 18), and this volume, 506.
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of Schröder, above). Commutativity implied that two products have the same value, 
while univocality, the uniqueness condition for determinate values and meaning of 
symbols and operations, implied that two domains have only one product.54
To the extent that Schröder tried to offer a proof of commutativity, Neurath 
noted, it did not rely on the definition of the products. In the case of signs standing 
for statements, their valid product represented simply their joint validity, their logi-
cal product without the algebraic distinctions.55 Instead, then, Schröder’s demon-
stration relied on the proof of univocality: that for any second value, (ab),’ of the 
product, it would have to be identical to any other value (ab), (ab)’ = (ab).56 Schröder 
used the substitution of values in the axiom of products of subordinations57 to do the 
same in the univocality condition for the product and replace the value (ab)’ with 
the value (ba) and generalize to the equation ab = ba (Schröder 1909, 32).
In Schröder’s system, Neurath concluded, univocality and its proof occupy a 
more fundamental place. This standard of formal meaning, central to mathematical 
calculation as well, would prove central to Neurath’s subsequent scientific and 
metascientific (philosophical) explorations. In particular, many of his views would 
rely on judgments about the success of its applicability as a standard of clarity and 
precision to the linguistic representation of empirical cases, including the 
representation of any language of practical and theoretical social significance.
In the third and last paper on the identity of logical products, “Definition Equality 
and Symbolic Equality,”58 Neurath insisted on the distinction between two interpre-
tations of the equality relation that expresses the property of commutativity of the 
product: (1) ab and ba are defined simultaneously by denoting the same relation 
between two objects – a and b –; and (2) ab and ba are either two relations separately 
defined or separate instances of the same relation with the same results as the sepa-
rate mathematical products (ab) and (ba).59 The first is the case of symbolic equality, 
represented as ab == ba. The second is a relation of identity.
Nevertheless, with Axiom VIx’, above, and its reciprocal, Schröder could also 
define the products asymmetrically in terms of the more fundamental relation of 
subordination (see also Köhler 1991, 111).
Neurath found support elsewhere for his project of drawing distinctions between 
uses and interpretations of equality signs: in particular, in Petzoldt’s and Wundt’s 
attention to the exact representation of empirical causal relations in physical theory 
and psychology.60 Neurath (1910b/2004) had been reading Wundt’s Logik for a 
54 Neurath (1909b, 18), and this volume, 506.
55 Nevertheless, with Axiom VIx’, below, for instance, Schröder could also define the products 
asymmetrically in terms of the more fundamental relation of subordination.
56 Neurath (1909b, 17), and this volume, 505. Schröder’s (1909, 30) more general introduction used 
the example of putatively different null domains.
57 Axiom VIx’ is (x € a)(x € b) € (x € ab) (Schröder 1909, 23).
58 Neurath (1910a/1981, 19–21), and in this volume, 509–11. 
59 Neurath (1910a/1981, 19), and this volume, 509.
60 Neurath (1910a/1981, 19), and this volume, 509. See Petzoldt (1895) and Wundt (1894) and 
(1893/1895).
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review in the context of the debate over the disunity between the natural and the 
human sciences (more below).
For Wundt the issue of identity relations was a conceptual issue in logic and, 
relatedly, also in psychology, not just as a source of logic, but in relation to the 
problem of psychophysical parallelism, namely, the relation between (claims about) 
mind and matter. As mentioned above, Petzoldt sought an interpretation of 
mathematical physics in line with Mach’s Humean empiricist standpoint. Relations 
in mechanics, then, could be causal only in the deterministic sense that the relations 
between mechanical quantities are univocal. From Wundt he borrowed the 
distinction between definitional equality, represented by the equation c = s/t, and 
causal equality, as in v = gt. As Neurath noted, in the physical case, Petzoldt consid-
ered definitions to be definitional equalities and, ultimately, identities.61
To accommodate the formal case in algebraic logic Neurath turned to Petzoldt’s 
mathematical examples and introduced an extended formal classification.62 In addi-
tion to symbolic asymmetries, as in symbolic equalities, Neurath pointed out that 
definitions provided asymmetries in the conceptual relation between terms on dif-
ferent sides of the equality sign, that is, one side defined the other, but not vice 
versa. Otherwise, definition equalities might also be entangled with symbolic 
equalities – type (1), above – and computational equalities – type (2). Neurath set-
tled on the following classification:63
I. Equality: (a + b)(a – b) = a2 – b2.
II. Definition equality: a + a + a + a + … + a (b times) == ab.
III. Symbolic equality: b√a == a 1/b.
Neurath’s linguistic standpoint, unlike Frege’s, left no cognitive significance for 
the expressive difference in symbolic presentation. The symbolic approach paved 
the way for the syntacticism and physicalism that would come to characterize his 
social and empirical language and its unifying role.
In the same vein as the previous article, Neurath also broadened the scope of his 
discussion beyond the linguistic and conceptual to the structural. The place of the 
law of commutation in an axiomatic system he now addressed quoting a recent 
paper by Olga Hahn on the axiomatic dimension of systems of algebraic logic such 
as Schröder:
It differs from O. Hahn’s axiomatization (Archiv f. system. Phil. XV, 1909, p. 347):
“Similarly, one can prove that a + b € b + a, whereby the law of commutation for addi-
tion and multiplication is proven. While in Schröder’s presentation there is no reason for the 
introduction of the commutation law, here it becomes necessary due to the asymmetric 
expression of the definitions of addition and multiplication.”
The interesting fact that the commutation law in logic depends on the axiom system 
suggests the question of the degree to which commutation laws may be eliminated by 
61 Neurath (1910a/1981, 20), and this volume, 510.
62 Note that as theoretical approach, Neurath had already adopted empirical classifications in his 
work in the history of economics, namely, with the classification of systems of organization of 
production and distribution of goods.
63 Neurath (1910a/1981, 21), and this volume, 511.
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variations of the axiom system. Today a systematic approach to axiomatics is becoming 
more and more a requirement. (Neurath 1910a/1981, 20, my translation in this volume, 
p. 510.)
This article was Neurath’s final attempt at exploring identity relations and dismiss-
ing the substantive significance of the law of commutation – e.g., over the law of 
univocality, as in the second paper – in a logical system. And it echoed the history 
of axiomatics in its formalist unmooring from absolute foundations, in intuition or 
otherwise. The role of the commutation law is, like the postulate of parallels in sys-
tems of geometry, relative not just to symbolic, typographic, conventions, but also 
to each specific axiomatization. Here Neurath might have been relying on his read-
ings of Poincaré and Helmholtz, for instance, with the Hahns and other fellow mem-
bers of their informal discussion group.
Not only was Neurath exploring the regimentation of symbolic language through 
the analysis of kinds of identities and the role of univocal determination. He was 
also exploring the relativity of logical systems much like his historical models of 
economic systems, also acting as systems of calculation and representation. It is the 
application of such standards, the absolute system, absolute precision, and univocal 
determination of meaning and calculation, that his scientific and metascientific – or 
philosophical  – work would challenge. Language, calculation and organization 
stand, fall, limit, multiply or evolve together. In this case, the analysis of the 
algebraic standard is the analysis in the Leibnizian tradition of an ideal language 
and rational calculation, and unified systematization as well.64
Neurath’s attention to axiomatic structure as the standard for a (logical) system 
points to Olga Hahn’s ongoing own explorations of algebraic logic. Her own first 
article, “On the Axiomatics of the Logical Calculus of Domains,” followed Neurath’s 
second in the same issue of Archiv für systematische Philosophie, the journal edited 
by Wilhelm Dilthey, Benno Erdmann, Paul Natorp, Ludwig Stein and Eduard Zeller 
and reflecting rather ecumenically the diversity of their interests. It was likely 
written around the same time in the course of their ongoing discussions of the litera-
ture, including Schröder’s posthumous Abriss, published the same year.65
In the article Hahn addressed Schröder’s loose attempt at an axiomatization of 
his logical calculus. Schröder proceeded as one might have expected in this regard, 
by identifying first principles and definitions and adding several others throughout 
the presentation. Schröder (1909, 25) discussed also in the Abriss the distinction 
between principles, definitions and postulates and adopted axioms as general and 
self-evident principles. Taking the relation of subsumption as fundamental, 
Schröder’s (1890, 169) first principle is
Principle I. a € a.
The subsumption relation expresses the copula ‘is’ of predication and connects 
concepts – that is, as extensions over domains of elements – that may be distinguished 
64 Walter Dubislav (1931) devoted an entire monograph to definitions in 1931, in a book, Die 
Definition, published in the Erkenntnis series edited by Carnap and Reichenbach, a collaboration 
between the Berlin and Vienna groups. He distinguished, following Leibniz, the following kinds of 
definitions: nominal, real, causal and essential (1931, 24). He also listed Neurath’s article in the 
bibliography, but, as in other authors’ bibliographical mentions, didn’t discuss it (1931, 155).
65 O. Hahn (1909), and this volume, 507–9.
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as subject and predicate (see my exposition of Schröder’s work, above). Principle I 
represents the most general, hence ‘formal’ principle of identity, ‘a is a,’ as in ‘gold 
is gold’ and ‘white is white’ (Schörder’s examples, ibid.). This is different from the 
symmetric relation he identifies in Definition 1:
Definition 1
If (a € b) and (b € a), then a = b, and vice versa (Schröder 1890a, b, 184).
Nevertheless, also here the identity relation is based on denoting one and the 
same domain (Schröder 1890a, b, 185). Schröder (1890a, b, 186) derived then the 
theorem a  =  a. Taken as an extensional principle of individuation, the identity 
recovers its Leibizian rationalist metaphysical roots.
In the spirit that Neurath would echo in his third article, Hahn’s declared that “it 
may be of some interest to discuss the various possibilities for an axiom system for 
this calculus.”66 It was the same heuristic – adopting pluralism about axiom systems 
as units of scientific knowledge – that had been greatly valued in the new formal 
development of mathematics, even mathematical physics, through the second half 
of the nineteenth century in the wake of its success in non-Euclidean geometry.
Her approach consisted first in adopting Schröder’s basic identity statements:
Principle I. a € a.
Principle II. If a € b and at the same time b € c, then a € c.
Definition 1. If (a € b) and (b € a), then a = b, and vice versa.
Then she added an additional principle suggested by Schröder himself concern-
ing the negation of a logical element:
Principle III. (a|)| = a.67
Hahn emphasized the fact that the relation of negation indicated by the stroke 
was univocal and invertible. Then she proceeded to derive a number of theorems in 
addition to the ones that followed from Schröder’s original principles of identity. 
She concluded that the alternative axiomatic basis was sufficient to derive the entire 
calculus, as presented by Schröder.
For instance, she proved relations between the negation of the product and the 
sum of negations, and commutation laws for the operations of addition and 
multiplication. She did so echoing Neurath’s position: “While in Schröder’s 
presentation there is no reason for the introduction of the commutation law, here it 
becomes necessary due to the asymmetric expression of the definitions of addition 
and multiplication.”68 She also proved the theorem that (b| € a|) = (a € b), whose 
significance lies in its heuristic value in the derivation of dual theorems.
The relevance of negation to duality was precisely in the focus of her earlier 
article, co-authored with Neurath at the very onset of their collaboration, “On 
66 O. Hahn (1909, 345), and this volume, 507. 
67 See Theorem 31, (a|)| = a, Schröder (1890a, b, 305).
68 O. Hahn (1909, 347), and this volume, 509. However, Schröder’s introduction of the operations 
in terms of subsumption is in fact based on asymmetric expressions.
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Duality in Logic.”69 As in the case of equalities, the methodological and organiza-
tional roles of the principle of duality derive form its nature as a methodological 
principle of symmetry (see my discussion, above).
From a purely formal standpoint, in 1905 Louis Couturat (1905/1914, 20) had 
offered a pragmatic defense of Schröder’s principle of duality: “Hence a true 
formula may be deduced from another true formula by transforming it by the 
principle of duality; that is, by following the rule given above [of interchanges and 
transpositions]. In its application the law of duality makes it possible to replace two 
demonstrations by one.”
In the paper on dualism Hahn and Neurath set out to exploit the heuristic value 
of axiomatics to elucidate the origin and nature of the principle of duality in the 
context of Schröder’s system. Schröder required the exchange of operation 
symbols – multiplication and addition – and of 1 and 0, and reversing the relation of 
inclusion. Instead, Hahn and Neurath require that classes be exchanged for their 
complements, which applies to 1 and 0. Negation plays a key role. This is precisely 
the main original contribution of their paper, relating the symmetry of duality to the 
complementarity of domains (Fig. 11.2).
For Schröder, complementary classes served a more distant, unrelated role. Hahn 
and Neurath objected that for Schröder the law of duality is an empirical – that is, 
inductive  – principle suggested by a number of specific dual theorems about 
different operations. In their article, they nevertheless proceeded in the same exten-
sional spirit, without seeking a proof.70 It is worth noting that in a passing footnote, 
no doubt by Neurath, pointed out that the more precise and formal presentation of 
the Schröder’s calculus in the Abriss came close to Itelson’s conception of logic, the 
science of objects in general (see my discussion, above).
One question remains: in light of such contributions to the literature on algebraic 
logic, and the fact that they were hardly cited and discussed by any logicians, why 
were there included in literature reviews and bibliographies such as Couturat’s or 
Church’s? I suggest that the one should consider the function of such bibliographies 
and the logic surveys they accompanied. They played the role of identifying 
symbolic or algebraic logic as an intellectual discipline or area of research and track 
69 O. Hahn and Neurath (1909), in this volume, 493–505, and in Haller and Rutte (1981, 5–16).
70 Köhler (1991, 112) objects that Hahn and Neurath fare no better by appealing to a list of theo-
rems too, but that is just as well, since the principle is not an axiom or a theorem, but a metatheo-
retic statement operating as a proof procedure. For Köhler, again, implicit in their argument is yet 
another redeeming metatheoretic intuition.
Fig. 11.2 Example of O. Hahn and Neurath’s notation
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its developments. With such a purpose in mind, their authors would have aimed at a 
comprehensive account of available sources, which might include minor 
contributions as well as more significant ones as well as works in larger formats 
with similar ambitions.
To conclude this section: in addition to the considerations of language and sym-
bolic expression, also considerations of duality and complementarity would play 
immediately a role in Neurath’s scientific and meta-scientific works. A cursory sur-
vey of examples of such roles is the subject of the final section.
11.7  Applications and Challenges of the Algebraic-Logic 
Standard of Language and Reasoning in the Social 
Sciences
In this Section I begin arguing that Neurath’s attention to logic as language and 
calculus was hardly an intellectually isolated episode and I show, in particular, that 
elements of his own work and the literature he had become acquainted with played 
a significant role in his more familiar works in different areas in the human sciences – 
psychology, political economy and history – and related social projects.
11.7.1  Algebraic Tools for a Rational Economic Calculation 
In Kind: From War Economics to the Calculus 
of Pleasure
In Sect. 11.5., above, I have described how during the few years prior to 1909 
Neurath had been undertaking projects that involved a certain affinity between 
different disciplines such as economics, history, mathematics and logic. He was also 
involved in debates over the unity of the sciences and the methods and role of values 
in the social sciences. A central element in those debates was the role of precise 
description and reasoning as a standard for scientific rationality and objectivity; 
logic and mathematics, synthesized in algebraic logic, embodied just that standard.
Then, his activities in 1909 gave way to a period of integration of different spe-
cific elements from the work in logic in (1) the pursuit of specific empirical and 
social projects with historical dimensions, and (2) the participation in debates of 
methodological, philosophical, or meta-scientific nature that continued through 
changing circumstances into the period of logical empiricism, in Vienna and exile. 
In fact, the two were inseparable, each constraining the other in varying ways.
In Sect. 11.3.3, above, I have argued that Neurath’s detailed acquaintance with 
algebraic logic, especially in the works of Schröder and, either through it or 
separately, of Jevons and others, didn’t drive a wedge separating his interests in 
disciplines such as political economy. Economic thinking appeared also in illustra-
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tions and applications through the algebraic tradition: in Boole’s logic writings, 
especially in Jevons’ works in logic, methodology and political economy, and 
finally in Schröder’s, which also recounted some of the previous instances.
The form and purpose of algebraic logic were hardly independent of the project 
of economics. In particular, they resonated with the themes and terms of the debates 
over method  – the so-called Methodenstreit  – that confronted Neurath’s own 
teachers and local authors. While the historical school of Schmöller, Meyer and 
others defended empirical research and inductive generalizations, the Austrian 
school of Carl Menger and others defended an a priori approach based on definitions 
and abstractions and the focus on rational decision. If Neurath rejected Menger’s 
Aristotelian essentialism, Schmöller’s inductivism and Weber’s ideal types (Uebel 
2004, 7), the resources and broader perspective of formal logic expressed in 
mathematical symbolism, I suggest, played a role in enabling Neurath to articulate 
a synthesis of inductive historicism and abstract decisionism.
Interest in the algebraic standard of representation and reasoning through a uni-
versal symbolic language and calculus provided Neurath with a standard of eco-
nomic theory. Similarly, his review of Wundt’s Logik placed his interest in logic and 
the social sciences on a higher level in relation to psychology and the debates over 
the unity of the sciences. A productive resource turned out to be the growing ties 
between logic and economics, between  psychology and economic theory and 
between logic and psychology. And yet, in the process of exploring such connections 
in social phenomena, he soon identified both value and limitations in their applica-
tion. And it was this realization that would prompt decisive and distinctive contribu-
tions to the debates over logical empiricism: For instance, his familiar defense of a 
limited kind of rationalism, with limited univocality, he distinguished from 
pseudorationalism.
In the post-1909 economics writings, Neurath sought to articulate a theory of 
economy in kind already identified in his historical analysis of 1906. The challenge 
consisted in integrating the goals of the decisionism of the Austrian school while 
defending a standard of rationality without abstract universal units of calculation 
relative to universal standard of profit. Neurath’s alternative involved a comparison 
of multiple indicators – individual physical health, intellectual satisfaction, etc. – 
combined into different possible orders of life and correlated to subjective 
preferences although without the conditions for comparing individual or social 
utility. The role of utility was instrumental and formally objective, unmoored from 
any reductive psychologism or psychological realism beyond individual statements 
of pleasure attributions; and it focused on representations of actual and possible 
distributions of goods, that is, any goods with use value, or real income.
What Neurath explored and proposed was a so-called calculation in kind, with-
out the market standard of decision such as profit and price as abstract and universal 
unit of measure in monetary calculations; and without a socialist, objective measure 
of value such as labor either. It was at odds with the Austrian school’s rational 
choice theory, market capitalism, neo-classical marginal utility theory, even welfare 
economics.
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Reasoning in kind was nevertheless both a consequentialist and a comparative 
approach much in the way the dominating models of practical rationality in eco-
nomics. It assumed only the possibility of an ordinal ranking of pleasures and a 
comparisons of indicators, only with incomplete mechanical calculations to be 
performed in relation to market-free, non-monetary alternative considerations: use- 
value, productivity, economic efficiency and welfare goals. The multi-dimensional 
decisions were to be ultimately based on the exercise of judgment – and decision.
Wartime cases of economic administration illustrated how the model could be 
realized (Neurath 1910c). In the Lesebuch edited with his then-wife Anna Schapire, 
Neurath drew attention to the American economist Henry George for having noted 
the economic significance of wars.71 Around the same time, Neurath objected that 
economists he looked up to such as Jevons and Pareto had hardly paid any theoreti-
cal attention to different kinds of economic crises.72 It is worth noting that George’s 
work presented familiar aspects of graphic interest: in a book on the case of industrial 
depression, Progress and Poverty, George (1882, 197) introduced a dual presenta-
tion reminiscent of Schröder’s, except with a contrastive meaning, namely, display-
ing a contrast between ‘the current statement’ and ‘the true statement’ about rent, 
wages and interest which was reprinted in translation (Fig. 11.3.).
War economy provided the model of a possible peacetime economic order, the 
administrative organization of the economy or economy in kind based on calculations 
in kind. The theory of war was a representation of war economy as a whole: an 
overall picture of the multiple changes of an entire complex situation in terms of the 
71 Neurath and Schapire-Neurath (1910, vol. 2, p. 168). See also Neurath (1910a/2004, 162).
72 Neurath (1910b/2004, 290 n. 25). He devoted an entire chapter in his textbook, Neurath (1910b, 
40–47).
Fig. 11.3 Dual presentation of contrasted statements about rent, wages and interest in Henry 
George’s Progress and Poverty (1882, 197), reprinted in Neurath and Schapire’s Lesebuch (1910), 
vol. 2, p. 275
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distribution of pleasures and displeasures tracked by real incomes (all goods used, 
consumed, even if not purchased) (Neurath 1910a/2004, 153–154).
As the conceptual laboratory of history had shown Neurath (1906–1907 and 
1909c), there has been, and therefore is, a plurality of possibilities of economic 
organization bringing about the circulation of goods: the money economy, based on 
the instrument of prices and the goal profitability, is “only one of the possible ways” 
(Neurath 1910a/2004, 172). It’s characterized by disorder and intentional waste, 
and from the standpoint of maximizing productivity and consumption, inefficient. 
The administration of war suggests the value of an alternative way, an organized 
economy in kind, which from the standpoint of alternative goals, distribution of 
goods maximizing pleasure through “unrestricted production and consumption” 
and a “full utilisation of all energies,” (Neurath 1910a/2004, 194) proved more effi-
cient. It is a technical matter of practical rationality in matters of collective choices 
and valued goals. Independely of its practical value, the theoretical model, like the 
historical framework, shared with the algebraic logical framework in Jevons and 
Schröder the combinatorial exploration of possibilities.
The kind of reasoning involved required a calculation in kind, without the com-
parison of prices (Neurath 1910a/2004 162), and, as we have seen, reasoning rested 
on means of representation such as language. For the sake of the alternative sort of 
economic theory, and its associated economic plan and organization, Neurath 
(1910a/2004, 154) called for a new “means of representation” opposed to the 
“traditional method of description.” In particular, he insisted on a symbolic notation 
in order to comprehend the overall change in complexes in terms of symbolic 
formulas (Neurath 1910a/2004, 153). Neurath suggested also the use of synoptic 
tables arranging the distribution of real income across groups at a certain time side 
by side with the inventory at a later time (ibid.). On the one hand, then, Neurath’s 
symbolic proposals incorporated accounting standards and the modes of algebraic 
logic. On the other, the economic counterparts to the forms of logical reasoning and 
calculation Neurath was introducing were representing and planning change: duality 
now met history, contrast represented change.
Seven years later, he would acknowledge the further limitations of formal rea-
soning in the understanding and planning of causal influence, and the role of judg-
ment and will: “Even if one were able to determine the effect of one or another of 
these economic orders precisely and indisputably in some intricate chain or reason-
ing, this would not be enough to influence the will in any unique way” (Neurath 
1917a/2004, 242). The measures of individual and collective happiness associated 
with real income were now operationalized in terms of comparable indicators he 
called qualities of life. They are linked to the set of material and social conditions 
that enabled them at any given time. As in formal algebraic theory, Neurath 
(1917b/2004, 315) required that the two sets be correlated univocally.
The same themes appeared in is review of Wundt’s Logik, of 1910. In the third 
volume Wundt appended to the third edition, logic and psychology gave way to the 
discussion of the logic of the social sciences in the debate of unity. Neurath’s review 
synthesizes too the intellectual interests he was pursuing in 1909: mathematical 
logic and economics, disciplines grounded in the standard of a formal calculus and 
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a formal, abstract psychological models of rationality  – as well as empirical, 
inductive history.
In Wundt’s discussion of the social sciences, Neurath identified the theme of a 
universal science and taxonomy, which became a clear and specific idea in Leibniz. 
But the project was beset by a problem of univocality: the search was on for a 
determinate fundamental level, whose “objects are more and more determined,” 
(Neurath 1910b/2004, 267) including, physics, mathematics and logic (“the title 
‘Logic,’ so ambiguous today” [so vieldeutigen]) (ibid.).
For Neurath logical precision was not sufficient on additional grounds. While 
Wundt followed the logical standard and endorsed abstract economics based on the 
definition of concepts, Neurath pointed to the problem of the particular approach to 
language reform, namely, by eliminating terms with an ambiguous designation of 
concepts without general empirical research. In general, Neurath objected, “logically 
correct connections” when “inferences are valid” leave conclusions empirically 
irrefutable because the conditional prevents them from asserting directly anything 
about actual economic reality (Neurath 1910b/2004, 270).
Wundt grounded economic abstraction such as ideal types on simplified psycho-
logical constructions that had led to utility theory (Neurath 1910b/2004, 274). 
Economic theory relied on an exact treatment of economic phenomena, that is, 
abstract but measurable quantities such as prices. But there were problems about 
transfers of goods “involving non-measurable but comparable quantities” that can 
be treated with exactness (Neurath 1910b/2004, 276).
This was the calculus of pleasure, in Jevons’ quantitative sense. Neurath valued 
that the formal emphasis as a tool for representation and decision avoided a deeper 
reductive psychological analysis of individual experiences motives.73 What was 
compared is the (utility) value that different goods (a, b, c, …) have for different 
individuals (A, B, C…) (see also Neurath’s textbook, Neurath 1910b, 52 and 64). 
Thus, if for A: c > a > b, for B: a > b > c, and for C: b > c > a, the initial state of 
economic distribution [(Aa), (Bb), (Cc)] may be replaced with the more satisfying 
one [(Ac), (Ba), Cb)], but economic theory cannot provide a logical derivation or 
calculation of the latter state from the former.
For the mathematical representation of relations Neurath could rely on the exam-
ple of prior uses of inequality relations. He had encountered them in Schröder’s 
multiple examples of algebraic order and inclusion, in Jevons’ economic calculus of 
pleasure and pain, especially in the formulation of the theory of exchange at its heart 
(Jevons 1874, vol. 1, p. 121) and in Fechner’s (1888, 106) psychophysics comparison 
of stimuli and sensations, also present in Wundt’s (1906, 185–186) review of psy-
chophysics more generally.
73 In a note Neurath (1910b/2004, 290, n. 27) points out that “the above account required no exami-
nation of the motives” and, more radically, that if we ignore moral pleasure or pain, the transition 
from one distribution of wealth to a more satisfying one represents an improvement since it doesn’t 
constrain the particular kind of transfer of goods involved and takes into account, or at least makes 
room for, different possibilities.
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Another concept connecting logic and economics was complementarity. In 
Pareto’s own criticism of the availability of cardinal utility measures Neurath 
discovered the challenge posed by the pervasive relation of complementarity 
between different goods (Neurath 1910b/2004, 280).74 Our personal satisfaction 
from consuming one cannot be established independently of the other (Pareto 1906, 
239–240). However indirectly, this relation suggests a purely formal resemblance to 
the relation of complementarity of domains underpinning Schröder’s logical 
calculus and which Neurath and Olga Hahn (1909) had recently addressed in their 
discussion of dualism.75 The empirical application of the formal calculus here began 
to challenge the very idea of a calculus, which “consists in deriving a complex from 
the individual elements” (Neurath 1910b/2004, 280). The implied holism prevents 
the mechanical calculation of the maximum collective pleasure, the theoretical and 
political cornerstone of utilitarianism.
As a science, economic theory aimed, according to Neurath, at systematicity, 
rationality and exactness, but not measurability. Neurath stressed the point that the 
relation of inequality expressing the difference in personal valuation didn’t have to 
relate measurable quantities: in general, “exact relations are also possible between 
non-measurable quantities” (1910b/2004, 277). This fact expanded the scope of 
economic theory and decisions; still, Neurath (1910b/2004, 277) remarked, they 
were grounded on formal logic rather than quantitative mathematics: the “calculus 
of logic represents an example of how far such systems of relations can be 
developed.”76
Rather than pointing to Peirce and Schröder, in the economic context Neurath 
pointed to Jevons:
It is noteworthy that even a man like Jevons, who after all was equally significant as an 
exact logician as he was as an exact political economist, only considered relations of 
[measurable] quantities and thus deprived his speculations in political economy of the 
opportunity to enter the fruitful field of a goods transfer in which quantities do not matter. 
(Neurath 1910b/2004, 277.)
On similar grounds he criticized also Wundt, in his double capacity as logician and 
empirical scientist, for failing to distinguish between two standards of exactness, the 
logical or symbolic standard and the mathematical, quantitative one, and for failing, 
like Jevons, to uphold in the social sciences the more general logic one: “Even 
Wundt, who after all does also consider exact logic and the parts of mathematics 
that do not deal with measurable quantities, does not indicate that the method of 
symbolic-exact representation and that of quantitative-exact representation do not 
have to coincide at all” (Neurath 1910b/2004, 277; original emphasis).
74 He introduced the notion of complementary goods as a fundamental concept also in his textbook 
on economics of the same year (Neurath 1910b, 1).
75 For Schröder (1909, 26), the exhaustive conjunction of two domains of objects (including propo-
sitions) may be represented as a + b = 1 (totality, universe), so that negation allows the definition 
of a complementary (or reciprocal) domain b = not-a.
76 Notice that Schröder’s Vorlesungen bore the subtitle Exakte Logik.
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Economic theory seems then, for Neurath, to fall within the Leibnizian tradition, 
both a language of representation and a calculus of reasoning, but its symbolic 
standard is logical, not merely mathematical, if only partially. The standard of a 
universal language standard remained in place, but Neurath rejected a quantitative 
one, e.g., the kind of universal measure provided by monetary prices. In the logical 
space, however constructed – for instance, combinatorially, as in Jevons and also 
Schröder – or constrained by attention to empirical cases, logical possibilities could 
then be laid out and economic theory become scientific in the way Neurath had 
already associated with the historical approach: “True science consists in 
systematically examining all possible cases” (Neurath 1910b/2004, 277; original 
emphasis). Language led to classification. As in Jevons’s own project, the logical 
framework provided a combinatorial approach to seeking a useful system of 
classification.
There can be little doubt that the logical standpoint pervaded Neurath’s analysis 
of economic theory in particular and his view of the sciences more generally, and 
both in terms of a universal language for representation and a calculus of reasoning, 
also to support decision-making – that is, policy-making. The application extended 
well beyond Jevon’s logicism and was enabled by Neurath's joint education in the 
related fields of logic and political economy, related by symbolic formalism, its 
rational value and its expression in general a priori abstraction and particular 
empirical measurement. It was prompted further by Neurath’s simultaneous 
participation in the debates over method, unity and also values during the same pre- 
war period.
His commitment to empirical science was, in this early sense, inseparable from 
a broader logical standpoint, found also in Jevons, Itelson, Schröder, Wundt and 
other scientists and philosophers, with a commitment to exact thinking. The 
synthesis of disciplines and epistemological standards is consistent also with his 
interest during the same period in Mach, Duhem and Poincaré, shared by his friends 
Hans Hahn and Philip Frank.
The group shared with so many scientists and philosophers metascientific, foun-
dational preoccupations that led them to the shift in intellectual perspectives taking 
place through the second half of the nineteenth century and expressed, for instance, 
in the debates over psychologism. Moreover, adopting philosophical and historical 
perspectives to address broader or foundational questions, whether by Helmholtz, 
Mach, Schröder, Duhem, Poincaré or Neurath himself, seems gradually led by a 
twofold mistrust of naïve inductive empiricism and of speculative philosophy and 
by a commitment to a growing sense of scientific standards, closer to the disciplines 
that sought both foundation and reform, including the social sciences. Logic, partly 
in the image of mathematics, became the last scientific refuge of philosophy.
In fact, after his return to Vienna, Neurath, Hahn and Frank joined the 
Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna, led by Friedrich Jodl between 
1903 and 1912. Their talks were hardly empirical in content. Thus, on November 
23, 1906, Hahn had lectured on empiricism in geometry, presumably also on 
Poincaré’s conventionalism, with the title “Does Geometry Ultimately Rest on 
Facts?” (Reininger 1938, 28; Blackmore et al. 2001, 289). And Frank’s first lecture, 
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on December 4, 1909, bore the title “Is there Absolute Motion?” (Reininger 1938, 
30). Neurath’s topics, while in line with his researches and debates engaged during 
1908–10, were further removed. On March 5, 1908, Neurath gave the lecture “War 
and Moral Principles” (ibid., 29). Then, on January 17, 1910, he lectured on the a 
priori under the title “The concept and range of validity of the a priori” (ibid., 30).
In his subsequent lecture on June 1st, 1912, Neurath returned to the calculus of 
pleasure in political economy he had addressed first in the review of Wundt. This 
time he developed the earlier argument and presented his conclusions from the theo-
retical and political perspective of the British tradition of utilitarianism, only criti-
cizing the possibility of applying its first principle, of maximum collective happiness: 
“The Problem of Pleasure Maximum” (Reininger 1938, 31; Neurath 1912/1973). 
The lasting and often unacknowledged contribution of this article was the introduc-
tion of a classification of measurement scales typically attributed to the Harvard 
psychologist S.S. Stevens.77 I want to focus on how Neurath argued in more detail 
that the total pleasure of a human collective cannot be derived univocally from the 
mere sum of individual pleasures.
The problem of univocal determination appeared in the formal context of solving 
an algebraic problem. Neurath’s algebraic-logical treatment relied on the 
introduction of two relations, pleasure and inequality (greater-than), and the sum 
operation. Pleasure, as Jevons had already noted, is the relation between a person, 
M, and a good, m, which Neurath (1912/1973, 114) denoted by (Mm). Different 
pleasure relations may then be ordered by means of the inequality relation, 
(Aa)  >  (Ba) or (Aa)  >  (Ab). The relation is of course transitive. By duality of 
reasoning, comparison could be extended to displeasures and take the same form, 
only modifying the interpretation of the attribution: (Bb) > (Ab) will read “B is less 
upset by b than A” (1912/1973, 121).78
Neurath introduced the additive property of pleasures (Aa) + (Bb) and explored 
the limits of the distributive property of addition in composition with inequalities. 
Both are necessary to the utilitarian use of the calculus: Additivity is the condition 
for calculating collective pleasure; inequality provides the comparative relation 
between collective distributions of pleasure that point to a desirable choice. But 
indeterminacy appears in cases in which individual comparisons fail to determine 
collective comparisons (the policy choices): (Aa) > (Ab) and (Ba) > (Bb) and yet 
(Aa) + (Bb) ? (Ab) + (Ba) (ibid. 115). The failure extends to cases of complemen-
tary goods such that (Aa) + (Ab)? (A(a + b)) (ibid. 116).79
To the algebraic model of reasoning by calculation, Neurath added a combina-
tion of Jevon’s and Schröder’s notations for the logical elements: capital letters, A, 
in Jevons and small letters, a, in Schröder. Jevons introduced capital letters to refer 
77 On the influence of Neurath and Carnap on Stevens see Hardcastle’s (2003) discussion of Carnap 
and Stevens at the head of the so-called Harvard Science of Science Discussion Group, in 
1940–41.
78 On reasoning with inequalities, see Jevons (1874, vol. 1, 186–188).
79 Neurath’s notation for the indeterminate relation when the inequality sign doesn’t apply was the 
question mark “?”.
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to negations of terms and thus a different interpretation than Neurath’s for combina-
tions in the logical alphabet of possibilities such as A = Ab (‘A is not B’).80 Once 
again, this suggests that algebraic logic, as a standard of symbolic language and 
reasoning, was not for Neurath the subject of a parallel interest, but a resource.
11.7.2  Algebraic Tools for Rational Decision-Making 
and Theorizing Through Classification
Several months later, on January, 27, 1913, Neurath gave what may be considered a 
follow-up lecture, “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive (On 
the Psychology of Decision)” (Reininger 1938, 31, and Neurath 1913/1983). The 
continuity with the meta-theoretical project of logic and the theoretical and practical 
projects of political economy is evident. It is also continuous with his earlier 
participation in the debate over values in the social sciences and in relation to war. 
His position remained a consistently technical one: science is an instrument, even if 
judgment must be exercised to reach any conclusions or choose among possible 
ones, but the valued goals, even if they can be partly determined empirically in 
relation to, say, society’s values, are nevertheless external to the economic solution. 
From a theoretical and practical standpoint, the expanded focus on psychology is 
also significant, especially in an intellectual landscape in which a variety of views 
and local authors were identified as psychologistic and so many others were simply 
turning to psychology as an emerging scientific discipline in the footsteps of, for 
instance, Fechner and Wundt.
The essay addressed the broader limits to the empirical application of formal 
reasoning that Neurath had exposed earlier  – in relation to the challenge of 
determining univocal solutions to the economics problem of maximum pleasure, 
and especially in cases of entangled pleasure attributions. Defending the value of 
rationality also in ordinary psychology of practical thinking, Neurath pointed to the 
case of Descartes’s rationalism to distinguish between rationalism and pseudo- 
rationalism. Rationalism properly understood acknowledged, according to Neurath, 
the limits of insight and theoretical argument in the process of reaching conclusions 
to make choices among hypotheses or decisions. Pseudorationalism, by contrast, 
failed to acknowledge that thought processes, as matter of empirical psychology, are 
not reducible to “a system of logical relationships” (1913/1983, 3) and that missing 
premises would fail to determine a unique conclusion (ibid., 7). Instead, “one finds 
oneself very often in the position of having to choose one of several hypotheses of 
equal probability” (ibid., 3) and is unable to mechanically reach a decision or make 
a principled choice.
The problem, theoretically and practically, takes the form of a kind of holism that 
extended to scientific reasoning beyond Duhem’s well-known problem of auxiliary 
hypotheses (Cartwright et al. 1996). Thinking processes are temporal unities in the 
80 See, for instance, Jevons (1874, vol. 1, 122).
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way are sciences are; and in the theoretical case, Neurath (1913/1983, 3) noted, “the 
phenomena we encounter are so much interconnected that they cannot be described 
by a one-dimensional chain of statements.”81 From an epistemological standpoint, 
“the correctness of each statement is related to that of all others” (ibid.). And this 
led Neurath, without recourse to a boat metaphor, to a position of anti-foundationalism 
about out system of concepts: “Each attempt to renew it from the bottom up is by its 
very nature a child of the concepts at hand” (ibid.). Neurath’s solution was the 
theoretical and practical necessity of provisional rules, or auxiliary motives. He 
would later call them extra-logical terms or factors (Neurath 1934/1983, 104, 106). 
Their job was, at the most theoretical, to help ever provisionally construct and apply 
a scientific system. Rather than a rejection of logical formalism, or rationality, 
against opponents, or in defense of radical empiricism, his persistent argument 
since 1910 consisted in exposing the limits of empirical applications of the formal, 
normative, standard with which he himself was familiar.
About a year later, on March 2nd, 1914, Neurath developed the themes further in 
a new lecture, “On the Classification of Systems of Hypotheses (With Special 
Reference to Optics)” (1916/1983) and a second essay to be published first, “On the 
Foundations of the History of Optics” (1915/1973). The focus on the application of 
the logical standard remained in the human sciences, but went beyond the earlier 
cases of economics and psychology, in this case extending to the historical sciences, 
with a historical theory of scientific theories. The focus is however similar in the 
attention to the formulation of possible theoretical cases and the problem of 
empirical selection among them. And temporality was relevant again, only now as 
the historical dimension of the social phenomena at hand. In addition, Neurath gave 
the challenge of capturing an intellectual totality a disciplinary dimension that 
would sustain into the future the theme of unity in a science and among the sciences.
In the case of “fields of knowledge” such as psychology, Neurath (1916/1983, 
13) asked “what there is in common.” His answer was the notion of theory in term 
of possibilities and the notion of methodology in terms of multiple choices 
(underdetermination). The unified representation of the scientific field, then, took 
the form of a classification as a comparative study of possible systems of hypotheses. 
In general, Neurath (1916/1983, 24) noted that any system of classification selection 
and connectedness of facts or hypotheses. The selection would involve auxiliary 
assumptions such as analogies that played a key role in the construction and selec-
tion of systems of hypotheses and in the selection of hypotheses within it.82 They 
link a particular hypothesis to a whole of concepts and assumptions at work at a 
given time (Neurath 1915/1973, 101). Neurath had learned it about physics from 
Duhem.83
81 Note that in the case of symbolic equalities, Neurath also pointed to the typographic artifact of 
one-dimensionality in our symbolic representations.
82 On the role of analogies and their relation to Mach’s work also on optics, see Stöltzner 
(1996/1983).
83 See Duhem (1906). Duhem was also concerned with classification as the proper aim of science, 
without deeper explanations.
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On a related Duhemian theme, symbolic precision and exactness, Neurath 
(1910b/2004) had previously characterized theories after the standard of algebraic 
logic (and language): as a systematic representation and comparison of (logical, 
conceptual) possibilities with symbolic exactness (see above; the use is ambiguous 
between exactness and precision). Again, now Neurath (1916/1983, 24) pointed to 
the challenges of empirical application and noted the unavoidable limitations in the 
symbolic precision of classified hypotheses: systems of classification cannot avoid 
blurred margins and reach clarity only asymptotically. The notion of blurred margins 
is Neurath’s representation of the gap between the artificial distinctness of the 
formal construction and ‘the whole fullness’ of a phenomenon (remember here his 
previous example in rational psychology of decisions of the logical, one-dimensional 
train of thought picked out in a psychological complex whole). As a source of 
blurred margins,  Neurath (1916/1983, 25) pointed to the role of empirical data. 
Duhem (1906) had noted a similar semantic gap, the indeterminacy in the relation 
between the symbolically precise theoretical facts (quantities) and practical facts 
(qualities) (with the implication that laws are neither true nor false).
The theme would evolve into Neurath’s metalinguistic doctrine of the inevitably 
limited precision of our scientific language in (linguistic) contact with empirical 
contents and ordinary contexts. Neurath (1916/1983, 24) illustrated the idea in 
terms of the optical phenomenon of refracted light rays of different colors with 
blurred edges.84
In a later optical illustration Neurath pointed to the application of language as 
writing and thinking “arrayed one-dimensionally,” and of artificially precise 
networks of mathematical concepts with functional and logical connections. He 
referred to the blurred edges of a projected beam of light from a lamp on the walls 
of a mine, representing the inexhaustible whole, which, from the analytical 
standpoint of precise elements, he represented as the manifoldness of experience 
and complexes of representations (Neurath 1921/1973, 198).85
How did the classification come about? Following a logical analysis of known 
cases into constituents, “precisely expressed notions of the systems of hypotheses 
can be systematically registered” and then “their ‘combinations’ can be classified 
according to different characteristics” (Neurath 1916/1983, 24). The classification, 
then, consisted in combinations of “all imaginable relations” that “can be produced 
by purely logical operations” (ibid., 28). The combination could then be “fixed by a 
kind of formula” (ibid., 15). This inquiry into the “logical structure of theories” 
leads to a theory in the form of a taxonomy in the form of a network for exploring 
“how they may develop” (Neurath 1915/1973, 101).
One might begin, like Jevons, with a basic dichotomy, A-theories and non-A- 
theories. But the choice, Neurath (1916/1983, 15) remarked, had logical but no 
practical value (as in Schröder’s complementary domains). A more complex set of 
elements had the practical value of accommodating a plurality of cases while 
84 Neurath’s linguistic treatment of the conceptual blur is the doctrine of Ballungen, see Cat (1995) 
and Cartwright et al. (1996).
85 On the optical illustration, see Gábor Zemplén’s chapter in the present volume.
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constructing a unifying totality. Then would come the matter of empirical relevance: 
identifying natural combinations according to some accepted theory.
The new challenges were only the outcome of upholding the (algebraic) logical 
standard. Unlike other interpretations of Neurath’s different works, my focus on one 
running theme and resource also suggests a new interpretation of the essays on 
history and classification. Neurath was following here Schröder and Jevons too 
(alongside Mach, Duhem, Poincaré and others) as he embraced the notion of a logi-
cal classification as a calculus of combinations into classes taken as unities (this is 
the extensional interpretation of terms as domains of logical elements). It was the 
Jevons of the logical alphabet and natural classification, including a heuristic role 
for analogies and analogical reasoning.
A few brief remarks developing the discussion of Jevon’s project in Sect. 11.3.3., 
above, will make clear the connection to Neurath. Jevons (1874, vol. 2, pp. 346–48) 
adopted the view that the practice and products of classification were based on iden-
tifying analogies that exhibited laws of union or correlations of properties.86 He 
further attempted to distinguish imprecise distinction between natural and artificial 
systems87: artificial classifications are based on arbitrarily selected properties of 
objects and natural analogies involving a concurrence of essential characteristics of 
objects grouped by closest degree of analogy (Jevons 1874, vol. 2, pp. 351–352). 
Still, he admitted of a multiplicity of possible systems of classification and that any 
choice among them would be based on pragmatic considerations (ibid., 
pp. 348–349).
Of particular relevance here is Jevon’s interest in the symbolic presentation of the 
theory of classification (ibid., 367–371). Jevons sought to generalize on the so-called 
bifurcate classifications resulting from a dichotomy of the universe and the 
application of the principle of duality with considerations of negatives; such was the 
mechanical combinatorial source, after Leibniz, of the logical abecedarium – later 
renamed ‘alphabet’ – (Fig. 11.4.) and logical machine (Fig. 11.5.) (ibid., 367 and 
371–374, and 1874 vol. 1, p. 109).
At the symbolic level, then, classification “may be explained most precisely by 
the use of letter combinations” (Jevons 1874, vol. 1, p. 376). For instance, he added: 
“If we pay regard only to three qualities or circumstances in which things may 
resemble each other, namely the qualities a, B, C, then there are according to the 
laws of thought eight possible classes of objects” (ibid.). The combinations include 
the negations of the qualities, a, b, c (Fig. 11.6.).
This was precisely the combinatorial scheme Neurath adopted (1916/1983, 15): 
“from three elementary notions and their negations we get eight combinations in 
total.” Nevertheless, despite his close acquaintance with both Jevons and, following 
Jevons, Schröder, Neurath adopted Schröder’s notation (Figs. 11.7 and 11.8) – with 
small or lowercase letters for the positives and the vertical stroke sign for negations.
86 In the plural scene of nineteenth-century British new empiricism, the view can be traced back 
especially to Herschel and Mill, also Whewell.
87 He was following Ampère, and indirectly a long literature going back to the seventeenth century. 
Duhem would adopt a more regulative and metaphysical notion of natural classification (Duhem 
1906).
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Fig. 11.4 Jevons’ logical abecedarium, Jevons 1874, vol. 1, p. 109
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Neurath had introduced Schröder’s notation already in the paper on dualism with 
Olga Hahn and here he was applying it to the historical classification of systems of 
elementary concepts or hypotheses: a|, b|, c| (the stroke is sometimes replaced by a 
typographic choice of the visually analogous ‘l’ or ‘1’) (Fig. 11.9.). In the 1983 
English translation of “On the Foundations of the History of Optics” the stroke sign 
has been replaced by asterisks, obscuring the typographic genealogy of the conven-
tions in the logic literature (Neurath 1915/1973, 104).
Neurath’s (1916/1983, 15) choices for the three elementary characteristics were 
periodicity, polarizability and interference; he added a fourth, diffraction. What 
determined the choice of elementary terms is some combination of conceptual con-
jecture, analysis and decision.
Fig. 11.5 Jevons’ logical 
machine, Jevons 1874, 
vol.1, frontispice
Fig. 11.6 Symbolic 
representation of the eight 
combinations of three 
classes (properties) and 
their negations, Jevons 
1874, p. 367
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Finally, at the level of presentation, the choice for the graphic expression of logi-
cal combinations of elementary terms were the classification tables (Fig. 11.10.). 
Their use was established in the taxonomical tradition, alongside synoptic tables 
introduced by Petrus Ramus in the sixteenth century, which Jevons and Schröder 
also used to organize logical combinations. They were also common in a wide-
spread graphic tradition of presentation of numerical information  – e.g., Luca 
Pacioli’s double-entry bookkeeping in the fifteenth century. Such kinds of grids 
mark out a visible spatial arrangement to map out conceptual relations in an effi-
cient way, at a glance – synoptically. Neurath’s symbolic standpoint in logic was not 
just consistent with his later structural, physicalist formulation of empiricism, it was 
another visual example of it. Before he became concerned with the logic of image, 
and its social value, he was concerned with the image of logic.
Fig. 11.7 Fragment of table of symbolic representations of logical combinations of four classes, 
Schröder (1890a, b, 563)
Fig. 11.8 Fragment of 
table of symbolic 
representations of logical 
combinations of four 
elements, Schröder (1890a, 
b, 564)
Fig. 11.9 Neurath’s 
symbolic presentation of 
the eight combinations of 
three theoretical elements 
and their negations 
forming a classification of 
systems of hypotheses 
(original publication in 
Neurath 1915, 376)
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11.7.3  Universal Symbolic Language for Social Representation 
and Intervention, from Numbers to Pictures (Pictorial 
Pasigraphy)
Neurath returned to Vienna sometime in 1919 in the aftermath of World War One; 
the time corresponded also to the wake of the turmoil of his involvement in German 
political projects of Soviet-inspired central planning, which landed him briefly in 
prison. In “Anti-Spengler,” drafted during his imprisonment, Neurath appealed to 
the principle of duality in the form introduced in projective geometry in order to 
represent the structural objective that made sense of human communication and 
shared objective content of experience, so that two speakers “always manage to 
coordinate their statements unambiguously” (Neurath 1921/1973, 200).88 In sym-
bolic terms from geometry: “There could be a far-reaching parallelism or ‘dualism’ 
such as in projective geometry, where we can enunciate two sets of statements that 
have quite the same structure and can be represented by one single notation and yet 
describe totally different facts, depending on how symbols are interpreted” (ibid.). 
The pasigraphic ideal of a universal language had to accommodate, formally, the 
possibility of different languages or interpretations.
It is important to note that, whereas for Jevons the role of logic in economic 
theory was mainly foundational, Neurath was clear that the role of the symbolic 
standard was both theoretical and practical, as was the role of social theories. Pure 
logic could have anti-metaphysical, practical value: “It is precisely Marxism that 
uncovers indirect relations and detours, and thus might ascertain that cultivating 
pure logic and the most general problems of mathematics and physics is especially 
favorable to revolutionary thinking” (Neurath 1928/1973, 295).
His post-war jobs in the Museum for Settlement and Town Planning, in 1923, 
and in Social and Economic Museum of Vienna after 1924, and his involvement in 
adult education extended the emphasis on the social and practical dimension of 
social information. Still, before settling on the new emphasis, Neurath delivered a 
talk on economics at the Philosophical Society on 26 February 1923 still with the 
theoretical focus included in his pre-war writings and with an explicit reference to 
88 This is similar to the structural description Carnap would introduce in his Aufbau later in the 
same decade.
Fig. 11.10 Neurath’s table of optical theories, or systems of hypotheses, Neurath (1915, 385)
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the role of logic. The lecture bore the title “The Conceptual Building of Economic 
Theory. A Logical Treatment” (Reininger 1938, 37).
While in previous discussion his focus was decision-makes at the level of eco-
nomic government, now the emphasis extended to citizens as democratic partici-
pants. Neurath (1925/1973, 214) defended, acccordingly, the practical value of a 
universal visual pasigraphy, also portrayed in the spirit of internationalism, linked 
to the universal language of statistical information (information in the form of social 
correlations was of special practical value). While Neurath (1933/1973, 222) 
acknowledged that “only quantitative facts are socially significant,” a schematic pictorial 
representation would have cognitive mnemonic value, at the expense of quantitative 
exactness (ibid., 220; see also Elisabeth Nemeth’s chapter in the present volume).
The pasigraphic dimension was explicit, including Schröder’s own example of a 
(failed) project of international languages of cognitive and social value, Volapük. 
His old interest in pictures, also, like economic organizations in kind, can be traced 
to Egyptian culture, feeding into the project of a universal language beyond 
mathematics: “The problem of an international language attracted me fairly early, 
Volapük had come and gone; Esperanto reigned uneasily in its place. Scientists tried 
to improve on it by evolving Ido as a more consistent language. Basic English and 
Interglossa were yet to come” (Neurath 1946/1983, 96). The very project of a 
universal Visual Thesaurus in the 1930s connected his encyclopedia project to 
Leibniz’s old ambitions by extending the symbolic to the pictorial. Indeed, Neurath 
(1936/1983, 142–143) believed his encyclopedia would drive the unification of 
scientific language and graphic representation; and he attributed to Leibniz the 
value of both unifying encyclopedic compendia and visual representations.
Again, Neurath was extending symbolic representation beyond the quantitative. 
Pictures are symbols, and their role depends on the representation of quantitative 
information according to the rule “one symbol means a given number.” Then 
Neurath’s displays would introduce combinations of symbols by juxtaposition  in 
order to represent different amounts based on the interpretation of a picture as a 
unit. If the initial concern with the image of a language of logic, he soon extended 
it to the logic of a language of images. As in his earlier discussion of Schröder’s 
identities, especially in the case of commutativity of logical products, Neurath’s 
standpoint was explicitly typographic. The communication technique, the pictorial 
symbolic language, was first known as the Vienna method and from exile was 
named, accordingly, International System of TYpographic Education (ISOTYPE). 
It is worth noting that Neurath chose to emphasize the technical, instrumental, or 
functional dimension of visual communication in the same way he was conceiving 
both language and knowledge as tools, and referring to it accordingly, as a method – 
the Vienna Method – or a technique.89 The linguistic standard was still very much at 
the heart of its conception: “The important point is that there must be a system of 
rules, a sort of grammar of picture language; that, and a dictionary of symbols” 
(Neurath 1933/1973, 222). The universality of the pictorial language as a unified 
method of representation was as constructed as were its symbols, or those of the 
89 See Burke et al. (2013), also Angélique Groß’s chapter in the present volume.
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artificial languages Carnap would prefer; it was a uniformity that would require “a 
unified, planned, central control of all museums and educational institutions” (ibid.).
Visual communication was not divorced from reasoning. In a Socratic fashion, 
Neurath’s interest in the social value of education focused on the practice of 
arguing – “teaching how to argue” (Neurath 1937/1973, 239) – and the presentation 
of arguments. Part of their role was the parsing of essential and incidental aspects of 
issues; in this sense, the notion of argument was close to the narrative notion of 
plotline, and the selective task is one of the conditions of storytelling. In the case of 
child education, Neurath (1996, 284) stressed the fact that symbolic drawings were 
natural tools for storytelling, and that only as children grow up, they lose such 
symbolic habit in favor of more detailed, realistic pictures.
While arguing takes place in general through the use of symbols, for Neurath it 
also had a dual character, narrative and logical, so that its public expression would 
facilitate encouraging the latter, at least in some a functional sense; hence its alleged 
social and scientific significance: “Sincere arguing is something of international 
importance because it creates a common basis for discussions and decisions” 
(Neurath 1996, 285). Its social function was to allow some critical distance from 
tradition and authority in the task of reaching one’s own judgments and making 
decisions with their help but within the limits of univocal inference he had long 
drawn attention to: “any decisive action has to be based on a decision which cannot 
be derived from any unequivocal result of arguing” (ibid., 286). In this way, in light 
of the broad shared goals, he could conclude the close connection between logical 
empiricism and visual education. But it is the film experience that could educate 
most effectively, Neurath suggested, in this critical form of communication. In his 
presentation, Neurath introduced the notion of a visual argument. The use of film 
allowed the temporal dimension to be integrated with the pictorial medium, 
combining visual and verbal aids to exhibit and facilitate argument, presumably in 
both the narrative and logical senses (Neurath 1945/1973, 240 and 1946/1983).
11.7.4  Logic at the Service of the Integration of the Human 
Sciences
Neurath would continue to uphold the role of logic, especially Jevons’, in later dis-
cussions of the social sciences, and especially in relation to goal of unification – 
something Jevons himself had done. In the earlier phase of the unity project within 
the Vienna Circle, Neurath had followed Carnap in trying to address at once the 
issues of (1) unity and demarcation, (2) empirical grounds – that is, alongside the 
formal analytic truths of mathematics –, (3) a logical-linguistic framework and (4) 
objectivity. His earlier solution consisted in endorsing the universal language of 
physicalism across the sciences (a metalinguistic and epistemological standard of 
testability without reductionism to the concepts and generalizations of physics).
Addressing the anti-metaphysical imperative to compare statements only with 
other statements in relation to human perception and behavior, he pointed to the 
practical value of using Jevon’s logical machine:
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All this could be developed experimentally with the help of a ‘thinking machine’ as sug-
gested by Jevons. Syntax would be expressed by means of the construction of the machine, 
and through its use, logical mistakes would be avoided automatically. The machine would 
not be able to write the sentence: “two times red is hard.” (Neurath 1931b/1983, 67).90
Jevons’ logical machine, then, provided the material, physicalist, coordination of 
the logical – and the syntactical – and the empirical.
Neurath also pointed to Jevons in the context of the encyclopedia movement, 
later in the 1930s, this time in relation to the unifying method of empiricism for both 
the natural and the social sciences: “Mill, Jevons, and Pearson were all very 
interested in the social sciences and tried to apply the empirical procedure to all 
questions without distinction” (Neurath 1937/1987, 133). Neurath’s purpose then 
was to endorse Jevons and the others as historical exemplars in his encyclopedic 
approach to unification. The project aimed to arrive at “a synthesis on an empirical 
basis” (ibid., 134).
With the emphasis on empiricism, Neurath was not rejecting Jevons’ emphasis 
on logic; he was countering, instead, a rationalist, even metaphysical, alternative to 
unity based on a grand system of logical relations alone:
The all-embracing view of the scholastics is to be found again in a somewhat weakened 
form among the leading rationalists who, like Descartes and Leibniz, took part in the 
expansion of the individual sciences. The striving for logical derivations which we encounter 
among the scholastics was to revive again in Leibniz in a thoroughly modern form. He was 
to become the forerunner of logicism. But empiricism does not look kindly upon such 
synthesis, and any rationalism a priori appears suspect to it. (Neurath 1937/1987, 
133–134.)
Like social engineering, logical engineering had its limitations too; neither sci-
ence nor society could be fully mechanized.
The indictment against (pseudo) rationalism, a priori metaphysics, cannot be 
mistaken for an indictment of the use of logic. What Neurath was defending was 
after all a logical form of empiricism whose scientific goal involved the empirical 
application and testing of formal linguistic structures and whose philosophical goal 
involved the demarcation, by means of a logical analysis of language, of tautological, 
identity statements from empirically testable statements (Neurath 1937/1987, 135). 
In this respect, he noted that mathematicians and logicians were contributing new 
creative opportunities, pointing to Frege, Peano, Schröder, Peirce and Russell and 
noting that their “ideas are influencing an increasing number of scientists from 
every discipline” (ibid.). He singled out Peirce and Russell as having “found a most 
intimate way of combining their interest in empiricism with their interest in logic,” 
Dewey, whose own interested in logic didn’t prevent him from guiding American 
thinkers “in the direction of empiricism,” and Schlick, at the center of a “circle for 
the development of logical empiricism” (ibid.; original emphasis).
Neurath picked up again the question of the logical unity of the sciences and the 
value of symbolic logic in relation to language and classification, now in his review 
of Carl Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s book Der Typusbegriff im Lichte der neuen 
90 Mosselmans (2007, 50) quotes Neurath merely to identify in Jevons a “logical positivist 
attitude.”
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Logik (Hempel and Oppenheim 1936; Neurath 1937c/1983). Even though concerned 
especially with psychology, Hempel and Oppenheim adopted a formal approach to 
typology as a method cutting across differences between natural and human 
sciences. In fact, the authors concluded the book pointing explicitly to the goal of 
“die logische Einheit der Wissenschaft” (Hempel and Oppenheim 1936, 125). To 
contribute  to this project, they replaced the standard of classification in terms of 
single-term designations attached to objects or phenomena of scientific interest with 
a general theory of order with special attention to concepts that admit of distinctions 
of degree.
The authors sought to establish the method of typology on the notion of type 
based not on the notion of class but of series. The fundamental idea was the 
topological order that replaces the quantitative standard of a metric with a more 
general notion of ordered series and the relation of betweenness. In turn, the 
fundamental relation also made fundamental in typological language the role of 
two-term predicates: if, in a series m, l, h, i, k, a quality symbolized as g is placed 
between i and k, the single-term (monadic) predicate ‘g’ is replaced by the two-term 
predicate ‘(i, k)’ (Neurath 1937c/1983, 186). Neurath objected, besides to the 
relativity of series-location, to the emphasis on mixes of extremes, after the 
Aristotelian model, in the same way he had rejected as simplistic the classification 
of hypotheses based in the binary opposition between A and non-A theories, 
favoring, instead a combinatorial approach he now associated with chemistry 
(Neurath 1916/1983, 15).
In addition to unification and symbolic logic, the book spoke also to Neurath’s 
earlier specific interest in classification, surveys, scales and general symbolic 
precision – beyond quantitative measurement for the relations between pleasures or 
life quality indicators.91 Thus Neurath connected the book’s focus to his earlier dis-
cussions of empirical representation in the social sciences and offered the following 
meta-classification:
One could now start from cases in which object are characterized by names, given to them-
selves and to their properties […]. In all cases of this kind one either ascribes or denies a 
property to an object. And it seems to depend on the richness of our “catalogue of quali-
ties” – if one can use this expression – whether we have enough names at our disposal, with 
the understanding that in the case of classification through measurement one will use cardi-
nal numbers, in the case of a topological order, ordinal numbers, and in the case of non-
ordered qualities, perhaps numbers that, by their value of position, indicate neither 
quantitative nor topological order. (Neurath 1937c/1983, p. 185.)
Next he distinguished between the catalog of qualities – with the single-term labels 
(the categorical scale) providing a uniform syntactical treatment –, an atlas of 
qualities – with a topological arrangement – and a table of qualities – with formulas 
(1937c/1983, 185). The order of the different modes of representation also sets the 
terms for a historical evolution in empirical sciences, even if the transformations of 
one mode into another will always be only partial (ibid.).
91 See, for instance, his review of Wundt in Neurath (1910b/2004) and the additional discussion of 
aggregate pleasure in Neurath (1912/1973).
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Instead of classifications from above, he returned to the logical model of ‘many 
small scientific units as a logical start’ reminiscent of the logical combinatorial 
approach based on elementary units: “a great many scientific units (many of them 
very small) might be assembled step by step as systematically as possible. Such an 
increased of assembling is closely connected with the actual increased of scientific 
investigation and comprehensive logicalization: chemistry and optics could not be 
really joined by means of a mere classification” (Neurath 1937/38/1983, 200).
The symbolic, notational standpoint and the combinatorial method inherited 
from Neurath’s early work in algebraic logic and subsequent applications found use 
through to the end of his life. Tables of classification appeared, for instance, in his 
prehistory of logical empiricism, where philosophers (and their doctrines) are 
compared in terms of the categories anti-metaphysics, empiricism, logic and 
mathematics; Leibniz is the closest to scientism, the sole difference between them 
Neurath (1936/1981, 694) identified on that count is only the former’s commitment 
to metaphysics. To the extent that he applied any standard of duality in his 
classification tables, it was Jevon’s logical principle of duality in the polar sense of 
A and its complementary not-A, e.g., often represented in each taxonomical category 
by the symbols + or − (ibid.). It is not the sense of correspondence and equivalence 
in Schröder’s principle discussed by Neurath. The same format, with an explicit 
mention of duality and the +/− expression of its application, made a final appearance 
in the context of his concern with education and politics in handwritten notes on his 
copy of proofs of an article by the educator C.G. Field on Plato’s use in education 
(Fig. 11.11.).
Fig. 11.11 Neurath’s handwritten “List of Dualities” on a copy of C.G. Field’s article “Plato’s 
‘Republic’ and Its Use in Education,” The Journal of Education, 77 (909), April 1945, pp. 161–
162. (I’m grateful to Adam Tamas Tuboly for drawing my attention to this file)
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11.8  Applications and Challenges of the Algebraic Logical 
Standard in Neurath’s Participation in the Movements 
of Logical Empiricism and the Unity of Science
11.8.1  Differences Within a Shared History of Interest in Logic 
and Language
In the opening, I pointed out that, for decades now, Neurath’s activities and contri-
butions have been duly assessed, even vindicated, in a dialectical manner, roughly 
in terms of at least three oppositions: (1) intellectual theory/social-political action, 
(2) formalism/antiformalism in language and method and (3) natural/social sci-
ences. His distinctive historical role has been singled out – that is, classified and 
explained – primarily in terms of an emphasis on each three of the second elements: 
social-political action, antiformalism (or informalism) and the social sciences. In 
fact, his alleged informalism has been explained, in turn, by reference to the other, 
social factors (and this in addition to references to the social nature, not just applica-
tion, of standards of objectivity and rationality).92
This story is too narrow to take into account Neurath’s attention to logic both 
before and during his logical empiricist militancy; it’s also too narrow to take into 
account the role of the formal, symbolic standards in his own social theorizing. I 
have been telling a long but different story, introducing a larger context that places 
Neurath in an active and substantive relation to logic and mathematics and to their 
application in social thought and action (in relation to both decision theory and its 
application in social practice).
From the same standpoint, to conclude this argument, I suggest that the new 
periods of intellectual involvement provided an expanded context in which new 
circumstances and occasions prompted new expressions of attention to the symbolic 
standard, only this time sensitive to specific situations. In other words, I suggest 
that, in relation to logical empiricism and the unification of the sciences, Neurath’s 
proposals and criticisms stemmed from a shared background, and differences within 
it, not from it.
The second half of the 1920s represented Neurath’s postwar return to philosophy 
of science with his participation in theoretical discussions of Marxism, in activities 
of the Monist Society, in the private discussions of new developments the foundations 
of physics and mathematics within the so-called Schlick Circle and in the foundation 
and activities of the Ernst Mach Society, the public springboard for the constitution 
at the end of the decade of the Vienna Circle and the movement of logical 
empiricism.93
Neurath public involvement in the movement of logical empiricism included, 
broadly speaking, two periods and contexts, the 1929–33 Vienna Circle and the 
92 See, among others, Uebel (1992) and (2007) and Cartwright et al. (1996).
93 For an overview of the intellectual and associationist Viennese landscape, see Stadler (2001).
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post-1933 exile. The first was geographically and intellectually more localized with 
an emphasis on the Vienna Circle and the issues and doctrines of logical empiricism, 
while the second was consistently international in perspective, with an emphasis on 
the Unity of Science movement and the Encylopedia project.
I have been documenting that different ways and times Neurath had long been 
paying attention to standards of logical calculus and universal language, that is, the 
rational and the pasigraphic sides of the algebraic logic tradition. His interest 
survived the turmoils of the 1910s and the social opportunities of Red Vienna 
through the 1920s, and found expression, even if a diverse and shifting one, also in 
his efforts at articulating a program for an intellectual and social movement around 
the Vienna Circle. This includes his communications with fellow Circle members 
such as Carnap and in his proposals for formulating an account of scientific method 
and unification.
Neurath’s proposals were throughout anti-Cartesian in the more general sense of 
opposing an unrestrained standard of rationalism he had labeled pseudorationalism, 
of which he accused also Leibniz. According to a number of charcaterizations, it 
involved a precise language and rules of calculation, first principles and the 
assumption that any problem had a uniquely determined solution (see above). 
Neurath considered it incompatible with the application of the algebraic-logical 
standards of reasoning and representation in empirical science and human rational 
action, of economic policy-making. His more critical rhetoric can be associated 
with the Encyclopedia period in exile, but, for the same intellectual and practical 
reasons at work in the writing of the Vienna Circle’s Manifesto, in 1929, it never 
amounted to a blanket condemnation.
We may say that also Carnap had entered logical empiricism with a philosophi-
cal outlook informed primarily by active interests in logic and mathematical sci-
ence. While Neurath’s preferred science was economics, Carnap’s was physics. 
What about logic? As I have argued in previous sections, Neurath’s differences with 
Carnap, and other philosophers or Circle members, cannot be reduced to a dismissal 
or avoidance of formal logic and language. Rather, it was a matter of Neurath’s 
putting forward critical qualifications of the significance of symbolic languages and 
calculi that may be traced to (1) his different kind of attention to actual scientific 
practice and its social management and (2) differences in logic background and 
attitude towards it.94
Having attended Frege’s lectures at Jena between 1910 and 1914, after the First 
World War Carnap turned to Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica 
(1910–1913), which Frege had referred to in his lectures.95 Soon he would endorse 
unreservedly their logicism, more comprehensive and notationally convenient than 
94 Rather than subscribing to overdrawn contrasts between pre-1930, pre-1935 and post-1935 
Neurath, drawn for instance by Mormann (1999), and equally between Neurath and Carnap, use-
fully drawn by Uebel and, especially after 1935, by Mormann, I want to emphasize any differences 
only in relation to a shared background and interest in symbolic language and logic.
95 For a detailed discussion of Carnap’s involvement in logic in the 1920s, see Reck (2004) and 
Reck and Awodey (2004).
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Frege’s own, in 1920 in his teacher certificate dissertation, “Of What Philosophical 
Significance is the Problem of the ‘Foundation of Philosophy’?”: geometry “can be 
derived completely without use of intuitive elements from arithmetic, and the latter 
in turn from deductive logic” (quoted in Carus 2007, 97).
By the end of the decade, Carnap had recently published Die logische Aufbau der 
Welt (1928/1967) where he adopted Russell’s formal methods and so-called supreme 
maxim of philosophizing, with which the text opens: “Wherever possible logical 
constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities” (Carnap 1928/1967, 1). In 
early September 1930, he participated in a session devoted to the foundational crisis 
in mathematics at the Second Conference on the Epistemology of the Exact Sciences 
held in Königsberg in which von Neumann discussed Hilbert’s formalism in 
axiomatics, Arend Heyting discussed Brouwer’s intuitionism and Carnap discussed 
logicism, its challenges and some of the affinities with the constructive element in 
intuitionism and the pure formal calculus of the formalist method (Stadler 2001, 
352).
In 1920 Carnap had emphasized that the starting point of logicism was precisely 
deductive logic “represented in algebraic form – on the basis if an idea of Leibniz – 
by Peano, Russell, Couturat, Frege and Schröder, among others” (quoted in Carus 
2007, 97). By the end of the decade Carnap had also separated older from new 
symbolic logic, or logistic: In the Abriss der Logistik (1929) he introduced a 
distinction between older and modern works. Older systems he associated with De 
Morgan, Boole, Jevons, Peirce, and older works with Frege, Peano, Schröder, 
Whitehead and Couturat, the last two on algebraic logic. In particular, he listed 
Schröder’s Vorlesungen and even mentioned the Schröder-Bernstein theorem. 
Modern logistics Carnap (1929, 107) associated resolutely with Whitehead and 
Russell. And, to mark the change, he noted that the term ‘algebraic logic’ had been 
replaced by ‘symbolic logic’ and ‘logistic’ (1929, 1–2). The term ‘logistic,’ Carnap 
(1929, 2) also noted, was introduced in 1904 by Meinong, Itelson, Couturat and 
Lalande.96
In his article ‘Die alte und die neue Logik’ (1930), we find a similar distinction: 
The most important older works: by Frege, Peano and Schröder (1930, 26). In both 
cases, Carnap emphasized how the new symbolic logic developed from the older 
(1930, 14). He had been clear that in this development, “all of mathematics becomes 
a branch of logic” (Carnap 1929, 2). The role of symbols is to facilitate the precision 
of concepts (language) and exactness of demonstrations (1929, 1).
When Neurath, in the course of his studies of mathematics and philosophy in 
Vienna, turned his attention to logic, the more science-oriented scholars were paying 
attention to algebraic logic, and, according to contemporaries, its complete 
systematization was Schröder’s. Whitehead’s own A Treatise on Universal Algebra 
(1898) had recently come out and it would still be over a decade before the 
publication of the Principia. Schröder was critical of Frege’s Begriffschrift as a 
competing attempt at realizing Leibniz’s ideal of universal conceptual script, the 
96 Itelson, Couturat and Lalande made the proposal at the 1904 at the International Congress of 
Philosophy in Geneva.
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characteristica, and its application in rational calculus (see Sect. 11.3., above).97 He 
was also sensitive, like Carnap would be, to history in both directions, the historical 
identity of the project since Leibniz and a sense of progress and modernity. Thus, 
while finding merit in symbolic work by Peano and the Italian school as representa-
tives of an Italian pasigraphic movement, he also criticized them for not having 
caught on to progress made first in America by Peirce with the algebra of relatives, 
so that Peano’s notation lacked an expression for the relation ‘of’ and the corre-
sponding operations (Peckhaus 2014, 222). Like Jevons, only metaphorically, 
Schröder illustrated progress in logic with progress in technology and borrowing 
from Minkowski’s introduction of their Section in the Congress of Mathematicians 
in Zurich on 10 August 1897. Schröder used a boat simile that placed Peano with 
“those who persist in still using sailing ships whilst steamboats have already been 
invented, constructed and are waiting at their service” (1897, 161 and 1898, 61).
The differences between Carnap and Neurath over logic, then, was hardly just 
the difference at the heart of the usual contrast between naturalism and rationalism, 
or between social and natural sciences. It was also a difference in generations of 
practitioners in modern symbolic logic, with Frege acting as bridge figure. Neurath 
belonged in the pre-1910, older logic (Schröder); Carnap  – Frege’s student  – 
belonged in the post-1910 new logic, which developed on the back of an explicit 
program of logicism (Russell). But the difference cannot be considered outside the 
shared historical and cultural background, for instance, the Leibnizean genealogy of 
the different stages in the progress in symbolic logic, the appeal of modern 
formalism, the value of the relation to mathematics, the broader social value of 
pasigraphy, and the symbolic standpoint.
Carnap’s challenge in the Aufbau consisted in reconstructing rationally the uni-
fied and objective nature of scientific knowledge and its basis in experience. For the 
logical construction of scientific objects urged by Russell Carnap adopted the 
method of applying purely structural concepts and relations and the step-by-step 
derivation of higher-level objects – concepts – and general relations between them 
through rules and definitions. But to model the empirical foundation of scientific 
knowledge he simply turned to a modern, extensional interpretation of formal terms 
in set theory and postulated sets of Gestalt-like complex elementary experiences.98
For Carnap, the modernity of logicism and his own project was also rooted in 
history of logic and more ordinary projects of pasigraphy. In this he shared Neurath’s 
narrative and culture. Carnap had already been interested in universal constructed 
languages such as Esperanto, independently of any rationalist  – Cartesian or 
Leibnizean  – ideal. Carnap also quoted the semiotic work of the psychologist 
Richard Gätschenberger, in Symbola (1920): ‘“All philosophers are correct, but they 
express themselves in with varying degrees of ineptness, and they cannot help this, 
since they use the available language and consequently speak in a hundred 
97 About the debate between them, see Couturat (1905/1914) and Peckhaus (2004).
98 In all the techniques Carnap was relying, also rhetorically, on modern scientific developments, 
both empirical, e.g., Gestalt psychology, and formal and foundational, e.g., set theory, axiomatics 
and logicism.
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sublanguages, instead of inventing one pasigraphy.’ This neutral language is the 
goal of construction theory” (Carnap 1928/1967, 287).
As part of the history of logic, the application of modern logistics in that neutral 
and universal sense was based on concepts of the theory of relations that, as Carnap 
(1928/1967, 8) noted in the opening sections of the Aufbau, could be found in 
“Leibniz’s ideas of a mathesis universalis and of an ars combinatorial.” In particular, 
he added, the “application of the theory of relations to the formulation of a 
constructional system is closely related to Leibniz’ idea of a characteristica 
universalis and of a scientia generalis” (ibid.).
The Leibnizean genealogy of the project of logical unification wasn’t just Frege’s 
own conception (see above), or even Schröder’s.99 Also Russell had discussed 
Leibniz at length, especially in his early Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of 
Leibniz (1900), a work that marked his transition out of idealism and monism into 
logical analysis and construction. The selection of Leibniz texts reprinted there 
includes Leibniz’s fragments on the characteristica universalis  – the universal 
Alphabet of Thought – and the ars combinatorial (Russell 1900, 282–283).
Carnap also adopted for the same purpose the duality of material and formal 
modes of speech, where pseudo-questions (and metaphysical assumptions) are 
prompted by the material mode as “the more usual formulation.” To express the 
correspondence and the contrast, Carnap adopted the dual format introduced by 
Schröder and adopted also by Neurath: “In the rest of the paper we shall at all times 
help the reader by using both modes of expression and write the formal, and strictly 
speaking, only correct, expression of our thought in a parallel column on the left of 
the more usual formulation” (Carnap 1932/1995, 41).
11.8.2  Old and Modern Symbolic Logic, Neurath and Carnap, 
Meet in the Manifesto for Logical Empiricism
By the time of the so-called Vienna Circle Manifesto, in August 1929, immediately 
after the publication of the Aufbau at least three different projects were in progress: 
Carnap’s interest in explicative rational reconstruction, Schlick’s interest in the 
conditions of coordination of empirical foundations and Neurath’s interest in the 
social sciences and naturalism about the conditions of scientific practice (Uebel 
1992 and 2007). The debates posed the challenge of constructing a unified umbrella 
formulation of the program that could identify the movement’s viewpoint, if not 
doctrine.
It should be easier to accept an integrated account of the authorship of the 
Manifesto, “The Scientific Conception of the World: The Vienna Circle” (Carnap 
et al. 1929/1973). Signed by Hahn, Neurath and Carnap, and aimed at prompting 
Schlick to turned down outside offers and stay in Vienna, it may be assumed that 
statements about logic and mathematics were penned by Hahn and Carnap, while 
99 Carus (2007, 103) stresses the Fregean connection.
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Neurath added the references to the social sciences and social goals. If in fact, as 
Carnap’s diaries suggest, Carnap only revised Neurath’s original draft (Stadler 
2001, 335), Neurath had not been thinking just about formal logical and mathematical 
interests and standards as Schlick’s, or even Hahn and Carnap’s alone, but also his 
own.
The intellectual core of the Vienna Circle grew primarily out of the informal 
discussions of the Schlick Circle (1924–34). Its members included Hahn, Neurath, 
Carnap, Waismann, Kaufmann and Reidemeister and their discussions focused on 
issues in the philosophy of language and mathematics prompted first by Schlick’s 
interest in Hilbert’s program of formal axiomatics, followed by Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus and later Carnap’s Aufbau.
A broader pool of members and social interests surrounded the foundation of the 
Ernst Mach Society (1928–34) in November 1928 (Stadler 2001, 328–334). Neurath 
himself supported scientific adult education, as long it included new ideas and 
results from both natural and social sciences. But, over that distinction, he was 
responsible drawing a boundary around them with the descriptor Society for the 
Promotion of Knowledge of the Exact Sciences, along with an opening lecture 
about Mach’s exact world conception,100 and adopting the broad category of empiri-
cist rationalism, close to the term introduced by Itelson, “empirical rationalism” 
also associated with the empirical application of doctrines such as critical positiv-
ism, conventionalism, logicism, free-thinking and dialectical materialism and, later, 
with French experimental rationalism – note the primacy of the rational and formal, 
even as Hahn was defending their value in experimental science.
Carnap, Hahn and Neurath signed the Manifesto on behalf of the Ernst Mach 
Society. The Manifesto mixed up two overlapping strands, the Schlick’s Circle’s 
discussions of foundations of the exact sciences – mainly mathematics and logic – 
and the Mach Society’s social and educational goals. Tension followed, pitting 
Neurath against Schlick, to whom the Manifesto was addressed. Only Neurath, 
more actively than Carnap, could straddle any divide. Thus, while mentions of 
logistic and a commitment to logicism and figures such as Frege, Russell, Whitehead 
and Wittgenstein, fall squarely within the scope of Carnap’s public statements (and 
private revisions to the draft?), other references to symbolism and logic and 
historical sources and declared “precedents” such as Leibniz and Schröder fall, on 
the other hand, also well within the purview of Neurath’s own intellectual biography. 
Only his history of qualifications to the otherwise worthy empirical application of 
the formal standards of symbolism and rationality he omitted. Instead, he chose the 
rhetoric of a public unity of the program and movement under the rubric of a scien-
tific world conception.101
100 Neurath (1937a/1983, 174) later wrote, in relation to the new discipline of the logic of science, 
a replacement of philosophy, and linguistic (anti-metaphysical and social) unification, that “prog-
ress of the unification of scientific language requires a logical analysis of the sciences” and that 
“Mach’s far-reaching conclusions did not depend upon new experimental data, but simply upon a 
rigorous logical analysis of the traditional formulations.”
101 My discussion of this aspect supplements the account in Stadler (2001) and the detailed recon-
struction of the manifesto’s writing in Uebel (2008).
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The Manifesto listed the five main strands that ‘came together’ in the scientific 
world conception, aimed at unified science against metaphysics (‘the common goal 
of all’): the more empirical and social strands are (1) positivism and empiricism, (2) 
foundations, aims and methods of empirical science, and (5) hedonism and positive 
sociology; then we find the formal categories of (4) axiomatics  – a modernized 
mathematical standard for Schlick as well as Carnap and, less so, Neurath – and (3) 
‘logistic and its application to reality’ and listed as main representatives of the latter 
Leibniz, Peano, Frege, Schröder, Russell, Whitehead and Wittgenstein (Carnap 
et al. 1929/1973, 304).102
The issue of the relation of logic to reality was central to its methodological rel-
evance to the possibility of objective empirical theorizing for Schröder and Neurath, 
and central to Itelson’s conception of logic, also to the relation of mathematics to 
empirical reality for Neurath (see above), Schlick (especially in his General Theory 
of Knowledge) and Hahn. The same year, Hahn wrote from the symbolic standpoint 
that, from logic and mathematics had permeated theories of scientific knowledge of 
scientist-philosophers such as Helmholtz, Mach, Peirce, Schröder, Poincaré and 
Duhem, before Neurath, and characterized the Circle’s new interpretation of math-
ematics, as built on convention and tautology (and the interpretation of philosophy 
as well)103:
If logic were to be conceived – as it has actually been conceived – as a theory of the most 
general theory of objects, as a theory of objects as such, then empiricism would in fact be 
confronted with an insuperable difficulty. But in reality logic does not say anything at all 
about objects; logic is not something to be found in the world; rather, logic first comes into 
being when – using a symbolism – people talk about the world, and in particular, when they 
use a symbolism whose signs do not (as might at first be supposed) stand in an isomorphic 
one-one relation to what is signified. (Hahn 1929/1980, 40; original emphasis.)
Hahn’s concern was precisely with the question, “how is pure empiricism compatible 
with the existence of mathematics?” If empiricism is compatible with logic, the 
answer is only a matter of commitment to logicism, that “mathematics is part of 
logic, and hence, that the propositions of mathematics too do not say anything about 
the world, but are merely directions for saying what has been said in another way” 
(Hahn 1929/1980, 41–42).
Logic was at the heart of the exact world-conception, the source of its exactness; 
and its role would be discharged, following Russell, through the method of logical 
analysis. Its key role was to unify formal and empirical sciences and distinguish the 
latter both from older forms of empiricism and from philosophy as a kind of 
102 Carnap had done the same in the Abriss, of the same year.
103 An important question that deserves attention is the distinction between sign and symbol. These 
authors often lack a systematic distinction, or a consistent statement of their equivalence: they 
sometimes use the terms interchangeably, or else their use is inconsistent in taking ‘sign’ as the 
more general term, almost in Peirce’s sense, or else as a concrete token of a symbol, or as an index, 
in contrast with the more conventional character of a symbol, restricted further by the rules of a 
specific system of symbols, or language, including mathematics.
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knowledge (Carnap et al. 1929/1973, 306). This was still the Carnap of the Aufbau 
and the constitutive system: “The aim of scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified 
science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material” (ibid., 309).
The reform was at its heart a symbolic project of language reform: only the con-
trol of language and linguistic statements would rid the scientific conception of 
pseudo-problems that could be traced to the reliance on a priori speculation and 
ordinary language alike (ibid., 307–308).104 And since no symbolic language would 
do, the ideal is a modern one, that is, one regulated by modern logic: “Only modern 
symbolic logic (‘logistic’) succeeds in gaining the required precision of concept 
definitions and of statements, and in formalizing the intuitive process of inference 
of ordinary thought, that is to bring into a rigorous automatically controlled form by 
means of a symbolic mechanism” (ibid.). The automated mechanism provides also 
the social and formal conditions for effective communication – “what unites men in 
language”  – and for objective description through structural formulae. Unity, 
objectivity and freedom from metaphysics would have to rely, then, on symbolic 
form determined by modern symbolic logic.
So, reform of language and reform of logic went hand in hand, and the Manifesto 
emphasized the role of logic’s shifting relation to mathematics in a history of mutual 
aid in establishing each other’s foundations – axiomatic structure – and in eliminating 
each other’s ambiguities and contradictions. And that is precisely the history of 
symbolic logic from algebraic logic to logicism, from Leibniz to Russell. The 
Manifesto made a point of including the goal of a practical relation of logic to 
reality. First, what Carnap called the old logic: “Since Leibniz and Lambert, the idea 
had come up again and again to master reality through a greater precision of concepts 
and inferential processes, and to obtain this precision by means of a symbolism 
fashioned after mathematics. After Boole, Venn and others, especially Frege (1884), 
Schröder (1890a, b) and Peano (1895) worked on this problem” (Carnap et  al. 
1929/1973, 310). Then came the new logic: “On the basis of these preparatory 
efforts Whitehead and Russell were able to establish a coherent system of logic in 
symbolic form (‘logistic’), not only avoiding the contradictions of traditional logic, 
but far exceeding that logic in intellectual wealth and practical applicability” (ibid.). 
Here logicism constituted an application to, also an outcome of, confronting 
conceptual and logical challenges in the foundations of mathematics, and, in 
particular, of arithmetic. In general, more practical applications extended to social 
reality, closer to Neurath’s sustained attention to the value and challenges of 
symbolic representation and reasoning: the scientific would conception would serve 
life, personal and public, from education to architecture to “the shaping economic 
and social life according to rational principles” (ibid., 317–318).
104 Carnap would soon add to the list of sources the material mode of expression.
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11.8.3  Neurath’s Physicalism and Syntacticism 
from the Semiotic Standpoint. The Role of the Old 
Algebraic Standards
More traces of the early symbolic standards I am tracking in Neurath’s later works 
appeared in a more personal follow-up piece on the scientific world-conception 
(Neurath 1930/1983). In the essay, Neurath set out to explore the historical 
conditions of the new view in connection to “other spheres of life and science” 
(ibid., 46). He insisted on the instrumental nature of language and thought and their 
historically and socially holistic dimensions: “Our thinking is a tool, it depends on 
social and historical conditions.” Our own use of language in thought is historical in 
ways that develop his later linguistic – social – doctrine of empiricism in the use of 
protocol statements: “We confront our present thinking with earlier thinking, but we 
have no possibility of taking a judge’s stand on a point outside” (ibid.). The same 
must apply to linguistic expression at the concrete symbolic level: “We owe our 
means of expression, our rich language and script, to definite historical premises” 
(ibid.). Neurath’s concern was the same he had pursued in the context of economic 
theory, using historical knowledge to determine logical possibilities and effective 
empirical options. In this case, the constructive goal was the reform of language at 
the service of intellectual, scientific and social goals.
Neurath was delving into his long own acquaintance, going back to at least his 
University courses, with the diversity and history of languages and into the linguistic 
interest that permeated Viennese culture and academia. Alfred Stöhr, for instance, 
was one such scholar, successor to Mach and Boltzmann’s University Chair, 
interested both in symbolic logic and language much in the psychological and anti- 
metaphysical way of Mach and the mathematical way of Schröder (see above), and 
the author of The Algebra of Grammar. From his own symbolic, semiotic, standpoint, 
Neurath warned against the conceptual risk of the combinatorial capacity for “freely 
moving symbolism” and “unlimited word formation” in alphabetic writing, the sort 
of “tongue acrobatics” that Stöhr had called glossurgy (ibid.). This capacity might 
have been a source of artistic creativity, but, at least in ordinary language, it was also 
a source of philosophical problems – that is, what Carnap had declared pseudo- 
problems (ibid.). Those problems, in Neurath’s familiar diagnostic, were “much 
dependent on language” (ibid.).
The remedy, as indicated in the Manifesto, consisted, much in the pasigraphic 
tradition and renewed interest in constructing universal artificial languages, in 
applying a combinatorial approach to more strictly regimented symbolisms without 
fixed uses and meanings: “The letters as signs without conceptual meaning are, 
however, well suited for a strictly scientific symbolism” (ibid.). Then, “one combines 
signs whose meaning one can define at will” (ibid.). To the extent that modern 
science exemplified the scientific world-conception, “it owes its success partly to 
the new symbolism that can be used for the purification of language” (ibid.).105 The 
105 Neurath drew attention to the scientific value of general names (variables).
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declared goal was “building up a system of symbols with the aid of logic and math-
ematics” (Neurath 1931a/1983, 48).
Neurath’s remark on the importance for science of general names (symbolically, 
variables) was reminiscent of Schröder’s claim, in his essay on signs, that signs are 
handles on ideas that free the latter from their association with concrete impressions 
and give them the generality and control that makes human reason possible (Neurath 
1930/1983, 46; Schröder 1890a, 5 and 1890b/1892, 3431). Schröder here as well as 
in the Vorselungen was following Johann Heinrich Lambert, whose work on logic, 
Neues Organon (1764) included a second volume on a theory of signs or Semiotik, 
‘the theory of the designation of thoughts and things,’ as a study of Leibniz’s 
universal language or characteristic at the foundation of the sciences. Neurath was 
familiar with the work of both authors, Schröder and Lambert as well, who were the 
subjects of Olga Hahn’s doctoral dissertation and were mentioned in the Manifesto. 
The independent introduction into German of the term ‘semiotik’ in relation to the 
study of linguistic signs – that is, independently of Peirce’s, not of Locke’s and the 
medical tradition – suggests that Neurath’s symbolic, notational standpoint adopted 
already in algebraic logic may be called also a semiotic standpoint.106 Indeed, 
Neurath drew these connections in relation to the term ‘semiotik’ in a letter to 
Carnap of April 9, 1932:
Semeion is called the sign, of which semiotics – the doctrine of the characteristics of the 
disease. As a theory of signs par excellence in Leibnitz, Lambert, but in a very narrow and 
unpleasant sense. (Neurath to Carnap, 9 April 1932; RC 029-12-55. My translation.)107
His first significant contribution to logical empiricism was precisely in the form 
of the universal physicalist language, an application of the pasigraphic ideal to a 
philosophical problem of the scientific world-conception. Physicalism entered the 
picture around 1930 when it was adopted, albeit with different conceptions, by 
Neurath and Carnap as a solution to the problem of objectivity of empirical 
knowledge that Carnap had undertaken in the Aufbau.
Neurath had objected to Carnap’s proposal of a system, a logical construction, 
founded on the subjective language of phenomenology. Carnap, from a theoretical, 
scientific perspective, adopted the language of physics, the basis of the construction 
system that reconstructed the unity of sciences. For Neurath, instead, physicalism 
echoed the social nature of materialism in the sense associated with socialism and 
preserved some degree of disciplinary autonomy for the social sciences. Its scope 
was, then, broader, consisting, instead, in descriptions of publicly accessible objects 
and events in space and time.108 Neurath (1931a/1983, 49 and 1931b/1983, 55) 
spoke of spatio-temporal data expressing space-time linkages. This proposal would 
106 Note also that for Peirce (1884), algebraic logic was a contribution to the ‘philosophy of 
notation.’
107 In the followings sections, the Neurath-Carnap letters are quoted from the Carnap Archive at 
Pittsburgh (Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, ASP.1974.01, Special Collections Department, 
University of Pittsburgh). All rights reserved.
108 For a discussion of the first stage of the so-called protocol-sentence debate see, Uebel (1992) 
and (2007).
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be the core of the account of the protocol language and the protocol sentences that 
exhibit the objective empirical basis of scientific knowledge.
Aside from an implicit reference to the cental status of spacetime in Einstein’s 
theory of relativity, Neurath placed an explicit emphasis on two inseparable features 
of his proposal, the anti-metaphysical (against Wittgenstein’s picture theory of 
meaning) and anti-subjective (against Carnap’s phenomenological reduction). Both 
depended on a commitment to more formal relations, at three different levels: (1) 
the semantic commitment to the (meta)linguistic framework, without references to 
any extra-linguistic world or reality, with the methodological implication that 
statements are only compared with statements; (2) the syntactical aspect of 
language – as in Russell and Carnap’s emphasis on structural descriptions –; and (3) 
the particular focus on relations of order, arrangement or linkages in space and time 
(Neurath 1931a/1983, 1931b/1983 and 1932/1933/1983).
The latter feature connects Neurath’s syntacticism with his physicalism. In rela-
tion to unity, the universality of the objective (and empirical) language suggests a 
requirement of completeness and reflexivity (completeness extended to include 
itself) without a semantic dependence on the suspicious extra-linguistic facts. 
Language, then, and metalanguage, must be of this world, just like any other 
physicalistically describable fact. They are a kind of spatio-temporal physical 
structure – of public objects and events – such as speech behavior. Statements in 
speech or thought are physical events. As a matter of meaning, physical correlations 
could be both expressive of a speaker’s physical (material) states and indicative of 
physical (material) states of the world (see Uebel 1992, 2007; and Derek Anderson’s 
chapter in the present volume).
Neurath (1931b/1983, 53) used an analogy to ornaments as physical arrange-
ments, which indirectly integrated the system of pictorial symbols, and telegraphic 
signals: “What is at all scientifically expressible is not richer in fundamental rela-
tions than the symbols on a Morse tape which the telegrapher reads as they are 
sounded by his apparatus” (Neurath 1931a/1983, 49). Or more generally: “In lan-
guage nothing but order is essential, and that is already represented by a sequence 
of signs in Morse code” (Neurath 1931b/1983, 62).
The structural emphasis was consistent with the typographic approach in visual 
education through pictorial symbols and, similarly, with the formal standards of 
algebraic logic – even when steeped in psychologism or assuming the dominating 
extensional interpretation. The issue of symbolic order is what was at stake, from 
the symbolic, or semiotic, standpoint, in Neurath’s discussion of symbolic equality 
and the law of commutation (see Sect. 11.6., above).
By contrast, Carnap’s syntacticism about language in the same period evolved 
out of his logicism and the problems of unity and objectivity he had followed 
Neurath in solving in terms of some notion of physicalism. The roots of his turn to 
logical syntax included Gödel’s communication in 1931 of his incompleteness 
theorem. If symbolic logic had been inspired by algebra and Schlick’s epistemology 
and Hilbert’s formalism on axiomatics in geometry, now Carnap was modeling a 
metalogic based on arithmetic. The system of arithmetic, Carnap learned, was 
consistent but incomplete…. except about its own formal features (Carnap 
1934/1937).
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Very succinctly put, he promptly turned to the philosophical project of construct-
ing a metalanguage in terms of syntax, derivation rules, rather than truth, testability 
or meaning. Content, semantics, is a formal matter of syntax or metalogic. In fact, 
until 1935 and his next fatal encounter, with Tarski, “semantics” meant syntax. 
Meaning was introduced by formal logical equivalence or equality (e.g., ostensive 
and nominal definitions within the same language system, and translations between 
languages) (ibid.). Out of this development came the distinction between the mate-
rial and formal modes of speech, the principle of tolerance in matter of logic and the 
centrality of analyticity problem of standard of definitions and identities described 
in the metalanguage. In particular, Carnap declared that identity or definition cannot 
depend on extensional matters of truth or designation of objects (equality of truth 
value or denotation); if syntax depended on semantic sameness of descriptive mean-
ing, it must be an intensional matter (ibid.).109
For Carnap, as well as Neurath, the syntactic turn was part of the linguistic turn 
in science and philosophy, and of the culture of language criticism in Austria and 
Germany. It had a marked normative significance in line with the terms and goals 
laid out in the Manifesto and expressed in different ways by kindred groups: “The 
aim of logical syntax is to provide a system of concepts, a language, by the help of 
which the results of logical analysis will be exactly formulable” (Carnap 1934/1937, 
xiii). The project was meant to replace philosophy with the logic of science, which 
“nothing other than the logical syntax of the language of science” (ibid.). This is a 
standpoint from which to study scientifically what otherwise may be the object of 
sociology in Neurath’s sense, language as a “historically given method of 
communication, and thus of mutual influence, within a particular group of human 
beings” (ibid., 5). Other scientific standpoints, according to Carnap, are the 
syntactical, or formal, that is, his own, the psychological and the semasiological (the 
study of meaning of expressions or semiotics; Carnap borrowed the term 
‘semasiology’ adopted in psychology by Bühler, Külpe and Gätschenberger) 
(ibid.).110 Carnap’s formal standpoint considered languages as calculi, sets of rules 
or conventions for the formation and transformation of finite series of symbols, or 
linguistic expressions (ibid., 4).111
The contrast between Carnap’s and Neurath’s respective doctrine of physicalism 
rests on differences over the linguistic basis of empirical, objective language in, at 
least, scientific practice and for effective social communication, more generally. 
Distinctively, Neurath disagreed with Carnap over the normative – instrumental or 
ideal – value of precise symbolic language (in the mathematical model of algebraic 
109 The literature on Carnap’s syntactic turn is vast, but to stay within the context of the Circle, the 
reader may do well to start with Uebel (1992) and (2007).
110 As he had done in the Aufbau, in the bibliography Carnap listed Gätschenberger’s Symbola 
(1920).
111 In the tradition of Leibniz, Lambert and turn-of-the-century symbolic logic, Gätschenberger 
(1920, 126, 133, and 454) declared that sematology contributed to algebraic logic, especially to the 
calculus of relations sought by Peirce and Schröder, and from that standpoint, it was the mother of 
mathematics. On Gätschenberger’s relevance to Carnap’s early works, see Haller (1959); on his 
place in German semiotics, see Eschbach (1987).
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logic and subsequent symbolic logic) over ordinary language (source of no less 
confusion than metaphysics). The limitations in the value of the former, as I have 
discussed (see Sects. 11.5 and 11.7., above), extended, in addition, to its empirical 
application, as a methodological matter of representation, reasoning and 
decision-making.
Neurath adopted his semiotic standpoint against Carnap’s use of ‘semantics’ 
after 1931. In a letter to Carnap of April 9, 1932, he wrote as follows:
Neither I nor Olga can befriend semantics. A faint picture of words, a “mantic”, reminiscent 
of visionary art. Strange and scholarly in an unfair sense.
In addition, as the learned woman knows, semantics is moreover still wrong, it is called 
“semiotics”, Semeion is called the sign, of which semiotics  – the doctrine of the 
characteristics of the disease. As a theory of signs par excellence in Leibnitz, Lambert, but 
in a very narrow and unpleasant sense. Sema the character knows no semantics.
We both think that SYNTAX – Logical Syntax – General syntax or the like sounds much 
better and can be popularized for emergencies. (Neurath to Carnap, 9 April 1932; RC 029- 
12- 55. My translation.)
Neurath also pressed Carnap on the distinction between empirical, logical and ter-
minological, or glossological, normative standards for the construction and use of 
words and statements. The construction of language was a normative task at the 
very level of elementary expressions. Not any group of sounds can make up an 
acceptable, meaningful word in a given language, e.g., ‘nots’ (Heidegger’s Nichte).112
Similarly, it is not surprising that in the wake of Carnap’s syntactic turn, Neurath 
wrote to him to remind him of Neurath’s early essay on symbolic equality and 
request Carnap’s opinion.113
Standards of symbolic language and reasoning were at the heart of Neurath’s, 
and the Circle’s, project of unification, even with the shifting limits he set on the 
application of aims driving the program of algebraic logic. Noticeable changes in 
his statements responded to changing circumstances, including responses to 
positions by other authors. Some were more pointed such as the explicit opposition 
of the systematic dimension of the ideals of knowledge, the system-encyclopedia 
model opposition; others were more a matter of explicit emphasis, such as declaring 
the only possible universal terminology a jargon.
For Neurath, unlike for Carnap – after Frege –, (see Carus 2007, 102–103) ordi-
nary language was unavoidable in empirical science in general, and, in particular, 
the social sciences and their practical social role. Rational reform had, then, its 
limits. Already in “On Protocol Statements” Neurath had departed further from the 
unqualified generalizations in the Manifesto and had stressed how empirical science 
required a universal jargon that reflected what above I have called its historical and 
social holistic character, that is, the thickly and locally embedded character of 
scientific practices in social and historical conditions, and in which, accordingly, we 
“combine terms of ordinary and advanced scientific languages, since in practice, the 
112 Neurath to Carnap, 3 November, 1932; RC 029-12-13. In the same letter Neurath also analyzed 
cases of empirical falsehood as forms of logical contradiction or nonsense.
113 Neurath to Carnap, 5 April 1934; RC 029-10-77.
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terms of both languages overlap” (Neurath 1932/33/1983, 92). Protocol statements 
are an unavoidable source of imprecise cluster expressions that belie the one- 
dimensional linear formal ideals: predictions are “checked in turn by common 
language statements” endowed with a “relatively great stability” that “is not linked 
with a precision equivalent to that of scientific formulas” (Neurath 1936/1983, 151). 
Instead, in the actual cases and in Neurath’s linguistic version of the epistemic 
reconstruction, they operate as “manifestly imprecise, equivocal, indeterminate 
formulas” (ibid., 152).
Still, in an early letter to Neurath of October 7, 1928, Carnap himself had consid-
ered a similar situation, although only as a default, which was for Neurath the only 
situation:
[A] logic, a method of concept formation must be established which takes into account the 
fact that we always have crystals and dirt mixed before us, which therefore specifies the 
demands on science. Concepts and statements are to be provided as long as the “ideal 
language” is not available. (Carnap to Neurath, 7 October 1928; RC 029-16-01. My 
translation.)
When in 1935 Carnap turned to semantics in Tarski’s sense, Neurath perceived 
the move as metaphysical and pseudorational and at odds with the scientific attitude 
(Uebel 1992, 2007). Without mentioning the Leibnizian language-calculus standard 
or its fortunes on the back of the development of symbolic logic, it has been argued 
that the members of the Vienna Circle, including Neurath, embraced the universalism 
of the linguistic framework, but not a calculus, without distinguishing between 
Cartesian and anti-Cartesian possible versions, and only when Carnap embraced 
semantics, he singly left the universal-language camp to join a Cartesian version of 
the calculus one (Mormann 1999, 170–171).114 Carus, in the present volume, ques-
tions elements of this portrayal of Carnap. My elaboration on the theme of logic and 
its associated standards emphasizes the way in which (1) Neurath's early (anti-Car-
tesian) anti-pseudorationalistic commitment evolved in expression and argumenta-
tion, without reversals, as he entered new debates, while (2) its includes a sustained, 
although restricted, appeal to the dual standard of both language and calculus the 
earlier tradition of symbolic logic picked up also by Schröder and Frege, if not by 
Russell and Whitehead as well.
I have argued above that limitations on language preceded Neurath’s warning 
about restrictions implied by the unavoidable presence of Ballungen terms after his 
attention had turned to the broader philosophical picture prompted by Schlick and 
Carnap’s works, especially the latter’s Aufbau (Uebel 1992, Cat 1995, Cartwright 
et al. 1996). Neurath also introduced the idea of a universal jargon along with the 
presence of Ballungen and the absence of an epistemological tabula rasa  – the 
historical holism expressed by the boat metaphor  – as early as in “On Protocol 
Sentences” (Neurath 1932/33/1983, 92). Physicalism, even if purified from 
metaphysical terms, can be only a universal jargon. As a result, scientific language, 
from this Neurath’s perspective, despite its “growing equipment of systematic 
114 Mormann adopts Hintikka’s terminology, paraphrasing van Heijenort’s focus on logic, language 
as universal medium and language as calculus.
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symbol formation, can by no means be regarded as an approximation to such an 
ideal language” (ibid., 91).
Syntacticism might have been compatible with physicalistic jargon, but it could 
not have provided a consistent enough metalanguage (Mormann 1999, 174). The 
view preceded, then, also the reaction to Carnap’s semantic turn and the subsequent 
attention to the encyclopedia as the anti-systemic model of unification.115 And yet, 
the anti-pseudorationalist limitations didn’t prevent Neurath from endorsing, in 
however limited a form, the calculus standard. In both cases, the ideal universal 
language and its calculus, the logical-mathematical background he shared with 
others, prompted him to keep formulating his alterantive views in relation to those 
standards. Only the occasions and expressions varied.
11.8.4  Logical and Terminological Unity of the Encyclopedia 
in Exile, and Back to Symbolic Equality
Neurath’s preoccupation with the empirical conditions of scientific practice, espe-
cially in the empirical and, in particular, the social sciences, led him to an interest in 
their methodological and social management. With this approach to empiricism, 
and mainly in this regard, it should be acknowledged that his participation in debates 
over logical empiricism or with fellow Circle members became complicated by a 
tendency to substitute, and conflate, epistemological questions for logical ones.
At the same time, he also declared that logic and (empirical) behavioristics con-
stitute alternative perspectives on scientific practice with their respective sets of 
concepts, or terms, such as contradiction and deduction – logical – and acceptance – 
behavioristic. So that when discussing “the problem of unified science and 
encyclopedia,” he could, if he wished, “separate the behaviouristic considerations 
strictly from those about the logic of science” (Neurath 1936c/1983, 170).
Also, both logic and universal language, the two sides of the Leibnizian algebraic 
project, were relevant to unification. Neurath’s commitment to the value of symbolic 
logic as an ideal was sustained but growingly critical and distant: notably since the 
position laid out in 1913  in “The Lost Wanderers of Descartes,” first as calculus 
(1913/1983, 1932/33/1983 and 1934/1983), then explicitly also as language 
(1932/33/1983), and as two sides of pseudorationalism (1936c/1983, 1935a/1983 
and 1935b/1983). Still, Neurath pointed to a similar standard in a joint extension of 
both methodological holism and logicism, echoing some of the programmatic (and 
propagandistic) statements of the Manifesto and Carnap’s Fregean commitment to 
the logical foundations of the sciences, including the empirical ones.
115 In a number of places, Neurath adopted the characaterization of the encyclopedia as a model, in 
a Duhemian sense, part of the opposition to the characaterization of unity as a system (Neurath 
1936/1983, 145); but he used the term “model” also for a broader category to contrast the encylo-
pedia with the system as models of knowledge (ibid., 156). In relation to Duhem, it must be noted 
that he adopted the notion of logical unity in the sense of oneness, as a fundamental feature of natu-
ral classification.
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In 1937, after the International Congress of Philosophy and in preparation for the 
Third International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris at the end July, 
Neurath felt compelled to talk up the value of logic in logical empiricism, retaking 
in exile the international propagandizing tone in Manifesto on behalf of the 
movement as a whole, now detached from its original geographical and cultural 
location. That is, he would restate the early intellectual endorsement of the 
connection of science to technical logical development in philosophy in a manner 
consistent with the Circle’s joint projects of intellectual and social reform. In 
particular, he would insist on the desirable meta-scientific (or scientific?) synthesis 
of philosophy and science as recapitulated in the synthesis of formalism (in sym-
bolic logic, in foundations of mathematics and in mathematics) and empiricism. In 
the Circle’s scientific philosophy formalism was represented primarily in two 
approaches to the foundations of mathematics, formalism in Schlick’s Hilbertian 
picture and logicism in Carnap’s.
In “Unified Science and its Encyclopedia,” already in exile and in his Encyclopedia 
phase, Neurath wrote:
The program of the unification of scientific language requires a logical analysis of the sci-
ences. The history of science during the last decades shows the importance of such an 
analysis for the progress of concrete scientific work. (Neurath 1937a/1983, 174.)
Examples of such scientific relevance were for Neurath scientist-philosophers 
such as Mach, Duhem, Einstein, Poincaré, Boltzmann and Russell. The logic of 
science is the study of the scientific application of the method of logical analysis.
In the task of unification we find, again, the two faces of the Leibnizian project: 
the calculus and the universal language. On the calculus, Neurath is again explicit: 
“The logical calculus in its widest sense becomes an essential apparatus of a unified 
science, and all logistic research acquires very great direct and indirect importance 
for the evolution of the logic of science” (1937a/1983, 175). In particular, the task 
“of modern logical analysis of science is to build up a more consistent framework 
for the special science and for a unified science” (ibid.). The two parts were 
inseparable: “The process of the logical organization of a single science cannot be 
divorced from the process of building up bridges or connections between the 
different sciences.” The calculus, as the combinatorial calculus to construct logical 
classification, allows for systematization, in the deductive sense, but only locally 
and from below, from the connection between available small units and not as a 
single closed deductive system (Neurath 1936b/1983, 145 and 153).
And here is where the linguistic dimension plays a key technical, constructive 
role in the form of his older proposal of physicalism:
As has already been indicated, the unification of scientific language is a special and techni-
cal task. The fundamental thesis of our movement is that terms similar to those employed 
in physics and in our everyday language are sufficient for constructing all sciences. This 
thesis, known as Physicalism, has been progressively confirmed by special investigations in 
recent years. (Neurath 1937a/1983, 175-176.)
As in the case of logical analysis, Neurath pointed to empirical evidence from actual 
historical cases of applications in the sciences or about them. Both, then, the 
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evidence and the goal are historical and constructive, and this sets out the contrast 
in the role of logic with the “[pseudo] rationalistic anticipation of the system of the 
sciences’ based on the notion of ‘a philosophical system which is to legislate for the 
sciences” (ibid., 176–177).
He had made the point elsewhere with a broader historical focus so as to distin-
guish between older and modern projects, just like Carnap had done about older – 
Schröder and Neurath – and modern – Russell and Carnap – symbolic logic: “The 
striving for logical derivations which we encounter among the scholastics was to 
revive again in Leibniz in a thoroughly modern form. He was to become the fore-
runner of logicism. But empiricism does not look kindly upon such synthesis, and 
any rationalism a priori appears suspect to it” (Neurath 1937/1987, 133–134).
It is this more liberal sense, also narrowly informed by attention to empirical sci-
ence, that he could endorse a restricted application of the standards in algebraic 
logic, since 1909, and could later insist on the Manifesto's theme and standard. 
Writing to Susan Stebbing in England on April, 8 1939, he distinguished between 
“unification by logicalisation” and “unification by visualization” (quoted in Körber 
in this volume) Once in exile in England, Neurath acknowledged the two 
perspectives, ideal and restricted, when the logical met the empirical, that is, in the 
project of logical empiricism. On the one hand, he noted, “Carnap’s work shows 
how symbolism helps us to overcome some difficulties which arise when we 
seriously try to logicalize’ and ‘empiricalize’ our scientific enterprise” (1941/1983, 
213). On the other, he warned, “formalization is no magic sieve, saving empiricism, 
saving empiricism” (ibid.); no only language may be unavoidably imprecise, but 
sometimes “a symbolism may even conceal the ambiguity of certain explanation” 
(ibid.).
Neurath made the point in vivid terms in a letter of August 8, 1944 to Hans 
Reichenbach’s brother Bernhard, also exiled in England:
LOGIC deals with ARGUING, and therefore NEVER CAN LOGIC TELL YOU 
ANYTHING WITHOUT APPLYING IT TO FACTUAL STATEMENTS. Fechner said, 
you cannot get out from a roasted turkey more boiled apples than you put into it before …..
Logic is only PLAYING WITH APPLES, and now listen:
ALLL, ALLLLLLLLL, ALLLLLLLLLLLLLLL factual statements, which tell about 
some stories, earthquakes or weather, forests or mountains, human beings or comets are 
based on SELECTED material, with well KNOWN remaining details and others we shall 
perhaps know later on …. THEREFORE ALL LOGIC APPLIED TO SUCH FACTUAL 
STATEMENTS CAN NEVER PRESENT YOU WITH UNAMBIGUITY, SINCE THE 
START IS AMBIGUOUS, EVERY ARGUMENT IS EITHER LOGICAL OR ILLOGICAL, 
to say it is logical OK, but things in history do not happen according to the logic, sounds to 
me Bushman language, which I do not understand. (Neurath to Bernhard Reichenbach, 8 
August 1944; original emphasis; Otto Neurath Nachlass.)116
As a matter of empirical method, not just meaning, Neurath repeatedly concluded, 
the selection of scientific statements was a matter of decision, the outcome of a 
process that involved a limited use of reasoning and limited benefit from logical 
determination (same as the general empirical psychology of decision making 1913):
116 I’m grateful to Adam Tamas Tuboly for drawing my attention to the letter.
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Multiplicity and uncertainty are essential. From data at our disposal we can, in more than 
one way, deduce predictions that are in harmony with science; the multiplicity of predicting 
cannot be excluded by any method; no degree of systematic procedure can alter this. One 
can, so to speak, not agree on a ‘machine’ that unambiguously produces ‘inductions’ in the 
wider sense. The progress of science consists, as it were, in constantly changing the machine 
and in advancing on the basis of new decisions. Still, the result in fact is far-reaching unity 
that can not be deduced logically. (Neurath 1935a/1983, 116; original emphasis.)
Against the Jevonsian mechanical ideal, here judgment, purpose, extra-logical 
factors distinguish the rationality of actual process from the pseudorationality of the 
ideal. The well-known implications for an epistemological picture are holism and 
antifoundationalism.
In this sense, Neurath distinguished the conditions for accepting content state-
ments, synthetic statements assessed in relation to protocol statements, from logical 
statements. In their case the presence of uncertainty and role of decision is possible 
but not inevitable: “While to make progress at all, of course, we have to choose 
between several equally possible groups of content statements and do this on the 
basis of a decision, such a decision is unnecessary in a logical statement (that, for 
example, a system of statements in a given language is consistent)” (Neurath 
1934/1983, 103). And he added, echoing the Jevonsian ideal, that “such a decision 
is discarded in the sphere of combinatorial analysis” (ibid.).
The pseudoscientific and pseudorationalist position is the belief that there is one 
solution and a calculus and a precise language with the power to reach it, so that 
decision, as he attributed to several Polish logicians, is replaced by “the calculus of 
the logic of science” can replace decision in the practice of science (Neurath 
1936a/1983, 136). Instead, “we have to reach a ‘decision’ not based on a calculus” 
(Neurath 1946/1983, 235). The difference in uncertainty stems from a difference in 
modal multiplicity: “In logic and mathematics we are dealing each time with one 
possibility in principle, in the sciences with several possibilities in principle that are 
in competition with each other” (ibid., 104; original emphasis). The uncertainty 
consists in the inability to conclude that we know whether a statement is analytic or 
synthetic (ibid.). For Carnap this was a matter of logical tolerance and the pragmatic 
challenge of choosing a linguistic framework. It was also a matter of convention 
about the way we use symbols in relation to the same content. This was also how 
Neurath had discussed symbolic equalities as a matter of practical or conventional 
constraints on the use of symbols and the dual pattern of presentation (see Sect. 
11.5., above).
In the last decade of his life, Neurath devoted his time and energy in exile to the 
coordination, first out The Hague and later from Oxford, of Isotype projects such as 
the pictorial contributions to educational booklets and films, and the coordination, 
and of Unity of Science projects such the Encyclopedia of Unified Science and 
annual International Congresses for the Unity of Science. To carry things out, the 
core group of patient collaborators included his wife Marie in Oxford, Carnap and 
Charles Morris in Chicago and Jörgen Jörgensen in Copenhagen.
The projects had a clear pragmatic character, as had the Manifesto before them, 
aiming, for instance, at actual expressions of linguistic unification and social 
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collaboration. The three main fronts of such collaborations were the sciences, 
science education, and scientific philosophy as philosophy of science, and, in 
particular, the logic of science. For practical reasons, then, Neurath would have to 
straddle the line between touting the goals of unity and universality and clarifying 
the actual limitations that challenged the empirical and practical applications of 
ideal formal standards of language and logic  – that is, of representation and 
reasoning. In this way he remained engaged in projects of symbolic standardization 
and reform harking back to his work in the first decade of the century.
The focus on language as a social tool for communication and community, for 
unity, remained extended to logic and to its application in linguistic analysis – a 
philosophical project pursued, among others, by Russell, Tarski and Carnap. Thus 
one of the results of the First Congress for the Unity of Science, held in Paris in 
1935, was an international commission to explore the standardization of logical 
symbolism in the face of growing numbers of suggestions and inconsistent usage. 
The committee was formed by Carnap, Heinrich Behmann, Heinrich Scholz, Adolf 
Lindenbaum and Paul Bernays.117 Neurath himself drafted the proposal, a six-page 
document titled “Unification of Logical Symbolism” (“Vereinheitlichung der 
logischen Symbolik”), stressing the goal of unity and the condition of enough 
continuity with tradition (Otto Neurath Nachlass K13.). The final text was discussed 
at special meetings first during the Third Congress, held again in Paris the last week 
of July 1937 and again during the Fourth Congress, in Cambridge, England, the 
third week of July the following year.
The Sixth International Congress for the Unity of Science took place in Chicago 
the first week of September 1941. Since many Europen participants were unable to 
cross the Atlantic because of the war outbreak, Neurath organized in England a 
smaller conference on the first week of October (with Susan Stebbing and the 
education expert Joseph A. Lauwerys). The topic was terminology. I have introduced 
his position, which he published in “Universal Jargon and Terminology:” to the 
extent that unification requires universality, the universal language can only be a 
universal jargon. That is, it can function as a tool for the encyclopedia model of 
unification only if based on unavoidably uncertain and imprecise expression 
(Neurath 1941/1983).118
In his correspondence with Carnap, Neurath persisted in the bitter attacks on the 
latter’s semantic turn and its association with Polish philosophy. On one front, 
Neurath insisted on distinguishing the idea of precise formula in a formal calculus 
from empirical expressions, holistically embedded “aggregations,” and it was in the 
empirical application of the calculus that he sensed the danger of incurring in meta-
physical commitments.119 He pointed to the specific risk of “calculus absolutism,” 
which he resisted, but required some form of integration within the alternative proj-
117 These are names listed by Neurath on the cover letter from 10 May 1937 with the proposal sent 
out for circulation. Nachlass K13. The Congress Report included a mention of the committee that 
listed Alfred Tarski and Olaf Helmer (Erkenntnis 7, 63).
118 See also Adam Tamas Tuboly’s chapter in the present volume.
119 Neurath to Carnap, 25 September, 1943 (RC 102-55-03). See letter 22 in the present volume.
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ect, of “orchestration.”120 On another front, Neurath pointed to a Catholic Austria-
Poland axis in which a genealogy that originated with Brentano led to Twardowski 
and then Kotarbinski.121 He associated their work in logic with metaphysical doc-
trines and approaches of neo-Scholasticism, Thomism and Aristotelianism, even in 
the case of Lukasiewicz and his “free-will tendency in multi-valued logic.”122 By 
association with Tarski and the alleged metaphysics of semantic talk of truth, 
Neurath extended his indictment to Carnap himself, who in his final letters he would 
accuse of embodying also the rigid values of Platonism, Puritanism and 
Prussianism.123
Neurath remained defiantly committed to his physicalism and syntacticism, 
which he considered authentically anti-metaphysical, and to its ensuing decisionistic 
methodology, which he considered authentically rational. It’s hardly surprising, 
then, that when Russell took on the question of protocol sentences in the late 1930s 
and targeted especially Neurath’s views, and his anti-metaphysical criticisms of 
Wittgenstein and Schlick, Neurath would adopt the same attitude and react to 
Russell the same way he had reacted to the others and more recently to Carnap’s 
semantic turn.
Russell’s presented his effectively own contribution to the protocol sentence 
debate in an essay, “Basic Propositions,” included in the book An Inquiry into 
Meaning and Truth (Russell 1940, 137–149). It could hardly  have been an 
intellectually less welcoming reception on Neurath’s arrival in Britain. Russell’s 
book contained a series of lectures delivered at Oxford in 1938; the book was 
subsequently presented at seminars attended by Carnap and Morris – and Hempel? – 
in 1938–9 at the University of Chicago and most likely also by Reichenbach at 
UCLA in 1939–40, also by Carnap at Harvard in 1940.
In the essay on basic propositions Russell sought, as had Popper before him, to 
identify the source of the epistemic authority of the distinctively empirical evidence 
associated with protocol statements. Russell was concerned throughout the book 
with perceptual knowledge and empirical evidence, and argued that such an 
empirical claim on our beliefs could not be available within a self-enclosed social 
linguistic world in which the syntactical standpoint reduced empirical truth to 
formal, logical truth (Russell 1940, 140). According to Russell, the corresponding 
refusal to acknowledge a semantic concept of truth, in relation to some extra- 
linguistic reality, rendered Neurath’s empiricism, inter alia, completely unintelligible. 
It was mere “ultra-empirical” verbalism. Russell was joining forces with Schlick 
and Wittgenstein and, indirectly, with the empiricism of the Carnap of the Aufbau 
and the more recent semantic turn. Empirical knowledge, the epistemic force of 
basic statements, rested on individual perceptual access to extra-linguistic reality.
120 Neurath to Carnap, 16 June, 1945 (RC 102-55-11). See letter 31 in the present volume.
121 Neurath to Carnap, 15 January, 1943 (RC 102-55-02). See letter 17 in the present volume.
122 See letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945, unsent (RC 115-07-66). See letter 34 in the present 
volume.
123 See letter to Carnap, 22 September 1945, unsent (RC 115-07-66). See letter 34 in the present 
volume.
11 Neurath and the Legacy of Algebraic Logic
330
Neurath included in “Universal Jargon and Terminology” a reply to Russell’s 
criticism marshalling the combined retorts he had wielded against Carnap’s 
metaphysical subjectivism, or idealism, in 1928–31 and against Schlick’s and 
Wittgenstein’s metaphysical realism in 1934, even denouncing, for good measure, 
Russell’s talk of “absolute truth” (Neurath 1941/1983, 226–228, and 1934/1983).
The following year, Neurath’s British intellectual ally and collaborator Susan 
Stebbing published the third edition of her A Modern Introduction to Logic (1930). 
To his satisfaction, it contained a section on definition and analysis with criticism of 
Russell’s own logical method in philosophy of language central to the both symbolic 
logic and the methodology of the logic of science  – symbolic language, logical 
analysis and definitions (Stebbing 1930/1942, 439–442). Stebbing attributed to 
Russell, in the Principia Mathematica, a contradiction between definition as purely 
symbolic equation (simplifying substitution rule) and conceptual analysis:
It is obvious that Mr. Russell has been led into contradiction because he wanted to do two 
things at once, viz. to define definition as concerned with symbols, and to point out that the 
analysis of a concept, which may be most suitable expressed in a definition, constitutes an 
advance in knowledge.
The analytic definition of a symbol does indeed entail the analysis of a concept which 
the symbol expresses. A definition is an equation; it asserts that a given set of symbols is 
equivalent to some other symbol, or set of symbols. Both the definiendum and the definiens 
express the same referend, the latter being an analysis of the former. It is for this reason that 
an analysis of a symbolic expression may constitute an advance in knowledge. The 
definition enables us to see what it was we were meaning when we used the expression that 
is now defined. We sometimes use words to refer to a referend with regard to which we have 
no clear idea. Then we may come to see that another set of words, or symbols, much more 
clearly expresses what the referend is. It is in this way that the analytic definition of a 
symbol entails an analysis of what is expressed by both sets of symbols, although the 
analytic definition is of the symbol, not of the concept which the symbol expresses. […] But 
in logical analysis there are not two things but two expressions which mean the same. […] 
The correct analysis of a symbolic expression is enlightening since it shows what we meant 
when we used the defined expression. (Stebbing 1930/1942, 440; original emphasis.)
For Stebbing, logical symbols, in particular, served the dual purpose of abbreviation 
and abstraction, and as a consequence, they revealed form (see, for instance, 
Stebbing 1930/1942, Ch. XXIII). Her remarks dovetailed with Neurath heated 
exchanges with Carnap over the latter’s “lapse” into the metaphysical, semantic 
turn, which included the issue of symbolic definitions and the relevance of Neurath’s 
early work.
After reading Russell’s new book, Neurath had promptly approached Carnap in 
April 1941 asking about his opinion not without sharing initial reactions: “What do 
you think about Russell’s last book? It looks somewhat strange? Neo-neo-Platonic 
Mysticism  – I think it is full of misunderstandings. He seems not to grasp our 
purpose. His position – an interesting coincidence – seems to be very similar to 
Schlick’s conception in his latest days.”124
Carnap replied in conciliatory tone: “Yes, Russell’s book is somewhat disap-
pointing. But I think one can still call it empiricism though – as you say – it is the 
124 Neurath to Carnap 4 April 1941 (RC 102-55-20), see letter 5 in the present volume.
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Schlick-denomination of empiricism.”125 The following year, in a letter of 17 July 
1942, Neurath supplied Carnap with a list of detailed replies to Russell’s state-
ments.126 In line with Russell’s argument, Neurath’s criticisms extended to seman-
tics, entering the ongoing debate with Carnap himself, and to the interpretation of 
logical symbols. Neurath’s sustained but turbulent sailing through symbolic matters 
of language and logic retained its early original references:
You answer, that all my remarks touch even Russell’s existence symbol in his logic. Of 
course, it does. I always knew that and I always looked with some suspicion to that. But as 
long as such symbols remain within calculus not much may happen, we should not be too 
pedantic, but if they did enter the empiricist sphere through semantics, we have to be 
careful. But that is another long story, connected with the problems of introducing symbols, 
an action not very properly done by Russell, as you may see, where he introduces letter 
combinations. How to say that ab and ba are the same or vice versa, only ab may be used. 
Russell’s remark is a very weak one and only an additional one – Stebbing made the right 
remark on that in her book. This whole symmetry business is a difficult problem in itself. I 
am not sure, what to do in detail with it. My remarks on monogrammatic writing touch only 
one point, and my remarks on symbolically equivalence etc. (Neurath to Carnap, 25 
September 1943, RC 102-55-03. See letter 22 in the present volume. See Neurath 1910a.)
In a follow-up letter of July 20, Neurath returned to the frequent topic of his 
satisfying efforts rebuilding his lost library, especially reading and buying scientific 
texts in physics, chemistry and mathematics. He concluded by listing Schröder: “I 
always hope I shall find a Schroeder, I have now a VENN with his nice ellipses (I 
had them only in my Schroeder).”127
11.9  Conclusion
If I am right, tracking Neurath’s attention to symbolism and symbolic logic intro-
duces a broader perspective and a new object of study that significantly supplement 
current accounts of his intellectual life and works; they are also integrative in how 
they yield a richer understanding of Neurath’s more familiar interests and views in 
economics, pictorial language and logical empiricism. For these reasons, they also 
require further and more detailed attention.
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Chapter 12
Neurath and Carnap on Semantics
A. W. Carus
Abstract Carnap is still often portrayed as a “representationalist.” While the gene-
alogy of this prejudice may not actually go back to Neurath’s response to Carnap’s 
embrace of Tarskian semantics, there is a continuity of motivation and rhetoric. 
However, based on a reading of the later Neurath-Carnap correspondence repro-
duced in this volume, it would appear that the apparent dispute between them over 
semantics really was largely terminological, with certain differences of emphasis 
amplified by personality differences and the long interruption of personal contact 
due to the war. Their conceptions of a language of science can be reconciled. Carnap 
was neither a representationalist nor an anti-representationalist nor an inferentialist 
(though it may appear that he can legitimately be portrayed as any of these), since 
ultimately to embrace one of these positions is to endorse an “order of explanation” 
or ontological primacy, and Carnap rejected ontology.
Some of the cruder stereotypes about logical empiricism, and especially about 
Carnap, have faded into relative obscurity since the bright light of historical scholar-
ship has been trained on them in the past few years. But others survive unscathed, 
and seem almost ineradicable. One such hardy perennial is the idea that Carnap was 
a doctrinaire “representationalist,” as Robert Brandom puts it. What he has in mind 
is Carnap’s supposed adherence to the “myth of the given” castigated by Wilfrid 
Sellars (1962). Brandom, following Rorty, regards “the idea of things known simply 
by our grasp of our own meanings” – by which he means analyticity – as another, 
different kind of “given” from that discussed by Sellars, “the idea of things known 
simply by being in some sensory state.” Parenthetically, Brandom (2013, 92) adds 
“Carnap, of course, embraced both forms of givenness.”
I am grateful to the editors, Jordi Cat and Adam Tuboly, for suggesting that I contribute to this 
volume and for helpful comments. I also thank Thomas Uebel for some valuable suggestions.
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Those who know their Carnap will be aware that he did not, of course, embrace 
either “form of givenness.” But Brandom’s offhand remark is by no means original; 
it hardly expresses a view that is peculiar to him. He probably just thought he was 
repeating what everyone knows (hence the “of course”); certainly his teacher Rorty 
would have conveyed such an understanding of Carnap to him. But so would the 
major names of the generation in which Rorty grew up, including both Quine and 
Sellars, who each, according to Rorty (and Brandom) were able to overcome one of 
the two kinds of givenness while still clinging to the other (ibid.).
But this view of Carnap as a “representationalist” goes back further than the 
1950s. Otto Neurath, Carnap’s own friend and comrade on the “left wing” of the 
Vienna Circle, leveled the same accusation at Carnap from the moment Carnap first 
incorporated semantics into his conception of meta-discourse in the mid-1930s. 
Those who currently perpetuate the notion of Carnap as a “representationalist” may 
not consciously be influenced by Neurath, but they are repeating the same patterns, 
and some of the same motivations appear to be involved.
So it is not too surprising that efforts have been made to rehabilitate Neurath’s 
critique of semantics (Mormann 1999), and to argue that it was not rooted in misun-
derstanding at all, but in a deeply rooted antipathy to Carnap’s “Cartesianism” and 
to Neurath’s own development of an anti-Cartesian alternative to the Cartesian 
mainstream of the “language as universal medium” school of thought, as portrayed 
by Hintikka (1988, going back to van Heijenoort 1967), and contrasted with the 
“language as calculus” school. Carnap, according to Mormann, had  – just as 
Hintikka (1992) portrays him – adhered until 1935 to the “language as universal 
medium” view, but with his adoption of semantics, defected to the “language as 
calculus” side, while remaining “Cartesian” (see Sect. 12.1. below for details). 
Mormann’s defense of Neurath may be regarded, then, as a way of shoring up the 
“obvious” interpretation of Carnap that Brandom inherited from Rorty and from 
Sellars, Quine, and ultimately from Neurath himself.
Thomas Uebel (2001) suggests a different interpretation of Neurath, in which his 
rejection of semantics was not in fact rooted in a principled and fundamental differ-
ence between himself and Carnap (as Mormann contends), but mostly in emotional 
and relatively superficial overreactions to Carnap’s unimaginative, wooden- 
sounding terminology. In principle, at least, Uebel contends, it should have been 
possible for Carnap and Neurath to overcome their disagreement over semantics. 
Uebel’s view, then, is not so much the traditional “misunderstanding” view, but it 
also rejects Mormann’s contention that Carnap and Neurath misleadingly papered 
over deep and indeed unbridgeable philosophical differences.1
I have repeatedly endorsed something like Uebel’s view of the matter (Carus 
2007, Ch. 11., 2017), and would see the difference between Neurath and Carnap 
regarding the form of the language of science as less a practical disagreement (even 
less a theoretical one) than a matter of emphasis. Each accepted the other’s concep-
1 There have also been other interpretations of Neurath’s rejection of semantics that are less pro-
grammatic than Mormann’s or Uebel’s but seek merely to clarify Neurath’s position while holding 
out the possibility that it could be worked out more coherently as an alternative to the “main-
stream” view of Tarski and Carnap; the best example of this is Mancosu (2008).
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tion of the language of science, in principle, but each thought his own conception of 
greater importance and the other’s of subsidiary interest, and each had a different 
conception of how the two fit together, which neither spelled out very clearly, if at 
all. I have tried to reconstruct what their joint idea of how the two fit together might 
have looked like if Neurath had lived a bit longer and they had had a chance to talk 
in person after the war had separated them for so long. But this looks dangerously 
like mere idle speculation if it is not at least consistent with what we know about 
Carnap and Neurath. If Mormann’s picture (buttressing the traditional interpretation 
of Carnap handed down from Rorty, Sellars, Quine, and others) is right, then of 
course my attempts over the years to synthesize Carnap’s and Neurath’s conceptions 
of the language of science into a single coherent picture are going nowhere. So I had 
better be able to show that there is something wrong with Mormann’s picture of 
Carnap. But the present paper tries also to give an alternative interpretation of 
Neurath’s motivation on the basis of the Neurath-Carnap correspondence repro-
duced in this volume.
The first section reviews Carnap’s transition from the Syntax to his incorporation 
of semantics into meta-discourse. Section 12.2. surveys Neurath’s response to 
semantics from 1935 to his death (1945), especially the last few years. Section 12.3. 
addresses Carnap’s response, and argues that Carnap and Neurath are in fundamen-
tals not so far apart, i.e. that their correspondence supports Uebel’s interpretation 
rather than Mormann’s. Section 12.4. goes on to argue that not only representation-
alism (as well as its supposed opposite, inferentialism) but the whole idea of a pre-
ferred “order of explanation,” so often invoked by Brandom, is irrelevant and out of 
place in Carnap’s perspective.
12.1  From Syntax to Semantics
The reception of Carnap’s Logical Syntax was significantly distorted by the timing 
and circumstances of its publication.2 The Vienna Circle was in the process of 
breaking up and fleeing from fascist regimes; Carnap moved to Chicago soon after 
the 1934 publication of the original, and by the time the English translation appeared 
in 1937, Carnap had already signaled in “Wahrheit und Bewährung” (1936a) that he 
had now left behind the “formal mode of speech” highlighted so prominently in the 
final (“philosophical”) section V of the Syntax (the only section, it seems, that most 
readers actually attended to). As discussed elsewhere in detail (Awodey and Carus 
2009; Carus 2007, Chap. 10.), this section was written in mid-1932, before Carnap 
had arrived at the principle of tolerance, which is therefore hardly in evidence there. 
Since this section appeared to most readers to articulate the philosophical point of 
the book, it is not surprising that they (a) missed the principle of tolerance entirely 
and (b) thought that with the incorporation of semantics, the Syntax had been left 
behind.
2 As I have discussed in much more detail in Carus (2007, 33–37).
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The consensus view in the current Carnap literature regards the principle of toler-
ance as the major turning point in Carnap’s career (as well as the most important 
contribution of the Syntax), and no longer sees the incorporation of semantics into 
meta-discourse in 1935 as a major discontinuity at all (Creath 1991; Ricketts 1996; 
Carus 1999; Awodey 2007; Awodey and Carus 2009). The rejection of “meaning” 
(specifically of Wittgenstein’s picture theory of meaning in January 1931  – in 
Carnap’s famous “sleepless night” – and thus of any substantial account of mean-
ing) was not taken back. There was no restoration of meaning in 1935. The new 
designation relation is not a relation between language and world (some pre- existing 
or objectively existing world) but between designators and an explicitly specified 
universe of discourse whose elements have only the content that is explicitly speci-
fied, nothing beyond. The designation relation is, in other words, entirely schematic, 
and Carnap’s early semantics is in spirit (if not yet quite in practice) model-theoretic 
in the modern sense.3 The “Carnapian linguistic turn” (Carus 2015a) and the lan-
guage pluralism of the principle of tolerance remained in place.
Why then did Neurath (who during Carnap’s last Vienna years was perhaps 
closer to him than anyone else) see the incorporation of semantics into meta- 
discourse as such a fundamental break with the Wissenschaftslogik of the Syntax? 
The more recent literature on logical empiricism, insofar as it addresses this ques-
tion, largely accepts the consensus view on the relative insignificance of this step, so 
tends to regard Neurath’s objections as based on misunderstandings. Thomas Uebel, 
the foremost interpreter of Neurath over the past twenty years, essentially takes this 
view, while also showing how given the context, Neurath’s misunderstandings were 
not entirely arbitrary or unmotivated. It is certainly true, for instance, that Tarski 
emerged from a Polish philosophical school some of whose members did indeed 
adhere to ideas of “truth” in a much more absolute and substantial sense than any-
thing suggested by Tarski’s famous monograph of 1935. And Carnap hardly both-
ered to absolve himself from such guilt by association, since he thought it blindingly 
obvious that he himself could not possibly be considered to entertain such ideas.
Mormann, in contrast, argues that this consensus view is mistaken, and that there 
really was a major discontinuity in Carnap’s development in 1935, which Neurath 
accurately discerned. The Vienna Circle, up to then, had all (though to varying 
degrees) been unthinking adherents of the Cartesianism of the Frege-Russell tradi-
tion of “language as universal medium” (in Hintikka’s (1988) classification), 
according to Mormann, but in 1935 Carnap and Neurath moved in different direc-
tions: Carnap remained Cartesian, but changed sides to the “language as calculus” 
view, while Neurath went on to develop an anti-Cartesian version of the “language 
as universal medium” idea (Mormann 1999, 171). In Mormann’s view, this move of 
Neurath’s to a more anti-Cartesian position was simply a return to Neurath’s origi-
nal anti-Cartesianism as expressed e.g. in an early paper “Die Verirrten des Cartesius 
und das Auxiliarmotiv” (Neurath 1913/1983). By “Cartesianism” in Neurath’s 
sense, Mormann (1999, 166) means this:
3 Hintikka (1991) questions this. But Schiemer (2013) takes a different view, based on a close read-
ing of the hitherto unstudied notes and drafts for the second part of the Untersuchungen zur allge-
meinen Axiomatik.
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 (1) Infallibilist foundationalism: Starting from indubitable true statements an all- 
embracing final system of philosophical and scientific knowledge can be 
erected.
 (2) Deductivism: Science is a deductive system of general statements ensured by 
proofs.
 (3) Transparentism: The system of (scientific and philosophical) knowledge can be 
expressed in a language whose concepts refer to clear and distinct ideas.
Mormann regards (3) as the “hard core” of the Cartesian program, in Neurath’s 
sense, since (1) and (2) depend on (3) for their realization. And Mormann regards 
Neurath’s rejection of Tarskian semantics to have been motivated by his opposition 
not only to (1) and (2), but most especially to (3) – as expressed, for instance, in his 
insistence that the scientific vernacular generally still retains unclear concepts 
inherited from ordinary language, which he referred to as “clots” (“Ballungen”). In 
Sect. 12.3. below, we consider the question whether Carnap can be seen as repre-
senting a “Cartesian” position in Mormann’s sense.
But first, we consider the degree to which Neurath’s own position against seman-
tics in 1935–45 can accurately be portrayed as motivated by “anti-Cartesian” 
impulses.
12.2  Why Did Neurath Reject Semantics?
Neurath’s rejection of semantics at the 1935 Paris conference, in response to 
Carnap’s (1936a) “Wahrheit und Bewährung,” is well known, not least from 
Carnap’s own report in his autobiography (Carnap 1963, 61; see also the detailed 
and well-documented account in Mancosu 2008). Two years later, Carnap and 
Neurath had a private meeting when both were attending another conference in 
Paris,4 and from Neurath’s prepared document for that meeting, we at least get a 
little more detail about Neurath’s motivations. Dated 12 July 1937, it begins with a 
section entitled “I. Self-knowledge is the first step toward improvement” that begins 
as follows:
Two good lessons from the past years: CARNAP: Better not to disguise proposals as dog-
mas. NESS: Never forget that every way of putting things is only fully understood when the 
target is specified. These wise lessons can be articulated much more crisply, and then they 
become something more than pedagogical maxims.
I admit that in my paper “Physicalism” (Scientia, November 1931, p. 299) and in other 
papers that partly occasioned the current discussion about truth (SCHLICK, HEMPEL, 
CARNAP, etc etc) I didn’t speak of PROPOSALS where actually it was proposals I was 
putting forward.
On the other hand, in contrast to many others currently participating in this discussion about 
truth, I have clearly specified my target: WITTGENSTEIN and those around him. (UCLA 
Box 5/CM20, section 10, item 2.)
4 This 1937 meeting is also discussed by Mancosu (2008, 215–19), with documentation from the 
Neurath Nachlass.
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The main burden of the discussion document, however, is once again to suggest 
(this time perhaps in a bit more detail) using the model of Neurath’s protocol sen-
tence form (which avoids any mention of correspondence to anything external to 
language) to avoid the locutions Carnap and Tarski have introduced in semantics, 
especially truth itself (but also the distinction between “Bezeichnetes” and 
“Bezeichnendes”). So in substance nothing much has changed. Neurath is still wor-
ried primarily by the rhetoric, and points to the fact that even at the 1935 Paris 
conference, Tarski was misunderstood by some people in precisely the ways he, 
Neurath, has feared.5 Also he points to the incriminating historical background of 
semantics in Polish Catholicism and Thomism, and wants no one to associate logi-
cal empiricism with that stuff. We do learn, though, perhaps more unambiguously 
than before, that the fear of a return to Wittgenstein and the (correspondence- 
theoretical) picture theory of meaning was an important motivation for Neurath in 
opposing the adoption of semantics.
And this is still where we are in Neurath’s first extended letter pertaining to 
semantics after those discussions of the mid-1930s (among those reprinted here, 
Letter 18 of 29 January 1943), Neurath’s objection is still to the supposed Aristotelian 
connotations of Carnap’s terminology in the Introduction to Semantics (Carnap 
1942). While Neurath certainly complains that his old friend has always had a 
weakness for formal systems, and that this weakness allowed him to be seduced by 
the Polish Catholic obscurantists, there is otherwise no reference to long-running 
deep philosophical disagreements. On the contrary, Neurath says he is merely 
defending “Carnap One” (the Carnap of the Syntax) against “Carnap Two” (of the 
Semantics). Again, nothing has changed since 1937.
The next relevant letter is the long, meandering Letter 22 of 25 September 1943.6 
One can certainly share Carnap’s frustration at its vagueness and loose free associa-
tion, but it seems clear that Neurath’s main priority here is something he calls “plu-
ralism,” by which he means something like the denial that there could be a single 
authoritative system, in science or in human values – or even a single criterion for 
choosing one theory over another; he objects to Carnap’s mention that he is working 
on defining degree of confirmation; as he put it a bit later, “[w]e do not have any 
reason to assume a one-dimensional ranking of theories.”7 He repeatedly expresses 
admiration for the permissive, pluralistic English or Anglo-Saxon attitude in both 
cognitive and practical matters, contrasting it with German absolutism, idealism, or 
authoritarianism. There is certainly an implication, at least, that Carnap has tenden-
cies of the latter sort. The immediate object of his scorn (and the antithesis to his 
5 Mancosu (2008, 209) documents that it was Louis Rougier, in particular, who in his presentation 
at the Paris conference took Tarski’s account of truth to vindicate Schlick’s position in the contro-
versy between the left and right wings of the Vienna Circle about protocol sentences and 
“Konstatierungen” (affirmations), and thereby to shift the boundary between metaphysical and 
scientific language.
6 See Neurath to Carnap, 25 September 1943 (RC 102-55-03); see letter 22. in the present 
volume.
7 Neurath to Carnap, 1 April 1944 (RC 102-55-05); see letter 26. in the present volume.
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vision of pluralism) is not Carnap, though, or even Wittgenstein, but Popper – per-
haps as a proxy for Carnap. Again and again, Popper is castigated for suggesting a 
decision method to identify the single theory that has at a given time withstood all 
tests. In this way, Neurath suggests – rather more stridently even than in his review 
article of Popper’s Logik der Forschung (Neurath 1935/1983) – that Popper pro-
motes a cognitive (and by implication a practical, political) authoritarianism.8 (It is 
of course ironic that at this very moment Popper was at work in New Zealand on 
The Open Society and Its Enemies (Popper 1945), where he was himself advocating 
pluralism and fallibilism, by his own lights, against the authoritarianism inherent in 
the philosophical tradition, especially Platonic and German idealism, in both knowl-
edge and social organization. It is doubly ironic that insofar as Popper does indeed 
exhibit the tendencies toward verisimilitude and “the one true system” that so 
annoyed Neurath, this was due to his incipient (later much more pronounced) real-
ism – which Neurath himself, according to Carnap’s (1963, 51) autobiography, had 
promoted as superior to idealism in Vienna Circle discussions. In any case, if Popper 
is the antithesis to the “pluralism” Neurath is stressing to Carnap, then “anti- 
Cartesianism” is hardly an adequate description of his position; Popper would even 
in 1940 have rejected at least (1) and (3) of Mormann’s three criteria for Cartesianism, 
and his “deductivism” (i.e. his partial or potential support for (2)) extended only to 
the generation of testable instances of theories.
In one part of his letter Neurath even harks back to the extreme positivism of the 
early Vienna Circle, suggesting that science should not entertain universal laws that 
inherently go far beyond what we could possibly know, but should restrict itself to 
limited generalizations in the way Mach had suggested. Carnap had certainly been 
attracted by such ideas during the late 1920s, and more or less deprecated the legiti-
macy of all theoretical language – and though they left little trace in his actual pub-
lications, he echoed such ideas e.g. in his 1929 Bauhaus lectures (Carus 2007, 
218–19). In “Testability and Meaning” and certainly in his Encyclopedia volume 
Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (Carnap 1939), however, he had returned to 
accepting theoretical language, without Neurath having raised much of an objection 
at the time. Perhaps he retrospectively wondered whether this hadn’t been a slippery 
slope, and now regretted not having objected sooner.
Neurath’s letter is less an expression of anti-Cartesianism, then, than of a far 
more generalized anti-authoritarianism. Mormann’s three criteria for Cartesianism 
were, after all, rejected by Popper as well, and yet Popper is obsessively held up as 
the antithesis to the “pluralism” Neurath advocates. He not only resists the idea that 
we can construct or identify a single consistent system of knowledge and empha-
sizes that our knowledge even at its best remains fragmentary and incomplete. But 
we are not even able, as Popper thinks we are, to identify or pick out one theory as 
cognitively better than its rivals. An obvious analogy (not suggested by Neurath 
himself) is to the granddaddy of the English empiricism he had recently come to 
appreciate (and whose grandchildren, including Mill, he does mention): Locke, like 
Neurath, had been very concerned in his Essay to limit the claims of knowledge, and 
8 See the discussion on Neurath and Popper in Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, and Uebel (1996).
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it seems clear that this was motivated by the same anti-authoritarian impulse that 
underlay his Two Treatises and his support for the revolution of 1688.
These themes continue through Letter 26 (1 April 1944), now with even more on 
Popper, including many quotations and page references to the Logik der Forschung, 
and once again the spirit of late-1920s Vienna radical positivism is invoked, with 
Neurath reminding Carnap of their discussions of “our” Gustav Kirchhoff and his 
rejection of explanation in favor of mere description. However, things now also 
begin to get more personal, as well; “I am really sorry that you agree to such an 
extent with Schlick, Tarski, and Popper that you feel more with them than with me. 
[…] I feel that what you like is a tendency towards CALCULUS, connected with 
[…] what I would call a mixture of crude realism and metaphysical absolutism. You 
very seldom speak of EMPIRICIST problems as such. I feel very uneasy.”9 Here we 
can indeed begin to detect an indication of long-suppressed differences, perhaps 
fundamental differences of the kind Mormann suggests.
But it must also be kept in mind that by this time, Carnap and Neurath had not 
seen each other for nearly five years, and had relied only on written communication. 
As Neurath himself admits, this was not the ideal mode of interaction for him; in 
Letter 28 he suspects he may get on Carnap’s and the others’ nerves for presenting 
his case more forcefully in person than they might like, since unlike them he doesn’t 
publish his ideas but rather “I […] used the discussion as my medium.”10 It seems 
obvious three-quarters of a century later, as it seemed obvious even at the time to Ina 
Carnap (who eventually intervened with a letter to Neurath to try to calm things 
down)11 that personal contact in conversation could have sorted out all the differ-
ences in short order. Carnap himself readily admitted that his personality was more 
a north German, perhaps Prussian, protestant, somewhat repressed and introverted 
one, while Neurath was the voluble, loud, excitable, but basically generous and 
affectionate Viennese extravert. One should not give way too easily to the tempta-
tion to read genuinely doctrinal differences into the last year or two of the Carnap- 
Neurath correspondence when there are mostly much simpler explanations.
This applies especially to the following long Letter 28, where Neurath gives 
anguished and elaborate expression to his feelings of having been insulted by 
Carnap, who had inserted a note at the end of Neurath’s encyclopedia monograph 
(then just appearing) to say that he had been unable to exercise editorial responsi-
bilities for this volume (which he in fact hadn’t). This gives Neurath an occasion to 
open the floodgates of recrimination about all sorts of wrongs over the years, real 
and imagined, inflicted on him not only by Carnap, but also by Reichenbach, by 
Schlick, and the rest of the Vienna group. First he recounts his humiliation by 
Carnap over an article he had submitted to Erkenntnis a decade previously. “One 
day you wrote me a letter, in a similar teacherlike tone, that you can hardly accept 
an article of mine for the Erkenntnis since my style of presentation did not reach the 
level wanted there etc. etc.” But actually, Neurath continues, the article was no 
9 Neurath to Carnap, 1 April 1944 (RC 102-55-05); see letter 26 in the present volume.
10 Neurath to Carnap, 18 November 1944 (RC 102-55-06); see letter 28 in the present volume.
11 Ina Carnap to Neurath, 24 August 1945 (RC 102-55-10); see letter 33 in the present volume.
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worse than many others published there, so why, Carnap, are you only critical 
toward me? “You are usually not very critical towards other people, but particularly 
irritated by me.”12
He then develops an elaborate speculative story line (freely admitting that it is 
“guesswork”) about his role in the Circle as the outsider who always annoys the 
others by giving them a bad conscience about straying from strict empiricism, and 
hence makes them uncomfortable and incurs their resentment. First it was 
Wittgenstein, he says; he still doesn’t understand what not only Carnap, but also 
Schlick, Waismann, and Hahn saw in that “antiscientific thinker full of metaphys-
ics,” and remembers with resentment how Feigl and Carnap forced him, Neurath, to 
go along with a positive mention of Wittgenstein in the “Manifesto.” Then it was 
Popper: “you preferred his attitude to mine. I think today what I thought then, that 
you like the strong antithesis of YES and NO in his looking at positive and negative 
instances, and then his tendency to start from ONE world system as the most com-
plete one.” And now, in the third stage of Carnap’s progressive alienation from his 
loyalty to empiricism (and to Neurath), it is of course Tarski, “whose Aristotelian 
metaphysics seems useful to you in building up semantics. What may be helpful in 
building up a calculus, [though,] can become very dangerous in building up an 
instrument for empiricism.” Admit it, Neurath urges Carnap, admit “that you FEEL 
A LITTLE THAT YOU ARE IN SOME WAY UNEMPIRICIST, then I should 
understand that I myself as your bad conscience irritate you enormously.” Then, for 
a moment, Neurath steps back from his tirade to put himself in perspective:
Let me come to an end. All that is guesswork, but I think I should write it to you since I 
would say it to you. Of course writing and speaking are different, scripta litera manet, but I 
tried to write as peacefully as possible, whereas in a conversation I should call you names, 
as usual. (Neurath to Carnap, 18 November 1944. RC 102-55-06. See letter 28 in the pres-
ent volume.)
Finally he admits that despite all the insults and his hypersensitivity toward them, 
he is quite resilient, and holds out that prospect for the present incident as well, even 
managing a bit of irony at his own expense:
In spite of the fact that all such events touch me very much, I usually overcome them and 
discover a way how to go on better than before. You see, your treating me badly by not 
mentioning me induced me to start with publishing my main ideas regularly – I like that 
now. Your letter on my articles [being] hardly acceptable for the Erkenntnis immediately 
induced me to create the series Einheitswissenschaft, where I could publish my own stuff 
whenever I wanted to do it, without any consent from my strong teacher. Of course I did not 
insult you but invited you to be with me and to publish there, you by me, highly admired 
giant of logical analysis and a man who unveils the secrets of so many metaphysicians. 
…… And so life could go on in a rather smooth way, as far as we are concerned. (Neurath 
to Carnap, 18 November 1944. RC 102-55-06. See letter 28 in the present volume.)
And so when Neurath near the beginning of the letter accuses Carnap (along with 
Hempel, Popper, Reichenbach, Morris, and others) of closing off “pluralism” from 
the outset (the immediate context is once again Carnap’s project of an inductive 
12 Neurath to Carnap, 18 November 1944 (RC 102-55-06); see letter 28 in the present volume.
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logic), and then follows this with “I think this antagonism between us is an old one,” 
it is hard to see this as more than a reiteration of the previous accusations about 
Carnap’s supposed hostility to “pluralism,” but now charged with personal resent-
ment about Carnap’s new affront. And sure enough, immediately after this sentence 
about the old antagonism, Neurath launches into his story about getting on every-
one’s nerves and therefore provoking their hostility and their desire to hurt him (as 
in the case of the rejected Erkenntnis paper, and now again). So it is once again hard 
to see this as evidence of a fundamental philosophical or doctrinal divergence 
between Neurath and Carnap traceable back to Vienna or before.
The final letters descend even further into the personal. Letter 32 of 23 August 
1945 complains at length of the condescending behavior toward himself of Schlick, 
Hempel, and Carnap himself during the Vienna years and since then, but even of his 
old school friend Hans Hahn, and then letter 33 of 24 August is Ina’s intervention. 
She is well-placed to mediate, as a Viennese who understands very well how the 
cerebral north-German Carnap can rub people the wrong way. The Viennese Philipp 
Frank, she tells Neurath, would never have gone to the trouble of inserting a note 
into the back of Neurath’s encyclopedia volume as Carnap had done:
[…] he does not have Carnap’s earnest righteousness and also he has a certain mellowness, 
half wisdom, half “Wurstigkeit”; it would never have occurred to him to drop his name even 
if he had felt like Carnap did, for the simple reason that he would not have thought it impor-
tant enough and that he would have been too lazy to write the attending letters. Ah, but 
that’s the difference between the Viennese temperament and the zealous Lutheran from 
Prussia! I do not try to excuse Carnap, I am just trying to point out the way he is made. Yes, 
he could be induced to treat you with greater circumspection but that would not improve the 
friendship. He does not have the saving grace of a light touch and of a felicitous formulation 
which might soften the blows which he is striking in the name of science, impartiality, and 
other suchlike gods. But then again, perhaps you cannot have the charm and the reliability 
in one person! (Ina Carnap to Neurath, 24 August 1945 (RC 102-55-10); see letter 33 in the 
present volume.)
Not surprisingly, Ina’s intervention was largely successful; Neurath’s final letters to 
both Ina and Carnap himself are much more conciliatory than before, and insofar as 
they are still antagonistic, they focus entirely on the personal; there are no further 
accusations of Carnap’s failure to adhere sufficiently to “pluralism.” Indeed, Neurath 
had already, in one of his most hostile letters, fully accepted that the issue was 
mainly personal for him:
I personally always fear that I do queer things and therefore I like people like Frank who try 
to reduce my overestimating protocol-statements etc. without grieving me. And you see, 
that is the point. My letters dealt with YOUR UNKINDNESS. That is the main point. One 
has no “right” to ask for kindness, but one can object to unkindness. Look at [Carnap’s] 
letter to Morris [about Neurath’s encyclopedia volume]. You only tell of my bad qualities 
and that you drop ONLY your name, – as a concession – because he is such a violent boy 
….. No kind word about me in this letter. You see, it could e.g. come into your wise brain 
that even strong elephants sometimes need much of their energies to overcome the obstacles 
of life. You see, to reach the shores in shoes only is not just the best start for a new life in a 
foreign country and an internment is also not the best introduction. (Neurath to Carnap, 16 
June 1945. RC 102-55-11. See letter 31 in the present volume.)
A. W. Carus
349
All in all, by the final letters there seems to be every reason for optimism about the 
future of the Carnap-Neurath friendship and their philosophical collaboration; 
Uebel (2001) is on the right track – if anything he understates the prospects for 
reconciliation. When in the earlier letters of the 40s Neurath accuses Carnap of 
insufficient “pluralism” it seems very likely that he is talking about an attitude, not 
a doctrine, just as in his very last letters to Carnap he focuses on trying to get Carnap 
to admit to a certain over-zealous Platonism (by which he means something more 
like Lutheran Prussianism or punctiliousness) in his demeanor and behavior – which 
Carnap would presumably have admitted without hesitation! Certainly there are dif-
ferences between Neurath’s and Carnap’s priorities and attitudes, just as there had 
been before 1935; but from the correspondence of 1935–45, at least, there is little 
evidence of a fundamental philosophical difference of the kind suggested by 
Mormann.
12.3  Carnap’s Cartesianism
Now we come to Carnap’s responses to Neurath’s critique of semantics, and to the 
larger question in the background whether Mormann’s hypothesis of “Cartesianism” 
(in Neurath’s – or Mormann’s conception of Neurath’s – sense) applies to Carnap. 
Here there are many fewer documents to draw on, both because Carnap’s letters are 
not nearly as long as Neurath’s, but also because Carnap was initially at a loss to 
understand what Neurath was saying, and kept asking for clarification.
Carnap’s initial response to Neurath’s doubts about semantics in the Paris meet-
ings of 1935 and 1937 was to show that the concept “true” could not be replaced 
everywhere by the concept “accepted by scientists” or something of the kind, but 
also to point out that the semantic use of “true” had no implications whatever 
regarding the “truth” in some language-transcendent sense of the sentences in ques-
tion; “‘F’ is true” meant simply “F.” To Neurath’s concern that sentences be com-
pared only with sentences, as in syntactic Wissenschaftslogik, rather than (as it 
appeared to be the case in semantics) with matters of fact in the world, Carnap 
answered that in that respect, nothing had changed, but that in the end there is still 
the question (as there was before) how sentences can represent matters of fact 
(which he regarded as an empirical question; by the 1940s it would become a ques-
tion of pragmatics). To Neurath’s insistence that this could be misunderstood, and to 
Neurath’s insinuations of guilt by association (pointing to the provenance of the 
Polish logicians and the philosophical backgrounds of some of their colleagues), 
Carnap imprudently did not respond.
His response to Neurath’s Letter 17 is, accordingly (in Letter 18) simply to ask 
for clarification about where Neurath discerns Aristotelian metaphysics in the 
Introduction to Semantics and what in particular he has in mind. In his response to 
Neurath’s Letter 22 (Letter 24 of 4 February 1944) he goes into more detail. 
Regarding semantics itself, he essentially repeats what he had to say in 1935 and 
1937, as Neurath still seems to be conflating the epistemological question of justify-
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ing or establishing the truth of a sentence with the logical or linguistic question of 
the semantic truth definition:
On Semantics. If I see it correctly, you raise objections or doubts in two points:
1. Semantics may be a[l]right as a mere calculus, but if it is applied to the language of 
empirical science, it seems doubtful or at least an open question whether it is fruitful and 
useful.
2. Some of the chief concepts of semantics are metaphysical; therefore empiricists have to 
reject them as meaningless.
I am not quite clear how you intend to combine these two objections; they do not seem to 
me to fit well together. (Carnap to Neurath, 4 February 1944. RC 102- 55- 04. See letter 24 in 
the present volume.)
In response to the first point, Carnap assures Neurath that he has little interest in 
semantics as a mere calculus, but is concerned to apply it to the analysis of ques-
tions about science. He exhorts Neurath to patience and tolerance while the first 
steps are taken; we can’t know whether a new tool is useful until we’ve had a chance 
to develop it and try it out for a few years. But he points out that Neurath himself is 
constantly making semantic statements in everyday life, and points once again to 
the scientific examples he gives in §14 of Introduction to Semantics. He expresses 
exasperation that Neurath keeps asking for examples but does not engage with the 
many examples he has given him previously. In any case, he says that the question 
of usefulness and applications can only be put off if we feel reasonably sure that the 
concepts we are using make sense and are not metaphysical, which brings us to 
Neurath’s second point. On this, Carnap again repeats essentially what he had said 
in 1935 and 1937:
On (2). That the semantical concept of truth is not metaphysical can very easily be shown 
by the following translation: “The sentence ‘this tree is green’ is true” means not more and 
not less than “This tree is green”. (If the latter sentence does not occur in your strangely 
restricted language you may take instead any other sentence which you regard as meaning-
ful.) (By the way, if the term ‘true’ were to occur only in connection with a direct quotation 
as in the example given, the term would indeed hardly be useful; but that is another ques-
tion.) This translation shows that the concept of truth is not metaphysical but scientific. 
Furthermore, the translation makes it clear that the term ‘true’ is not at all meant in the sense 
of ‘absolutely certain’, ‘indubitable’ or anything like that as you sometimes seem to believe. 
And the translation also shows that ‘true’ has nothing to do with ‘accepted’; you make time 
and again the mistake of demanding that I should translate my semantical sentences into 
sentences with the term ‘accepted’. (Carnap to Neurath, 4 February 1944. RC 102-55-04. 
See letter 24 in the present volume.)
Further to Neurath’s continuing tendency to conflate the epistemological question 
of the grounds for the truth of a sentence with the logical question of defining truth, 
Carnap addresses Neurath’s attempt to cast doubt on semantics by an elaborate dis-
cussion of what scientists actually do:
To your letter p.11, the last two paragraphs. I am in complete agreement with your descrip-
tion of the scientific procedure. I should classify this as belonging to the methodology of 
science. I do not see what it has to do with semantics. Which assertion of mine concerning 
semantics seems to you to be in contradiction to your description? – Likewise p.12 you 
see[m] to believe that semantics intends to propose a new conception concerning scientific 
procedure; that is certainly not the case. (Ibid.)
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So far, this is all covering familiar ground. Now we come, though, to Neurath’s new 
objection – that Carnap does not share his “pluralism.” Carnap responds by reject-
ing Neurath’s accusation, but with the reservation that he is not clear about it and 
would like Neurath to give a more precise formulation:
On pluralism. I believe that in this point I am in agreement with your attitude. I say “I 
believe” and “attitude”, not “opinion” because your formulation of pluralism (p. 9) is so 
vague that I am not able to see in it any clear thesis. As you formulate it now, nearly every-
body would agree, including Schlick, Popper, Russell. Since pluralism seems to you very 
important, and in particular also the question whether I agree with you in this point, please 
give me a more precise formulation of what is asserted by it. – Perhaps the difference here 
is not a difference of opinion but of emphasis. We emphasize the importance of the task of 
systematization in science; you, on the other hand, emphasize the fact that the statements 
accepted by scientists at a certain time do not form a well connected system and you point 
to the dangers involved in overlooking this fact. I think you are right in both points. (Ibid.)
Is Carnap being disingenuous here? If we consider the radical implications of what 
Neurath appears to mean by “pluralism” (see the discussion in Sect. 12.2. above), 
then perhaps Carnap’s summary of Neurath’s views is somewhat narrow and care-
ful. Certainly Carnap would not at this point have signed on for a return to the radi-
cal positivism of late-1920s Vienna with its almost complete banishment of 
theoretical language (Carus 2007, 218–9), nor would he have been willing to give 
up on the idea of a deductive unity of the sciences (in the very long run), while cer-
tainly admitting, as he later did explicitly (Carnap 1963, 883) that it was at best a 
distant goal. But as he actually paraphrased Neurath’s pluralism, in the penultimate 
sentence of the above quotation, his concurrence with Neurath’s two points is hardly 
controversial. In fact, he could have gone substantially further. He was fundamen-
tally on Neurath’s wavelength regarding the voluntarism that Neurath is perhaps 
trying to articulate in his Letter 22. From quite early on (Carus 2007, Ch. 1.) he 
thought that human conceptual systems were a matter of choice and under human 
control. Though constrained by the facts of the world, frameworks have broad lee-
way to articulate these facts differently and represent them differently (Jeffrey 
1994); this impulse goes back at least to Der Raum (Carnap 1922), though it only 
found its adequate philosophical expression in the principle of tolerance. The incor-
poration of semantics into meta-discourse did not change this.
But with this voluntarism came the responsibility of imposing appropriate con-
straints (empiricism, logicism, etc.) on this broad range of choice (Ricketts 1994). 
Without any constraints whatever, voluntarism could be interpreted to mean that we 
could make up any reality we liked, and that of course was not what Carnap had in 
mind. So he wanted to be sure Neurath wasn’t going too far; this was why he wanted 
a more precise articulation of what Neurath had in mind when he demanded “plural-
ism,” and also thought Neurath shouldn’t go too far in deprecating the efforts of 
systematizers like himself:
I should be still more inclined to agree with you were it not for the impression that you 
exaggerate very much laying more stress on the dangers of systematization than on its use-
fulness, importance and indispensability; I doubt whether your overstressed warning is 
fruitful. (Carnap to Neurath, 4 February 1944. RC 102-55-04. See letter 24 in the present 
volume.)
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In fact he ends this part of his letter with a plea for mutual tolerance between people 
of different priorities and temperaments:
I believe [that] if we are careful to avoid exaggeration on both sides, we shall easily be able 
to come to an agreement on this point; “we” includes Popper, Tarski, etc. For here there is 
really no serious difference of opinion; it is more a difference in temperament and therefore 
in the direction of interest. I think it would be best for the development of science if the 
people on the one side who see more the turbulent whirl of material in all its colorfulness 
and vagueness, and those on the other side who love nice structural schemata would not 
polemicize against each other but rather realize that the work of both is necessary for sci-
ence. (Ibid.)
Carnap then goes on to respond to Neurath’s tirade against Popper. In their previous 
discussion of Russell’s Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, Carnap – though respond-
ing in great detail (Letter 19) to Neurath’s detailed comments (Letter 11), eventually 
tires of the exchange and asks Neurath why he goes on harping on this book, which 
they agree is wrong and not very interesting. Popper, on the other hand, he is willing 
to defend (against Neurath, at least) up to a point. A remark from an earlier letter 
about this casts an interesting light on his general attitude toward discussions within 
the Vienna Circle (and now among those he considers part of the “movement”):
In the case of Popper, I believe your reaction is chiefly caused by the fact that he criticized 
the Vienna Circle quite unnecessarily. He was overcritical and so you are now. Even when 
he wrote the book he was in agreement with us on most fundamental points. When later he 
came into personal contact with us the agreement became even more strong and conscious 
to him. Some of his views which you criticize, e.g. the refutability of hypotheses, have the 
same defects – and, I think, the same as many of our earlier views: they might be taken as 
first approximations but closer inspection shows that they are not entirely adequate but must 
be replaced by better approximations. I suppose that the same holds for many of our present 
views, including mine, where we do not see today how they should and can be improved. In 
the case of some of your views which are not shared by most of the people in our movement 
I often defend them in just the same way: I admit to those who criticize them that the for-
mulations are not quite adequate but I point to the fact that they may be taken as first 
approximations. I like to defend your views but sometimes you make it, by Jove, hard for 
me to do so when you stubbornly stuck to your old formulations years after they have been 
shown to you to be inadequate (e.g. “No facts, only statements”, your form of protocol 
sentences, “the semantical concept of truth is only applicable to calculi not to the language 
of science”). The views of all of us within the movement of empiricism do of course differ 
more or less from each other. I think for the sake of the movement it would be much better 
if we were more tolerant towards each other. If your intolerance would become the general 
custom, then I am afraid you would be among the first to be declared a heretic and excom-
municated. By tolerance, of course, I do not mean acceptance of each others’ views. The 
differences of opinion should and will be discussed. But this discussion is not helped by 
labelling the views of the others as nonempiricist and metaphysical. (Carnap to Neurath, 29 
January 1943. RC 115-07-62. See letter 18 in the present volume.)
Now, since Neurath continues harping on Popper and using him as a proxy in his 
complaints about Carnap’s supposed failure to share his “pluralism,” Carnap goes 
into a little more detail:
Popper’s position […] seems to me good as a first approximation. I think in the question of 
asymmetry we have to distinguish two assertions of Popper’s:
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1. In testing a universal law, there is an asymmetry between favorable (confirming) and 
unfavorable (disconfirming) cases. If somebody proposes a law hypothetically then he 
usually has already a number of favorable cases, and he is looking around for further 
cases. The asymmetry is this: an unfavorable case has a much stronger influence upon 
our judgment concerning the law than an additional favorable case.
2. One single unfavorable case refutes the law. (Carnap to Neurath, 4 February 1944. RC 
102-55- 04. See letter 24 in the present volume.)
The discussion of these two points that follows is very interesting, because it further 
illustrates Carnap’s ethos of rational discussion, as already spelled out in the previ-
ous quotation (from Letter 18):
Some objections might perhaps be raised against (2). But still I would think that it is accept-
able as a first approximation. On the other hand, your rejection of (1) in your last letter is 
surprising to me. I think that all empiricists and all good scientists agree in this; Who, in 
your opinion, does not? (Carnap to Neurath, 4 February 1944. RC 102-55-04. See letter 
24 in the present volume.)
The interesting thing about this passage is not what Carnap says, but what he does 
not say. When he says that some objections may be raised against (2), he does not 
mention that he himself, in §§25-6 of “Testability and Meaning” (Carnap 1936b–7; 
summarized in Carnap 1963, 879), pointed out a fatal flaw in just this thesis (2) of 
Popper’s – an objection that Popper never responded to and to this day remains 
unanswered by his followers (Carus 2015c). He could have made this discussion 
with Neurath easy for himself by going along with Neurath and saying “Yes, you’re 
right, Popper is wrong, and I’ve shown myself that his falsification criterion doesn’t 
do what he claims, so I dissociate myself from him and agree with you.” But he does 
not want Neurath to reject Popper for the wrong reasons; he wants him to under-
stand and appreciate the insight of genuine value in Popper before focusing on the 
limitations of that insight. His ethos of rational discussion rejected not only a pre-
mature rush to judgment, but also the exclusion of viewpoints in a sweeping and 
generic, undifferentiated sort of way.
He also points out that Neurath can’t have it both ways; he can’t both say that 
Popper is wrong about universal laws, falsifying instances, etc. but then also say that 
these assertions of Popper’s are metaphysical:
You remember how our opponents called us solipsistic because we rejected the thesis of 
realism as meaningless? We always emphasized that if a sentence is metaphysical and 
hence meaningless, then the same holds for its negation. Now Popper makes certain asser-
tions concerning universal laws, negative instances etc. You deny these assertions. This is 
your good right. But then you go on to say that Popper’s assertions are metaphysical. If so, 
however, your counter-assertions are likewise metaphysical and meaningless. Seriously, I 
think it would be better if you would at long last abandon your habit of calling people who 
are empiricists and antimetaphysicians metaphysicians if you do not share their opinions. 
First, it is absurd; and second it does not help a successful discussion. (Carnap to Neurath, 
4 February 1944. RC 102-55-04. See letter 24 in the present volume.)
There are a few further remarks in the following letters, but there was hardly an 
opportunity for a proper debate of the issues themselves (as opposed to personal 
animosities and reconciliations) before Neurath’s death in late 1945. There are no 
grounds in this correspondence, in any case, for Mormann’s hypothesis of a deep 
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philosophical fault line between Carnap and Neurath that they both were in denial 
about and papered over for the sake of a harmonious friendship. For one thing, we 
can see that the friendship was not particularly harmonious; both were too honest to 
sacrifice things they believed in for personal harmony. And second, it is pretty obvi-
ous that the single substantive (or possibly doctrinal) bone of contention, the issue 
of “pluralism,” was less a thesis of Neurath’s than an attitude. In this it resembled 
“physicalism,” which was one of the earlier foci of conflict and debate between 
Carnap and Neurath (cf. Carus 2007, 239–50). But unlike physicalism, which was a 
more articulate and explicit (i.e. more objective) attitude or value, “pluralism” 
remained somewhat vague, and may in the end have been a way for Neurath to rep-
resent personal characteristics of Carnap’s (as acknowledged in Ina’s letter) rather 
than anything that could serve as an orientation for Wissenschaftslogik. Even if we 
want to interpret it as something more objective, though, it was evidently not a mat-
ter of dispute between Carnap and Neurath, at most one regarding which (as Carnap 
suggested) their emphases differed.
There remains the question of Carnap’s supposed Cartesianism. Going back to 
Mormann’s three criteria of (Neurathian) Cartesianism in Sect. 12.1. above, it is 
obvious that Carnap rejected (1); his above-quoted response to Neurath about “plu-
ralism” makes this very clear. (2) and (3) are different. Carnap obviously recognized 
that both were false, of science as it currently exists; so in that sense he does not 
qualify as “Cartesian” by Mormann’s Neurathian criteria. On the other hand, both 
(2) and (3) represented aspirations for him, to some degree. He thought both were 
goals worth working toward, though as he grew older he became less and less con-
fident they could ever be attained. He also left open the possibility that any eventual 
deductive unity of our knowledge could be undertaken in different, mutually incom-
patible ways, and encouraged the pursuit of different programs for such a unity. In 
his review of Popper’s Logik der Forschung in Erkenntnis (Carnap 1935), for 
instance, he acknowledged Reichenbach’s extremely negative review of Popper’s 
book (in the same issue), but didn’t think that we needed to decide between Popper’s 
and Reichenbach’s conceptions of probability; we should view them as two differ-
ent proposals for the structure of the language of science. He hoped both authors 
would go on to develop their respective proposals in more detail, and apply them to 
actual scientific problems, so that eventually we could see which one was working 
out better. This pluralism is obviously also not very “Cartesian.” It was Mormann 
(2001) himself, after all, who first suggested that Carnap saw philosophy as a “sci-
ence of possibilities” – a Möglichkeitswissenschaft in the sense of Robert Musil.13
Carnap realized, then, that current science was far removed from anything like a 
deductive system, and was aware that the scientific vernacular used for regular com-
munication among sciences, and even within the most advanced sciences, could 
hardly count as transparent, clear, or distinct. And he may well have realized that 
this would always remain the case, however far the deductive system-builders like 
13 A suggestion strongly endorsed by Carus (2007); see the discussion, including an illustrative 
quotation from Musil, on p. 64. The fundamental kinship between Carnap and Musil has also been 
addressed by Jacques Bouveresse (e.g. 2001, 2012).
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himself advanced their projects.14 But this would not have discouraged him; he 
would have continued to think it was better to extend the islands of clarity in the 
murky sea of vagueness in which the sciences communicate with each other than to 
wallow complacently in vagueness.
And here is where it seems quite reasonable to think he and Neurath could have 
come to a kind of rapprochement regarding the language of science. Carnap strove 
for clarity and, ultimately, some sort of deductive unity, while Neurath strove for 
pluralism and openness within the scientific vernacular envisaged as a tidied-up ver-
sion of ordinary language, one in which all the terms that have explications within 
any of the sciences defer to those explications (in cases when pressure is put on 
them and they need to be more precise than they are in ordinary language). Neurath 
was very concerned to emphasize that this vernacular was not, and could not be, a 
perfect deductive system, and would continue to have “clots” (Ballungen) of vague-
ness in it. Carnap could readily have agreed to this as a matter of fact in science as 
it now is, but one could also see him, ever the forward-looking optimist, proposing 
that precisely these Ballungen be regarded as the most necessary and promising 
target concepts for explication (in his sense; see Carus 2007, 273–384). Neurath 
might have seen this as a threat, worrying that the overzealous Carnaps of this world 
would set about removing all the Ballungen from the scientific vernacular and thus 
constraining or eliminating “pluralism.” But he might have been coaxed into accept-
ing such a conception of it in view of Mark Wilson’s many examples showing that 
the Ballungen never really go away; they only shift their position under the rug, or 
ramify further into more branches of meaning (Wilson 2006, 2018). On the assump-
tion (or reassurance) that the supply of Ballungen is inexhaustible, Neurath might 
well have been willing to concede that some might be targeted for explication, and 
might actually succumb. In any case, it is easy to imagine a scenario whereby 
Carnap and Neurath could have converged on a conception for the iterative and 
continuous improvement of the scientific vernacular along such lines.
12.4  Carnap’s Representationalism and Inferentialism
By way of conclusion, I return to the question of Carnap as a “representationalist” 
that, as we saw, Robert Brandom took over unquestioningly from tradition. In 
Brandom’s scheme of things, everyone is either a representationalist (like Carnap) 
or an “inferentialist” (like Brandom). Representationalists come in many varieties, 
14 It has been known since Reisch (1991) that in his capacity as the editor of the Encyclopedia of 
Unified Science, Carnap oversaw Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which 
interested him very much and which he found very compelling; see also Friedman (2003). It is thus 
hard to believe he would not have been interested in other well researched pieces of recent “descrip-
tive pragmatics” (as he would have classified it) that tended to undermine his default view of a 
gradual convergence toward deductive unity and transparency, such as Mark Wilson’s work, as I 
suggest (Carus 2012), where I also suggest how he might have accommodated such news; see also 
Wilson’s reply (Wilson 2012) in the same volume.
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but they have in common that they regard language as representing some pre- 
existing, extra-linguistic given, while inferentialists regard the system of representa-
tions as ultimately internal to language; representation is re-created or explained 
(away) by means of intra-linguistic inferences.
Of course, not everyone sees Carnap this way; the wave of new research over the 
past two or three decades15 has begun to turn the tide, and while consensus has been 
reached on some issues (as on the transition from syntax to semantics; see above, 
Sect. 12.1.), the degree to which Carnap can be regarded a representationalist is in 
flux, under discussion. This has gone so far, in fact, that some have even gone to the 
other extreme and begun to talk about “Carnap’s Inferentialism” (Chalmers 2012; 
Peregrin 2014, 2019) in the Syntax, by which approximately the same thing is meant 
as Neurath’s aspiration to compare sentences only with sentences, in 
Wissenschaftslogik, and never sentences with facts. And the mistake still made by 
those who now think of Carnap’s Syntax period as inferentialist is also essentially 
the same as Neurath’s mistake; they are misled by the semantic terminology to think 
that meaning (in the pre-1931 sense of correspondence with some pictured complex 
of matters of fact) was reinstated in 1935, and was no longer a matter of interrela-
tions among sentences.
Even before 1931, if one wants to get picky, Carnap could be regarded as a 
“structural” inferentialist. The metaphor of the railway map in the Aufbau indicates 
how he wants to go about referring to a set of concepts purely structurally, without 
ever having to employ ostension or direct matching up of a node in a structure with 
a particular space-time point in the world or a particular object. This structuralist 
inferentialism is not widely appreciated, perhaps because Carnap’s attempt there 
(§§153–5) to do away with reference altogether and thus to make all knowledge 
purely structural failed. But this failure hardly dilutes the fundamentally “inferen-
tialist” character of the project of picking out even the basic difference among 
human senses not by ostension but by their structural characteristics, e.g. the num-
ber of (experiential) dimensions they exhibit (Carnap 1928; Friedman 1999, Chs. 5 
and 6, 2007). This inferentialism is rather different in tendency from Brandom’s, of 
course, but it certainly shares Brandom’s goal of explaining reference away (or 
rather accounting for reference without requiring that there be anything indepen-
dently accessible for linguistic reference to refer to).
So it is entirely legitimate to talk about Carnap’s inferentialism (cf. also Tuboly 
2017). But we also saw in Sect. 12.3. above that Carnap aspired, at least, to a kind 
of Cartesian representationalism – admittedly a rather off-beat, pluralistic sort of 
Cartesianism that Descartes himself would not have been very happy with, and a 
very schematic representationalism. Still, how can that be? Are representationalism 
and inferentialism really opposites, as Brandom has always claimed? Are they 
mutually exclusive? Some have argued compellingly that they are not, and that both 
are indispensable, so there is not only no need to choose between them, but either 
choice would leave an incomplete and one-sided conception of meaning (e.g. 
Kremer 2010). Carnap’s case, though, was different.
15 Of which an overview up to 2015 is provided in Carus (2015b).
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For both representationalism and inferentialism as commonly understood (or 
understood by Brandom, anyway), a question of reduction is at stake. Brandom 
refers to this as the “order of explanation.” His preferred order of explanation is that 
from inference to representation, rather than putting representation first and then 
deriving inference from it (the order he attributes to the mainstream of analytic phi-
losophy). In other words, he wants to reduce representation to inference. But there 
is no point to reduction of this sort outside an ontological context – one is only 
motivated to reduce this to that if one wants to make a case that really or ultimately 
there are only thats, while thises are constructions from thats. That seems to be 
Brandom’s motivation as well; he wants to argue that the kind of reasoning we 
employ in constructed languages of science (which he calls “algebraic reasoning”) 
is ultimately parasitic on a more primitive kind of practical reasoning (exemplified 
by his “material rules of inference”; cf. Brandom 1994, 97–107; Carus 2004, 319–
27) that he calls “hermeneutic reasoning” (Brandom 2009).
Now Carnap actually once argued specifically against this idea that constructed 
languages are parasitic on colloquial or evolved languages, in his reply to Strawson 
(Carnap 1963, 933–40), who had relied on the intuitive plausibility of the idea that 
colloquial languages are learned first, and that we learn constructed languages later, 
through the medium of a colloquial one. In his reply Carnap sought to undermine 
the plausibility of this apparently obvious consideration by pointing out that while 
it is true that we learn colloquial languages first, this is purely contingent. Strawson 
wrongly infers from this contingent fact that no other way is possible. But we know 
from the cases of Esperanto and other such made-up languages that we can create 
languages for everyday communication, and there is no reason to think that children 
couldn’t grow up speaking those instead of their usual mother tongues.16 How far 
could we vary the parameters of such artificial languages, how precise could we 
make them, before it became impossible for children to learn them as first lan-
guages? We have no idea (this is an empirical question that for good reason hasn’t 
been studied),17 but we do know that adolescent and adult humans are in fact able to 
learn complex artificial languages (e.g. algebraic topology, musical scores, pro-
gramming languages) to a point of amazing fluency, and to build up extensive 
 networks of intuitions around them. So we can hardly make dogmatic pronounce-
ments on this issue, which remains an empirical question.
In Carnap’s view there is no room for anything but an empirical question here. 
There is no way of answering the question “what is language really?” other than (a) 
empirical research; (b) stipulation, i.e. construction of a new language – in which 
case what that language “is” is exhaustively specified in the given rules. There are 
no grounds other than empirical (or stipulative) ones on which one could claim that 
16 Children have in fact been brought up Esperanto-speaking, e.g. George Soros, but apparently 
there are no known cases of monolingual upbringing in Esperanto; native Esperanto speakers have 
also, so far, always learned another language from childhood; see the article “Native Esperanto 
speakers” in Wikipedia.
17 Which is also one reason why the learnability literature (e.g. Steven Pinker) isn’t very 
empirical.
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one kind of language is primary in some sense to others, in the sense that the others 
must always or necessarily be dependent on it. It is certainly true that the first con-
structed languages (the language of the law, the language of geometry) were set up 
using ordinary colloquial language as a meta-language, and that has not changed 
over the millennia, but it is also true that our colloquial languages contain many 
more concepts from constructed languages than they did when this process first 
started in ancient Greece. And the practical need to use a colloquial language as the 
metalanguage for setting up constructed languages does not imply there is some-
thing inherent in human cognition that requires this “order of explanation.”
For Carnap, then, neither inferentialism nor representationalism is of interest as 
a reductive doctrine. Each can be of interest as a conceptual exploration, to find out 
what different strategies and raw materials can be used to define logical operators 
and set up elementary logical or arithmetical languages or theories, and how these 
different approaches relate to each other (cf. Murzi and Steinberger 2017; Hjortland 
and Standefer 2018). But these are technical questions in logic and mathematics like 
any questions in those fields, and have little bearing on the correctness or the prefer-
ability of one “order of explanation” over another. About an “order of explanation” 
Carnap would have said exactly (and for the same reasons) what he said about ques-
tions of existence in “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology” (Carnap 1950/1956). 
They can be understood in an internal sense, then they can be answered, usually 
trivially; the order of explanation internal to a framework depends on what universe 
of discourse comes with the framework. Whatever doesn’t come with the frame-
work has to be constructed, where that is possible, out of the materials that do come 
with the framework. If inference comes with a framework but not representation, 
then representation has to be constructed from inference, as Brandom prefers. If 
only representation comes as a primitive concept within the framework, though, 
then inference must be constructed from representation. What does not make sense, 
for Carnap, is to ask the external question “which order of explanation is right or 
correct?” in some general or absolute sense, without indexing this question to a 
language framework. In response to this question Carnap would ask “for what?” – 
just as he does in the case of existence. The question itself, when stated without a 
reference language, is strictly speaking meaningless, but it can be turned into a 
practical question regarding the preferability of this or that order of explanation.
In that case, though, it has to be indexed to a purpose, relative to which one order 
of explanation can be judged to be preferable to (i.e. more conducive than) another. 
Carnap and Neurath would have been in complete agreement – against Brandom, 
Rorty, and perhaps many or most other philosophers of recent decades – that an 
order of explanation purporting to explain what language really or essentially is by 
reducing one of its functions to another (e.g. by reducing representation to inference 
or vice versa) is of no great interest.
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12.5  Note on Sources and Quotations
The location of an unpublished document from the Carnap papers (Manuscript col-
lection No. 1029) in the Young Research Library, University of California at Los 
Angeles, is specified by the abbreviation (UCLA. . .). Translations from German are 
my own. In the quotations from the correspondence between Neurath and Carnap, I 
have corrected minor errors of spelling, grammar, punctuation, and usage to avoid 
distraction. References are to the letter numbers in the part of the correspondence 
that is reproduced in this volume.
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Chapter 13
Rejecting Semantic Truth: 
On the Significance of Neurath’s 
Syntacticism
Derek Anderson
Abstract This chapter argues for the centrality of Neurath’s syntacticism to his 
physicalism, encyclopedism, and the unity of science program. I defend the intelli-
gibility of Neurath’s opposition to semantics and underline the role syntacticism 
plays in his anti-metaphysical empiricism. I argue that Neurath was correct to fear 
that the semantic turn would spell the end of logical empiricism. Many of the most 
influential metaphysical arguments of the twentieth century turn on premises that 
would be undermined by a Neurathian rejection of semantics.
Neurath notoriously opposed Carnap’s semantic turn and insisted that a semantic 
theory of truth would undermine the logical empiricist agenda. Many scholars, 
including Carnap, have regarded this opposition as either unintelligible or misguid-
ed.1 Here I take up a defense of Neurath. I argue that his opposition to semantics was 
intelligible and his concerns prescient.
Section 13.1 outlines Neurath’s syntacticism and its relationship with both his 
physicalism and his Unity of Science Movement. Here I defend the intelligibility of 
Neurath’s opposition to semantics and the place his syntacticism occupies in his 
broader political and scientific projects. Section 13.2 argues that Neurath’s fear of 
semantics was warranted. The semantic turn contributed decisively to the demise of 
logical empiricism and many of the most influential developments in metaphysics 
from the second half of the twentieth century were spurred by semantics and would 
have been undermined by Neurathian syntacticism.
1 See Mancosu (2008) for discussion of Carnap’s reaction to Neurath, as well as Tarski’s and 
Kokoszyńska’s, all of who ultimately found Neurath’s resistance to semantics unfathomable. See 
also Uebel (2001, 2007) for a contemporary discussion of whether Neurath’s syntacticism is 
acceptable. Other criticisms of syntacticism may be found in the contemporary literature, although 
their target is Carnap’s (1934/1937) Logical Syntax of Language (LSL). Neurath’s project is suf-
ficiently close to Carnap’s that we may take criticism of LSL to bear on Neurath’s syntacticism, 
which be found in Coffa (1987), Creath (1990), Oberdan (1992), Uebel (2007), Friedman (1999), 
Tuboly (2017) and André Carus’s chapter in the present volume.
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13.1  Physicalist Syntacticism
Syntacticism entails a constrained approach to theorizing about language that limits 
the scope of investigation to syntactic entities and relations that hold between 
expressions in virtue of their syntactic properties. Semantic entities such as proposi-
tions, contents, and truth-values, semantic properties such as being true and being 
false, and semantic relations such as reference and satisfaction are systematically 
omitted.
Neurath’s conception of syntacticism flows from his physicalism: the treatment 
of linguistic entities as physical particulars, empirically observable and located at 
particular places in space and time. The language of science is a material tool that is 
constructed for purposes that accord with the goals of society. For Neurath, the rel-
evant goals involve implementing radical socialism at a global scale (Cartwright Cat, 
Fleck, Uebel 1996). Part of this socialism is the effort to organize our scientific and 
linguistic practices in a way that promotes general knowledge and welfare. Language 
can be fashioned into a more effective empirical tool through considered and directed 
manipulations. We can organize exact rules for producing new sentences on the basis 
of sentences we have already accepted. In this way, we can make sense of scientific 
theories themselves and make decisions about which theories to accept.
13.1.1  Neurath’s Physicalism: First Aspect
Neurath’s physicalism is a thesis about language. Differences in his formulations of 
this thesis indicate that there are two aspects of physicalism. The first aspect con-
cerns the nature of language as a physical system. The second concerns the proper 
organization of language for use in the program of unified science. Neurath does not 
explicitly distinguish these two aspects, indicating that he regards them as closely 
connected.
In its first aspect, physicalism is the thesis that language is a physical formation 
that cannot be treated as different in kind from the rest of the physical world. As 
such, it has no special properties beyond those of other physical systems. Most 
notably, the language of science does not “express” anything beyond its own physi-
cal structure. The study of language is the study of physical processes. Any act of 
saying or writing is a spatio-temporal arrangement. This spatio-temporal arrange-
ment exhausts what is expressed by language. Neurath writes,
[w]hat is scientifically expressible is no richer in fundamental relations than the symbols on 
a Morse tape which the telegrapher reads as they are sounded by his apparatus. In a sense 
unified science is physics in its largest aspect, a tissue of laws expressing space-time link-
ages – let us call it: Physicalism. (Neurath 1931a/1983, 49.)
Note that the physical system of language is here identified with unified science 
itself for reasons that will become clear shortly.
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This passage poses a small puzzle. In the first sentence, Neurath gives a state-
ment of his physicalist syntacticism: what is scientifically expressible is only the 
physical structure of symbols. An expression of the language of science only 
“expresses” its own physical structure. Immediately after giving this ultra- 
deflationist picture of scientific language, Neurath says the language of unified sci-
ence expresses all physical space-time linkages! The laws of physics would seem to 
be more than physical relations between symbols, but somehow Neurath disagrees. 
The puzzle is resolved when we recognize that Neurath takes laws of physics to be 
syntactic strings constructed in a physical medium. The laws of physics are physical 
items, e.g. ink patterns on a piece of paper, and they “express” connections between 
other physical items, e.g. other ink patterns on other pieces of paper. How these con-
nections are implemented will be discussed later.
The unity of language as a physical system is part of what Neurath has in mind 
when he talks about the unification of science. “All these disciplines [geology, bot-
any, zoology, and the science of science itself] are constructed of the same bricks, as 
it were” (Neurath 1931a/1983, 48). These bricks are expressions of the physical 
language. Neurath (1931b/1983, 52) emphasizes the same point again when he 
writes, “[f]or ‘physicalism’ it is essential that one kind of order is the foundation of 
all laws, whichever science is concerned, geology, chemistry, or sociology” (origi-
nal emphases). The unity of order is uniformity in the physical nature of the expres-
sions of the language of science.
Neurath’s physicalism does not entail that science is unified in virtue of captur-
ing the unity of reality as expressed in the subject of physics. It would be thoroughly 
confused to think of Neurath as holding that all scientifically investigated phenom-
ena are grounded in the properties of microphysical systems and that this unity of 
reality is the metaphysical ground of the unity of science. Physicalism provides the 
foundation of all laws in the sense that the physicalist language is the physical 
medium for the expression of every law, each of which is a syntactic object.
Because language is physical, part of the world like anything else, unified sci-
ence can engage with it as a subject of inquiry. Hence, language can engage with 
itself. In explaining the physical nature of language, Neurath (1931b/1983, 53) 
writes, “scientific language itself is a physical formation whose structure, as physi-
cal arrangement (ornament), can be discussed by means of the very same language 
without contradictions.” We use syntactic language systems to study the physical 
order and language itself is part of that order, so language can be used to discuss 
itself. The physicality of language guarantees there is no methodological problem 
with using language to discuss language. “The statements themselves also form part 
of other statements as physicalist elements” (1931b/1983, 55). There is no physical 
restriction on constructing statements within statements, so there is no principled 
reason why language can’t engage with itself as object (in the sense of “object” as 
argument position of a syntactic structure).
It follows immediately that the project of modeling language within language, 
pursued by Gödel (1931) and Carnap (1934/1937), is possible. Where Gödel and 
Carnap argued for this possibility by showing how to encode a language using its 
own syntax within an abstract mathematical framework, the argument that language 
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can engage with itself because of its physical nature is unique to Neurath. Neurath’s 
project precedes the project of syntactically modeling language within language 
pursued by Carnap and Gödel. Further, Neurath’s physicalism provides an indepen-
dent argument for the possibility of this project.
This aspect of Neurath’s physicalism, viz. the way it enables language to talk 
about language, undercuts the theoretical role of a metaphysically robust semantic 
theory. Once Neurath’s physicalism is accepted as a fundamental postulate, what 
could semantics be except more physical syntactic strings? There cannot be a 
domain of semantic meta-objects expressed by a semantic theory, since that theory 
is merely another collection of physical strings that “expresses” only linkages 
between syntactic strings. Semantic theorizing, if we were to engage in that kind of 
thing, would itself have no semantic content; it would only express syntactic rela-
tionships. So there is clearly a sense in which Neurath’s physicalism renders seman-
tics impossible.
13.1.2  Neurath’s Physicalism: Second Aspect
In its second aspect, Neurath’s physicalism is a thesis about the proper composition 
of the language of unified science, viz. that our adaptation of language for the pur-
pose of unified science should start with ordinary common language and transform 
it so that incorporated expressions can be controlled by empirical evidence. In 
explaining this second aspect, Neurath (1931b/1983, 54) writes, “[w]hat matters is 
that all statements contain references to the spatio-temporal order, the order that we 
know from physics. Therefore this view is to be called ‘physicalism.’ Unified sci-
ence contains only physicalist formulations.”2
According to Neurath’s physicalism, the language of unified science is not 
restricted to terms that belong to the technical jargon of physics. It can and must 
include words used to describe ordinary objects such as tables and people. These 
terms do not need to be completely precise. Neurath (1936b/1983, 162) says, “[f]or 
example, we do not use completely precise terms when we say: ‘Man A formulates: 
in the room was a table perceived by A.’ But this kind of formulation as known in 
everyday language is always needed where predictions are empirically checked by 
confronting predictions with protocol statements.” What is essentially physicalist 
about the protocol statement in this example is that it contains no terms that cannot 
be placed under the control of empirical evidence concerning things that are part of 
the spatio-temporal order.
The notion that expressions can be placed under the control of the senses plays a 
central role in Neurath’s physicalist criterion for curating the language of unified 
science. Physicalism is meant to rule out metaphysical statements by excluding 
2 Here “references” must be understood in a syntactic way, hence the spatio-temporal order itself 
must be comprised of syntactic items and ‘reference’ must be connection to such items either as 
parts of the statements themselves or parts of other statements reached via transformation rules.
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certain expressions from the language altogether, those that are not under the con-
trol of the senses. Such expressions are to be labeled “devoid of sense:”
Our knowledge of phenomena is controlled by sight, hearing, tasting – our sense organs. 
[…] A statement which cannot be controlled is a thesis devoid of sense. Those who thus 
succeed in formulating a system of laws which they apply in predicting events were best 
regarded as “representatives of a scientific conception of the universe.” (Neurath 
1931a/1983, 48; original emphases.)
Neurath is not interested here in providing a theory of empirical justification, but 
rather in specifying what it is for a system of laws to count as admissible into the 
system of unified science. A necessary condition for incorporating a statement into 
the system is that deployments of that statement be appropriately controlled by our 
sense organs. This is a requirement concerned with how to properly engineer a lan-
guage for unified science. An acceptable statement must be connected (in some 
indeterminately complex way or other) to sense experience through social 
practices.
This is where Neurath’s formulation of physicalism comes closest to what 
Carnap claims was the Vienna Circle’s official doctrine of physicalism in his intel-
lectual autobiography. Carnap (1963, 59) writes, “[t]he thesis of physicalism, as 
originally accepted in the Vienna Circle, says roughly: Every concept of the lan-
guage of science can be explicitly defined in terms of observables; therefore every 
sentence of the language of science is translatable into a sentence concerning 
observable properties.” However, Neurath’s physicalism is not committed to this 
strong form of translational reductionism. Neurath’s program does not entail that 
every theoretical term of a scientific theory must be translated into a complex of 
observation predicates, nor that every sentence that expresses a scientific concept 
can be translated into an observation sentence. Neurath only requires that expres-
sions connect up with observation statements in some way, but this way is intention-
ally left unspecified.
The difference is worth emphasizing. At the time in question, Carnap (1936) 
maintained that every viable concept of science could be defined through a logical 
relation to what he called “observable predicates.” An observable predicate is 
defined as a predicate P such that a person can come to a decision between “P(a)” 
or “not-P(a)” with the help of only a few observations. The logical relation Carnap 
proposed was given by reduction sentences. What it is for a theoretical predicate Q 
to be reducible to observable predicates is for Q to be uniformly replaceable by a 
new predicate Q* explicitly introduced by a reduction sentence of the form (x)
(O1x→(O2x→Q*x)) or (x)(O1x→(O2x↔Q*x)), where O1 and O2 are observable pred-
icates. O1 specifies the directly observable experimental setup. O2 specifies the 
directly observable outcome of an experiment that would confirm a predication of 
Q. Reductions could involve chains of such reduction sentences. What this means is 
that, for Carnap, every significant scientific expression must admit of explicit defini-
tion via a chain of reduction sentences connecting the use of that expression to some 
set of observations made under conditions that can be specified using observable 
predicates.
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Neurath’s program could make use of Carnap’s reduction sentences in control-
ling the use of predicates, but Neurath does not call for explicit reductive definitions 
of this or any other kind. In fact, Neurath explicitly rejects the call for a definitive 
criterion of significance for acceptable language. “As scientific people, we are pre-
pared to check all our tenets by observation statements, but also – far removed from 
every absolutism – to alter the principles on which the checking is based” (1935/1983, 
115). Neurath only insists that we engage in a general practice of critically evaluat-
ing the language of unified science, but even in this project “everything remains 
ambiguous and in many ways uncertain” (1935/1983, 116). Neurath’s approach is 
to treat the criterion of significance as necessarily vague, ambiguous, indeterminate, 
and never absolutely and eternally acceptable in any particular form.
Our best practice for evaluating the significance of language changes as our sci-
ence and social organization develops. The best practice is a function of socio- 
historical circumstances. There is no rational way to predict a priori how our 
theoretical apparatus should be connected with our observation statements as sci-
ence and society develop. Neurath says this practice of seeking out new ways to 
clarify our terms must (for best results) produce a uniform, coordinated effort at any 
given time, but he says, “[i]t is not [a logical consequence of our program]; I stress 
this again and again; I see it as a historical fact in a sociological sense” (1935/1983, 
115; original emphasis). The best practice must be uniformly enacted, but it is a 
matter of historical sociological fact which practice should be enacted at a given 
time and place.
Rather than insisting that some specific principle for inclusion in the physicalist 
language be developed, Neurath’s physicalism relies on an open-ended exclusion-
ary principle. “One can hope to remove only some coarse errors and certain coarse 
nonsense; much remains uncertain at first, though one cannot do without it” 
(1935/1983, 118). Science cannot proceed while simultaneously and instanta-
neously removing every term that might be suspect. Neurath maintained that this 
reliance on expressions riddled with uncertainty is unavoidable in science.3 It is 
both epistemically and practically intractable to replace our whole language with 
something perfectly precise and clearly connected with observation.
Understanding Neurath’s physicalist criterion of significance in this negative and 
open-ended way makes his approach much more feasible than the reductionist pic-
ture advocated by Carnap. Neurath’s approach is much closer to the holistic assess-
ment of scientific theories famously advocated by Quine (1951). Neurath 
(1935/1983, 118) says, “[t]he whole of science is basically always under discus-
sion.” Because we are not forced to evaluate the significance of scientific concepts 
on a term-by-term basis as Carnap required, Neurath’s criterion of significance 
allows us to judge whole theories at once.4 A theory can be accepted if it makes 
3 For more in-depth discussion see Cat (1995).
4 As Adam Tuboly has pointed out to me, Carnap (1934/1937, §82) also maintains a Duhemian 
perspective on the confirmation of theories, writing: “Thus the test applies, at bottom, not to a 
single hypothesis but to the whole system of physics as a system of hypotheses (Duhem, Poincaré)” 
(original emphasis). We should take care to distinguish this holistic view of theory confirmation 
from Carnap’s (1936) criterion of cognitive significance for theoretical terms.
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good predictions, even if the contribution of individual expressions of that theory 
cannot be traced directly to particular observations. Yet where Quine (1951, 20) saw 
this holism as resulting in “a blurring of the supposed boundary between speculative 
metaphysics and natural science,” Neurath’s approach avoids this result by strictly 
adhering to physicalist syntacticism. The holistic, vague, ambiguous, indeterminate, 
and non-absolute physicalist criterion of significance is, after all, only concerned 
with whether certain physical strings should be incorporated into the body of uni-
fied science. These decisions have no bearing on metaphysics or ontology of any 
kind. We cannot always tell with certainty whether a given term is directly definable 
in terms of observation or controlled more indirectly by observation. Perhaps we 
even accidentally use a term that is completely beyond control of the senses. But 
these facts have no metaphysical implications.
13.1.3  Physicalism as Social Program
Neurath (1935/1983, 115) speaks of implementing a “program of unified science” 
and a “program of empiricism.” To invoke an anachronistic metaphor, unified sci-
ence can be thought of as a kind of computer program. The language of unified 
science – the code in which the program is written – is specified in physical syntac-
tic terms. Expressions are identified by their physical properties. These physical 
properties are coordinated with syntactic types. The computations the program runs 
are given by transformation rules – statements within the body of unified science 
that specify in syntactic terms inferences that can be made. Syntactic types thus 
codify relations between physical expressions according to their syntactic classifi-
cations. Semantic properties such as truth or reference are fully left out of account.
The purpose of the program is to connect statements generated by the sense 
organs with predictions generated by laws of various sciences. These predictions are 
then used as an aid to the social planning of action. The code must be constructed in 
a physical medium since there is nothing else to construct it from. Its functioning 
must be established through social intervention, since the relevant operations on 
statements can only be carried out by groups of people within a language-using 
community. The community as a whole implements the program of science.
The picture of science-as-computer-program is borne in Neurath’s discussion of 
scientific laws. Neurath (1931c/1983, 62) writes: “Unified science contains all sci-
entific laws; these can be connected without exception. Laws are not statements; 
they are directions for obtaining predictions from observation statements (Schlick)” 
(original emphasis). Here we find two ideas that are connected with the computer 
program metaphor. Scientific laws – mere syntactic strings – function as parts of 
inferential chains connecting observation statements with prediction statements. 
Theoretical statements play an important role in the code that generates predictions 
on the basis of observation, but they do not stand for facts. The idea that all scientific 
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laws “can be connected without exception” means that laws from any set of scien-
tific domains can occur in a single inferential chain.
The conception of laws as inference rules sheds light on the earlier puzzle of how 
Neurath could maintain that laws conceived as mere syntactic strings express space- 
time linkages. When these strings are part of a system of inferences that is imple-
mented within the social fabric of a community, they “connect” the events that are 
observed with events that are predicted. An event occurs. It is observed by the sense 
organs of some individual who, as part of the program of unified science, records 
the event with an observation sentence. Scientific laws are then used to infer predic-
tion sentences, which are used in guiding interactions with future events.
Neurath’s treatment of laws as derivational rules is exemplified in Carnap’s 
(1934/1937) account of the logic of science as logical syntax.5 According to Carnap, 
we introduce L-Rules (constructed from purely logical vocabulary) and P-Rules 
(constructed from logical vocabulary together with physical predicates) and these 
function together “as transformation rules of the physical language” (1934/1937, 
§82, p. 316). The L-Rules assign measurable magnitudes and determine valid infer-
ences that are used to test the P-sentences that serve as primitive laws. These 
P-sentences “contain no constants as interior arguments” and so are treated as valid 
for all arguments, e.g. for all space-time points. Valid P-sentences are “tested by 
deducing consequences on the basis of the transformation rules of the language, 
until finally sentences of the form of protocol sentences are reached” (ibid. p. 317). 
We use the laws to derive observation statements that would confirm them. Carnap 
gives the example of Maxwell’s equations, which are formulated as P-primitive 
statements. “[S]entences of protocol form can be deduced from the Maxwell equa-
tions in conjunction with the other primitive sentences of classical physics; in this 
way, the Maxwell theory is empirically tested” (ibid. p.  319). When a valid 
P-sentence is not confirmed by observation, we can delete that sentence from our 
theory and formulate a new one. Carnap’s approach provides a clear example of the 
kind of syntactic treatment of laws Neurath advances. But Neurath never says 
Carnap’s analysis of the logic of science is the best we can expect to achieve. He 
advocates a continuing analysis of the logic of science.
Neurath (1937/1983, 175) maintains, “[t]he process of the logical organization 
of a single science cannot be divorced from the process of building up bridges or 
connections between the different sciences.” The idea that all scientific laws can be 
logically connected with one another reflects Neurath’s (1931b/1983, 53) convic-
tion that “under certain circumstances it must be possible to link the laws of all 
sciences with each other to make one definite prediction.” Predictions about a town 
we plan to build must take account of the geography, the weather, potential natural 
hazards, economic factors, sociological factors, and so on. Neurath (1931b/1983, 
54) writes, “[f]or ‘physicalism’ it is essential that one kind of order is the founda-
tion of all laws, whichever science is concerned, geology, chemistry, or sociology” 
(original emphases). The order Neurath is speaking of is the syntactic medium of 
5 See the discussion in The Logical Syntax of Language (1934/1937, 315–333). Carnap explicitly 
acknowledges Neurath’s influence in the development of his account on pp. 320–321.
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scientific prediction. What is required is that the various laws can be made to physi-
cally work together.
Scientific laws are not the only components of the language of unified science 
that are used for deriving predictions from observations. Neurath also grants a cen-
tral place to the implementation of symbolic logic.
The evolution of modern logic makes possible the organization and utilization of all 
research as upon the foundations of mathematics; and at the same time it clarifies the appli-
cation of mathematical and other calculi to concrete subject matter. We thus become clearer 
concerning such matters as the relation between what are called pure and physical geome-
try, or the logical structure of the probability calculus and its relevance to all the concrete 
sciences. (Neurath 1937/1983, 175.)
Here, Neurath makes oblique reference to the sorts of logical investigations Carnap 
(1934/1937) is engaged in. Neurath’s endorsement of symbolic logic as central to 
the program of unified science shows the close affinity he sees between his own 
work and Carnap’s work on logical syntax.
Making statements physically work together is a social engineering project. 
Statements don’t interact with each other all by themselves. They only interact 
through the actions of groups of people. Neurath should be understood as proposing 
and advocating a social engineering project that would enforce a pattern of language 
use within a global community, a pattern that Neurath hopes would facilitate the 
project of unified science and ultimately provide epistemic power for the masses.
Neurath indicates in several places (1915/1973, 1916/1983, 1930/1983, 
1934/1983) that he accepts a Duhemian view of science according to which obser-
vations can be equally well accounted for by indefinitely many different theories. 
What distinguishes theories from one another is that they are composed of different 
and potentially incompatible sets of laws and/or formalisms. For Neurath, even the 
protocol statements that serve as our evidential basis can vary from theory to theo-
ry.6 Hence, on Neurath’s picture, social coordination is required for establishing our 
formally specified derivational laws of nature, the rules of logical inference, and the 
format of the program’s input, i.e. the protocol statements. These syntactic items 
can take a myriad of different forms. There can be no a priori consensus about what 
the program of unified science should or must look like.
13.1.4  Syntacticism: Comparing Statements with Statements
“An unblemished syntax is the foundation of an unblemished unified science. 
Language is essential for science; within language all transformations of science 
take place, not by confrontation of language with a ‘world’, a totality of ‘things’ 
whose variety language is supposed to reflect. An attempt like that would be meta-
physics” (Neurath 1931b/1983, 54). The transformations of science are processes 
6 See Uebel (1996) for discussion of how Neurath’s principle is a distinctive development of 
Duhem’s thesis on this point.
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that transform statements – physical structures – into other statements. “Thinking in 
terms of language as physical process is the starting point of all science” (Neurath 
1931b/1983, 54). But these transformations are specified independently of any rela-
tion between the expressions of the language of science and the world apart from 
those expressions. The transformations of statements are governed by principles 
that are fully syntactic. They only relate statements with other statements.
The idea of a mechanized program for knowledge production helps us under-
stand what Neurath (1931b/1983, 53) means when he says that “statements are 
always compared with statements, certainly not with some ‘reality’, nor with 
‘things.’” The program proceeds from observation statements to prediction state-
ments. The inputs to the system are statements, the internal procedures are defined 
over statements, and the outputs are statements. To go beyond this picture and speak 
of a reality that corresponds to the statements of science is to pass into the realm of 
pseudo-rationalistic metaphysics. Syntacticism blocks this passage.
When Neurath says that statements are always compared with statements and 
never with reality, the phrase “compared with” bears some scrutiny. Expressions are 
not to be compared with reality, as a picture might be, and assessed for truth or 
falsehood on the grounds of such comparison. Neurath (1934/1983) qualifies this 
position by pointing out that statements can be compared with other physical objects 
in the way that physical objects can be compared with other physical objects. For 
example, we can say that the statement “This chair has four legs” has more words 
than the chair has legs – the chair has four legs, the statement has five words. We can 
describe the physical properties of a statement and compare those properties with 
the physical properties of other systems.
When the impossibility of comparing statements with reality is contrasted with 
the necessity of comparing statements with other statements, how should we under-
stand the special way in which sentences can be compared with other sentences? 
The scientifically relevant relations between statements are given by a comparison 
of their physical structure as coded by syntactic properties. The syntactic properties 
of an expression are determined by their physical properties. They are shapes or 
patterns in some physical medium.
Neurath’s physical syntacticism is a weapon of unified science against any meta-
physics or ontology rooted in a priori reflection. In the first instance, Neurath 
(1931a/1983, 53) rejects the idea that statements can be assessed for truth or false-
hood through comparison with reality: “Statements are compared with statements, 
not with ‘experiences’, not with a ‘world’ nor with anything else. All these mean-
ingless duplications belong to a more or less refined metaphysis and are therefore to 
be rejected.” Neurath takes semantic relations themselves to belong to metaphysics 
and thus thinks they should be rejected. Moreover, Neurath advocates Carnap’s idea 
that a syntactic approach to language reveals broad swaths of philosophical dis-
course about metaphysics and ontology as meaningless: “Precisely for the purpose 
of evading such idealistic metaphysics, physicalism tries to replace pseudo-content 
statements (Carnap’s ‘content language’) by statements about language conventions 
(Carnap’s ‘formal language’)” (Neurath 1934/1983, 101).
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Sentences that purport to state metaphysical theses are excluded from the lan-
guage of unified science and replaced with metalinguistic discourse: more state-
ments about statements. This appeal to Carnap’s methodology of demonstrating the 
impossibility of translating sentences of metaphysics into the formal mode indicates 
that Neurath embraced syntacticism for the purpose of doing away with metaphys-
ics. Hence, one of the goals of physicalism is that it should render metaphysical 
statements meaningless: “everything that was put forward as philosophy by scholas-
tics, Kantians, phenomenologists, is meaningless except that part of their formula-
tions that can be translated into scientific, that is physicalist, statements” (Neurath 
1931b/1983, 57).
13.1.5  Encyclopedism
The output of the program of unified science is a collection of statements, observa-
tions and predictions, together with laws and procedures for going forward. Many 
of these laws and procedures will be constructed through the use of logical and 
mathematical techniques. They can be refined through investigation. Hence, part of 
the program’s output may be an updated set of instructions about how the program 
should proceed.
Neurath is opposed to characterizing this output as a “system” of the kind that he 
attributes as the goal of science according to Descartes. The purpose of unified sci-
ence is not “to reach an absolute point from which all particular things should some-
how radiate” (Neurath 1936a/1983, 153). The output of the program of unified 
science is never to be regarded as absolute truth; nor is it to be regarded as complete. 
“‘The’ system is the great scientific lie. Not even as an anticipated goal is it a useful 
guiding thought” (Neurath 1935/1983, 116; original emphasis). Moreover, none of 
the sentences that compose the output at a given time are to be regarded as certain 
or as irrevocable. For these reasons (among others) Neurath advocates the choice of 
the term “encyclopedia” for this output.
An encyclopedia is a physical structure. It is a product of a particular society at a 
particular place in history. There may be more than one at a time even within a 
single society. These multiple encyclopedias need not coincide with one another at 
all, although they may need to confront one another. This picture is not very differ-
ent from the actual sociology of science in which different groups of scientists with 
competing theories present their data and their competing explanations and try to 
work things out.
According to Neurath (1936a/1983, 146), scientific progress is characterized as 
the transformation of one encyclopedia into another. “The march of science pro-
gresses from encyclopedias to encyclopedias. It is this conception that we call ency-
clopedism” (original emphasis). We continue to improve and change our 
encyclopedias as we are confronted with new data, new desires, and new decisions 
about the directions our societies should take.
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Neurath sometimes suggests that the word “true” might be used as a shorthand 
for indicating that a claim is included in the encyclopedia one currently accepts 
(although he is very wary of using the word “true” at all; see the next section). “One 
can completely renounce the use of these terms [‘true’ and ‘false’], but one can also 
try to redefine them appropriately. It would, for example, be perfectly expedient to 
use the term ‘true’ for all statements that are ‘valid’ for us in the sense given above, 
that is, are either part of our encyclopedia or can be deduced from it” (Neurath 
1936b/1983, 161).
The idea of treating truth in this hyper-deflationary way naturally raises the ques-
tion: what about the possibility that encyclopedias might contain contradictions? 
Neurath (1936b/1983, 160) acknowledges this possibility. “In the actual encyclope-
dias that we use, there are often theories in contradiction with each other, which, if 
restricted to certain areas, however, produce good predictions.” Whether by design 
or by accident, our best encyclopedia (collections of physical strings) may contain 
contradictions. But Neurath is explicitly unconcerned with this possibility on the 
assumption that we can design ways to limit our inferential chains to non- 
contradictory fragments of our encyclopedia. In effect, this means implementing 
practical procedures to prevent logical explosion where two theories we accept are 
incompatible. This is very much in the spirit of how scientists actually proceed 
given the incompatibility of various scientific theories in good standing.
Neurath’s encyclopedism has a close affinity with Carnap’s logical syntax in this 
regard. Sarkar (2013) argues that Carnap’s (1934/1937, §17) principle of tolerance 
does not require a language to be consistent. That is to say, the principle of tolerance 
implies that there are no logical constraints whatsoever imposed on our choice of 
logical syntax. For all Carnap says, it is possible to adopt an inconsistent language. 
Sarkar regards this as an objection that needs to be responded to, and cites Beth 
(1963) and Gödel (1995) as raising the objection against Carnap. But for a propo-
nent of the principle of tolerance, there really is no reason to believe that logic itself 
imposes sanctions against the use of inconsistent languages, especially once it is 
recognized that inconsistent languages can be safeguarded against explosion. In 
principle we may discover reasons for adopting inconsistent languages for certain 
purposes. This is what Neurath recommends. Moreover, the practical and empirical 
contexts in which our encyclopedias are developed will tend to safeguard them from 
containing contradictions.7
Yet the possibility of unwanted contradictions appearing within what we take to 
be a consistent fragment of our encyclopedia is unavoidable. When we find these 
contradictions, we fix them. The mere possibility of accepting contradictions is not 
a deep objection to Neurath’s syntactic encyclopedism. It is a real problem that must 
be dealt with in practical ways.
7 Sarkar argues this is why Carnap was not overly concerned with the objections raised by Beth and 
Gödel.
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13.1.6  Rejecting “True”
As noted above, Neurath sometimes advocated excluding the use of the word “true” 
altogether from the language of unified science.
One source of uneasiness concerning the word “true,” noted by Mormann (1999), 
is that Neurath rejects the idealization of a perfect body of scientific knowledge. 
This rejection is connected with his encyclopedism. Neurath writes:
I propose that one no longer use the term ‘the system of science’ or any other similar terms, 
and that one equally avoid all expressions that sound as if they supported the absolutism of 
the ‘system’. We should never say that certain formulas are ‘unshakable’, ‘definitely free 
from contradiction’, ‘absolutely true’, nor that they ‘approximate’ such a state more and 
more, as if this were something determined or determinable. (Neurath 1936a/1983, 145.)
The fact that there is no ultimate encyclopedia is one reason that we should not 
speak of “absolute truth” or, what usually comes to the same thing, “truth.”
Another reason for Neurath’s rejection of “true” is that we cannot be certain any 
of our statements will not be revised in the future. Neurath’s argument against truth 
concerning certainty is tricky and has confused several philosophers, including 
Carnap. What does Neurath mean by “certainty?”
Neurath writes:
When we say that one statement is more certain than another, we maintain something con-
cerning our ‘conduct’ in this respect; for example that we do not intend to spend more time 
and effort in order to test its truth; moreover, that we do not foresee that the development of 
science must soon change it, in other words, what would be necessary to do in this case, we 
do not feel obliged to do. (Neurath 1936a/1983, 146.)
Certainty is thus construed as a psychological inclination and a physical process, 
but one that is governed by the program of unified science insofar as that program 
dictates our conduct regarding how we spend our time and effort and how we update 
our encyclopedias. The necessary lack of certainty is connected with the necessary 
incompleteness of every encyclopedia and the fact that we can have no justification 
for refusing absolutely to revise some part of any encyclopedia. Because we can 
always gather more data, we can never regard an encyclopedia as ultimate. Thus, 
Neurath’s argument about certainty does not turn on an identification of the concept 
of truth with the concept of certainty, pace Carnap who ascribed this position to 
Neurath during their debate at Congrès Descartes in 1937 (see Mancosu 2008). 
Neurath’s argument turns only on the fact that we cannot regard any physical reposi-
tory of knowledge as complete. Neurath extends this point even to logico- 
mathematical statements, arguing that what we now regard as analytic we might 
soon regard as contradictory.
Another reason Neurath regards truth with suspicion is the fact that the language 
of unified science must, as a matter of historical necessity, be constructed using 
inexact terms – what Neurath calls Ballungen, terms from common language that 
have no precise use.8 Ballungen cannot be given exact rules of interface with the 
8 For a detailed discussion of Ballungen see Cartwright Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996).
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program of unified science but are nevertheless essential to that program because 
they form the basis of the common language with which we must speak when doing 
science. To abandon these terms altogether would be to abandon the connection his-
tory has established between our senses and our observation statements. Since 
Ballungen cannot be given an exact analysis, nor can they be removed from our 
encyclopedia, an encyclopedia cannot be regarded as an exact or perfect reflection 
of reality.
The reasons presented thus far are consequences of treating knowledge as a syn-
tactic product of the program of unified science. None of these considerations gives 
the deepest reason for Neurath’s rejection of truth. The deepest reason follows from 
physicalism itself. In this connection, Neurath writes:
The study of language can perfectly well be combined with the study of physical processes; 
for one always stays in the same field. In staying within the closed area of language one can 
express everything. Thus statements are always compared with statements, certainly not 
with some ‘reality’, nor with ‘things’ […]. [Idealistic and realistic elements] can be com-
pletely eliminated if the transition is made to pure unified science. […] If a statement is 
made, it is to be confronted with the totality of existing statements. If it agrees with them, it 
is joined to them; if it does not agree, it is called ‘untrue’ and rejected; or the existing com-
plex of statements of science is modified so that the new statements can be incorporated 
[…]. There can be no other concept of ‘truth’ for science. (Neurath 1931b/1983, 53; origi-
nal emphases.)
It is because language is to be treated as a physical medium, and because the use of 
language is to be specified with regard to its physical syntax only, that the notion of 
semantic truth should be to be rejected by proponents of Neurath’s program of uni-
fied science. A strict syntacticism simply does not admit of a substantive semantic 
theory of truth.
Neurath allows that “truth” could function as a tool in inference, as part of the 
inner workings of the program of unified science, i.e. as a piece of syntax. As men-
tioned above, it could function as everyday shorthand for indicating which sen-
tences belong to or follow from the accepted encyclopedia. Neurath also accepts 
that a Tarski-type truth definition can be given as part of the purely formal fragment 
of the language of unified science. He does not object to Tarski’s (1936/1956) the-
ory of truth for formalized languages qua piece of mathematics. Neurath only 
objects to applying Tarski’s definition in a way that would make statements of sci-
ence count as true or false as a consequence of how things are in reality (see Mancosu 
2008). Treating “true” as part of an acceptable logical formalism is consistent with 
treating logical formalism as a purely physicalistic component of the mechanized 
production of knowledge.
13.2  Neurath’s Prophecy Fulfilled
Neurath warned that engaging in semantic analyses of language would lead to a new 
era of metaphysics. And indeed many of the most influential metaphysical ideas of 
the twentieth century were articulated and defended through reasoning about 
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semantics. What follows are three case studies in metaphysics: Carnap’s linguistic 
frameworks, Armstrong’s theory of truth-makers, and (early) Putnam’s knowledge- 
transcendent correspondence relation. In each case, special attention is paid to the 
role semantics plays in establishing metaphysical conclusions. Each argument is 
then checked from the point of view of Neurath’s physicalist syntacticism to show 
that semantic assumptions are necessary to drive the metaphysics.
Carnap (1950) argues that questions of ontology are trivial when raised inside a 
linguistic framework and cannot be coherently raised at all when no linguistic 
framework is assumed. But from the perspective of Neurathian physicalist syntacti-
cism, Carnap has already taken the plunge into deep metaphysical waters by treat-
ing linguistic frameworks as semantically interpreted.
A linguistic framework is constructed by introducing a system of rules for a lan-
guage. This procedure is not very different from constructing a logical syntax except 
that a linguistic framework includes a semantic interpretation. When one introduces 
a linguistic framework, the expressions of the framework are assigned designations: 
sentences designate propositions, predicates designate properties, and names desig-
nate things.
Carnap’s discussion of linguistic frameworks provides an explicit characteriza-
tion of the link from semantics to ontology. He walks us through an example. Start 
by accepting the linguistic framework of numbers. Within this framework, the state-
ment “Five is a number” is analytic. From the fact that “Five is a number” is ana-
lytic, it follows that “There is some n such that n is a number” is also analytic.
Neurath would be perfectly happy to countenance rules of transformation of this 
kind if they were to be construed syntactically. We could include the string “There 
is some n such that n is a number” in the encyclopedia by inferring it from “Five is 
a number.” Construed as parts of the program of unified science, these statements 
express merely their own physical structure. In syntax there is no ontology, no 
domain of facts beyond the language itself.
Carnap, however, has taken his semantic turn. Now, analytic sentences are true. 
So from the fact that “There is some n such that n is a number” is analytic, it follows 
that it is true that there are numbers. More generally, accepting a framework means 
regarding the analytic sentences of that framework as true. It is not surprising that 
questions of existence can be settled by adopting linguistic frameworks. One can 
adopt a framework that asserts the truth or falsity of the answers to those 
questions.
Carnap presents this picture as if it were deflationary. He says, “[n]obody who 
meant the question ‘are there numbers?’ in the internal sense would either assert or 
even seriously consider a negative answer.” But that is because, in accepting the 
framework of numbers, they have accepted that “Numbers exist” is true and thus 
accepted that there are numbers. Carnap observes that once we accept the number 
framework, and thereby accept that there are numbers, the question of whether there 
are really numbers no longer makes sense. Carnap thinks that this conclusion indi-
cates that questions of reality are pseudo-questions.
But this is not how the syntacticist sees the situation. From Neurath’s point of 
view, once we have accepted Carnap’s semantic framework and endorsed the idea 
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that there are true statements of e.g. arithmetic, we have accepted something more 
than the existence of linguistic forms identified with physical properties. The person 
who accepts the framework of numbers thinks it is true that numbers exist in addi-
tion to the syntactic strings with which truths about numbers are expressed. The fact 
that we cannot identify a meaningful question of the reality of numbers that is sepa-
rate from the question of whether to adopt a linguistic framework does not show that 
metaphysics has been avoided, only that adopting a framework fully determines our 
answers to metaphysical questions. This is because accepting linguistic frameworks 
requires accepting truths about non-linguistic reality. Despite his intentions to the 
contrary, Carnap demonstrates the bridge from semantics to metaphysics.
Let us consider a likely objection to this interpretation. A defender of Carnap in 
the spirit of Creath (1990) might maintain that analytic truth and its attendant ontol-
ogy is not a significant commitment to metaphysics because anything can be 
regarded as a logical truth. Carnap’s position in “Empiricism Semantics and 
Ontology” is the result of combining the principle of tolerance with a semantic 
theory of truth. The result is the view that any sentence can be treated as a truth. 
Doesn’t this render the notion of logical truth harmless by making it trivial?
From Neurath’s perspective, the question of harm is not to be assessed in terms 
of whether the notion of truth is trivial in this sense, but whether accepting this 
account of truth gives rise to metaphysical speculation, debate, and conviction. In 
these respects, Carnap’s view constitutes harmful metaphysics. Consider some of 
the questions it raises. If you and I adopt different frameworks, then what is logi-
cally true for me is not logically true for you. Is logical truth therefore relative to a 
person at a time? I can adopt a framework according to which it is logically true that 
there are no electrons. Is the existence of electrons then to be decided by my choice 
of framework? Is the existence of things always relativized to people or is there an 
absolute existence in addition? Carnap mentions that we might refrain from speak-
ing and thereby reject all linguistic frameworks. Does this mean the existence of 
numbers requires speech? Even metaphysical questions that Carnap explicitly aims 
to rule out are still open for discussion: Are numbers real, given their existence 
depends on the adoption of a linguistic framework? These are metaphysical ques-
tions that are legitimated by Carnap’s endorsement of a semantic notion of truth, 
questions that would be rendered meaningless by Neurath’s syntacticism.
Armstrong (1993, 1997) gives a semantical argument for a theory of truth makers 
that purports to be independent of linguistic frameworks. According to Armstrong a 
state of affairs exists if and only if a particular has a property, or if a relation holds 
between two or more particulars. States of affairs are constituted by the particulars, 
properties, and relations that are sufficient for their existence. Armstrong takes 
properties and relations to be universals. Neurath would see these as metaphysical 
statements par excellence.
The semantical argument for these posits follows closely on the tail of the 
assumption that natural language involves a semantic concept of truth. Armstrong 
(1993, 430) writes, “[w]hy is anything more needed than particulars and universals, 
monadic and polyadic? The answer to this comes from one of the fundamental 
assumptions that drive this ontology. It is the need for truths to have a truthmaker 
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[…] or an ontological ground […].” The idea is that the mere existence of e.g. a 
property F and a particular a is not sufficient to guarantee the truth of “a is F.” If the 
sentence is true, then (according to Armstrong) some truthmaker is required, some-
thing that brings these elements together. “The state of affairs of a’s being F is sug-
gested as that truthmaker, as the ontological ground” (Armstrong 1993, 430). Hence 
the acceptance of a semantic notion of truth engenders discussion of states of affairs, 
a type of entity posited as the ground of truth, as well as speculation concerning the 
reality of properties, relations, and particulars as the things that constitute these 
states of affairs.
The notion of a state of affairs brings with it a host of metaphysical puzzles. 
What is the truthmaker for the sentence “Grass is not blue”? Does the negation sign 
designate a property of negation? Are there negative states of affairs? Are properties 
also particulars? If not then how can we name them? Armstrong’s picture also gives 
rise to the challenge of Bradley’s regress. He raises the question himself (1993, 
432): “Is not bringing the constituents of a state of affairs, the particulars, the prop-
erties and the relations, together into states of affairs, a further relation in which all 
the constituents stand? But then the new relation is just a further element which 
requires to be integrated along with the other constituents.” If being part of a state 
of affairs is itself a state of affairs, then each state of affairs requires infinitely many 
more states of affairs to hold it together.
Neurath’s syntacticism undermines Armstrong’s discussion of states of affairs in 
a most straightforward way. Since sentences do not have properties such as truth 
and falsehood, there is no need to explain the truth of “a is F” by positing some 
ontological structure in which the truth of the sentence is grounded. More generally, 
the metaphysics of truthmakers and truthmaking is rendered completely idle by the 
syntactic perspective.
Putnam (1975) initiates another major metaphysical program of the twentieth 
century through his much discussed Twin Earth thought experiment. The proper 
semantic insight to be drawn according to Putnam is that on Twin Earth the word 
“water” designates XYZ, not water. Yet the people on Twin Earth are physically and 
functionally the same as Earthlings. The conclusion is semantic content does not 
supervene on the internal physical nature or structure of an organism, but rather on 
relations between the organism and its environment. Concordantly, the truth of sen-
tences is determined in part by such relations. Hence, Putnam conjures the idea of 
semantic relations of reference and truth that hold between organisms and their 
environments.
The metaphysical fallout of this semantic argument is immense. Our understand-
ing of scientific truth must take into account not just the facts that we investigate but 
also the relationships between the organism and its environment that constitute the 
semantic content side of the correspondence between our theories and reality. These 
representation relationships can hold without our knowledge. Our “operational defi-
nitions” by which we control the use of our terms can turn out to be false given what 
our words actually refer to in virtue of this external reference-fixing relation. This 
provides for the possibility that even our best possible scientific theories may be 
false in ultimate reality. It also provides the possibility that some description avail-
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able in our language or some more sophisticated language might be absolutely true, 
in the sense that descriptions made available by the ideal language would capture 
reality exactly. The notion that facts about reality beyond the grasp of even our best 
theories might determine the absolute truth or falsity of any given encyclopedia is 
perhaps the most extreme antithesis of Neurathian physicalism.
The syntacticist would reject Putnam’s earliest premise. For the syntacticist there 
is no sense to be made of the claim that “water” refers to the substance water. The 
only significant relations that “water” enters into are relations with other syntactic 
objects. Nothing about the nature of reality or the nature of scientific inquiry could 
be concluded from analyses of these relations.
I have presented three examples, but there are many ways in which the semantic 
turn has given rise to contemporary metaphysics. This study could be expanded at 
great length. Further important examples of metaphysical conclusions being drawn 
from semantic assumptions include Davidson’s (1967) project of giving a theory of 
meaning in terms of Tarski’s theory of truth, Kripke’s (1980) theory of metaphysical 
necessity, Burge’s (1979) theory of social externalism for mental contents, the wide 
range of ‘naturalistic’ explanations of intentionality developed by Millikan (1984), 
Fodor (1987), Dretske (1988), and many others.
13.3  Conclusion
I conclude that Neurath was right about the danger semantics posed to logical 
empiricism. It was an empirical question whether Carnap was right to think that a 
semantic theory of truth could be added harmlessly to Neurath’s scientific world-
view. The evidence strongly suggests Carnap was wrong. A physical syntacticism of 
the kind advocated by Neurath would have provided a strong counter-position to the 
metaphysical discourse of the twentieth century. Perhaps that is why Neurath’s 
opposition to a semantic theory of truth was so vehemently rejected. Whatever the 
historical reasons for its rejection, Neurath’s syntacticism presents an intriguing and 
underdeveloped philosophical program with the potential to generate important 
critical resources for anti-metaphysical theorizing.
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Chapter 14
What a Difference a Decade Makes: 
The Planning Debates and the Fate 
of the Unity of Science Movement
George A. Reisch
Abstract This paper examines selected writings of the American science writer 
Waldemar Kaempffert, Science Editor for the New York Times, in public support of 
Otto Neurath, his Isotype projects, and his Unity of Science Movement. Attention is 
focused first on Kaempffert’s writings in the 1930s, when some intellectuals, the 
American public, and their elected leaders were relatively sympathetic with 
Neurath’s quest to unify the sciences in ways that would advance and direct scien-
tific research toward practical goals. Attention then turns to the 1940s to examine the 
debate over the nature, scope, and limits of wartime research and Vannevar Bush’s 
call for a national institution to support research. Against Bush, James Bryant 
Conant, and others, Kaempffert argued vigorously for a foundation that would adopt 
values and methods of the Unity of Science Movement, but he lost that argument as 
the National Science Foundation finally took shape. To suggest that this public 
debate influenced not only the decline of Neurath’s Unity of Science Movement but 
the scholarly development of history and philosophy of science after the war, the 
paper considers early writings and events in the life of Conant’s protégé Thomas 
Kuhn, whose Structure of Scientific Revolutions helped shape that development.
Research on the history of logical empiricism has shown the large extent to which it 
was originally rooted in cultural and social concerns and ambitions that fell out of 
favor in professional philosophy during and after the 1950s.1 One largely unex-
plored marker of logical empiricism’s vitality in the 1930s and early 40s is the 
coverage received by Otto Neurath in the popular press. Thanks to Waldemar 
Kaempffert, the Science Editor for the New York Times who happened to be 
1 See for example, Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, Uebel (1996), Stadler (2001 /2015), Howard (2003), 
Reisch (1994, 2005), Wuest (2015). On Neurath’s early political concerns see Don Howard’s and 
Günther Sandner’s chapters in the present volume. On the rise of analytic philosophy in the United 
States and its relation to political currents, see Capps (2003) and McCumber (2001, 2016).
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Neurath’s cousin, goings-on within Neurath’s museum and Isotype work, his Unity 
of Science Movement, and to some extent the Vienna Circle itself were effectively 
promoted to the American public and its elected leaders. To this extent, the dream 
Neurath once shared with Rudolf Carnap and Hans Hahn – to elevate and invigorate 
modern life with the insights, intellectual rigor, and enlightenment values of their 
Wissenschaftliche Weltaufassung – was not so dreamlike. Kaempffert’s coverage of 
Neurath’s various projects was frequent, enthusiastic, and well positioned (given the 
stature of The New York Times) to make good on the manifesto’s claim that “endeav-
ors toward a new organization of social and economic relations, toward the unifica-
tion of mankind, toward a reform of school and education, all show an inner link 
with the scientific world-conception.” Unlike those advocates who would “lead a 
withdrawn existence on the icy slopes of logic,” Kaempffert was “a fighter” (Neurath 
et al. 1929/1973, 305, 317) who enlisted Neurath’s projects in a crusade to teach 
Americans about science and to shape federal policy toward research and its finan-
cial support.
Here I will survey Kaempffert’s coverage of Neurath and his projects against the 
backdrop of the larger international movement in the 1930s for understanding sci-
ence as a social phenomenon whose research, discoveries, and applications, like 
other institutions – including schools, factories, economies, and popular cultures – 
can be consciously organized and planned for the collective benefit of modern soci-
ety. By the early 1940s, we shall see, the debate between those who believed modern 
science could be profitably planned and their critics who believed that planning 
would harm modern science became fractured and complicated by the sensational 
wartime achievement of the atom bomb. On the one hand, the bomb’s rapid and suc-
cessful development seemed to demonstrate the powers and benefits of planning 
and organizing science and to validate the claims of figures like J.D.  Bernal in 
England, Otto Neurath in Vienna and later England, and William Malisoff in the 
United States. On the other hand, critics such as James Bryant Conant, Warren 
Weaver, and Michael Polanyi believed that the war effort demonstrated at most the 
rapid and effective application of then-recent discoveries in “pure science.” In the 
nature of scientific research, they insisted, pure research cannot be organized or 
planned, and attempts to do so will at least slow scientific progress, if not altogether 
prohibit the pursuit of novelties and serendipitous circumstances that sometimes 
lead to momentous discoveries.
Pressing political concerns cut across and complicated this debate. As the cold 
war took shape and Truman’s United States and Stalin’s Soviet Union  – former 
allies in the fight against Germany and Japan – became mistrusting and anxious 
about each other’s intentions, critics of planning positioned their objections within 
this geopolitical framework. Not only did planning not work (as demonstrated by 
Lysenkoism’s harm to biology in Russia), they believed, efforts to plan science in 
the west would amount to a cultural concession in the cold war struggle, for under 
planning western science would become authoritarian and Stalinistic. For the most 
part, those who promoted planning in science were no fans of Stalin or the Kremlin. 
But, as the arc and evolution of Kaempffert’s advocacy shows, these political anxi-
eties deeply shaped national debate over science and the possible forms of national 
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science policy that could be imagined – either free, creative, and progressive or, on 
the other hand, controlled, repressed, and unproductive. Kaempffert tried to 
 articulate and defend a vision of nationally funded science that was neither “laissez-
faire” and chaotic nor authoritarian and intellectually repressive. But his voice 
became marginalized as American political and intellectual leaders fell into line to 
vigorously oppose any form of planning and organization.
Finally, I will describe two aspects of a young Thomas Kuhn’s relationship to the 
planning debates. One, his brief collaboration with Philipp Frank in the early 1950s 
when Frank struggled to keep Neurath’s Unity of Science Movement strong and 
vital for science studies; and, two, Kuhn’s Lowell Lectures of 1951, during which 
Kuhn evidently feared that he was being thrust into these contentious, public debates 
over planning and science’s place in postwar society. Kuhn chose to avoid these 
debates, denied that his research had meaningful bearing on them, and crafted a 
theoretical approach to science’s history – fully articulated in his The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions published a decade later – that denied prospects for planning 
science. To the considerable extent that Kuhn’s Structure itself became a paradigm 
for postwar science studies, this epilogue suggests one way in which the decline and 
fate of Neurath’s unity of science project is linked to the programmatic foundations 
and assumptions of history and philosophy of science as they are practiced today.
14.1  Waldemar Kaempffert and the Unity of Science 
Movement
Waldemar Kaempffert, born 1877, was an American cousin of Otto Neurath, born 
1882. They were related through Neurath’s mother, Gertrud Kaempffert.2 Waldemar 
was born in New York City, attended the City College of New York, earned a law 
degree, and began writing about science for popular audiences in magazines and 
books. In 1916, he became an editor of Popular Science Monthly and by 1922 had 
moved to the New York Times. After a brief, three-year relocation to Chicago where 
Kaempffert became the Director of the Museum of Science and Industry, he returned 
to New York and the New York Times in 1931, where he remained Science Editor 
until his retirement in 1956.3
Kaempffert shared Neurath’s enthusiasm about science and his civic responsibil-
ity to help ordinary citizens understand as much as possible about science’s roles – 
actual and potential  – in modern life. While Kaempffert’s efforts to promote 
scientific understanding were rooted neither in the fundamental epistemological 
concerns of the Vienna Circle nor the technical, scientific experience of British 
Marxists, he endorsed the view that advances in science were transforming the mod-
2 According to Neurath’s son, Paul, Waldemar and Otto were cousins, which suggests that 
Waldemar’s father, Bernhard, in New York and Neurath’s mother Gertrud in Austria were siblings 
or themselves cousins (Fleck et al. 2005, 285).
3 This and other information about Kaempffert can be found in his obituary (New York Times 1956).
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ern world for the better. In the Book of Modern Marvels, for example, assembled 
from articles written by others for Popular Science Monthly, Kaempffert (1917, 6) 
noted that developments in knowledge ranging from scientific research to criminol-
ogy and warfare “make this the most dramatically interesting period in the whole 
history of the world.”
The politics of this enthusiasm, however, presented a problem that would color 
much of Kaempffert’s coverage of Neurath and his Unity of Science Movement in 
the coming decades. In broad terms, the movement to promote planning and organi-
zation in science can be understood to have swept westward in the wake of the 
Russian Revolution. In 1931, when Boris Hessen and Nikolai Bukharin brought 
Marxist sociology of science to the meeting in London of the International Congress 
of the History of Science and Technology, they converted a generation of British 
intellectuals, including Bernal, Lancelot Hogben, Joseph Needham, and 
J.G. Crowther. These and other like-minded intellectuals came to believe it was no 
coincidence that the new Soviet Union was growing by leaps and bounds (famously 
under Stalin’s first and subsequent “five year plans”) when western nations which 
had not learned to organize and plan scientific research remained mired in the great 
depression (Werskey 1978, 142–3, 2007). Neurath and his unity of science project, 
in turn, brought this sensibility to the United States manifest in the new scientific 
philosophy of logical empiricism, his visual language Isotype, designed to educate 
the masses to clearly understand social and economic information, and his 
International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, designed to facilitate interdisciplin-
ary cooperation among different sciences (Reisch 1994).
Kaempffert supported his cousin’s efforts faithfully and energetically. On at least 
18 occasions in the 1930s, these projects appeared in notices, articles, features and 
reviews in the New York Times, usually written by Kaempffert but sometimes by 
other writers. In all cases, the coverage was sympathetic and championed the goals, 
methods, and democratic (if not socialist) ideals embedded in these projects.4 (See 
Fig. 14.1.). Given the ravages of the depression, many of Kaempffert’s readers in the 
United States were already sympathetic to socialism and scientific and economic 
planning as likely solutions to the urgent economic problems at hand. Kaempffert 
did not hide these socialistic sensibilities. In his piece “Staccato Speech for Silent 
Statistics” of 1933 (Kaempffert 1933), and most likely with knowledge of Neurath’s 
own work for the Soviet government as an expert in visual statistics (Survey Graphic 
1932), he pointed out that Isotype “is now definitely established by decree in the 
Soviet Union for the pictographic presentation of statistics in schools and in posters 
that are to instruct the masses” (the same point is made in Modley 1935). (See 
Fig. 14.2.). Again in 1937 he pointed out that Isotype overcomes one of the obsta-
cles of “written and spoken language” which “varies with the class to which it is 
addressed.” For “it is one purpose of Isotypes to bridge the intellectual gap between 
the college professor and the masses to whom he wishes to appeal” (Kaempffert 
1937b).
4 See e.g. Kaempffert (1933, 1935, 1936, 1937a, b, c, 1938), New York Times (1933, 1937a, b, 
1939a, b, c, d), Barnard (1933), Modley (1935), Duffus (1939), and Thompson (1939).
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Fig. 14.1 One of Kaempffert’s more prominent features about Neurath and the International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science, in the New York Times Book Review, Aug. 7, 1938
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While Isotype aimed to spread and democratize social and economic information, 
Neurath’s new encyclopedia of science aimed to invigorate science itself, partly by 
calling for interdisciplinary cooperation and the cultivation and use of a universal 
language of science. It would allow researchers in different fields to  collaborate and 
locate the gaps and inconsistencies in current knowledge. This too would help facili-
Fig. 14.2 Kaempffert’s coverage of Neurath’s ISOTYPE project, Jan 22, 1933
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tate communication between scientists and the public. Envisioning the forthcoming 
encyclopedia as making great use of Isotypes (which is not accurate of the mono-
graphs that would appear beginning about a year later) Kaempffert mused that this 
will be “the strangest and most useful encyclopedia ever published.”
Give it to Jack Smith in the fo’c’stle of a ship or to Einstein and each will absorb more 
information from it in five minutes than he could from the millions of words in an ordinary 
encyclopedia. (Kaempffert 1937b)
While portraying Neurath’s projects as part of a progressive, international van-
guard reaching across the disciplines and across social classes, Kaempffert knew 
that he ran some risk of exciting ideological and xenophobic anxieties about 
Communism that took root in the United States in the wake of the Russian 
Revolution. These anxieties would have been well known to Kaempffert because 
they were on full display during the so-called first red scare of the early 1920s. But 
in the 1930s there was a strong case to make that history was on Neurath’s side and 
that his projects belonged to America’s future. This was at a time, for example, 
when not just Russia but also the Works Progress Administration under Roosevelt’s 
New Deal adopted Isotype methods and styles into their literature and public posters 
(See Fig.  14.3.). Thanks in part to Rudolf Modley, who assisted Neurath at his 
Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in Vienna and who later came to the United 
States to work with Kaempffert at the Museum of Science and Industry, the distinc-
tive aesthetic and political sensibilities of the Vienna Method of pictorial statistics 
were not uncommon in 1930s America. In Chicago, Isotype exhibits were familiar 
to those visiting the Museum and Science and Industry, while the Roosevelt 
Administration’s so-called alphabet agencies, including the WPA (Works Progress 
Administration) and FERA (Federal Emergency Relief Agency), employed Modley 
and others to create posters and charts about the nation’s efforts to lift itself out of 
the depression (Charles and Giraud 2013). A review in the New York Times of 
Modley’s book How to Use Pictorial Statistics noted his aim “to present picture of 
social and economic facts” in ways that are both engaging and memorable to the 
“man in the street” (New York Times 1937b).
While Neurath’s projects within the Unity of Science Movement aimed mainly 
to educate adults about the ways of modern science, the Vienna Method was also 
embraced by progressive educators of children. In 1933, one Eunice Barnard 
reported on this trend in the New York Times and wondered, “can the children of 
tomorrow throw away many of their wordy textbooks and learn instead through the 
‘fact picture’ – a kind of cross between the ordinary picture and the statistician’s 
graph?” According to presentations given at Columbia University’s Teachers 
College, Barnard reported, “America is just beginning to see the educational possi-
bilities of the fact picture, which have heretofore been developed chiefly by Dr. Otto 
Neurath of the Social-Economic Museum in Vienna” (Barnard 1933).
Given this cultural landscape, marked on one side by the nation’s conservative 
political and religious sensibilities and on the other by the growing belief that prog-
ress in science, government, and education offered the nation a way forward and out 
of the depression, Kaempffert steered a cautious, middle course in his coverage and 
commentary about Neurath’s projects. On some occasions, he seems to have toned 
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down the Marxist content and overtones in what Neurath wrote and said about his 
projects. In his book “Personal Life and Class Struggle,” of 1928, for example, 
Neurath clearly associated his vision of unified science with a Marxist sensibility 
that aimed to solve problems for the masses: “The Marxist always aims at informing 
himself about the main problem of the proletarian class struggle: how will the suf-
fering of the capitalist order come to an end?” To Bourgeois scientists, on the other 
hand, “it is left to chance whether a man thinks about some linguistic formations in 
Chinese or about a medieval legal text, about African beetles or about wind 
Fig. 14.3 U.S. Government posters utilizing and adapting Neurath’s Vienna Method of pictorial 
statistics in the 1930s
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 conditions at the North Pole” (Neurath 1928/1973, 294–5). Kaempffert discussed 
the unification of the sciences in similar ways, but without using this Marxist termi-
nology. For example, he wrote,
Naturally, it requires an organization to carry out this conception of unity. The different 
specialists cannot be left to their own devices – the old method. They must be brought 
together and made to understand one another. (Kaempffert 1937c.)
Thus Neurath’s “bourgeois science” became Kaempffert’s “old method” of science, 
one he later called a “laissez-faire” approach to research.
Kaempffert also emphasized that Neurath’s Unity of Science Movement did not 
aim to legislate or impose unity on scientific research. Writing about the Vienna 
Circle’s views of unified science in 1938, for example, he wrote, the need for unity
became more and more apparent as language was analyzed. It was far from the mind of the 
group to evolve a super-science to legislate for all the known disciplines. The object was 
integration, and integration was to be achieved by building bridges form one science to 
another. (Kaempffert 1938)
To explain how the new encyclopedia would help achieve this goal, Kaempffert bor-
rowed Neurath’s (and later Quine’s) well-known metaphor of science as the Ship of 
Theseus whose beams and planks are slowly replaced over time. Kaempffert’s met-
aphor was also nautical, but better suited to this anti-authoritarian point: The ency-
clopedia’s function, he explained, is
to act as a pilot to scientists. In the past they have been independent navigators […]. [But] 
[t]he encyclopedia is intended to tell each navigator what other ships are doing and what he 
Fig. 14.3 (continued)
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can learn from their signals, their movements, their errands. A heterogeneous collection of 
vessels on a common ocean, but each going its own way, is to be converted into a homog-
enous fleet. (Kaempffert 1938)
Crucially, he continued,
[t]here will be no admiral to give orders. Only this encyclopedia is to serve as chart and 
compass. To it all navigators will contribute, and all will revise it from time to time to make 
it more useful to themselves and the educated public. (Kaempffert 1938)
In these and similar passages, Kaempffert walked a thin, political line. In reviewing 
the first monograph multiply authored by Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, and Charles 
Morris (the Encyclopedia editors) as well as Bertrand Russell, and John Dewey, 
Kaempffert emphasized that these “sensible contributors to this work make no 
attempt to club one another into accepting ideas.” In comparing these new encyclo-
pedists to those around Diderot, and at a time when most American intellectuals 
were alarmed by threats to intellectual freedom in Germany, Spain, and the Soviet 
Union, Kaempffert attempted to portray the effort as intrinsically unpolitical, and 
yet politically important in its effects:
The men who are making this encyclopedia have no desire to enter the political arena but 
every desire to influence intellectual leaders and to insure freedom of scientific inquiry 
everywhere. (Kaempffert 1938)
Several years later, we shall see, some of Kaempffert’s fellow opinion leaders would 
emphatically disagree with this view. To them, any such effort to organize and plan 
research was itself a threat to intellectual freedom and the advancement of 
knowledge.
14.2  Kaempffert and Kilgore Versus Bush and Conant
World War Two made the United States’ relationship to Marxism and the Soviet 
Union even more complicated and unstable than the political terrain Kaempffert 
navigated in the 1930s. Once the nation declared war on both Japan and Germany, 
Stalin and his Soviet Union became an ally in the nation’s crusade to defeat fascism 
and totalitarianism. Not least because Hitler’s campaign against the Soviets to his 
east weakened his grip on Western Europe and North Africa, and because it was the 
Soviets who finally captured Berlin and ended Hitler’s regime, even soon-to-be cold 
warriors like James Bryant Conant recognized America’s debt to the Soviets. As 
Conant (1970, 561) put it, “gratitude for the prowess of the armies which finally 
overwhelmed the Germans on the Eastern Front was mixed with fear of the ambi-
tions of the dwellers in the Kremlin.”
Beginning soon after the close of the war 1945, the fears Conant mentioned 
began to dominate and simplify U.S. and Soviet relations. By the McCarthy era of 
the early 1950s, these fears defined the national mood, the United States moved to 
the political right, and all things Soviet, Communistic, or totalitarian were seen as 
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powerful, sometimes immanent threats to the nation’s well being. Anticommunist 
politicians, administrators, and intellectuals thrived in this cold war climate, while 
American communists who did not reinvent themselves politically retreated into 
nervous silence or went “underground” to avoid capture and prosecution by J. Edgar 
Hoover’s FBI.
This transition was rapid but not instantaneous. Beginning in the mid 1940s, we 
can see in some detail how the nation’s move to the anticommunist right over-
whelmed and discredited the philosophical and scientific ideals that Kaempffert 
championed. This story begins during the war with debate over the nation’s ability 
to utilize its scientific and industrial resources for maximum military effectiveness. 
In Congress, West Virginia Senator Harley Kilgore called for a national, institu-
tional effort to organize war research and was quickly and powerfully supported by 
Kaempffert. As he saw it, the senator’s proposals would implement Neurath’s ideas 
about unifying the sciences at a national scale. In 1943, in the pages of the magazine 
The American Mercury, for example, Kaempffert defended Kilgore’s ideas in much 
the same terms that he used to present and defend Neurath’s encyclopedia in the 
New York Times. At present, he wrote,
[e]ach government agency, each industrial laboratory goes its own way. There is no overall 
direction and control. […] All this Senator Harley Kilgore of West Virginia would correct 
by two bills of his [that …] would marshal the country’s scientists and engineers in a vast 
research organization to solve the pressing war problems of the armed forces and industry. 
(Kaempffert 1943, 441.)
Echoing Neurath’s own complaints about “Bourgeois” science under which “it is 
left to chance” what different investigators study, Kaempffert criticized the popular 
laissez-faire approach to research. The problem is, he wrote, “[t]here is no system-
atic attack on fundamentals. Everything is left to chance – the chance that some able 
investigator will be stirred into action and that he will somehow manage to raise the 
money that he needs to make his inquiries” (Kaempffert 1943, 447).
In 1944, as the end of the war came into sight, President Roosevelt commis-
sioned Vannevar Bush to formulate a proposal for scientific research in the upcom-
ing postwar era. Bush was at that time in charge of the Office of Scientific Research 
and Development (OSRD) and working closely with Conant, J. Robert Oppenheimer, 
and others in the Manhattan Project to develop and test the atomic bomb. Roosevelt 
was not a philosopher of science and may not have known about Neurath’s Unity of 
Science Movement or the ambitions of the Bernalists. But by acknowledging in his 
letter to Bush the successful and “tangible results” of the OSRD’s “unique experi-
ment of teamwork and cooperation in coordinating scientific research,” he took for 
granted Kaempffert’s and Neurath’s view that research stood to gain by being coor-
dinated, organized, and planned. He also shared their hope that science be applied 
to reform and improve modern life. In particular, Roosevelt insisted that these enor-
mous strides in organized military research be somehow translated or adapted “for 
the improvement of national health, the creation of new enterprises bringing new 
jobs, and the betterment of the national standard of living.” “There is,” he wrote, “no 
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reason why the lessons found in this experiment cannot be profitably employed in 
times of peace.”5
Bush’s reply came in the form of his report, published in 1945 as Science, the 
Endless Frontier. Among Bush’s conclusions was that the United States “can no 
longer count on ravaged Europe as a source of fundamental knowledge” or basic, 
pure science. It must therefore begin to cultivate its own and it should do so through 
“the creation of a National Research Foundation” (Bush 1945, 22, 34). Yet Bush’s 
vision of how such a foundation would operate was rather different from Kilgore’s 
proposals. The main difference reflected the longstanding divide between science 
planners and their critics – a divide which had intensified in Europe during the war 
with the formation of the Society for Freedom in Science (SFS) by Michael Polanyi 
and colleagues. Directly opposing the views and clout of the Bernalists, the new 
society was formed in 1940 and premised on the convictions that “science can only 
flourish […] when research is conducted in an atmosphere of freedom” and “[s]
cientific life should be autonomous and not subject to outside control in the appoint-
ment of personnel or in the allocation of funds assigned by Society to Science.”6 In 
the United States, a similar reaction had been formulated by Abraham Flexner, 
founder of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey. In his essay, 
“The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge,” first published to a popular audience in 
Harpers Magazine the year before, Flexner (1939, 550) urged that even the thought 
of potential applications and uses in researchers’ minds would hamper and impair 
the forward march of research – just as it was then being impaired in the great uni-
versities in Europe, where “the freedom of the human spirit” was tragically sup-
pressed by politicians and administrators presuming to guide and control scientific 
research.7
Bush emphasized this categorical difference between applied and pure (or “fun-
damental”) science and repeatedly spoke of “freedom,” “complete freedom,” and 
“independence” from political or practical constraints as “essential” for scientific 
progress. Like Flexner, he insisted that this simple point was demonstrated by the 
history of science itself.8 He also echoed the SFS’s view that funds granted to 
researchers by governments cannot be used to guide research. It is of “utmost 
importance,” he wrote, that basic research funded in universities and research 
5 Roosevelt to Vannevar Bush, Nov. 17, 1944. The letter is reprinted in Bush (1945, 3–4).
6 Quoted in Shils (1947, 80–2). See also Nye (2011, 204–6).
7 Of Michael Faraday, Flexner (1939, 546) wrote, “[a]ny suspicion of utility would have restricted 
his restless creativity” – as if the mere thought of prototype electric motors or other applications 
would have harmed his research in magnetic forces and electric currents. For a historical survey of 
the pure-versus applied distinction at midcentury and the difficulty of maintaining it credibly, see 
Douglas (2014).
8 Bush (1945, 56) wrote, “[t]he entire history of science bears testimony to the supreme importance 
of affording the prepared mind complete freedom for the exercise of initiative.” Flexner (1939, 
545) had earlier written, “[…] throughout the whole history of science most of the really great 
discoveries which had ultimately proved to be beneficial to mankind had been made by men and 
women who were driven not by the desire to be useful but merely the desire to satisfy their 
curiosity.”
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 institutes “leave the internal control of policy, personnel, and the method and scope 
of research to the institutions themselves” (Bush 1945, 33). Given that some degree 
of control over research comes with the choice of which researchers and institutions 
get funded and which do not, Bush (1945, 33) added that these choices should be 
made not by the public or its representatives, but by an agency staffed by “persons 
of broad interest in and understanding of the peculiarities of scientific research and 
education.”
Kaempffert was unimpressed and disappointed with Bush’s report. It rubbed 
against his political sensibilities, for within Bush’s vision of publicly funded 
research there was no mechanism by which “Jack Smith in the fo’c’stle of a ship,” 
as Kaempffert had written eight years before, or other ordinary citizens would have 
much say in what research goals were pursued with public funds. Its insistent equa-
tion of scientific progress with freedom and independence denied his and Neurath’s 
methodological conviction that attempts to plan and guide research could be, and 
often were, scientifically fruitful. In response, he reviewed Science, The Endless 
Frontier and attacked the fundamental assumption on which Bush’s proposal 
depended: “The plain truth,” he wrote, “is that there is no difference between ‘pure’ 
and ‘applied’ science. Science is science, whether it is engaged in solving the prob-
lem of television or the constitution of matter” (Kaempffert 1945a). Success in pure 
science, even Nobel prizes, he pointed out, had come from industrial laboratories in 
Europe and in America, and despite the tragedy of Lysenkoism impressive achieve-
ments in Soviet medical research had been overseen by the Kremlin.
Most “astonishing” to Kaempffert was Bush’s failure to see his own leadership 
of the OSRD as plain evidence for the potential effectiveness of planned, organized 
research. Writing just weeks before the nation learned of the new atomic bomb after 
its use in Japan, Kaempffert pointed out that the OSRD was widely considered a 
spectacular success for its developments and improvements in medicine, logistics, 
and technologies like RADAR.  The OSRD, Kaempffert reminded the nation, 
“mapped out the whole field of military and medical science” and “sought out the 
best research scientists and laboratories and engaged them by contract to develop 
projects; in a word, it organized, it planned, it directed.” Yet instead of carrying 
forward the acquired organizational experience into the coming era of peacetime 
research, Bush’s report reverted to “a kind of laissez-faire system, much like that 
adopted by philanthropic foundations.” Instead of directing and commissioning 
research, the new foundation would merely “wait for ideas to be submitted” for 
potential funding (Kaempffert 1945a). In terms of the nautical metaphor he used to 
describe Neurath’s project, Bush knew very well how to organize a fleet of research-
ers to pay attention to each other and build on each others’ successes. But now he 
was suddenly and inexplicably an advocate of “the old method” and the laissez-faire 
approach to modern science.
Kaempffert recognized the geopolitical realities animating Bush’s recommenda-
tions. “All through the report,” he wrote, “runs the fear of Government dictation and 
interference.” Of course this was a real fear, as demonstrated by the state of genetics 
in Russia. “I hold no brief for the Marxist ideology which has permeated Russian 
science,” he wrote. “America wants no restriction of that kind of scientific thinking.” 
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But the fact remained that in other areas of science, “Russia has made astonishing 
progress” in spite of “the ideological limitations imposed on it” – a fact overlooked 
in Bush’s report. Despite its exaltation of the wondrous, “endless frontier” of sci-
ence, Kaempffert argued, Bush’s report ignored recent history and common sense to 
impose a methodological frontier on American science:
This country showed that it could mobilize science and plan research for war. There is no 
reason why it should not similarly mobilize and plan research for peace, without departing 
from democratic principles; no reason why it should not take over the best features of the 
Russian system and adapt them to its own needs, no reason why it should not first map out 
the whole field of science to reveal gaps in our knowledge and see to it that every science is 
developed rationally in every field. (Kaempffert 1945a)
While pointing readers to Bernal’s The Social Function of Science, Kaempffert 
(1945a) insisted that “[a]n all-embracing plan which embodies the best in Soviet 
and American systems need not be dictatorial.”
Kaempffert was not alone in his dismay. The day before his review appeared, the 
Times featured an unsigned editorial, titled “Research for Defense,” that made simi-
lar points with similar language. The New York Times itself, in other words, was 
taking Kaempffert’s side and calling for OSRD-style direction of research within 
any national institution created to facilitate publicly funded research (New York 
Times 1945a).
At this point, Conant, writing as Chairman of the National Defence Research 
Committee within the OSRD, stepped in to dispute Kaempffert’s and the paper’s 
position. In a letter to the editor, he too recognized the geopolitical dimensions of 
this debate. He conceded that were the United States poised to go “down the road of 
socialism” like Britain and to nationalize some or all of its industries, Kaempffert’s 
position would make sense. But the United States was not so poised, as Conant 
reminded Kaempffert by pointing to the recent elections of 1944 in which neither 
major party called for British-style reforms. In addition, Conant insisted that 
Kaempffert misunderstood the OSRD and how it operated. Yes, administrators set 
goals for researchers to meet; but if those goals were met it was precisely because 
researchers had “the maximum of autonomy” and “the minimum of centralized con-
trol” from OSRD. Following Bush, that is, Conant invoked a substantive distinction 
between pure and applied research in order to sequester and isolate science from 
threats of dictatorial control. “Almost by definition,” he wrote, advances in pure sci-
ence consist not in getting closer to specified goals but in being surprised and intel-
lectually sparked by something unexpected and inexplicable. The story of penicillin’s 
discovery, he remarked, should be studied by “all who are interested in this subject” 
for it underscores the serendipity and unpredictability of basic research and the 
intellectual freedom it requires:
There is only one proved method of assisting the advancement of pure science – that of 
picking men of genius, backing them heavily and leaving them to direct themselves. There 
is only one proved method of getting results in applied science – picking men of genius, 
backing them heavily, and keeping their aim on the target chosen. (Conant 1945)
“A reply to Dr. Conant’s interesting letter will be published in a later issue,” the edi-
tors wrote after Conant signed off.
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Kaempffert girded for battle and replied a week later, more or less insisting that 
Conant’s letter did not make sense. His effort to portray OSRD-style research as 
somehow supporting, instead of problematizing, a robust distinction between pure 
and applied science “is lost on us,” he wrote. As counterpoint to Conant’s case study 
involving penicillin, he pointed to the discovery of radioactivity and its impact on 
atomic theory to illustrate how pure and applied research are usually joined together 
as they push knowledge forward: “Technology leads as naturally to fundamentals as 
fundamentals lead to technology” (Kaempffert 1945b). Whether or not they did so 
intentionally, Kaempffert and his fellow editors pushed back against Conant’s tenu-
ous arguments again two months later as they congratulated Alexander Fleming, 
Howard Florey, and Ernst Chain for the Nobel Prize the discovery had brought 
them. They editorialized,
[w]e have here another example of what research can do when it is organized, planned, and 
competently directed. A group of bacteriologists, [and] physiologists, biochemists working 
as a team scored a triumph in months instead of the usual years. (New York Times 1945b)
14.3  The Kilgore Bill
By the fall of 1945, two bills in Congress competed to create the new national foun-
dation for scientific research that Bush had proposed. Kilgore’s proposals for war-
time research had evolved into what was known as the Kilgore Bill, while the 
Magnuson bill, sponsored by the Washington State senator Warren Magnuson, 
offered a different vision of postwar science. Among the controversial differences 
were the status and ownership of patents coming from publicly funded research, the 
place of social sciences in the new foundation and, most importantly, how much 
power the officers would have to approve or commission projects and thus guide 
research in various directions. Also at issue were rules establishing whether officers 
commissioned would represent public or private, corporate interests. The Magnuson 
bill called for a board of nine leaders from science and industry, one of whom they 
would elect to be the director. The Kilgore bill, on the other hand, called for a single 
director who would actively direct research and remain more closely accountable to 
the public through its elected leaders. In Kaempffert’s terms, the Magnuson Bill was 
largely committed to a laissez-faire research sensitive to the needs of private indus-
try and corporations, while the Kilgore bill aimed to organize and plan research for 
the public good and to emphasize democratic control of publicly funded research.
President Truman himself tilted in Kaempffert’s and Kilgore’s direction. In a 
message to the nation in September, he agreed that the OSRD and the Manhattan 
Project had demonstrated the viability of planned research and he questioned the 
practicality of adhering to a strict distinction between pure and applied science. The 
future of science in America, that is, should not be hampered by a hands-off, wait- 
and- see approach that exalted the unpredictability and depended on “brilliant 
 inspiration or sudden flights of genius” to move science and technology ahead. The 
nation instead required a powerful institution to “coordinate and control diverse 
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scientific activities now conducted by the several departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government” (New York Times 1945c). A month later, one of Truman’s 
officers reportedly sent a note to both Senators Kilgore and Magnuson expressing 
the president’s support for a “straightline administration” (New York Times 1945d) 
of the new institution, consisting of a single administrator and advisory board, both 
appointed by the president.
With this, Bush, Conant, and about forty other leaders of foundations, busi-
nesses, and universities sprang into action. They formed an official public-relations 
committee, called The Committee Supporting the Bush Report, and wrote an open 
letter to President Truman on behalf of “the great majority of American scientists” 
(New York Times 1945e). While they agreed that the board of the new organization 
could be “composed of laymen and scientists,” they insisted that the President 
appoint them “without reference to political affiliation” and that scientists have a 
say in those appointments. Most importantly, they argued,
it would be most unwise to subordinate the board to a single director appointed by the 
President, as is done in the Kilgore bill. No single person, however eminent or competent, 
could, except in a great emergency, command the confidence and support of all branches of 
science and of the many organizations and agencies, private and public, whose cooperation 
will be required. (New York Times 1945e)
Perhaps because Truman seemed sympathetic with the view that methods of war-
time science involving cooperation among “all branches of science” could be fruit-
ful in times of peace, the new committee’s argument quietly shifted gears. It 
conceded that “all branches of science” could be organized and directed to cooper-
ate fruitfully – but that is only in times of “great emergency” such as the recently 
concluded world war. The task at hand was to conduct science freely and without 
any taint of Soviet, authoritarian methods and values. Postwar science must involve 
“a high degree of institutional and individual freedom and responsibility,” the 
Committee insisted. Similarly, the board of the new foundation may appoint from 
within its ranks “a chief administrative officer,” but that officer “should not be in a 
position to dictate or interfere” with the board’s activities. “He should be the agent – 
not the master – of the board.” Nor must the board itself “be empowered to control 
or coordinate other Government scientific agencies” (New York Times 1945e).
The committee’s position was framed within the specter of dictatorial control 
that Kaempffert had been trying to dispel for almost a decade as misleading and 
irrelevant to the future prospects available. In his coverage of Neurath’s new ency-
clopedia, his advocacy of Kilgore’s earlier proposals for wartime research, and his 
grappling with Bush and Conant over the methods of postwar science, he tried to 
disconnect the idea of planned, organized research from political fears of dictators 
and thugs. But he did not succeed. Congress eventually passed in 1950 the National 
Science Foundation Act which embodied much more of the Magnuson-Bill propos-
als than those of Kilgore and Kaempffert. Today’s the NSF remains mainly a grant- 
giving foundation that funds but does not commission, guide, or organize research 
as Kaempffert and others once hoped it would. Its long and controversial creation, 
only partially illustrated by these debates in 1945, allowed other government agen-
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cies, like the National Institute of Health, the Atomic Energy Commission, and 
NASA, to grow and lay claim to specific areas and kinds of research. The compre-
hensive, unified approach to research that Neurath and Kaempffert advocated would 
never be realized within the United States government.
14.4  The Planning Debates and the Postwar Unity of Science 
Movement
Kaempffert’s smart and determined advocacy of Neurath’s project reminds us that 
the original promise of logical empiricism was not only intellectual but also practi-
cal and inescapably political. Advocates for and against planning agreed that mod-
ern science, as well as studies of its history and philosophical foundations, was 
inevitably connected to the cultural, intellectual, and economic struggles at hand. 
Like Clausewitz’s understanding of war, debates over the nature of science, its roles 
in society, and its modes of progress were politics by other means.
The member of Bush and Conant’s committee that most aggressively blended 
anticommunist politics and philosophy of science was Warren Weaver, Director of 
Natural Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation. Perhaps stung by Kaempffert’s 
view of Bush’s proposed foundation as merely “a glorified Rockefeller Foundation” 
(Kaempffert 1945a) whose effectiveness would pale next to OSRD-style manage-
ment, Weaver personally sustained the committee’s attack on Kaempffert and the 
New York Times. In a letter to the editor in September 1945, Weaver angrily 
denounced Kaempffert and the New York Times for recommending that,
all science should be mapped out and the gaps discovered, and that an all-high, all- 
embracing central organization, presumably set up by the Federal Government, should plan 
and direct scientific activities. (Weaver 1945)
Comparing the fruits of science to the dividends a corporation might pay to its 
shareholders, Weaver (1945) wrote: “The earnings of science are not to be gained by 
organizing a super-control which holds guns at the heads of scientists and tells them 
what to do. The earnings of science are gained only by setting the scientists free.” 
“For the nth time,” Kaempffert (1945c) wrote in frustration as he responded a week 
later, “we insist that no scientist would be compelled to join the organization and no 
director would tell anyone how to proceed in solving a problem.”
Weaver’s participation in this debate documents another link to Neurath’s Unity 
of Science Movement. Somewhat ironically, Weaver himself was something of a 
“super control” behind the Unity of Science Movement because his Rockefeller 
Foundation first supported Philipp Frank and the Institute for the Unity of Science 
that he and others created after the war in Boston. Initially, at least, Weaver and his 
colleagues happily supported Frank because he was an intellectual refugee (Frank 
was touring the United States in 1938 when Hitler annexed Czechoslovakia, where 
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Frank had lived).9 But Frank’s relationships to Weaver and his underling officers 
deteriorated and fulfilled Weaver’s initial doubts about whether Frank, then in his 
sixties, was capable of building and growing the Unity of Science Movement.10 This 
was one reason why Frank was informed in 1952 that his second three-year grant 
would be his last. A Foundation report on this grant states that “longer and larger 
support […] would be amply justified” were Frank and others “surely passed their 
prime” to recruit younger intellectual talent into their movement.11
14.5  Philipp Frank, Thomas Kuhn, and the Sociology 
of Science
Whether or not it was because of these sentiments within the Rockefeller Foundation, 
at the end of 1952 Frank reached out to a young Thomas Kuhn, then about 30 years 
old. Though Frank and Kuhn would surely have crossed paths as instructors within 
Conant’s General Education program at Harvard, Frank wrote a letter to Kuhn in 
which he invited him to join a new committee within his Institute. It would include 
Frank, Robert Merton, Ernest Nagel, and Kuhn himself and would promote research 
in the sociology of science by providing small grants to researchers. The theoretical 
interests Frank expressed in his correspondence concerned the complicated rela-
tionships among epistemological, methodological, and social aspects of science and, 
in particular, cases of underdetermination when social interests or values can enter 
into scientific reasoning. As he put it in the précis he sent Kuhn, this project would 
aim to identify and understand “the role which sociological factors have played in 
the acceptance of scientific laws and theories.”12 Kuhn eagerly responded to Frank’s 
9 Frank and other logical empiricists, one internal report on the Unity of Science Movement points 
out, were refugees from “the stifling atmosphere of totalitarianism” (“Toward Integration of the 
Sciences,” hand-dated March 1949, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, NY, hereafter RAC.). 
For more on Frank and the foundation of the Institute, see Reisch (2005). For more on Frank’s exile 
and his relationships to James Bryant Conant, see Reisch (2017) and the other essays in Tuboly 
(2017) prepared for the 50th anniversary of Frank’s death.
10 As early as 1946, before Frank’s Institute received funding from the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Weaver noted private concern after talking to Frank that the movement “may be developing in to 
too much of a personal venture on the part of F[rank]” (“Interview: WW, Friday Dec. 13 1946,” 
RAC). By 1951, Rockefeller documents frequently express reservations about “old-timers in the 
Unity of Science Program” who are “repeating themselves” (Letter to Weaver, Dec. 9, 1951, RAC), 
Frank’s organizational skills (Memo from C[hadbourne] [G]ilpatric, Nov. 5, 1951, RAC), and 
Frank’s conviction (as Weaver put it) that “it is politically important to support activities which 
emphasize empirical and pragmatic philosophies, since Fascism and Communism depend essen-
tially on metaphysical doctrines” – an argument Weaver found “very tenuous and unconvincing” 
(“WW’s Diary, Thursday Sept. 27, 1951,” RAC).
11 Trustee Report, Jan 18, 1952, RAC.
12 A copy of this document and Kuhn’s reply remains in Kuhn’s archival papers at MIT (hereafter, 
TSK-MIT), box 25, folder 53.
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offer and, in a letter remaining in his archival papers, jumped right into theoretical 
debate about what, exactly, the new committee should take “sociology of science” 
to mean.
In a subsequent report to Weaver’s Foundation, Frank mentioned this new com-
mittee and this collaboration with Kuhn (as well as the sociologist Bernard Barber, 
whom Frank evidently also invited to join). But it does not appear that the commit-
tee bore much scholarly fruit. Research done under it was largely parochial to 
Frank’s particular interests. In his final report, Frank noted that the sociology proj-
ect would henceforth be supported by the new NSF, that the six papers “will be 
published together with other results of the research supported by the National 
Science Foundation.”13 Though the NSF did begin to support research in social sci-
ence and related fields (including history and philosophy of science) in the mid-to 
late 1950s, the committee’s work and the research it supported was not published. 
Frank’s own career was nearing its end and there is little evidence that his interests 
in the mutual effects of science, philosophy, and politics gained traction in history, 
philosophy, or sociology of science.14
Kuhn’s collaboration with Frank suggests that he did not share Frank’s political 
interests in this project. His reply to Frank’s offer reads “not sent” in the top margin, 
written in Kuhn’s hand. The notation may simply mean that Kuhn discussed the 
issues with Frank in person, or that he sent a different letter in reply. But against the 
backdrop of the planning debates, there is programmatic significance in Kuhn’s 
effort to convince Frank that the future of research in the sociology of science lay in 
a different direction. The sociological dynamics that matter, Kuhn said, operate 
strictly inside scientific communities and are largely screened off from culture and 
popular politics – from matters of “religion, social status, economic organization.” 
For this reason, Kuhn wrote,
[i]t would seem to me more fruitful to examine the ubiquitous role of the sociology of the 
professional group than to concentrate solely on those factors (like government, church, 
etc.) which at this time and place have relatively little impact upon decisions made by pro-
fessional scientists about problems arising within their sciences. (Unsent letter from Kuhn 
to Frank, TSK-MIT, box 25, folder 53)
Though Kuhn (1962/2012) had yet to formulate his conceptions of scientific com-
munities, normal scientists, and paradigms, he was inclined to acknowledge only 
the internal sociology of professional communities as properly within the scope of 
sociological study.
13 “Report of the Institute for the Unity of Science to the Rockefeller Foundation for the Period of 
July 1952-1953,” RAC. Frank’s final report to the Rockefeller foundation lists seven “research 
assistants” who wrote six papers under the guidance or support of the committee (Anatol Rapoport, 
Jeremy Bernstein, Ernst Topitsch, Benoit Hepner, John Wilkinson and William H. Meyer, and 
Lewis Feuer). The majority of subjects of research listed represent Frank’s theoretical interests, 
including criteria for acceptance and rejection of theories (Rapoport) and philosophical interpreta-
tions of general relativity (Bernstein, Topitsch, Hepner).
14 There is positive evidence, on the other hand, that Frank’s research project was viewed with suf-
ficient disdain to be attacked as intellectually irresponsible in the pages of Philosophy of Science 
(Kegley 1959). On the relation of sociological studies of science and logical empiricism see Uebel 
(2000), with particular reference to Frank, see Reisch (2005, Chap. 11.).
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Kuhn was aware of the political controversies surrounding planning as well as 
his mentor Conant’s debate with Kaempffert and the formation of the NSF. If he had 
not followed this dispute in the New York Times in 1945, it was brought to his atten-
tion two years later when he first joined Conant’s General Education program to 
teach history of science and read Conant’s book On Understanding Science (Conant 
1947). In this book Conant outlined a general education course that complemented 
Bush’s report, specifically his call for research policy and the allocation of funds to 
be made by “persons of broad interest in and understanding of the peculiarities of 
scientific research.” Graduates of Conant’s new General Education program – future 
leaders in politics, business, and government administration – would gain just such 
a detailed, but nonspecialized understanding of science by working through histori-
cal case studies in science. Though he remained convinced that science could not 
fruitfully be planned, that accidents and acts of individual, unpredictable genius 
were essential to scientific progress, Conant acknowledged complex relationships 
between science and society, that “science is indeed a social process.” Later in the 
book, he noted the “storm signals of present controversy” that surround the pure 
versus applied distinction and prospects for organizing and directing research for 
progressive social ends. In a detailed endnote, Conant directed interested readers to 
texts by Hessen, Crowther, Bernal and others (Conant 1947, 64, 107, n. 43).
The most vivid evidence that Kuhn was aware of and concerned about these 
“storm signals” comes from his preparations to deliver the prestigious Lowell 
Lectures at Boston’s Public Library in early 1951, a year and a half before Kuhn 
articulated to Frank his conception of sociology of science. Upon seeing an adver-
tisement for his upcoming lectures in the newspaper The Boston Globe, Kuhn 
immediately telephoned his contacts at the Institute and later followed up with let-
ters that reveal his “acute distress,” as he put it, over being presented to the public as 
an expert authority on contemporary research.
What he saw was an advertisement (Fig. 14.4.) which read:
What are the Problems of Scientific Research Today?
under which appeared the particulars about his upcoming lectures. The Institute 
evidently agreed to cease publishing the ad, but a day or two later Kuhn became 
incensed again upon discovering a paper flyer distributed around Boston. It read, in 
part,
In a world in which science’s quest for physical theory has already had results that promise 
to change the course of history, the fate of mankind may depend upon solving the problems 
of research […].
The final, ominous ellipses were intended to intrigue readers, to bring more 
Bostonians than usual to the public library. But it appeared to Kuhn that the public-
ity was dangerous, irresponsible, and perilous for his future career. On the eve of his 
debut as a public intellectual, he evidently saw himself presented as an advocate of 
scientific planning. The tagline “What are the problems of scientific research 
today?” echoed Kaempffert’s advocacy of Senator Kilgore’s wartime plans for “sci-
entists and engineers in a vast research organization to solve the pressing war 
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problems of the armed forces and industry” (Kaempffert 1943; emphasis added). It 
invited the public to believe that Kuhn was a scientific planner who knew  – or, 
worse, falsely presumed to know – how today’s scientists could change the course 
of history and save mankind.
Kuhn had earlier provided Ralph Lowell with a title for his lectures, “The Quest 
for Physical Theory – Problems in the Methodology of Scientific Research.” The 
problem with the Institute’s tagline evidently was its failure to include “methodol-
ogy.” Without this word, Kuhn seemed to fear, his stated interest in methodological 
problems could be seen as interest in scientific problems thought to bear on contem-
porary issues in science and society. “It may help you to understand my dismay,” he 
wrote, “if I explain that the fascinating topic your copy writer has so clearly stated 
is one to which I believe no serious and responsible student of science would address 
himself.”15 A month before, describing his current research to one of his Deans, 
Kuhn had said the same thing: methodological study can help us understand the 
15 Kuhn to Lowell, Feb. 20, 1951. TSK-MIT, box 3 folder 10.
Fig. 14.4 Advertisement 
in the Boston Globe for 
Thomas Kuhn’s Lowell 
Lectures (clipping from 
Kuhn’s papers, TSK-MIT, 
box 3, folder 10)
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nature of science – but, he emphasized, it “cannot ever venture to prescribe fruitful 
research procedures to the working scientist.”16
Though Structure first appeared as a monograph within Neurath’s encyclopedia, 
it has for decades been read as a kind of theoretical Trojan Horse designed to dis-
credit logical empiricism along with Whig or presentistic bias in historiography of 
science. It should also be understood, however, in light of Kuhn’s personal and 
practical reaction to these contentious cold war debates over scientific planning. In 
a number of ways, his theoretical arguments bleed into these political debates and 
come down squarely against the leftist, Marxist tradition in science studies that 
inspired Neurath, Kaempffert, Frank and the larger Unity of Science Movement. 
Structure’s critique of formalism, for example, marshals psychology, sociology, and 
semantics to deny the possibility of a neutral, universal language of scientific obser-
vations. In terms of Neurath’s and Kaempffert’s conception of unified science, the 
unavailability of any universal language of science implies that unified scientists 
cannot productively survey knowledge as a whole in order to identify the “gaps” to 
be filled, to build “bridges” from science to science, and thus create Kaempffert’s 
powerful scientific fleet. Against Frank’s interests in sociology of science, for a 
second example, Structure’s view of scientific communities dominated by their dis-
tinctive internal sociologies of knowledge denies that scientific knowledge or rea-
soning is related in important and specifiable ways to social or political realities 
outside those communities.
Structure also opposes the foundational methodological premise behind 
Neurath’s Unity of Science Movement: its claim that science suffers from excessive 
specialization. According to flyers distributed by the University of Chicago Press in 
the late 1930s, the new encyclopedia would be primarily “concerned with the scien-
tific enterprise as a whole.” This synoptic view was offered as an “indispensable 
corrective of the extreme specialization of scientific research.” “It is an urgent task 
of science,” one flyer continued,
to work out the synthesis of its results and methods. Otherwise, science will not have car-
ried to the limit the fulfillment of its own task as science, nor will it perform adequately its 
educational role in the modern world. Science is gradually rousing itself for the perfor-
mance of its total task. (University of Chicago Press Papers, University of Chicago Library, 
box 347, folder 2.)
As his distress over the Lowell Institute’s publicity suggests, Kuhn was uncomfort-
able being cast in this or any similar role that told scientists what to do or how they 
should do it. But Kuhn did more than reject this role; he theorized why it was unseri-
ous and irresponsible to accept it. In the first of his lectures, he mentioned the 
Institute’s publicity took care to set the record straight with his audience. “If any of 
you happens to have followed closely the advance notices of this series of lectures,” 
his prepared lectures read,
16 Kuhn to Owen, Jan. 6, 1951, TSK-MIT, box 3 folder 10.
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you may have remarked that the topic just described bears very little relation to the one 
announced in some of the flyers prepared by the Lowell Institute’s copy writer. That topic 
was, I believe, described under a banner head reading: “What are the Problems of Scientific 
Research Today?
“I can scarcely imagine a more fascinating question; I should gladly attend a series 
of lectures devoted to it,” Kuhn continued. “Except,” he emphasized,
that I doubt whether any serious student of science or scientific method would consider 
himself equipped to address such a subject. Therefore with apologies for any confusion that 
the misrepresentation may have created, I should like to announce that I do not intend to 
deal with any of the problems raised by that question at any point in this series of lectures. 
(Kuhn, “Introduction: Textbook Science and Creative Science.” Surviving drafts of Kuhn’s 
Lowell Lectures are at TSK-MIT, box 3, folders 10–11.)
This is because, Kuhn explained, the study of methodology can only bear fruit when 
directed at practices and beliefs superseded and rendered obsolete or antique. If we 
seek to understand where theories and “finished conceptual schemes” come from, 
he explained, this
is peculiarly hard to achieve in dealing with the science in which we happen to believe. For 
the theory in which we believe is necessarily and uniquely characterized by the apparent 
inevitability of its relation to the facts from which it arose. Our belief itself represents a 
commitment to the double position that only this theory will account for the facts which we 
know and that this theory will account for all the relevant facts. We may admit that in the 
future there will be other facts and other theories, but for the moment we cannot conceive 
these, so the appearance of the inevitable connection remains. (Kuhn, “Introduction: 
Textbook Science and Creative Science.” TSK-MIT, box 3, folders 10–11., pp. 7, 8–9.)
Science cannot be planned, that is, because the mechanisms of scientific progress 
(such as the dynamics of paradigms Kuhn would later articulate in Structure) are 
obscured by contemporary beliefs that scientific knowledge is true and complete 
(“that only this theory will account for the fact which we know and that this theory 
will account for all the relevant facts”). They are available for inspection and analy-
sis only by future historians or methodologist who are not so blinded by their epis-
temological and methodological commitments.17
17 Not only Kuhn’s focus on science of the past, but a tacitly invoked pure-versus-applied distinc-
tion additionally isolated his Lowell Lectures from debates about science’s proper or potential 
roles in modern life: “We shall be concerned with the sort of research that led to the Newtonian 
laws of motion, not with the manner in which these laws were applied in building new machines 
or instruments. We shall be concerned with the work of such men as Boyle and Dalton, in so far as 
this led to a new understanding and a new set of laws governing the formation of chemical com-
pounds, but we shall not be concerned with the manner in which these laws, once arrived at and 
confirmed, were applied to the production of dyes, explosives, or plastics” (Kuhn, “Introduction: 
Textbook Science and Creative Science,” op. cit., p. 7).
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14.6  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and the Postwar 
Future of Science Studies
By the time that Structure was published in 1962, Kuhn had reformulated his theo-
retical language and refined his theory of how science works. But his new language 
of paradigms, normal science, crisis, and revolution made clear (arguably clearer 
than his Lowell Lectures, which remain unpublished) his understanding of why the 
Unity of Science Movement’s aspirations were not only utopian but fundamentally 
mistaken. The real engine of scientific progress, Structure argued, is not unification, 
synthesis, and the overcoming of specialization; it is specialization itself and the 
impulse to push any paradigm to its epistemological limits.
On this point, Structure stands with Bush’s, Conant’s, Flexner’s and Weaver’s 
shared contention that progress depends essentially on the freedom of scientists to 
conduct research independently, by their own lights, and without external constraint. 
Importantly, this is not because scientists themselves are the only effective and legit-
imate planners of science’s future. As he implied in his Lowell Lectures, Kuhn 
believed that no living persons – not even scientists themselves – are equipped to 
plan the future of science. Instead, scientists are equipped and trained only to solve 
the problems their paradigmatic tradition bequeaths to them. But this modest func-
tion is vitally important for the advancement of science, for scientists in their com-
munities are uniquely positioned to notice and recognize when these puzzles 
become recalcitrant and something may be fundamentally wrong with the current 
paradigm. As he put it in his essay “The Function of Dogma in Scientific Research,” 
the dogmatic determination of scientists to solve all of the puzzles their paradigm 
offers renders the scientific community “an immensely sensitive detector of the 
trouble spots” that may spark future revolutions (Kuhn 1963, 349). As he put it in 
Structure, this mental “rigidity” of scientists “provides the community with a sensi-
tive indicator that something has gone wrong” with the paradigm in question (Kuhn 
1962/2012, 165). So it is, according to Structure, that while future scientific change 
is real and inevitable, no one can reliably predict in advance, much less plan or leg-
islate, what future paradigms will be like. Modern science is essentially 
unplannable.
As this feature of Kuhn’s Structure-era theorizing may suggest, Kuhn did not 
share all of the libertarian politics of science defended by Conant, Bush, Weaver and 
others during the planning debates. While they believed productive and creative 
scientists and their innovations were among the West’s most convincing proof of the 
geopolitical superiority of liberal democracy over eastern totalitarianism, Kuhn saw 
professional scientists in a very different light as dogmatic, narrowly trained, and 
not in fact creative, open minded, and intellectually adventurous. As he explained in 
his chapter “The Invisibility of Revolutions,” most scientists are not even aware of 
the revolutionary dynamics by which their beliefs and commitments became estab-
lished and accepted. As some scholars would later notice, by recognizing only a 
single, commanding paradigm at the heart of any scientific community, Structure 
seemed to take leave of Bush, Weaver, and Conant and to accept and recommend 
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centralized forms of epistemic organization.18 But Kuhn agreed nonetheless with 
these cold warriors that the Unity of Science Movement and all attempts to plan and 
guide the future of science had little credibility and therefore deserved little pro-
grammatic support within the academic study of science.
Acknowledgement I thank Günther Sandner for pointing out Modley’s importance to me, as well 
as spirited commentary from others at the conference ‘The Socio-Ethical Dimension of Knowledge: 
The Mission of Logical Empiricism,’ Budapest, December 2017.
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Chapter 15
Of Tennis Courts and Fireplaces: 
Neurath’s Internment on the Isle of Man 
and his Politics of Design
Michelle Henning
Abstract Otto Neurath’s version of functionalism is one that begins with people 
“as we find them,” a proposition first set out in his 1917 essay “The Converse Taylor 
System.” Any attempt to redesign the existing furnishings of everyday life must take 
into account “functions” that go beyond the obvious purpose of objects: functions 
that are to do with sociability, happiness, familiarity, the love of “coziness,” and that 
address the diversity and contradictoriness of people. This essay considers how 
Neurath applied and made use of these ideas about design in 1940s Britain, during 
and after his internment on the Isle of Man between 1940–1941 and in talks, papers 
and correspondence from this period. It does not focus on the Isotype Institute, 
which would usually be considered his principal intervention in design, but on his 
commentary on everyday objects and practices. In particular it centres on four 
items – tennis courts, fireplaces, chairs and shoes – and through these elaborates 
some of the connections between Neurath’s ideas about the design of everyday life, 
and the significance of everyday practices, and his logical empiricism.
15.1  Introduction1
During the early 1920s, as part of his work in the Österreichischer Verband für 
Siedlungs- und Kleingartenwesen (Settlement and Allotment Garden Association), 
and then through his work in the Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftsmuseum (Social and 
1 This essay is partly based in AHRC-funded archival research in Otto Neurath’s correspondence 
and papers during 2007–2009, and later research at the Manx Museum in Douglas, a visit to the site 
of the Onchan internment camp and discussion with friends and relatives of internees in nearby 
camps, as well as secondary reading. I am grateful to the AHRC, Eric Kindel at the Otto and Marie 
Neurath Isotype Collection (Department of  Typography and  Graphic Design, University 
of Reading), to Ádam Tuboly and Jordi Cat, and to Sabrina Rahman for all their help. This essay 
began life as  a  paper at Politics, Democratic Education and  Empowerment: The  Case of  Otto 
M. Henning (*) 
London School of Film, Media and Design, University of West London, London, UK
e-mail: Michelle.Henning@uwl.ac.uk
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Economic Museum) in Vienna, Otto Neurath had developed strong views about 
design as it pertained to everyday life. His views regarding functionalism in design, 
and regarding the social importance of design, were strongly influenced by his close 
friend, the architect and textile designer Josef Frank. With Frank, he oversaw the 
development of the innovative housing estate, the Werkbundsiedlung, which opened 
on the outskirts of Vienna in 1932 (Rahman 2014, 22; Sophie Hochhäusl in the pres-
ent volume).
Frank’s practice stood in stark contrast to the functionalist aesthetic of the neue 
Sachlichkeit and the Bauhaus. His houses built for the 1927 German Werkbund 
exhibition (“Die Wohnung”) in Stuttgart, had been criticised on the grounds that his 
work was too decorative: critics described the interiors as “femininely appointed,” 
filled with “frippery,” like a “bordello” (cited in Long 2002, 108; Galison 1990, 
723). Frank responded by arguing that an empty and affected “functionalism” did 
not address psychological needs for comfort, coziness, and liveability. He also 
argued that the fashion for bare furnishings was more oriented toward intellectuals 
than to the working classes: “The demand for bareness is made particularly by those 
who think continuously, or at least need to be able to do so, and who can obtain 
comfort and rest by other means” (cited in Blau 1999, 196; Frank 1927).
In his own work, Neurath recognized the importance of everyday household 
objects and architecture in making possible certain ways of living, allowing a toler-
able and viable way of life. However, like his friend, he was a strong critic of the 
ideas of shaping a way of life that were held by some modernist designers (of the 
neue Sachlichkeit and the Bauhaus) and the concepts of function and causality these 
implied. Together with Frank, he took the view that functionalism in design was 
actually a specific aesthetic style, and that there was no such thing as a true or com-
plete functionalism, since that would require knowing in advance the full range of 
uses to which a designed object might be put.
Neurath’s version of functionalism is one that begins with people “as we find 
them,” a proposition first set out in his essay “The Converse Taylor System” 
(1917/1973). Any attempt to redesign the existing furnishings of everyday life must 
take into account “functions” that go beyond the obvious purpose of objects: func-
tions that are to do with sociability, happiness, familiarity, the love of “coziness,” 
and that address the diversity and contradictoriness of people. This essay considers 
how Neurath applied and made use of these ideas about design in 1940s Britain, 
during and after his internment on the Isle of Man between 1940–1941 and in talks, 
papers and correspondence from this period. It does not focus on the Isotype 
Institute, which would usually be considered his principal intervention in design, 
but on his commentary on everyday objects and practices. In particular I shall focus 
on four items – tennis courts, fireplaces, chairs and shoes – and through these elabo-
rate some of the connections between Neurath’s ideas about the design of everyday 
life and the significance of everyday practices, and his logical empiricism.
Neurath (1992–1945) Universität Wien/Institute Vienna Circle Symposium, 28 May 2015, 
and I am grateful to Günther Sandner, Chris Burke, Elisabeth Nemeth, Friedrich Stadler as well 
as the other participants in the symposium.
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15.2  Internment and the Tennis Court
Details of Otto Neurath and Marie Reidemeister’s arrival in Britain and their intern-
ment on the Isle of Man are given in Ádám Tamás Tuboly’s chapter in this volume, 
“United by Action: Neurath in England.” Here, I will give additional background to 
contextualize my discussion of how Neurath’s ideas about design and everyday life 
both shaped and were shaped by his experience of internment. This background will 
help to elucidate a lecture given by Neurath while he was interned.
The Isle of Man is not part of the United Kingdom but is classed as a “self- 
governing British Crown dependency.” One of its principal trades in the 1930s was 
tourism. In 1939–40, the holiday trade on the Isle of Man was severely affected by 
the War, and the Manx Chamber of Trade suggested the island be a site for Internment 
camps as it was in World War One. These previous camps had held civilians who 
were mostly German nationals living in Britain. However, this time, the home sec-
retary decided not to build camps in the countryside but to requisition the large, 
terraced Victorian boarding houses, which were central to the bed and breakfast 
trade on the island. The decision did not please the Manx landladies, who had to 
vacate their houses very quickly at the end of May 1940. But it was designed to 
placate the press and the public, coinciding with a growing media panic about spies 
and “fifth columnists.” World War Two internment on the Isle of Man began in late 
1939.
When Neurath and Marie arrived in England on 15th May 1940, the numbers of 
refugees arriving from Europe each day was increasing. The internment program 
expanded to take in men and women who had lived in Britain for years, together 
with the newly arrived refugees from Europe, most of whom were Jewish. Neurath, 
who at 57 was one of the oldest internees (the cut-off age was 60), was held in 
Onchan camp, in the north of Douglas bay on the Isle of Man, one of around 1200–
1300 German-speaking men. The camp was made up of four streets in Onchan, 
surrounded by double fences of barbed wire, and consisted of around 56 to 60 large 
furnished houses, many with nine bedrooms or more. With two or three men to a 
bedroom, Onchan camp was still less overcrowded than other camps on the island.
The internment program was indiscriminate and conditions uncomfortable. In 
the beginning, Nazi sympathizers were sometimes housed with Jews. Some would 
have arrived without full identification papers, and could be using false names. This 
made it very difficult to know who to trust among the other prisoners. Neurath, to 
my knowledge, did not commit much description of the camp to writing, but from 
other refugee accounts, we know that the emotional impact of internment was very 
varied. For some prisoners, particularly those who had already experienced the Nazi 
concentration camps, it was traumatic. For Jews and known opponents of Nazism 
there was another danger: in 1940, no-one could know the outcome of the war, and 
the internees had no access to news and communications, but they realized that 
should Germany take Britain, they would have no escape. Some felt that they were 
effectively “sitting ducks.” Moreover, winter was brutally cold on the Isle of Man, 
with only Victorian fireplaces for heating.
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Nevertheless, in his history of the Isle of Man internment camps in World War 
Two, Island of Barbed Wire, Connery Chappell (1984, 40) suggests that the size of 
the houses, the beautiful sea views from the headland and the presence of football 
pitches and tennis courts meant that “Onchan Camp could reasonably have been 
regarded as the ‘best’ male internment camp on the island.” Local residents gener-
ally had no contact with the interned men but would see them accompanied by sol-
diers, going down to the sea, to go swimming. The camp included recreation 
facilities because a social club was a part of the requisitioned area.2 At first there 
was a ban on communications but radios were allowed after a while and the men 
produced their own newspaper – The Onchan Pioneer. A Popular University was 
founded and between May 1940 and February 1941, 496 lectures were held.
According to The Onchan Pioneer it was Neurath’s lecture, given in January 
1941, that held the record of the highest attendance for an indoor lecture. 250 men 
came to hear him give a talk cryptically titled (according to the Pioneer), “How do 
you make the tennis court so durable?”. This title can be read very literally as mean-
ing “Why is the tennis court hard?”. That is, why have a tarmacked tennis court 
(such as the one in Onchan camp) rather than a grass court? However, Neurath’s 
equally cryptic notes for this paper are in the Otto Neurath Nachlass, with the title 
“Wie Machen Sie’s nur dass der Tennis-Rasen so Dauerhaft ist,” perhaps better 
translated as “How Does the Tennis Court Endure?”3 The notes are in German and 
it is likely that the lecture was given in German, but unfortunately they do not give 
a clear sense of the full content, since they are little more than a list of prompts. 
Neurath subtitled it “A social-critical reflection,” and we can see in the list some 
hints of the ideas that would continue to preoccupy him over the next five years.
One prompt listed in the lecture notes is the phrase: “Wo ist das Pferd?” (“Where 
is the horse?”). This peculiar question makes more sense in the context of Neurath’s 
notes for a later lecture, given after his release from internment, at Bedford College, 
Cambridge, on 9 November 1941. There, Neurath described how in the early nine-
teenth century, in some countries, members of the ruling classes wore tailcoats and 
high boots, clothes that were originally associated with horse riding, but now worn 
when not riding. His point was that the fashion signified a kind of modern status, 
because of the direct connection with horse riding, but he cautioned that not all 
customs could be read in this way: fashion loses its connection with function, but 
the function does not necessarily become a residual, subliminal or “subconscious” 
purpose or meaning (see Neurath 1942/1973).
This is part of a larger argument where he sets out his philosophy of logical 
empiricism and argues against thinking in terms of cause and effect or attempting to 
deduce too much, a tendency Neurath had long associated with what he termed 
“pseudo-rationalism” (Neurath 1913/1983). But it is also a critique of idealist 
2 It was called The Royal Avenue Social Club. See Onchan District Commissioners Flickr site: 
https://www.flickr.com/photos/88093414@N03/9520895627/. accessed 18 October 2018.
3 “Tennis Rasen” 6. Jan. 1941. Otto Neurath Nachlass (ONN), Wiener Kreis Stichtung, Noord-
Hollands Archief, 206/K. 82. Thanks to Sabrina Rahman for help with the translation of these 
notes.
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 theories of culture which tried to establish a connection between the will, spirit or 
mentality of an age or a generation, and its artistic or aesthetic manifestations, 
understood in terms of “style.” Neurath’s antipathy to such theories of national char-
acter and Geist was set out early in his 1921 essay “Anti-Spengler”. This attack on 
Oswald Spengler’s influential Decline of the West emphasized Spengler’s pseudo- 
rationalism – “through method and proof he wants to compel our approval” – in 
what is, Neurath (1921/1973, 160) argued, essentially a work of speculative proph-
ecy. In particular, Neurath saw Spengler’s popularity as dangerous because of his 
insistence on “proofs” of decline, his confusion of history and biology, his treatment 
of culture as independent of social and environmental context or conditions.
Against the influence of such accounts Neurath attempted to set out other ways 
of describing and accounting for cultural difference. Indeed, the tennis court lecture 
notes reveal evidence of interest in questions of national difference, and in the pos-
sible role of German philosophical tendencies in the success of Nazism. There are 
mentions of traditions and taboos, of co-existence and tolerance of different aspira-
tions and ways of life: all themes that will preoccupy his later writing in Britain. The 
notes end with mention of happiness and then, at the end, the words “Tennis- 
Rasen”– tennis court.
15.3  The English Fireplace
It is clear from his notes that Neurath meant “enduring” rather than durable, which 
has a subtly different meaning. If we ask the question “how do you make the tennis 
court endure?” we suddenly seem to be on more familiar Neurath territory and we 
can begin to imagine a possible lecture. Why, for instance, keep a tennis court in a 
prison? How to keep playing in such a situation? What is the importance of play, of 
pleasure?4 What if the question about the tennis court is actually about how to pre-
serve joy, against the odds?
Play mattered for Neurath. Above all, he valued human happiness and in his writ-
ings had frequently suggested that it ought to be the basis and the starting point for 
planning (town planning, and social and economic planning more broadly).5 Later 
he would be misrepresented by Friedrich Hayek, author of the influential The Road 
to Serfdom (1944), as an apologist for planning as enforced social conformism and 
social engineering. Yet Neurath’s understanding of planning and of design could not 
4 I don’t know if the courts were used. I do know of one game – called Witness – played by Imre 
Goth and other internees in a different male camp several streets away. A good friend of his, the 
artist Marcia Farquhar reports: “The game involved an elected group staging an incident with all 
sorts of details to be recalled, or not, by the rest of the group watching. Even though the audience 
group were looking to remember there was a high instance of contradictory/fabricated memories. 
Imre only told me of this game in relation to the unreliability of witnesses.” (Farquhar, Marcia 
Email to Michelle Henning, 6th May 2015).
5 Neurath’s Epicurean understanding of happiness is discussed in several texts including: Sandner 
(2007), O’Neill (2008), Cartwright, Cat, Fleck, and Uebel (1996) and Stuchlik (2011).
15 Of Tennis Courts and Fireplaces: Neurath’s Internment on the Isle of Man and his…
418
be further from this. His view was that planning done well would enable the indi-
vidual freedom and non-conformism necessary for happiness. On Hayek he wrote,
Professor von Hayek thinks of planning exclusively as something dictatorial. I do not know 
why… planning can be connected with a suppression of individuals hardly heard before, 
but also to enable us to be free to an extent hardly heard before, “free” i.e. a multiplicity of 
ways of life possible, non-conformism supported by planned institutions. (Neurath, 
“Physicalism, Planning and the Social Sciences: Bricks Prepared for a Discussion v. Hayek, 
26 July 1945.” 202/K.56. Otto Neurath Nachlass.)6
It seems likely that the tennis court played a similar role as the “English fireplace” 
did in Neurath’s thought. The latter comes up several times in Neurath’s notes and 
effects after internment. It is mentioned in his 1941 lecture at Bedford College 
Cambridge on logical empiricism. It comes up again in his 1942 essay “International 
Planning for Freedom.” It also appears in notes for a talk, not by Neurath, but by 
Henry N. Winter titled “The Englishman Abroad” which is among Neurath’s papers 
in the Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection at the University of Reading.
In these writings the fireplace example serves a dual purpose. First, it seems to 
represent the importance of pleasure and human happiness as against the tendency 
of social planners and designers to emphasize efficiency and function. For example, 
in the Cambridge lecture, Neurath contrasted the German use of the fire with the 
British. In Germany, he suggested, a fire is “a tool for making warm,” but in Britain 
it also has a social function, “centralising, grouping people, … giving an opportu-
nity to be together.”
Grouping and gathering around the fire had been a necessity in the Onchan camp 
during the bitter winter nights. In the Manx Museum in Douglas, one painting made 
by an internee shows a large group of internees around a fireplace. The museum also 
includes a Manx fireplace, which in the traditional Isle of Man cottages would typi-
cally take up an entire wall and incorporated seating and ovens. The fireplaces of the 
Onchan boarding houses are more conventionally Victorian in design, similar to 
suburban houses built throughout Britain in the late nineteenth-century. These large 
houses would have had fireplaces in bedrooms, as well as in the main living room, 
but availability of coal may well have limited fires to the main room, forcing the 
men to cluster together around the fire.
In his 1941 lecture, Neurath made the point that, if to German and Austrian eyes, 
the English fireplace is a “waste of calories” (since 80% of the heat goes up the 
chimney), we might say the same about skiing. He argued that what one person 
views in terms of efficiency, calories and waste, another calls pleasure. His discus-
sion of the fireplace is a riposte to those functionalists in design who have a limited 
notion of function, and a means of showing that planning is more difficult than it 
might seem, since the impact of a fireplace is not quantifiable. He had made this 
argument in an earlier article, “Inventory of the Standard of Living”, where he 
6 As John O’Neill (2006, 2) says, Neurath was “a central target” of Hayek’s papers “The Counter-
Revolution of Science” and “Scientism and the Study of Society” published between 1941 and 
1944. Hayek misrepresents Neurath as more concerned with scientific measures and centralization 
than he actually was.
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 recognized that “the usual standard of living research, though very useful, does not 
tell the whole story of human happiness” (Neurath 1937/2004, 517). The things that 
go toward our happiness are of different orders, he wrote, We can speak about tre-
bling the mortality rate, but perhaps not about trebling the beauty of an ocean view” 
(Neurath 1937/2004, 517).
Even as early as 1912, Neurath had argued against the attempts to measure plea-
sure made by the Austrian School of economists and the Utilitarians. In a lecture 
entitled “The Problem of the Pleasure Maximum,” he set out to demonstrate the 
impossibility of such calculations since, as Jordi Cat (2014) explains “cardinal mea-
sures for comparative utility, or pleasure values, could not be determined for the 
same individual, much less for different individuals” (cf. Neurath 1912/1973, 118–
119).7 In “Inventory of the Standard of Living,” he developed this critique further, 
describing the dominant approach in economics as an “atomistic, utilitarian 
approach” in which human feelings appear only as the pleasures and pains corre-
lated with “commodities” and “discommodities” (Neurath 1937/2004, 513–526). 
Neurath argued that a sense of well-being is not the aggregate of various pleasures 
and pains, and therefore cannot be measured according to a pleasure calculus.8
The point about the function of the fireplace comes up again in this 1942 essay, 
where he makes the point that fireplaces are not “happiness neutral:”
Let us take an uncontroversial example. Assume the scientists tell the English people that 
their fireplaces waste calories – of course they do so enormously. But the fireplaces as an 
element of our environment are not “happiness-neutral” as it were, as is e.g., the cable shaft 
below the surface of the street. The fireplaces are related to homely comfort and to many 
customs of our private life. (Neurath 1942/1973, 427.)
The second purpose of the fireplace example is as a means for Neurath to distance 
himself from any straightforward idea that design can produce or cause certain 
forms of sociability. It should be clear that Neurath was not claiming that the fire-
place contributed to an English immunity to Nazi or Fascist government, although 
at times in his writing he seems to be implying this. Rather, he uses it as an example 
to warn against deducing too much from phenomena. Design carries a great respon-
sibility but its consequences cannot be determined in advance: as he says in the 
Cambridge lecture, “changing the fireplace institution means changing many things; 
we cannot say what. It is very difficult for sociologist to find out what things are 
related with that” (Neurath 1941)9.
To deduce too much, Neurath argued, is dangerous: “relations are always inter-
esting, but all relations are so to speak without direction. If you give a relation a 
direction you are adding more. That is dangerous” (1941). He began his Cambridge 
7 See also Uebel (2004) and his chapter in the present volume.
8 Neurath used the term “Lebensstimmung” which has been variously translated as “states of felic-
ity” or “quality of life” but which could mean “sense of well-being” or, more clumsily 
“life-feeling.”
9 This is connected to his idea of unpredictability in principle, which he considered to be one of his 
most important contributions to the philosophy of science. See his Encyclopedia monograph, 
Neurath (1944, Sect. 12.).
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lecture with a discussion of the development of logical empiricism out of the oppo-
sition between an over-systematizing “rationalistic attitude” and an empiricism that 
focused on scattered detail with no coherence. Logical empiricism, Neurath (1941) 
argued, is not an attempt to build a totalizing system, but a reflective approach, “an 
attempt to analyse more carefully than before the terms and expressions used in 
arguing.” This means avoiding certain terminology and statements which assume 
more definite knowledge than can possibly be known, and accepting the provisional 
nature of decisions and solutions.10 In everyday life we have to make decisions and 
find solutions all the time, and this understandably leads to “a tendency to overstate 
the possibility of unambiguous judgments.” The uncertainty associated with the 
fireplace example demonstrated one of the main difficulties of planning: the impos-
sibility of knowing the world in its entirety, and the importance of assembling 
diverse perspectives (and biographies of objects and people) rather than trying to 
impose an overarching view.
“International Planning for Freedom” is an explicit call for social planning – for 
the need to “consciously cultivate the future and the possible” (Neurath 1919/1973, 
155). But the fireplace serves as a warning about how nuanced and complex this is, 
and a reminder of how pleasure as well as efficiency must take a central role. What 
makes people happy is very hard to anticipate since “all homely comfort relate to 
certain traditional customs and environments and that joy sometimes might depend 
solely on the fact that something should not be changed […]. How much ‘discom-
fort’ is liked because it is ‘ours.’ And yet other people like changes and adventure” 
(Neurath 1942/1973, 423; original emphasis).
Neurath did not specify which of his German friends had been so damning about 
the wasteful English fireplace. But we can look at commentary from the period to 
see that the fireplace is under fire, so to speak. William Gaunt (1934, 605), writing 
in the Journal of the Royal Society of the Arts in 1934, argued “we no longer have 
any need for a huge black cave in the room in which a fire burns” and “round which 
a shivering family crouch” on the grounds that the wireless now provided an alter-
nate focus (similar arguments have been made about the television). In 1942, in the 
same journal, R. Fitzmaurice (1942, 501), anticipating the postwar rebuilding of 
Britain emphasized that the key factors in the design of heating systems were the 
economy and efficiency of fuel but that this was blocked in Britain by “a violent 
prejudice” in favor of the “open domestic grate.” In other words, Neurath’s example 
of the fire was not simply plucked from the air or even from experience, but came 
10 It means avoiding, for example, the language of cause and effect, in which we deduce one thing 
from another. Neurath gave an entertaining list of the kinds of accounts this would disallow: such 
as Max Weber’s account of Protestantism as facilitating capitalism; accounts of the “concealed 
intentions” revealed in styles of dress or customs; arguments of the origins of a torturer in his child-
hood experiences; or about war as a necessary outlet for destructive tendencies in humanity, and 
similar arguments regarding film. Whether film produces aggression or acts as an outlet is a debate 
on which Neurath has “not the slightest hypothesis” – instead his aim is to point to the problem of 
the kind of definite assertions such speculations lead to – “if you are reading as a boy such things 
then the results are…” (Neurath 1941). On Neurath and films, see Cat and Alford (forthcoming).
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from a recognition that heating systems were a key part of the debates in Britain 
surrounding postwar planning.
15.4  (In)Tolerance and Diversity
Of the three mentions of the English fireplace I cited above, the third is in a talk 
given by a correspondent of Neurath’s called Henry N. Winter, later the author of a 
book called Fluency in German. In early January 1944 Winter had sent a copy of his 
notes to Neurath, at Neurath’s request. Winter referred to his talk as being on his 
“impressions of Germany” and “the riddle of the German character,” although the 
paper he enclosed was titled “Notes for a Talk: The Englishman Abroad.” The talk 
was divided into headings: “The Englishman;” “The Foreigner;” “Home Life” and 
“Position of Women.” Under “The Foreigner” Winter’s notes include the 
following:
In Germany every provincial town has its municipal theatre with own company, opera 
house, orchestra, art gallery, academy of music. Puritan tradition in England – suspicion of 
art and social pleasures.
Englishman at heart a countryman, brings cottage and garden tradition into his towns. 
Retires to the country, whereas the German retires to some idealised town. Healthy inter-
flow between town and country […].
Large blocks of flats in continental cities compared with the English ideal of “one fam-
ily, one house” with garden attached. Social significance of this difference. Significance of 
the open fireplace. (Winter to Neurath, January 1944. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection, Department of Typography and Graphic Design, University of Reading.)
The notes characterize both English and Germans with highly dubious stereotypes, 
particularly in relation to attitudes of men toward women.11
Neurath’s letter in return (on 15 January 1944) thanked Winter very politely but 
also provided some gentle criticism: he emphasized his own ability to see Germans 
from the outside since he is Austrian, not German; he emphasized the problems with 
proceeding from anecdote, or observation of the “puzzling multiplicity of German 
behavior,” adding “you have to proof your case. And that is, as you know, difficult.” 
He also commented, “I am just looking through the literature of the nineteenth cen-
tury to find out, how that goes together the freedom of criticism, sometimes free to 
an unexpected extent, and the obedience and acceptance of militarism etc.”12
In other words, Neurath himself was trying to find out why the German cultural 
environment might lend itself to militarism, propaganda, and a culture of obedience.13 
11 In his letter, Winter also refers to another part of the talk, where “I wished to attempt some expla-
nation of the riddle of the German character, based upon the idea of a ‘collective neurosis’ (Freud 
und Jung).”
12 Neurath to Winter, 15 January 1944. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection, Department 
of Typography and Graphic Design, University of Reading.
13 See Ádám Tamás Tuboly’s and Antonia Soulez’s chapter in the present volume, and Sandner 
(2011). Neurath was working on a book project which was never finished, provisionally titled 
Tolerance and Persecution.
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He also seems to lean toward broad-brush generalizations which, though not as crude 
as Winter’s, are still premised on polar oppositions between German and “Anglo” 
(British) character, though in an attempt to avoid essentializing or personalizing it, 
Neurath talks in terms of “atmosphere” and “climate.” As Günther Sandner has 
argued,
[t]he “German climate” […] was not identical to the national character. For Neurath, not 
every German was automatically a representative of the “German climate”. What he wanted 
to address were specific relations between certain features of German philosophy and litera-
ture and the behaviour of people. A human climate represented an ensemble of certain 
modes of behaviour, statements and articulations. (Sandner 2011, 76.)
Anticipating the issues of the “denazification” of German youth, which he under-
stood not in terms of collective guilt, but in terms of the ideological consequences 
of Nazi propaganda, Neurath compiled lists or “questionnaires” (though not 
intended to be used to question people) as a means to collect “descriptive material.” 
These include binary oppositions such as an opposition between the German trust 
of great leaders, and the British distrust of leaders, or contrasting the tendency of the 
“German atmosphere” to treat “lack of enthusiasm” as a defect, with the attitude in 
Britain (where it might even constitute a virtue!).14 Similarly, he suggested, that to 
the British “compromise appears humane,” while in the German culture “compro-
mise appears bad.” The same themes emerge in his correspondence with Carnap:
It is impressive to listen to plain people here, how they avoid boasting and overstatements 
in daily matters. I collect “expressions”, e.g. fire guard leaders speaking seriously, used e.g. 
once the term “happiness” explaining how people should get a feeling to be sheltered by the 
neighbours etc and then explaining, what is needed to act “quickly”, to be “calm” and to 
have the “usual commonsense”. I like this type of habit much more than the continental one, 
with “highest duty”, “national community”, “selfsacrifice”, “obedience”, “subordination”, 
etc “eternal ideals”, wherever you give a chance to open the mouth. (Neurath to Carnap, 25 
September 1943. RC 102-55-03. See letter 22 in this volume.)
For Neurath as for Winter, fireplaces are linked to differences in national tendencies. 
Despite his own cautions about correlations between behaviors, environments and 
ideologies, the horrors of Nazism led Neurath to what appear, from a contemporary 
perspective, as untenable generalizations about cultural difference. In at least one 
talk he gave, Neurath acknowledged his own feelings, as an Austrian, about German 
culture:
I hesitate a little to speak on this subject, for you see, resentment is not a good for scientific 
deductions and scientific discussions, and as a citizen of one occupied country and a refu-
gee from another occupied country, I have sufficient resentment, but I know from history 
that sometimes hate and love are not the worst teachers. (Neurath, “Contributing features in 
the emotional and intellectual isolation of the German.” K.48. Otto Neurath Nachlass, no 
date.)
14 Neurath, “Questionnaire (IV).” 202/K.58. ONN. He also published an essay on this topic in The 
Journal of Education (Neurath 1945). 
M. Henning
423
He acknowledged that he came from a very different intellectual tradition, which 
had more in common with English and French philosophy than with the German 
tradition informed by Kant and Hegel. But in a private letter to Ina Carnap, he also 
acknowledged a more personal resentment, linking his falling-out with her husband 
to the latter’s Germanic attitude of unyielding principle:
As you say Carnap is inflicting pain in the name of ‘science, impartiality and suchlike 
gods’, that is just, what I try to fight, and what my German friends usually try to defend, 
whereas my English friends in most cases agree with my attitude, which is based on com-
promise, muddle, happiness and not on some unhuman ‘principles’ (Neurath to Ina Carnap, 
24 September 1945. RC 102-55-13. See letter 35 in the volume.)
It seems ironic that though he valued what he saw as the British “compromise habit, 
the not believing in too many arguments,”15 Neurath was unable to refrain from such 
arguments in his correspondence with Carnap, despite the fact both were writing in 
English. There is a stark juxtaposition between their affectionate exchanges of 
household and personal news, and their strikingly uncompromising, blunt criticisms 
of one another’s work. Perhaps neither man had a great enough grasp of the English 
language to make use of its many means for “beating around the bush,” or its ten-
dency toward politeness and euphemism. In any case, it seems that compromise and 
avoidance of argument were qualities Neurath aspired to, not ones that he could 
enact in his relationship with Carnap.
If Neurath could not separate his attitudes to the “German atmosphere” from his 
personal resentment and hurt, and his own intellectual distance from the dominant 
German philosophical tradition, it is also the case that, to some extent at least, 
Neurath was attempting to analyze German and British “atmospheres” or “climates” 
in the specific context of a broader discussion of reconstruction and Nazi education 
in Germany. In common with numerous exiled German-speaking scholars at the 
time, Neurath wanted to make sense of the culture, physical environment and even 
“intellectual and emotional environment” in which Nazism had taken root, not sim-
ply to form a theory of national difference but to counter the impact of Nazi educa-
tion on a generation of young Germans.16
His notes on the meeting of the Belgium committee on 15 June 1945 reveal that 
he had argued there that the Nazi view that the war was a historical test, the victor 
crowned as fit to rule the world, had been challenged by the defeat of Nazism. 
Indeed, “[t]he war taught the Nazis the lesson that just the Nations with muddle 
defeated the nation which praised always the over efficiency of army, navy, air force 
and everything under the sun.”17 The victory of the allies was, in this sense, not a 
lesson in who was fit to rule the world, but in the potential of co-operation and 
compromise.
15 Neurath to Carnap, 25 September 1943. RC 102-55-03. See letter 22 in this volume.
16 Neurath to Joyce, 27 November 1944. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection. See also 
Sandner (2011) and Antonia Soulez’s chapter in the present volume.
17 Neurath, “Meeting, Belgium committee... chairman Lauwerys, 15th June 1945.” K.79, Otto 
Neurath Nachlass.
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Neurath’s diagnosis of the British “atmosphere” of muddle and compromise pre-
dates his arrival in Britain. It seems remarkable, but likely, that he addressed these 
themes in the tennis court lecture while interned in Onchan. Held captive by the 
British as a result of a xenophobic moral panic, Neurath was still prepared to speak 
of the British tradition of tolerance and diversity. The notes for the lecture include 
the following list:
“Tolerance and toleration
Coexistence and interpenetration of different aspirations
Not even unity of the majority”
Though Neurath was an avowed Anglophile, and given he would also have had to be 
careful what he said within the context of the internment camp, we should not 
assume that he was celebrating this tolerance and mutual coexistence as a certain or 
unassailable fact of wartime Britain. He may well have been holding Britain to its 
own standards, and perhaps, using the microcosm of the group around the fireplace 
in the internment camp to help his audience picture that ideal democratic atmo-
sphere. Later, in “International Planning for Freedom” he would argue that not only 
would a democratic society tolerate the diversity of people but the diversity and 
contradictions within individuals themselves. He makes the point through a quota-
tion from the Swiss author Conrad Ferdinand Meyer’s epic poem Huttens letzte 
Tage (Hutten’s Last Days): “I am not a wittily constructed work of fiction; I am a 
human being and full of contradiction” (Neurath 1942/1973, 429).
That Neurath was able to talk about tolerance and diversity in a lecture in Onchan 
Camp might have had something to do with the shift in policy that had happened 
during his period of internment. In May 1940, when the internment policy was first 
put in place, the numbers of refugees arriving from Europe each day was increasing. 
The social survey organization Mass Observation had carried out a survey in April 
1940 that suggested that very few people felt that mass internment of refugees was 
necessary: Tom Harrisson (1940, 36) of Mass Observation wrote, “literally not a 
single person contacted during the investigation felt that aliens should be interned 
en masse.” A policy of classifying “enemy aliens” according to the risk they posed 
was already in place, but both the Daily Mail and the Daily Mirror had been press-
ing for extending internment to all “enemy aliens.” This pressure came from jour-
nalists and editors who only a few years before had expressed pro-Nazi views. Their 
campaign succeeded in increasing hostility toward Germans, Austrians and (later) 
to Italians. When Mass Observation repeated their survey in mid-May the press 
campaigns seem to have had an effect. Harrisson (1940, 36) reported in The New 
Statesman that “many people who a month before were inclined to be tolerant of 
aliens were now almost pogrom minded.”
Yet opposition to the policy came right away, in parliament and in the press, and 
it was compounded by the torpedoing of the Arandora Star in July 1940, a ship 
which was deporting internees to Canada. While some in parliament and the press 
attempted to present the drowned victims as Nazi sympathizers, the sinking of the 
Arandora Star affected attitudes towards the internment policy. This change in atti-
tudes may also have been influenced by a book, The Internment of Aliens by the 
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27 year old François Lafitte, which was published by Penguin books in November 
1940. Copies were smuggled into the camps, and although the book did not in itself-
change internment policy, it was widely read.
Lafitte had been in Vienna in 1934 when the Austrian fascists invaded and had 
contacts among the Viennese left. In Britain, he was active in communist circles. 
His book mentioned Neurath and Marie Reidemeister, describing Neurath as a 
“world-famous pioneer of pictorial statistics” who “fled from Vienna in 1934 
because he was a Social Democrat” (Lafitte 1940, 80). The book was filled with 
statistics and surveyed how members of the press and parliament, “individuals who 
should have known better” had drummed up xenophobic feeling and the pressure to 
“intern the lot.” He emphasized that the majority of those interned were Jews, and 
detailed some of the cruel separations caused by the deportation policy, and how 
non-Nazis were forced together with Nazis in the camps. By the time Lafitte’s book 
was published, tribunals for the possible release of internees were already underway 
on the Isle of Man, and during 1941 most internees would be freed – Neurath and 
Reidemeister were released in early February. 
15.5  Happiness and Muddle
Neurath’s principal opportunity to put his ideas about planning for human happiness 
into action in England was in his involvement with the redevelopment of the town 
of Bilston near Wolverhampton, in the West Midlands.18 This work was fraught with 
local political difficulties and that it proved extremely stressful for Neurath is evi-
dent from his letters. He felt the contradiction between what he was touted in the 
media as doing – “bringing happiness to Bilston” – and the limited room for maneu-
ver or influence that he had been given. Neurath died before his work in Bilston was 
completed, but from his letters we can see that he was trying to put his idea of a 
nuanced approach to planning into practice – as he wrote “I am looking at all these 
items from a personal point of view, how a single person in your society may look 
at it, as a father, as a tired person, as a person who would like to read a book.”19
In beginning with where people are, what they actually do and enjoy (instead of 
where they ideally “ought to be”) Neurath was being remarkably consistent with 
one of his earliest writings, “The Converse Taylor System” of 1917, where he argues 
for an approach to social planning that does not impose structures from above but 
builds upwards, from the diversity of people “as we find them” (Neurath 1917/1973, 
131). He was also distancing himself from a certain tradition in German and British 
thought, which associated planning with moral reform. In 1940s Britain, there was 
18 See Nikolow (2004), Henning (2007), Rahman (2014). Sabrina Rahman’s text is a short article 
about an exhibition she co-curated in Bilston, based on her research on Neurath’s impact on the 
redevelopment of Bilston.
19 Neurath’s letter to A.V. Williams, 5 November 1945. Isotype 1/12-13. In the Otto and Marie 
Neurath Isotype Collection.
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an influential discourse around “problem families,” which, as Gillian Swanson 
(2007, 56–57) has argued, was shaped by the eugenics movement and pathologized 
“domestic failure”. Another factor was the longer tradition of “social hygiene” 
reform that made sexuality and personal life the subject of social planning.
Nevertheless, in Britain, Neurath also found an environment open to debates 
about empathy and fellow-feeling and about happiness. As Swanson (2013, 141, 
135) suggests, there was a significant difference between early twentieth-century 
British psychological models which emphasized “the cultivation of social feeling 
[…] towards ‘human sympathies’, feelings of ‘fellowship’ and universal ‘brother-
hood’” and other European models which “held group behaviour (and mass culture) 
in lower regard.” Additionally, in the 1930s and ‘40s, British commentators repeat-
edly invoked the United States Declaration of Independence in order to argue for the 
role of government in facilitating the pursuit of happiness. The Liberal MP and 
author of the 1942 Beveridge Report which paved the way for the post-war welfare 
state, William Beveridge (1946, 56), wrote that one of the “primary duties” of gov-
ernment was “making possible for all the pursuit of happiness.”
For Neurath, this attention to happiness was closely tied to British or English 
muddle (it is unclear in Neurath’s writings whether he conflates Englishness and 
Britishness). This notion of “muddle” is often mentioned in writings on Neurath, 
where it tends to be described in terms of the absence of strict regulations. However, 
the term is more nuanced, as Neurath was aware. “Muddle” can be defined as frus-
trating, disorganized confusion, and we also have the British English expressions 
“muddling along” or “muddling through” which means to get by, to make do. It is 
associated with “botching,” with the fix that is just good enough, and with making 
it up as you go along.
The wartime meanings of “muddle” were distinctive, and differed from the 
meanings it had accrued in other variants of English (such as American English). In 
one nineteenth-century American publication, Richard Soule’s 1871 Dictionary of 
English Synonyms, muddle is defined primarily in relation to drunkenness and 
wastefulness: to “stupefy, fuddle, inebriate” and to “muddle away” was to “waste, 
misuse, squander.” But in 1930s and ‘40s Britain, one could, quite successfully and 
tolerably, muddle along through life; muddling along is the opposite to grand ambi-
tions, dreams of ideal society, or organized planning.20 In this period, it also had a 
specific meaning linked to British identity and politics, which was to do with the 
absence of ideology, of policy and of economic planning. It was understood as a 
positive national characteristic, almost a virtue, at times. The term was used in both 
British and American contexts to characterize wartime Britain.21
20 Botching is at the more creative end of muddling along and it is of course not an exclusively 
British trait: so for example, when the Onchan families finally got their homes back they discov-
ered that the men had knocked doors through to get from one house in a terrace to another, had 
filled attics with soil to grow mushrooms, and had blocked the drains with radio parts, from the 
home-made radios they had cobbled together.
21 See for example: “We Americans, younger in form of self-government by many years than the 
English, can learn something from the manner in which the English ‘muddle’ through adversity” 
(Mundt 1941).
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Neurath connected British “muddle” to its origins in an old country. Germany, by 
contrast was a new country and “when people have no long tradition in civilization 
and no established type of living, what do they do? They make rules.”22 He perhaps 
overstated his admiration for muddle to his British correspondents, sensitive to the 
political climate in wartime and also possibly conscious of the censor. Nevertheless, 
and whether or not it was actually true that the British were not rule-bound and “do 
not fear differences” (a position that overlooks the bureaucratic and racist nature of 
the British Empire), he wanted to make the point that “the muddle is related to 
democracy”(ibid.). In a letter to Ina Carnap he also directly related it to happiness: 
“when thinking of human happiness one has to bear muddle, which is also essential 
for any evolved democracy.”23
Given his lifelong commitment to social planning, Neurath’s feelings on this 
score were also, and understandably, quite mixed. On the one hand he recognized in 
“muddle” a quality that might be necessary for preventing any kind of cultural hos-
pitality toward Nazism, on the other hand he wanted to see botching and making do 
as merely a rational response to imperfect design, and therefore something that can 
be designed – or planned – out. I gave an example of this in an essay about Neurath’s 
visit to Bilston (Henning 2007, 11–12). The town clerk of Bilston, A.V. Williams, 
wrote that the town councilors were worried that slum-dwellers moved into new 
modern houses would simply turn those houses into slums by putting coal in the 
bath. Against this, Neurath “stressed most emphatically that people only put coals 
in the bathtub for some very good reason” such as inadequate fuel storage places, or 
expensive hot water systems (Williams 1973, 76). He went on to mention that he 
knew a man in Vienna who kept a pig in his bath. Putting coal (or pigs) in the bath 
is a way of muddling along that supports (rather than undermines) Neurath’s faith in 
human ingenuity, rationality and creativity. However, with a proper heating system 
or fuel storage, Neurath imagined that the muddle, or botch, would no longer be 
necessary.
Even so, Neurath’s sensitivity to human feeling and the tendency to love what is 
not necessarily efficient or functional, is much greater than that of most commenta-
tors of the period, and despite his largely positive representation of Englishness, he 
was critical of certain practices of social planning and intervention in England. One 
famous and influential example is the Peckham Experiment which was initiated in 
1925, and then rolled out in full from 1935–1939. The Peckham Experiment had set 
out to explore the impact of the environment on children’s health and development 
through direct social intervention, by establishing a social club with health and lei-
sure facilities, called the Pioneer Health Centre, in Peckham, South London. As Ben 
Highmore explains:
For a smallish membership fee families could belong to the health centre and make daily 
use of its facilities, which included: a swimming pool, a gymnasium, crèche facilities, 
snooker, darts and table tennis, a cafeteria, covered play areas, a room for dances, a theatre 
22 Neurath, “Contributing features in the emotional and intellectual isolation of the German.” K.48, 
ONN.
23 Neurath to Ina Carnap, 24 September 1945. RC 102-55-13. See letter 35 in this volume.
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(for acting rather than surgically operating), badminton court, and so on. As well as using it 
for all forms of socialising and play, families could undertake regular “health overhauls.” 
(Highmore 2006, 74–75.)
Actually, these “health overhauls,” central to the “experiment,” were compulsory 
conditions of membership. They were not conceived as medical appointments (since 
the consultants were biologists and the participants had not identified themselves as 
ill), but as opportunities to test and record the health of the families and to intervene 
pedagogically in practices of parenting, family planning and self-help. As Highmore 
(2006, 74) describes it, the Pioneer Health Centre was a modernist project “dedi-
cated to the study and production of health.” Yet it was also informed by the eugen-
ics debates mentioned earlier. According to Innes Pearse, one of its founders, the 
center was designed on principles of surveillance:
It was […] necessary that the observers should be able to note the effect of the new environ-
ment upon family action. Hence the building was planned for visibility and free circulation 
throughout […]. Everything was visible. One object of this provision was to test the hypoth-
esis we had laid down, namely that the sight of action was a natural stimulus to action […]. 
(Pearse 1945, 48–55.)
Although Neurath may have approved of the use of “exuberant social practices and 
learning through play” (Highmore 2006) at the Health Centre, he was concerned by 
and wished to distance himself from the experimental emphasis, which made par-
ticipants the objects of study. In a letter to R.C. Kirk of the department of Zoology 
at Birmingham University, Neurath wrote: “please do not speak of ‘experiment,’ it 
is the very life of people at stake. I dislike the speaking of the Peckham experiment, 
it is more than that, because the life of families is altered and one cannot repeat the 
action […] and using some people as experimental material for other people is 
against my feelings […].”24
15.6  Chairs, Shoes and Functionalism
Even so, Neurath’s modernist attention to the mundane aspects of British life was in 
some ways consistent with the approach in Peckham, and with the statistical, 
survey- based work of British organizations such as Mass Observation and Le Play 
House (Neurath was familiar with both).25 His concern with ordinary objects was 
also consistent with the 1920s neue Sachlichkeit interest in everyday things.26 For 
24 Neurath’s letter to R.C. Kirk, 7 November 1945. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection.
25 His and Marie Neurath’s correspondence includes letters to and from Dorothea Farquharson of 
the Institute of Sociology at Le Play House, in The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection. A 
1943 letter to Josef Frank states “I just looked through the Mass Observation book on housing and 
so many common sense remarks from plain people.” Neurath to Frank, 28 September 1943, 
Osterreichische Nationalbibliotek 1230/43.
26 Neurath’s relationship to the neue Sachlichkeit is discussed in Dahms (2004) and Damböck 
(2017).
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him, these mundane things play three roles: they are a means of exploring and 
exemplifying the task of sociology and social theory, and what logical empiricism 
is capable of; they enable him to debate the nature of functionalism in design, 
debates begun in the 1920s in his interaction with the Bauhaus and with modern 
architecture in Austria and Germany; and third, they are the material of Isotype 
charts – the stuff out of which data can be produced, ways of life described and 
analyzed.27 This last use is also mentioned in the Carnap correspondence:
I should highly appreciate it if you were kind enough to send interesting newspaper cuttings 
and reprints and such stuff. We have now a nice studio again, with many files full of interest-
ing material, but it is not our old richness, which was evolved in years. We like very much 
statistical data, interesting pictures of single objects, e.g. certain characteristic animals, 
busses, chairs, teapots, coffeepots etc, lists of knifes and forks, cups and pots, plates etc 
refrigerators etc. We are buying LIFE, LOOK etc for catching such material. Today we 
found in this way the shape of an American telephone apparatus, but there are thousands of 
apparatus, you know. (Neurath to Carnap, 17 July 1942. RC 102-56-04. See letter 11 in this 
volume.)
This attention to objects for the purposes of Isotype is not at all trivial. In this 
period, Isotype is becoming increasingly international and so the Isotype Institute 
had to take into account the recognizability and meaning of the pictograms in differ-
ent cultural contexts. Since the beginning of the Vienna Method in the 1920s, close 
attention had been paid by Neurath, and by the chief artist in Vienna, Gerd Arntz, to 
the specific choice and design of symbols that had to fulfill criteria of recognizabil-
ity and repeatability, since, as Christopher Burke puts it, “it was necessary that these 
signs be suitable for repetition in sequence along a line, to indicate statistical quan-
tity; this differentiates Isotype pictograms from their successors in public signing” 
(Burke et al. 2013, 501–502). At the Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftsmuseum they put 
together a systematic card index or “picture dictionary” of Arntz’s designs, but 
without Arntz in Britain, with limited access to their old files, and with the changing 
shape of designed technical objects, there was a continuous need to update old pic-
tograms and develop new ones.
Through Isotype and in his writings and lectures, Neurath began to plot a correla-
tion between the design and uses of everyday objects and forms of sociability, as 
part of his attempt to arrive at a more complex, pluralist functionalism – understood 
from the ground up, that is, from the empirical basis of everyday experience.
This is best demonstrated via the example of chairs. Tennis courts and fireplaces 
endure: the tennis courts because of the necessity for play even in the most con-
strained circumstances, and fireplaces because of British obstinacy, and the inade-
quacy of efficiency calculations (or calorie counting). Yet chairs are amongst the 
objects most easily and frequently reinvented in modernism. The centrality of the 
chair in modernist design is remarkable and linked to the fact that chairs are most 
evidently a means to shape people by positioning their bodies. Chairs are anthropo-
morphic: literally taking on the shape of people, but also becoming person-like. In 
27 Isotype is discussed by Angélique Groß and Sophie Hochhäusl in this volume. See also Twyman 
(1975), Burke, Kindel, and Walker (2013) and Henning (2010).
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the 1935 essay “Art as Experience” the Bauhaus teacher Josef Albers (1935, 391–
392) wrote: “We should try to see a chair as a living creature […] as an apparatus 
willing to hold us, to carry, to surround or embrace us.” Adolf Loos (1998, 65), 
another Viennese observer of British or English muddle noted: “following the prin-
ciple that every type of tiredness requires a different chair, an English room is never 
furnished with one type of seat alone.” Loos neglected the fact that being tired is not 
the only precondition for sitting. In Britain at least, fireplaces and chairs were inti-
mately connected – you pulled up a chair to the fireside.
Similarly in one of his draft questionnaires, mentioned earlier, Neurath wrote 
about the German attitude that the house and furniture are not “indifferent places of 
happy living, adapted to people of various inclinations and tastes,” and he contrasted 
this to “the Anglo-Saxon atmosphere [which] supports the attitude that house and 
furniture should remain relatively indifferent, not presenting any ‘expression’ of a 
certain person (father, mother or some architect), but to be a centre for different 
persons, therefore mixing up various kinds of seats, tables, etc.”28
Neurath decorated one letter to J.K. Hunt, a member of the Ministry of Production 
committee, with a little cartoon captioned “The higher the seat, the lower the 
salary.”29 This wry joke points to another aspect of British seating arrangements that 
Loos overlooked: their function in maintaining forms of social distinction. Changing 
the seating arrangements, moving the chairs around, may be easier and more pre-
dictable in its impact than changing something as durable as the fireplace but, as 
with fireplaces, chairs have functions that go beyond their obvious use and beyond 
the purely symbolic. They facilitate interaction, they allow for certain kinds of dis-
cussion and they shape social behavior. In Neurath’s view, to understand how they 
do this would be a task for a careful and nuanced empirical sociology.
For Neurath, the cultural and symbolic role of designed objects was as important 
as their social function even if one could not be extrapolated from the other. Shoes, 
for instance, have the ability to shape ways of being in the world – how we stand, 
run, walk. On the 19th March 1944, Neurath wrote to the British photographer John 
Hinde who he had met through the book-packaging firm Adprint, with some 
thoughts about a possible Isotype chart on shoes. During the war Hinde was mostly 
employed doing highly-staged, well-crafted, wartime propaganda photographs in 
full color. He was also working on a book project with Neurath, based around a 
Mass Observation study of the village of Luccombe, on Exmoor (the project was 
eventually published as An Exmoor Village by George G. Harrap and co. ltd. 1947). 
However, Neurath may have known that Hinde had also produced shoe advertise-
ments for the company Clarks. Indeed, he was grandson of the company founder, 
James Clark, and lived in a village near Clarks’ Somerset factory.
In his letter, Neurath offered plenty of suggestions for ways of researching shoes. 
Although it is unclear whether this is with reference to the Exmoor village project 
or a different project, the letter demonstrates that the Isotype Institute was much 
28 Neurath, “Questionnaire (IV).” 202/K.58. Otto Neurath Nachlass.
29 Neurath’s letter to Mr. J.K.  Hunt, 18 September 1943. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection.
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more than a design organization that produced statistical charts and diagrams, and 
that it was involved in initiating and commissioning social research. Neurath wanted 
to know what kind of shoes people wore in “this part of the country,” and suggested 
some ways of classifying them according to use: did people go barefoot at all, did 
they wear shoes and stockings, did they wear specific shoes for specific occupations 
or for “festivals, dancing, church, etc. or everyday life?” He also wanted to pay 
attention to the differences between shoes, between boys and girls, men and women, 
fashionable and old-fashioned people. Additionally, he asked Hinde for some com-
parative data: “with the next town, with other countrysides, with London etc.” He 
requested details of heels, color, the materials the shoes were made of and of the 
extent to which shoes were repaired, or damaged shoes still worn. He even won-
dered what “names and expressions” were used to describe shoes. Neurath acknowl-
edged that nothing might come of these questions: “Perhaps the result will not be 
very stimulating and only used in the text, perhaps something comes out worthwhile 
for ‘Isotypizing’ it.”30
This is possibly not the first time Neurath has thought about shoes in relation to 
everyday experience. At the Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftsmuseum, the museum in 
Vienna that Neurath opened in 1925, the staff photographer took a number of pho-
tographs that seem to attend to feet and footwear. The explicit content of these 
photographs is work, specifically factory labor, but the images draw our attention to 
the male and female workers’ shoes. This is to do with the fact that the machinery 
they were using was partly foot-operated, but also the photographer would have 
been aware that shoes were an indicator of wealth or deprivation, and of types of 
labor (the workman’s steel boot, the woman worker’s comfortable slipper and swol-
len ankle indicating long periods spent standing, the fashionable Mary-Janes of the 
younger women). Among the Gesellschafts-und Wirtschaftsmuseum’s collections of 
photographs of the new state kindergartens, part of the social housing built by the 
socialist municipal government, are images of children tying their shoes. Such 
images have an obvious significance, indicating the growing prosperity of child and 
city as well as the development of independence through the civic kindergarten 
education.
Neurath had used shoes as an example in his Cambridge lecture of 1941 and pos-
sibly in the Tennis Court lecture too. As I suggested near the beginning of this 
chapter, he used the example of a tailcoat and riding boots to show how style is not 
purely functional (“where is the horse?”), but nor is it an unconscious expression. 
His example is a dancer in tailcoat and low shoes:
He has very low shoes, very nice low shoes and he has also perhaps tails. What is that for a 
strange combination? The low shoes are shoes of the Red Indians and of other people who 
are running on plains and the tails are horseman’s clothes. So I imagine […] somebody 
might write I see the comprehensive modern man in his feeling combine all types of human 
life: on horseback subconsciously in the tails and running on the plains subconsciously in 
his shoes. (Neurath 1941.)
Neurath argues there are “dozens and dozens of books, seriously written of such a 
type.” He could be referencing any number of Spengler-influenced texts, but there 
30 Neurath’s letter to John Hinde, 19 March 1944. The Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection.
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is also an evident connection with the art historian Heinrich Wölfflin. In his disserta-
tion (published in 1886) Wölfflin had argued that the Gothic shoe expressed the very 
same “historical state” of the human will or mind as the Gothic cathedral did. The 
three-pointed style, he argued, developed in contradiction to the demands of func-
tion and materials in order to express the Gothic spirit. Wölfflin claimed that “we 
feel forms by analogy to our bodies and forms are created as the unconscious 
expression of the corporeal feeling of an age.” The closeness of shoes to the body 
connects body and spirit, or Geist.31
Whether Neurath was aware of Wölfflin’s discussion of the Gothic shoe, it is 
unclear, but he certainly uses the example of shoes to demonstrate how culture and 
custom cannot be explained solely with reference to function nor with reference to 
“unconscious expression.” Shoes, like fireplaces, are meaningful objects – and it is 
from such everyday, basic objects that we can learn lessons both for planning and 
design and for sociological study. These lessons are to do with the difficulties of 
disentangling overt symbolism and actual use, efficiency and meaning, of establish-
ing causality and of the risk in making uninformed, under-researched changes to the 
everyday environment. Through these objects, and the everyday “muddling along” 
that they represent, Neurath was refining his politics of design and of decentralized 
planning.
Even in the 1940s, Neurath still wrote of the need to avoid dangerous, imprecise 
terms, and he bemoaned the difficulty people have in letting go of such terms. Yet as 
a number of Neurath experts have explained (notably Cartwright Cat, Fleck and 
Uebel 1996) he also recognized that ordinary language was necessarily formed of 
Ballungen – imprecise clusters of concepts. Cartwright and her co-authors also link 
“muddle” (as a specifically British quality) to Neurath’s opposition to over- 
centralized planning. The present essay has attempted to show how Neurath’s inter-
est in muddle in the 1940s was accompanied by an increasingly thoughtful attention 
to the everyday objects through which daily life was made bearable, comfortable 
and pleasurable. These would form the basis of an approach to planning in which 
human happiness, not moral improvement, was the core value.
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Chapter 16
Does Understanding Mean Forgiveness? 
Otto Neurath and Plato’s “Republic” 
in 1944–45
Antonia Soulez
Abstract In this paper I consider Otto Neurath’s late discussion of the political and 
social context of Plato’s Republic, especially how Neurath conceived them in the 
1940s. Neurath’s argumentation is contrasted with the ideas of Karl Popper, both 
with regard to the latter’s reading of Plato and to his general methodology. The dis-
tinction between Neurath’s treatments of epistemology and politics is also dis-
cussed, by highlighting how these two were interwoven in the discussion, and how 
they differentiated Neurath’s articles from Popper’s considerations in the Open 
Society.
16.1  Introduction
As Karl Popper (1973, 55) pointed out in his testimonies presented to readers of 
Otto Neurath’s “Memories” in the Empiricism and Sociology volume, both himself 
and Neurath planned to elaborate a theory of knowledge capable of dealing with 
problems of political philosophy. Popper, having left Marxism and wearied by what 
he calls its “prophecies” (which he had believed in during his youth) welcomed, 
after the failure in Munich, in Neurath the quality of a social philosopher who hoped 
to lead the future Vienna Circle towards a “philosophical reform of politics.”1
1 For the relation between politics and philosophy, see the chapters of Günther Sandner and Don 
Howard in the present volume.
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We know that Popper afterward became the official critic of the Vienna Circle. 
His thesis of “falsificationism,” presented within his Logic of Scientific Discovery in 
1934, has remained notable. He did, however, appreciate Neurath’s efforts to put 
into practice a “new philosophy of science” able to contribute to the development of 
political theories, even if this resulted in greater distance from Neurath’s professed 
socialism. To state it in his own terms, Neurath and he differed profoundly in practi-
cally all the areas that interested both of them, except for one thing: the fact that a 
theory of knowledge was crucial for an understanding of history – the Vienna Circle 
had not given sufficient weight to this – and for an understanding of political issues.
This unique point of encounter between epistemology and politics is precisely 
what I should like to clarify, with the help of Plato’s Republic. At the moment, 
Popper’s battle with Plato as precursor to modern totalitarianism is well known. But 
when The Open Society and its Enemies (Popper 1945/1966) first appeared in 
England in 1945, with E. Gombrich’s help, there were protests from specialists who 
felt that Popper mistreated Plato’s text. It is interesting though not surprising to note 
that British writers such as Warner Fite, G. C. Field (Bristol) and C. E. M. Joad 
(London), as well as, to a lesser extent, Richard Crossman2 – in short, many well- 
known commentators and translators of the Republic, are mentioned or discussed in 
Popper’s work with a good deal of asperity. They are the same disputants who can 
also be found in Neurath’s Plato-controversy around the same time, still a decade 
before Levinson’s3 counter-reply.
The interesting aspect of what must be called Popper’s violent criticism is that it 
shows that a philosophical position that is usually considered an eminently refined 
one, is argued to be the source of a most brutal and dangerous political theory. 
Popper proposes a careful reading of the Republic, but I do not want to dwell on that 
reading, which would divert me from Neurath, the subject of this paper.
I would simply like to bring to your attention a meeting of minds between 
Neurath and Popper concerning Plato, so that the outside observer has the impres-
sion that Plato is being tried in the same way by both of them. And there are reasons 
for that: it is quite true that there is a family resemblance between these Austrians, 
like Gomperz, father and son, both with a weakness for Epicurean philosophy, and 
not disguising their preference for philosophies which might give rise to materialist 
and utilitarian theories. A study comparing early twentieth century Austrian and 
German approaches to ancient Greek thought would certainly be worthwhile. It 
should probably also be mentioned that young Marx, author of a thesis on Democritus 
and Epicurus, influenced Popper and, supposedly, probably also Neurath (see 
Sandner 2014a).
2 Crossman, as the author of Plato To-day, he is the first to have contraposed Plato’s Republic with 
contemporary political issues. He accuses the Republic of being a “polite form of fascism”: “The 
more I read the Republic” Crossman (1937, 190) writes, “the more I hate it.” Cornford (1941) 
refers to this in his Republic of Plato.
3 Levinson (1953), in his Defense of Plato, argues against Popper’s and Neurath’s imputation of a 
Nazi-type thesis of eugenics to Plato.
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My choice of presenting the opposition between two conceptions of “social engi-
neering” is based, however, on a communion of ideas between the two Austrian 
critics of the budding totalitarianism of Plato’s Republic. Instead of describing a 
contrast for its own sake, I wish to point out, by means of a number of divergences 
between their respective epistemologies, that Plato’s Republic and its interpretative 
problems during the years 1944–45 reveal serious methodological differences 
which distinguish Popper and Neurath. I am thinking of Popper’s criticism of the 
Vienna Circle’s verificationism, and of Neurath’s criticism of Popper’s pseudo- 
rationalism. Yet in spite of their agreement on the two principle dangers – racism 
and the idea of a natural enemy who must be vanquished – there is one aspect of the 
Platonic Republic which Popper challenges implacably, but which apparently 
escapes Neurath’s polemic: it is the utopian aspect and its prophetic pathos.
This final comment leads me to demarcate Neurath’s “social engineering” from 
Popper’s.4 I want to demonstrate how it was possible that the ideas of Neurath – a 
planner at heart and supporter of social techniques for building utopias – might be 
subject to the attacks of Popper’s criticism of Platonic utopias, denounced in chapter 
9 of Open Society.
16.2  The Republic According to Neurath
16.2.1  The Republic in Political History
I shall simply follow Neurath’s statements, reorganizing them slightly, and drawing 
on articles published with Joseph A. Lauwerys in the British Journal of Education 
of November, February, May and August of 1944 and 1945, presenting the attacks 
and counterattacks concerning the reading of the Republic.
First of all, Plato’s Republic periodically gives rise to politically problematic 
interpretations when read outside the narrow circle of specialists. In the eighteenth 
century, there was such an episode, “Plato and the French Revolution,” marked by 
the discussions of the figure of the legislator  – less totalitarian in truth, in the 
Republic than in the Laws. In such discussions, the model of Sparta against Athen’s 
one was prevailing, as shown in writings by Rousseau and Malby. In these respects, 
the reader is here invited to read Pierre Vidal-Naquet (1975) on the conflict between 
Sparta and Athens represented by the characters of Lycurgus and Solon, the law-
makers. Then, the “Plato and Bolshevism,” or Russell’s examination of communist 
totalitarianism and the ideology of a total regeneration of the social fabric through a 
4 A term usually having a negative connotation in countries of German language or culture, as I was 
able to confirm: It is striking that Neurath and Popper used it with the positive tone of a verifiable 
project conceived by a social and political philosopher. Victor Goldschmidt (1970) refers to it in a 
note about “utopia,” as being a key-term of a “piecemeal” rather than “holist” program of social 
technique in Popper’s case – in reference to Popper’s Poverty of Historicism (1957).
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politicized ethics (cf. H. Marcuse as well). And finally, there is the episode that 
interests me here, “Plato and Nazism.”
16.2.2  Neurath and the Greeks
Neurath’s interest in antiquity began very early, but from an economic angle. In 
1904 and then in 1909 he wrote “Interest on Money in Antiquity” (“Geldzins in 
Altertum,” 1904/2004) and Economic History of Antiquity (Antike 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 1909/2004). His thesis was published in 1906 and entitled: 
Zur Anschauung der Antike ueber Handel, Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft (Neurath 
1906–1907). His thesis director was Eduard Meyer, who, according to Marie 
Neurath,5 was an “historian and good linguist, acquainted with all the central 
European languages.” It was from 1932 that Nazism was an evident threat to Otto 
Neurath – becoming at the same time also a theoretical problem for him –, as Marie 
Neurath also told me in a private talk in London, shortly before her death. She was 
not yet his wife at the time, but his associate. Of German origin (the mathematician 
Kurt Reidemeister’s sister), she made her choice in 1925: she would live in Vienna 
rather than return to Germany; the decision was made a year after meeting Otto 
Neurath.
To Neurath, the system closest to his program of “empirical sociology” was 
Marxism. He had in mind particularly the Marxism of the earliest writings: the 
Manifesto, 18 Brumaire, German Ideology. Given his social-democratic sympa-
thies, Neurath should have felt close to the Austrian Marxist Otto Bauer, whom he 
greatly admired, even though Bauer could hardly believe in the attempt at socialism 
in Bavaria, in which Neurath had actively participated. So there was only a distant 
sympathy between the two partisans of socialism.6
The Neurath who reads the Republic in 1944–45 is not exactly the historian of 
ancient Greece. He is an empirical materialist who, as a victim of persecution, had 
to flee his country like so many other people, going first to Holland in 1934 and then 
to England in 1940, where he was interned on arrival, before being able to live a 
normal life in Oxford from 1941 to 1945, in pursuit of his work (he died on the 22nd 
of December 1945).7 He is, as I said, the empirical materialist who, beginning in 
1932, asked himself about how Nazism could have been possible in Germany 
(according to Marie Neurath).
5 This is information I received personally from Marie Neurath, during private consultations that 
soon became friendly chats, when she was kind enough to receive me at her home in London on 
March 3 and 4, 1983. My thanks go to this great lady who has since died, and to Bob Cohen who 
introduced me to her in 1982. On Neurath’s early years and his relation to Meyer see Sandner 
(2014b, 45–48).
6 On Neurath’s relation to Otto Bauer see Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel (1996, Part I).
7 Neurath’s English years is described by Sander (2011) and Michelle Henning’s, Silke Körber’s, 
and Adam Tamas Tuboly’s chapters in the present volume.
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His articles of 1944–1945 particularly communicate a desire to educate. During 
the Twenties in Vienna, Neurath had experienced the Austrian movement for educa-
tional reforms, led by the social democrat, Otto Glöckel. In order to understand how 
Nazism was possible in Germany, the education of German youth must be exam-
ined. Reflections on education are very timely, furthermore. Nazism is in full sway 
when Neurath thinks about what seems to him the only real solution: to re-educate 
the German literate population, a solution which associates an enlightened human-
ism – Neurath always considered himself the modern heir to that tradition – with, 
(on a broader scale), a strategy of de-Nazification made to activate the international 
conscience.
Some 20 years earlier, as I have said, certain critics had diagnosed the seeds of a 
Bolshevik sort of oriental dictatorship in Plato’s great political dialogue. Russell, 
disenchanted by his voyage in Russia, reads the Republic differently since he sees 
communism differently.8 Then, beginning in the Thirties and Forties, the Republic 
is seen to become a reference book for certain Nazis eager to base their theories of 
eugenics on great masters of the past.9 To give an idea of what could be said in these 
times in reference namely to Plato, let us read for instance the following lines taken 
from Hans F. G. Günther’s later preface to the third edition of his book, Platon, 
eugéniste et vitaliste (Plato, Eugenicist and Vitalist)10:
From 1933 to 1945, Germany, in the wake of North America, had fully justified legislation 
concerning heredity (a law to control genetically transmitted illnesses), as well as all sorts 
of absurd misinterpretations of Galton’s ideas11 and consequently, of Plato’s. Under the 
influence of an equally absurd type of reeducation, eugenics or racial hygiene – rules of 
health to conserve a good genetic stock maintaining and multiplying hereditary qualities – 
appeared or still appears to many Germans as an inhuman and even “animal” practice, 
while Plato’s teachings already proposed eugenic practices as the only way to safeguard and 
increase human dignity […]. (Quoted by Goldschmidt 1970, 135. Cf. Günther 1965.)12
8 Cf. Ronald W. Clark’s (1976) biography of Russell, and Jacques Bouveresse’s (1978) review of it.
9 On this subject see Goldschmidt (1970), particularly the section, “Quarrels over Platonism.”
10 The book was first published in German in 1928 as Platon als Hüter des Lebens. In the introduc-
tion to the 3rd edition (1965) there is a significant “state of research” on Plato, citing Windelband, 
Taylor, Jules Stenzel, P.  Friedlander, C.  Ritter, W.  Jaeger, L.  Robin, G.  Kruger, E.  Hoffmann, 
H. Herter, all from publications or reeditions dating between 1928 and 1950, as well as comments 
on the favorable reception of his book of 1928, especially in Hans Leisegang’s “La signification 
actuelle de Platon.”
11 Francis Galton, nineteenth century physiologist who – with Gobineau and Mendel – established 
bases for eugenics or racial purification. He is known for his table of men of great talent, and is the 
author of Hereditary Genius. Neurath (1921/1973, 179) cites him in reference to an “archetypal” 
method used by Spengler to derive forms of culture, in his Anti-Spengler. Galton is rather well 
estimated, cited with Goethe by Neurath and even by Wittgenstein as a forerunner of ideas on fam-
ily resemblance.
12 And he adds several titles (by W. Braeucker, H. Siemans …) useful in examining this domain.
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That such lines could be written again in 1965 makes us realize the possibility of 
presenting these ideas again and have “public debates” about them in western 
Germany.13
The educational importance given to reading such texts and all the eugenic litera-
ture associated with them shows that Otto Neurath had correctly chosen his terrain. 
What troubled Neurath the educator was the racist and imperialist-German propa-
ganda which evolved during the Thirties through works destined to be educational. 
He remembered especially the German atlas and manuals, the “Nazi textbooks” 
which served as title for an article in 1944 and gave example of the Putzger school 
atlas, comparing the editions from 1910 and 1937 (Leipzig) which demonstrate the 
progress of alarming ideas (Neurath and Lauwerys 1944).
The danger is “continental,” Neurath says, and not at all a product of our acciden-
tal culture (he contrasts continental culture with the culture of “Western countries”).14 
Specialists and British scholars calmly study Plato’s Republic, innocent of the fact 
that they are supporting ideas which serve the ends of racist and warlike propa-
ganda. Enlightened and liberally minded scholars do not realize that they are play-
ing into the hands of dangerous teachers of German youth, which needs, says 
Neurath, to be re-educated. It is his warning cry: take care not to drag our youth 
along the same road!
Thus, the specialist in ancient economy is now clothed as interpreter of Plato’s 
dialogue. His message is straightforward and momentous: in the Republic, he says, 
“everything is based on the idea of war” (cf. Neurath and Lauwerys 1945). Neurath 
gets right to the heart of the matter. Referring to the program of extreme specializa-
tion of duties in the fifth part of the dialogue, and the idea that the only worthwhile 
war is the one between Greeks and Barbarians, the pre-eminent “natural enemy” 
(Neurath and Lauwerys 1945, 470–471), Neurath puts his finger on Greek ethno-
centrism as opposed to Epicurean cosmopolitism, on the reactionary character of 
the criterion of inherited qualities to be respected in the education of the guardians 
of the Platonic republic (415a-435b), and the elite and police-like character of the 
army formed by the guardians, the class especially trained to guard the city. All of 
these traits describe the training in the Republic, an anti-democratic, repressive and 
selective system that may be compared with Hitlerism. Add to this the censorship in 
the arts (music must be military), the training of the young (compared with the rais-
ing of animals [459]) and the development of a cast system. And there is still the cult 
of familial identity, the control of marriage and birth which, with the elimination of 
the unsuitable (406, 460), must contribute to preserving a katharon genos, a pure 
and renewed race. All these are markedly typical aspects, he says, of the German 
“weltanschaulichen Grundgedanken.”
13 Precisely since 1963, following work by the fashionable geneticists like Hans Nachtscheim, 
author of one of the statements on eugenics, in the newspaper Die Welt of May 1965.
14 “On the continent, things are different, for the tradition of scholarship differs somewhat from the 
tradition over here. When a German philosopher characterized Hitler’s advent as the victory of 
Platonism, he was expressing wide felt sentiments […]” (Neurath and Lauwerys 1944, 575).
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16.2.3  What Have Platonism’s Defenders to Say in 1944–45?
Neurath’s critics refer to works by such authors as Garforth, G. C. Field, C. E. M. 
Joad who, when the Republic seems equivocal to them, reply that it evokes Soviet 
Russian communism far more than German Nazism, particularly considering Plato’s 
violent indictment of tyranny.15 Readers who interpret it as a salute to a Mussolini 
or a Hitler should rather consider the way Plato treated the Greek tyrants.
And where, asks Field, do we see a program of “racial purification” in Plato, “as 
we understand it today?” Not only is there a basic reasoning about the inevitability 
of war – which escaped Neurath – not only is Plato’s rhetoric of high ideals – which 
aroused Neurath’s contempt. Different from Hitler’s, but accusing Plato of racism is 
an anachronism and proof of a total lack of “understanding.” Neurath reads Plato in 
the first degree, with the prejudice of his century, without considering the Greek 
context.
Joad adds to these defending voices that Neurath’s preference for Epicurean cos-
mopolitism instead of Plato’s republicanism was another aspect of an alienation 
from a political position, marked by a cult for personal relations and far from public 
affairs. Last but not least, Plato does not proffer the mystique, but the ethics of a 
Führer. They keynote of Platonic politics is a vision of the Good. The vision pre-
scribes – according to an idea of rationality – the principle of selection of the fittest, 
as the way to deal with a redefinition of the citizen.
Plato’s defenders accuse Neurath of incomprehension. Neurath does not “under-
stand,” from several points of view:
 1. He does not read the text in its context but judges it from the distance of his own 
century.
 2. In short, he does not know how to read the Republic, he is not a specialist. From 
there stems his elementary – not to say primitive and unrefined – reading.
 3. Furthermore, he is a poor philosopher, since he has missed the rational point of 
departure. Closed to ideas, to discussion, he has reacted to certain “details” with-
out seeing the “totality” of their situation.
Neurath replies to this argument about his lack of comprehension, in an article of 
May 1945, and that date gives his answer its interest. Neurath does not want to 
“understand,” because “to understand means that all is forgiven” (Neurath and 
Lauwerys 1945, 222). That gives crucial importance to a simple or seemingly naïve 
reading. To him, a refined and complex interpretation is the gateway to ideology: 
here, erudite and respectable appearances hide justifications of the worst ideals. One 
has only to think of the “Manifesto of Pan-Germanism,” signed by so many high- 
ranking intellectuals and professors. The responsibility of the intellectual is in ques-
tion. Yet Field’s argument is that the semantic ambiguity of the expression such as 
“purification of race,” as he put in the mouth of ancient Greeks allows more than one 
15 It should be noted, that Joad (1950) later accused logical positivism (especially A.  J. Ayer’s 
famous Language, Logic, and Truth) of ensuring a positive atmosphere for fascism in Oxford.
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interpretation – at least theirs (the Greeks) and ours in our contemporary time. Two 
thousand years of distance and quotation marks used, seem to him to reinforce the 
criticized project.
16.3  Epistemological Background to Neurath’s Replies 
to the Questions About Understanding
I do not know which formulation to choose: whether to read Neurath, the political 
man in the light of epistemology or to read Neurath the epistemologist in a political 
light. But under these circumstances, I deliberately choose the first mode, in opposi-
tion to Gideon Freudenthal’s (1989) recommendation in his “Otto Neurath from 
Authoritarian Liberalism to Empiricism.” If it is, in fact, legitimate to relate 
Neurath’s theory of knowledge to his political formation where history and the evo-
lution of his ideas are concerned, it is impossible to understand the full meaning of 
his response without transposing it into terms of his theory of knowledge: the theory 
he defended in his role as representative of the Vienna Circle, even when its defense 
might have meant distancing himself from other members of the Vienna Circle.
Three types of responses may be distinguished, shedding light on the exact 
nature of his attacks against Platonic conceptions or race and war which he feels 
make of the Republic a forerunner of German Nazism.
 1. Practice and theory cannot be separated. Theory is just as much of a practical 
commitment. According to this principle, confirmed in an article of 1913 about 
Descartes’ “lost wanderers in the forest” – the famous parable where Descartes 
illustrates the second maxim of provisional morals.
Neurath (1913/1983) rejects the idea of a difference in kind between thought and 
action. This rejection governs his conception of “social technique” (Soulez 1988) in 
the construction of utopias here and now; there is no need to wait for the ideal 
moment to apply the technique. This is why “to understand” the theory would be “to 
forgive” the unforgivable political action.
Let us apply Neurath’s refusal to understand the “noble lie.” We shall see that this 
means to refuse two levels of falsehood.
The myth of a pure genos16 in Plato, a lie termed “Phoenician” (Republic, book 
4, 546a-547a), is intended to convince citizens that they are all brothers. This lie, 
which supposes that they are not brothers (qualifications begin by being associated, 
like metals to be refined for specific uses)17 is also a lie at the level of internal con-
trol, where the magistrates are supposed to convince themselves so they can con-
vince others. This myth of belonging to a genos, “gennaion pseudos,” is presented 
16 A myth very often cited by German eugenists; Cf. Gunther (1965) in which German eugenics 
found fuel for their myth of “blood and earth” (Blut und Boden).
17 Gold (authority) is distinguished from silver (auxiliaries to authorities) and from iron and copper 
(peasants and working classes).
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as a myth, not as a truth. However – and this is the educational impact essential to 
maintaining the high standards of the city – the myth lies only at the level of words 
and not at the level of the soul: as Julia Annas (1981, 107) reminds us in the intro-
duction to Plato’s Republic, there is “the noble falsehood,” which is in the soul, and 
the tolerable falsehood, which is only in the spoken word.
But, as Neurath sees it, we are not dealing with pure thought on one hand and 
action on the other; they are on a par. There is no falsehood that would be a truth in 
the soul. A lie can have only one meaning. This single meaning corresponds to the 
pragmatic maxim formulated by J. L. Austin and expressed in his initial lecture, 
How to do things with words: Rigorous truth and morality are both characteristic of 
someone who simply says, “[o]ur word is our bond.”18
 2. It is this difference of degree which justifies the coupling of theory and politics, 
epistemology and realpolitik, also defended by Popper, as I pointed out earlier. It 
is therefore completely coherent, and coherent in its strongest sense, that Neurath 
should apply to Plato himself that anti-Cartesian maxim corresponding to his 
necessarily provisory political morals. Plato’s text is guilty of totalitarianism. 
The theory of the Republic and political totalitarianism belong to the same “sys-
tem,” are parts of the same integrating whole. Correspondingly, Platonists are 
virtual signers of the manifesto of Pan-Germanism.19 Criticism of the Republic 
must not remain the monopoly of historians of Greek philosophy.
Putting Plato back into a Greek context dissimulates a bias. Taking context into 
account, it is evident that “Greekness” is not synonymous with totalitarianism. 
There, Neurath – as Popper did – invokes the example of Pericles’ funeral oration 
according to Thucydides. There were, then, even in Plato’s time, liberal and demo-
cratic ideas!
Specialization is dangerous from every standpoint, whether it concerns the pre- 
established qualifications (“fitness”) for a particular activity in the city – “selec-
tion” – or the selective attention to detail proffered by professional interpreters of 
Plato.
 3. These are “overall” observations, like Neurath’s reply to critics: “If you don’t 
like the details, revise the ensemble.”
Concerning the issue of war, Neurath remains faithful to his own “war econom-
ics,” declaring that, in times of peace, preparation for war should not be an aim, as 
Plato sees it. The advantages of wartime organization should be used to build a 
18 “Accuracy and morality alike are on the side of the plain saying that our word is our bond” 
(Austin 1962, 10).
19 “Manifesto of Intellectuals” read June 20, 1915 at an assembly of German professors, diplomats 
and officials in Berlin’s Künstlerhaus. Unpublished, it circulated as a “strictly confidential docu-
ment” signed by 1341 supporters (352 university scholars, 158 schoolmasters and clergymen, 148 
judges, 252 artists, writers and editors), not counting the popular support which would have meant 
free circulation of the Manifesto in the countryside, fief od the “Junkers” (Who formed a real class 
together with the landowners, manufacturers and big industrialists in the Rhine-Westphalian 
region). Cf. Bevan (1918).
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 liberalized and durably peaceful society. There is no natural enemy, there are only 
hostilities. Hopefully, the resolution of these hostilities may finally make friends of 
former enemies.
On the subject of economy, however, Neurath’s explanations regarding his arti-
cles on Plato and there.20
16.4  The Spirit of Planning Aspirations vs. Historicism
Epicurianism, empiricism, a sort of Austro-Marxism (there is no time to go into all 
this)21 all of which nourish Otto Neurath’s convictions, do not explain everything 
about his reading of Plato, or of the present polemic, perhaps, in its epistemologi-
cal – political duality. I should like to discuss an aspect of Neurath’s ideas which 
differs completely from Popper’s reading of Plato: the concept of planned 
economy.
In one of his addenda of 1961, where he replies to a criticism of his Open Society 
by Ronald Levinson (1953) in his important book, In Defense of Plato, Popper 
(1945/1966, 323. ff.) defends himself against what seems to him an unfortunate 
amalgam of his reading of Plato with the reading by the “two-headed monster” 
formed by the couple, Neurath and J. A. Lauwerys, in the same controversy. He 
adds incidentally, that in spite of what would seem a fraternal combat, there was no 
particular affinity between the philosophies of the two, as an attentive reader of their 
respective writings would discern.
Certainly, the desire for dissociation may be exaggerated, if we remember 
Popper’s statement mentioned early in this talk. Detailed analyses follow, with 
recourse to the Greek text for point by point replies to Levinson. Here, an effort at 
interpretation by the historian of philosophy is implicit; Neurath refused to make 
such an effort, which he might have considered futile. He goes on to avow not hav-
ing read Neurath’s attacks and being aware of them only through Levinson’s men-
tion of them in his book of 1953. Philosophically, he says, nothing would seem to 
unite them because Neurath is really for Hegel and against Kant, while Popper not 
only sides with Kant against logical positivism, but carries over to Hegel (and then 
to Marx) his well-known criticism of Plato’s historicism which introduces this very 
disastrous lineage into the history of ideas.
We might say that the essence of Popper’s criticism is the subject of historic 
fatality, a philosophical attitude at the same time irrational and politically danger-
ous. “We don’t need a sense of history,” says Popper (1957), in The Poverty of 
20 On Neurath’s economy see Uebel (2004) and his chapter in the present volume.
21 Neurath’s background is explained in details by Sandner (2014b) and in his chapter in the present 
volume.
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Historicism, but just in that need consists the Platonic “poverty of historicism”22 
with its very noble “theory of ideas” leading straight to various forms of 
 totalitarianism. Besides many other references, roughly the same passages of the 
Republic which Neurath points out are invoked to illustrate Popper’s thesis. The 
same errors or weaknesses in the planning of the Republic are challenged: the ideas 
of war, eugenics, and even the noble lie which obliges the Guardians of the state to 
remain true to a false discourse on the status of the pure race and its comparison to 
gold, in the myth of metals which they must recite to others and believe them-
selves.23 This is not to say that Neurath did not have an anti-historicist bent resem-
bling Popper’s. His Anti-Spengler (Neurath 1921/1973) suffices to convince us, I 
should say, that Neurath’s Spengler makes a kind of echo to Popper’s Plato; it gives 
us a modern German version of historical fatalism. But Neurath is above all a social 
engineer of reconstruction. He believes that the idea of planning will counteract the 
ideas of decline. Planning is not the counterpart of historical degeneration, as Popper 
views Platonic utopia to be: it is the way to avoid just that. We might notice that in 
1921 – the same date as Anti-Spengler – Neurath (1921) using the pseudonym of 
Karl Wilhelm, writes his project for Jewish economy in Palestine for the “construc-
tion” (“Aufbau”) of Palestine. The exact title is, “Jewish planned economy in 
Palestine; application of social technique.”
Does this mean that because of his idea of a planned economy, which would be 
directed by the governing administration, Neurath exposes himself to the same criti-
cisms that Popper directs at supporters of “utopian social engineering” such as Plato 
(title of Open Society’s chapter 9), or Hippodamos de Milet, the first “city planner,” 
whom Aristotle mentions in his Politics (1276b22)?
All of Neurath’s explicit efforts went towards combining freedom and planning. 
But, as Gideon Freudenthal (1989, 207) writes, “the way to liberalism is not lib-
eral.” Neurath cannot be likened to the kinds of liberal Austrians including Popper; 
he actually maintains a form of “authoritarian liberalism.” In an important article on 
the “orchestration of the sciences,” where he defends his encyclopedic idea of sci-
ence, opposed to the traditional pyramidal classifications,24 Neurath (1946/1983, 
237–238) wants to demonstrate that the task of reconstructing a community has a 
very different character from a Platonic utopia, contrary to what Horace Kallen 
proclaims.25 And this is so, precisely because a liberal outcome both motivates and 
must ultimately crown an international planning program. Far from being “imperi-
22 The Poverty of Historicism was first published as articles in the journal Economica in 1944-45.
23 I discussed this myth in a lecture entitled “The Sophism of Belonging to the Race,” at a sympo-
sium, “Is the word ‘race’ superfluous in the French constitution?” Senate and Sorbonne, 27–28 
March, 1992. See Soulez (1992).
24 The pyramidal classifications, inherited from Comte, Spencer, Wundt, are still to be found in 
Wilhelm Ostwald. On Ostwald’s ideas in the context of logical empiricism see Dahms (2016).
25 This is a reaction to a 1939 lecture by Kallen, “The Meaning of ‘Unity’ among the Sciences,” see 
Kallen (1940). Neurath says that he forged the word “orchestration” after having listened to Kallen 
at a Harvard meeting. On Neurath and Kallen see Reisch (2005, 167–190).
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alist,” his plan for unity in science, which would be a linguistic internationalism, is 
democratic in spirit.26
A number of traits separate Neurath’s encyclopedic approach from totalitarian-
ism, which could menace even a planning program oriented towards freedom:
(A) Its anti-separatism. Neurath eliminates a clear distinction between the linguistic 
and the empirical, and renders impossible the sort of foundationalism which 
relies on strictly imposed protocol statements meaning all  – even logical- 
linguistic – forms of tabula rasa á la Descartes, and consequently, all divisions 
and institutional separations of knowledge into specialized areas arranged in a 
hierarchical manner.
(B) Its anti-experimentalism. Neurath reproaches experimentalism for the “pseudo- 
rationality” of the idea that scientific progress is a “step by step” affair advancing 
“from one test to another.” Neurath places his holistic, encyclopedic model in 
opposition to Popper’s incomplete model tainted with the metaphysics of an 
idiom of pure experience and governed by “piecemeal social engineering.” One 
cannot calculate the future; one can only make decisions. In contrast to Popper’s 
probabilism concerning scientific ideas, supposedly rationally regulated by his-
torical verification, Neurath (1913/1983) proposes throwing dice to draw lots, 
recalling the decisive paradigm case in his study of democratic institutions in 
ancient Athens.
(C) Its voluntarism. Neurath’s idea of planning, an idea more arbitrary than natural, 
gives more credence to a voluntary decision than to a system of empirical proofs. 
This attitude introduces a social engineering called utopian science, which owes 
its spirit to J. Popper-Lynkeus, Austrian social reformer, demographer and statis-
tician of an Aufklärung – understood as an utilitarian tendency, as well as a moral 
doctrine provisionally built upon a reevaluated Cartesianism – that is, cleared of 
the Cartesian duality between pure thought and action, therefore equally applied 
to thought.
The ensemble of these elements makes Neurath’s planning the contrary of a 
deterministic project. In Neurath’s thinking, this means that the “Zukunftbild” of 
the regulation of the future, if correctly understood, no longer owes anything to 
Marxist “historicism.”27
26 At this point, Neurath refers to his “International Planning for Freedom.” See Neurath 
(1942/1973). His most detailed discussion of democracy (and its relation to pedagogy) is to be 
found in his posthumously published manuscript, “Visual Education: Humanisation versus 
Popularisation.” See Neurath (1996).
27 Lack of competence in a precise approach to Neurath’s economy makes me prefer to leave this 
area to connoisseurs. Clearly, Neurath’s idea of freedom, although strongly marked by the 
Epicurean idea of happiness, requires some technical precisions in economy. Controlled finance 
demands economic administration, with a distinction between state economy and the democratic 
social order which must be directed towards the happiness of the individual, and not exclusively 
the group to the detriment of the individual. Lastly, a socialist economy as he understands it ceases 
to depend on money as its operating force. It excludes profit and must control finance even if that 
function cannot, by definition, be socialized. Cf. for example Neurath (1919/1973).
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16.5  Conclusion
If on a deliberate shocking tone of anachronism, Neurath answers “yes” to the ques-
tion, “Was Plato a Nazi?,” it is by virtue of an opposition to the hermeneutic para-
digm of understanding, an opposition in principle which he states loudly and clearly 
and which is rooted in his conception of methodology and epistemology of science. 
A holistic vision forms the background of his reading of Plato, calling for a judg-
ment of the Republic within the framework of a theory and a political attitude; this 
means that he criticizes a certain conception of “social engineering” which a refined 
and detailed reading might mask, even though it were acknowledged. Holism con-
firms a philosophy of social and political action which also implicated the ideas 
concerning this action which also implicates the ideas concerning this action, in the 
same way and to the same degree as the action itself. Neurath’s holism endorses 
utopian social engineering. Does this utopia revert to the “Platonic utopia’s social 
engineering” denounced by Popper? No, answers Neurath to Kallen’s warning. 
Rather “utopia” means – instead of the dream of someone disappointed by history – 
a project for building the future, without awaiting the blessing of experience or ideal 
conditions which are by definition unattainable. The ship must be repaired at sea 
and this means working with doubtful premises which may always be revised.
This utilitarian and Epicurean principle calls for construction, as indicated in the 
“plan for a Jewish economy” of 1921 (“the plan of plans”)28; it seems to be founded 
on the imaginative projection of a potential reality, always on the horizon. The ten-
dency of this attitude is analyzed by Ernst Bloch in his The Spirit of Utopia, 1918: 
it seems to be seeking “a way of making forerunners of possibilities.” All philoso-
phy about reconstruction could be directed to reflecting on projecting into the future 
a program of social intervention which assumes that men are capable of acting to 
modify the future, contrary to a fatalist approach. This means that the human 
“agency” should not be determined by an overall causal system. The “science of 
utopia” is aiming precisely at the very “social technique” which an “image of the 
future” forces ahead into a “doctrine of happiness” which Otto Neurath called 
“social Epicureanism” (see Stuchlik 2011). This representation, imbued with volun-
tarism, is clearly an impressive instrument for combatting historicism’s ravaged. 
But what guarantee do we have – in Ernst Bloch’s (1918/2000) terms – that the 
“dream of advancing” in a regeneration of the human social community is not a 
shadowy apparition cast by a “backsliding dream”? We can wager that Neurath 
would have answered this as he replied to Kallen’s criticism of unconsciously 
extending Plato’s totalitarianism when he invoked his big, working, methodological 
model of the “encyclopedia.” But the answer belongs more to epistemology than to 
politics: the latter might have its reasons that the former cannot know! Perhaps 
Neurath’s prudent holism does not exclude a certain visionary character.
28 This plan is translated for the first time into French as well as the article on Neurath’s text “The 
lost wanderer of Descartes and the Auxiliary Motive” in our special issue on Neurath: Otto Neurath 
un philosophe entre science et guerre, Cahiers de philosophie du langage, n° 2, en hommage à 
Philippe Soulez, in coll. with Elisabeth Nemeth (University of Vienna), 1997, publ. L’Harmattan.
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Chapter 17
Thinking About the “Common Reader:” 
Otto Neurath, L. Susan Stebbing  
and the (Modern) Picture-Text Style
Silke Körber
Abstract When Otto Neurath went into exile in 1934, first to Holland and then to 
England, he succeeded in establishing important new connections within the con-
text of the international Unity of Science movement, for which he was largely 
responsible. A notable example was the British philosopher L. Susan Stebbing, who 
supported his pragmatic ideas on the “humanization” of knowledge. Both Neurath 
and Stebbing were looking for ways to apply modern logic and linguistic analysis, 
not only to the transfer of information in science and teaching, but above all in pub-
lication projects for the “common reader.” In 1941, Stebbing became the first presi-
dent of the Isotype Institute in Oxford, which Neurath directed until 1945. Soon 
after ISOTYPE was founded, long-term relations began between it and the book- 
packaging company Adprint managed by German-speaking emigrés in London, as 
well as its successors and British clients (publishers). A technically and organiza-
tionally sophisticated process for the production of illustrated non-fiction books was 
gradually established. The “picture-text style” developed by Neurath and epito-
mized in Modern Man in the Making (1939) was applied to non-fiction books and 
series with “integrated layouts,” then professionalized and successively transformed 
into a production model for illustrated books which enabled scientific information 
to be prepared for the mass market and the “common reader” – in the service of a 
modern, democratic (post-war) society.
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17.1  L. Susan Stebbing and Otto Neurath: Clear Thinking 
and the Democratization of Knowledge
In exile in The Hague, Otto Neurath wrote a letter on 30 July 1934 to the British 
philosopher Professor L. Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) in London to invite her to the 
First International Congress for the Unity of Science in Paris in 1935 and to a pre-
paratory meeting in Marienbad in August 1934, which was to take place shortly 
before the International Congress of Philosophy in Prague.1 This formal invitation 
was the prelude to a regular exchange of letters which lasted until Neurath’s flight 
to England and the end of his internment on the Isle of Man in early 1941. It was 
also the beginning of a friendship, which lasted until Stebbing’s early death in 1943 
and was marked by a continuous exchange of ideas and collaboration. The latter 
took place not only within the framework of the Unity of Science movement, of 
which Stebbing was an active member, but also in an attempt to democratize knowl-
edge. Stebbing soon became a member of the committee that organized congresses, 
and was especially involved in the Fourth International Congress at Girton College 
in Cambridge (14–19 July 1938) on the topic of “Scientific Language.” She also 
gradually became involved in the scientific activities and publication projects of the 
Unity of Science movement (see Sandner 2014, 257ff.). In addition, she became the 
first president of the Isotype Institute founded in Oxford in 1941, where she sup-
ported Neurath’s efforts to make the principles of logical thinking and the critical 
use of language into a basis for the transfer of knowledge outside science. The fact 
that Neurath made this philosopher the president of the Isotype Institute makes 
sense, given that he found her not only an equal companion in implementing the 
scientific goals of the Unity of Science Movement, but also an individual who criti-
cally questioned the political and social situation during the war and whose own 
interests had focused increasingly on linking analytical logical thinking with the 
world of practical life and whose own texts were directed at the “common reader,” 
i.e. the “citizen” who is politically aware and active. In order to better understand 
Stebbing’s role and significance, some brief biographical information is needed.
L. Susan Stebbing was born in 1885 as the youngest of six children of a mer-
chant. She studied history at Girton College in Cambridge from 1904 to 1908 – 
which was exceptional at that time.2 Following her interests, she began studying 
philosophy, which she completed in 1912 with an MA in Moral Science at King’s 
College London. In 1933 she was the first woman in Great Britain to be appointed 
a professor of philosophy, at Bedford College in London. Stebbing was co-founder 
of the journal Analysis, chairman of the Aristotelian Society (1933–1934) and presi-
1 See correspondence between Otto Neurath and L. Susan Stebbing (No. 303, 304; 30.07.1934 to 
ca. Jan./Feb.1941) at Otto Neurath Nachlass (ONN), Wiener Kreis Archief, Noord-Hollands 
Archief, Haarlem (NL), partial estate of Otto Neurath. Stebbing replied on 14 July 1934 that unfor-
tunately she could not attend the pre-conference and the philosophy congress in Prague, but 
intended to attend the conference in Paris planned for 1935, which she did.
2 See Beaney and Chapman (2017), Beaney (2003) and Chapman (2013). The biographical infor-
mation in this section is taken primarily from Beaney’s and Chapman’s publications.
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dent of the Mind Association (1931–1932). During her studies she was influenced 
primarily by the philosophy of G. E. Moore, whom she first met in 1917 at one of 
her talks at the Aristotelian Society. She was also particularly interested in modern 
logic, philosophy of science and philosophy of language, as represented by the phi-
losopher/mathematicians Bertrand Russell and Alfred N. Whitehead. Stebbing can 
therefore be regarded as a representative of what later became known as the 
Cambridge School within analytical philosophy, which was committed to the  logical 
analysis and interpretation of common language to solve philosophical and indi-
vidual scientific problems – even before the rise of ordinary language philosophy in 
Oxford after the end of the Second World War.
In her standard work A Modern Introduction to Logic (1930), which went through 
several editions and reprints, modern mathematical logic was already treated on an 
equal footing with Aristotelian logic, and the work is regarded as the “first textbook 
of analytic philosophy.” As Beaney and Chapman found, she also played a decisive 
role in establishing the philosophy of the Vienna Circle and logical empiricism in 
Great Britain: Stebbing “was at the centre of the debate about the relationship 
between the Cambridge School and the Vienna Circle, which formed the two main 
traditions of analytic philosophy in the 1930s” (Beaney 2003, 339). When Neurath 
contacted Stebbing in 1934, she had already gained an international reputation3 and 
been a visiting professor at Columbia University in New York in 1931–1932. Having 
expressed great interest in the Vienna Circle,4 she had met Moritz Schlick at the 
Seventh International Congress of Philosophy in Oxford in 1930, and in 1934 
invited Rudolf Carnap to attend a series of lectures at Bedford College in London 
where he was also introduced to Bertrand Russell and Alfred J. Ayer.
In the regular and increasingly personal correspondence housed at the Noord- 
Hollands Archief in Haarlem, Neurath also informed Stebbing about his plans in the 
field of visual education. In April 1939 he wrote, “I read your blue booklet [Thinking 
to Some Purpose5] through and was very pleased to find the remarks about Visual 
Miseducation. Excuse me, please, that I beg you to write a review on my booklet[s] 
International Picture Language. The first rules of ISOTYPE and Basic by ISOTYPE. 
I seek always a reviewer for these books, but nobody of our people who are inter-
ested in Logic are interested in Visual Education and ISOTYPE too. You are the first; 
I am very glad that you are full of educational ideas. It is nice that you are a member 
of the board of directors of our International Foundation of Visual Education.”6
Neurath’s statement is relevant in several ways. It indicates reflection on his own 
position within the Vienna Circle and the logical empiricism movement in exile, 
3 In a letter to Stebbing dated 12 Feb. 1938 Neurath describes her as “famous logician.” See 
Correspondence Neurath, Stebbing (1934–1941).
4 See Stebbing to Neurath 14 July 1934, Corr. No. 303. (ONN). Cf. Beaney (2003, 339).
5 Neurath is probably referring to a passage in the chapter “On being misled by half, and other frac-
tions” in which Stebbing (1939, 154f.) deals in particular with the misleading and erroneous graph-
ical conversion of statistical data. Since the 1920s, Neurath and his team had been working on 
preventing such errors.
6 Neurath to Stebbing, 8 April 1939; original emphases. Corr. No. 304. (ONN).
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while also identifying Stebbing as like-minded in so far as she combines the method 
of logical analysis with critique schooled in everyday use and the effort to objectify 
ordinary language, especially in the public sphere. At the same time it reveals that 
Stebbing’s interest and involvement in the Visual Education project did not begin in 
1941 when she became president of the Isotype Institute, but that she had belonged 
since 1939 to the Foundation of Visual Education which had been founded in The 
Hague in 1934.7 In Thinking to Some Purpose Stebbing (1939, 153ff.) had already 
discussed statistics and their pictorial representation and pointed out that these are 
fundamentally helpful and meaningful means of grasping contexts, but only if they 
are systematically and carefully executed. On a more fundamental level, however, 
Neurath’s letter also suggests that he saw himself increasingly – as has been noted 
on numerous occasions8 – as an outsider in the scientific milieu of logical empiri-
cism. This seems also to have been the case to some extent with Stebbing, at least 
with regard to her interest in the concrete communication of scientific content and 
the methodology of critical-analytical thinking across social boundaries. As Beaney 
and Chapman (2017) observe, “[s]he combined her commitment to formal logic 
with a belief in the importance of practical analysis of everyday texts and as a result 
in the necessity of public engagement by philosophers, in a manner which was at the 
time rare in academia.”
Stebbing’s interest in Neurath’s ideas for visualization thus becomes plausible, 
especially against the background of her own general approach to logical thinking, 
which she regarded as purposeful thinking and acting in the struggle against politi-
cal ideologization and for democracy. She had initially treated language as a means 
of communication and conveyance of new scientific findings in an academic con-
text. Her interest in modern mathematical logic, however, did not lead to the call for 
an ideal scientific language. Instead, and in contrast to representatives of Unified 
Science and logical empiricism, she doubted that an artificial symbolic language 
beyond mathematics could be developed for all sciences.9 However, she also saw an 
increasing need to make progress in the sciences accessible to the general public, 
and sought to direct scientific publications not only to experts and philosophers but 
also to the “common reader” for educational purposes. Her main interest lay in a 
clarifying, critical analysis of ordinary language and the disclosure of implicit prej-
udices and cognitive errors.
7 See Neurath to Stebbing, 4 May 1939, Corr. No. 304. (ONN).
8 Neurath’s difficult position within the logical empiricism movement and his increasingly strained 
relationship with Carnap during exile in the debate on the “semantic turn” have been noted on vari-
ous occasions. Neurath and Carnap, who emigrated to the USA in 1936 and taught at the University 
of Chicago, belonged to the “left wing” of the Vienna Circle and increasingly disagreed in exile 
about the goals and methodological foundations of unified science and the jointly edited publica-
tion project, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. For a recent review, see also Derek 
Anderson’s and André Carus’s chapters in this volume and Tuboly (2017).
9 See Stebbing (1937, 111). As she explains here, “[t]he only appropriate language is that of math-
ematics. To those who cannot use the symbolism of mathematics such scientific theories must 
remain largely incomprehensible.” Stebbing’s understanding of logical analysis, also in demarca-
tion to logical empiricism, cannot be further addressed in this context. See above all Beaney 
(2003).
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In 1939, the same year that Neurath’s Modern Man in the Making was published 
in the US by Alfred A. Knopf, she published Thinking to Some Purpose, based on a 
series of lectures for the BBC, with Penguin in its Pelican book series for popular 
non-fiction. In this publication, mentioned above by Neurath, logical thinking is 
called “purposive thinking,” which should be clear, systematic and reflect the 
author’s own prejudices in order to form judgments and act accordingly (Stebbing 
1939, 22ff., 27, 30). Stebbing also warned against popularizing complex scientific 
content in the service of entertainment without using sophisticated methodologies 
and appropriately precise and clear language. Neurath (1996, 257) explained his 
position in “Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation,”  as follows: 
“Sometimes writers think that it suffices to translate a translation of well-selected 
terms into popular terms is sufficient, whereas it is common knowledge that the 
insuffiency of these terms was the main reason for the introduction of scientific 
terms. This kind of translating from the complicated to the simple, from top to bot-
tom, as it were, we shall call, Popularisation of knowledge.”
Stebbing explicitly opposed those authors and scientists who sought to win over 
the lay public by emotional evocation, personification and improper language and 
metaphor – which serve precisely to hinder logical thinking on the part of the reader. 
Since Stebbing’s writings are little known, a longer passage on this topic from 
Philosophy and the Physicists (1937) is cited below. Here she criticized particularly 
the writings of Sir James Jeans and Sir Arthur Stanley Eddington, well-known phys-
icists, astronomers and scientific popularizers:
In these days of popular expositions, both written and broadcast, of Outlines, and of mam-
moth Guides to the Intelligent Man – guides through science, guides through economics 
[…] the common reader cannot be unaware that the sciences in general and the physical 
sciences in particular have been developing rapidly […]. These developments in science 
have a twofold interest. First, their results have given us information, often surprising, about 
the world we live in. Secondly, the following out of scientific method is in itself exciting, 
affording us the purest of all satisfactions – intellectual satisfaction. There is among com-
mon readers a genuine interest in scientific research, a desire to follow as far as a layman 
can what is being found and to understand the implications of these findings […] there are 
not a few scientists who have written books that to some extent satisfy our needs. 
Unfortunately, however, there are other famous scientists who do not seem to realize that 
their subject has an intrinsic interest for the common reader, and accordingly they seek to 
arouse his emotions, thereby inducing a frame of mind inimical to intellectual discernment. 
Popularizations of such a kind constitute a grave danger to thinking clearly. […] Yet we 
common readers surely have a right to expect that a scientist setting out to discuss for our 
benefit philosophical problems arising from his special studies will do so in a scientific 
spirit. He would seem to be under a special obligation to avoid cheap emotionalism and 
specious appeals, and to write as clearly as the difficult nature of the subject-matter permits. 
(Stebbing 1937, 4ff.)
Similar to Neurath’s approach, Stebbing’s rejection is directed ultimately against 
the ignorance of experts that leads to inappropriate simplifications, imprecise gen-
eralizations or abstractions and distortions of facts. As she also stated in Thinking to 
Some Purpose (1939, 30, 238f.), this favors that “muddled thinking” which stands 
in the way of purposeful logical thinking and makes it susceptible to instrumental-
ization, for example by political authorities. Moreover, she called for a use of lan-
guage that is appropriate to the subject and that reflects one’s own type of 
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communication, especially from those who influence a society’s politics, social 
affairs and science. She also emphasized that there could be no absolute, “neutral” 
and objective knowledge, and that even attempts to enlighten should always be 
examined.
Her understanding of knowledge seems to resemble Neurath’s approach as 
described in his well-known ship simile (Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel 1996, 
89–95). Also for Stebbing, science is a collective undertaking based on intersubjec-
tively achieved knowledge that remains contextually bound and revisable:
Science is the work of scientists, who, profiting by each other’s labours, come gradually to 
achieve an agreed body of knowledge, and in the course of this achievement continually 
develop new and more powerful technical methods. The natural scientist observes, formu-
lates hypotheses, performs experiments, and verifies his theoretical constructions. A scien-
tific law worthy of the name of a Principle […] is achieved only by the labours of scientists 
working within a certain context of agreed theory, subject no doubt from time to time to 
considerable revision, but capable of being taken as the main basis for further advance. 
(Stebbing 1937, 69.)
Overall, Stebbing’s approach is to combine theory and practice, i.e. to link the 
principles of logic with pedagogical goals in everyday contexts and make them 
usable for the public sphere and for social and political debate. This ultimately con-
nects her approach with Neurath’s.10 He writes the following in his essay “Universal 
Jargon and Terminology” (1941/1983, 217): “It is not only by accident that L. Susan 
Stebbing wrote on the one hand a book criticizing highly metaphysical speculations 
of modern physicists and on the other hand her Thinking to Some Purpose and her 
Ideals and Illusions. It will be stimulating when we new critics of our language will 
be criticized by means of the procedures we proposed.”
Regardless of her interest in principle, however, Stebbing was quite critical of 
some positions of logical empiricism represented by members of the Vienna Circle, 
including Otto Neurath, especially of their criticism of metaphysics as Beaney and 
Chapman (2017) have emphasized. Nevertheless, she can be seen as a mediator 
between positions in the Vienna Circle and the Cambridge School – although her 
achievements extend beyond that. Beaney and Chapman also note that
she saw no discrepancy between the rigours of logical argument and the requirements of 
practical problem solving, and stressed the need for clarity and transparency in language 
use. In this, she championed the importance to philosophers of paying attention to ordinary 
language and the varieties of its everyday use somewhat in advance of the rise of ‘ordinary 
language philosophy’ in Oxford after the Second World War. (Beaney and Chapman 2017.)
Neurath himself was convinced that in Stebbing the logician he had found an 
interlocutor who shared his interest in visual communication, language criticism 
and socio-political thinking. On 12 February 1938, he wrote to her, “you are flesh of 
the flesh of logical empiricism.”11
In his examination of her writings and in the correspondence between the two 
which has yet to be studied in detail, Neurath clearly received ideas for his own 
10 For the relation of (social and political) practice and theory, see Don Howard’s chapter in the 
present volume.
11 Neurath to Stebbing, 12 February 1938, Corr. No. 303. (ONN).
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work. In exile he was also looking for other avenues to explore and other ways to 
further expand his readership, for example by working with the Adprint book pack-
ager and via publications for the Anglo-American book market. As president of 
ISOTYPE in Oxford, Stebbing was only able to guide the further development of 
the institute until 1943.12 In a letter to Rudolf Carnap dated 25 September 1943, 
Neurath wrote that “Stebbing died after a cancer operation. […] Our best friend. A 
very brave and sincere personality. Many people in England feel her death a heavy 
loss. She represented a kind of public conscience for some circles. We loved her. 
[…] She acted as chairman, as I lectured in Cambridge, in a very nice way, and in 
agreement with most of my statements.”13
17.2  Clarity in Thought and Expression: The Picture-Text 
Style and the Integrated Book
In his preface to Modern Man in the Making, Otto Neurath described the visual style 
developed to present the book’s content  – a historical-sociological view of the 
global development of modern man, cultures, wars, business and scientific and med-
ical progress – as follows:
An attempt has been made to evolve for this purpose a special picture-text-style which 
should enable anybody to walk through the modern world that is beginning to appear about 
us and see it as he may see a landscape with its hills and plains, woods and meadows. […] 
The principle of visualization applied in this book is based on the ISOTYPE method, devel-
oped by me together with my collaborators during the last fifteen years. It shows connex-
ions between facts instead of discussing them. Impressive visual aids do not merely act as 
illustrations or as eye-bait in this book; they are parts of the explanations themselves. The 
reader may not understand the contents by reading the text only; he must ‘read’ the pictures 
as carefully as the text. An international picture language is combined with a world lan-
guage. (Neurath 1939, 7f.)
The form of knowledge transfer described here was not simply a further develop-
ment of the Viennese method of visualizing statistical data that arose in Austria in 
the 1920s and was used extensively at the Österreichisches Gesellschafts- und 
Wirtschaftsmuseum (Social and Economic Museum of Vienna).14 It was a question 
12 The ISOTYPE collection at the archive of the University of Reading apparently contains no 
further documents or letters by L. Susan Stebbing.
13 Neurath to Carnap, 25 September 1943 (RC 102–55-03); see letter 22 in the present volume.
14 As part of Neurath’s work at the Museum for Social and Economic Affairs which he directed 
from 1925 on, a major focus was on disseminating new scientific and socio-politically relevant 
information on behalf of the Vienna City Administration, the Chamber of Labour and the Social 
Insurance Institutes. For example, quantitative statistical data and facts that had been widely dis-
tributed in newspapers and magazines since the end of the nineteenth century were to be translated 
into graphical form for the purposes of popular enlightenment. The “Vienna Method,” which had 
become known in Austria and abroad via exhibitions, publications and lectures, ended in 1934 with 
the expulsion of almost all permanent employees into exile. Also in exile, Neurath continued the 
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of finding a new style of communication for another medium,15 which in view of the 
changes brought by war and exile could continue pursuing pedagogical aims in the 
service of the general public just as effectively as scientific work in the Unity of 
Science movement. For Neurath (1996, 259), the two aims were inseparable: “The 
educational background for Visual Education is that of Unified Science.” On 8 April 
1939 he wrote to Stebbing, “You know I plan to prepare a Visual Thesaurus in our 
institute, as a ‘pendant’ (companion pair) to our Encyclopedia. The one Unification 
by Visualization, the other Unification by Logicalisation.”16
The aim was to promote the conditions for cooperation across social boundaries 
and national borders, because for Neurath the (re-)construction of a tolerant and 
democratic world society depended on this. Just as Stebbing called for critical 
thinking, precise analysis and the conscious use of language, i.e. non-manipulative, 
emotional and streamlined transfer of knowledge to facilitate logical thinking and 
the formation of one’s own judgment in the direction of practical democratic action, 
Neurath (1996, 263) too strove for a consistent, internationally understandable 
“neutral” transfer of information made possible by the visualization of data – “a 
comprehensive Visual Education Scheme.” This visual style should be objective and 
easily accessible without being boring or aesthetically unattractive, applicable 
equally to the humanities and natural sciences, addressing high and mass culture or 
even different target groups, adults and children alike. Neurath (1996, 262) did see 
some exceptions, such as content with a high degree of abstraction: “Subjects that 
depend on verbal expression only cannot be taught by pictures, e.g. theological or 
philosophical doctrines. It is however perfectly possible to make quite complicated 
matters of fact intelligible by pictures.” Generally speaking, therefore, he was con-
cerned with the search for “[…] possible ways of transferring simple scientific 
knowledge by means of a common visual language, as it were, in a common visual 
style” (Neurath 1996, 253).
Neurath had devoted great attention to historical models and developing the visu-
alization of information, of both a scientific and non-scientific nature, in his other 
pictorial educational writings, especially in manuscripts that were only published 
posthumously (From Hieroglyphics to Isotype. A visual autobiography, and “Visual 
Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation”). As he explained in his publica-
tion planned for the “common reader” created as a supplement to the scientific text 
(“Visual Education”), he was not interested in the aesthetic quality of the images, 
work with a small staff (especially Marie Reidemeister and Gerd Arntz); without the concrete 
framework of the museum, however, the content and type of work had to adapt to new require-
ments. See Burke, Kindle, Walker (2013), Nikolow (2006), (2007), and Angélique Groß’s chapter 
in the present volume.
15 Marie Neurath (1973, 63f.) recalled the situation as follows: “I remember when Otto and I were 
walking together one evening along the street to post several letters and we were talking about 
Modern Man. Otto remarked that we had only to put together some of the many things we had done 
in the past; and for once it was my turn to suggest: why not use this chance to make something 
different? It was all in our hands. And so the picture-text style idea was born that night. It certainly 
came more from his brain than from mine, but I did present one real gift to him at that time, the 
word ‘Isotype.’ He heard it and liked it, and asked Arntz the next day to design an Isotype trade-
mark.” See also the role of former employee Rudolf Modley in Ihara (2013, 325).
16 Neurath to Stebbing, 8 April 1939, Corr. No. 304. (ONN).
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but in the image as a sign, as a means of communication, as an “informative pic-
ture.” However, given the long historical tradition of visualizing content such as the 
knowledge of prehistoric cultures, the magical and religious ideas of the ancient 
Egyptians, astronomical observations and geometric drawings, or works such as 
maps up to and including the Orbis Pictus of Amos Comenius, Humboldt’s Cosmos 
and the French Encyclopedia, Neurath considered that the time had come to com-
bine visualization with modern logical reasoning. In his Visual Education, for 
example, he explained that modern transfer of knowledge required closer links 
between verbal and visual education.
Two streams come together in modern visual education. One is visualisation in general and 
the other is logical arguing. Arguing requires a tradition. Our tradition in arguing and visu-
alisation developed in the Church of the Middle Ages. Both can become secularised; this 
process has been supported by printing. Perhaps there is something in the idea that the 
parallel – scholasticism and visual aids in the Church – may find its counterpart in modern 
scientific arguing, together with visual aids. (Neurath 1996, 280).
Two things are expressed here. On the one hand, the method of close argumenta-
tional connections between text and image that Neurath strove for and achieved in 
Modern Man in the Making, which had also been possible in technically non- 
complicated ways even in the colorfully illuminated pages of medieval codexes was 
now facilitated by current technical innovations. These innovations made it increas-
ingly easy to produce books and print illustrations in high quantity and quality. They 
included typesetting and rotary machines for print and reproduction purposes, 
coated paper (not only for plate sections) to gradually eliminate separating text and 
plate into different printed sheets, the successive use of offset printing and not least 
of all the rapid spread of photography at the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth 
century.17 The combination of text and images in newspapers, magazines and adver-
tising became more closely linked and complex, which affected the style of book 
illustrations.18
On the other hand, this type of knowledge transfer became particularly relevant 
for Neurath as a basis for socially responsible action against the background of 
social and political crises. “Sincere arguing is something of international impor-
tance because it creates a common basis for discussions and decisions. All tenden-
cies towards what may be called logical empiricism are therefore particularly 
closely connected with consistent visual education. Both start from ordinary man’s 
commonsense and are in full harmony with highly developed scientific activities” 
(Neurath 1996, 285). It is precisely here that Neurath’s unbroken trust in education 
and science can be seen. As Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel (1996, 3) observe, 
“[a]lthough he was a pluralist about knowledge systems and took seriously their 
historical and cultural roots, he trusted firmly in the power of science.”
During World War Two, Adprint developed two series for the British publisher 
G. G. Harrap with financial support from the Ministry of Information. The Soviets 
17 See Heiting (2012, 6–10); Lucius (2012, 315–320) and Peters (2012, 21–22).
18 One example is the work of the medical doctor and non-fiction author Fritz Kahn, who collabo-
rated with his friend Paul Steiner on several book projects in exile. A business partner of Wolfgang 
Foges, Steiner had opened a branch of Adprint in New York and later very successfully managed 
it himself. On Fritz Kahn see Debschitz, (2009) and (2013) and on Steiner see Körber (2014).
17 Thinking About the “Common Reader:” Otto Neurath, L. Susan Stebbing…
460
and Ourselves and America and Britain were intended to make the British people 
more familiar with the everyday life and the political and economic systems of the 
other Allies. The New Democracy series for the Nicholson & Watson publishing 
house was intended to provide post-war British society with information and expert 
advice on important matters. The books were produced by Adprint and use Isotype 
graphics and photographs to illustrate the content. (Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype 
Collection, University of Reading, Figs. 17.1, 17.2, and 17.3)
As mentioned above, however, Neurath’s visual picture-text style in books was 
associated with special system-based, organizational and technical requirements. 
Moreover, due to the limited resources available in exile, finding a suitable partner 
seemed the only way to secure the requisite technical know-how and the consider-
able funding needed for color reproduction and printing in order to produce further 
publications of this kind. Because Neurath’s Modern Man in the Making had proven 
to be a success the American publisher Alfred A. Knopf offered him a follow-up 
project, but this eventually did not come to fruition on account of his having to flee 
again, this time from Holland. Even though Neurath was able to continue later his 
research on the planned topic (“Persecution and Brotherhood”) in Oxford as well, 
he never got more than a few pages of notes.
A more sustainable form of collaboration was launched following Neurath’s 
release from the internment camp to which he and Marie Reidemeister (later 
Neurath) had been sent after their flight. The Neuraths and their staff at the Isotype 
institute participated in these book projects with a small group of German-language 
publishers in exile19 in Great Britain who fled Nazi persecution in the 1930s and 
19 The terms exile, emigration and forced migration are understood here synonymously as non-
freely chosen flight from the country of origin to a country of refuge on account of political and/or 
racist persecution, although exile research has long differentiated between groups of exile and emi-
grants in terms of causes, return interests, language behaviour etc. See especially the publication 
series Exilforschung – Ein internationales Jahrbuch, e.g.: Krohn and Winckler (2012, VII-XIV).
Fig. 17.1 The New 
Democracy: Education. 
The New Horizon
Book cover of a title from 
1947. The books were 
produced by Adprint, the 
sociologist Karl Mannheim 
was a member of the editorial 
committee, and Neurath’s 
Isotype Institute was 
responsible for the visualiza-
tion of the volume in 
coordination with the authors
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1940s, including the publisher Wolfgang Foges (1910–1986). According to Marie 
Neurath, Foges was already familiar with Otto Neurath’s ideas when he emigrated 
to Great Britain (Neurath and Kinross 2009, 65). Both came from the same intel-
lectual Viennese milieu and shared an interest in modern science, art and a visual 
culture established through new media.20 In an interview in 1964, Foges described 
Otto Neurath as “the most important influence on my thinking” (cited in Hamilton 
1964). Foges lived in London since 1937, and had previously published an illus-
trated magazine.21 His Adprint company produced primarily illustrated non-fiction 
20 See Burke (2010, XIII). On the influence of emigrated Jewish publishers, scientists and editors 
in the UK see James (1999, 371–377).
21 Foges was editor-in-chief of the Moderne Welt Verlag and the illustrated magazine Moderne Welt 
for art, literature and fashion in Vienna. It was founded in 1918 by the international company 
Fig. 17.2 The New 
Democracy: Woman and a 
New Society
This book, published in 1946 
in The New Democracy 
series, was written by Karl 
Mannheim’s research 
assistant, the German 
sociologist Charlotte Lütkens
Fig. 17.3 The Soviets and 
Ourselves: How do you do 
Tovarish?
This volume, published in 
1947 in the series The Soviets 
and Ourselves, was created 
for the publisher 
G.G. Harrap, subsidized by 
the Ministry of Information
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books in series, initially with the financial support of Lord Glenconner (Tennant & 
Son).22 Foges worked with other German-speaking emigrants, including Eva 
Feuchtwang (1908–1999), Walter Neurath (1903–1967, no relation to Otto Neurath) 
and Paul Steiner (1913–1996)23 who headed the US branch of Adprint in New York. 
The core group was supported by other creative emigrants from Germany and 
Austria, such as graphic artists, photographers and picture editors – a new profes-
sional occupation at the time.24
Adprint achieved its first successes with the production of the illustrated King 
Penguin series starting in 1939, which essentially copied the German Insel-Bücherei 
series launched in 1912 (see Lambert 2009, 114). Penguin’s small-format introduc-
tions to history, nature and wildlife, preferably those of Great Britain, contained an 
average of 16 color illustrations plus black-and-white images and made ideal and 
relatively inexpensive gifts (see Edwards and Hall 1988). The Adprint programme 
consisted of popular general education works ranging from culture and history to 
nature and technology. Adprint was probably the first publisher to be known as a 
“book packager,” and thanks to this organizational form was also able to engage in 
productive joint projects (Ridler 1976, 9). A book packager was a book producer 
that designed books on behalf of or for publishers and produced them up to a pre- 
press stage, or also did commission printing (Schlitzer 2007, 13). Paul Steiner, 
Wolfgang Foges’ friend and later business partner, wrote in his unpublished autobi-
ography that this was a new business model that focussed on technically and orga-
nizationally complex publications with extensive picture material and text (see also 
Ridler 1976, 4).
Foges had the brilliant idea to establish a publishing house based on the principle of creat-
ing books, that is a publishing house whose sole purpose was to conceive books and book 
series, to commission the texts from competent authors, but not to worry about distribution 
[…], instead selling […] the edition to an established publisher. Since the books in question 
were invariably non-fiction books that were conceived by an in-house editorial team and 
because those non-fiction book series lend themselves to illustration, Foges’ book creation 
house was not just responsible for the text of the individual volumes, but also for the art-
work. (Steiner, undated, 421f.)
This new production process required a modified organizational structure with a 
more team-oriented approach than was customary at traditional publishing houses. 
Wiener Weltmode (Chic Parisienne Bachwitz AG) and changed hands several times before Foges 
became involved. See ANNO, the database of the Austrian National Library http://anno.onb.ac.at/
info/dmw_info.htm
22 According to John Spiers, innovative book series can express publishers’ self-image and creative 
visions. At the same time, such serial artefacts function as an independent system that can define 
public and personal fields of meaning and convey perspectives on the respective historical situa-
tions. See Spiers (2011, 1–61), also Lambert (2009, 113f).
23 For this and other biographical information on the individuals mentioned, see Fischer (2011, 
78f., 227f., 312), and for Paul Steiner see Körber (2014).
24 For an in-depth analysis from an exile research perspective of the influence of German-language 
Jewish publishers on the British book market, especially art books, see Nyberg (2009, 51).
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In particular, in order to establish the successive text-image connections created 
with Isotype in what were known as “integrated layouts,” close coordination was 
needed between internal employees such as text and image editors, and external 
authors, photographers and designers. This type of cooperation would also become 
important in further developing illustrated non-fiction books.25 The increasingly 
sophisticated production of heavily illustrated non-fiction books, which became 
successively differentiated and professionalized in the second half of the twentieth 
century, was most efficiently managed by creative teams working in concert (Körber 
2016) (Figs. 17.4 and 17.5).
The principle of cooperation among editors, authors and graphic designers in 
planning and producing publications can already be seen in the first edition of 
25 For reasons of space further attention cannot be devoted to the development of the non-fiction or 
illustrated non-fiction book. In brief, these are non-fiction, entertaining and comprehensible pre-
sentations of current and complex information, which can also contain illustrations, for readers 
without specific training in the respective field. Although such books have been produced at the 
latest since the Enlightenment, the idea of popularizing specialized knowledge gained a new qual-
ity following World War One. For more information see Voges (2012), Körber (2016).
Fig. 17.4 Double page spread from the The New Democracy series: Women and a New Society (1946)
Women and a New Society: “Comparison is an educational element,” says Neurath in his posthu-
mously published “Visual Education.” A double-page spread from the Adprint publication shows 
how this principle can be implemented in layout design. Neurath also noted that this would encour-
age recipients to draw comparisons themselves – whether on the level of individual characteristics 
or topics. (Otto and Marie Neurath Isotype Collection, University of Reading)
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Adprint’s Future Books: Overture series which started appearing in 1946. Like the 
similarly named Future Magazine, the series addressed socially relevant topics from 
culture to technology. “So far as method is concerned teamwork is the idea behind 
FUTURE books. It governs the planning of the series […] it underlies the marriage 
of written and visual exposition which marks these books out from other miscella-
nies” (Milne 1946, 1). Especially with respect to technology, illustrated newspapers 
and magazines tended to make more professional and flexible use of pictorial mate-
rial at this time than book publishers, as Paul Steiner (undated, 422) explains in his 
memoirs. Since the time at the museum in Vienna,26 close cooperation among spe-
cialists and experimentation with the processes of conveying information had played 
a key role at the Isotype Institute, and now fit in well with the developing 
 organizational structures at Adprint. In addition, Foges and his staff cooperated with 
external serial editors and editors-in-chief of the publishing houses involved, for 
example in the case of the Britain in Pictures series (Carney 1995, 14–17).
26 Teams of scientists, statisticians and other specialists compiled information as part of the “Vienna 
Method,” employing a modernist, clear design under the direction of the progressive graphic 
designer Gerd Arntz, as was also taught at the Bauhaus with which Neurath was connected. See 
Galison (1990, 709–752) and Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter in the present volume.
Fig. 17.5 Double page spread from the first volume of the Future Book series (1946)
The Future Books series was produced by Adprint from 1946 to 1952. The series concept is based 
on a closely linked structure of text, photographs, maps and ISOTYPE graphics as can be seen on 
this double page from the first volume entitled Overture. The modern design of the books and the 
magazine of the same name was developed in close creative coordination and cooperation among 
Adprint employees, well-known authors, photographers and the Isotype Institute. (Otto and Marie 
Neurath Isotype Collection, University of Reading)
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The concept behind Adprint’s book publications on general educational topics 
was clearly based essentially on the interplay of image and text, or rather focused 
primarily on staging pictorial material for the construction of meaning. In general, 
the content was created in the course of its conceptualization in the interplay of text 
and visual design of double pages as smallest units up to longer sequences within 
the book. The types and formats of images for the respective publication were com-
bined with units of text that could take the form of main, special or image texts. 
Comprehension of the content was therefore no longer bound to the text alone. 
Germano Facetti, as art director for Foges and later as the designer responsible for 
reworking the Penguin Classics series, described the works produced by Foges and 
integrated books in general as follows: “The flow of images, captions and diagrams 
was planned like a documentary film; but unlike a film the book could be opened at 
any page to provide leads onward and backward in the text […] the images and the 
graphics follow a track where the essence of the text is underlined […] in ‘close- 
ups’ enhancing the art works and in ‘sequences’ integrated in the text” (Facetti 
1964, 53, 57).
The influence of this new and variegated media, which according to Neurath 
could be used most effectively for transferring knowledge, was now clearly evident 
when different media and presentation techniques were used. “It is manifest how 
fruitful a film presentation may become if it intentionally combines documentary 
and diagrammatic techniques, just as a book can combine photographs and dia-
grams with the text” (Neurath 2010, 120). While a close connection between text 
and image on double pages and over longer sequences was a distinctive feature of 
many of Adprint publications, the image material itself could vary – from photos 
and maps to pictograms and art reproductions.
Adprint was very successful in the UK book market and worked with publishers 
such as Collins, Hamlyn, Harrap, Muller, Pitman and the UK Ministry of Information 
(see Lambert 2009, 114). As Jim Aulich (2012, 343–366) explains, it was the con-
temporary combination of affordable but visually innovative and high-quality books 
that made Adprint an interesting business partner, particularly for the Ministry of 
Information – and especially with regard to positive propaganda on “mutual under-
standing” amongst the Allies against National Socialism. With the support of the 
Ministry of Information, the book series entitled The Soviets and Ourselves and 
America and Britain were published by G.G. Harrap and distinguished themselves 
with elaborate color prints of Isotype graphics and photographs. Their covers were 
designed by the German artist John Heartfield (né Helmut Herzfelde), a pioneer of 
photomontage, among others.
The special style of the books developed by Adprint was regarded by the British 
book trade as belonging to the German-language book culture, for example in the 
tradition of the Bauhaus Verlag (publishing house) (see Nyburg 2009, 226). 
However, the actual design of the individual series varied from case to case: the 
modern, diversified publications which were made in collaboration with the Isotype 
Institute and which could be produced particularly elaborately thanks to the support 
of the Ministry of Information, stood out in the field (Burke, Kindel and Walker 
2013, 360). But continuous improvement of the quality of images under the direc-
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tion of production manager Walter Neurath also affected the overall impression of 
other series. However, the scope for content and design was limited not least of all 
by factors such as paper shortages, high overall production costs for color prints and 
an inadequate production infrastructure in the UK (see Hogben 1949, 262; Kinross 
2010, 120–145; James 1999, 371–377). After Otto Neurath’s death, Foges contin-
ued to produce books with Marie Neurath and the Isotype Institute, especially for 
children and young people (Walker 2013). He continued his activity as a book pro-
ducer and founded a new book packaging company called Aldus Books Ltd., which 
worked together with houses like Doubleday in New York (Lambert 2009, 116f.).
Walter Neurath, who played a major role in many of Adprint’s successes, founded 
his own publishing house in 1949 with Eva Feuchtwang whom he would later marry. 
Over the decades to come, Thames & Hudson became an international leader in the 
art and culture sectors (Rosenthal 2009, 111–122; Fischer 2011, 227f.). Here, too, the 
principle of democratizing art books continued to yield mass-produced but inexpen-
sive works of high quality. The same applied to art books from Phaidon Press, another 
house founded by German-speaking emigrants in England (Fischer 1999, 289–309). 
But unlike Phaidon and similar publishers, Thames & Hudson used as many color 
illustrations as possible, which were presented in the integrated layouts already devel-
oped and proven by Adprint. The rising demands on print quality and the greater 
number of color illustrations were financed by a system of international co-produc-
tions perfected by Walter Neurath, which spread the production and printing costs as 
well as the financial risk across various publishing houses (Craker 1985, 9f.). This 
enabled long print runs, which in turn lowered the production price per copy. As a 
consequence, book concepts and designs had to be developed to enable extensive 
international compatibility among texts and illustrations. Foges had already striven for 
this type of international distribution and cooperation by establishing a branch office 
in New  York, but was not in a position to achieve these goals until after the war 
(Lambert 2009, 118). Thames & Hudson, by contrast, began in the 1950s under com-
pletely different conditions. It enjoyed increasing political and economic stability in a 
society with growing purchasing power and a consistent demand for illustrative book 
formats, including high-quality color prints.27
As the book trade acquired greater degrees of internationalization, the combina-
tion of proven design and production principles with a range of topics suitable for 
international distribution proved to be sustainable over the long term for popular 
illustrated works of non-fiction – as perfected for art books at Thames & Hudson and 
by Foges’ partner Paul Steiner at Chanticleer Press in the USA, for which space 
27 The effects of these correlations on book production conditions can be seen in the business cor-
respondence between Adprint (in particular Wolfgang Foges and Walter Neurath) and Otto 
Neurath/Isotype. It is housed in the Isotype collection at the archive of the Institute for Typography 
and Graphic Communication at the University of Reading, UK: Isotype Collection 1: Isotype 
Institute Correspondence (1941–1945). See also Eve (2009) for difficulties in the cooperation after 
Otto Neurath’s death.
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considerations here prevent further elaboration.28 In Germany, some books by Foges 
and especially those by Thames & Hudson and Paul Steiners have been published 
very successfully by Droemer Knaur in collaboration with the publisher Willy 
Droemer as Bildsachbücher (illustrated non-fiction books),29 and this production 
and distribution model has survived internationally to this day.
17.3  Conclusion
Even in exile, Neurath continued to study potential new methods of transferring 
knowledge in science and society. These efforts gained a new dynamic in his 
exchange with the philosopher L. Susan Stebbing, as can only be touched on in this 
article. In combination with the tried and tested transformation of visual data into a 
densely woven “picture-text style,” the logical principles of the subsequent critical 
examination of common language became an additional means of making knowl-
edge content available to a mass audience for Neurath. Against the background of 
his theoretical examination of the historical development of visual communication, 
this was intended to broaden the possibilities of purely linguistic transfer of knowl-
edge toward a more structural-contextual understanding of content that could also 
keep pace with the diversification of media in books at the time. Conscious and 
careful handling of the selection of information and of the choice of language, such 
as the avoidance of technical terminology, was directed against the inappropriate 
and popularizing simplification that both Neurath and Stebbing condemned. Both 
demanded a respectful and serious approach to the transfer of knowledge in order to 
strengthen judgment and logical thinking on the part of the “common reader” as a 
prerequisite for social participation in modern democracies. Education and training 
were therefore not understood as simply passing on information, but rather were 
associated with the ability to think, analyze and argue in structured ways.
As of 1941 Neurath pursued this approach by further developing the “picture- 
text style” in publication projects with the book packager Adprint. The resulting so 
called integrated layouts were an overall attempt to develop book series in coopera-
tion with image and text editors, graphic designers, authors and photographers, 
forming an argumentative syntax of information in terms of content and physical 
integration. The idea that this should not be a “naïve” objective but nevertheless 
appropriate reproduction of knowledge was already evident in the self-image and 
differentiated processes of selecting and transforming information which were also 
fundamental to the creation of ISOTYPE symbols. As Neurath (1939, 7) wrote, 
“How can facts be presented without causing confusion by their overwhelming 
28 See Fischer (2011) and Körber (2014) for further information on Paul Steiner.
29 As stated in the publisher’s autumn 1961 programme, the “new book type” was a “requirement 
of the times:” the illustrated book of the past was no longer sufficient; a new, closer connection 
between images and words was to be created, a new type of Bild-Band (picture book) which was 
also non-fiction. See Droemer Gesamtkatalog (Autumn 1961, 3f).
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diversity? The visualization of selected primary material connected with simple 
statements is one solution. Even such ‘selection’ influences readers in a certain 
direction, but one can interpret the same facts in different senses and augment 
them.”
This approach to book design differed markedly from that of non-fiction vol-
umes that conveyed their contents primarily through text accompanied by a few 
secondary illustrations. Via collaboration between ISOTYPE and Adprint and their 
successors, these ideas and concepts found their way into the practices and methods 
of structuring and systematizing text and images in the illustrated non-fiction book 
genre – a development that can only be hinted at here. While individual elements of 
visual design and content structure were not in themselves innovations in book pro-
duction, the systematic approach and the exploitation of new technical possibilities 
for more cost-effective and therefore mass reproduction and printing technology 
must be seen as influential for modern, highly visual book design.30 As has been 
noted on numerous occasions, these possibilities were assessed by a generation of 
German-speaking emigrants in the twentieth century for a new culture of visualiz-
ing information in the Anglo-American book market.31 The aim was to reconcile the 
strong socio-political awareness, pedagogical goals and influences of the new visual 
mass culture. Especially in the field of conveying information for general and fur-
ther education, the “picture-text style” for books was to no small extent a material 
expression of changing cultural techniques and concepts of knowledge in response 
to political and social crises and upheavals of the time.
Acknowledgments This article is the result of an ongoing doctoral research project at the 
Department of Philosophy, Humboldt-University zu Berlin, which was supported by scholarships 
from the German Historical Institute in London and Washington, DC, and an 
Elsa-Neumann-Scholarship.
References
Abel, Richard, and Gordon Graham. 2009. The Impact of Expatriate Publishers in Britain and 
America in the 20th Century. New Brunswick/London: Immigrant Publishers/Transaction 
Publishers.
Aulich, Jim. 2012. Stealing the Thunder: The Soviet Union and Graphic Propaganda on the Home 
Front during the Second World War. Visual Culture in Britain 13 (2): 343–366.
Beaney, Michael. 2003. Susan Stebbing on Cambridge and Vienna Analysis. In The Vienna Circle 
and Logical Empiricism, ed. Friedrich Stadler, 339–350. Dordrecht: Springer.
Beaney, Michael, and Siobhan Chapman. 2017. Susan Stebbing. In The Stanford Encyclopedia 
of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta. https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/steb-
bing/ Accessed 15 Apr 2018.
Burke, Christopher. 2010. Introduction. In Neurath (2010): VII–XVIII.
30 See James (1999); Fischer (2003); Kinross (2009), Lambert (2009); Nyburg (2009).
31 See e.g. Kinross (2009) and Abel – Graham (2009).
S. Körber
469
Burke, Christopher, Eric Kindel, and Sue Walker, eds. 2013. Isotype: Design and Contexts 1925–
1971. London: Hyphen Press.
Carney, Michael. 1995. Britain in Pictures. A History and Bibliography. London: Werner Shaw 
Ltd.
Cartwright, Nancy, Jordi Cat, Lola Fleck, and Thomas Uebel. 1996. Otto Neurath: Philosophy 
Between Science and Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chapman, Siobhan. 2013. Susan Stebbing and the Language of Common Sense. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Craker, Trevor. 1985. Opening Accounts and Closing Memories. Thirty Years with Thames and 
Hudson. London: Thames & Hudson.
Debschitz, Uta von, and Thilo von Debschitz. 2009. Fritz Kahn – Man Machine. Vienna: Springer.
———. 2013. Fritz Kahn. Cologne: Taschen.
Droemer Gesamtkatalog. 1961 (Autumn). Munich: Droemersche Verlgsanstalt.
Edwards, Russell, and David J. Hall. 1988. So Much Admired: Die Insel Bücherei and the King 
Penguin Series. Edinburgh: Salvia Books.
Eve, Matthew. 2009. Isotype in trouble, 1946–1948. In Modern Typography in Britain: Graphic 
Design, Politics, and Society, Typography Papers 8, ed. Paul Stiff, 129–134. London: Hyphen 
Press.
Facetti, Germano. 1964. The integrated book. The Penrose Annual 57: 51–58.
Fischer, Ernst. 1999. The Phaidon Press in Vienna, 1923–1938. Visual Resources 15 (3): 289–309.
———. 2003. Buchgestaltung im Exil 1933–1950. Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Exilarchivs. 
Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz.
———. 2011. Verleger, Buchhändler und Antiquare aus Deutschland und Österreich in der 
Emigration nach 1933. Ein biographisches Handbuch. Elbingen: Verband deutscher Antiquare 
e.V.
Galison, Peter. 1990. Aufbau/Bauhaus. Logical Positivism and Arcitectural Modernism. Critical 
Inquiry 16 (4): 709–752.
Hamilton, Ian. 1964. Visionary bookman. The Guardian, 10 November 1964.
Heiting, Manfred. 2012. Autopsie: Anschauung, Information und Analyse. Über die Sammlung 
zur Wissenschaft. In Autopsie. Deutschsprachige Fotobücher 1918 bis 1945, ed. R. Jäger, 6–10. 
Göttingen: Steidl.
Hogben, Lancelot. 1949. From Cave Painting to Comic Strip. New York: Chanticleer Press.
Ihara, Hisayasu. 2013. Isotype in America: Otto Neurath and Rudolf Modley. In Burke, Kindel, 
and Walker (2013): 298–353.
James, Clive. 1999. On the Library Coffee-Table. Visual Resources 15 (3): 371–377. Special Issue: 
The Early History of the Phaidon Press, 1926–1967.
Kinross, Robin. 2009. Design in Central-European London: Interactions between Émigrés and 
Natives in the 1940s. In Modern Typography in Britain: Graphic Design, Politics, and Society, 
Typography Papers 8, ed. Paul Stiff, 105–112. London: Hyphen Press.
———. 2010. Modern Typography. An Essay in Critical History. London: Hyphen Press.
Körber, Silke. 2014. Paul Steiner. Transatlantic Perspectives. http://www.transatlanticperspec-
tives.org/entry.php?rec=162 Accessed on 15 Apr 2018.
———. 2016. The Democratization of Knowledge and a New Visual Culture: Popular Illustrated 
Non-Fiction Books by German-speaking Émigré Publishers in Britain during and after the 
Second World War. Publishing History 76: 57–76.
Krohn, Claus-Dieter, and Lutz Winckler (eds.). 2012. Exilforschung. Ein internationales Jahrbuch, 
ed. Gesellschaft für Exilforschung 30, 2012: Exilforschungen im historischen Prozess. 
Hamburg: edition text + kritik.
Lambert, David. 2009. Wolfgang Foges and the new illustrated book in Britain: Adprint, Rathbone 
Books, and Aldus Books. In Modern Typography in Britain: Graphic Design, Politics, and 
Society, Typography Papers 8, ed. Paul Stiff, 113–128. London: Hyphen Press.
Lucius, Wulf D. von. 2012. Buchgestaltung und Buchkunst. In Geschichte des deutschen 
Buchhandels im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Die Weimarer Republik 1918–1933. Bd. 2, Teil 1, ed. 
E. Fischer and S. Füssel, 315–340. Munich: De Gruyter.
17 Thinking About the “Common Reader:” Otto Neurath, L. Susan Stebbing…
470
Milne, Marjorie B., ed. 1946. Future Books: Volume 1, Overture. London: Leathley Publications.
Neurath, Otto. 1939. Modern Man in the Making. New York: Alfred A. Knopf.
———. 1941/1983. Universal Jargon and Terminology. In Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 
1913–1946, ed. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, 213–229. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
———. 1996. Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation. In Encyclopedia and 
Utopia. The Life and Work of Otto Neurath (1882–1945), ed. Elisabeth Nemeth and Friedrich 
Stadler, 245–335. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
———. 2010. From hieroglyphics to Isotype. A visual autobiography.  Ed. Matthew Eve and 
Christopher Burke. London: Hyphen Press.
Neurath, Marie. 1973. Marie Neurath: 1940–1945. In Empiricism and Sociology, ed. Marie 
Neurath and Robert S. Cohen, 68–75. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
Neurath, Marie, and Robin Kinross. 2009. The Transformer: Principles of Making Isotype Charts. 
London: Hyphen Press.
Nikolow, Sybilla. 2006. Imaginäre Gemeinschaften. Statistische Bilder der Bevölkerung. In 
Konstruierte Sichtbarkeiten. Wissenschafts- und Technikbilder seit der Frühen Neuzeit, ed. 
M. Heßler, 263–278. Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag.
———. 2007. Aufklärung durch und mit Beobachtungstatsachen. Otto Neuraths Bildstatistik 
als Vehikel zur Verbreitung der wissenschaftlichen Weltauffassung des Wiener Kreises. In 
Wissenschaft und Öffentlichkeit als Ressourcen füreinander. Studien zur Wissenschaftsgeschichte 
im 20. Jahrhundert, ed. S.  Nikolow and A.  Schirrmacher, 245–272. Frankfurt/New York: 
Campus.
Nyburg, Anna. 2009. ‘Hardly a trace left of Danube or Spree?’ A contribution to the study of art 
book publishing and illustrated book production in Britain by German-speaking exiles from 
National Socialism. Unpublished dissertation, University of London.
Peters, Dorothea. 2012. Fotografie, Buch und grafisches Gewerbe: Zur Entwicklung der 
Druckverfahren von Fotobüchern. In Autopsie. Deutschsprachige Fotobücher 1918 bis 1945, 
ed. R. Jäger, 12–23. Göttingen: Steidl.
Ridler, Colin. 1976. Out-House Publishing. Oxford: Oxford Polytechnic Press.
Rosenthal, Tom. 2009. Walter and Eva Neurath: Their books married words with pictures. In 
Immigrant Publishers, ed. R.  Abel and G.  Graham, 111–122. New Brunswick/London: 
Transaction Publishers.
Sandner, Günther. 2014. Otto Neurath: Eine politische Biographie. Vienna: Zsolnay.
Schlitzer, Monika. 2007. Langenscheidt Praxiswörterbuch Verlagswesen und Buchhandel 
Englisch. Munich: Langenscheidt.
Spiers, John. 2011. The Culture of the Publisher’s Series, Vol. 1.: Authors, Publishers and the 
Shaping of Taste, ed. J. Spiers. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Stebbing, L. Susan. 1937. Philosophy and the Physicists. London: Methuen.
———. 1939. Thinking to Some Purpose. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Steiner, Paul. Unpublished autobiography, undated. Typescript at the Leo Baeck Institute. 
New York (Acc. No. ME938).
Tuboly, Adam Tamas. 2017. From ‘syntax’ to ‘Semantik’ – Carnap’s Inferentialism and its pros-
pects. Polish Journal of Philosophy 12 (2): 57–78.
Voges, Britt. 2012. Sachbuch- und Ratgeberverlage. In Geschichte des deutschen Buchhandels im 
19. und 20. Jahrhundert. Die Weimarer Republik 1918–1933. Vol. 2, Teil 2, ed. E. Fischer and 
S. Füssel, 241–270. Munich: De Gruyter.
Walker, Sue. 2013. Graphic explanation for children 1944–71. In Burke, Kindel, and Walker 
(2013): 390–419.
S. Körber
471© Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 
J. Cat, A. T. Tuboly (eds.), Neurath Reconsidered,  
Boston Studies in the Philosophy and History of Science 336, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02128-3_18
Chapter 18
Logical Empiricism and Art: 
The Correspondence Otto Neurath/Meyer 
Schapiro
Hans-Joachim Dahms
Abstract Logical Positivists had a very lively interest in the revolutionary science 
of their time, but also in modern art and especially in ‘international style’ architecture. 
Surprisingly they never published a representative volume or longer statement on 
art and architecture. But: it is not well known that Otto Neurath, their leading 
organizer and spokesman, invited the (later on) eminent art historian and critic 
Meyer Schapiro (professor at Columbia University NY) to contribute a volume on 
art to the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Schapiro failed to deliver 
the promised book. But from the extended correspondence and some material in the 
Schapiro papers one can describe the general direction the thing would have taken. 
The correspondence is also very interesting, because it also covers questions of the 
endangered peace and the approaching war, the academic scene in Europe and in the 
USA, and surprisingly: Martin Heidegger. Neurath died in 1945, but Schapiro came 
back to the Heidegger theme in 1968 when he wrote his famous harsh criticism of 
Heidegger’s programmatic long paper “Das Kunstwerk” (the work of art) where he 
interprets one of Van Gogh’s shoe-paintings. Schapiro’s short article caused much 
controversy then (even Jacques Derrida intervened).
After the defeat of the national-socialist dictatorship, logical empiricism was either 
completely forgotten in middle Europe, where it had its roots, or had become a 
subject of polemics. In Austria, its criticism of religion and metaphysics were 
exposed as subversive and even its alleged communist tendencies laid bare1; in the 
Federal Republic of Germany, its focus on philosophy of science and logic to the 
detriment of ethics and aesthetics received devastating criticisms. In leftists circles 
such as the Frankfurt school of critical theory in Germany, the argumentative figure 
of a “double positivism” was created: on the one hand it made the 
1 See for an overview on the situation of philosophy in Vienna after 1945 Dahms and Stadler (2015, 
115–123) and the literature mentioned there.
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(phenomenological) given as the starting point for all knowledge and, on the other, 
it “accepted the (political) given, that is, the social and political status quo, in an 
attitude of conservative quietism” (on this, see Dahms 1994, 303–307).
It took a younger generation of contemporary historians of philosophy to unmask 
these views as prejudices, using research in many archives and interviews with eye-
witnesses. It started – around the late 70s – mainly with the deconstruction of the view 
that “positivists” were worshippers of the socially and politically “given” on issues of 
politics, ethics and morals. In the course of these investigations it emerged that 
exactly the opposite was the case: logical empiricists had belonged in the inter- war 
period in Austria and during the short-lived Weimar Republic in Germany to the small 
minority, which had favored and proclaimed far-reaching reforms of economy, soci-
ety and culture and had promoted these goals through a whole number of activities. 
Nowadays it seems that this new view of the historical “positivism” has prevailed.
In the 90s, although with less intensity, a number of publications examined the 
relationship of the Vienna Circle to culture and the arts. They focused in the 
beginning on the encounters of its members with the Bauhaus in Dessau.2 This line 
of research is in need of an accompanying deeper look into the Austrian scene in 
modern architecture and interior design. Josef Frank (brother of the Circle member 
Philipp Frank, the physicist) played a leading role in the vast housing program of 
“Red Vienna”, together with Otto Neurath, who immediately after his return from 
the short-lived political experiments of the Bavarian revolution in Munich, had 
quickly assumed a leading role in the settlers movement in Vienna (see Thun- 
Hohenstein, Czech, and Hackenschmidt (2016), and Sophie Hochhäusl’s chapter in 
the present volume). The cooperation between these two men proved successful first 
in the reconstruction of the Austrian Werkbund in November of 1928 and reached 
its zenith in the International Werkbund exhibition of modern housing in the summer 
of 1932 in Vienna (see Nierhaus et al. 2012).
Up to now, the relationship of the logical empiricists with art in a narrower sense 
– leaving architecture aside – has received less attention. That is a surprising fact, 
since Franz Roh, Rudolf Carnap’s friend from common years as students in Jena 
(and also Otto Neurath’s savior after the fall of the Soviet Republic of Bavaria in 
may 1919) became later on, in the middle of the 20s, the leading theoretician of the 
movement of “Neue Sachlichkeit” (New Objectivity) (Dahms 2004). Also Gerd 
Arntz, a painter from Cologne and there a member of the left-leaning group 
“Cologne Progressives” of painters and also photographers, was hired by Otto 
Neurath in 1929 for his Social and Economic Museum of Vienna. There he designed 
many pictograms for the Neurathian picture statistics according to the “Vienna 
method” (and later on: ISOTYPE).3
That it took so long before all these themes and issues became research material 
(or even now have to wait for investigations) is in part the logical empiricists’ own 
fault: they were not able to publish anything comprehensive about them (apart from 
2 See, e.g., Galison (1990), Stadler (1995), Dahms (2004), (2019), Bernhard (2015),  (2019a), 
(2019b).
3 See for autobiographical information Arntz (1982) and (1988).
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much cited programmatic trombone sounds in Carnap’s Logical Structure of the 
World (1928/2003) and in the Vienna Circle’s Manifesto; see Carnap, Hahn, 
Neurath (1929/1973).
That the situation stayed that way is, at least in part, the result of a historical 
misfortune, namely, the circumstance that a planned und agreed upon contribution 
about art for Neurath’s International Encyclopedia of Unified Science (IEUS) was 
not finished and delivered. I have in mind the pamphlet Interpretation and Judgment 
of Art, which Meyer Schapiro (Columbia University) had agreed to write. My 
description of this episode is based mainly on the correspondence between Neurath 
and Schapiro (and the publications of the two men, of course). As far as I can see, 
up to now nobody cared to dig into those unpublished papers.4 It would be 
worthwhile to take a closer look at the notes and preliminary papers for the IEUS in 
Meyer Schapiro’s papers at Columbia University.5 There are indeed a number of 
items that belong in the vicinity of the planned contribution, for instance, the piece 
titled “Physicalism in art.” But the required sorting of the material is a difficult 
endeavor: there are preliminary notes and drafts etc. for different encyclopedias, 
among them one for the Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, which are not marked 
among the papers for the later use. To disentangle this knot cannot be achieved in 
this article.
18.1  Themes in the Neurath-Schapiro Correspondence
18.1.1  Schapiro’s Planned Contribution for the IEUS
Neurath and Schapiro knew each other since 1936, when Neurath visited the exiled 
Horkheimer Institute for Social Research, and when was later invited to Columbia 
University. Schapiro (and also Ernest Nagel) accompanied him (Dahms 1999). The 
correspondence between Neurath and Schapiro started in October 1937, when 
Schapiro sent reprints of articles6 after a meeting in which also Schapiro’s wife had 
participated. It continued – with interruptions during World War Two – till the very 
last days before Neurath’s death on 22 December 1945 in Oxford.7 All in all Neurath 
sent 10 letters of sometimes astonishing length,8 and Schapiro sent 10 letters to 
Neurath (among them a telegram from London at the 29th of July 1939, shortly 
before the German aggression of Poland, which started the war).
4 In the otherwise indispensable Neurath biography in Sandner (2014), Schapiro is mentioned 
nowhere.
5 A few of them have been published already in Schapiro (1999a).
6 Schapiro to Neurath, 17 October 1937.
7 The last letters are: Schapiro to Neurath, 9 September, and Neurath to Schapiro 18 September 
1945.
8 Neurath’s last letters have 9 pages (29 September 1942), 6 pages ( 4 September 1945) and 7 pages 
(18 September 1945). Two of Neurath’s letters (29 March 1940 and the very last of 18 September 
1945) carry his typical elephants at the end.
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When, from where and how exactly Schapiro was invited to contribute to the 
IEUS cannot be determined from the correspondence. Aesthetics had not belonged 
to the themes in the initial planning of the IEUS. Still, one comes across ideas for 
such a volume in 1938, when the first contributions had already appeared. In March 
of that year Neurath wrote a letter about the necessity to have such a pamphlet in the 
IEUS to his co-editor Charles Morris and also included a proposal for its author: 
“[…] I am definitely in favour of inserting a booklet by Meyer Schapiro about arts. 
The title should express, that ‘arts’ is the object of scientific analysis. History of art 
should be discussed prominently.”9
While introducing Neurath is not required in this volume, Schapiro on the other 
hand will only be known to very few interested in Neurath – or in general, interested 
in logical empiricism. Therefore some remarks here about his life and work are in 
order. Schapiro was born on the 23rd of April 1904 in Schaulen in the government 
district of Kowno (Russia). Already in his younger years he emigrated with his 
family to the USA. He stayed for the rest of his life in New York, where he also lived 
from 1932 till the end of his life in the same house. He studied art history and 
philosophy at Columbia University and stayed there during his whole academic 
career, from lecturer to assistant professor and to full professor. In contrast to his 
very settled life in New York, in Europe he travelled a lot on trips to museums and 
other sites of artistic significance.
His work shows an unusual span of interests, from antique Roman, medieval 
Romanesque architecture to modern and contemporary art and almost everything in 
between. His monographs about Vincent van Gogh and Paul Cezanne were published 
with many editions and reprints and translated into many languages. He also wrote 
extensively about overarching themes in art history like the problem of style.
That Neurath thought of Schapiro as an author for the IEUS already 80 years 
ago, when he was not known as “the most important art historian that America has 
produced” or – shortly before his death in march 1996 – even named “art history’s 
only living hero,” is not an accident (citations from Holly 1997, 6). He would have 
impressed Neurath with a combination of attributes. In art history he propagated 
and followed a decidedly social and historical approach; this can be seen, for 
instance, in his polemics against the Viennese school of art criticism published in 
1936. Michael Holly has summed up its main points as follows:
 1. a concentration on the way social structures impinge on the formal structure of 
works of art,
 2. a focus on concrete, historical objects,
 3. a refusal to admit any transhistorical, metaphysical forces into an analysis,
 4. an adequate conception of historical process […]
 5. a scientific rigor which can only result from an empirical study of historical fac-
tors and conditions. (Holly 1997, 7.)10
9 Neurath to Charles Morris, 14 March 1938.
10 See also the other articles of the symposium about Meyer Schapiro in the Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, volume 55, issue 1 (1997) and the contributions on Schapiro to the Oxford Art 
Journal volume 17, no. 1 (1994).
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All historians and theorists should investigate their own method and inquire into its 
relation to contemporary values in art and social life. One can easily assume that 
these methodological principles pleased Neurath equally, whereas they are now 
criticized by many as mere “factology.” Furthermore, at that time Schapiro began to 
develop an interest in abstract art, which was in line with Neurath’s avantgardist 
tendencies, whereas it prompted furious criticisms from some of Schapiro’s more 
orthodox Marxist friends.
Schapiro was not only interested in his subject, but in addition belonged to those 
left-leaning “New York Intellectuals” such as John Dewey, Sidney Hook, Ernest 
Nagel etc. who entered many important actual debates in journals such as Partisan 
Review about the question of whether to go to war against Hitler’s Germany or the 
famous “failure of nerve” debate against religious and metaphysical philosophers 
and writers. Furthermore, Schapiro had a small discussion-circle with some of his 
friends of an open-minded empiricist tendency about philosophical themes.
As already said above, Schapiro’s contribution never reached the chief editor of 
the IEUS, Neurath. But it is possible to reconstruct the fate of the planned booklet 
from the correspondence. It seems to me that the “blame” over this failure has to be 
assigned to both sides, that is: not only to the prospective author Schapiro, but also 
to the editor Neurath.
Neurath was very much interested to know what Schapiro was about to write in 
his contribution, and so urged him time and again to present preliminary ideas and 
to observe the fundamentals of logical empiricism. Already in his very first letter 
from 18 February 1938, Neurath had asked him to “say something about physicalistic 
language and analysis of art or something similar” at the congress for unity of 
science from 14 to 19 July 1938 in Cambridge, UK. Whether that happened, the 
records do not say. In any case Neurath invited Schapiro, who at that time was again 
on a visit to Europe, to come to his Institute in den Haag, in the Netherlands, for one 
or two evenings in order to “tell a small circle about CONSIDERATIONS OF ART 
AND PHYSICALISM or what else you want.”11 This meeting must have taken 
place, it seems, since Schapiro announced his arrival in a telegram on 29 July 1939. 
Gerd Arntz, who had moved from Vienna to den Haag too, belonged surely to the 
“small circle” as well as Marie Reidemeister, Neurath’s third wife. In the next letter 
from Neurath from 19th March 1940, the meeting is mentioned as well as discussions 
in New York. Neurath complained that Schapiro had not delivered – as promised – 
to send “a short article for our JOURNAL OF UNIFIED SCIENCE about the 
physicalistic approach in studies of art.”12
In all these letters about the booklet for the IEUS the emphasis on physicalism 
plays the leading role. What was meant by “physicalism” and even the matter of 
who had invented the whole idea had been a subject of controversy in the times of 
the Vienna Circle around 1930 (see for an overview Haller 1993, 166–171). 
11 Neurath to Schapiro, 10 July 1939.
12 Neurath to Schapiro, 29 March 1940.
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Seemingly, the postulate that every term of science should be defined (or at least 
reduced) in a long chain of definitions to physical ones was not in the focus of its 
adherents and even less the idea that all general statements of all the sciences should 
be deduced in the last resort from the laws of physics. The main idea was, instead, 
that all sentences should be about entities existing in space and time. This postulate 
is of course fulfilled by the observation sentences of physics (and every other natural 
science), and, according to Neurath, also by the sentences and objects of every day 
life. His main goal was to establish a sort of common-sense materialism that was 
also in line with contemporary knowledge in the most advanced sciences. In this 
way physicalism should be able to deliver a sufficient basis for scientific inquiry and 
to exclude at the same time religious and metaphysical speculation and talk about 
dubious entities. As part of his project to reform the sciences, Neurath also tried to 
establish behaviorism as the physicalistic version of psychology and social 
behaviorism in sociology (including a portion of a behavioristics of scientists, which 
should substitute the sociology of knowledge).13 As Karl Popper told in an interview, 
Neurath even envisaged to export this reformed materialism – or physicalism – to 
the Soviet Union. It would be of course interesting to know how he might have 
conceived a physicalistic methodology of art criticism and history.
In any case, a few days after his last letter to Schapiro about physicalism Neurath 
had to flee the Netherlands on a life-saving boat to England, where he was in turn 
interned as a possible (national-socialist!) “enemy alien” on the Isle of Man.14 When 
he was released and went back to Oxford, the correspondence started again. Still, in 
a long letter from 29 September 1942 about Schapiro’s booklet for the IEUS (as one 
item among many others) Neurath wrote:
I am very glad – by the way – that you are prepared to write a monograph about analysis of 
arts. Please be kind enough to tell a little about your plan. I think it will be of importance 
that such a monograph will appear and written by you. (Neurath to Schapiro, 21 September 
1941.)
Later on, in this nine-page-latter he underlined why it would be so important to have 
the monograph in the IEUS:
I should like very much to hear a little more of the Encyclopedia monograph. Could you 
explain the main ideas and chapters? I should appreciate it very much. You see, I deplore 
very much, that Logical empiricism is mentioned mostly in relation to physics etc., and just 
in this field it is not so necessary to regenerate our arguing. Therefore it is important to show 
in what way we Logical Empiricists treat Arts, etc. I also think – more and more – that 
“logical” mistakes in the narrower sense, play not a great role and that the Language Making 
is much more important, and the theory of that, what I want to call TERMINOLOGY. 
(Neurath to Schapiro, 21 September 1941.)
Since it seemed that Neurath’s emphasis on empiricist principles shifted slightly 
from the former physicalism to what he now called “terminology,” this latter 
conception is in need of clarification as well. This is a program to establish a 
13 For a description and critique of these programs, see Dahms (1997, 100–110).
14 On Neurath’s period in England see Michelle Henning’s, Silke Körber’s and Adam Tamas 
Tuboly’s chapters in the present volume.
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(relatively short) list of both admitted terms for scientific use and an “index verborum 
prohibitorum.” As already the Latin name for the latter list indicates, this is an 
allusion to the papal “index librorum prohibitorum.” Neurath’s idea of such an index 
for forbidden terms dates back to the times before World War One, and so it has no 
connection with logical empiricism, and among its adherents found no followers. 
Nevertheless, he pursued the idea in his talks and publications (and also in his 
reading of books). So he is reported to have said during the 1937 International 
Philosophical Congress in Paris that it was sufficient to read a book only diagonally 
and judge its relevance from the presence (or absence) of terms on his “index.” In 
the correspondence with other authors of the IEUS, it played also a role when 
Neurath tried in vain to persuade John Dewey to substitute his title “Theory of 
Values” by “Empirical Axiology” (they reached a compromise nearer to Dewey’s 
proposal, namely “Theory of Valuation”). Neurath also rejected a proposed booklet 
by Herbert Feigl about Scientific Explanation because the term “explanation” 
appeared to him a very dangerous one. In Neurath’s own booklet or the IEUS, the 
program of terminology and the “index” are prominent: pages 9 till 19 (of his 
relatively short contribution of only 51 pages) are devoted to this program and titled 
“Accepted and Rejected Statements” and “The Richness of a Sociological 
Vocabulary.” In its Appendix one finds an “Index of Terms” with allowed 
“phraseology used in this monograph” and prohibited concepts (“expressions 
avoided in this monograph”). “True (false),” “mind (matter),” “good (bad)” and 
“justice” all belong in the latter category (Neurath 1944/1970).
Now Neurath intended to urge Schapiro to change the already agreed upon title 
of his monograph “Interpretation and Judgment of Art,” because both concepts were 
“very dangerous terms,” as he wrote his co-editor Morris.15 He instructed Morris to 
inform Schapiro accordingly. Such a request is not contained in the correspondence 
between Neurath and Schapiro, which became interrupted from the 29th September 
1942 till the 4th of September 1945.
Now in a letter from 19 August 1942, in which Schapiro wrote also about his 
booklet for the IEUS, he had to admit not to have started with it. But it was “rarely 
out of my mind and almost everything I see and read provides some material for 
it.”16 Indeed Schapiro seems to have worked from time to time on it, but more often 
found other projects more important and, as a result, did not finish the task. It would 
be interesting to know, to what degree Neurath’s insistence on “physicalism” and 
“terminology” contributed to the waning of Schapiro’s intention to write the booklet. 
The prospect of the threat of a straightjacket or at least a corset was surely not an 
incentive for productive work.
After Neurath’s death, his replacements as main editors of the IEUS, Charles 
Morris and Rudolf Carnap, put an end to the notorious “Meyer-Schapiro-problem.” 
Carnap gave him a deadline and, when this was crossed, changed the whole subject 
15 Neurath to Morris, 26 February 1943.
16 Schapiro to Neurath, 12 August 1942.
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and he devoted the last booklet to economics and let his former pupil and colleague 
from Prague Gerhard Tintner write a booklet on Methodology of Mathematical 
Economics and Econometrics. At that time Schapiro was already so far removed 
from the development of mainstream logical empiricism that he only very seldom 
came back to their ideas and publications. In his long article “Philosophy and 
Worldview in Painting” Schapiro mentioned only Carnap’s conception of art and its 
function, according to which works of art cannot claim to tell the truth, only to be 
an expression of emotions:
Carnap speaks […] simply to indicate that metaphysics, worldviews – broad approaches to 
a totality, to many a problem – are not so in a logical analytical sense but rather in the sense 
of expressing a life feeling or outlook which affects us emotionally in the art and 
metaphysics. But only the art gives us aesthetic pleasure; metaphysics gives us, at least for 
Carnap, perplexity or a headache or a wish to be done with it as a disease of language. 
(Schapiro 1999b, 17f.)
Schapiro sums up Carnap’s ideas correctly. It is important to keep in mind that 
Carnap was not an enemy of art, music etc.; he was an enemy of a sort of idle word- 
music he believed to have found in the books of metaphysicians, because they 
proclaimed to have attained knowledge, whereas – according to him – they produced 
only bad music. Schapiro (1999b, 18) himself adds in his article that he too ranked 
(real) music above metaphysics.
18.1.2  National Socialism, Comments on the War, Hopes 
for Reconstruction After Its End
Since both correspondents were much interested to discuss the aggravating interna-
tional situation, a considerable part is devoted to other themes besides art and the 
IEUS: the start of the war and its later stages, which also for Neurath himself led 
into dramatic developments. One only has to think of his narrow escape on a life 
saving boat from Holland to England and his internment on the Isle of Man. He 
mentioned also the fate of his son, who had remained in Austria and – as a leading 
member of the former socialist student organization – was deported to the German 
concentrations camps Dachau and Buchenwald after the “Anschluss” of Austria to 
the German Reich.17 Later on, hopes of the defeat of the Nazi dictatorship and the 
measures needed for the denazification of Germany became dominating themes. 
They would be the worthwhile subjects of a separate article.
17 Paul Neurath even wrote his dissertation in sociology (under the supervision of Paul Lazarsfeld) 
on “Social Structure in the German Concentration Camps Dachau and Buchenwald,” which was 
published only 70 years later; see P. Neurath (2004).
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18.1.3  Philosophy and Sociology: Martin Heidegger and Max 
Weber
But there are also themes that do not belong to contemporary history, but to the 
political circumstances of philosophy and sociology. These contexts are important, 
because they are apt to shed new light of the persons under discussion in the 
correspondence, but also on the biographies and descriptions both of Neurath and 
Schapiro.18
Among other things, we find a discussion about Plato as (an alleged) intellectual 
forerunner of fascism in ancient Greek times, about Martin Heidegger as a 
contemporary counterpart and  – surprisingly  – also about Max Weber. The 
correspondence partners soon reached an agreement about Plato: one should keep 
an eye during the denazification process on a possible prolongation or revival of 
platonistic tendencies in political philosophy in a new Germany, given Plato’s 
support for a rigid dictatorship and of slavery.19 The discussions of Heidegger and 
Weber took a more complicated course and seem more interesting.
18.1.3.1  Heidegger
Concerning Heidegger Neurath had remarked in his long letter of 29th September 
1942, when he introduced his plans to cleanse language by impeccable terminology:
[…] we shall demonstrate what a poor and empty shell this Heidegger is, it is OK that he 
became a Nazi […]. Heidegger is a poor poet and his statements regarded as statements are 
monstrosities, there one should analyze his descriptive importance, as dealing with habits 
mostly, not discussed by our logicalized boys, unfortunately. (Neurath to Schapiro, 29 
September 1942, p. 8.)
Schapiro entered this discussion when he wrote in the beginning in a more general 
way:
Scientific criticism was never applied in a thorough way to the problems that the metaphysi-
cians and neo-religionists thrive on, so that people haven’t even the memory of a literature 
which did justice to them.
These remarks about “metaphysicians and neo-religionists” remind of the famous 
“failure of nerve-debate,” in which the New  York Intellectuals fought for 
enlightenment and a scientific worldview in times of a revival of antiscientific 
skepticism and the tendency to take consolation in super-natural entities and forces. 
Schapiro in his letter then continued more concretely:
18 Since no biography of Schapiro was published up to now, one has to rely on obituaries and 
handbook-articles. On Neurath see Sandner (2014).
19 On Neurath’s critique of Plato, see Antonia Soulez’s chapter in the present volume.
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In our circle no one read Heidegger seriously, one simply said “das Nichts nichtet” and 
laughed, so that when a newer generation is impressed by the lyric of anxiety in Heidegger, 
they have no means of dealing with it and at the same time cannot be satisfied with a 
criticism which dismisses Heidegger as a syntactical monstrosity. (Schapiro to Neurath, 12 
August 1942.)20
Here Schapiro admonished his correspondence partner and his logical empiricist 
friends not to take the task of criticizing Heidegger too light-heartedly, as Carnap 
(1932/1959) had done it in his famous article about “Overcoming metaphysics…” 
from 1932, where utterances like “das nicht nichtet” were simply taken out of 
context and made the standard example of ridicule. Instead, Schapiro thought, one 
should try to decipher Heidegger’s intentions behind his often extravagant 
formulations and then discuss them critically. This approach was taken by Michael 
Friedman (2000) and Peter E. Gordon (2010) more recently.
In his penultimate letter from the 22nd July 1945 Schapiro had found a recent 
occasion to come back to the Heidegger theme. He started again in a very general 
way:
There is now a growing curiosity (more among literary people than philosophers) about 
existentialism, not for Kierkegaard, who had his day some years ago and is now 
uninteresting… but for Heidegger, whom very few have read (it is astounding with what 
faith he is received by poets who know only a few quotations, including “das Nichts 
nichtet”), but who has a considerable reactive value, because he is concerned with fatality, 
care, disgust, the trivial and nothingness, things which American and British philosophers 
completely underestimate, although they have an oppressive actuality. (Schapiro to Neurath, 
22 July 1945.)
Schapiro informed Neurath of a special episode concerning existentialism:
When the French writer, Sartre, lectured on Heidegger in New York last April – a poor piece 
of philosophizing, I thought – he made a strong impression. The optimism of “naturalism” 
is appallingly shallow, and sound too much like the league of democratic experts to satisfy 
anyone. (Ibid.)
Sartre indeed had come to New York in January 1945 – only half a year after the 
liberation of Paris from the German occupation in August 1944 – in order to serve 
as foreign correspondent for the French journal Combat (Fight) – edited by Albert 
Camus.21 Sartre’s lecture was given in the “Maison Francaise” of Columbia 
University on 117th Street (Guttenplan 2013).
Schapiro closed his remarks on Heidegger with the following words:
Heidegger has to be criticized in his own terms, and not from outside, because he doesn’t 
use the language properly: and the new interest in his philosophy has to be accepted as a 
challenge to deal with the same problems scientifically. And they are social and ethical 
problems on which empiricism has had little to say; and that little, often negative and 
worthless. (Ibid.)
20 The “circle” was seemingly a philosophical discussion group, to which Sidney Hook, Ernest 
Nagel and Schapiro belonged and which tried to combine logical analysis with a prospect of politi-
cal activism. The correspondence contains in various places information about the group and its 
decline during World War Two.
21 For an account of Sartre’s and Camus’s relationship to the USA, see Martin (2012).
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As we will see (Sect. 18.2.1), Schapiro himself dealt with Heidegger and one of his 
problems “scientifically.” That problem was not a “social and ethical” one, though. 
It concerned a field, where Schapiro had a special competence, namely: art.
18.1.3.2  Max Weber
The most controversial part of the discussions between Neurath and Schapiro was 
about Max Weber. Neurath had witnessed him at a congress of the “Verein für 
Socialpolitik” 1909 in Vienna as a brilliant speaker and a passionate participant in 
discussions. Later on during Neurath’s habilitation in Heidelberg 1916 he almost 
certainly would have met Weber, although he had resigned his professorship over a 
decade earlier because of poor health, but played an important role behind the 
scenes at the university. In any case, Neurath came again across Weber during the 
meetings at Lauenstein castle in southern Thuringia, where Weber fought a hard 
battle as proponent of a negotiated peace in World War One and a thorough 
democratization of Germany afterwards against the annexionist and chauvinist Max 
Maurenbrecher (see for the Lauenstein events Dahms and Neumann (1994) and 
Radkau 2011, 483–487). Weber’s role in the trial for high treason against Neurath 
after the defeat of the Bavarian Soviet Republic in summer 1919 surely was less to 
Neurath’s taste, because Weber had attempted to protect Neurath by depicting him 
as politically naïve (Dahms and Neumann 1994, 131f.). When one now adds to this 
the paragraphs in one of Weber’s magna opera, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, where 
he criticizes Neurath’s plans and activities for full socialization of the economy in 
revolutionary Bavaria (Dahms and Neumann 1994, 136–140), perhaps it becomes 
understandable that Neurath (1931/1973) wrote quite critically about Weber in his 
Empirical Sociology of 1931.
It comes all the more as a surprise that he defended Weber vehemently in the 
correspondence with Schapiro against the latter’s disdainful invectives. Weber is 
mentioned in the correspondence for the first time in a letter of Neurath from the 
29th March 1940. The context is the writing of Neurath’s own booklet for the IEUS:
I am writing my article about the Foundations of the Social Sciences for our encyclopedia. 
I want to speak about my own discipline in friendly words – you know the successes in 
knowledge are tremendous, but not in the clarification of expression. I think it is more 
important what Max Weber says about concrete fact than about the methods of his science 
“Wissenschaftslehre”. Unfortunately it is the subject matter of “foundations”: the structure 
of a discipline. I hope to tell as correct as possible what is done in the field without too sharp 
criticism. (Neurath to Schapiro, 29 March 1940.)
These remarks were written and sent only a few days before the invasion of German 
troops into the Netherlands on 10 May 1940 and the capitulation 5  days later. 
Neurath had to leave behind the manuscript for his Foundations of the Social 
Sciences on his flight in a sea rescue boat and then – after his release from internment, 
to start anew on his contribution.
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Max Weber again popped up as topic after the war, when Schapiro (1945) had 
written a very critical short article about him and sent it to Neurath. He reacted as 
follows:
[…] in general I agree with you. I read a lot of Weber, also his letters, biography etc. to 
understand better German “Liberalism” with its strong nationalist implications, lack of 
finger-feeling etc. see Weber’s contacts with Ludendorf (sic). (Neurath to Schapiro, 4 
September 1945.)
Later on in the same letter he sketched a more detailed picture of his character:
WEBER was a very complicated person. Very sincere, very outspoken, charming, attrac-
tive, clever.. prepared to listen to other people’s opinions. Very prepared to invite scientific 
opponents to discussions etc. Never avoiding a controversy…. Against tyrants, against 
William II.  I met him more than once in difficult periods e.g. at the meeting on the 
Lauenstein etc. BUT full of studentic tradition, DISTANCE important to him, and a certain 
attitude. Always thinking in certain extremist terms. But his life nevertheless without a real 
energetic push towards a goal…
He was a real fighter for the freedom of speech and his vision of a leader implies, that one 
is able to put him away, whenever one wants to do so. As Clemenceau put away Foch with-
out hesitation and Churchill put away generals without hesitation and the British voters put 
away Churchill, without putting him to the gallows. (Neurath to Schapiro, 4 September 
1945.)
Neurath criticized especially Schapiro’s depiction of Weber as an opportunist: “If 
you call Weber an opportunist, you will find not many people who would not be 
allied with such a name….” Even hints to Weber’s wild attacks against Karl 
Liebknecht were not accepted by Neurath as behavior that could undermine his 
integrity: the communists in Vienna had agitated against the social democrats in the 
same way, when they accused them of “treason” or accused the social democrats 
leader Otto Bauer to be “well paid.” That sounds like playing down Weber’s 
utterances, because he exclaimed during the election campaign for the left-liberal 
German Democratic Party (DDP) on 4 January 1919: “Liebknecht belongs in the 
madhouse and Rosa Luxemburg in the Zoological Garden” (see for this episode 
Radkau 2011, 507). A few days after this speech both Luxemburg and Liebknecht 
were murdered – within a short distance from the Berlin Zoo. It is no wonder that 
the correspondence partners reached no agreement.
18.2  Two Sequels
18.2.1  Schapiro’s Criticism of Heidegger
Although nothing became out of his planned contribution to the IEUS, Schapiro 
nevertheless continued to reflect on the relation between scientific philosophy and 
art. Two remarkable results came out of this. The discussion with Neurath about 
Heidegger had been one reason (among others) that Schapiro reflected and ultimately 
published something on the latter – only decades after the publication of Heidegger’s 
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famous article on the origin of the work of art and an interpretation of a painting of 
Vincent van Gogh given there.
A friend of Schapiro, the psychiatrist Kurt Goldstein, an émigré from Germany, 
had called his attention to some ideas of Heidegger’s about art contained in a number 
of lectures given in 1935 and finally published as “Zum Ursprung des Kunstwerks” 
(“On the Origin of the Work of Art”) in a volume of articles under the title 
“Holzwege” (“Woodway,” in German also meaning sometimes a wrong track) in 
1950 (see Heidegger 1950). There he discussed not only the essence of works of art 
and useful artifacts, but also a painting by van Gogh of shoes taken as an example 
of useful objects. It so happened that exactly in the same year the first edition of a 
book by Schapiro (1950) on van Gogh appeared (later on it would be reprinted 
many times and translated into many languages). But it took almost two decades 
before Schapiro took up the subject again. Sadly the article about Heidegger and 
van Gogh appeared only in a volume in memory of the deceased Goldstein in 1968 
(see Schapiro 1968).22 This was Schapiro’s attempt to achieve what he had missed 
in the writings of positivist critics of Heidegger in the correspondence with Neurath, 
namely: to analyze in detail his methods and results, without letting oneself be 
misled by his extravagant language and rhetoric.
That Heidegger had chosen the example of shoes had a somewhat complicate 
background: in order to arrive finally at finding out the essence of the work of art, 
he started with things (in general) and then took a middle step on useful artifacts 
(named by him with the – in German – unusual term “Zeug”), in order to arrive 
finally in the third stage at the category foremost on his mind in the article: the 
object of art. I concentrate on the middle step, because Heidegger tried to extract the 
essence of “Zeug” from the contemplation of works of art. Heidegger interpreted 
van Gogh’s painting of shoes in the following way:
From the dark opening of the worn insides of the shoes the toilsome tread of the worker stands 
forth. In the stiffly solid heaviness of the shoes there is the accumulated tenacity of her slow 
trudge through the far-spreading and ever-uniform furrows of the field, swept by a raw wind. 
On the leather there lies the dampness and saturation of the soil. Under the soles there slides 
the loneliness of the field-path as the evening declines. In the shoes there vibrates the silent 
call of the earth, its quiet gift of the ripening corn and its enigmatic self- refusal in the fallow 
desolation of the wintry field. This equipment is pervaded by uncomplaining anxiety about the 
certainty of bread, the wordless joy of having once more withstood want, the trembling before 
the advent of birth and shivering at the surround menace of death. This equipment belongs to 
the earth and it is protected in the world of the peasant woman. From out of this protected 
belonging the equipment itself rises to its resting-in-itself. (Heidegger 1950, 22f. Cited after 
Schapiro’s translation in his 1994a, 135 f.)
Strangely, this interpretation hasn’t been correlated till now to the time of its initial 
composition. As I said, a first version of Heidegger’s article was given in the form 
of a lecture in 1935. Therefore it seems tempting to ask how it fits with the spiritual 
and political environment of the early Nazi regime. That Heidegger took a painting 
of van Gogh as a subject seems at first sight to indicate a self-conscious distance 
22 For Schapiro’s further notes on Heidegger and van Gogh, see Schapiro (1994a) and (1994b).
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from the official Nazi attitude to art. Their chief ideologue Alfred Rosenberg had 
made some detrimental comments on the artist already in his “Mythos des 
Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts” (“Myth of the 20th Century”), published in 1930: “he 
painted apple trees, cabbage and street stones, till he got mad” (cited after Roh 
1962, 72). Later on even some of van Gogh’s paintings were confiscated in the 
preparations of the infamous exhibition “Entartete Kunst” (“Degenerate Art”). But 
they did not go to the Munich exhibition, but instead landed in the private collection 
of Hermann Göring. Apart from taking an ideologically dubious van Gogh painting 
as a starting point for his investigation into the essence of “Zeug,” the interpretation 
of that artwork is perfectly in line with National Socialist ideology, namely the 
“Blut-und-Boden” (“blood and soil”) mythology. That already applies to Heidegger’s 
identification of the shoes as the shoes of farmers, but especially to the part, where 
a farmer woman experience at giving birth is evoked.
Now Schapiro aimed at the deconstruction of this interpretation. He knew that 
van Gogh had produced a number of shoe-themed paintings. So he wrote in 1965 a 
letter to Heidegger, asking him when and where he had seen that particular painting. 
Heidegger answered as follows:
Very estimated Mr. Meyer-Schapiro (sic)!
With pleasure I answer your question as far as I can. When I was on a lecture tour in 
Holland in March 1930, I visited in Amsterdam the great Van-Gogh-Exhibition which just 
was opened. There I saw “The Shoes”. According to my memory it was one of the early 
versions of that theme. My “description” is related to that original seen in Amsterdam. I 
think, you will as an experienced expert find out easily with the means at your disposal, 
which painting is meant. (Heidegger to Schapiro, 6 May 1965.)
Heidegger went on in his letter to praise Schapiro’s book on Cezanne and expressed 
hopes that one day an art historian would gather all the different views of Cezanne’s 
beloved Mont Victoire and interpret them in their development. In any case his hints 
toward the Amsterdam exhibition of 1930 were sufficient to identify the painting. It 
was thus possible for Schapiro to offer a thorough refutation of Heidegger’s 
identification of the depicted shoes with the ones of a peasant woman. His 
investigations demonstrated that they were van Gogh’s own shoes. In other words, 
if van Gogh had wanted to make a statement at all about the owner of the shoes, it 
should have been an autobiographical remark. And that had to do with the fact that 
the painter was used to walk long ways on his own feet. For example, the young van 
Gogh traveled from his parents home in Holland to the coal region of Belgium in 
order to serve there as a lay priest and help workers in misery.
Later on, philosophers took up the challenge posed by Schapiro’s interpretation. 
Jacques Derrida (1978/1987), for instance, tried to show the irrelevance of Schapiro’s 
findings. The controversy between critics and adherents of Heidegger went on till 
recently.23 In 2009 there was an exhibition in Cologne at the Museum Ludwig in 
23 I cannot comment on Derrida  and all the others who cared to write about the Heidegger/
Schapiro-argument.
H.-J. Dahms
485
which only one painting was shown: van Gogh’s shoes (which Heidegger had seen 
in 1930), surrounded by a multitude of controversial interpretations.24
In this whole controversy not enough emphasis was put on the question whether 
and to what degree Heidegger’s philosophy depends on the correctness of his (or the 
alternative) interpretation. He had declared in his article that philosophy in its quest 
to detect the essence of things, especially of “Zeug,” should not look at those types 
of objects themselves, their fabrication and use etc., but to take instead the detour 
via the depiction of them through works of art:
The essential being of equipment was found. But how? Not by description and explanation 
of a really present shoe equipment; not by a report about the making of shoes, also not by 
the observation of a here or there real occurring use of shoes. But – but only by us bringing 
us in front of the painting of van Gogh. It has spoken. In the nearness of the work we have 
suddenly been elsewhere than we use to be. The work of art let it know, what shoe equipment 
is in truth. (Heidegger 1950, 24.)
It seems that the essence of “Zeug” could better be detected by “positivistic” 
approaches excluded by Heidegger than by the interpretation of a work of art. 
Therefore the question is, which lesson to draw about a philosophical method that 
let slip through completely wrong interpretation of art works.
18.2.2  Schapiro Stimulating Nelson Goodman’s Languages 
of Art
Before Schapiro published his article on Heidegger, he had pursued ideas in the cor-
respondence with Neurath. He stimulated a close friend, Nelson Goodman, to write 
a philosophical treatise on art. Goodman was himself a former art-gallery manager 
in Boston and by then a Harvard professor famous for books such as The structure 
of Appearance and Fact, Fiction, Forecast. This plan was developed during joint 
visits to art exhibitions and galleries in New York.25
Goodman indeed followed this project. In the end he could publish his epoch- 
making book Languages of Art. This work appeared in 1968, two years before the 
final two-volume edition of the IEUS. It is the most remarkable writing on art in the 
tradition of analytic philosophy. The question of whether the book would have fitted 
in with the IEUS must be left open here. But let’s suppose it had: how would 
Neurath’s encyclopedia project, and with it the whole tradition of logical empiricism, 
be looked at and evaluated if Goodman’s book  – published immediately after 
Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions – had been the conclu-
sion of the whole IEUS enterprise?
24 See the booklet accompanying the exhibition: Batchen (2009).
25 These “strolls” are mentioned variously in the correspondence Goodman/ Schapiro.
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 Appendices
 Appendix 1: The Logic Articles of Otto Neurath and Olga 
Hahn
Translation and additional notes by Jordi Cat (Fig. A1)
 1. Otto Neurath: Ernst Schröder’s Proof of Theorem 12, that the Law 
of Commutativity Holds for Identical Operations (1909)
(Otto Neurath, 1909, “Ernst Schröders Beweis des 12. Theorems: Für die iden-
tischen Operationen gilt das ‘Kommutationsgesetz.’” Archiv für Philosophie, 2. 
Abteilung: Archiv für systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge, Bd. 15: 
104–106)1
(Lessons on the Algebra of Logic, p. 254 ff.)2
Schröder’s proof is based on the following statements:
Principle I. a € a.
Principle II. If a € b and simultaneously b € c, then also a € c.
Definition 1 of identical equality (identity) [der identischen Gleicheit (Identität)].
1’ If a € b and simultaneously b € a, it is said that a = b.
1” If a = b holds, so must a € b and b € a.
1 Reprinted in Neurath (1981, 1–3). [Translator’s note.]
2 The reference is to Schröder (1890). [Translator’s note.]
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Then we need
3x If c a, c b,
so holds c ab.
3x If c ab,
so holds c a, c b.
3+ If a c, b c,
so holds a + b c.
3+ If a + b c,
so holds a c, b c.  
Moreover, Theorem 6:
ab a, ab b a a + b, b a + b. 
The proof goes as follows (p. 254)3:
x ab = ba 12+c a + b = b + a  
Accordingly, both
factors of an identical product members of an identical sum  
are exchanged without any effect on the meaning of the value of each expression. 
The identical multiplication and addition – we could also say – are “commutative” 
operations; their result is “symmetrical” with respect to the elements in each 
operation.
Proof of the statements. According to the formula of Th.
6x ab b, ab a 6+ b a + b, a a + b,  
of which, according to the remark on Pr. I, p. 190, any form could be established 
first, it follows from Def. (3x)’ and (3+)’, respectively, that:
ab ba b + a a + b 
and in this generally proven formula, one may also exchange a and b and get:
ba ab a + b b + a, 
which merges with the previous result according to Def. (1) into
3 Schröder expressed his principle of duality presenting results involving interchangeable opera-
tions with the double columns. The numbering is qualified with the corresponding operation signs, 
x and +, but the original publication and the reprint (Neurath 1981, 1–3) omit the operation signs 
distinguishing the respective versions of Theorem number 12. [Translator’s note.]
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ab = ba a + b = b + a, 
which was to be proven.
[The second result could also have been derived, analogously to the first, from 
the inclusion4 relations yielded by Th. 6:
ba a, ba b a b + a, b b + a 
according to Def. 3’; but this variant of the proof would have been in appearance 
somewhat less simple.]”
This proof provided by Schröder is superfluous. If in Definition 3 the statements 
c € a, c € b and a € c, b € c are combined, it is explicitly stated that both statements 
should be valid at the same time. The order of the statements is indifferent. So, it 
would be correct to write: If c € a, c € b, c € ab is valid, or, what is the same, c € ba.
A proof is superfluous, because ab and ba are not only equal in terms of the 
result, but each time both symbols denote the same relation between the same 
domains. Were the symbols for example for a: o, and for b: ×, the expression 
[Schreibung] of the product would be, without further ado: ⊗. The question of 
whether to write o× or ×o could only arise if two relations could be conceived with 
the same result. Two circumstances might have prompted Schröder to provide this 
superfluous proof, firstly, the fact that his symbolic notation, since it is one- 
dimensional, yields two signs of its own accord, and secondly, the fact that it is 
based on the commutation law of mathematics. It would be a case where the reli-
ance on mathematical nomenclature in logic proved to be inadequate.
The present consideration suggests itself that, in those cases where the symbol-
ism for the same relation between the same objects allows two or more expressions 
(Schreibungen), the equality of these symbols, which does not hold  only in the 
results, should be indicated by its own sign, e.g. in our case:
ab ba 
reading ab symbolically equal to ba. Otherwise it would be possible to remove the 
inconvenience by giving preference to any expression, e.g. the one in which the first 
letter in the alphabet stands, and the reversed expression only comes into consider-
ation when a second relation between the same objects is found, which may eventu-
ally produce the same result. I.e., in our case we would only speak of e.g. “ab” and 
in this symbolic notation the expression “ba” would be completely meaningless.
4 Translations, including Schröder’s own use of English terms and disambiguations, and presenta-
tions such as Louis Couturat’s L’Algèbre de la Logique (1905/1914) and recent discussions, follow 
this interpretive rule: using “inclusion” [“Enthaltensein”] when the terms are introduced explicitly 
to denote classes or extensions, “subsumption” [“Subsumtionen”] for the sign more generally, but 
also for the case where terms denote concepts, and “implication” [“Einordnung”], when the terms 
denote statements – and the algebra extends to a proper symbolic logic for rules of reasoning. 
[Translator’s note]
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Fig. A1 First page of Olga Hahn and Otto Neurath’s “On Duality in Logic” (1909)
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 2. Olga Hahn and Otto Neurath: On Duality in Logic (1909)5
(Olga Hahn and Otto Neurath, 1909, “Zum Dualismus in der Logik.” Archiv für 
Philosophie, 2. Abteilung: Archiv für systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge, 
Bd. 15, Heft 2: 149–162.)
The presentation of duality in Schröder’s seminal Vorlesungen über die Algebra 
der Logik (exakte Logik) (Lessons on the Algebra of Logic (Exact Logic)) shows a 
number of imperfections of which the author is aware. Thus he says inter alia (Vorl. 
ü. d. Alg. d. L. vol. II (1), 1891, p. xi, “Additional Corrections and Appendices to the 
First Volume”): “I am not hiding the fact that in the late position we had to introduce 
Theorem 37, (a € b) = (b| € a|), regardless of its simplicity and high degree of direct 
evidence within the system of our theory, there may still be an imperfection in its 
completely correct systematic construction.” Our presentation, which includes the 
first half of the aforementioned Theorem 37, namely,
(a b) (b| a|) 
incorporated among the first principles, was required by the effort to make clearer 
the essence and origin of duality to further develop the system and carry out a num-
ber of proofs more correctly. Although now Schröder wanted like us to see Theorem 
37 shifted to the beginning from a totally different viewpoint, we believe we must 
nonetheless emphasize this circumstance as a positive agreement with our line of 
thought. We will come back some other expressions of unease in Schröder concern-
ing duality. We would like to follow Schröder’s presentation as closely as possible, 
without wanting to declare faultless everything we adopt unaltered. On the one 
hand, it is only a matter of strongly emphasizing certain alterations on principle, and 
on the other, we want to avoid hindering contact among researchers working in the 
same domain with innovations in terminology and presentation that are not abso-
lutely necessary. In our presentation we will put Schröder’s numbering for princi-
ples, theorems and definitions in brackets next to ours. Whenever we write theorems 
without any proof, it means that we adopt Schröder’s own without modification.
5 After delivery of our manuscript, appeared E. Schröder’s “Abriß der Algebra der Logik” (“Outline 
of the Algebra of Logic”), edited by E. Müller, in which some of the presentation touches upon our 
account. It should be noted that this interesting small work presents a number of advantages over 
Schröder’s older works. The  introductory paragraphs are more precise than the  analogous 
in Schröder and come closer to  the conception of  logic specified by Itelson’s definition, that is 
study of objects in general. We haven’t introduced any alteration in our presentation on account 
of the Abriß, since the treatment of several statements of the calculus of statements [Aussagenkalkul, 
which Schröder himself often translated by reference to Hugh MacColl’s term for his own propo-
sitional logic, “calculus of equivalent statements”] from the calculus of domains [Gebietkalkul, 
more general than the calculus of classes, when the terms denote classes based on different selec-
tive judgments within a domain] would not affect the core of our presentation and we want to pre-
serve as much as possible the connection with Schröder’s main work.
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For every conceptual demarcation of a domain a there exists one and only one 
domain non-a, the former is called the positive [Posit], the latter is called the nega-
tive [Negat].6 We place these two fundamental concepts at the front of our presenta-
tion, while Schröder introduces the negation in a subsequent place by means of 
Definition 6. Our statement above corresponds approximately to Schröder’s not 
very precisely formulated Postulate 3. We now begin, with Schröder, with
Principle I [I]: a € a.
This statement holds for any arbitrary domain, therefore for positives as well as 
for negatives, and also contains the statement about it
a| a|. 
We hereby reach the definition of identical equality,
Definition 1’ [1’]:
If a € b and at the same time b € a, it is stated that a = b.
Definition 1” [1”]:
If, a = b holds, so must a € b and b € a.
Theorem 1 [1]: a = a.
Both the definition and the theorem are, of course, subject to what has just been 
said regarding their application to negatives.
Principle II [Theorem 37, first half]:
If a € b, it holds that b| € a|.
Written in the calculus of statements is that
(a b) (b| a|). 
This statement declares that just as every positive determines a negative, every 
relation between two positives determines a relation between the two related nega-
tives. We will see in the following that this principle is suitable to derive two series 
of statements in such a way that just as multiplication or addition corresponds, 
respectively, to relations between positives, addition, and respective multiplication, 
correspond to the associated relations between the assigned negatives. The duality 
of these two operations seems to be traceable black to the fundamental connection 
between positive and negative.
6 Schröder introduced the term Negat in the first volume of the Abriss (1909, 24), as synonymous 
with nicht (“a nicht”) and non (“non a”) for the negative domain, or domain of negations. 
[Translator’s note.]
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Theorem 2 [32]: If a = b, b| = a|.
Proof: a = b means according to Definition 1” that a € b and b € a. From a € b fol-
lows according to Principle II that b| € a| and equally from b € a follows a| € b|, 
from which according to Definition 1’ results b| = a|.
Schröder is unable to derive his Theorem 32 in the way indicated, because he 
himself used it to derive his Theorem 37 – our Principle II. Schröder has not avoided 
the flaw that the equality of two domains is not derived from the definition of equal-
ity through double subsumption. About this he expresses himself as follows (Vol II 
(1), p. xi): “We feel compelled to turn to the proof [of Theorem 37] to invoke the 
theorems 30, 32 and 36 based on equations, whereas it seemed natural to establish 
the corresponding Contraposition Theorem 32 for equations, according to Definition 
1, on the 37 for subsumptions.”
Principle III [II]:
If a b and
at the same time b c,
it holds that a c.  
Applying Principle I, we obtain that
if b and
at the same time c
it holds that
a
b
c| a|.  
We see that we can reach conclusions that contain only negatives from premises 
that contain only positives. However, we are not yet entitled to accept, in general, 
that the conclusiveness of the statements about relations between positives also 
means the conclusiveness of the corresponding relations between negatives, since 
our Principle II means only that, if a € b, then b| € a|, but not the other way around, 
that if b| € a|, then also a € b. In the present case, though, from the relations between 
negatives we can derive that
draw the conclusion:
b| a|
c| b|
c| a|  
but only because Principle III seems again applicable, which holds generally for 
positives and negatives alike. Of all statements, we want to describe those reached 
through the application of Principle II as the first duals, although it should be noted 
that they are fundamentally different from the ones described as duals by Schröder. 
The principles of dual statements are obviously only theorems, which we describe 
with the corresponding Roman numerals and the negation stroke.
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In an analogous way, for the dual theorems we use parentheses with Arabic 
numerals and the negation stroke. In Schröder’s case, theorems 2 to 4 now follow – 
in our case, 3 to 5 –, which we adopt without modifications.7
Definition x
If c a and at the same time
c b, we say
c ab or ba 2
Definition x
If we say c ab,
It means that it holds that
c a and at the same time c b
Definition x]
If a b, so we say that
ab| = 0
Definition
If we say that ab| = 0, it
means that a b
Theorem 2|
If c a and at the same time
c a it holds that
(ab)| c|
Theorem 2|
if c ab,
it holds at the same time that
a| c| and b| c|
Theorem 3|
if a b, then
0| = (ab|)|
Theorem 3|
if ab| = 0 then it holds that
b| a|.  
This definition of identical zero is more in keeping with the character of the other 
definitions, such as the dollows from Definitier and, as we show, accomplishes the 
same.
As always a € a, it follows from Definition 3’
Theorem 6 [30x]
aa| = 0
Theorem 7
If ab = 0 and at the same time
a|b| = 0 then
a = b| and
b = a|
Theorem 6|
0| = (aa|)|.
Theorem 7|
if ab = 0 and at the same time
a|b| = 0 it holds that
a| = (b|)| and
b| = (a|)|.  
Proof. From Theorem 3|” it follows that, if one replaces b| with b,
if ab = 0, then b a|. 
It also follows from Definition 3” that, if one replaces a with a|,
if a|b| 0, then a| b. 
According to Definition 1’ also b = a|.
7 Cf. Archiv für systematische Philosophie, XV, vol 1, p. 104. [See article 1. in the Appendix; trans-
lator’s note.]
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From Theorem 3” it emerges that, if ba| = 0, then a| € b| and if one replaces a| with 
a, one obtains,
if ab = 0, then a b|, 
and when we replace b with b|, we obtain from Definition 3” that
if a|b| = 0, then b| a. 
From Definition 1’ also b| = a
Theorem 8 [31]
 
a a| |( ) = .  
According to Theorem 6 it holds that aa| = 0 and in the same way
 
a a| | |( ) = 0,  
therefore, from Theorem 7, a = (a|)|.
We can see from this that the relation between a and a| is reversible. We can now 
draw from this an important conclusion.
Theorem 9 [37]: The statements a € b and b € a are equivalent, i.e., in the calculus 
of statements written as
(a b) = (b| a|) 
which corresponds in Schröder to the complete Theorem 37.
Proof. If b| € a|, it holds from Principle II that
(a|)| (b|)|, 
therefore, from Theorem 8, a € b. Together with Principle II, this results in the theo-
rem to be proven. We see that the relation between positives and negatives is revers-
ible, and we are therefore able to draw conclusions from the conclusiveness of the 
positive statements and vice versa.
We note that Schröder’s Theorems 2 and 3 should be actually described as dual 
statements, not in [logical] succession. If a € b and b = c, then a € c, and, if a = b 
and b € c, then also a € c, but side by side:
If a = b and b c,
then a c
If b| = a| and c| b|,
then c| a|.  
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In the new expression, the definition of multiplication is
If c a and at the same time
c b, then we say
c ab
and vice versa.
If a| c| and at the same time
b| c|, then we say
(ab)| c|
and vice versa.  
To the definition of multiplication we now add that of addition:
Definition +
If a c and at the same time
b c
then we say that a + b c
Definition +
if we say that (a+b) c,
one says that a c
and at the same time b c
Theorem 4|
if c| a| and at the same time
c| b|
it holds that c| (a+b)|.
Theorem 4|
if c| (a+b)|, it holds that
c| a|
and at the same time c| b|.  
From what we have stated it follows that each of the three statements
 I. “a € c and c| € b| are simultaneously valid”
 II. “a + b € c”
 III. “c| € a|b|”
implies the other two.
If in II we replace c with a+b, then III follows in the form (a+b)| € a|b|.
If in III we replace c| with a|b|, the statement dual to II follows in the form a|b| € 
(a+b)|.
Through the application of Definition 1’ we obtain
Theorem 10 [36]
(a+b)| = a|b|
Theorem 10|
(a|b|)| = ((a+b)|)| = a+b.  
From Theorem 10| we obtain Schröder’s 36, if we replace a with a| and b with b|:
 
a b a b| | | | | | |
( ) ( )( ) = +
 
and by applying Theorem 8 and Theorems 2|’ and 2|”, (ab)| = a| + b|.
We see that, if
ab c, then also c| a| + b| 
and vice versa, if
c a| + b|, then ab c. 
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Likewise, if
c ab, then a| + b| c| 
and vice versa, if
a| + b| c|, then c ab. 
If a general statement is given, e.g.,
If
and at the same time
a c
b c,  
then we say a + b € c, likewise, since a, b and c are completely general, also holds 
the statement:
if a| c|
and at the same time b| c|,
then a| + b| c|  
where a|, b|, c|, however, do not represent de negatives of the designated positives, 
and are again general symbols.
Likewise, in general statements negatives can be converted into positives.
From
a c
b c
I. a+b c  
we obtain the dual statement
c| a|
c| b|
II. c| a|b|  
And from these, by converting negatives into positives, we obtain
c a
c b
III. c ab.  
While all three statements taken individually claim to be of the same generality, 
I and II are also distinguished by the fact that they apply at the same time to pairs of 
positives and negatives, whereas, e.g. statement III is not necessarily valid at the 
same time as II or I. The positives in I and III are in general not identical. This is one 
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of the considerations that suggest themselves in Schröder in which he compares the 
calculus of statements and the calculus of domains (Vol. II, 1, p. 46). According to 
Schröder’s terminology, statement III represents the dual of statement I. While in 
our formulation there is a logical connection between I and II, in Schröder state-
ments I and II are connected only empirically. For us, statement II forms a bridge 
between I and III, and the connection between a statement and its dual counterpart 
seems to be due to the empirical element in the principles. In addition, Schröder’s 
choices repeatedly introduce flaws in the course of the proof. From the fact that 
Schröder is eventually led to the peculiar Theorem 35, one may feel inclined to infer 
that this is in particular a fundamental deficiency in Schröder’s otherwise clear pre-
sentation (Vol. I, p. 315): “In each statement and general formula of the identical 
calculus of domains, it is allowed to interchange at the same time the super- and 
subordination signs, the 0 and 1 as well as the times and plus signs, and this means 
that one must always obtain a valid sentence and a correct formula.” The unfounded 
“must” is particularly disruptive in a theorem that lacks actual proof. Schröder him-
self declares (p. 318) in no satisfactory way: “Incidentally, as in the examples above, 
we will not be compelled to make any fundamental use of Theorem 35, of duality, 
while being able to prove the required statements individually and in detail. As far 
as we like, we can let Theorem 35 play here only the role of an empirical principle, 
which subsequently determines in each statement that its dual counterpart holds, in 
other words, it sums up all these determinations in a general statement with a com-
prehensive induction.” Since Schröder relies on induction, Theorem 35 acquires the 
peculiar characteristic of being always valid for every statements found at that point; 
whereas, according to the strict wording of Schröder’s statement, for subsequent 
dual statements duality would have to be determined inductively. If one claims 
Theorem 35 only for each statement found, then it is certainly found by complete 
induction; but if one assumes the application of duality for the ensuing statements, 
then one is applying an incomplete induction, which cannot have a place here. 
Schröder hints on p. 318 at an attempt to explain duality in relation to the connec-
tion between content and extension relations, but it is not developed, only suggest-
ing that the author feels dissatisfied. Our presentation of duality shows that he finds 
sufficient grounds only in the extension of the comparison of positives and nega-
tives, and that he does not feel compelled to refer back to the opposition between 
extension and content.
In the following we will use Theorems 8 and 10 to write the dual statements and 
will write 1 always instead of 0|.
In the new notation, it reads as follows,
Theorem 6
aa| = 0
Theorem 7
if ab = 0 and at the same time
a|b| = 0, then
a = b| and
b = a|
Theorem 6|
1 = a + a|.
Theorem 7|
if 1 = a| + b| and at the same time
1 = a + b, then
a = b| and
b = a|.  
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We could express Theorem 7 also as follows:
if ab = 0 and at the same time 1 = a + b, then a = b| and b = a|,
which corresponds to Schröder’s definition of negation.
If ab = 0 and a + b = 1, and on the other hand, ac = 0 and a + c = 1, then b = a| 
and c = a|, and therefore b = c|, which in Schröder functions as the auxiliary Theorem 
29.
To continue our presentation,
Theorem 11 [6x]
ab a
Theorem 12 [13x]
a (bc) = (ab) c
Theorem 13 [14x]
aa = a
Theorem 14 [15x]
if a b, then
ac bc
Theorem 15 [16x]
If a = b, then
ac = bc
Theorem 16 [17x]
if a b and c b
then aa bb
Theorem 11|
a| a| + b|.
Theorem 12|
(a| + b|) + c| = a| + (b| + c|).
Theorem 13|
a| = a| + a|.
Theorem 14|
if b| a|, then
b| + c| a + c|.
Theorem 15|
if b| = a|, then
b| + c| = a| + c|.
Theorem 16|
if b| a| and b a
then b| + b| a| + a|  
Analogous to Theorems 17 [18] and 18 [19],
Theorem 19
(a b) = (a = ab)
Theorem 19|
(a| + b| = a|) + (b| a|),  
and replacing on the right side a with b| and b| with a, with the left side together 
with Schröder’s Theorem 20, we obtain (a = ab) = (a € b) = ((a + b) = b).
Theorem 20
0 a
Theorem 20|
a| 1.  
Proof: According to Theorem 6, aa| = 0. According to theorem 11, aa| € a, therefore 
0 € a for any desired a. In Schröder we are told this is in Definition 2. So we see 
that our zero definition leads to the same results as Schröder’s.
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Theorem 21 [5x]
if a 0, then a = 0
Theorem 22 [21x]
a . 1 = a
Theorem 23 [22x]
a . 0 = 0
Theorem 24 [23x]
a (a + b) = a
Theorem 25 [24x]
if 1 = ab, then a = 1
and b = 1
Theorem 26
if ac bc and
at the same time b|c| a|c|, then
a b
Theorem 21|
if 1 a|, then 1 = a|.
Theorem 22|
1 = a| + 1.
Theorem 23|
1 = a| + 1.
Theorem 24|
a| = a| + a|b|.
Theorem 25|
if a| + b| = 0, then a| = 0
and b| = 0.
Theorem 26|
if b| + c| a| + c| and
at the same time a + c b + c, then
b| a|,  
which, if one carries out the required substitutions, corresponds to Theorem 
40 in Schröder.
Proof: If ac € bc, then from Theorem 11, ac € b, therefore from Definition 3’ 
acb| = 0, then from Definition 3”, ab| € c|, likewise b|c| € a| and b|c|a = 0, thus ab| 
€ c. From ab| € c| and ab| € c and from Definition 2’, it follows that
ab| € cc|, from Theorem 6, then ab| € 0, then ab| = 0 after Theorem 21, and as a result, 
after Definition 3”, a € b.
Theorem 27 [41]
if ab c, then this is
equivalent to a b| + c
Theorem 27|
if c| a| + b|, then this is
equivalent to bc| a|.  
Proof: From Definition 3’, abc| = 0, therefore, from Definition 3” a € b| + c.
Theorem 28
a b is equivalent to
ab| b + a|
Theorem 28|
b| a| is equivalent to
ab| b + a|.  
Proof: If a € b, then from Definition 3, ab| € 0. Its dual statement is 1 € b + a|,
Therefore, ab| 0 1 b + a|, 
on the other hand, if ab| € b + a|, it holds that ab| (b + a) = 0, i.e. ab|ab| € 0,
i.e. a € b. This theorem may be found in Schröder’s Vol II, 1, p. 314.
Theorem 29 (corresponds
to the Theorem in Vol. II, 1, p. 316)
if a a|, then a 0
Theorem 29|
if a a|,
then 1 a|.  
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Proof: a (a|)| = 0, therefore aa = 0, i.e., a = 0.
Theorem 30
if a b and b a|,
then a = 0
Theorem 30|
if b| a| and a b|,
then 1 = a|.  
Proof: If a € b and b € a|, then a € a|, i.e. from Theorem 29, a = 0.
Theorem 31
if a b and b| a,
then b = 1
Theorem 31|
if b| a| and a| b,
then 0 = b|.  
Proof: b| € a| since a € b then b| € b, i.e. b| € (b|)|, and as a result of Theorem 29, b = 1.
Theorem 31
if a b and b| a,
then, b = 1
Theorem 31|
if b| a| and a| b,
then 0 = b|.  
Proof: b| € a| as a € b, then b| € b, i.e. b| € (b|)|, therefore, from Theorem 29|, b = 1.
Theorem 32
a b is equivalent to
ab| b
Theorem 32|
b| a| is equivalent to
b| a| + b.  
Proof: From Definition 3, ab| = 0 and 0 € b, thus ab| € b and, on the other hand, if ab| 
€ b, then ab|b| = 0, thus a € b. If in the dual statement we replace b| with a and a| 
with b, we obtain a € b, equivalent to a € b + a|, which can be found in Schröder’s 
Vol II, 1, p. 314.
Theorem 33
a ( a| + b) b
Theorem 33|
b| a + a|b.  
Proof: From Theorem 6 it holds that ab|. (b  +  a)  =  0, from this follows from 
Definition 3
a(b + a|) b. 
Theorem 34
if bc 0, then
a ab| + ac|
Theorem 34|
if 1 = b| + c|, then
(a| + b)(a| + c) a|.  
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Proof: from Theorem 33 it holds that a(a| + b) € b and a(a| + c) € c, therefore 
a(a| + c) (a| + b) € bc = 0; it follows from Definition 3 that a € ab| + ac|. This theo-
rem corresponds in some respects to Schröder’s Principle III: if bc + 0, then a(b 
+ c) € ab + ac, considering that, if bc = 0, then b| + c| = 1 holds, thus a(b| + c|) = a.
Theorem 35 [Theorem 34]
0 = (a + b)(a + b|)(a| + b)(a| + b|)
Theorem 35|
a|b| + a|b + ab| + ab = 1.  
Proof: From Definition 3 it must hold that, if the statement above is correct, (a + b) 
€ ab + a|b + ab|; now we know from Theorem 34 that, since always bb| = 0, a € 
ab| + ab as well as
b ba| + ba, 
hence a + b € ab + ab| + a|b, in Schröder as his own Theorem 33, which proves 
the theorem.
Theorem 36 [Theorem 39]
ab| + a|b = 0 is equivalent
a = b
Theorem 36|
b| = a| is equivalent to
(a + b|)(a| + b) = 1.  
Proof: From Definition 3 it holds that, if a € b, then ab| = 0, if b € a, then ba| = 0 and 
therefore if a = b, ab| = 0, a|b = 0 and ab| + a|b = 0, and vice versa, we know from 
Theorem 25 that ab = 0 and ba| = 0, thus it holds at the same time that a € b and 
b € a, i.e., a = b. In order to derive the second equivalence in Schröder from our 
dual sentence, we replace a| with b and b| with a, and, after applying Theorem 34, 
we obtain ab + a|b| = 1.
Theorem 37 [Theorem 27]
a(b + c) = ab + ac
Theorem 37|
(a| + b|)(a| + c|) = a| + b|c|.  
Proof: The first half, from Schröder’s Theorem 25, ab + ac € a(b + c); the second 
half, from Definition 3, the theorem is
equivalent to: a(b + c)(a| + c|) = 0, it also holds that 
a(a| + b|) b|, from Theorem 33
a(a| + c|) c|, likewise from Theorem 33
b + c b + c  
therefore, the product on both sides
a(a| + b|)(a| + c|)(b + c) b|c|(b + c) 0 
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from Theorem 6,
which proves that the law of distributivity applies to the whole system. While 
Schröder should acknowledge at this point that duality escapes him, and a certain 
amount of uncertainty on p. 294 and p. 310 is unmistakable in his expressions, our 
presentation seems more appropriate for a consistent structure, which Schröder 
himself has always sought. This is so not only by making duality clearer and more 
intelligible, but also by making it possible to lay out the proof without systematic 
difficulties.
 3. Otto Neurath: Univocality and Commutativity of the Logical Product ab 
(1909)
(Otto Neurath, 1909, “Eindeutigkeit und Kommutativität des logischen Produktes 
ab.” Archiv für Philosophie, 2. Abteilung: Archiv für systematische Philosophie, 
Neue Folge, Bd. 15, 1909, 342–344) 8
In the recently published “Abriß der Algebra der Logik”, by Ernst Schröder and 
edited by Eugen Müller,9 the commutation law is derived again, which is why I want 
to present some additional remarks to my article.10 Although in §2 of the Abriss it 
states that two signs or two elements, a and b, may be identical, the identity sign (a 
≡ b), which corresponds to the symbolic equality (a ≣ b) I have proposed, is not 
always used where necessary. In “Presuppositions of the theory of statements” in 
§18 it states the following about the commutativity of the product: “If the product 
αβ means the simultaneous validity of both statements, α and β, whichever is men-
tioned in the first position, so that βα has the same meaning as, or is identical to, αβ. 
The factors of a product are interchangeable.” The author then continues: “Since 
identical statements are ordered and equal to each other, one has the “commutation 
statement”
, =  
It is in no way convenient to call this symbolic equality commutativity, since in 
arithmetic, from whose terminology the term is taken, there is a difference between 
multiplier and multiplicand. One obtains two products, with the names ab and ba, 
and then finds that both products have the same value, whereas here the same prod-
uct has two names, because the two statements are valid at the same time and cannot 
8 Reprinted in Neurath (1981, 17-18). [Translator’s note.]
9 See Schröder (1909). [Translator’s note.]
10 Cf. Archiv für systematische Philosophie XV, vol. 1, 1909, pp.  104ff. [See article 1. in the 
Appendix; translator’s note.]
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be distinguished from each other as multiplier and multiplicand, and only the one- 
dimensional descriptive ordering automatically generates, as it were, the two names.
In “Presuppositions of domain theory” the “law of commutativity” is not applied 
to the definition of product. It means actually only
(x a) (x b) = (x ab), 
whereas the following could be added:
(x a)(x b) (x ab). 
Based on §18, which has introduced αβ = βα, it now holds true that
(x a)(x b) (x b)( x a) and therefore also 
(x b)( x a) (x ab). 
The symbol “ab” should now be discussed. It is manifestly independent of the order 
of the statements. What does ba mean, then? If the stipulation we put forward in the 
cited treatise holds, that only the alphabetical order should be used, ba is a meaning-
less sign. Otherwise, however, the following holds by definition:
(x ab) (x a)(x b) (x b)( x a). 
It would be meaningful, therefore, besides the symbolic equality of statements:
, here the equality of domain statements  
ab ba also to introduce immediately.  
In the abovementioned Abriß, however, the concept of “commutativity” leads to 
further ambiguities.
In §42 there is a completely correct proof that a product of two domains a and b 
is univocal,
 
ab ab( ) =’ .  
But then in §43 it continues: “As such a second product value (ab)’ may be con-
sidered somewhat like the product ba, with interchanged factors, which corresponds 
to a swap in the premises in VIx’.”11 Commutativity will then be proven in the same 
11 Axiom VIx’ is (x € a)( x € b) € (x € ab). See Schröder (1909, 23). [Translator’s note.]
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way as univocality, a proof also that in essence it is only proof of univocality. Here 
the symbol “ba” is assigned only to the product (x € b)(x € a), which, as we have 
shown above, is not permitted. The proof of univocality shows that two domains 
have only one product, and the proof of commutativity should show that the two 
products have the same value. However, the two products do not appear defined 
anywhere; so, of the two proofs, only the proof of univocality has a place in the 
system.
 4. Olga Hahn: On the Axiomatics of the Logical Calculus of Domains 
(1909)
(O.  Hahn, 1909, “Zur Axiomatik des logischen Gebietkalkuls.” Archiv für 
Philosophie, 2. Abteilung: Archiv für systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge, 
Bd. 15, 1909, 345–347)
In his Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik Ernst Schröder indicates that it 
might be expedient to place the statement a = (a|) as an axiom at the top of the cal-
culus of domains. Since it may be of some interest to discuss the various possibili-
ties for an axiom system for this calculus, the following attempt is made to carry out 
Schröder’s suggestion.
Each conceptual delimitation of a domain a determines at the same time one and 
only one domain a|, which we call the negative belonging to the positive.
Like Schröder, we begin with the principle of identity:
Principle I. a € a.
Principle II. If a € b and at the same time b € c, then a € c.
Definition 1. If (a € b) and (b € a), then a = b, and vice versa.
The theorems resulting from these statements will be adopted from Schröder with-
out modification. Just as all those statements of Schröder’s are used implicitly, no 
new proof is necessary for this presentation.
Principle III. (a|)| = a,
i.e., the negative of the negative is equal to the positive to which, according to our 
postulate, it appears assigned. The relation between positive and negative is  univocal 
in an invertible manner, as the univocal operation of negation assigns to each nega-
tive one and only one positive. We could formulate our statement as: the positive of 
a positive is equal to its negative.
Definition 2. If a € a|, then we say that a = 0 and a| = 1, and vice versa. We will see 
in the following that this definition corresponds to that of 0 and 1 in Schröder.
Theorem 1. From Definition 2 it follows that 1 = 0| and thereby, from Pr. III, 1| = 0.
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Definition 3. If at the same time a € c and c| € b|, then we say that a + b € c and c| € 
a|b|, and vice versa, whereby the definition of addition and of multiplication is 
given.12
Hereby follows
Theorem 2. The statements a + b € c and c| € a|b| are equivalent. Our double defini-
tion allows us to contrast each statement in the form of Theorem 2 about addition 
(multiplication) with one about multiplication (addition).
Theorem 3. If a| € c| and at the same time c € b, then it holds that a| + b| € c| and c € 
ab.
Proof: from Pr. III and Def. 2, therefore a| + b| € c| is equivalent to c € ab.
Theorem 4. a + a € a, a| € a|a|.
Proof: from Pr. I and Def. 3.
Theorem 5. a € b and b| € a| are equivalent.
Proof: if a € b, then from Th. 4, also a + a € b; therefore, from Def. 3, b| € a|a|, and, 
from Th. 4, b| € a|; therefore
(a b) (b| a|).  
If b| € a|, then b| € a|a|, therefore a + a € b and a € b, then:
(b| a|) (a b), whereby
(b| a|) = (a b)  is proven.  
This theorem, whose significance for logical duality has been proven elsewhere,13 
makes it possible to write the other dual theorems.
Theorem 6. a + b = b + a.
Proof: From Th. 5 it follows that instead of a € c and c| € b| in Def. 3, one can write 
c| € a| and b € c, from where, after Pr. I, b + a € a + b.
Similarly, one can prove that a + b € b + a, whereby the law of commutation for 
addition and multiplication is proven. While in Schröder’s presentation there is no 
reason for the introduction of the commutation law,14 here it becomes necessary due 
to the asymmetric expression of the definitions of addition and multiplication.
12 The univocality proof is in accordance with Schröder and Müller’s Abriß (Teubner, 1909).
13 Archiv f. system. Phil. XV, 2, 1909. “On Duality in Logic” (O. Hahn and O. Neurath). [See article 
2. in this Appendix; translator’s note.]
14 Arch. f. system. Phil. XV. 1. 1909. P. 104f. [See article 2. in this Appendix; translator’s note.]
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Theorem 7. (ab)| = a| + b|.
Proof with Def. 3, Pr. III and Th. 5.
Theorem 8. aa| = 0, a + a| = 1
Proof: aa| € 0a + a| – see Schröder – and since a + a| = (aa|)|, the statement follows 
from Def. 2.
From this, 0 € a, a| € 1, for any a, which correspond to Schröder’s definitions of 
0 and 1.
Principle IV. If ab| € b + a|, then a € b.
Theorem 9. (a € b) = (ab| € 0).
Proof: if a € b, then ab| € bb| € 0. If ab| € 0, then from Def. 2, ab| € (ab|)| € b + a|, 
therefore, from Pr. IV, a € b, which was to be proven.
Since the law of distribution can be derived from this theorem,15 the principles 
and definitions presented here are sufficient to derive the entirety of Schröder’s cal-
culus of domains.
 5. Otto Neurath: Definition Equality and Symbolic Equality (1910)
(Otto Neurath, 1910, “Definitionsgleichheit und symbolische Gleichheit.” Archiv 
für Philosophie, 2. Abteilung: Archiv für systematische Philosophie, Neue Folge, 
Band 16, 1910, 142–144) 16
Ernst Schröder and Eugen Müller speak of a commutation law in the logical 
calculus. Elsewhere17 I have shown that the two symbols ab and ba appear to be 
defined at the same time by denoting the same relation between two objects, not two 
relations defined separately or two different instances of the type of relation with the 
same result as the mathematical products ab and ba. It turns out that it is appropriate 
to distinguish the case of equality of two symbols from the second case. I pressed 
for expressing the fact this way
ab ba, 
to be read ab symbolically equal to ba. Taking this difference into account, it is pos-
sible to avoid oversights like Schröder and Müller’s.
15 Arch. f. system. Phil. XV. 2. 1909. “On Duality in Logic.” [See article. 2. in this Appendix; trans-
lator’s note.]
16 Reprinted in Neurath (1981, 19-21). [Translator’s note.]
17 Cf. Archiv f. system. Philosophie 1909, Bd. XV, “Ernst Schröders Beweis des 12. Theorems: Für 
identische Operationen gilt das ‘Kommutationsgesetz,’” p.  104ff, and “Eindeutigkeit und 
Kommutativität des logischen Produktes ab,” p. 302ff. [See article 1. and article 3 in this Appendix; 
translator’s note.]
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I have recently noticed that J.  Petzoldt and, in a sense, also W.  Wundt have 
already proposed drawing a similar distinction. It is easy to find in the literature 
expressions along the same lines, especially by mathematicians and physicists. A 
collection of such points would likely help draw attention to the question of the 
essence of definition.
Petzoldt adopts Wundt’s distinction between definition equality, e.g., c = s/t, and 
causal equality, e.g., v = gt.18 Petzoldt now describes definition equalities as identi-
ties and hence suggests19 writing
 c s tº / .  
The question now is whether there is still a difference between this identity and 
symbolic equality, that is, whether there is yet a third case besides equality and 
symbolic equality.
The case ab ≣ ba in algebra of logic is completely clear; we want to maintain the 
expression ‘symbolic equality’ for such types, because only one product appears 
defined in Schröder’s formulation.20 On the other hand, in the example given by 
Petzoldt,
 
a b a b a b+( )( ) =– –2 2  
18 See Petzold (1895). Univocality is the property of determination at the basis of determinism 
associated with causal laws and, with Mach, their empirical significance. Petzold referred to an 
article by the empirical psychology pioneer Wilhelm Wundt (1894). The question arose for Wundt 
as a problem in the empirical interpretation of mathematical relations in physics and psychology. 
As a formal issue in logic – on psychological foundations and the basis of empirical knowledge –, 
Wundt had examined equality relations in the first volume of his Logik (revised edition, 1893), and 
as matter of natural knowledge in the two parts of the second volume, published separately in a 
revised edition (see vol. 2, section 1, 1894, 327-332, and vol. 2, section 2, 1895, 146-7,155, 194, 
208 and 256). Neurath had been reading Logik for a review published the same year in the context 
of the debate over the unity of the natural and human sciences. See Neurath (1910/2004). 
[Translator’s note].
19 Cf. Vierteljhschrft f. wiss. Phil. 1895, XIX, “Das Gesetz der Eindeutigkeit,” p. 150.
20 It differs from O. Hahn’s axiomatization (Archiv f. system. Phil. XV, 1909, p. 347): “Similarly, 
one can prove that whereby the law of commutation for addition and multiplication is proven. 
While in Schröder’s presentation there is no reason for the introduction of the commutation law, 
here it becomes necessary due to the asymmetric expression of the definitions of addition and 
multiplication.” [See article 4 in this Appendix; translator’s note.]
The interesting fact that the commutation law in logic depends on the axiom system suggests 
the question of the degree to which commutation laws may be eliminated by variations of the 
axiom system. Today a systematic approach to axiomatics is becoming more and more a 
requirement.
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is no doubt an instance of the usual “equality.”21
What about the case a + a + a + a + … + a (b times) = ab, where Petzoldt rightly 
wants to see the identity sign used? We can establish a difference immediately. The 
left-hand side of the definition itself makes sense, not on the basis of a definition, 
but by combining multiple definitions. The right-hand side cannot be defined at the 
same time as the left-hand side; it is defined by the left-hand side. The situation is 
different for symbolic equality; the left-hand side has been determined first by defi-
nition; the right-hand side could have been defined equally, and then the left-hand 
side can be obtained by means of a symbolic equation. Both sides occupy the same 
place in relation to the definitions.
It might be worth considering, therefore, three different cases, which we can 
illustrate with examples from mathematics:
 I. Equality: (a + b)(a – b) = a2 – b2.
 II. Definition equality: a + a + a + a + … + a (b times) ≣ ab.
 III. Symbolic equality: b√a ≣ a1/b.
That the discrimination between III and I is effective has been shown by logical 
example, where the mixture of II and III led to confusion; whether the symbolic 
independence of II from III is in place would first have to be examined more closely, 
but I have shown that the three cases can be set apart and in the discussion of the 
essence of definition the distinction may even be necessary.
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 Appendix 2: The 1940–1945 Neurath-Carnap Correspondence
Edited with additional notes by Adam Tamas Tuboly and Jordi Cat (Fig. A2)
 Editorial Introduction
Robert S. Cohen and Marie Neurath edited the first (Empiricism and Sociology) and 
the second (Otto Neurath: Philosophical Papers 1913–1946) selected writings of 
Neurath appearing in English. The volumes were published in the important “Vienna 
Circle Collection,” under the general editorship of Henk L. Mulder, Robert S. Cohen, 
and Brian McGuinness (with, among others, A. J. Ayer, Herbert Feigl, Viktor Kraft, 
and Karl Menger on the Editorial Advisory Board). The second volume’s updated 
bibliography of Neurath’s writings ended with the following item: “The 
Fig. A2 First page of Neurath’s letter to Carnap
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Correspondence of Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap,” edited by Marie Neurath and 
Henk K. Mulder, forthcoming in the “Vienna Circle Collection.” Nothing came out 
for years.
Two years later still, Rainer Hegselmann (1985, 276, n. 1.) indicated in his paper 
about the philosophical significance of the Neurath-Carnap correspondence that 
there would be a German-English edition of the 1940–45 correspondence under the 
editorship of Marie Neurath, Henk K. Mulder, and himself. As it turned out, there 
was an internal debate among the editors since Neurath’s third wife, Marie, wanted 
to publish just a selection of letters in which all quarrels between Neurath and 
Carnap should be eliminated. After a few years of discussion, however, Rainer 
Hegselmann convinced Marie Neurath that everything should be published, the con-
flicts included, and she agreed. Nevertheless, due to the changing priorities and 
others reasons, the correspondence was never published.22
Although these letters have not appeared in print before, they have not been 
unknown to those working on the re-evaluation of logical empiricism, especially of 
Carnap’s and Neurath’s philosophies. They have been used regularly in philosophi-
cal and historical arguments.23
 Content and Context of the Letters
The 1940–1945 correspondence between Neurath and Carnap is as intellectual as it 
is personal. The reader is able to get a quite comprehensive view not just of how 
these philosophers established their commitments, arguments, and researches in the 
1940s, but also of their personal development and attitudes, especially in changing 
circumstances, and, no less significant, how the personal and the philosophical 
changes expressed each other.
Philosophical correspondences may be consulted not just for reasons of curios-
ity, to peek into the daily life of philosophers, they also open up a view into a special 
forum for discussions prior to published arguments. W. V. O. Quine wrote to Carnap, 
for example, that after their years-length debates about modality in their letters, they 
“did accomplish a good deal toward ironing out misunderstandings in the prelimi-
nary correspondence, and that it is all right to let the public in.”24 Also Carnap and 
Neurath mentioned the benefit of having a private, partly informal and freely devel-
oping debate about problematic issues before any publication on the given topic 
(see especially letters 17. and 23.). In fact, that is the situation in which Neurath’s 
early death left matters.
22 We are indebted for this information to Rainer Hegselmann (email correspondence with Ádám 
Tamás Tuboly, August 9, 2017).
23 The most important and throughout going use of these letters are in Hegselmann 1985, 1987; 
Uebel 1992, 2007; and Reisch 2003a, 2003b and 2005.
24 Quine to Carnap, 4 December 1946; in Creath (1990, 403).
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The 1940–45 correspondence presented here can be consulted also with a histo-
riographical interest in mind. In order to write a history of logical empiricism (it is 
quite dubious whether “the” history of logical empiricism could or should be writ-
ten), the story-telling historian finds a whole gamut of possible perspectives and 
sources, for instance:
 (1) The history of the received orthodox view (mainly by W. V. O. Quine, Nelson 
Goodman, A. J. Ayer, and in textbooks from the twentieth century).
 (2) The recent work challenging the received view about logical empiricism (Coffa 
1991; Uebel 1992, 2007; Richardson 1998; Friedman 1999; Reisch 2005; Carus 
2007; Richardson – Uebel 2007; Damböck 2016).
 (3) Original self-presentations of the movement in published memoirs, biogra-
phies, and historical introductions by logical empiricists themselves (Blumberg – 
Feigl 1931; Reichenbach 1936, 1951; Neurath 1936/1981; Morris 1937; Kaila 
1939/2014; Frank 1949; Jörgensen 1951/1970; Kraft 1950/1953; von Mises 
1956; Carnap 1963; Menger 1979a, 1979b, 1982, 1994; Rutte  – Acham  – 
Götschl 1973; Popper 1976/2002; Haller  – Rutte 1977; Feigl 1969/1981a, 
1969/1981b; Bergmann 1993; Næss 1993).25
 (4) Histories documented in private letters and other archive files.
 (5) Alternative accounts by contemporaneous actors, including critics (Popper, 
again, too).
 (6) Contemporaneous public notices and narratives featured in the news media and 
other non-professional venues.
 (7) The history of intellectual collectives such as schools and other self-organized 
and self-labeled groups.
These stories usually do not match and sometimes even contradict one another 
(especially in the case of (1) and (2)). It is also true that works in (2) built upon the 
narratives and themes emerging in the files of (4). Nevertheless, some unpublished 
drafts, notes, and conference presentations could undercut even those stories that 
already diverged from the usual received.
Correspondences might be important for another reason as well: they could tease 
out or re-evaluate ignored or forgotten strands of the movement. Take the case of 
Hans Hahn: he is not the most cited author among members of the Vienna Circle; 
his ‘philosophical writings’ is formally quite a thin booklet, and he was entirely 
dropped from the stories of (1) and even from many of (2). Still, according e.g. to 
Philipp Frank, Hahn was the ‘real founder’ of the Circle, teacher and mentor of 
many important members of the movement, a regular and persistent member of the 
evening discussions whose critical notices carried great weight. But that could be 
reconstructed only from certain works in (3), and mainly from (4).
A similar case could be presented regarding Philipp Frank too. After the 1950s, 
he seems to have been dropped from the canon in (1); he was usually mentioned as 
25 Some of these works are treated by Stadler 2001/2015, Sect. 4.1. and Hofer – Stöltzner 2014.
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only occasionally attending the Circle’s meetings in (3); he is more often mentioned 
as a peculiar case by (2). But according to (4), he seems to be an equal partner of 
Schlick (and not just in age), a leading figure of opinion-formation for some mem-
bers, a sometimes sloppy, but still active organizer like Neurath, and a forerunner of 
important trends in history, philosophy, and sociology of science.26
The stories presented in the members’ memoirs are sometimes similar to those in 
(1), other times to those in (2). The reasons behind this phenomenon are quite com-
plex, but the time and place of writing, the language of the work, the milieu and 
context of philosophy could be relevant in all of the given cases. Thus, the histories 
documented in (3) might be counterbalanced also by the materials in (5), (6) and 
even (4): letters often contain valuable insights on the production and aims of these 
memoirs, stories and works of logical empiricists.
All of these considerations are especially relevant to the Neurath-Carnap corre-
spondence. Though there are many (side) issues recurring frequently in the letters, 
seven themes provided the core issues of their correspondence. These are, in (some-
times overlapping) temporal order, (a) emigration, (b) semantics, (c) Popper’s phi-
losophy, (d) Russell’s philosophy, (e) Neurath’s Encyclopedia monograph, (f) 
Neurath’s own place in the movement, (g) the relation between Platonism in the 
history of philosophy and the oppressive German climate the led to Nazism. 
However, the main issue is partly political, partly cultural, partly scientific, and 
partly methodological: namely the difference between absolutism and pluralism. 
We shall not go into the details here; all of these topics are treated in the general 
introduction to the present volume, and are discussed in detail by the authors of the 
volume in their chapters.
 Form, Structure, Editorial Issues
The correspondence between Neurath and Carnap contains many side-references to 
various persons. We have provided biographical and bibliographical information 
(dates, fields of research, relevant works) for only those people (scientists, philoso-
phers, politicians or just friends) who do not have a biography in Friedrich Stadler’s 
The Vienna Circle (2001/2015, 397–592). Since Neurath and Carnap were always 
embedded in various scientific-cultural-social circles, these figures, occasionally 
mentioned in the letters, also provide further insight into the context of logical 
empiricism.
Bibliographical information for those works that are either mentioned or dis-
cussed in details by Neurath and Carnap is presented also in the footnotes. The 
English translations that became available after their correspondence are noted as 
well; in other cases, details of the original editions are given without any specific 
26 On Frank’s rehabilitation see the special issue of Studies in East European Thought (Tuboly 
2017), edited on occasion of the 50th anniversary of Frank’s death.
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references. Since Neurath often quoted from original German texts (without provid-
ing translations), we have provided the English translations from later editions in 
the footnotes. Since the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science was a fre-
quent theme, and the correspondents referred to the various monographs as well, 
they are noted in the footnotes with the volume- and monograph number as “II-3,” 
meaning Volume II, Monograph 3. As the most easily accessible edition is the one 
released in 1970,27 we have provided page numbers referring to it.
Some words should be said about the selection-principles. Until 1940, and 
through the first months of that year, Neurath and Carnap corresponded in their 
native language. The fact that they started to exchange letters in English is signifi-
cant for various reasons. It is known from the Carnap-Quine correspondence that 
Carnap started to write letters in English earlier to prepare for his journey to America 
(in Creath 1990, 126). Writing letters in English thus meant a means to practice the 
language of the future adoptive country in an informal setting. In Neurath’s case, the 
first reason might have been that he was required to write in English by the rules 
enforced at the British internment camps: when he was interned during the summer 
of 1940 in England, all the letters sent out and received by internees were opened, 
read through, and often censored by the suitable officers (see e.g. Kochan 1983, 
136). Accustomed to writing letters in the new language, staying in England for the 
rest of his life during wartime as a foreign national habit and caution would have 
prompted corresponding in English also with individuals in other countries engaged 
in war.
It was our editorial decision not to include those letters that were written in 
German during the relevant period: though there are a few of them between January 
and May 1940 (the last was sent out by Neurath on May 6, a few days before the 
Nazis entered Holland and he fled to England), all of them are about editorial issues 
regarding the Encyclopedia and its structure. They will be published under the gen-
eral editorship of Christian Damböck in the official and critical edition of the Carnap 
correspondence.
The Neurath-Carnap correspondence practically stopped after May 1941 when 
Neurath became interned with Marie for eight months: they were released only in 
February 1941; the correspondence started then with renewed force as soon as they 
settled down in Oxford that year. Our selection of the 1940–1945 correspondence, 
despite the absent parts, still make up a coherent and continuous exchange of letters: 
their running thread is provided by the abovementioned philosophical and social 
questions.
Besides the selection process, publishing the English letters meant another edito-
rial challenge. Though Neurath and Carnap wrote letters in their second language 
for years, in most of these letters are still often the use of English, especially by 
Neurath, can be idiosyncratic when not incorrect. We have not modified any of the 
stylistic features: all the texts are preserved as they were originally written and 
27 Foundations of the Unity Science: Toward an International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, 
Volumes 1–2, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
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received by the correspondents. The fact they both turned to English in their per-
sonal communication is a moving document of being in English-speaking countries 
that are both foreign and at war against Germany. Preserving their respective use of 
English also documents the degree of alienation and compromise involved in the 
experience of emigration.
On the other hand, writing in English might have another incentive. In their 
debate about auxiliary and international languages, Neurath wrote to Carnap the 
followings: “You see in the English speaking world, English is the auxiliary lan-
guage also for foreigners, the various aliens here, all the foreign governments use 
English, it is astonishing how the whole business runs in this way, English is mani-
festly now the Lingua franca for very many people. Who will learn Esperanto in the 
USA? For what purpose?”28 English was thus an instrument, imposed on Neurath 
by the requirement to communicate effectively in the international community. But 
in the usage of English he found other reliefs as well: “You see, how difficult it is 
and what monst[er]s of sentences there appear in my German. How to translate, as 
I told you: ‘the pattern of the brotherhood of mankind.’ I am glad you know now, 
that English is, for me, more adequate than German, which is full of Metaphysics 
and lacks CONCRETE Brotherhood phraseology. Funny, but an experience.”29
Besides the stylistic issues, we should warn the readers of the many ungrammati-
cal formulations and typos. Where obvious mistaken phrases or simple errors 
occurred, we have indicated them in [brackets], by replacing the mistaken letters, or 
providing the missing one. To see some examples, “I should like to see Brunswiks 
paper” became “I should like to see Brunswik[’]s paper,” or “much more then any 
other publication of our movement” became “much more th[a]n any other publica-
tion of our movement,” “it would be allright” became “it would be a[l]right.” In many 
other cases, when obviously idiosyncratic or mistaken words appeared, we tried to 
provide again in [brackets] what would have been the appropriate expression. For 
example, “I prefer the differences of the decisions, because then we get more people 
with civil courage and less people who always look to the ‘formal’ correctness of 
central decisions” became “I prefer the differences of [in] the decisions, because then 
we get more people with civil courage and less [fewer] people who always look to 
the ‘formal’ correctness of central decisions.” In other cases, when entire words 
should have been deleted or entirely rewritten, we chose to indicate them with “[sic]” 
noting that the mistake or incorrect formulation was in the original text.
Thus, we haven’t indicated and corrected every ungrammatical expression, but 
tried to do so with missing characters, mistaken prepositions, or misspellings. Our 
aim was not, after all, to produce a critical edition of the correspondence, but to 
make such a text that might be useful for a wide range of scholars, interested in the 
history of logical empiricism, early analytic philosophy, and twentieth century 
thought in general.
28 Neurath to Carnap, 22 December 1942 (RC 115-07-61); letter 16. in the present appendix.
29 Neurath to Bernhard Reichenbach, 22 April 1944 (Otto Neurath Nachlass (ONN, Wiener Kreis 
Archiv, Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands). All rights reserved.
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Since the letters were written in an informal tone, Neurath and Carnap often 
referred to people, but notably not to each other, by their first name. In such cases 
we provided the surname as well in brackets to help the reader in identifying whom 
they talked about. In other cases, when it seemed to be necessary or helpful for the 
reader, we inserted the first name in brackets.
Finally, marginal handwritten notes are indicated in brackets and italicized: “[…] 
so important as my neighbour’s happiness [marginal addition: but would prefer 
 suffering] by making the man unhappy […].” The same italics technique is used to 
indicate handwritten signatures, and we provided signatures in brackets where there 
were none.
 Location of the Letters
Most of these letters are preserved in both of the Carnap and Neurath archives:
• Rudolf Carnap Papers, 1905–1970, ASP.1974.01, Archives of Scientific 
Philosophy, Archives & Special Collections, University of Pittsburgh Library 
System.
• Otto Neurath Nachlass (Wiener Kreis Archiv), Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, 
Haarlem, The Netherlands.
There are a few exceptions though that could be located only in one of the Archives. 
In order to track down the original sources and letters, we have provided their 
Archive numbers underneath the name of each letter’s correspondents and date.
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 1. Carnap to Neurath, January 22, 1940.
(ASP RC 115-07-36)
RUDOLF CARNAP
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
22. Jan. 1940
Dear Neurath:
I received your two cables and inferred from the second that my letter of Nov. 
29th arrived.
Kaila sent me his book “Den Mänskliga Kunskapen” (Söderström, Helsingfors).30 
It seems to me a good introduction into logical empiricism written for a wider pub-
lic; but taking into consideration also some more technical questions. It will appeal 
to many readers because it considers the historical background from Euclid and 
Aristotle on, much more th[a]n any other publication of our movement.
Content: I. Construction of Theories.
1. The searching for invariants.
2. How the searching for invariants created Greek science.
3. The Aristotelian concept of knowledge.
4. The Galilean concept of knowledge.
5. Induction.
II. Formal Truth of Theories.
1. Logical truth.
2. Mathematical truth.
3. The two first principal theses of logical empiricism.
III. Empirical truth of theories.
1. Principle of Verifiability. The third principal thesis of logical empiricism.
2. The logic of physical theory.
3. Logical behaviorism. The fourth principal thesis of logical empiricism.
Kaila asked about the possibility of an English translation. In this case he would 
change the book somewhat. But his letter was written in the beginning of September, 
and I do not know about his present conditions. It seems to me, an English transla-
tion would be very desirable. But I cannot make a final judgment about the book 
because my Swedish reading is rather slow, and, therefore, I read only certain parts. 
30 “Den Mänskliga Kunskapen,” was the Swedish translation of Eino Kaila’s Finnish “Inhilmillinen 
tieto: Mitä se on ja mitä se ei ole,” published originally in 1939. An English translation was pub-
lished recently, see Kaila (1939/2014).
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I guess that you ask Jörgensen and Ness for judgment.31 I suppose that they have the 
book. Please let me know when you got their opinion, and then we may decide 
whether or not an English translation of the book would be suitable for our Library.32
Do you have the material of the Congress discussions?33 Did we not plan to send 
to everybody a typescript of his remarks? I did not get anything so far. Or did you 
give up the intention of publishing the discussion?
Best thanks for your New Years greetings. I am very pleased to see that the ele-
phant waves the flower gaily. I infer from it that he is as well as it is possible under 
the present circumstances.
Cordially yours,
Carnap
January 22, 1940
Supplementary remarks concerning “Studies in Semantics” 
The ms. of Part I is now finished. I will be typed during the next weeks, then I 
shall send it to some friends, and then perhaps make some changes. Thus, I suppose, 
it will not be ready for print before March or April. I have added two appendixes to 
be printed in small type. One indicating further problems which will perhaps be 
dealt with in later Parts; the second explaining the changes which are to be made 
with respect to my book “Logical Science”34 from the new point of view of 
semantics.
31 “Ness” was the usual spelling of Arne Næss (1912–2009) who attended Vienna Circle meetings 
in 1934–35. For his recollections of these events, see Næss (1993). Jørgen Jørgensen (1894–1969), 
sometimes mentioned as Jörgen Jörgensen, or Joergen Joergensen, was a Danish philosopher, co-
editor of Einheitswissenschaft and member of the “Committee of Organization” for the IEUS. In 
the English-speaking world he is mainly known for his A Treatise of Formal Logic (1931), and for 
his monograph The Development of Logical Empiricism (1951). Neurath (1938a) wrote a paper 
about Jørgensen’s work in Denmark in 1938.
32 “Library” was the “Library of Unified Science,” a continuation of Neurath’s Einheitswissenschaft 
series (see letter 28). It consisted in a “monograph series” (Heinrich Gomperz’s Interpretation. 
Logical Analysis of a Method of Historical Research (1939) were volumes 8–9), and a “book 
series,” including Richard von Mises’ Kleines Lehrbuch des Positivismus. Einführung in die 
empiristische Wissenschaftsauffassung (1939) and Hans Kelsen’s Vergeltung und Kausalität 
(1941). Von Mises’s book was translated into English in 1951. For more details see Hegselmann 
(1987).
33 Presumably the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science Congress, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, Mass. (USA), September 3–9, 1939. Despite their intentions, the papers 
read at the Congress did not appear together.
34 Carnap presumably refers to his Logical Syntax of Language (1937), originally published as 
Logische Syntax der Sprache in 1934.
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According to my calculation, the present ms. of Part I would have about 130 
printed pages of the size of the Encyclopedia or about 120 pages of the size of the 
“Logical Science.” What will be the size of the monographs in the “Library”? How 
many English words on a page?
R. C.
 2. Carnap to Neurath, January 31, 1940.
Rudolf Carnap
Faculty of Exchange
University of Chicago
CHICAGO, ILL.
January 31, 1940.
Dear Neurath:
Morris asks to write to you my opinion about an author for the biology pamphlet. 
Since I do not know anybody whom I could propose, I am willing to accept Morris’ 
suggestion of Gerard,35 although I do not know him sufficiently myself. (See 
enclosed copy of my letter to Morris.)
For the sake of safety, I repeat some item of my letter of Jan. 22nd.
 1. We might consider an English translation for our Library of Kaila’s new book 
“Den Mänskliga Kunskapen”, (Söderstöm, Helsingfros) which is an introduction 
to logical empiricism. Please ask Jörgensen and Ness for their opinion.
 2. Part I of my “Studies in Semantics”36 will become longer than previously calcu-
lated, about 120 or 130 printed pages. It will not be ready for print before March 
or April.
Cordially,
Carnap
35 Presumably Ralph Gerard (1900–1974) the American psychologist, specialized on neurophysiol-
ogy. During the 1930s and 1940s, Gerard worked at the Department of Physiology, University of 
Chicago, where Carnap thought as well since 1936.
36 Part I of Studies in Semantics was Carnap’s Introduction to Semantics (1942).
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 3. Carnap to Morris, Copy to Neurath, January 31, 1940.
Rudolf Carnap
Faculty of Exchange
University of Chicago
CHICAGO, ILL.
January 31, 1940
Prof. Charles W. Morris
Emerson Hall
Harvard University
Cambridge, Mass.
Dear Charles:
In the meantime you will received my letter of Jan. 23rd and Ina’s of 26th.
I am returning Neurath’s letter. I am not sufficiently acquainted with Gerard’s 
work and views in order to pass judgment about him and his suitability as an author 
for the Encyclopedia. But I am willing to accept your suggestion that we ask him. I 
am simultaneously writing this to Neurath by air mail.
I am surprised to learn that Santillana’s ms. is already finished.37 I was not quite 
satisfied with certain features in his previous abstract concerning the development 
of mathematics, and especially the nature of geometry from the point of view of 
science. I believe that at the partition of the subject matter had not been cleared up, 
and, therefore, I said (I believe wrote so to Neurath) that I wanted to postpone my 
remarks S. would write a new abstract. But I have not got anything from since that 
time. I hope, I may now make these remarks when I shall have read the ms., although 
they might possibly involve greater changes in the ms.
I agree with you that the next unit of the Enc. should not be announced until the 
present one is much nearer to completion.
Cordially,
C.
37 Giorgio de Santillana (1902–1974) was an Italian-American historian of science. He wrote a 
monograph (to be more precise: the first part of it) for the IEUS with Edgar Zilsel (1941).
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 4. Carnap to Neurath, November 1, 1940.
(ASP RC 115-07-53)
RUDOLF CARNAP
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
Cambridge, Mass., Nov.1, 1940.
15 Everett SA
Dear Neurath:
We all were immensely glad to learn of your and Mieze’s escape from Holland.38 
And now we are looking forward to the day when it will be possible for you both to 
come to this country. I have written testimonials for you and Mieze and sent them to 
Kaempffert [marginal addition: already on August 13].39
It was most comforting to see that the elephant still bears flowers and grinned 
quite happily. Some difficulties seem to have developed in the plan to get you in on 
a non-quota visa via Johnson’s committee for refugee scholars.40 I do not see clearly 
in the matter, but Kaufmann’s letter do[es] not sound helpful.41 I have also warmly 
recommended Waismann’s case to the same committee, no action has been taken on 
his case either. Kaufmann is devoting himself greatly to the task of pressing the 
cases of our friends, but he does not seem to be very influential. Since Kaempffert 
planned a different mode of action, we hope very much that he will be [a] success 
in your case.
38 Mieze was Marie Reidemeister, first a collaborator on Neurath’s ISOTYPE project, and later (in 
1941, see letter 6 below) his wife. Marie (often mentioned as “Mary”) edited later the English 
translation of Neurath’s selected works; see Neurath and Cohen (1973) and (1983). Regarding Otto 
Neurath’s papers, where possible, we will refer to the English translations as they are in the men-
tioned selected works.
39 Waldemar Kaempffert (1877–1956) was Neurath’s cousin and the science editor of New York 
Times, advertising Neurath’s ideas frequently (also in the American socio-political journal, the 
Survey Graphic).
40 Alvin Saunders Johnson (1874–1971), an American economist who was a co-founder and direc-
tor of The New School for Social Research. Johnson helped many European refugees, among 
others the Vienna Circle member Felix Kaufmann, who emigrated to the U.S. from Nazism.
41 Presumably Felix Kaufmann, member of the Vienna Circle.
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So much has happened since we last heard from each other that it is hard to select 
a beginning. Perhaps you want to hear about friends. Kotarbinski,42 Rougier43 and 
Peppi Frank44 have been invited by Johnson to come here – Frank finds it hard to get 
a visa though, since he does not fulfill the requirement of previous two years of 
teaching. Jørgensen has been taken into consideration by the committee, likewise 
Grelling,45 who is somewhere in a camp in the Pyrenees; nobody has heard from 
Jørgensen since the invasion. Ness has not been molested so far.
I have finished Semantics II46; though the Press would like to bring both vol-
umes, they say they cannot do so without considerable subsidies (something like 
1500 dollars per volume). The same applies to the publication of a translation of my 
Logistics.47 Meiner has asked me what he is to do with the 60 copies of the 
Sonderausgabe des Kongressberichtes and has sent me a copy of the bill for 336 
42 Tadeusz Kotarbinski (1886–1981) was a Polish logician, one of the leading members of the 
Lwów-Warsaw School. He is known for his special form of realism, called reism.
43 Louis Rougier (1889–1982) was a French philosopher of science who was responsible for the 
French advertisement and propagation of the Unity of Science Movement. He was also the orga-
nizer of the International Congresses for the Unity of science, and was a member of the Committee 
of Organization of the IEUS. His 1919 book on the philosophy of physics was translated into 
English in 1921.
44 ‘Pepi Frank’ was the famous architect Jozef Frank, one of Philipp Frank’s younger brothers, who 
held lectures in the Ernst Mach Society in Vienna, and worked with Neurath in his Museum of 
Society and Economy in Vienna (Gesellschafts- und Wirtschaftsmuseum in Wien). On Jozef Frank, 
see Thurm-Nemeth (1998).
45 Kurt Grelling was a member of the so-called Berlin Group of logical empiricism under the guid-
ance of Hans Reichenbach. Grelling was murdered in Auschwitz, on September 18, 1942.
46 See Carnap’s Formalization of Logic (1943).
47 In 1938, Kurt Edward Rosinger (a philosopher from Harvard, later Princeton) translated Carnap’s 
Abriss der Logistik into English. According to Richard Creath (1990, 255), Rosinger translated the 
book for Alfred N. Whitehead’s son. Later Carnap wrote to Quine (October 25, 1938; in Creath 
1990, 255) that University of Chicago Press would like to publish the English translation. Carnap 
wrote also to John Cooley (September 22, 1938; ibid. p. 256) that he aims at buying his mimeo-
graphed ‘Outline of Symbolic Logic’ because he is “writing a new and entirely changed edition of 
[his] ‘Abriss der symbolischen Logik.’” (Cooley’s manuscript was published in 1942 (and became 
a classic text) as A Primer of Formal Logic.) Both the rewritten German version (Einführung in die 
symbolische Logik, 1954) and the new translation (Introduction to Symbolic Logic and its 
Applications, 1958) appeared much later (see further letter 8. below). The book was translated, 
after all, by William H. Meyer and John Wilkinson. A new translation of the original Abriss will be 
published in the Collected Works of Carnap.
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marks. He wrote that Hazebroek does not reply to him.48 I do not suppose that you 
will have heard from Hazebroek, but I thought you might like to know about the 
matter. Meiner writes that he is willing to ship the copies to the individuals for 
whom they are destined if he gets an order to do so. It becomes clearer from day to 
day how vital your presence is for the Unity of Science Movement; without you, it 
simply does not seem to be a movement, but just individuals.
Cambridge is a place full of activities, learned and otherwise. We have two kinds 
of discussion groups, one on logic, which is necessarily small, and a large one where 
scientists are participating and which has the purpose of spreading the gospel.49 
Russell is here for this term, also Feigl, Tarski, Wundheiler50; Franks live in the 
same house as we.
Russell told me that he wrote to Morrison, Minister of Labor in London, in your 
behalf.51 We hope that at the time this letter arrives, you are already released and that 
you and Mieze are married. Our very best gratulations and good wishes!
Tarski told me that Struik52 (Prof. of Math. here, an old acquaintance of Frank, 
perhaps you saw him at the Congress) has some connections with President Cardenas 
of Mexico; he has succeeded in getting a visa to Mexico for a friend. If you have 
plans for going to Mexico and wish Struik to intervene, please let me know.
48 Neurath presumably is referring to the Dutch Piet Hazebroek, (1907–1971), a mathematical 
physicist by profession, who was a friend of Neurath’s secretary, Annie van Middelburg (later Van 
Ginkel), and thus belonged to Neurath’s circle in The Hague. He was also a member of the socialist 
student group, called ‘Politeia,’ and worked with Shell from 1937. Though there isn’t any recorded 
scientific publication of Hazebroek, it is not unusual for scientists working at Shell to have no 
official publications of their work even if they did research. See Merten (2007).
49 By the “logic group” Carnap’s presumably refers to those discussions that he had at Harvard with 
Alfred Tarski, Carl Hempel, and Nelson Goodman (occasionally with Bertrand Russell as well) in 
1940 and 1941. For more details, see Frost-Arnold (2013). The other group was the so-called 
“Science of Science” discussion group; see Hardcastle (2003).
50 Alexander Wundheiler (1902–1957), a Polish philosopher and logician, student of Tadeusz 
Kotarbiński at the University of Warsaw and belonged to the Lvov-Warsaw School. Wundheiler 
also attended the Fifth International Congress for the Unity of Science at Harvard in 1939. For 
more biographical and philosophical background see Artur Koterski and Thomas Uebel (2017). 
For the English translation of Wundheiler and Edward Poznański’s important paper on truth in 
physics, see Wundheiler and Poznański’s (1934/2017).
51 Herbert Morrison (1888–1965) was a British Labour Politician, Minister of Supply (12 May 
1940 – 4 October 1940), later Deputy Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1945–1951).
52 Dirk Jan Struik (1894–2000) was a Dutch mathematician working mainly in the United States 
(retired from MIT). He is known for his A Concise History of Mathematics (1948).
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I am sending to Miss Stebbing53 for you: 1. Zilsel’s MS for Encycl., 2. a reprint 
of my “Testability.” You will get my Encycl.-monograph together with all the other 
ones from the publisher. There is no other recent publication of mine. I shall send 
you the “Log. Syntax” as soon as you are settled down somewhere on this side of 
the ocean.54
To you and Mieze (we hope: Mrs. Neurath) our
love and best wishes,
yours,
Carnap
 5. Neurath to Carnap, April 4, 1941.
(ASP RC 102-55-20)
64 Park Town, Oxford
4th April 1941
Dear Carnap,
What a pleasure to get my notes for the monograph in the Encyclopedia. That 
helps me very much in my attempt to reconstruct my own ideas on this matter. In the 
meantime I have learned a lot from modern literature I was in a position to consult 
here in the Bodleian Library.
We are very busy with our studies in different fields; first of all we are collecting 
[material] for the book TOLERATION AND PERSECUTION.55 Many other things 
have to be done, too. We have now two technical collaborators who are in a position 
to use a printing press and we go on with full speed; we are buying books, collecting 
newspaper cuttings creating new files, so to speak the nucleus of a fine institute. We 
learned from friends that many people in London and elsewhere are interested in our 
work; I shall be invited to go to London to read a paper about actual problems in this 
field etc.
53 Susan Stebbing (1885–1943) was a British philosopher, co-founder of the journal Analysis, and 
the first woman professor in England. She wrote many important logic textbooks during the 1930s, 
attended the Unity of Science Congresses, and helped Neurath during his English years. Though 
she also organized lectures for Carnap and Schlick in London, she was quite critical with logical 
empiricism. On Stebbing, see Beaney (2016) and Chapman (2013).
54 See Carnap (1936–37); cf. further Carnap (1937) and (1939).
55 “Tolerance and Persecution” in the Neurath Nachlass, 207/K.88. Wiener Kreis Archiv 
(Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands). For a time, Alfred A. Knopf wanted 
to publish the manuscript as Persecution and Brotherhood. See Marie Neurath’s memoirs in Cohen 
and Neurath (1973, 68).
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The almond trees are blossoming, the birds are singing and the whole atmo-
sphere is very nice, in spite of war and danger. I am buying my own books – I see 
Carnap’s works in German and English [o]n the shelves, but I anticipate he will 
send me his books and articles very soon. Could you be kind enough to send me my 
EMPIRISCHE SOZIOLOGIE as soon as possible.56 No copy is in the library here 
and I need it very much for my discussion class. Could you be kind enough to send 
me one copy of the yellow booklet and some of my articles of which you have 
reprints?
What do you think about Russell’s last book?57 It looks somewhat strange? Neo- 
neo- Platonic Mysticism – I think it is full of misunderstandings. He seems not to 
grasp our purpose. His position – an interesting coincidence – seems to be very 
similar to Schlick’s conception in his latest days. How to safe the absolute remain-
der of relativism. Probably I shall write something about this theme.
I hope that Frank will be elaborate his monograph for the Encyclopedia and send 
the additional chapter on cosmology to Freundlich.58 Please, press this lazy fellow 
to do something. Many thanks my dear Carnap for the money you provided for me. 
I hope we shall be very soon in a position to repay the sum.59
Please ask our friends to send us books, newspaper cuttings, reprints, letters etc. 
that we have our usual intellectual environment. We are completely recreated by our 
camp isolation and are prepared to work more than before.60 It is some time neces-
sary to create a good environment. Until now the Britons are very kind and helpful 
to us, especially the university people.
You did not answer my question why you do not intend to publish semantics in 
our LIBRARY OF UNIFIED SCIENCE. I asked you to cable me, whether you are 
prepared to do it or not. You see I prefer to make an agreement with a publisher who 
pays for the JOURNAL61 and gives us free hand in publishing books in the library, 
as van Stockum did. I hope I shall settle the whole matter within a relatively short 
time.
56 See Neurath (1931), translated as Neurath (1931/1973).
57 See Russell (1941).
58 See Frank (1946) and Finlay-Freundlich (1951).
59 Many friends and colleagues have sent money and other materials to the Neuraths when they 
arrived to England. See Cohen and Neurath (1973, 72).
60 When Neurath and Marie had to flee from The Hague, they used an overcrowded small boat, The 
Seaman’s Hope. They were picked up by a British destroyer and since they had only German pass-
ports, they were imprisoned first in London and later one the Isle of Man; they were released on 
February 7 and 8, 1941. For further information see Cohen and Neurath (1973, 70–72) and Sandner 
(2011).
61 Neurath is referring to The Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis).
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Tell me something about Harvard, about men and opinions, about Frank and 
Tarski etc., about the various scientists etc. We shall visit the US as soon as 
possible.
Our ideal is to live quietly but we have to meet many people and to attend lec-
tures etc., sometimes I have to read a paper etc.
What do you know about Grelling? etc. We learned from friends that Prof. 
Joseph62 (the Biologist) committed suicide at Vienna together with his wife, his 
wife’s mother etc.
Paul stays as Goeteborg and tries to go to the US.63 He asked for an affidavit but 
did not receive it until now. I hope he will succeed in this effort.
Please remember me and Mary to Ina. We should appreciate it if she would tell 
us something about the American life. Our only source of permanent information 
are [is] the New York Times.
We anticipate a long letter from you
with kind regards from both of us
ever yours
NB. Please have you no opportunity to help M. STRAUSS,64 his grant will expire 
this month and he has no job. It would help him if he were in a position to tell the 
Society for the protection of Science and learning, that he has an opportunity to get 
something in the future in the US.
 6. Carnap to Neurath, June 5, 1941.
(ASP RC 102-55-19)
R. Carnap
Faculty Exchange
University of Chicago
Chicago, Ill.
Cambridge, Mass., June 5, 1941.
62 Neurath is presumably referring to the zoologist Heinrich Joseph (1875–1941).
63 Paul Neurath (1911–2001) was Otto Neurath’s son. He went to Sweden after he was released 
from the concentration camp of Buchenwald in 1939. See further letter 16. note 146.
64 Martin Strauss (1907–1978) was a German physicist and philosopher, who tried to combine logi-
cal empiricism and the foundational searches of quantum mechanics. He was a persistent leftist 
(thus imprisoned twice during the 1930s in Germany), worked with Niels Bohr in Copenhagen and 
Philipp Frank in Prague, and he was associated with Hans Reichenbach and the Berlin Group dur-
ing the late 1920s. In the major part of his works, he tried to extend Carnap’s logical syntax project. 
His selected papers were published in 1972.
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Dear Neuraths!
Congratulations to having merrily married Mary! We were very glad to hear 
about your new life, and about your optimism and courage.
Our year here at Harvard is nearly over (you had better send letters from now on 
to Chicago for forwarding). It has been a pleasant experience, the students being 
rather more sophisticated than the ones in Chicago, and an interested ‘Science of 
Science’ group consisting of members of various departments who were interested 
in our problems.65 About the philosophers there is not much to say, they were very 
friendly toward me personally but not much in the way of discussions happened, 
except with Quine with whom I discussed frequently (together with Tarski). Frank 
has had a halt-time job at Harvard for the past year and expects that this appoint-
ment will be renewed for the coming year (in addition he has invitation from 
New York City College to lecture there the other half year).66 Tarski has received a 
Guggenheim Fellowship for the coming year – his wife and children are still in 
Poland. Zilsel has been living on a grant for the past two years – his wife has had 
repeated nervous breakdowns and probably would be better off in an institution – or 
at least he probably would be better off with her in an institution. I have heard that 
he is rather depressed about it all, and he also seems to have difficulties in adapting 
himself.67 It is getting harder and harder to find academic positions in this country. 
Not even Kelsen has found an appointment. One of the many reasons for this 
increasing difficulty is the cutting down of teaching personnel because of the 
reduced student enrolment due to conscription. The Harvard budget e.g. has been 
cut 10% and since they intend not to cut salaries, it results in not filling vacancies, 
appointing less tutors and instructors. This is also one of the many reasons why it 
seems impossible to find something for Strauss particularly as long as he is not in 
this country. If he were here, probably an organization could be induced to assist 
him financially, but overburdened as they are, they will in no case assume the 
responsibility to do so for someone who is not already here. You will have heard of 
the Johnson Action under which – with Rockefeller money – a number of refugee 
scientists have been called over. Kaufmann and I (together with Morris and friends) 
65 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 4.
66 Frank become a ‘Lecturer in Physics and Mathematics’ in May, 1939; 2 years later, in the fall of 
1941, he received his tenured part-time position: he had to teach somewhere else (usually in 
New York) every second semester. He became a member of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences in 1943 as the very first among the logical empiricist refugees. On Frank’s reception and 
role in the United States see Reisch (2005, Chap. 11 and 15) and Tuboly (2017).
67 Zilsel arrived to the United States in 1939 with his wife and son. Though he had some grants (e.g. 
a Rockefeller fellowship), he always lived in poor and insecure conditions; also his wife was 
treated occasionally in a sanatorium (with manic depression). After being isolated in poor condi-
tions, Zilsel committed suicide on March 11, 1944 (in Mills College, San Francisco). See Raven 
(2003).
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have done all we could to get you, Waismann, Jörgensen and a few Poles here under 
this scheme but no result whatsoever. My recommendation for Jörgensen has been 
refused because he still has a post, Waismann’s case – I believe – is still pending; my 
recommendation also has been refused at first with the reasoning that he has a post; 
I have tried to argue that his position is not really a “post” but only a stipend etc. 
(though I actually do not know the particulars of his appointment) and have never 
heard about the final outcome. Will you, when you meet him, tell him about this 
stand of the matter? Kotarbinski actually got an appointment but refused to come – I 
believe because he has an old father in Poland whom he did not wish to leave. For 
the younger Poles – Lutman, Hosiasson – nothing could be done.68 I have not under-
stood the principle of selection of the Rockefeller+Johnson people but it seems 
fairly clear that on the one hand they want very well known names and on the other 
hand pull has an influence and not necessarily does scholarly merit speak the final 
word (at least that is the explanation I am inclined to give to the appointment of 
Rougier who is already here). But unfortunately it is not the sort of pull people like 
Morris, Nagel69 and I are able to bring to bear. Pepi Frank has received an appoint-
ment – independent of the Johnson Action to the New School, Hanja70 managed it 
in some way and he will come if he can secure passage. What happened with your 
own case I am not sure – I only know that the Rockefeller people (or somewhere 
else in the machinery) said no. Probably you have already better information from 
someone better informed. I am very sorry about it, because I think you should come 
and settle here. We all need you, and so does the Library, the Encyclopedia and the 
Journal. By the way: it is not that I did not want to have my “Semantics” [marginal 
addition: & the Journal] published in our Library. I offered it to the University of 
Chicago Press in the hope that the Library would be continued there and that my 
book could appear as one of its volumes. As I wrote you, the Press demanded a 
subsidy about equalling [matching] their out of pocket costs. In the meantime a new 
development has occurred: the Dept. of Philosophy here has allowed [awarded] me 
a grant toward the publication provided the book will appear at the Harvard 
University Press (the Press here also had demanded such a subsidy), and I am now 
68 Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutman (1905–1981) and Janina Hosiasson-Lindenbaum (1899–1942) 
were Polish logicians and philosophers, members of the Lvov-Warsaw School. Hosiasson (1940) 
is mainly known for her work on the so-called “raven paradox of confirmation.” On Kokoszyńska-
Lutman see Brożek (2017).
69 Ernest Nagel (1901–1985) was an American philosopher, working mainly at Columbia 
University. He participated at the Vienna Circle’s meetings at the turn of 1934–1935 and attended 
the International Congresses for the Unity of Science. Nagel wrote and edited many influential 
(text)books, among others An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method (1934) with Morris 
R. Cohen and The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation (1961). He 
also wrote a monograph for the IEUS, The Principles of the Theory of Probability (1939).
70 Hanja, or Hania Frank (1894–1967) was a former student, then the wife of Philipp Frank. On her 
life see Holton (2015).
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negotiating with the Harvard Press about the publication. I do not think your idea 
about having it published in England is quite realistic. To send a manuscript there in 
these uncertain times seems to me inappropriate. And though I do not doubt your 
talent for finding a publisher there, I do not see any advantage in having it printed 
there. When we considered publication in Holland, one of the good reasons was that 
the printing costs would have been cheaper there than here. But printing in England 
would not be cheaper, and the fate of the manuscript and of the shipping of the 
books would be too uncertain. I also do not think that the English public at the time 
being would be interested in such highly technical material and that nearly all of the 
sales would be here. -- I have urged Frank again and again to write his encyclopedia 
contribution and each time he promises it for “in two months”. -- I am sending you 
the yellow pamphlet and a number of reprints which I happen to have here – most 
of my things are in Chicago in storage and I can not get them before we are back in 
Chicago. Your “Empirische Soziologie” unfortunately has disappeared from my 
shelves and I do not know who has it -- I shall ask all suspects.71 --- Grelling has a 
possibility to come provided he can find passage. Rockefellers refused his case also, 
but now were willing to invite him nominally i.e. Oppenheim72 having promised 
them to finance their invitation (the invitation from them for the purpose of a non- 
quota visa); Grelling is still in a concentration camp -- but probably Hempels have 
written you about this already. -- A reprint of my “Testability” I have sent you on 
November 11th via Stebbing. I hope it has arrived safely, since it was one of my last 
copies. Please forward the enclosed letter to Hollitscher73 after reading it.
All our love to Mieze and you,
Yours ina + C.
Yes, Russell’s book is somewhat disappointing. But I think one can still call it 
empiricism though – as you say – it is the Schlick-denomination of empiricism.
Zilsel has asked to have his name mentioned on our letterheads [marginal addi-
tion: as a member of committees] of Congresses, Encyclopedia, etc. I believe that 
we can do that. I have asked Morris about it. What do you think? Z. wishes it in 
order to give some publicity to his name.
71 See Neurath (1931/1973).
72 Paul Oppenheim (1885–1977) was a German scientist and philosopher. He was a member of the 
Berlin Group with Reichenbach, but emigrated to the United States in 1939. He is mainly known 
for his various co-operations with Hempel (on types and explanations), Grelling (on Gestalts), Olaf 
Helmer (confirmation), Nicholas Rescher (Gestalt), John G. Kemeny (methodology) and Hilary 
Putnam (unity of science). See See Ziche and Müller (2013).
73 Walter Hollitscher (1911–1986) studied philosophy, biology and medicine at the University of 
Vienna, and obtained a PhD under Moritz Schlick in 1933. During the 1930s he was a regular 
member of the Vienna Circle Meetings, but had to flee from Vienna upon the rise of National 
Socialism. After the war he returned to Vienna and became a full professor and published many 
articles and books e.g. on Marxism and the modern scientific world-conception.
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 7. Neurath to Carnap, September 21, 1941
(ASP RC 102-55-18)
21st September, 1941
24, Old Road, HEADINGTON, Oxford
My dear Carnap,
Many thanks for your congratulations. Now we are going on very well. No doubt 
about it. The fine loans we got from our friends enabled us to overcome the first 
weeks and to rebuild our office – now we have already finished our first ISOTYPE- 
film, a new type of films, on salvage for the Ministry of Information.74 Another one 
on Blood Transfusion is in the making – a very interesting job and fairly paid. Mary 
likes this job too.
Our office looks already very impressive, I bought many books and get them partly 
rather cheap. I am reading and reading and writing. My discussion class at the 
University I had last term on LOGICAL EMPIRICISM AND THE SOCIAL 
SCIENCES75 stimulated me to write something about the general principles of 
Language Making. I am sending you my article published by the ARISTOTELIAN 
SOCIETY.76 I am very interested in your reaction and hope you will write me about it.
I am writing my Encyclopedia Monograph. I think it will be an interesting chap-
ter. I am collecting material for my book on Toleration and Persecution.77 Mankind 
is a sad thing, believe me that, if you should not be already convinced of this fact. 
We are reading many historical books. Killing and tormenting one another, that is 
man’s business through the centuries.
In October we shall have a Unity-of-Science conference here.78 Various people 
are interested in it, in spite of the war. Prof. Russell79 will come from Birmingham. 
74 Otto and Marie Neurath was approached by the documentary film producer Paul Rotha shortly 
after their release from the internment camp. For several years, the Neuraths made animated pic-
tures on various issues for documentary films, such as “A few Ounces a Day” (dir. by Paul Rotha, 
1941) on salvage, and “Blood Transfusion” (dir. by H. M. Nieter, 1941); see Cohen and Neurath 
(1973, 72–74), and Neurath (1946). Cf. Sandner (2014) and Boon (2016, 172–180).
75 See “Logical Empiricism and the Social Sciences” in the Neurath Nachlass, 206/K.84. Wiener 
Kreis Archiv (Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands). See further letters 13. 
and 26.
76 See Neurath (1941/1983).
77 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 5. note 55.
78 Because of the war many European scholars were unable to attend the International Conference 
for the Unity of Science in Chicago, so Neurath organized a small conference, “Terminology,” with 
Susan Stebbing and Joseph A. Lauwerys in Oxford (October 2–5, 1941). See Stadler (2001/2015, 
192–193).
79 Presumably Leonard J.  Russell (1884–1971), a British philosopher, and President of the 
Aristotelian Society and of the Mind Association (1932–33). He succeeded C. D. Broad at the 
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He discussed our ideas in the Aristotelian Society years ago relatively well.80 We 
met him in Paris. Whether Strauss, Waismann etc. will read papers, or not I do not 
know, because the invitation are just sent out. There is always some discussion 
atmosphere, Pear81 the Psychologist came twice and we discussed many problems 
for hours. There are also younger people interested in unified science or sociology. 
You see, we have many reason to be content. Now the problem of housing is solved 
too, in the beginning we had only one room, then two and now we were lucky 
enough to get a very small house as subtenants for some months. Sky and trees as 
environment, only a few houses. The bus goes from there directly to our office in the 
Institute of Social History (Cole,82 he is interested in planning and writes together 
[with] his wife detective stories, you find one of them in the Pengui[n] series).
We have a great many acquaintances and friends in England, much more than in 
Holland. I read papers to students and scholars in Nottingham (London University, 
Educational Department), Exeter and shall read a paper in October in Cambridge.83 
The interest in our visual education work is apparently increasing. The intellectual 
and emotional atmosphere is OK. If all things remain as they are it would be a[l]
right – more one cannot expect.
I am glad that you had such a good time at Harvard. Such is life, successively we, 
the opposition, become classics. Now we form a branch like others, as I learned 
from LAIRD’s Introduction into modern philosophy.84
Please, give me Tarski’s address. I would appreciate it very much if you were 
kind enough to give me addresses of other people, too. We have to reconstruct our 
files. Until now we have about 200 addresses, but that is only a fraction of our 
University of Bristol, but later he went to the University of Birmingham. Leonard Russell corre-
sponded with Neurath between 1941 and 1945.
80 Neurath presumably refers to a Symposium on “Communication and Verification” with L. Susan 
Stebbing, Leonard J. Russell and A. E. Heath (1934) published in the Supplementary Volumes of 
the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
81 Tom Hatherley Pear (1886–1972) was a British psychologist (at Manchester) and the President 
of the British Psychological Society.
82 George D. H. Cole (1889–1959), a political theorist, economist, historian, and Margaret Cole 
(1893–1980). After Neurath was released from the internment camp, Cole was helping him settling 
down in Oxford. See also letter 13.
83 See “Logical empiricism (and everyday problems). Lecture at Bedford College, Cambridge, 
19.11.1941.” In the Neurath Nachlass, 201/K.50. Wiener Kreis Archiv (Rijksarchief in Noord-
Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands).
84 Presumably John Laird (1936)’s Recent Philosophy.
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 original files we had at The Hague. I should be glad to have addresses of HELMER, 
WEINBERG,85 ROUGIER, etc.
All our love to both of you,
with kind regards
Neurath
Poor Zilsel. He had always difficulties in adapting himself to other people, I 
think that is connected with his stomach difficulties. I always thought of that when 
I was angry with him. But I know there are always problems which cannot be solved 
by understanding their sources. I was therefore very glad to give him a monograph 
in the encyclopedia.86 I hope it will help him a little to get new connections.
I hear[d] Kelsen got a job in the meantime – or not? Here the number of students 
is very reduced, as you may imagine. We are glad not to depend upon on [sic] uni-
versities in these times. Strauss has now an appointment, but rather disappointing 
from scientific point of view.
I did not expect much for me from Johnson or the Rockefeller people, when only 
a general action is in question. I did not press anything in connection with the US, 
because we are really happy here and would be glad to remain here and to help, as 
far as we can, in fighting the Nazis. Here is, so to speak, the front. And even in the 
future. The nicest would be, to stay here and to visit the States every year for 4 or 5 
months. Our experience is, that we always find a realm of our activities when we are 
able to execute some unusual things which are our specialities. I think, if universities 
should be interested in me, it would be in connection with particular problems of 
social sciences, unified science or visual education. But we are not essentially inter-
ested in teaching, much more in science making and preparing educational aids. 
Rougier is much more the man who tries to get university posts and who is adapted 
to this business and what is around of [sic] it, therefore it is in accordance with the 
harmony of the world that he will be protected and supported by official committees 
etc. Such is life. You cannot want to be free and independent and  simultaneously to 
be classified as a part of the globe which has to get certain prepared jobs. Johnson 
and other people are very conventional. I am not even conventional in my studies 
and my attitude but not opposed to collaborate with very different people. Johnson 
is at very good terms with me and I was glad that helps us very much in our visual 
education activities (he is member of our American Committee) but I did not assume 
that he would like to have me with him in his school, if I did not c[o]me as a repre-
sentative of a strange opinion – then he would be interested in me, but not in me as 
a refugee only. Many thanks that you and Morris and other friends were busy to help 
me in this respect. Fortunately it was sufficient that I got the loans and that I am very 
85 Julius Weinberg (1908–1971) was an American philosopher, who obtained his PhD in 1935 at 
Cornell with a thesis on logical positivism, published as An Examination of Logical Positivism 
(1936). Though this was the very first book-length treatment of logical positivism in the United 
States, he became widely known for his A Short History of Medieval Philosophy (1964).
86 See Carnap to Morris, copy to Neurath, letter 3. note 29.
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pleased by your friendship, that is nectar for me, sweet drink – or soft drink, if you 
prefer this term, grape fruit juice or something like that – but in great quantities, too. 
I like things more in great quantities, as Ina knows.
Waismann does now act as a substitute for a metaphysical Professorship, but he 
is free to read what he wants. He tries to go to the US, as far as I know. I think he is 
here not really happy – as we are, e.g.
I am busy with reconstructing JOURNAL and LIBRARY here, because I want to 
see ENGLAND (as Europe’s representative now) in the game. Why should all busi-
ness of unified science be done in the US? The locality of publication is of impor-
tance. We have to rebuild Europe, do not forget it. The yellow pamphlets and other 
things are of great value for me. I now got: Psychologie und Einheitswiss. Emp.
Soziologie, but I need: Was bedeutet rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung, the history 
of the Viennese circle (HERMANN) in French, reprints of my articles, then books 
and articles by a certain Carnap.87
We shall now form – as already discussed – and additional editing committee 
(advisory committee, or something like that) for our JOURNAL. Then shall invite 
ZILSEL, of course.
 8. Carnap to Neurath, January 27, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-54)
RUDOLF CARNAP
DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
January 27, 1942.
Dear Neurath:
We were very glad to get good news from you in your letter of last September. I 
see that you are as active and as optimistic as always and I do not doubt that you will 
have good success in your activities. I hoped that you would come to this country at 
least for a visit of several months. Therefore I delayed sending your reprints. Since, 
however, it seems uncertain when you will come, I am now sending to you in five 
small packages four reprints of myself and 31 reprints of and about yourself, 
inclined “Cercle De Vienne”, and “Rationale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung”, for which 
you asked.88 I suppose that you have your and m[y] publications in Psyche 
87 See Neurath (1933/1987), (1931/1973), (1935/1987) and (1936/1981).
88 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 7. note 87.
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Miniatures,89 Encyclopedia and Erkenntnis; if this is not the case please let me 
know, then I shall send you whatever I have. I address the packages to the Institute 
of Social History.
I read with great interest your article in the Aristotelian Society.90 I am, of course, 
entirely in agreement with your general attitude, but there is also a number of par-
ticular points where I have doubts or objections which I should like very much to 
discuss with you, whenever we meet again. For instance, I am not quite satisfied 
with your reply to Russell. Although Russell, in his book, adds to his empiricism 
certain modifications, with which I can not agree, his criticism of your formulations 
is made on the basis of empiricism. And although he is not right with respect to what 
you actually mean, he is not quite wrong with respect to your formulations, which 
as I predicted would provoke a criticism of this kind. Russell does not at all think of 
“absolute truth in itself” (p. 147), but thinks of the empirical procedure of taking 
experiences as a basis for assertions. I should like you to read again my small paper 
on truth and verification (Congress 1935).91 I am sorry I have no reprints of it. 
Unfortunately, it seems entirely forgotten; if for instance, Ayer had read it, he would 
have avoided his terribly misunderstandings of my views in his latest book.92
Here some addresses; Tarski (Dept. of Math.Harvard), Helmer (496 Hudson St., 
New York City), Dr. Julius Weinberg (359 Thurman St., Zanesville, Ohio), Rougier 
(St. Johns Coll., Annapolis, Md.). Kelsen has no job, not a stipend from Rockefeller 
Foundation.
We hope soon to get more detailed news about your plan with the Journal and the 
Library. If the Library is published in England, what would you think about an 
English translation of my “Introduction to Symbolic Logic” (Second Edition, 
entirely rewritten and much larger) as a volume in it?93 Rosinger began the transla-
tion; but since the University of Chicago Press would not commit themselves defi-
nitely and did not make a contract with him, he stopped working at it after having 
translated about one third. If you agree, I shall ask the other editors of the Library 
for their opinion.
89 In the Psyche Miniatures General Series (edited by Charles Ogden) were published Neurath’s 
International Picture Language (No. 83, 1936) and his BASIC by ISOTYPE (No. 86, 1937). 
Furthermore Carnap’s The Unity of Science (No. 63, 1934) and his Philosophy and Logical Syntax 
(No. 70, 1935): all of them in London by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner.
90 See Neurath (1941/1983) That paper contains Neurath’s response to Russell’s Inquiry into 
Meaning and Truth, mentioned by Carnap above, one sentence later.
91 See Carnap’s “Wahrheit und Bewährung” (1936). Modified English translation as “Truth and 
Confirmation” (1949).
92 Presumably Ayer’s (1940) The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge.
93 See letter 4, note 47.
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My “Introduction to Semantics” will appear in February I hope.94 I shall send 
you a copy as soon as it comes out. The second volume (Formalization of Logic) 
will soon go to print.95 I am now working on a system of modalities, and also on 
probability and degree of confirmation.
When shall we see both of you here? We should like very much to have some 
good and detailed talks about you and friends and the whole world and the future. 
Our love to both of you.
Yours, Carnap
 9. Neurath to Carnap, March 2, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-55)
21 old Road, Headington, Oxford.
2nd March, 1942
My dear Carnap,
Your two parcels with reprints were the nicest gifts I can imagine. Some of the 
reprints I could get only in the British Museum, others not at all. Most of them are 
of some use for me in writing my monograph for the Encyclopedia. All things are 
going on very well for us – we are as happy as one can be in times as sad as these 
are. We have now a library again, files, notes, newspaper clippings, etc. lettertypes, 
blocks of our ISOTYPEsigns etc. Our well furnished house with nice view on 
meadows and cows, garden, etc. And then, we like the democratic Anglo-saxon 
atmosphere very much. I shall send you my article INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 
FOR FREEDOM,96 in which I explain, that a certain muddle is connected with all 
democracy and we should not complain of muddle and then want to have a democ-
racy, too. On the long run, I think democracy is much more stable, you have not to 
fight suspicion etc. I just finished again the story of Aseff,97 what a result of absolut-
ism …. terrible. In the US you have the Lincoln tradition and others. I am much 
interested in the history of all these phenomena – the centre Holland and England, 
Merchantmen the bearer[s] of tolerance. In Prussia the ‘Junker’, the Prussian 
‘Teutonic Knights’ etc., an old tradition of suppression. Think of the language in 
which not a few Germans were accustomed to speak of Poles, as of slaves. Problems 
after problems, when the war will be over.
94 See Carnap (1942).
95 See Carnap (1943).
96 See Neurath (1942/1973).
97 Perhaps Yevno Azef (1869–1918), who was a social revolutionist and a double agent. On this see 
what might have been available to Neurath as well, Nikolajewsky (1934).
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I hope you get my Aristotelian Society paper.98 I should like to hear from you 
what you think about. There are some difficult points.
I hope the JOURNAL will be settled very soon. Morris’ cable arrived so late, that 
in the meantime, we got a particular license regulation, now the publisher is going 
on with this thing.
We are depressed by Susan [Stebbing]’s illness. You wrote me that Hanja did not 
feel well (or wrote Morris of that?) What about her? I tried to get from Frank an 
answer dealing with his own monograph on physics. I hope you press him, too, and 
with Freundlich’s monograph.99 After Freundlich’s death we have to publish it with 
an introductory chapter by Frank and a last chapter, fitting the whole into our pat-
tern. I hope that you will be able to force Frank to finish his job. Poor Freundlich. I 
met him last time in Amsterdam, he asked me about my opinion on his decisions 
whether he should go to Scotland or to US. Poor Fellow.
My son seems to successful at Columbia University.100 Most people, we know 
are safe – Grelling and Walter Fraenkel101 in France, do you know something of 
Grelling?
Now I think of substitutes for monographs which cannot be finished, now, 
Joergensen, Tinbergen, I hope Morris will write me about the Biologists.102 Now I 
am thinking of the details of the following 60 monographs. I should like to see 
Brunswik[’]s paper as soon, as possible.103 I thought it is in the press. I only got 
Zilsel and Santillana.
We shall make an editorial board for our Journal and then invite, Zilsel, Nagel, 
Hempel, Feigl etc.
On the one hand – It needed about one year to be in the old position again, to 
continue all work, to have collaborators etc., on the other hand, many people say, 
98 See Neurath (1941/1983).
99 See further Neurath to Carnap, letter 14.
100 Paul Neurath was studying sociology and statistics at Columbia University and thought statistics 
at City College, New York, between 1943 and 1946.
101 Presumably Walter Fraenkel (1879–1943) who was a Jewish painter and the husband of Hans 
Hahn’s younger sister, Louise Hahn. Fraenkel was brought to the Drancy internment camp near to 
Paris – where Grelling was interned as well – and later to the concentration camps of Sobibor and 
Majdanek in Poland, where he was killed in 1943.
102 In the 1937 plans of the IEUS, there were two monographs on biology: one by Felix Mainx and 
one on formal biology by Joseph H. Woodger. Mainx’s monograph appeared in 1955 and Woodger 
wrote about The Technique of Theory Construction in 1939.
103 See Brunswik (1952). For many years the psychology monograph was to be written jointly by 
Brunswik and Arne Naess under the title “The Theory of Behavior.” See Morris (1937).
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that we in a relatively short time rebuilt our ‘fabric’ – you can look at all things from 
various angels. We are happy, that is also a point of view, but the world science is 
gloomy and it will need much time before we shall be victorious. And afterwards, 
will there be a more stable world order? I am very interested in studies on this sub-
ject and accepted therefore the invitation to be on the editorial board of the NEW 
COMMONWEALTH QUARTERLY. I analyze the scientific arguments and think 
one should speak of ‘international relations’, ‘world organization’ etc., and drop the 
terms ‘international law’, ‘world economy’ etc. etc. If you read papers and books on 
this subjects, they are a mixture of history, proposals, and I do not know what, 
mostly including OUGHT-TO-BEs. These you can avoid by transformation, but not 
the ‘natural right’ etc.
What is going on with your books, articles etc., what happens with our friends? 
How the war affects your and their life?
Dear friend, we think thankfully of all friends, who did what they could to sup-
port our release. It was boring and wasting time, this internment business. We were 
not so bad off, because we were happy [marginal addition: not] to be with the 
Nazis – and after life-boat experience you look differently to many things. Robinson 
Crusoe ------- We collected experience by reading in our youth, now we were able 
to apply this experience to our personal life. Firstly separated, then Crusoe and the 
man Friday met, then release, as it were, departed from the island (in our case Isle 
of Man).104
We are making films and do so something for the war effort. We should like to do 
more for this purpose. I shall be glad to hear from you in the near future. With kind 
regards from both of us to both of you,
every yours
[Otto Neurath]
By the way: Can you or somebody else, send me a copy of my HARVARD paper, 
1939. I need it urgently.105 Each member of the congress got a copy and I think 
some remained undistributed.
 10. Carnap to Neurath, June 24, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-56)
RUDOLF CARNAP
Faculty Exchange
University of Chicago
CHICAGO, ILL.
Chicago, June 24, 1942.
104 The fictional characters of Crusoe and Friday featured prominently in Neurath’s private lan-
guage argument in “On Protocol Statements,” see Neurath (1932a/1983, 96–97).
105 See Neurath (1939/1983).
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Dear Neurath:
Thanks for your letter of March 2. You got two of my parcels with reprints, and 
I hoped the other three, which I sent to exactly the same address, would also arrive 
soon. But short time ago I got back two of them, with remark: “Not known. Refused 
at University Registry, Oxford”. Instead of inquiring a little further, they send them 
all the way back across the ocean! You said once that a little bit of easy-going inef-
ficiency (“Muddling through”) is quite nice. I am not so sure whether I like it much. 
On June 5, I sent you once more the two packages, this time to your private address, 
not to the Inst.f.Soc.Hist. I wonder what happened to the fifth package. And then I 
sent my book “Semantics” to the Inst. address on May 1; perhaps you could inquire 
there and give them your address.
I shall be free from teaching duties for one year from now on, with the help of the 
Rockef. Found., for continuing my work in semantics. Is it not remarkable that even 
in times like these, purely theoretical research is encouraged and supported? A sec-
ond small book has gone to print and will, I hope, appear in the fall (“Formalization 
of Logic”). The work in the coming year will be devoted to new problems, among 
them probability and degree of confirmation. I do not yet know, where we shall be. 
Letters will always be forwarded.
I do not know whether you got my letter of Jan.27.106 Will the Library be contin-
ued in spite of paper restrictions? And if so, what would you think of publishing in 
it my “Introduction to Symbolic Logic” (it has been entirely rewritten; so far one 
third of it has been translated).107
Please write me your son’s address, and tell me if I can do anything for him.
Last year efforts were made to bring Grelling to this country. They seemed to 
develop well but had then to be interrupted because of the war.
I read with great interest Kaplan’s Dr.-Thesis.108 It seems the first systematic 
investigation in pragmatics from the present point of view, i.e. with explicit distinc-
tion between pragmatics, semantics and syntax. I talked it over with him in detail, 
especially the need of making more clear the explanations of his new concepts. He 
intends to work it over. I expect it to become a very good and interesting book. I 
think we might consider it for the Library. He could perhaps send you an abstract of 
it.
I talked with Morris about all the questions concerning the monographs in prepa-
ration or to be planned for Encycl. I and II. I suppose he will write you about it. I am 
106 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 8.
107 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 4, note 47.
108 Presumably Abraham Kaplan (1918–1993), an American philosopher who worked especially on 
ethics and the behavioral sciences; he was a student of Carnap in Chicago, and defended his PhD 
(“The Plurality of Language Structures”) written under the direction of Hans Reichenbach at 
UCLA in 1942. Later he published an important paper in Paul A. Schilpp’s The Philosophy of 
Rudolf Carnap volume on “Logical Empiricism and Value Judgements” (Kaplan 1963). See also 
Kaplan’s (1991) memoires on Carnap.
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very much in favor of getting the collaboration of Reichenbach and Feigl. Quite a 
number of monographs and supplements will have to be written, and R. and F. seem 
to fit in especially well.
I am looking forward to your article “Int. Planning f.Freedom”. In your letter, 
you put the alternative as: muddling vs. democracy; and then of course we all prefer 
the second. The question is, whether democracy is actually incompatible with effi-
cient planning and regulation.
We are glad to hear that you have a nice house, both of you living and working 
as happily as the world events allow, that you are again working at six or a dozen of 
projects at once, as in the old times. Our best wishes for you both, personally and 
for your work and for the big events upon the outcome of which all our lives depend.
Yours,
Carnap
 11. Neurath to Carnap, July 17, 1942.
(ASP RC 102-56-04)
17th July, 1942
21 Old Road, Headington, Oxford
My dear Carnap, (and Carnapesse),
We always appreciate very much to get some news from you. We are living here 
happily in a small house (4 rooms, we are alone), with garden, flowers, fruit, vege-
tables, a cat visits us from time to time and a dog participates through the railings 
with remainders of our meals. We have many friends and acquaintances, I am lectur-
ing in various places on Visual Education, Logical Empiricism and on, what is 
called ‘social sciences’ – they are more ‘social’ than ‘sciences’. Nevermind …. The 
film making business is continuing, we are very successful in that, our first film was 
purely diagrammatic, now we are making diagrammatic scenes for other films, on 
food, tuberculosis, etc. The Ministry of Information is presenting them to the public. 
Some go to the US. I am writing my monograph for the encyclopedia and I think I 
could improve it very much – how I can fit together my arguing on ‘true’, ‘state-
ments on statements’ etc. with your formulations, I do not know, perhaps you will 
find a way to put together these various strains. I think in Tarski’s and Popper’s 
arguings, which much influenced you is an essential metaphysical element of abso-
lutism. But I shall wait for your books.
Most of the announced booklet and papers arrived, not all of them, Rationale 
Wirtschaftsbetrachtung fortunately and also one of my little Chinese stories, the 
only I have now, but NOT the Cercle de Vienne.109 If you find a second copy of that, 
109 On these see booklets and papers, see Neurath to Carnap, letter 7. note 87. Neurath has pub-
lished six papers about Chinese teachings and stories under the pseudonym “La-Se-Fe” in the 
1920s. They were translated as “Six Lessons” (in Cohen and Neurath 1973, 84–100).
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please send it me. In general we are very successful in rebuilding our library, we 
have some books by Mach, Boltzmann, etc. of course: Voltaire, Diderot, Condillac 
etc., and new books, such as Carnap, Russell, Weinberg, Stuart Chase110, etc. The 
department [of] literature is a good one, history, statistics etc., I got most of my own 
books and even reprints in bookshops, our big atlas e.g. we are working as once in 
May with our three British collaborators. We came just back from a Visual Education 
meeting in Exeter with people from various parts of the country, including Lancelot 
Hogben, who referred on [to] his new AUXILIARY language INTERGLOSSA.111 
This and Basic are the only two auxiliary languages which seem worth to account 
for. The principle is similar to Peano’s Latina sine flexione, but consistent. It is 
Chinese based on western roots. Question, imperative, etc. formed by means of 
particular words ‘que’ means question, then the statement as usual. Very simple. 
Lancelot Hogben analyzed the language making very carefully, it was for me and 
also for a philologist who was with us a great pleasure to listen to him. He selected 
the roots from internationally known worlds and found out that there are about 2000 
such roots. If somebody does not know these roots, it is useful for him to learn them, 
even for his own language. Let me give some examples MICRO-PHON, 
 PHONO- GRAPH, GRAPHO-LOGY, etc. Hogben says, therefore MICRO means 
small, GRAPH means writing etc., the roots are mainly [G]reek or [L]atin. A very 
fine idea. And no IDIOMATIC RULES.
BASIC is fine for reading and listening but not for writing, because you have to 
learn the idiomatic allowed combinations, that is sometimes more difficult than to 
learn separate words. This is the weak point in BASIC. Therefore BASIC remains 
more for reading and listening. INTERGLOSSA is an ideal language for writing 
scientific things and other things, the examples are very illuminating. The manu-
script Hogben’s is devoted to Ogden, whose work he much admires.
Please ask MORRIS he and you should be allow me to ask Hogben (perhaps 
together with Ogden) to write for our first two volumes of the encyclopedia a mono-
graph FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE MAKING. Hogben is prepared to do it 
and we shall learn a lot from him about comparative studies of language tools AS 
TOOLS. I think you are interested in such things very much. I should like to write a 
short introduction (perhaps you, too?) telling a little about our own problems, and 
how they are related to that. PLEASE ANSWER TOGETHER WITH MORRIS 
THIS PROPOSAL IN THE AFFIRMATIVE. If you had sufficient money send a 
110 Stuart Chase (1888–1985) was an American economist and polymath. Quite unfortunately, he 
wrote in his The Tyranny of Words (1938, 160) that “Dr. Neurath is a kind of pioneer in semantics. 
He believes in going to things wherever possible, rather than to words.”
111 Lancelot Hogben (1895–1975) was a British experimental zoologist and medical statistician, 
who also worked on popularizing science and international languages. In the late 1940s and 1950s 
Hogben acted as “honorary editor” of many ISOTYPE volumes of Otto and Marie Neurath. Their 
typical topics were The First Great Inventions, How the First Men Lived, Visual Science, Living in 
Early Times, Living in Villages and Towns, Living in the World. See further Hogben (1943).
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cable with YES.  I am sure this would be a GREAT SHOW.  The manuscript of 
Hogben’s book is full of stimulating remarks and you learn more about language in 
this way than usually. I think that brings LIFE into our business. Perhaps instead of 
the monograph by Tinbergen or another one. I am looking around, what can be done 
more for our encyclopedia, Journal, library etc. THERE ARE VERY GOOD 
PROSPECTS, but I shall tell better about that if they results of my efforts there real-
ized. I think we shall perhaps get a kind of centre for our scientific enterprise, as we 
wish it to get, without any obligation to anybody. I hope so. Wait and see, please. We 
should not be impatient – there is a war on and a very serious and difficult one. I am 
astonished how well scientific work goes on in spite of all that and how many people 
are supporting our efforts.
I have MINIATURES, ERKENNTNIS (only partly) ENCYCLOPEDIA I should 
like to get reprints from other people, too. Please, be a nice fellow and tell that other 
people. Describe my situation, Hitler’s gang has all my reprints, manuscripts etc., 
therefore I am thankful for all gifts, also for books of course. It is difficult to get 
American books and periodicals.
Please read again RUSSELL and my Aristotelian paper.112 I shall tell you some-
thing in detail and I hope you will answer in detail.
RUSSELL, MEANING AND TRUTH,
p 14 he speaks of ‘error’ and ‘knowledge’ who is in the chair? Russell personally?
p 15 who is the ‘hypothetically inerrant recorder of what actually happens’? We 
know this type of arguing, Laplace’s demon etc.
p 15 ‘naïve realism’ is a very late stage. A naive man does not know the split and 
therefore not the elimination of that split, the making of the split again etc.
p 15 split into person and things, effects made by things etc. – the old ‘duplication’ 
sufficiently criticized by Avenarius113 etc.
‘observation happening in him’ the same.
p 16 ‘avoid error’ implies somebody knows what the truth is.
p 22 if that is not TRUTH in the worst style, then I do not know, to what extent you 
agree with me: ‘a proposition may be true although we can see no way of obtain-
ing evidence ----‘
p 50, can you transform into a tolerable statement: ‘we do now know our present 
experience’. I think that is Schlick redivivus.
p 64 what about the assertion which has no antitheses. Can you explain that?
p 70 I think in Vienna already we eliminated the expression ‘as many words as facts’ 
as if words were no facts.
112 See Neurath (1941/1983) and Russell (1941).
113 Richard Avenarius (1843–1896) was a German philosopher, influencing Neurath and Philipp 
Frank. Besides Frank and Ernst Mach, Avenarius was attacked in Lenin’s Materialism and 
Empirio-criticism too because of his positivist line of thought.
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I avoid the term fact altogether, as you know. How you translate this absolute truth 
expression?
p 77 I see no difficulty to speak of ‘desiring man’, ‘believing man’ etc., why Russell 
speaks of ‘desire’?
p 92 what is your translation of ‘fact in the world’?
p 104 how you are translating ‘no chronometer is exactly right?’ This statement 
belongs to the language of absolute truth, there is some judge in the chair know-
ing the RIGHT time and then he declares no chronometer is right. I do not under-
stand why not a chronometer should be ‘right’, as it were “by chance” IF I 
ACCEPTED THE JUDGE IN THE CHAIR. Without a judge in the chair I can 
only say that we select certain chronometers and perhaps we prefer a group of 
chronometers and form a MIDDLE or something like that, but why should not by 
chance one just have the hands at the figures of the middle? etc.
p 106 wavelengths have nothing to do with colours, you may see colours e.g. as 
result of a blow without any w[a]ve lengths in Russell[’]s terminology. W[a]
velengths are relateable to all sense fields, a blind man may treat optics (we agree 
in that)
p 108 characteristic that GOD and his impartiality is introduced … ABSOLUTE 
TRUTH
p 0P0  do you know what is a ‘non-mental’ world? All these expressions are possi-
ble in a transcendent realm of truth, where one may distinguish between mental 
and non-mental etc. but we have only protocol statements in which nothing of 
this dualism is be found, as far as I can see. Only from the ‘outside’ such a dis-
tinction may be introduced.
p, 111 what a strange ‘pure physical world’ without ‘words? Only in the TRUE 
WORLD such distinction has any place, not within the protocol realm.
p. 32 ‘minimum’ ideology is also related to a certain absolutism of Truth – as if the 
whole body of statements were known are knowable.
p 133 never completely certain …. true. How to discuss such a statement? Behind 
the multiplicity of statements and the fact that were are selecting some 
‘ACCEPTING’ them Russell imagines one particularly TRUE statement, we can 
never completely identify as what it is ….
p, 140 what I say is, that discussion, arguing, thinking etc. is SPEAKING, therefore 
I have fact-terms, statement-terms, statement of statement terms, etc. BUT NOT 
FACTS, etc. AS ELEMENTS OF DISCUSSION.  A certain Carnap was 
 sometimes partly of this opinion, wavering, but nevertheless more of this opin-
ion. Now he seems more to be impressed by the other side of wavering.
p, 141 Neurath (and a certain Carnap with a certain time index, or always, I hope 
so?) did not speak of reality he denied not a comparison of reality and proposi-
tions, but in his language he did not ACKNOWLEDGE the term reality…. That 
is all.
p, 143 Neurath says (I hope Carnap, too) instead of saying there is no definite world 
with definite properties, we shall use the expression no definite aggregate of 
propositions.
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p 144 I object to “continuity of ego’, there is EGO, in time 1, Ego, index time 2 etc., 
that there is used the term ‘genidentity’ is another point, a proposal made by 
clever boys, Carnap included.114
p, 146 why should Crusoe not distinguish between image in a river and a nonimage 
on the bank of a river?
p, 148 I would say if a certain police is in action after a certain time people not only 
speaking to others but even to themselves are using different empiricist state-
ments. They ACCEPT other statements, why not? We do not speak of TRUE and 
FALSEHOOD, but only of various groups of ACCEPTED STATEMENTS. And 
our acceptance is related to environment, certainly, there is no point outside the 
‘world’ from where we may judge on TRUE and FALSE.
p, 148 what is the translation of ‘I mean something’ into a language without the 
term meaning? A statement I think is either accepted or rejected or it is not 
decided, therefore also a statement such as ‘here is a table’, it ‘means’ JUST 
‘here is a table’ and I may deny or accept the statement. But Russell thinks it may 
be of importance whether ‘really’ there is a table, who is in the chair saying that 
or objecting to it? The bearer of absolute truth, who says statements he accepts 
or denies, not we. I say again: in the beginning of all discussion are statements, 
why not?
p, 154 again the ‘immediate’ past of Schlick’s.
p, 156 who decides that some memory is ‘true’? ‘erroneus’ etc., always from a 
speaker’s point of view accepted or rejected, the judgment based on more or less 
accepted statements etc.
p 160 IT MUST BE TRUE, Who makes such a strange statement?
p 161 who finds out the ‘CERTAIN DEGREE OF CREDENCE’.
p 164 who is the judge, that some propositions are ‘psychological’ ones?
p 168 I really do not understand how somebody may speak of a ‘TRUE 
PROPOSITION’ without an absolute standpoint, otherwise he has only 
ACCEPTED propositions with a person index.
171 Who tells us the story that an assertion has a ‘subjective’ and an ‘objective’ 
side? Manifestly a being only which is OUTSIDE our discussion between man 
and man, all our statements are in competition, some we are accepting others 
rejecting, but what is the translation of ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ in the Protocol 
language and its family?
p 186 I should just say, that we only discuss ‘social terms’ and if TRUE is no social 
term, we cannot discuss it. How should we speak of a language precisely  identical 
etc. WITHOUT ASSUMING THAT SOMEBODY COMPARES THE VARIOUS 
LANGUAGES ‘from without’ at is were.
114 Kurt Lewin (1922) introduced “genidentity” in his Der Begriff der Genese in Physik, Biologie 
und Entwicklungsgeschichte: it is a relation to identify an object from one moment to the next. On 
Genidentity, see Padovani (2013). Cf. Carnap (1928/1967, §159).
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p, 187 WE MUST SUPPOSE, who ‘must’? Who says this statement? Russell? It is 
an hypothesis ‘this and that language are the same’ ….
p, 189 ‘psychological’ comes into the story, how?
p-189, 191 etc. etc. always ‘meaning’ in itself discussed, i.e. absolute truth, not as a 
‘social’ relation between men.
p, 218 the story of brain in which observable phenomena happen in the brain is often 
told and criticized by Avenarius and others. Duplication. You can discuss all 
these problems without speaking of brain. And then again the ‘real’ question, 
only ‘meaningful’ within a theory of ‘absolute Truth’.
p, 221 what you think of the QUESTION ‘how do I think …” I would say: how to I 
use the term table in statements in which I do not use the terms I see, I touch etc.?
p, 221 Have we not sufficiently discussed the strange theory of ‘correspondence’?
p, 245 as if ‘facts’ and ‘sentences’ were in different worlds, ‘there are in a room e.g. 
tables: V ‘In this room there is a table and a label on which is written ““there is 
a table in this room””” why not? that is all.
Russell seems to have sentence as a substitute for the old mind
p, 258 Who is in the chair who says ‘if it is in fact true’?
p 268 As far as I can see, we are discussing whether we are accepting certain sen-
tences or not, that is perhaps the statement most similar to Russell’s ‘we are 
speaking about what it means’.
p, 277 do you think that the ‘real’ word is different from the absolute truth? That is 
all of the same breeding.
p, 281 Russell objects to your opinion – why not you to his as far as ABSOLUTE 
TRUTH is in question.
p, 282 I did not speak of solipsism
p. 286 I do not speak of ‘percepts’,
p. 288 truth and knowledge – strange statement. Or not?
p, 289 I do not think we said something similar to Hegel.
p. 304 Russell always overlooks that my yesterday (remembering) is similar to 
another persons statements. Russell introduces a permanent EGO and a perma-
nent REALITY, I think so.
p, 305 always the same.
p. 313 degree of certainty, as above said only in relation to an absolute certainty as 
test object,
p, 315 on one observation … I do not speak of simple observations, and you, I think, 
only a short time.
p, 317 the absolutism of ‘the moment of the occurrence’ again Schlick.
p, 321 precision only within the mathematical language, not within the aggrega-
tional language, therefore no TRUTH problem in the discussion of empiricism.
p, 321 who tests the testing success?
329 to obviously sad
p, 340 inside my head …
p, 347 there are universals ==== there is an absolute truth
p, 347 structure of the world, ===== absolute truth, something of it.
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I sacrificed some time to put this together, because I want to know more about 
your position. What is told above is the story of absolute truth in itself, I really can-
not see in the statements above any attempt to describe or analyze the procedures of 
taking [having] experiences.
I should like to read some explanation of yours on this point, perhaps in a letter 
to me. You see, just a statement like that on the ONE PERMANENT LANGUAGE, 
which is a real empiricist one, of no senseless at all, and the ONE PERMANENT 
INDIVIDUAL shows you how much Russell starts from unempiricist assumptions, 
because I can imagine experimental statements from which somebody infers state-
ments such as: I have changed my language in relation to other people’s language, 
which I accept as unchanged etc. etc. …. as far as some test statement is accepted 
etc. etc. NO DEFINITE PERMANENCE OF SOME EXCELLENT PERSON.
Many thanks for addresses.
Please, tell Morris and yourself, that I am trying to arrange Journal and Library. 
You see, the long to and fro reached just the period where the paper regulation 
dropped in and now I have to find out what to do. As you know, I do not cease to 
manage things and I shall think that we have a lot to do for Europe after this war.
Therefore, at the moment, I can say nothing on Kaplan’s book (in all cases I 
would like to read manuscripts before, in spite of the fact that I appreciate very 
much your’s and Morris’ judgement, of course) and other books, which may be use-
ful for the library of unified science. You see, Blackwell and others always are pre-
pared to print without any payment by us, on the contrary paying to us, therefore I 
prefer an agreement, which gives us a good position and enables us to go on, with-
out an interfering publisher. Therefore I appreciate very much our ENCYCLOPEDIA 
agreement which enables us to print, without particular permit of the publisher.
I would appreciate it very much, if you were prepared to publish the symbolic 
logic in our library, ask the co-editors, too. But, please, at the moment I cannot make 
a definite promise, because I have to get the general contract.
I am very interested in your semantics, I hope you found a way to give me an 
opportunity to translate your semantic statements into the ‘accepting’ language, it is 
not simple to transform the TRUE statements into ACCEPTING statements, the 
grammar is sometimes similar, but sometimes not, that depends upon your decision, 
how you want to introduce – or not to introduce – this damned ‘absolute truth’. It is 
not only the TERM, but the GRAMMAR which is dangerous, as I pointed out again 
and again. I hope I shall be able to explain that more in detail in the future. I am also 
interested in the confirmation degree business. I have always great fear that some-
thing ‘absolute’ slides into an explanation. The same is with the probability busi-
ness. I think the probability language is ONLY a mathematical one, but not an 
aggregational one, and one has to find out how to relate them to one another. I think, 
you not always make sufficient distinction between ‘aggregational’ terms and for-
mula terms. And after analyzing many articles and books (covering the last century) 
I think that the main bulk of differences between various authors is related to this 
problem.115 I found very remarkable older explanations of probability statements 
115 Cf. Neurath (1941/1983, 218–221). See further Neurath (1944, Sect. 8.).
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and statements on the permanence of certain averages (quite different statements, 
very often confused). But that needs a longer letter or an article. And I have at the 
moment (fortunately) not much time, I had to write my, already published article 
(NEW COMMONWEALTH QUARTERLY) on INTERNATIONAL PLANNING 
FOR FREEDOM,116 to prepare some lectures, one on TOLERATION, MUDDLE 
AND VICTORY with an stimulating discussion, have to make together with Mary 
films and films and illustrations for books, to continue my monograph (see above) 
and to organize a new institute for our visual education purposes – that all wants 
time, time. At the moment is [S]unday, three collaborator[s] are with us and are just 
discussing with Mary and me, Climate and Weather charts, Urban and Rural popu-
lation, etc. all stimulating. Of course. I met many people and have a very interesting 
correspondence on classics with a philologist. Sometimes I get letters from Strauss 
and others. I think Waismann is less and less interested in our points of view. Our 
British acquaintances and friends are very kind and helpful, especially Susan 
Stebbing in spite of her illness. We just met her in Cambridge where we had a busi-
ness meeting with her and other people. I should like to get from you a letter on 
friends and world, on Thomism in Chicago etc. I should highly appreciate it if you 
were kind enough to send interesting newspaper cuttings and reprints and such stuff. 
We have now a nice studio again, with many files full of interesting material, but it 
is not our old richness, which was evolved in years. We like very much statistical 
data, interesting pictures of single objects, e.g. certain characteristic animals, bu[s]
es, chairs, teapots, coffeepots etc., lists of kni[v]es and forks, cups and pots, plates 
etc. refrigerators etc. We are buying LIFE, LOOK etc. for catching such material. 
Today we found in this way the shape of an American telephon[e] apparatus, but 
there are thousands of apparatus, you know.
In England is plenty of food, if you are not so interested in particular types of 
food, bread is free, as you know, there are many vegetables and a real glut in milk, 
we enjoy it very much, dried eggs now from the US come etc. we enjoy it, too. Fine 
fruit etc. fish free (if not canned). Not the slightest similarity with the Central 
European situation in the last war. Not much meat, but you can get Vitamin[s] in 
various forms, e.g. as pills if you are very interested in these things. We are healthy 
and happy, and only sorry that such a terrible war is necessary to fight these gang-
sters. Did you hear from Paul? He seems to be successful[l] in his studies and will 
get now a fellowship. What is with your health?
Morris wrote me about the separation from Trude – what a pity.117 What about the 
daughter? Please give me Trude’s address. What about other people, e.g. Moholy 
Nagy118, the separated wife of whom I sometimes met here. What about Senior, and 
all other fellows? The youth of our Unity of Science Movement?
116 See Neurath (1942/1973).
117 Trude is Gertrude E. Thompson, the first wife of Charles Morris. In 1951, Morris married his 
second wife, Ellen Ruth Allen.
118 László Moholy-Nagy (1895–1946) was a Hungarian painter and photographer, mainly associ-
ated with the Bauhaus. Moholy-Nagy was a friend of Carnap and Neurath during the 1920s. In 
1937, he became the director of the New Bauhaus in Chicago, where he collaborated with Carnap 
and Charles Morris. On Carnap, Moholy-Nagy, and Bauhaus see Damböck (2017).
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I hope and Mary, too, we shall meet again in peaceful valleys and talk, and talk 
… and drink grapefruit from cans and orange juice …. as once in May. And then 
will be more planning in the world – perhaps – no unemployment, only the ‘normal’ 
difficulties of life based on love and hate, envy and prestige etc. It remains a suffi-
ciently interesting lot of problems.
I am reading many biographies, besides my special books and articles. Sometimes 
I look in mathematical and physical books and enjoy the clearness and exactness of 
this field. I understand very well, why so many thinkers try to anticipate such a 
clearness in all sciences. BUT “es bleibt ein Erdenrest zu tragen peinlich und waer 
er von Asbest er ist nicht reinlich”,119 but aggregational.
With kind regards from both of us to you, the Carnapess and all our friends. Ever 
yours
Neurath
 12. Neurath to Carnap, July 20, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-57)
20th July, 1942
My dear Carnap, one should not write to[o] soon (months means too soon) 
because something may happen. This morning one [of] your wonder packages 
appeared, I think it is the one I mentioned, it contained the French pamphlet on our 
circle, the Hypothesis System (I needed it very much and could not get it in any 
library) and many articles and your white pamphlet, white and wise.120 Many thanks, 
my boy. I appreciate very much, that you are sacrificing so many reprints etc., that 
is friendship. I am really happy and pleased. On an average I am astonished how 
easily I bear the fact that my whole library, all my notes, all my manuscripts, all my 
reprints, all my belongings are in Hitler’s dirty hands, but this lu[c]ky quality not to 
be depressed by a lack of things is not reducing my pleasure to get something, I 
think there are few things which please me so much (if we do not speak of persons 
and social events) as books and printed matter, files of material, living life, to thumb 
over things and to be stimulated by old and new ideas. It is pleasant, too, to rebuild 
my ‘memory’ my bulk of knowledge. I am reading books, I read first as a boy and I 
am pleased again. In Vienna or at The Hague, I had them in my library giving me 
the feeling that they are my own …. now I bought them and I am re-reading them, 
e.g. Lodge’s nice arguments on mechanical models of electric currents, Mengenlehre 
by Fraenkel, etc. I always hope I shall find a Schroeder, I have now a VENN with 
119 See Goethe (1832/2014, 301); the recent English translation reads as: “This remainder of earth,/
it’s distasteful to bear it;/even cremated,/it would still be impure.”
120 Neurath presumably refers to his 1916 paper, “Zur Klassifikation von Hypothesensystemen,” 
translated as “On the Classification of Systems of Hypotheses,” see Neurath (1916/1983).
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his nice ellipses (I had them only in my Schroeder).121 Perhaps you can get for me 
by chance (very [im]probale) JOSEPH POPPER LYNKEUS, Allgemeine 
Naehrpflicht.122 I got Ballod-Atlanticus Zukunfstaats.123 I want to have all these 
planning accounts. Mary is sitting in the same room, drawing a map of the USA for 
showing a cross section with the various plants – a nice business. Making charts is 
a great pleasure, really. And we support the war effort in this way (all this work is 
used by the Ministry of Information) I feel like a doctor who is fighting the plague. 
And our delicate tools are useful, too. I hope you will see some of our animated 
diagrams in USA.
The whole morning I was looking through the prints you have sent me – many 
thanks. Many thanks.
Now the reports on Russia and Libya are better – but better or worse, in the long 
run, we shall win the war, I do not doubt, and I did not doubt, as you remember. That 
does not change the pressure under which we are living, like in formers times, when 
the Black Death was waiting behind the quarantine walls. I prefer a situation in 
which no Black Death is waiting behind the walls, even if the walls are strong 
enough. What is with our friends, are they joining the USA army? Who?
What about the Franks? Males and females. What about other friends, please tell 
a little more. And do not forget to post copies of your letters, too. My proposal is to 
write on another even if no answer arrives after some months let me say, three 
month. That means 4 letters a year – there is a war on.
With kindest regards and many thanks
ever yours
[Otto Neurath]
 13. Neurath to Carnap, July 29, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-58)
21 Old Road, Headington, OXFORD
29th July, 1942
Dear friend Carnap. It is really nice of you to send again the two parcels, I enjoy 
very much. Please send me semantics again, should I get the second copy (very 
improbable, as you will see from my following explanation) I shall deliver it to a 
person you will nominate [name]. I need your semantics very much.
You complain seriously of the package muddle and I shall answer seriously. Your 
ADDRESS was UNIVERSITY. You see, there is not such a centralized office as you 
121 Presumably Neurath refers to the following works: Lodge (1892), Fraenkel (1919), Schröder 
(1890–1905), and Venn (1881).
122 See Popper-Lynkeus (1912).
123 Ballod-Atlanticus (1898). ‘Ballod-Atlanticus’ was the pseudonym of Kārlis Balodis (1864–
1931), a Latvian economist, financist, statistician, and also a demographist.
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have in Chicago, because there is no such university. The main body is formed of 
the dozens of colleges (plus quasi colleges) each with its own rights and regulations, 
with its own ‘Dons’ who are not always related to the University. Lecturing is a 
funny thing here, sometimes you are invited by the University as such, sometimes 
by the college sometimes by a chair, you are reading for a professor (such an honour 
was mine, invited by Radcliffe Brown anthropologist)124 – in all these cases you are 
on the list of the lectures. But there are cases in which discussion classes or even 
lectures are organized besides that etc. And now there are a great many institutes 
related not to the university but to colleges and then there are institutes, which are 
very loosely ‘connected’ and others very indirectly, e.g. INSTITUTE OF SOCIAL 
HISTORY, an institute made around a big part of Cole’s private library, which can 
now be used by students in a particular reading room, with office etc. [on] BANBURY 
ROAD, the house has the No 19 as I wrote you. But the position of such institutes is 
changing and nobody is informed about it – a privacy unknown in Europe and per-
haps in the US.  Sometimes this Institute was with the International Institute of 
Social History in the same building (a DUTCH institute in exile), now this interna-
tional institute changed its place and the building is now a part of a newly founded 
college, but Cole’s library and his institute remained in the building nevertheless. I 
do not know how the ‘rights’ are divided, because Cole is head of this college. And 
so all things are going on smoothly without great decisions and to and fro, some-
times with to and fro.
What is the advantage of this pattern (which does not make simple to find an 
institute) with all this vagueness? You see if a man e.g. in Vienna could not become 
a ‘[P]rivatdo[z]ent’ (let us assume he was a Jew and for decades there was an ani-
mosity) what could he do? fight on? or what? Here there many, many ways to teach 
and to make [do] research, you can be persona ingrata [non grata] in the one college 
but the other college is fond of you, here you cannot get a room for lecturing, there 
you can get a fellowship. Nothing is centralized, nothing is organized in the sense 
as you and many people think planning SHOULD MADE IT.
You speak of inefficiency of democracy ---- my dear boy, EFFICIENT IN [FOR] 
WHAT? [T]hat is the point. I disagree totally with all [the] people who think of 
sacrifice of personal freedom because they want planning. Planning avoids destruc-
tion of raw material, avoids unemployment, provides a society with raw materials, 
horse power etc., and now it depends of our organization, how we go on with the 
distribution. The most terrible thing would be if people got power to bully other 
people, therefore the centralization of decisions is dangerous, therefore the rights of 
Local Governments important, and the rights of smaller groups and individuals, too. 
124 Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown (1881–1955) was an English social anthropologist mainly 
known for his theory of structural functionalism. Earlier in June 1941, Neurath invited him to give 
a talk at the Sixth International Congress for the Unity of Science (University of Chicago, Sept. 
2–6, 1941), and Radcliff-Brown promised to write a paper about “Social Anthropology as a Natural 
Science of Human Society.” After all, however, he did not participate at the Congress, or wrote the 
paper for Neurath. See their correspondence in the Neurath Nachlass (Wiener Kreis Archiv, 
Rijksarchief in Noord-Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands).
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MAJORITY PRINCIPLE, as the continentals think of ‘democracy’ is bad, if not 
reduced to the minimum of a minimum. Look: what would you say of a democracy 
in which the majority (60) would decide, that these 60 have 5 hours working day, 
the 40 but 12 hours working day[s], I remember the problem was in Vienna whether 
department houses or small buildings.125 I propagated [argued] to avoid a majority 
decision, but asked for a distribution of building-power, as it were, in proportion to 
the wants of the people, if 60 want department houses and 40 small ones, give each 
of them, what he want, if the bricks, horse power etc. are more or less the same. You 
cannot make various railway gauges in one country without destroying the whole 
apparatus, but you can make hundreds of life pattern[s] in one country, why not? 
Then there is less [of a] possibility of bullying other people and there are not a few 
who like to do it, not only ‘fanatics’. Better is education and propaganda than a law 
as e.g. the prohibition law in the US.
You see, when a judge tries to make decisions in accordance with his own con-
science – and I think that is useful from my point of view, than you cannot give the 
courts of appeal to[o] many chances, otherwise they overrun the judge[’]s decisions 
and he looks at the higher courts as on the continent and the civil courages vanishes, 
to be in accordance with the highest authorities becomes important. Here you have – 
that is acknowledged in the whole world – the best judges, with a minimum of cor-
ruption etc. Here you have to SELECT the judges in a different way when you want 
changes in practice or INFLUENCING THE PUBLIC OPINION OF THE GROUPS 
FROM WHICH THE JUDGES COME. But it is difficult to get equalisation of deci-
sions, without weakening the intensity of the judge’s activity. I prefer the differ-
ences of [in] the decisions, because then we get more people with civil courage and 
less [fewer] people who always look to the ‘formal’ correctness of central decisions. 
You know to what extent even Hitler is formally legal. I DO NOT MUCH BELIEVE 
IN CENTRAL DECISIONS BUT MUCH MORE IN THE TOTAL BEHAVIOUR 
OF A FREE NATION based on tradition.
These differences in decisions create necessarily a certain kind of difficulties 
usually called ‘muddle’. You see, in free countries the police – in peace time – is 
[are] not interested in somebody’s travels, no forms have to be filled in hotels etc.
FIRST PRINCIPLE: one of the many ‘goods’ produced are: love, freedom, mul-
tiplicity, etc. besides cars, houses, grape fruit juice, etc.
SECOND PRINCIPLE: we are prepared to pay for freedom with cars, grape fruit 
juices etc. ….
RESULT is – as far as I can see, not always less efficiency even in the production 
of cars, making war etc. because this nice environment of freedom reduces the 
TENSIONS between men. You know better what everybody wants to do. I think that 
this is one of the reasons why you have here a minimum of quislings. The German 
propaganda does not even try to induce sabotage here, but the British propaganda 
125 On Neurath’s role in Vienna’s city planning and the housing movement see Hochhäusl (2011).
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tries to do that in Germany, and is right in that, because there are ten[s of] thousands 
of people in Germany who conceal their opinions totally.
There are people in high positions in Germany with the swastika around the arm 
who hate the system. I can hardly imagine that people who think Churchill is a 
damned fool would openly declare he is the finest boy. As far as I can see, people 
who dislike the government with, let me say, 80% will perhaps tell of 60% only or 
less, but not of 5%. The public discussion and the private remarks, the private argu-
ings are similar. I would not say that some changes can appear, not expected, but not 
in the continental way. Perhaps I am wrong. This opportunity e.g. to be a conscien-
tious objector (I would not say they are very well treated, but nevertheless you are 
not ‘annihilated’ or ‘liquidate[d]’ if you try to be one of them) is for me and some 
others of great importance. I think the reduced tension (partly depending of certain 
common features in education, creating a common attitude etc.) helps in a [sic] 
bearing hard shocks, and I think that just this situation (with what the continental 
call ‘muddle’ with a bad taste in the mouth) helps to win this war, really. Perhaps I 
am wrong. You see, one cannot bear muddle without liking it, that I am right in my 
thinking on the British behaviour I deduce from a book, in which a British author 
writes: ‘There is always some “history” some “incident” – to be frank, some incipi-
ent muddle, that makes the social life worth living.’126 I think you could not write 
that.
But only in comparison is power. Therefore I collected material from other coun-
tries, particularly on the deeply founded [i]nefficiency of the traditional Prussian 
and German organization. Read what Rathenau tells on the German civil service 
and the selection of collaborators, why he did not expect victory from the begin-
ning, read the description of his interview with the war minister, what a story – the 
war has started, the minister full of pride tells him that his table is empty.127 No 
recriminations, no questions (that means every soldier got his paper, with the hour 
of his train, carriage, no. of his seat and a remark that the lavatory on the rear is for 
the soldiers [and] on the front for the Herrn Offiziere etc. ABSOLUTELY 
EFFICIENT). Now Rathenau asks about the stores of raw materials ……. you know 
the classic answer and that IMMEDIATELY it was necessary to make a new office 
and to use Rathenau’s help (they did not like to use a Jew etc. you should read that 
and then think on muddle and democracy, that was not ‘muddle’ in the sense of 
multiplicity but well based stubbornness, one[-]sided and stupid).
Read on the Marne battle. Perhaps I shall write a satyric story of that. It is har[d] 
to believe. FROM GERMAN SOURCES you learn, that Moltke the boss of all 
bosses was selected stupidly, he had a nervous breakdown (I collected more nervous 
break downs, which perhaps are more dangerous than muddle) the generals com-
mending armies did not report sufficiently, because they wanted to have all iron 
126 The author is Sir Bernard Pares (1867–1949), a historian, known mainly for his works on Russia. 
See Pares (1941, 193).
127 Neurath presumably refers to Walther Rathenau (1867–1922), who was Foreign Minister of the 
Weimar Republic. See, for example, Rathenau (1919/1921).
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crosses with diamonds and something else and did not want that the neighbour 
general knows too much of their intentions.
Result: in the period of telegraph and telephone the Boss of all Bosses put a 
simple colonel on a real horseback and gave him power to organize the retreat where 
necessary, and now this poor fellow riding on horseback from army to army put the 
whole thing in a terrible mess (please read the GERMAN version of these events). 
I PREFER OUR BRITISH MUDDLE. The same is with Red Tape. One should 
make comparative studies on that. That is that. I wait for your answer, my dear anti-
muddleian boy. Perhaps my Viennese tradition helps me in liking the Anglo-Saxon 
way of living. I think the Americans overestimate TESTING and CUTTER 
EFFICIENCY more than the British. I know how many things here are defect[s], 
but it [there] is less bullying than at any other places in the world. The easy[-]going 
life is a great advantage.
I am glad that you will have time to study. I hope you will write me, how your 
semantics and its TRUTH is [are] related to my ‘accepting’ etc. I do not look with-
out fear at your actions.
Library, Journal etc. will be attempted after a short time. As I already wrote to 
you, there is a new fine possibility to get money and apparatus for our unity-of- 
science work. That would be fine. I do not want to spoil the whole thing by pressing 
too much. WAIT AND SEE is always my principle. BUT DO NOT CEASE TO 
WAIT AND SEE. I am always prepared to work for our research and our publica-
tions, of course. Be sure that I always think of that.
PAUL’s address is changing, please write c/o WALDEMAR KAEMPFFERT 
New York Times. He will get some fellowships and is successful. Please write him, 
he admires you and will be glad to get from you a letter and good suggestions or 
something else. He likes good books and grape fruit juice, too. I think so. Paul 
sometimes intended to go to Chicago (Ogburn).128
On the ENCYCLOPEDIA. I always think of the encyclopedia and I now think – 
and you and Morris will agree with me – we should put as much [many] mono-
graphs as possible into our pattern which deal with particular sciences or particular 
activities (e.g. LANGUAGE MAKING) BECAUSE WE NEED THE HELP OF 
SPECIALISTS IN SINGLE FIELDS. I just try to find such specialists. Therefore 
Schapiro129 is a big show for us. Perhaps FEIGL and HEMPEL could make together 
the monograph joining the subject of 6 and 9, WE NEED A REVIEW ON THE 
REAL SITUATION IN OUR MOVEMENT, what logical empiricism tries to make 
and what kinds of systematization are reached. There are manifestly various groups 
of problems, the ‘formula’ and the ‘aggregational expressions’ e.g. (using my own 
128 Neurath is referring to the sociologist William F.  Ogburn (1886–1959), who had taught at 
Columbia University and in 1927 became chair of the Department of Sociology at the University 
of Chicago.
129 Meyer Shapiro (1904–1996) was an American art historian; Neurath arranged a monograph for 
him in the IEUS during the late 1930s. Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris were still negotiating 
with Meyer during the 1950s, but the monograph was never completed.
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terminology) are of different type and there are some of us which stresses this dif-
ference, others not. Some tendencies are towards systematization, others are cau-
tious, the probability, induction, etc. by various authors discussed differently. I think 
such an analysis could be very useful. At the moment as have only books such as 
that by Weinberg etc. discussing a former stage.
If FEIGL would be prepared to make the general review and HEMPEL the half 
monograph on systematization it would be a fine show.
Collecting material on the second series of monographs I am preparing a survey 
on people who are related to us, but have some ‘whims’ – as it were – they should 
have an opportunity to express themselves with intensity (the first series of mono-
graphs stresses, what we have in common. I have in mind the psychologist Pear, 
then TARSKI with his TRUTH, then REICHENBACH. I re-read some of his enun-
ciations and found out that he is really interested in stressing the differences. I want 
to give him a real chance to stress his theory of induction, his strange things on 
probability of hypotheses etc. (strange from my point of view, sometimes I do not 
grasp his intention). That is the right place for him after his very decided statements 
on our whole enterprise and our point of view. That is that.
The situation is this: FRANK writes, (he wrote me that he will do it immediately) 
introduction and finish chapter to FINLAY showing the importance of his explana-
tions for the whole business. BIOLOGY is open, but has to be made. THEORY OF 
BEHAVIOUR will be written by BRUNSWIK and if Ness’ manuscript is already 
there together with Ness, otherwise we shall get Brunswik alone.
We need a substitute for Rougier (he does not even answer Morris’ letters) 
instead of Tinbergen we have Schapiro on arts. Wirth is writing, Hempel and Feigl 
together will make 6, I hope so and instead of 9 we make LANGUAGE MAKING 
that is a good tuba song. Bibliography and Index we shall make together. I collected 
a lot of articles etc. I think we should not only bring poor and pure titles but some 
short remarks and particularly mention books and articles in which are some para-
graphs dealing with Logical Empiricism, PRO and CON.  I asked Morris to ask 
Kaplan, how it is with his collection.
I should like to read Kaplan[’]s ideas. In principle it would be nice to find for him 
a place in the LIBRARY, but until now we have not got the library again.
We have to leave our house, because the landlady comes back. BUT we just – we 
always have good luck even when we have bad luck – found a new one in our neigh-
bourhood in spite of the fact that houses are very rare. Just around the corner. And 
the chance came from outside not from the corner.
Please ask Hempel whether he is prepared to do this job together with Feigl in 
the senses mentioned above. I had the impression that Hempel is much [quite] busy 
and then therefore a shortening of his task would be not so bad. Perhaps we find a 
common title and have th[e]n two nice half monographs.
I am writing my monograph and have such an amount of material together, that 
I now have to re-shorten the whole thing again. I hope it will be useful.
So is our life mixed up with war and science, love and thinking of victory. That 
a terrible thing such a war, but now can one eliminate these Nazis without war? In 
the US there are many tensions as I learn from English and American sources. Let 
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us hope that all things will go on very well. I am confident, because we have more 
producing power together.
With kind regards to all friends,
every yours
[Otto Neurath]
 14. Neurath to Carnap, August 27, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-59)
NEW ADDRESS 30 Bickerton Road, HEADINGTON, OXFORD
27th August, 1942
Dear Carnap,
I ask you a favour; my young friend Candida Kranold just wrote me, that Herman 
Kranold and his wife died one after another by heart attacks (fortunately without 
any pain) in a few days[’] distance.130 She is a physicist and has a brother and sister, 
both children. She just passed examinations, and wants to study, perhaps philosophy 
(Feigl, I shall write to him). As far as I can see, no money help is needed – she has 
a job, but some suggestions would be very helpful. Please be kind enough to write 
her and to ask her, whether you can help her with suggestions or introductions. She 
is very clever and full of energy and I have no doubt she will go on very well.
[The] Kranolds were not too happy at Taladega College, separated from the 
‘world’, as you may imagine. As I told you, I visited them and lectured once there. 
A nice campus, a nice house, but really a kind of island, and sometimes very hot. 
The relations to [between] negroes and whites, of course, not without difficulties. 
Life is hard and difficult on an [sic] average.
He was a very brave man, always and I estimated his uprightness  – she was 
clever and helpful. They loved one another very much. Less and less people remain, 
who can talk with me on common past ……. How many died just in the last years, 
some in concentration camps or in Nazi prison, some committed suicide. We are 
glad that the most of our friends are somewhere in the Anglo-Saxon world, even 
very distant, but reachable.
We are just moving. Our landlord needs the house. We found another one well 
furnished with garden round the corner. Smaller rooms, but one more, that is an 
advantage, because sometimes friends stay with us and we have our own studio with 
library.
130 Hermann Kranold (1888–1942) was a German political writer and member of the Social 
Democratic Party of Germany; he emigrated to the United States in 1936. Kranold developed a 
full-socialization program with Neurath and Wolfgang Schumann (known as the “Kranold-
Neurath-Schumann Program”), that formed the basis for Neurath’s plans in the Bavarian 
Revolution. See Cartwright, Cat, Fleck and Uebel (1996, 43–49). See further Schumann’s memoirs 
in Cohen and Neurath (1973, 15–17).
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We are making one animated diagram sequence after another, charts for books, 
writing, reading, etc. We are as happy as possible in so sad a time. We hear good 
news of Paul, he got a fellowship and succeeds in his studies. Joseph Frank is now 
in New York, too.
I wrote Philipp Frank to finish his Freundlich job, introduction and closing 
words – I think a few words on Freundlich should be said. I suggested to change the 
title, into, about FOUNDATIONS OF ASTRONOMICAL MEASUREMENT or 
something like that. Please talk it over with Morris, who will get a letter from me 
very soon. I am writing my monograph with intensity. I have a multiple [bundle] of 
pages together and I am now selecting the main points carefully, looking through 
the newest literature. I am very happy in doing so, buying books and discussing with 
friends many problems of Logical Empiricism, Visual Education etc.
I am a little depressed, that, as far as we can judge, even Vienna, not a few people, 
of which we did not expect it, have certain sympathies with the Nazis. Not that they 
are Nazis, but they think, something is very well done, e.g. the Jews are persecuted 
etc. [T]errible. And other things, too. In all cases after the war it will be there a sad 
situation. Whom you may trust? But life is always a complex and sad thing, only 
certain islands of happiness and now we compare these islands with the rest ……. 
Sometimes we feel rather ashamed of our happy life (in spite of all the sorrow and 
all sadness in our life, too, but that is human fate). Look, we are not idle now, we can 
help to fight the Nazis in doing some work for the Ministry-of-Information films 
etc. The primitive life as far as eating, sleeping etc. is concerned is OK, the food 
situation is really very good. You see we have no food ideals, therefore we adapt 
ourselves to all the changes and therefore we enjoy this life. Through months we got 
sufficient milk and could drink it as sour milk (here unknown and despised).
I hope to get your semantics soon, did you register it?
I should like to get issues from American philosophical and scientific periodi-
cals. Have you any opportunity to provide such stuff for me? Waldemar Kaempffert 
is very nice in sending me interesting odd numbers of periodicals, pamphlets etc. 
and I feel already comfortable surrounded by reprints, periodicals, books etc.
With kindest regards from both of us, to both of you, every yours [Otto Neurath]
Please, do not forget to give me Trude’s address.
ADDRESS CANDIDA KRANOLD,
SPROUT OBSERVATORY, SWARTHMORE COLLEGE, SWARTHMORE, PA.
 15. Carnap to Neurath, November 7, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-60)
Rudolf Carnap
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois.
Santa Fe, N.M., November 7, 1942.
(That is in New Mexico)
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Dear Neuraths:
Thank you very much for your letters of July 17, 20, 29, and August 27.131 We are 
very glad to see from all of them that you both are happy in your activities, as happy 
as is possible in a war. And that you are happy together and found a new nice place 
for living.
We are away from Chicago since July and until next June, on a leave of absence 
as I wrote you.132 Unfortunately my back trouble has started again on the first day of 
our trip and has become worse than before. In consequence I have been in bed all 
the time since the beginning of July. But we are here in a nice landscape and nice 
climate; I am lying on a porch with two giant windows so that I can enjoy the land-
scape. And sometimes I can take short walks. Mostly I have no pain and can work. 
Therefore I am in general quite happy. Disturbing is only the idea that the future is 
so uncertain because so far no doctor has been able to find the real explanation and 
a proper cure beyond merely temporal relief. Strangely enough, Ernest Nagel seems 
to have similar back trouble, and he even went through an operation – all in vain.
I have asked the Oxford University Press, Oxford (they distribute the Semantics 
book in England) to send you a copy. If you do not get it soon, please inquire there. 
If the other copy should still arrive, please let me know. Likewise, if you have 
already or will find some of the reprints of yours which I sent you, please put aside 
my copies because I should like very much to get them back from you later. The 
second volume will soon appear; it is more of a technical nature, less concerned 
with general problems of the nature of semantics. (About its contents see preface to 
vol.I., p.ix.) Therefore I doubt whether this volume will be of interest to you. If, 
however, for some reason or another you should like to have it, please let me know.
I am very much interested in what you wrote about Hogben’s ideas on language- 
making and about his own auxiliary language. I remember our previous discussions 
where I maintained the superiority of artificial languages in comparison to Basic 
English, while you were rather skeptical about their practical chances.133 You say 
that Hogben’s Interglossa seems better than the other artificial languages; do you 
know enough of the other ones to make a critical comparison or do you merely infer 
it from Hogben’s good ideas about the method of language-making? As Morris 
wrote you already, we think it better to see first Hogben’s book before we decide on 
a monograph of his for the Encyclopedia. Who will be the American publisher of 
Hogben’s book and when is it to appear? I am looking forward to it with great 
interest.
131 See Neurath to Carnap, letters 11., 12., 13., and 14.
132 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 10.
133 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 11.
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I am very glad to have your detailed comments on Russell’s book. However, in 
the moment I cannot study them in detail because I do not have the book with me. 
As soon as I have an opportunity I shall read them together with the book and 
answer you. I have myself many objections against this book, especially against his 
attempt of a revival of old epistemological questions. Please read Nagel’s critical 
review in Journal of Philosophy 38, 1941, pp.  253–270.134 I agree with most of 
Nagel’s objections. On the other hand, I think that Nagel should also have indicated 
the positive values of the book; e.g. that it carries out certain logical analyses instead 
of metaphysical speculations. I am afraid that in certain points here as with respect 
to Tarski and Popper you are too critical, or rather too suspicious. You reject certain 
statements because they might perhaps be meant in a metaphysical way, although 
another interpretation is possible which makes them scientific, i.e. acceptable to an 
empiricist. At least this was the case with respect to many statements in Tarski’s 
book which you criticized. Whether it is also the case with Russell I shall examine 
later. With people who stand in general on the same empiricist basis as we but who 
might deviate perhaps in some particular points (as e.g. Schlick, Tarski, Popper, and 
even Russell) I am more inclined to take the attitude of a cautious judge, that is to 
say, to give them in each particular point the benefit of the doubt. I have the impres-
sion that  – in doubtful or ambiguous cases  – you are inclined to condemn the 
accused of the crime of metaphysics.
You ask whether my semantical statements can be translated into your language 
of ‘accepting’. This is not possible and it should not be required. The semantical 
concept of truth is fundamentally different from the pragmatical concepts of 
 accepting or confirming. I suggest urgently that you read again my old paper 
“Wahrheit und Bewährung” (Congress Paris, 1935).135 There I have tried to make 
the distinction clear; further, I made a short remark about it in “Semantics” p. 28. 
We should only require that every concept should be translatable in some way into 
an empiricist, scientific language; but we should not require that it be translatable 
into certain special terms into which we perhaps like to translate it. I hope that you 
will see from my book that the semantical term ‘true’ is definable in a scientific 
language (e.g. in yours), see e.g. p.26.
I should like to get a clear explanation from you of your distinction between 
aggregational terms and formula terms. I have never been able to understand what 
you said about them. Does ‘formula term’ mean ‘uninterpreted’ (i.e. belonging to a 
calculus or syntactical system) or does it mean what I call ‘logical’ in distinction to 
‘descriptive’ (see “Semantics” §13)?
In addition to ‘Life’ and ‘Look’ you might perhaps find material of interest to 
you (statistics, report about cultural trends, etc.) in ‘Survey Graphic’, ‘Time’, and 
‘Fortune’.
I think, in the question of planning, our views are not very different. We both 
emphasize the advantages of planning, and I agree also with your description of the 
134 See Nagel (1941).
135 See Carnap (1936a) and (1949).
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dangers of overcentralization. However, I am still not convinced of the advantages 
of muddling through. I think that decentralization and democracy can well be com-
bined with a procedure according to a plan instead of according to momentary 
whims or tradition. (I see, I made a slip in my last letter towards the end; instead of 
‘muddling’ vs. ‘democracy’ I meant to say ‘planning vs. democracy’).
I wrote to Candid Kranold but did not get an answer.
Trude’s address is: 5428 Ridgewood Court, Chicago. However, Ina thinks that 
Trude does not appreciate approaches by Charles’ friends (including me) at the 
present time. Trude feels that a person is either Charles’ friend or hers, and that both 
together does not work; also, that Charles’ friends have no idea as to the actual situ-
ation and how it came about and that therefore they do not see her position 
properly.
You write that some people in Vienna have unexpectedly Nazi-sympathies. Are 
among them some whom I know?
I don’t know anything about the Franks -- we are quite out of touch. Tarski 
teaches mathematics at Berkeley. Hempel has written something about confirma-
tion; it seems near publication.136 He is very busy teaching and Eva is secretary to a 
psychoanalyst. Among our common friends nobody is in the army: some are too 
old, some have dependents, some are not citizens and therefore cannot volunteer 
(though they can be drafted for service if they have taken out first papers; however, 
it so happens that they all have dependents and therefore the draft has not yet reached 
them). All the efforts in Washington – especially by Johnson, Oppenheim, Hempel – 
to get visas for the Grellings have failed; and now Hempel writes the terrible news 
that Grelling and his wife have been deported from France by the Gestapo; but we 
don’t know any details.
I have not heard from Waismann since [for] years; do you know anything? Does 
he teach or how does he earn his living? Is he writing something? What became of 
the manuscript of his book? Please send me his present address.
With best regards and wished from us both to the two of you,
Cordially yours,
Carnap
 16. Neurath to Carnap, December 22, 1942.
(ASP RC 115-07-61)
ISOTYPE REPORT 30 Bickerton Road, Headington, Oxford
REGISTERED 22nd December, 1942
136 Presumably Hempel (1943).
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Dear Carnap,
Now we have to send you seasonal greetings – the time goes on, and we with it. 
Very sorry, that you, Carnap are not so well off. I heard of Nagel’s pain, but I did not 
imagine that your pain is also intense. I had the impression of a more superficial but 
nevertheless irritating thing. Poor boy, the whole time in bed. I hope the doctors will 
find out and fight your trouble, please, tell us, what will happen with you.
We are going on very well. We had to move, but got a new furnished house round 
the corner on the same hill, more adapted to our wants than the first one, which has 
been very nice indeed. We have now a nice studio in our house, where our collabora-
tors work, a very nice team of British people. Now we are co-operating for 1½ year, 
no quarrel, no tension – a different atmosphere from the atmosphere on the conti-
nent. We like the British temper and habit very much. We are always healthy and 
cheerful, no bullying boss, no financial difficulties after our initial ones, which have 
been bridged by our kind friends – what a bargain, to have such good friends. It is 
so important not to be hampered just at the start.
Now we have our ISOTYPE INSTITUTE. Mary and I are directors of studies 
and secretaries, (Home Secretary permitted that) and now we are going on, as once 
in May, we have a permanent scientific collaborator in London, who collects mate-
rial for us in the Libraries. Here we have, as I told you, first class libraries. Our own 
library is very fine, too. I got a lot of useful books, e.g. Ueberweg Heinze,137 
Encyclopedia Britannica etc. atlases etc. many book I wanted – I was furious that 
this Hitler gangsters have my library now, but now I am rebuilding my own, in spite 
of these beasts. All what happens in Europe is like a dark cloud --- what a world in 
which we are pleased by looking at the American fortresses in the sky, returning 
from Germany and France.
Oxford University Press, told me, she has no copies, Harvard would send me a 
copy. Please be kind enough and ask Harvard, whether they did send me a 
REGISTERED copy. I should like to answer some of your remarks after reading 
your book. Sure I want to get volume 2, too. Sooner or later I am reading everything 
in my library. “Auf die Postille gebueckt in der Sache des wärmenden Ofens”.138 
Sure, I shall collect the copies I have twice and give you back yours. It was a great 
help for me to get them. I feel really at home, surrounded by books, my own articles 
and pamphlets. I bought reprints on the market…. What a time.
Oh sure I know a lot about artificial languages. You see, I first met VOLAPUEK, 
a language, like other languages, too, only “neutral”. That was my impression, and 
I did not devote any further interest to it – then I met PEANO, Latino sine flexion, 
which interested me, because I was interested in Peano[’]s axiomatization of math-
137 Neurath presumably refers to Friedrich Überweg’s Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 
which was republished at the beginnings of the twentieth century by Max Heinze.
138 That quotation is from Johann Heinrich Voß’s “Der siebzigste Geburtstag” (1802/1972, 69). It 
says exactly: “Auf die Postille gebückt, zur Seite des wärmenden Ofens.”
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ematics and in his attempt to write a mathematical deduction in symbols only. The 
use of Latin has something in it, but the Latin tradition is vanishing more and more 
and [---]139 this way? I think Peano’s ideas did not long bother me. Again and again, 
I met ESPERANTO, and later on IDO, as a language it is a relatively complicated 
product with all the whimsicalities of relations between adjectives and noun, etc. I 
do not speak of the nonsense with the letters and accents not found in our composers 
drawers, Ido did abolish this nonsense, of which – people told me – business and 
monopoly have been responsible. But Interlingua and Ido are more or less like other 
languages, you have many “idiomatic” elements in, which are superfluous from a 
language point of view, as a tool of communication. It is difficult to get a sufficient 
number of books, written and printed in this language. ESPERANTO is success-
ful – but very narrow in real usage. Poor people. We discussed with some of those 
people, who were related to the publishing centre the publication of ISOTYPE 
charts or books with Esperanto text, they confessed that their means are far away 
from such possibility – what a situation. That wants to be an international body. We 
found out, that it looks more like a hobby of many people, but without important 
effect. IF it were an international tool – why not, but no scientist is prepared to pub-
lish his books in Esperanto, he prefers English or French. Now the Esperanto centre 
in Germany is closed and in other countries Esperanto is weak, in spite of the fact 
that even chambers of commerce etc. are supporting it.
You see in the English speaking world, English is the auxiliary language also for 
foreigners, the various aliens here, all the foreign governments use English, it is 
astonishing how the whole business runs in this way, English is manifestly now the 
Lingua franca for very many people. Who will learn Esperanto in the USA? For 
what purpose?
Therefore BASIC ENGLISH has a great advantage, for READING and 
LISTENING; you see, it is very difficult to WRITE and SPEAK Basic, more diffi-
cult than trivial English. Why? You see, the goal is to speak CORRECT English by 
means of about 900 words, that means, to find out the IDIOMATIC 
WHIMSICALITIES which just allow to use these words only. Instead of a simply 
trivial English phrase you have to find out a complicated Basic phrase. The 
Advantage is the VOCABULARY simplicity, most important for reader and lis-
tener. Therefore the best thing for wireless. If I know only one of the 900 words will 
appear, I can guess what word was just said, otherwise the choice between dozens 
of words remains. The vocabulary is important for East Asia, for newspapers there, 
and periodicals. Important BASIC is a bridge to normal English. It is used to a wide 
extent.
Therefore I think that BASIC for reading and listening as I often explained has a 
particular chance. I see no serious objection to its usage for printing books and giv-
ing wireless talks, from tomorrow, if necessary  – no particular organization is 
needed, no time devoted to that is wasted.
139 Unreadable word.
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The other international languages are “isolated” and not attractive as far as their 
vocabulary is in question. Why should one learn all these queer and odd terms, for 
nothing and nothing, when you have no hope to meet another Esperanto hobbyist, 
the chance to meet some man who understands Pidgin English is much greater. 
Therefore, I like some Pidgin English, BASIC or another one, it should be simpler 
in grammar and without idiomatic stuff….
INTERGLOSSA, you see, as I told you, all roots are useful and normal ones. 
Whatever you learn in Interglossa it will be part of the normal international termi-
nology in science in any case. Some terms are rare, but why should I not learn rare 
scientific terms, which may be useful another day.
Writing INTERGLOSSA is the simplest thing you can imagine, international 
roots. USED IN SCIENCE, and Chinese Grammar, or Chinese lack of grammar, no 
relations between adjective and noun and all this stuff. For scientific writing really 
a bargain. Perhaps for other writing, too. Learning Interglossa, implies learning 
something on language making and language technique, whereas learning Esperanto 
is learning a new language, which is a little simpler …….
That is that ---------
What do you think of that?
I see no much positive value in Russell’s book, because it does not lead anybody 
to scientific thinking, but, on the contrary, to unscientific epistemology of oldest 
style, behinds [sic] Avenarius. You see Duhem, remains the type of books, useful for 
scientific arguing, not Russell. He has his great merits, but not just here.
I again read Popper.140 I hope that after so many years you will see, how empty 
all that stuff is. Just the points in which we are interested from point of view of 
scientific arguing, are NOT ACCEPTED BY HIM, just there he is full of statements 
on experimentum crucis, negation of all sentences etc. what a decrease after Duhem, 
Mach, etc. No feeling for scientific research. I am sorry that you have no time to 
give me NOW a short analysis of Popper’s book, telling me, where the merits are. 
This queer idea that one can refute a hypothesis [so that it] cannot even be used in a 
weaker way. You know, that I think even your formulation on degrees of testing pro 
and contra are transgressing empiricism. Perhaps that is the reason, why you fell a 
little for Popper.
Of Tarski’s metaphysics I do not [sic] longer say anything. It is trivial sad 
Aristotle redivivus, nothing more. THAT DOES NOT EVEN TOUCH HIS FINE 
ACCOUNTING BUSINESS. But you see, what does help Tarski, when somebody 
proposes, to use statements in principle as statements OF SOMEBODY, and there-
fore always combined with some “accepted”. You may say, there are other possibili-
ties, too; then I would like to see, how Tarski would be able to tell a story of 
throughout relativistic skepticism, without any ABSOLUTE relation “true”, but 
140 Presumably Karl Popper’s, Logik der Forschung (1935). For the English translation see Popper 
(1935/2002). The first English translation appeared in 1959.
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only relations between changeable statements. I suggest not to use a statement THE 
SNOW IS WHITE, but only as abbreviation or a part of the sentence: WE ACCEPT 
THE STATEMENT THE SNOW IS WHITE. I accept the statement there are NAME 
PLATES which fit [correspond] to SNOW, other which fit [correspond] to ICE or 
WATER, why not, but even that is accepted by somebody, there are no STATEMENTS 
IN ITSELF …. I cannot see your point, perhaps in your Semantics you will tell of 
that.
That does not touch the calculus, the question is only where and when and how 
we may relate this calculus to scientific analysis. That I want to see. TARSKI tells 
about snow and white, I should like to see, how he analyzes meteorological analysis 
or biological analysis, or mechanics or something like that fruitful. Popper and 
Tarski should not be mentioned in the same breath, because Tarski is making things 
INDEPENDENT of the application, whereas Popper only speaks of applications of 
something trivial, which seems to me [i]napplicable, therefore when we do not 
accept the whims of refutation of universal statements, nothing remains of impor-
tance. It was some idea, combined with anti-Vienna-Circle resentment. Why not? It 
makes him breathing [sic] more cheerfully. [And] [s]o on.
You see, I test all these ideas by looking into the sciences, I am now reading care-
fully Maxwell’s letters, speeches etc. and I found fine things. I am looking, how 
Lord Kelvin argued, Faraday, Marx, Max Weber, and then I try to find out, where we 
could sharpen our doubts. And I see more and more, that the important point is to 
find out, where we expect stable relations or instabilities, “chance” etc. I am really 
sorry that Zilsel, Hempel etc. talk of social sciences sometimes, but do not analyse 
these points. Usually you find the remark that group events are better predictable 
than individual events – THAT IS WRONG. It depends, what happens, there are 
stabilities in groups sometimes, but also instabilities ….
In my Empirische Soziologie, page 130. And, it is puzzling, many people wrote 
on my book, there appeared reviews, nobody neither one of our friends, nor one of 
our critics, did even mention this very, very important point, the NON- 
PREDICTABILITY of some social phenomena, related to INTERNAL SPEECH, 
as it were, is usually not even touched. Yes people, who have nothing to do with 
Logical Empiricism and with antiscientific attitude, are against all prediction etc., 
but “our people” do concentrate [o]n prediction and do not even mention the prob-
lem of non-predictability. I shall put it forward in my monograph with some energy. 
I do not speak of the trivial Marxists, who know all things, and speak only of 
ERROR afterwards …. what a lot of lawyers ….
About your “true” I shall discuss with you after reading your book.
Oh yes, I read SURVEY GRAPHIC regularly, I get it as a friend of this periodi-
cal, FORTUNE and TIMES I bought, whenever I see a copy, I have a collection of 
it, relatively seldom I see LOOK, Life is very popular here.
You see, analyzing various countries, creeds, etc. I think people who have the 
conviction they are right, even in the statement they are in error, or they are sinners, 
are very dangerous. Only planning together with skepticism and multiplicity will be 
nice. This implies, what the traditional German calls inefficiency, because he does 
not ask efficient in what [?] Planning for what? Output of autos? or what? I speak of 
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PLANNING FOR HAPPINESS, FOR FREEDOM, perhaps the “output” in 
 machinery is smaller, but in freedom and happiness greater, what then? THIS 
PROBLEM IS NOT ANALYSED USUALLY BY PEOPLE INTERESTED IN 
PLANNIG, mostly propagated by people who are against planning. That is a pity. A 
fine muddling through is a pleasant thing, and you may learn a lot of that here. I like 
the British for that. There is a nice booklet with pictures MUDDLING THROUGH. By 
BENSON, ASKWITH and BENTLEY.141 Much fun in it. THE AIM OF ENGLISH 
INEFFICIENCY IS THAT THINGS SHOULD GET DONE WITHOUT ANYONE 
SEEMING TO CARE. You see, we do not know, how traditions are related to one 
another and to our happiness, therefore going away from some tradition perhaps 
reduces our happiness – there are certain points, where the matter is simple, and the 
things done far away from our personal life, for instance, organizing coffee produc-
tion and distribution, without burning a third of the crop is a planning matter, not 
dealing with the worker’s tradition in Brazil and, I hope so, not with my coffee on 
the table. Why should no planning coal production be combined with old coal min-
ing tradition and fire places wasting coal – the point is, that we do not destroy coal, 
not even used for our pleasure in wasting something. To produce less coal, because 
we like some singing and sprawling, means perhaps increase of happiness, but the 
rotting of coal in the docks does not help anybody, not even having more idleness or 
wasted coal in his fireplace.
Please, try to find out, what is with Candida Kranold, I did not get any answer, 
too. I hope nothing happened to her. Try to send a registered letter or a telegram, that 
is the way to find out officially what may be wrong.
I do not know Trude’s opinion officially, therefore I wait how she will react. I 
have not the slightest idea how Charles and Trude have been together or not together, 
for me they are two separate individuals, one a more dreamlike phenomenon for me, 
related to some vague images along the road or in a room around a table, and some 
voice in the air, sometimes with a timbre I like and some irony, I like, and some 
broken German I like, and some habits I like – that is not much, but sufficient to 
want to remain in touch with somebody, called Trude in this case. I always try to 
continue nice contacts – that is that. Charles is a separate personality, I do not much 
know of his tricks and tracks, I know him as faithful and correct person as far as I 
am concerned. I highly estimate his correctness in our collaboration and I like his 
serious side of his life, as far as I know it – I have not the slightest ideas of his “pri-
vate life” or “non-life” whatever it may be. Since his Paths of Life142 I should not be 
astonished if he did found a new religion or something like that or become a painter, 
or an explorer – why not? The Human SOUL (= as Schnitzler says)143 is a wide 
realm, and many various mansions may be there. Why should I not like him, and 
141 See Benson and Betty (1936).
142 See Morris (1942).
143 Neurath presumably refers to Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931), who was an Austrian author and 
dramatist, oriented towards psychology. Schnitzler’s books were burning by the Nazis in 1933.
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like Carnaps, and Franks, each separately and sometimes together, Hempels, why 
not Eva being in Capstadt as a lonely nun in a MAITREYAN camp,144 and Hempel 
as a lonely Bachelor in Haity, devoted to DIONYSIAN worship of some kind, 
MAITREYANLIFE, DIONYSIAN LIFE …. And all these MAITREYAN and 
DIONYSIANS may be regarded as members of a great family connected with 
Charles, why not? …. There are funny things in the world, I met somebody who told 
me of ghosts, he met just the day before, and others told me of a devil – why not? 
Some know something of THE truth, others of ERRORS, some make ISOTYPES 
and others a BAUHAUS, a strange world, …. why not? That is life. I must confess 
that I do not see any persons position properly, nevertheless I like some people and 
others not, some like much others like, other I dislike. I like e.g. Susan Stebbing 
very much, I do not think I judge her positions properly, I infer that from the experi-
ence, that I sometimes afterwards learn something about her I did not imagine 
before, but I liked her before and afterwards. Why should I not like Trude without 
knowing her position? You see even if the position were awkward, why not? We 
have friends, and we know their defects – just that is perhaps friendship, to like 
somebody in spite of this defects we know. That is that. If Trude has strange whim-
sicalities dealing with other people, why not, I knew people who could not trans-
gress open places and others got skin trouble after eating strawberries, Andersen 
tells of a man who could not look at a parson. And Trude cannot correspond with 
Charles’ acquaintances. Such is life – that is all. But, now wait and see.
I do not know whether you know people with Nazi sympathies, where we did not 
expect it – I had in mind some younger people, you know hardly. You did see per-
haps sometimes Neubacher,145 but one knew of this fellow that he had whimsicali-
ties of national flavor. We despised the German Nationalism from the start, but some 
of these fellows without sensitiveness in their fingers spoke in grand style of national 
unity etc. not believing, that this kind of arguing in Germany was mostly related to 
sad things, including coarse antisemitism, plunder and robbery ….
Why you are out of touch with the Franks? Terrible Grelling’s fate. He waited too 
long. He explained me he would go to USA, if there were some post for him etc. 
Many people thought so – unfortunately. I know cases in which people – antinazi 
Aryans – returned to Germany, disliking the situation abroad as an alien without 
background. It is right, you have to start from scratch, but why not? I myself take a 
[sic] pride, perhaps a foolish pride as other things, not to go away, if not immediately 
forced to do it by some gangsters etc. I did not want to leave Holland and I did not 
want to leave England as some friends suggested. Perhaps you feel a little like a sol-
dier – against Hitler and this plague. I like to be with the British in these hard days. 
144 In Buddhism, a Maitreya is considered to be a future Buddha. On the Maitreyan path of life, see 
Morris (1942, Chap. 7).
145 Possibly Hermann Neubacher (1893–1960), who was connected (just like Neurath) to the Social 
Democratic Party of Austria and to the housing project of Vienna. In the mid-1920s, Neubacher get 
closer at first to Pan-Germanism, then to Engelbert Dollfuß, the leader of “austrofascism.” Later he 
entered the Nazi Party and became a diplomat in the Third Reich, working mainly in the foreign 
ministry for the Balkans.
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Being in a new environment is rather thrilling and stimulating – I feel like a second 
youth here. On our life boat I thought of the future activity here. Perhaps others say 
we should go away sooner. Many did not like my return from the USA to Holland 
Autumn 1939, in war time …. Therefore I shall look at Grelling from this point of 
view. Sad, very sad. What was the reason the Washington did not give visa in time?
Waismann is teaching here in some college. I have seen him another day, but 
there is no real contact, his address: 104 Abingdon Road, Oxford.
Paul got a Columbia fellowship and is now assistant to the professor of statis-
tics – that is Ok. Fine. After all his trouble now some real success – he is not behind 
his years now. He is preparing his doctor thesis146 and hopes to finish this job, before 
he enters in some service, USA army business.
With kind regards from both of us both of you
Cordially yours
[Otto Neurath]
 17. Neurath to Carnap, January 15, 1943.
(ASP RC 102-55-02)
15th January, 1943.
Dear Carnap,
Your Semantics copy did not arrive, I therefore tried to get one for a few days. I 
am just looking through the main chapters, particularly the chapters, you mentioned 
in your letter. I am really depressed to see here all the Aristotelian metaphysics in 
full glint and glamour, bewitching my dear fried Carnap through and through. As 
often, a formalist drapery and hangings seduce logically minded people, as you are 
very much. I anticipated that, as I anticipated the coming of a religion founder --- 
such is a certain behaviour of movements, which are based on empiricism. The 
analogy with Comte’s positivism is not so far away. But why not – we are mortals, 
and therefore we have to be like mortals.
But, let us speak seriously, I mean business. It is for me obvious, that we should 
have a discussion between friends, as we have organized it about Protocol 
Statements. I do not like to criticize you, without admiring you and pulling your leg, 
I want to present my leg pulled by you. The tricks and tracks of such a discussion 
should be presented in the most kind and friendly way. I should like to do it in an 
American periodical (the JOURNAL matter is not definitely solved, and we shall 
repeat our discussion partly there but from another point of view).
146 Paul Neurath defended his PhD thesis in 1943; his doctoral dissertation was on social life in the 
Dachau and Buchenwald Concentration Camps of Germany, where he was deported between 
March 30, 1938 and May 27, 1939, when he was released to Sweden. His book appeared only later 
as The Society of Terror: Inside the Dachau and Buchenwald Concentration Camps (Neurath 
2005).
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I think the nicest way, would be the following. I write a letter to you, you write 
an answer, and I make my finishing remarks, and you tell the public, now it is for 
the first sufficient given to other people’s entertainment and studies.
I should suggest that we eliminate “misunderstandings” from our letters, that 
means it remains our unsolved problematic. And the whole affaire is useful and a 
kind of prototype, how to make a good discussion.
I do not like your way, to speak of me in your book of some empiricist who 
makes objections, without giving the reader any opportunity, to read the “objec-
tor’s” (what an unenglish term) own position, as I published it again and again.
Should you have money in your pocket, cable me, if not write me – the world is 
able to wait for our ‘famous’ correspondence on Semantics. I shall discuss the “des-
ignatum” and “denotatum” terminology, too.
It is really stimulating to see, how the Roman Catholic Scholasticism find his 
way into our logical studies, which have been devoted to empiricism.
The Scholasticism created Brentanotism, Brentano begot Twardowski, 
Twardowski begot Kotarbinski, Lukasiewicz (you know is direct relations to the 
Neo-Scholasticism in Poland), both together begot now TARSKI etc. and now they 
are God fathers of OUR Carnap too, in this way THOMAS AQUINAS enters from 
another door Chicago, where he entered already via ADLER.147 What an interesting 
story – that means TRADITION. You remember, I always have been full of mis-
trust, as far as Russell’s Existence symbol was concerned, and Russell the man with 
the DUPLICATION (Avenarius called it INTERJECTION) is just extending this 
start, which is closely related to your and Tarski’s and Aristoteles’ start: THERE 
EXIST SOMETHING IN ITSELF, this statement I thought is in a language not 
acknowledged by us (?) or by me (sure).
But these historical remarks do not form a part of our future correspondence. I 
shall write you, how I am just preparing my monograph by the encyclopedia, and 
have to deal with the chronicler’s language, and how I try to explain, what 
TERMINOLOGY implies, then your book arrives, and now I see, that the fine 
strings which have been Wittgensteinean before, or Schlickean, or Russellian, now 
become more and more Tarskian…. i.e. ARISTOTELEAN. And then I shall tell you 
my story, and you will answer … OK.
Your remarks that Semantics may be misused by metaphysicians do not help 
you, because they are only continuing your actions.
I think the whole thing is very fundamental. I have now to think, what position 
your Semantics gets after the removal of the metaphysical elements. I think it 
remains something translatable into empiricism. We shall see – it is not so simple to 
find out the implications of such a fine structure. You know how to make a build-
ing – even if the fundaments were not so good. p. 53 “thoughts” come even into the 
picture, as in Wittgenstein, Russell etc.
147 Mortimer J. Adler (1902–2001) was an Aristotelian and Thomist philosopher, and a colleague 
of Carnap at the University of Chicago.
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I am prepared to think of an “Anwendungsbereich” of your system in any case, 
but first I want to find out, where the elements of non-empiricism may be found. You 
see I do not see, how all these Semantics problems fit into the discussions of scien-
tific practice with which I am highly concerned at the moment.
I know not exactly what Strauss’ objections are, and I asked him about his atti-
tude towards your and my statements.
You see I am interested in statistics and in predictions in this field and therefore 
in the old problem how to give the whole story an empiricist flavor (the metaphysi-
cal flavor of all attempts is well known, also to you) but I doubt whether your way 
out, continuing the Wittgensteiniade will help us. I doubt it. But I am not very com-
petent in analyzing your story. But sometimes I found something by starting in my 
own way and then looking at links with the statements made by others, e.g. by my 
admired friend Carnap, the logical syntax148 of whom I prefer in many respects to 
Semantics. I shall be with CARNAP ONE against CARNAP TWO. You know that 
I did not agree with all your sayings. I am looking through your terminological 
appendix and I am highly interested in it. A hard chapter – of course. What I think 
of the Truth terms, and of the degrees etc., you know sufficiently.
We are busy with exhibition making, film making, charts making, reading, writ-
ing, designing, discussing social sciences, education etc. I have to write many letters 
on scientific matters, on educational projects, publishing projects etc. My mono-
graph grows up like plants after a tropical rain. As I started I did not expect so rich 
a crops [sic] – perhaps it has been useful to go away from The Hague to let my 
manuscript with Hitler. Now it becomes much more vivid – I think so. I am just re- 
writing it. The material is ever-sufficient.
Now the war is going on very well; Paul became assistant to the professor of 
statistics,149 we heard of friends that they are well in Holland and two of them got 
babies…. what a world, killing and births. An old story, a very old one, but a sad 
one. And then great discussions about birth rate and mortality rate. Human beings 
are rather mad. But as a scientist we have to look at all things just as we look at 
triangles and circles, but I think we may say sometimes: this damned triangle or 
this…. circle. Oh my dear Carnap, when shall we give names to bad things together 
and speaking [sic] of old days in Vienna?
Many greetings and good wishes, from both of us to both of you
every yours,
Otto Neurath
148 See Carnap (1937).
149 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 9. note 100 and letter 16. note 146.
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 18. Carnap to Neurath, January 29, 1943.
(ASP RC 115-07-62)
Rudolf Carnap
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois.
El Paso, Texas, January 29, 1943.
Dear Neurath,
Thank you for your detailed letter of December 22nd. I am hurrying to answer it 
because we shall leave here (Texas) in a few days in order to go to the Mayo Clinic 
(in Minnesota) -- this is the most famous hospital in the U.S. -- to get their opinion 
about my back since it does not improve at all. Normally I have no pain, but now 
much of the Rockefeller-year is over and I have to think of being able to teach 
again150; as I am today -- and have been for the past 7 months -- I could not teach, 
and therefore I have decided to make this long pilgrimage to Mayo’s. I don’t know 
yet that they will be able to do something for me -- some similar cases have been 
helped by an operation -- but it always depends what they think of the individual 
case. Well, we shall see.
I had a letter from the Harvard Press in October in which they said that they had 
no confirmation from the Oxford Press that the shipment containing copies of my 
book had arrived but that they felt certain that it had arrived because otherwise they 
would have been notified by the Oxford Press. Therefore I am surprised to learn 
from your letter that the Oxford Press has no copies. Anyway, I wrote yesterday to 
the Harvard Press, asking them to send you a copy, registered, if they have not 
already done so.
I regret very much that you are so intolerant with respect to some ideas of people 
who share with us the fundamental empiricist attitude. In the case of Popper, I 
believe your reaction is chiefly caused by the fact that he criticized the Vienna Circle 
quite unnecessarily. He was overcritical and so you are now. Even when he wrote 
the book he was in agreement with us on most fundamental points. When later he 
came into personal contact with us the agreement became even more strong and 
conscious to him. Some of his views which you criticize, e.g. the refutability of 
hypotheses, have the same defects -- and, I think, the same merits -- as many of our 
earlier views: they might be taken as first approximations but closer inspection 
shows that they are not entirely adequate but must be replaced by better 
 approximations. I suppose that the same holds for many of our present views, 
including mine, where we do not see today how they should and can be improved. 
150 Carnap was on a leave of absence granted by the University of Chicago and financed by a 
Research Grant from Rockefeller Foundation since 1942. He has spent his time Santa Fe, New 
Mexico, working on a manuscript that became later Meaning and Necessity (1947). See further 
letter 24, note 239.
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In the case of some of your views which are not shared by most of the people in our 
movement I often defend them in just the same way: I admit to those who criticize 
them that the formulations are not quite adequate but I point to the fact that they may 
be taken as first approximations. I like to defend your views but sometimes you 
make it, by Jove, hard for me to do so when you stubbornly stuck to your old for-
mulations years after they have been shown to you to be inadequate (e.g. “No facts, 
only statements”, your form of protocol sentences, “the semantical concept of truth 
is only applicable to calculi not to the language of science”). The views of all of us 
within the movement of empiricism do of course differ more or less from each other. 
I think for the sake of the movement it would be much better if we were more toler-
ant towards each other. If your intolerance would become the general custom, then 
I am afraid you would be among the first to be declared a heretic and excommuni-
cated. By tolerance, of course, I do not mean acceptance of each others views. The 
differences of opinion should and will be discussed. But this discussion is not helped 
by labelling the views of the others as nonempiricist and metaphysical.
When you read my “Semantics” and especially when you write to me about it, 
please keep in mind that the semantical concepts used there are meant for applica-
tion also to the language of science especially the concepts ‘true’, ‘L-true’, and 
similar ones. In this book I did not apply them to science and I made only brief 
remarks concerning their applicability. I regret now that I did not emphasize this 
point more, especially after reading Nagel’s review in the Journ.Phil.151 who in this 
and some other respects misunderstood the intention of the book, and after reading 
your remark about Tarski making things independent of the application. I do not 
know exactly what Tarski thinks of the question of applicability. In any case, the 
concept of truth as I deal with it is meant as a systematization of the inexact term 
‘true’ as used by scientists and in everyday life.
What became of Waismann’s MS?152 Did you not have it once for examination 
with respect to the question of publication? I should have liked to see it.
We are very glad to hear that you and Mary are again successfully working in 
your Isotype Institute, that you are rebuilding your library, have good collaborators 
and friends. Now that the military situation looks more hopeful our thoughts turn 
151 See Nagel (1941).
152 Waismann started to write a book (Logik, Sprache, Philosopie) on Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
during the late 1920s: it was planned as the very first volume of Schriften zur wissenschaftliche 
Weltauffassung, edited by Moritz Schlick and Philipp Frank, to be published around 1929. Though 
for some time even Wittgenstein worked on the manuscript with Waismann, he rejected the publi-
cation of the material at various points. During the war a near-to-final version was lost, though 
Waismann arranged an English translation as well, under various titles. Charles Ogden at Routledge 
and Kegan Paul would have published that translation (in the series “International Library of 
Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method” which included the translation of Wittgenstein’s 
Tractatus as well), but it never appeared in Waismann’s life. The book in a new form was published 
in 1965 as The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy.
 Appendices
575
more and more to the question of the kind of peace that will emerge. And there are 
sometimes reasons to worry. Or do you think we may be hopeful here too?
Reichenbach wrote that Gomperz died in December.
When returning to Chicago, I shall probably teach elementary mathematics 
instead of philosophy! The conversion of our colleges for war needs has not left 
many students in philosophy, whereas many more (in Chicago we have a special 
instruction center for Navy-communication-men) will need mathematics. Therefore 
I have volunteered to switch over.
With warmest greetings from both of us to the two of you,
Yours,
Carnap
 19. Carnap to Neurath, March 15, 1943.
(ASP RC 102-56-03)
Rudolf Carnap
El Paso, March 15, 1943.
Reply to Neurath’s Comment on Russell, Meaning and Truth. (Letter of July 17, 
1942)153
 
After some unsuccessful attempts to locate your references in Russell’s book I 
came to the conclusion that the English edition must have a different pagination, 
because of larger pages. I found a formula for the approximative calculation of the 
page numbers in the American edition, but still in some cases I could not find the 
places referred to. (The Amer.ed. has 445 pages.)
Engl. Amer. Abbreviations:
edit. edit.
H: This formulation of R. is harmless because  
translatable into
unobjectionable, empiricist language. (Some of these  
formulations I
myself should prefer to avoid.)
T: This formulation about truth is correct if meant  
in the sense of the
semantical concept of truth. (On these points  
we shall not easily
153 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 11.
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come to an agreement because you fail to see the  
difference between
the semantical concept of truth, which is scientific and not
absolutistic, and the realistic concept of truth, which  
is absolutistic
and metaphysical and which is sometimes used by R.,  
see R.)
R: Here is a point where R.’s realism comes in, which I,  
of course,
reject as metaphysical, like all of us.
p.15 p.14 I can explain your objection only by assuming that you did  
not read the whole paragraph. It seems to me that you attribute 
to R. a conception which he himself does not have but only  
reports and even criticizes: “The behaviorist is thinking of  
himself as …. he gives a false air of objectivity… As soon we 
remember the possible fallibility of the observer…”
15 15 (Naïve realism.) I agree.
15 15 (The split.) I agree.
22 23 In a benevolent interpretation, we might still take this as  
compatible with empiricism because a sentence may be  
confirmable without being testable. (Comp. “Testability”  
p.420ff.).154 However, I am myself doubtful whether R. would 
agree with this interpretation.
50 59 “Like Schlick”. Yes. Therefore not so bad. Even if not right,  
still compatible with empiricism.
64 78 I do not agree with R., and generally not with his interpretation 
of not-and or-sentences. (See below). But it is not contrary  
to empiricism.
70 86 “As if words were not facts”. No! R. says himself immediately 
after it: “Words are some among facts”. I do not see on this  
page any trace of absolutism.
77 94 H. By “desire”, R. means nothing else but an occurrence  
in a desiring man.
92 113 H. Translatable into “something was yellow”.
104 128 H. Translatable into “No chronometer is such that, for every  
time point t it shows t”. You say “Why should not by  
chance…?” Yes, that is possible. Therefore R. has no sufficient 
reason for his universal assertion; but it is nevertheless  
scientific, not metaphysical.
106 132 (Wave length.) I agree with you.
154 See Carnap (1936–37).
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108 135 “God”. H.
0P0(!) 135 H. Translatable into “world without organisms”.
111 138 H. The discussion is entirely behavioristic; R. does not refer  
to “mind” but instead to a machine which uses words.
132 164 Entirely correct and scientific, no absolutism. You probably  
misunderstood him. He speaks about a minimum set of  
premises for a given set of propositions! The whole  
formulation is nothing else but the customary explanation  
of the axiomatic method.
133 166 T.
140
141
134
176ff.
178
As far as your formulations are concerned (which  
unfortunately are not in agreement with your opinions) I have 
told you since many years that I cannot accept them and hence 
I agree with the criticism of these formulations by R., Schlick, 
and many others. In distinction to R., I know your actual  
conception from conversations; and I am in agreement with it. 
It seems to me that in your reply in “Univ.Jargon”155 to R.’s  
criticism you missed his point.
144 181 I agree with R. in his criticism of your triple-involved form  
of protocol sentences, especially as condensed in his  
paragraph “This is to say…” (p.147? – 183). (I do not like his 
formulation with “continuity of the ego”, but it is translatable).
146 182 (Crusoe). I agree with you; but this has not much bearing on  
the question under discussion: the form of protocol sentences.
148 185 --
148 186 “I mean”. T.
154 192 H.
156 194 T.
160 200 “Who…?” G.E.Moore, not R.
161 201 “Who…?” A psychologist. (By “degree of credence” R.  
means “degree of belief”, not “degree of confirmation”!)
164 205 H.
168 210 T.
171 214 H.
186 234 T.
187 234 --
189 237 -- (H.)
189–191 237–9 You say that “meaning” in itself is discussed, not as a social  
relation. I do not see that; to me the discussion seems  
behavioristic, not absolutistic. (I should criticize R.’s  
discussion from the opposite side: To me it is  
too psychologistic.)
155 See Neurath (1941/1983).
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218 ?
221 ?
221 291? (Correspondence theory of truth.) T.
245 307 “As if facts and sentences were in different worlds”.  
Not at all. R. says explicitly and repeatedly that he takes  
sentences as utterances hence as a special kind of facts;  
thus they belong for him to the same world.
258 323 T.
268 ?
277 347 (Real world.) Perhaps R.
281 352? R. misunderstands our rejection of realism.
282 ?
286 ?
288 361 T.
289 362 --
304 ?
305 ?
313 392? No. The concept of degree of certainty (or confirmation) can  
be defined in a scientific language without any absolutism.  
That will be shown in a later volume of my Semantics.156
315 392? --
317 398 --
321 ?
321 ?
329 ?
340 427 I too should reject this.
347 436 (Universals.) R.
347 438 (Structure of the world.) R.
My general opinion of R.’s book. As I wrote you once before, I agree with most 
of Nagel’s objections in his review157; on the other hand, I think that Nagel failed to 
mention the merits of the book, especially in comparison with the general run of 
books in epistemology.
My chief points of disagreement with R. are the following two.
 1. I object to what I should call R.’s psychologism. By this I mean the lack of dis-
tinction between logical problems and psychological problems.158 He often 
156 That volume – though not in the “Studies in Semantics” series – became the Logical Foundations 
of Probability (1950).
157 See Nagel (1941).
158 On that distinction see Carnap (1936b).
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begins discussing a logical problem and then inadvertently turns it into a psycho-
logical one. Herein, however, he is not guilty of metaphysics because he admits 
and often applies himself the behavioristic interpretation of psychology, although 
perhaps not quite consistently. More precisely: problems of pure semantics are 
misinterpreted as pragmatical problems. I don’t think that this objection of mine 
is in any way related to your objections to the book. On the contrary I have the 
impression that you (together with others of our friends, e.g. Ness, Jørgensen, 
Strauss) often make the same mistake.
 2. A more important criticism, in which I agree with you on the whole. Up to a 
certain point, R. proceeds in an empiricist and behavioristic way. Then, however, 
his realism appears on the scene and his discussion becomes metaphysical. He 
discusses pseudo-problems like those of the reality of non-perceived objects, of 
the physical world, of universals. – This general feature holds in particular for 
R.’s discussion of the concept of truth. Most of what he says on this concept is 
within the realm of an empiricist, scientific language, if we interpret it from the 
point of view of the semantical concept of truth. However, at certain places his 
realism comes through, and then his concept of truth takes on an absolutistic and 
metaphysical flavor. Thus I agree with your criticism of R.’s concept of truth only 
with respect to the places of the second kind (marked above by ‘R.’), not those 
of the first kind (marked by ‘T.’).
I should like to emphasize the fact that the acceptance of the semantical concept 
of truth does by no means necessarily lead to the acceptance of realism. R.’s intro-
duction of realism into the discussion of truth is an entirely unnecessary impurifica-
tion. The semantical concept of truth (as used by Tarski and myself) is entirely 
scientific and has nothing to do with pseudo-problems like that of realism. It seems 
to me that in this point you make an error based on a misunderstanding of the 
semantical concept of truth. I am rather disappointed that all our conversations on 
this point throughout the years, beginning with our talk in the train to Paris in 1935, 
have not succeeded in clearing up of what seems to me just a misunderstanding. In 
my book I have again tried to make clear the nature of the semantical concept of 
truth (e.g. p. 26).159 I refuse to give up the hope.
Carnap
 20. Carnap to Neurath, May 11, 1943.
(ASP RC 102-55-01)
Santa Fe, N.M., May 11, 1943.
159 See Carnap (1942, §7).
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Dear Neurath,
I suppose that in the mean time you have received my letters of January 29th and 
March 15th (with reply to your comments on Russell).160 About a month ago we 
have come back to Santa Fe; we bought a small and modest cottage high up on a hill 
with a wonderful view over Santa Fe and the distant mountains. It’s all very simple 
(only an amateur built job which manifests itself each time when it rains -- it will 
need a few repairs to make it water-tight), but it has for us a great charm and the 
weather here is very pleasant, dry and sunny most of the year. Unfortunately my 
back does not show any “spontaneous improvement” which the Mayo people held 
before my eyes as a possibility. Therefore it seems probable that an operation will 
have to be done after all if the doctors can agree among themselves that it promises 
relief. Since they suggested a postponement of at least half a year probably nothing 
will be done before the end of August, however. I hope the operation will be suc-
cessful so that I shall be able to teach in the Winter.
I hope you have received in the mean time vol. I and perhaps already vol. II of 
my Semantics. Vol. II does not contain much of interest to you, I suppose, but the 
Preface has some bearing on the question of the usefulness of Semantics by show-
ing the role it could and should play in the development of contemporary technical 
logic.
When I wrote about fellow empiricists making objections against Semantics (in 
the Preface of vol. I) I was, of course, thinking in the first place of you and Nagel. I 
thought whether there was anything published to which I could refer. I could only 
think of Nagel’s remarks in his paper at the Harvard Congress 1939.161 But since 
these remarks were too short and that volume of the Journal has not appeared I 
thought it better not to refer to them.162 As to you, I did not remember any place 
where you discuss Semantics in print in any detail so that it would be possible to 
reply to it. I know that you often criticized the use of the concept of truth or 
“TRUTH” by metaphysicians or (in your Aristotelian paper) by Russell.163 But I do 
not remember any critical discussion of Semantics, that is to say the concept of truth 
160 See Carnap to Neurath, letters 18 and 19.
161 Ernest Nagel delivered a talk (“Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism”) at the Fifth 
International Congress for the Unity of Science, held at Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. 
(USA), September 3–9, 1939. See Nagel (1940).
162 Felix Meiner suspended the publication of Erkenntnis in September 1937: since Reichenbach 
had Jewish ties, Meiner was not able to risk publishing the journal with him as editor-in-chief. 
Volume 7 was taken by Van Stockum & Son in the Netherlands, and from volume 8, the journal 
was renamed as The Journal of Unified Science (Erkenntnis). Since the Third Reich has invaded 
the Netherlands in May 1940, volume 9 of the renamed journal never appeared. On the history of 
the Journal, see Hegselmann (1987).
163 See Neurath (1941/1983, 226–229).
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and related concepts as defined by Tarski or of the semantical concepts which I later 
applied to empirical science in my “Foundations.”164 Please tell me where you dis-
cussed these things so that I may refer to it at the next occasion.
I am now working on a book about probability and degree of confirmation.165 I 
think, there I shall have to explain again the distinction between “true” and “con-
firmed” or “accepted”. I explained it long ago in “Wahrheit und Bewährung”;166 the 
discussion there was meant especially against you. I don’t remember that you ever 
tried to answer my arguments; but if you did, please tell me where. In your last letter 
you mention that I know sufficiently your view on degree of confirmation; but I 
don’t remember that we ever talked sufficiently about it. I know only the fact that 
you are against this concept, but I do not know your reasons. If you can explain 
them in a letter I shall be very much interested. For me it is clear that the concept is 
entirely scientific and does not have the least metaphysical component in it. 
Nevertheless, I too regard it as problematic but only in the sense that it is not yet 
clear whether we can define a quantitative or at least a topological concept of degree 
of confirmation which will turn out to be fruitful for scientific work. Nagel has 
expressed serious doubts in his Encycl. monograph.167
As you can imagine, I am very sorry about the bad impression you got of my 
book, and that you even think it is a revival of Aristotelian metaphysics. I try to 
remember the many and sometimes long conversations we had in the past on 
Semantics. The first was in the train to Paris 1935. Then there was the public discus-
sion at the Pre-Conference at Paris, with you and Ness on the one side, and Tarski 
and me on the other side.168 After these two discussions, I remember I had the defi-
nite impression that there were no rational arguments left on your side. When Tarski 
and I showed that your arguments were based on misconceptions concerning the 
semantical concept of truth you had nothing to reply. What was left, as far as we saw 
it, were merely your emotional reactions, namely your dislike of the term “truth” 
and your vague fear that this way would finally lead us back to old metaphysics. 
Later we sometimes had discussions on the same topic in America; but I did not 
have the impression that we came any step forward towards a mutual understanding, 
still less to an agreement. Perhaps my book will now show you more clearly what 
we mean by Semantics and what the nature of its concepts is, and perhaps thereby 
make it possible to you to be more clear and more specific in your objections. In any 
case, in spite of the disappointing experiences in the past, I am very willing to con-
tinue the discussions with you. I promise to you that, when we meet again, I shall 
164 See Carnap’s Foundations of Logic and Mathematics (1938).
165 Carnap presumably refers to his Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).
166 See Carnap, “Truth and Confirmation,” (1936a) and (1949).
167 See Nagel (1939, §8).
168 See the remarks in Carnap’s “Intellectual Autobiography,” (1963, 61).
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very patiently listen to all objections you have and, if I find again the old misunder-
standings of the semantical concept of truth, I shall try my best to explain the defini-
tion to you. I do not know whether it would be possible to make a fruitful discussion 
by correspondence, where the formulations are necessarily so short, while the mess 
of things which must be cleared up is so big. But at least we could briefly indicate 
to each other our views even if we cannot discuss them in detail. Certainly I should 
be very much interested if you could indicate to me where you believe to find the 
traces of Aristotelian metaphysics. One point here seems to me very important; in 
criticizing a concept used by an author one should not criticize the term he uses or 
the bad things other people have said with the same term, but the meaning which the 
author gives to the term, that is to say, the way he uses it and the assertions which 
he makes with its help. Whether out of our correspondence or later out of conversa-
tions there will grow something that we shall regard as good basis for a public dis-
cussion, we shall see later.
What are your objections against Russell’s sign of existence? It is in general use 
in modern logic and I do not see how a scientific language could do without some-
thing of this kind.
The attitude of the Press concerning the Encyclopedia is very regrettable. I am 
enclosing a copy of my letter to them.169 I think the decisive word will have to come 
from you because the contract is between you and them.
One day, we hope in the not too distant future, we all shall sit here on our hill, 
look at the mountains, speak about Europe, about problems -- looking with toler-
ance at each other, even if sometimes we have to shake our heads.
With love to you both,
C.
 21. Neurath to Carnap, July 15, 1943.
(ASP RC 115-07-63)
30 Bickerton Road, Headington, Oxford
15th July, 1943
My dear Carnap,
I am so busy with many things, that I shall write only a few lines today. Many 
thanks for both volumes on semantics, and your letters. We are very sorry that you 
have to take care of your health. We hope you will tell us, how you are going on 
now. Your letter to the Press is excellent. I wrote a long letter, have sent two copies 
to Morris to send one to you.170 I hope you agree with me. IN NO CASE 
169 This letter is seemingly lost.
170 Carnap has sent a letter about the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science to its publisher, 
the University of Chicago Press (see the former letter), thought it is seemingly lost, just like the one 
Neurath mentions in his letter.
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INTERRUPTION, I should prefer to find another publisher, should the press really 
want to get rid of the enterprise, but first we shall try to make a nice loyal compro-
mise. My monograph is waiting for the answer, then I shall send it to Morris for 
printing.171
I shall write you on Semantics in detail. I tried to find out how you introduce the 
“existential” statements, I could not find any information. The fact that Russell 
already introduced this “ontological” element into his logic does not help you and 
me. All his [bad]172 statements in this last book are more or less connected with his 
“ontological” start. I think so. The point is: We are using the sentences “there is an 
elephant here”, when people accept a certain group of statements, but we cannot 
compare any statement with “an elephant is here” as long as we are discussing the 
usage of expressions, sentences etc. That is that.
War is going on very well, but it will need about two years to get rid of this 
plague in Europe. And the future does not look nice. What a big weight will be 
removed after the defeat of the Nazis, but imagine Germany, Austria, Holland …. 
most of our friends either away or killed, or suicide …. and the atmosphere full of 
distrust, envy, hate etc… I assume they will kill many of the Nazis but I fear there 
will be Nazis who will transform themselves into Antihitlerites and terrorize our 
friends as before only using another flag …. The Darlan story is sad and bitter.173
We personally are happy and lucky. The American Ambassador becoming 
[xyxy]174 DR in Birmingham spoke mainly on ISOTYPE as a future aid of interna-
tional education …. fine. Many people interested in our work, our charts appreci-
ated in the press etc. everything going on very well. Son is now Dr, Columbia, very 
proud – and he has a right to be proud after so short a time. Now he has two Dr 
degrees, law and social sciences, with fellowship etc. post etc. ….175
We have a nice team of nice collaborators, mostly British, we have a nice fur-
nished house with a nice garden – yesterday an Owl on a pole, then flying away with 
heavy wings … apples, gooseberries etc. flowers …. good friends, radio apparatus, 
171 Presumably Neurath’s Foundations of the Social Sciences (1944).
172 Unreadable word, presumably “bad” was in the original letter.
173 Neurath probably refers to the case of François Darlan (1881–1942), who was the commander-
in-chief of the French Navy in 1939 and after 1940 the deputy leader of the Vichy regime for a 
time. In 1942, the Allies took some parts of North Africa, and made a deal with Darlan: they gave 
him control of North African French forces in exchange for joining their side; nonetheless, a few 
weeks later Darlan was assassinated by a Frenchman recently escaped from a German prisoner-of-
war camp.
174 Unreadable, but John Winant (1889–1947) was the American ambassador to Britain between 
1941 and 1946. He even wrote a preface to an ISOTYPE book, comparing the two countries; see 
Florence (1943).
175 Paul Neurath studied first law, and obtained his doctoral degree in 1937, Vienna.
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many books, and Kaempffert sending American periodicals and cuttings, reprints 
etc. Our files are growing up again and in a few years we shall feel like years ago, 
before Hitler grasped all our belongings.
What about our friends? Nagel, Feigl etc. ….
With kindest regards from both of us to both of you
Yours sincerely
[Otto Neurath]
 22. Neurath to Carnap, September 25, 1943.
(ASP RC 102-55-03)
30 Bickerton Road, Headington, OXFORD
25th September, 1943
My dear Carnap,
Very bad news – you probably heard of it already – Stebbing died after a cancer 
operation. The first symptoms appeared some months ago, but the doctors thought, 
that perhaps radium or something may help. She continued her activity, and looked 
relatively well  – always overworked. Operation suddenly appeared unavoidable. 
Unsuccessful and then waiting for the end. First very painful, later on better. We did 
not see her. Our best friend. A very brave and sincere personality. Many people in 
England feel her death [as] a heavy loss. She represented a kind of public con-
science for some circles. We loved her. She has been at particular good terms with 
Mary, but of course with me, too. She acted as chairman, as I lectured in Cambridge, 
in a very nice way, and in agreement with most of my statements. And now life is 
going on. That is our generation, more or less. It is seldom to get new friends. Any 
loss is hard in itself and hard if you look at the garden of friendship, as I often do.
I have to thank you very much for your kind letters and all your efforts in dealing 
with my remarks. I have to apologize, that I did not answer you sooner, but I had a 
lot to do. I had to finish my monograph176 and then to reduce its size, because the 
Press thinks now of the production cost more as before and we have now to bear in 
mind this viewpoint too. I think of the financial things, because we shall show, that 
the encyclopedia is well f[u]nded [by] in the public. We have to avoid losses. Even 
losses of our publisher. You agree with me, that we should go on properly. The war 
is now in the beginning of the end and it would be against my whole attitude to do 
anything else but go on, as usual. Only this attitude enabled us here after reaching 
the shores in our shoes to build up an institute with a nice team of collaborators and 
to reconstruct more or less all departments of our work, we have a full time collabo-
rator in London for research work only. We are publishing charts after charts and 
seem to become a kind of British household furniture. That implies the making of 
arrangements, meeting many people, mostly nice ones. We feel here very at home 
176 See Neurath, Foundations of the Social Sciences (1944).
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and feel with our British friends to be victorious on the battle front. The British way 
of living is nice, the compromise habit, the not believing in too many arguments, 
usual commonsense, instead of skyhigh principles from which one tries to deduce 
concrete details – in vain of course. This adaptation to a new aggregation of items 
forces us to be active every day, even when reading, listening to the radio, garden-
ing, etc. besides our work. I have to lecture at various places, have to write articles, 
to attend meetings etc., yesterday evening fire guard meeting of my sector. And then 
I have to read a lot, Kaempffert sends me heaps of periodicals, reprints, surveys etc., 
I get regularly the Survey Graphic, etc. and try to imagine the American life, too. 
Now, before starting my new book, a big one, on visual education177 (very probable) 
I shall write my long letter to my friend Carnap. I sometimes hear from Hempel, 
about you and your health. We are highly worried about you. It is not the question 
of danger, but of being in a sad state day for day. Unfortunately I have no idea, how 
I could please you by something you enjoy particularly. We always admire how you 
and Ina bear the burden.
What a world, millions killing and wounding one another intentionally and then 
sometimes diseases visit us, too, one reason more, that we should be as nice to one 
another as possible and enjoy our friends and neighbours as far as they are enjoy-
able. There are many nice people in this world of sorrow and pleasure. I think just 
people who are not in the foreground are very often nicer than the people acting and 
working. The same may be with learning. Usually people learn from mightful peo-
ple, who may afterwards protect their pupils against the disasters of life: I learned 
very much from Itelson,178 who never could do anything for me, except telling me 
wise arguments. Here in England we met many “small” people, who are good 
friends, without being in power. People in power are mostly too busy for nourishing 
friendship. And all our teaching is much more interested in efficiency, as something 
“making things” than in efficiency for friendship, and enjoying one another. The 
English education, from this point of view, is more human. I know very well, that 
caning pupils plays here its part etc., but nevertheless it remains here a kind of sense 
for personal happiness as something accepted – in the American constitution you 
have your “pursuit of happiness”. It is impressive to listen to plain people here, how 
they avoid boasting and overstatements in daily matters. I collect “expressions”, e.g. 
fire guard leaders speaking seriously, used e.g. once the term “happiness” explain-
ing how people should get a feeling to be sheltered by the neighbours etc. and then 
explaining, what is needed to act “quickly”, to be “calm” an to have the “usual com-
monsense”. I like this type of habit much more than the continental one, with “high-
177 Neurath probably refers to his manuscript that was written originally for Karl Mannheim’s The 
International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction series. It was published recently as 
“Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation,” see Neurath (1996). Some parts were 
already published in Cohen and Neurath (1973, 227–248).
178 Gregorius Itelson (1852–1926) was a Russian philosopher, who later worked in Berlin, where 
Neurath studied with him. Itelson died from the consequences of an anti-semiotic attack in Berlin. 
On Itelson (and Neurath) see Freudenthal and Karachentsev (2011).
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est duty”, “national community”, “self[-]sacrifice”, “obedience”, “subordination”, 
etc. “eternal ideals”, wherever you give a chance to open the mouth.
I am just reading a lot of older books of German and Anglo-Saxon literature. It 
is astonishing, how e.g. our German scientists of high rank, such as Weber etc. 
unconsciously give a descriptive story of Franklin e.g. I should not give after read-
ing his life in detail. I always thought (I only knew his autobiography and some 
scattered details of his life, of course meeting with Voltaire, action in England, his 
printing activities, electricity etc.) him a kind of enlighten[ne]d Puritan, devoted to 
a very exemplar daily routine (in this way as Weber and the Weberians describe it 
producing the environment of modern capitalism) and now, reading in detail his life, 
what appeared? A fine chap, acting like wise men do, with all human multiplicity 
life brings to us – we may agree with that or not, that is not the point, but that the 
common man’s life may be found in the fine fellow, as which I regard Franklin, too. 
Always interested in humanity and human brotherhood but not in theological doc-
trines. Making jokes like Lichtenberg179 – who is one of the Westerners in Germany – 
on the expressions dealing with drinking “boozy, tipsy, fuddled etc.”. Toleration in 
Philadelphia – what a pleasant thing. A doubtful type of relation to his fiancée, who 
remains in America, when he is in England, hardly writing to her. Afterwards he 
marries her, who in the meantime married another man who run away. The story of 
Franklin’s illegitimate child etc., many heartly friendships with women. Always in 
some way human and interested in human happiness, science, never gossiping but 
writing sharp and ironical articles, when important things at hand. He was not in the 
least ascetic. He did not desire to isolate himself from the common life. Nevertheless 
in addition to that ambitious. That is very characteristic, to like success but not to do 
something for success only, but for human happiness. And the Weberian strain of 
calculating prudence and morals not even in the writings, which contain the often 
quoted calculations (which are sometimes puzzling to me). But no “abstract” wealth 
as ideal. “Wealth is not his that has it, but his that enjoys is”.180 “Where there’s mar-
riage without love there will be love without marriage”.181 “An old young man will 
be a young old man”.182 (That is all about 1735, the time of the usually quoted cal-
culating statements). And his “An egg today is better than a hen tomorrow”183 is very 
179 Neurath presumably refers to Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742–1799) who was a German 
scientist – actually the very first professor of experimental physics in Germany – and a satirist who 
visited England twice. Many of his writings are translated into English; the latest one is Lichtenberg 
(2012).
180 See Benjamin Franklin’s (1914, 57), Poor Richard’s Almanack, that was published by Franklin 
between 1732 and 1758.
181 Franklin (1914, 60).
182 Franklin (1914, 14).
183 Franklin (1914, 13).
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illuminating a certain kind of habit. He lived in a comfortable marriage. 1735 he 
writes to his friend Catherine “I can say, thanks to God, that I do not remember I was 
ever better. I still relish all the pleasures of life that a temperate man can in reason 
desire, and through favor, I have them all in my power… I must confess (but don’t 
be jealous) that many more people love me now than ever did before….”184 Franklin 
liked the Quakers (the group of Christians I like, too, because they are tolerant and 
human and active simultaneously). Franklin did not like the tendency of German 
writers to introduce new words always, but nevertheless his words “colonize” and 
“unshakable” remained in the English language. (I think not “introduced” by him, 
but used by him against the daily usage). He was against slavery, of course, in 
America but also in Britain (Scottish colliers etc.). A politician like modern 
American Ambassadors who do not come from diplomacy, as e.g. Winant185 here 
and others in the Soviet Union. Paris. 74 he writes “I do not find that I grow any 
older”.186 His Dialogue between Franklin and the Gout tells something about his 
life. “You eat an aboundant breakfast, not less than four cups of tea with cream, and 
one or two slices of buttered toast covered with strips of smoked beef…sit down to 
write…without any kind of bodily exercise… chessboard… for two or three hours… 
amuse yourself with books, pamphlets, and newspapers most of which are not worth 
the trouble…”187 Somebody said disapprovingly of Franklin that “at the age of 
seventy- odd had neither lost his love for beauty nor his taste for it”.188 Franklin 
writes to his step[-]ni[e]ce: “…civilest nation (the french) … if ‘tis understood that 
you like mutton, dine where you will you find mutton. Somebody, it seems, gave it 
out, that I loved ladies; and then everybody presented me their ladies (or the ladies 
presented themselves) to be embraced; that is, have their necks kissed. For as to the 
kissing of lips or checks it is not the mode here; the first is reckoned rude, and other 
may rub off the paint”.189 Madame Brillon writes him “People have the audacity to 
criticize my pleasant habit of sitting on your knee, and yours of always asking me 
for what I always refuse.”190 The correspondence on the life in Paradise together 
with all the women is a curios reading. His biographer says Statesman and scientist, 
profoundly masculine, he took women into account as well as any other force of 
184 See Franklin “to Miss Catherine Ray, September 11, 1755,” in Franklin (1840, 89–90).
185 Neurath presumably refers to John Winant, see letter 21, note 174.
186 See Franklin “to Thomas Bond, March 16, 1780,” in Franklin (1817, 59–60).
187 See Franklin (1906, 19).
188 See John Adams (1851, 134).
189 See Franklin “to Mrs. Elizabeth Partridge. October 11, 1779,” in Smyth (1907, 393–394).
190 Quoted by Philipps Russell (1926, 263).
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nature … he treated every women as if she were a person too, and made her feel 
more truly one than ever. A full life, and very human.
I tell you that, that you imagine my state of arguing at the moment. I always 
appreciated the Bentham, Mill, strain in Anglo-Saxon arguing, but I always felt 
uneasy when thinking of Franklin, why? I quote from WEBER: “provisorische 
Veranschaulichung … was mit dem ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus gemeint ist … wir 
halten uns zu diesem Behufe an ein Dokument, jenes ‘Geistes‘ welches in nahezu 
klassischer Reinheit enthealt …. von aller direkten Beziehung zum Religoesen los-
geloest…: Bedenke dass die Zeit Geld ist … Die unbedeutendsten Handlungen, die 
den Kredit eines Mannes beeinflussen, muessen von ihm beachtet werden…. es 
laesst Dich als einen ebenso sorgfaeltigen wie ehrlichen Mann erscheinen und das 
vermehrt Deinen Kredit.191 (A rather cynic remark, Franklin tells, how he tried to be 
decent on Sundays, avoiding actions in the public, therefore READING at home, 
that does not reduce the public credit etc. many remarks are rather ironical.) “That 
are remarks from “Necessary hints to those that would be rich 1736 and Advice to a 
young tradesman 1748.” Es ist Benjamin Franklin, der in diesen Saetzen zu uns 
predigt. Dass es “Geist des Kapitalismus” ist, der aus ihm in charakteristischer 
Weise redet, wird niemand bezeifeln ----” Weber thinks that these quotations are 
used properly by Kuernberger in “Der Amerikamuede”192 and continues “Dokument 
der (heute laengst verblassten) Gegensaetze deutschen und amerikanischen 
Empfindens, man kann auch sagen, jenes Innenlebens, wie es seit der deutschen 
Mystik des Mittelalters den deutschen Katholiken und Protestanten trotz alledem 
gemeinsam geblieben ist, gegen puritanisch-kapitalistische Tatkraft schlechthin 
unuebertroffen”193 etc.
Just that I cannot see. I see that happiness habit in Franklin prevalent (of course 
I know sufficiently Puritan books, but I also know sufficiently ascetic books, written 
by Protestant and Catholic writers in Germany) and I think that just the acknowl-
edging HAPPINESS and PLEASURE as “moral items” is the difference, whereas 
191 See Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (2005, 15–16): “provisional 
description of what is here meant by the spirit of capitalism.... For this purpose we turn to a docu-
ment of that spirit which contains what we are looking for in almost classical purity ... being free 
from all direct relationship to religion, being thus, for our purposes, free of preconceptions: 
Remember, that time is money... The most trifling actions that affect a man’s credit are to be 
regarded ... it makes you appear a careful as well as an honest man, and that still increases your 
credit.”
192 See Kürnberger (1855).
193 Weber (2005, 16): “It is Benjamin Franklin who preaches to us in these sentences […]. That it 
is the spirit of capitalism which here speaks in characteristic fashion, no one will doubt […].” And 
Weber’s footnote, p. 138, n3: “[…] document of the (now long since blurred-over) differences 
between the German and the American outlook, one may even say of the type of spiritual life 
which, in spite of everything, has remained common to all Germans, Catholic and Protestant alike, 
since the German mysticism of the Middle Ages, as against the Puritan capitalistic valuation of 
action.”
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in Germany Kant stressed the point, that happiness and pleasure do not play any role 
within the moral sphere. Etc. You see, it is a long story, but I learn more and more, 
how strange German sociology tought us. I knew it before, but the extent becomes 
more and more clear.
I see, how well known philosophers in Germany always quote Plato, when spe-
king of the ideal state, and I imagine how many young people accepting that, became 
weakened against Fascism. Plato is the only author in antiquity and in history, with 
some fame as moralist, who thought pure and simple cruelties pure and simple 
oppression as ideal. Children should look from horseback, when the parents disem-
bowel enemies in battles, that they get, as he says the proper “taste of blood like 
young hounds”. He supports censorship, allows only millitary [sic] music, doctors 
have not [do not have] to help ill people who are responsible for their illness, better 
for them and for the community when they die, all people of Hellenic blood should 
be united and then start the conquest of the barbarians, the “enemies by nature” that 
is the way to be irresistible and to do, what is the highest ideal of the leading groups: 
the purity of blood.
How can we expect that an enthusiastic youth full of preparedness to selfsacri-
fice, prepared to think of happiness as something dirty, English utilitarian, can reject 
the voice of the highly admired Plato-Hitler? Plato this Fifth columnist in Athens 
who supported Sparta. Prussia? (I remember how Marianne Weber and Gertrud 
Baeumer194 after my lecture on planning for happiness said to me “Sehr interessant, 
wie immer, wenn Sie sprechen, aber warum mussten Sie das Niveau der Debatte 
senken? Gloeckkk is gemaiain.” Of Professor Cohen,195 Marburg Heinemann196 told 
me the statement: “Die Schweine wollen gluecklich sein”, Nohl197: “Dabei ist allem 
hoeheren Menschentum immer bewusst gewesen, dass Geniessen gemein macht 
und die Unabhengigkeit von der Lust die Basis alles hoeheren Menschentums ist. 
Jede Ethik muss darum zunaechst den Hedonismus erschlagen.” I see the difference 
in habit and attitude much more in the happiness and common sense arguments of 
194 Presumably Marianne Weber (1870–1954) and Gertrud Bäumer (1873–1954). Marianna Weber 
was a sociologist, a public speaker, and an activist for women’s rights, acting as the chairwoman 
of the Bund Deutscher Frauenvereine (League of German Women’s Associations) for a few years. 
She was also the wife of Max Weber. Gertrud Bäumer was also a political and social activist in the 
feminist movement. She was a member of the German Democratic Party, working in the Reichstag 
between 1919 and 1932.
195 Presumably Hermann Cohen (1842–1918), founder of the Marburg School of Neo-Kantianism. 
Carnap was a student of Cohen for a while; on their relation see Damböck (2017).
196 Neurath presumably refers to Fritz Heinemann (1889–1970), who gave a presentation (entitled 
“Instauration Scientiarium”) at the First International Congress for the Unity of Science (Paris, 
1935). See Stadler (2001/2015, 178).
197 Herman Nohl (1879–1960) was a German educator and philosopher, working in Jena (where 
Carnap was one of his students before the Great War) and Göttingen. On Nohl and Carnap see 
Damböck (2017) and Dahms (2004).
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the Western group and in the overpersonal, transcendent, anti-happiness arguments 
of the German leaders in philosophy and moral discussions. And I think that the 
metaphysical strain in Germany is in closely connected with the “abstract” ideals, 
transcendent in eternity, Volkstum etc. AGAINST the human habit towards the own 
and other people’s happiness. The difference between Franklin and Kant.
Perhaps you will think not too strong of my “intolerance” towards metaphysics, 
when you think of this possible correlation. The empiricist people, happiness peo-
ple, like Epicure, Montaigne, Voltaire, Lichtenberg, Franklin, Mill, Bentham are 
less prepared to persecution [persecute] than others ON AN AVERAGE, but more 
prepared to help other people, because they feel UNHAPPY, PERSECUTED, 
BEING SLAVES, etc. Whereas in Plato, in spite of all transcendentalism, bodily 
lust plays a great role  – in [the] Symposium the story of Alcibiades embracing 
Socrates a[ll] night long without success, or in the Republic the RIGHT of the brave 
soldier to embrace boys and girls, he likes. The price of victory. In Epicure, Franklin 
etc. the bodily lust [is] in a very temperate way accepted, Epicure telling people, 
that they have not much to expect from that, better to avoid it, but if, [sic] then think-
ing of the law, the customs, and other people’s happiness. But the tradition is, that 
Plato is the rock of idealism and Epicure at least a flat and dull pleasure-teaching 
man. Think how Voltaire usually is treated, who was one of the few famous people 
in the 18th century who devoted years of his life to help immediately many perse-
cuted people, suppressed people, not only by writing. If a man like Wieland198 
fought Plato’s dirty and cruel habit, etc. the historians of literature did, what they 
could to destroy his fame, to label him as sensuous, etc. Crossman and your Fite199 
and a few others such as Kelsen protested against Plato’s unrestricted fascism and 
mercilessness.
I am now re-reading our Austrian philosophers, too. I read them before and dis-
liked them, but now you see how they formed an environment out of which grew 
Nazism. You see, lecturing on ZUR PSYCHOLOGIE DES ENTSCHLUSSES 
1913 in Vienna,200 I explained, that our arguments cannot be sufficient, therefore the 
importance of decision and lot – perhaps. Who protested violently? saying that this 
198 Christoph Martin Wieland (1733–1813) was a German poet and writer, mainly known for his 
romantic epic of “Oberon” (1780). Wieland, on the other hand, wrote a philosophical novel, 
“Geschichte des Agathon” (1766), about Greek life and culture, in which Plato is described quite 
sarcastically with critical overtones.
199 Richard H. S. Crossman (1907–1974) was a British Labour Party Member of Parliament, and 
taught philosophy for a while at Oxford before 1935. He wrote in 1937 the Plato Today (originally 
broadcast by the BBC). Warner Fite (1867–1955) was an American Philosopher (teaching at the 
universities of Chicago, Texas, Indiana and Harvard), mainly concerned with ethics and moral 
philosophy. He wrote in 1934 the Platonic Legend. In Neurath’s wording, they “unmasked teach-
ings in [Plato’s] Republic,” paving the way for the comparison of Nazism and Plato’s ideas in the 
Republic. See Neurath (1945/2004, 546).
200 See Neurath (1913/1983).
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kind of teaching is against the high ideals etc.? KOLBENHEYER201 – and I am not 
astonished that he is now a leading NAZI writer after abandoning our Philosophische 
Gesellschaft an der Universitaet zu Wien, where a Neurath may teach such terrible 
things. Another famous Vienna philosopher, wrote during the first world war: 
“Connected with the growing up of one nation, through more power, better quali-
ties, better environment, castles, temples, poets, science etc. other nations have to go 
down, less lucky, and nobody w[i]ll shed tears … into the eternal night … who ever 
fights for his own country always fights in this sense, for THE GOOD CA[U]
SE. The hard law of nature ( sic ) victorious SHOULD be, who CAN be victorious 
… Hard and merciless history is a judge like nature, BENEFICIAL has been, was 
happened in reality, what not did happen, SHOULD not happen. … Tragedy of 
History … The success makes the decision GOOD, regarded from [the] viewpoint 
of future generations [it] is the case, which [that it] permanently and for ever has 
been victorious. … There are Poles, who feel they are Poles and want to rebuild 
tripartited Poland. But assum[ing] these Poles have been exterminated, nobody 
[any] longer wants a non-dissected Poland  – who could judge differently but: a 
nation not suitable for life, dies, as it DESERVED TO DIE, and by this death space 
for other nations has to be gained with a better future.202 (I despised this kind of 
writing [in] 1915 as [i]nhuman and full of senseless metaphysics. I doubt that 1915 
one could write such [i]nhuman arguments without some metaphysics on “law of 
history”, on “rights of a nation”, etc. but today it sounds particularly [i]nhuman, 
when we read of the extermination of the Poles. It is not somewhat deplorable that 
just a Jewish professor of Philosophy wrote such terrible pogrom book? Would you 
mind, when, I say this professor with his metaphysics has been a characteristic item 
in an environment, out of which Nazidom grew up ?) Who succeeds in helping to 
make his country victorious for ever, he may be sure, that in the eyes of future gen-
erations this case will be regarded, too, as the really GOOD case, and appear as 
useful for the benefit of mankind (it sounds like a blasphemy from viewpoint of 
humanity to me, not to mention the metaphysical elements of this habit, with his 
un-pluralist outlook, there is only ONE possibility, not many.) It is not a proper 
thing for a nation in war to deliberate whether the own case is the good case, it is the 
nation’s duty ( sic ) the nation’s case to transform in the good case, BY BEING 
VICTORIOUS (I call that the pure and simple pirate philosophy full of metaphysi-
cal tricks and tracks). And [it is by] taking care in this way ( sic ) that the own case 
will by regarded by future generations as the good case. WE ARE CONVINCED 
THAT THIS OUR FATHERLAND AND THE GERMAN NATION WILL 
SUCCEED IN THIS”. How much I prefer the attitude to find reasons to fight for 
something, one calls good, independent of victory and independent of the success-
ful extermination of a nation. Sometimes “cant” and “hypocrisy” – of course, I can-
201 Erwin Guido Kolbenheyer (1878–1962) was an Austrian novelist and poet, who became associ-
ated with Nazism.
202 It is unclear whose work Neurath translated and quoted here.
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not describe to you, how much I like an aggregation of human beings, where one has 
to apply hypocrisy and cant, when making cruel things, which are despised as such, 
and one cannot say, victory declares according to the hard law of history that your 
case is the good one… ugly and nauseati[ng] for me, today as 1915. I understand 
better people, who tell me, that they do their duty as long as they can in accordance 
with their nation, but that they would not go on with that, should the nation try to do 
something against their conscience, etc., of course, that is a temperate way of acting, 
but just this commonsense way enables us to think of people’s happiness and does 
not overcome the primary feelings of mercy and humanity, so far as they are given 
in some individuals.
I think that this merciless habit in history very often is connected with absolutism 
in metaphysics and faith. If one thinks there are many possibilities in arguing then 
one cannot be very hard with argumentative conviction, only indirectly or by heart, 
but not in the argument: Of all the possible world systems one is the best in coher-
ence, or the “relative” best (that does not alter the habit) one moral way of living is 
“the best” given by the “categoric[al] imperative”, but “the decision of an authority” 
etc. may be combined with merciless destruction of other people. Whereas a sceptic 
habit as such does not give a “reason” for aggression and merciless action as 
deserved [determined] by THE ONLY BEST SOLUTION.
Therefore, I think, that PLURALIST arguing, which seems to be closely con-
nected with empiricism, leads to a certain toleration, to a preparedness to look at the 
argument: you are intolerant, as a very serious one. The Pluralist cannot answer, of 
course, I am, how could I be different. You remember the story I told you of a friend 
of mine, who divorced his wife (with many children) letting her in a strange situa-
tion, and marrying another lady talked over his case with me. I knew all people in 
question and was simply sorry. I know, some things happen in life, not always clear- 
cut made, and we poor human beings try to go through all that, trying to avoid the 
own and other people’s pain. Etc, you know how poorly all arguing is at such 
moments. That reduces our preparedness to judge other people’s actions, as long as 
they are not clearly cruel and producing pain etc. There are no clear-cut situations 
… for me at least. But my friend did not like my sentimental habit, being sorrow[ful] 
and doubtful, taking the situation as it was, partly really lucky for the friend and his 
new wife, partly unlucky for the former wife, but the living together of both not 
lucky etc. etc. – you know how complicated such imaginations are, he started with 
explanations and finally presented me the CATEGORIC[AL] IMPERATIVE who 
induced him to act as he acted. I answered: “My dear, I did not criticize you, I lis-
tened, what you told me, and was in a rather doubtful mood, but what about the 
“categoric”, other friends of mine in similar situations did similar things WITHOUT 
THE CATEGORIC.”
You see, the pluralism of empiricism is closely connected with my speaking on 
a way of living and arguing. I would not say, that I should promote the pluralist 
arguing for reaching tolerance, but reaching it independently of that I found out that 
empiricists on an [sic] average are less prepared to become merciless persecutors, 
and not so frequently the enthusiast followers (for the higher glory of THE transcen-
dent nation ideal etc. or something else) because they are not prepared to sacrifice 
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the[ir] own and other people’s happiness to something “idealist” and antihuman. 
The commonsense leads back to looking at human happiness. That is question of 
historical analysis. You know I am collecting material for my book o[n] persecution 
and human brotherhood.203 We are all poor sinners and hardly able to judge every-
thing --- that seems a mood, which does not lead to persecution and suppression. 
There are many mansions in the house of freedom and many different animals in 
zoo of a free democracy. I do not speak of a “law” or something like that, I only 
stress the point, that the multiplicity of outlooks supported simultaneously is 
 connected with brotherhood of human beings as I see it evolved in the last centuries 
in Holland, England and America (I know, what one may say against that, and I say 
it with many reserves, but the descriptive silhouettes speak a certain language, 
which everybody may understand). What a difference between totalitarian Sparta 
and democratic Athens. In Sparta a custom to kill Helots as a kind of exercise for the 
Home Guard youth. Torquemada – what a terrible period.204 I am analysing the writ-
ings of saints and philosophers. Particularly dangerous are poets like Dante, full of 
resentment and revenge. Like Plato. Always dangerous the aesthetical view of 
world, the pain of the damned in hell a kind of “bass in the harmony of the music of 
the deity”, that goes through from St. Bernardino (15th century, continuing St. 
Augustine and others, where the sins form a part of the well managed picture, the 
beauty increased by shadows etc.) to Nohl, and other modern philosophers with 
their aestheticism of the word. Karl Moritz (Goethe period) as Mary told me, how 
impressed she was by his writings on that subject and later on feeling how doubtful 
the whole stuff is.
That is one of the reasons, why I am very careful in discussing pluralist and anti- 
pluralist arguing. You see, Popper’s writing is essentially based on a non-pluralist 
view and I think that all of us, who have been continuing DUHEM, POINCARE, 
MACH, PEIRCE, etc. did maintain the pluralist empiricism. MORE than one theory 
possible, when we see one acceptable. MORE than one “history of the world” pos-
sible within any given empiricist frame, and – very important – each detailed con-
crete statement “here is a table” is pluralist from the start, only an attempt to go on 
tentatively with “here is a table”, said by somebody. Another man, perhaps said 
“here is no table at all”. Whatever we do, we start from possible DIVERGENT pri-
mary statements and try to put them together, dropping some today, perhaps not 
dropping them tomorrow accepting a statement, when making theory one for the 
area three, and accepting a contradictory statement, when making theory five for 
area two. Of course, we try to eliminate such contradictions, but the way of the sci-
ences is just based on the tricks and tracks, which help us to avoid, as it were, the 
203 See Neurath, “Tolerance and Persecution” in the Neurath Nachlass, 207/K.88. Wiener Kreis 
Archiv (Rijksarchief in Noord- Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands).
204 Tomás de Torquemada (1420–1498) was a Castilian Dominican friar, and the first Grand 
Inquisitor of Spain. St. Bernardidno, or Bernardino of Siena (1380–1444) was an Italian priest and 
Franciscan missionary, and economic writer. Karl Philipp Moritz (1756–1793) was a German 
author and essayist during the late Enlightenment period, associated with Sturm und Drang.
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INFECTION OF OUR COMPREHENSIVE SCIENCE THROUGH SINGLE 
CONTRADICTIONS.
Of course, I learned one of the first things from Itelson that any contradiction 
destroys all formulae in a system. BUT THAT IS THE POINT I DO NOT ASSUME 
THAT ALL SCIENTIFIC STATEMENTS TOGETHER FORM ONE 
COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM, there are only SYSTEMATIZATIONS within 
empiricism, but not THE SYSTEMATIZATION of empiricism. I expected that 
Hempel would write about this problem in his monograph, giving the problematic 
situation, whatever he personally may prefer.205 He – and you, too – are less object-
ing to Popper’s anti-pluralist view, than I.206 I did not get any real explanation of 
your attitude only objections to mine. I think it useful, to start with this point, 
because it runs through all our letters, yours, Hempel’s and mine. It does not help to 
call me “intolerant” as long, as you do not explain [to] me, why the viewpoint of 
Popper which is rather connected with INTOLERANCE and TOLERANCE, as I 
explained above, has something in it from scientific point of view.
You see, Popper starts with the ONE system of the world, as the best possible at 
the moment. He speaks always of THE system, therefore ONE contradictory situa-
tion destroys any general statement. That leads to an asymmetry in TESTING and 
INDUCTION, whereas both are full of vagueness (PEIRCE), and rather symmetric 
from the viewpoint. First of all, why making absolutely general laws? Mach tries to 
restrict the area of validity, and I think we should try as empiricists to make [design] 
a procedure in such a way, that we may speak of limited uniformities. Further, I look 
at the procedures of scientists as follow[s]: (I re-read in the last two years and par-
ticularly during the last months many authors, Maxwell, Darwin, Newton, Kepler, 
Malthus, Marx, Smith, etc. and many single papers on various subjects) we start 
from certain observation statements, which may be dropped sometimes, and try to 
catch as many of them as possible by means of theoretical tools. Should we find 
holes for our pegs, we are very happy as research workers, and do not bother too 
much about the pegs without holes and the holes without pegs, feeling it a progress 
compared with a situation, without pegs wh[ich] fit into holes.
When we have a pattern, as I described it above, fitting into some area relatively 
well, and another pattern (contradicting the first in some statements) fitting into 
another area, we try to patternize [arrange] our material in such a way, that we get 
only one comprehensive pattern and all pegs fitting into all holes ---- a man who 
thinks as a research worker of such an ideal even as a “leading ideal” looks rather as 
a comic or jester. He teaches consistency and the infection power of contradictions, 
whereas the research worker needs some hints how to avoid the infection from con-
tradictions within his encyclopedia, as it were. Of course nobody speaks of contra-
dictions within a single argument. But it is astonishing how many primitive 
contradictions can be found in well[-]founded theories within single arguments, and 
205 Hempel’s monograph appeared only in 1952 as Concept Formation in Empirical Science.
206 See the reviews of Popper’s book: Carnap (1935) and Carl G. Hempel (1937).
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the whole machinery acts useful. My father207 explained [to] me that by saying, that 
the great thinkers, are not very pedantic, stepping down a staircase made by them 
they use the railing of empiricism, and when single steps are badly made or lack at 
all [are missing] the great thinkers go on supported by the empiricist railings. THAT 
I THINK PICTURES MORE OR LESS THE SITUATION.
[With the r]esult, that I and other research worker, look particularly at – some-
times unexpected – POSITIVE INSTANCES and not so much at the NEGATIVE 
ones. Popper says, that the good research worker particularly tries to find the nega-
tive spots for testing his arguments. Unfortunately he does not tell [give] examples. 
I collected many examples of the contrary. When you have to start with tentative 
assumptions, more or less vague, you cannot even expect any sharp negative reac-
tion in the corpore vili of our research field. Sometimes negative instances teach us 
something, but of course, the positive ones are much more convincing to me and 
other research workers.
There are sometimes even mathematical disciplines based on weak assumptions 
and successful, think of the history of differential calculus up to the second half the 
19th century. I remember STOLZ, who tried to be more consistent, I think in the 
same strain as Dedekind.208 The traditional technique, as in Kiepert – Stegemann 
textbook on differential calculus, full of man traps, but then Pareto’s Differential 
calculus, tried to improve the consistency, in the German translation we got the first 
Pareto symbolism, too.209 And how successful has been the primary differential cal-
culus with all its contradictions, which remained “isolated” to a certain extent. To 
have a cunning in isolating the difficulties, as it were, seems to be important for 
research work. If I were a man of cunning in this field I should present some proce-
dures, no general ones, of course, how one avoids the infection. A kind of local 
resistance against local infection, that is the point, not to be disturbed by contradic-
tions in our rear, when we have to go on somewhere. No cowardice in scientific 
research; of course, “be cautious”, is a rule, but not a general Popper-rule.
I always ask people to give examples for the Popper consistency and negative- 
test (Popper is only one name f[rom] a dozen names). And now to your statements 
on Semantics. I shall prefer to speak of the whole and only in a few cases deal with 
207 Neurath’s father, Wilhelm Neurath (1840–1901) was an Austrian political economist, teaching 
at the Hochschule für Bodenkultur in Vienna. On Wilhelm Neurath, see Uebel (1993) and (1995a); 
cf. Sandner (2014, 209–228).
208 Otto Stolz (1842–1905) was an Austrian mathematician, known for his work on analysis and 
infinitesimals. Richard Dedekind (1831–1916) was a German mathematician, working on abstract 
algebra, number theory and the definition of real numbers.
209 See Kiepert and Stegemann (1897).Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923) was an Italian polymath (engi-
neer, sociologist, economist, philosopher etc.), his name occurs in the “Pareto principle” as well, 
claiming that in many cases 80% of the effects come from 20% of the causes (80/20 rule).
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Russell, because the “T” points are just the important ones.210 One question in 
between: do you think that Russell’s book helps a student in understanding better 
his own empiricist research work, suggesting an alteration in dangerous terminol-
ogy etc., and if not that, what this book helps? [sic] Telling me, that it is less disturb-
ing than philosophical books is a weak consolation.
You see, I start from the many observation-statements, (not sense data or some-
thing like that), as made in a laboratory: professor X says here I see a certain retort 
with a fluid behave in a certain way. Another person tells a different story. What to 
do. Sometimes we can connect both, where the one man speaks of “grey” the other 
speaks of “green”, then we speak of a certain item of the type “A”, that implies 
“grey” in a X-story and “green” in an “Y” story etc. We try to find a COMMON 
statement, sometimes we find it, sometimes only under certain assumptions. 
Sometimes we say in our encyclopedia “here is an elephant” implying, that this 
statement is in concordance with certain observation statements, …
That is the reason, why I do not know, how to transform your arguments in 
semantics, with my start, which seems to be a very humble thing. Modest and 
tolerant.
You say page 22, 23, Suppose Pierre says “… true, IF A CERTAIN OBJECT, 
PIERRE’S PENCIL HAS A CERTAIN COLOUR BLACK. … TO FIND OUT 
WHETHER … WHAT WE MUST DO IN THIS CASE IS TO OBSERVE THE 
COLOUR OF PIERRE’S PENCIL. You may think me hopeless, but please, try to 
talk with we in my way.
I should say X says, something is black, Y says something blue, I AM NOT 
USING A PHRASE LIKE, “we have to observe the colour of Pierre’s pencil”, but: 
how we may use both sentences. Perhaps in this way, X is saying he is in the state 
of a black-observing person, Y is saying he is in the state of a blue-observing per-
son, but now the same story starts with the being there of a person Y or X. Y says 
here is a person Y and a person X, X says here is a person X only, no Person Y at all 
etc. The question is to find a pattern of statements we are finally to “accept” tenta-
tively in our arguing.
And now I ask, how we may speak of accepting something as a “lie”, you know 
I answer, when I accept X says this is brown, when I accept X says internally this is 
black and not brown, we may accept tentatively X is a liar. If we accept X is saying 
I see [a] brown table and X is internally saying I see [a] brown table, and we do not 
accept the statement here is a brown table (as a combined statement, as it were) then 
we call the X-statement a dream statement or an illusion statement.
Now somebody would say, we call this statement “true” only if X has an illusion, 
but this “has an illusion” implies in our language only, that it fits into a scheme of 
acceptance.
I see now various possibilities, e.g. (I asked sometimes Morris about that) that 
you may show me, that my explanations INCLUDE subconsciously the primary 
210 On the “T” notation see Carnap’s letter to Neurath, letter 19.
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habits of semantics, OK, please show me that, I confess that would be the nicest 
solution. As it were, you transform my statements in such a way, that we get a one- 
one correlation between your and my speaking, then everything is prepared for fur-
ther discussion, or you may show me, where my empiricism reaches difficulties. Or 
where there are questions I cannot answer. It is for me startling that Tarski in Paris 
tried to give examples, always from certain mathematical or logical generalizations, 
with “all” or something like that, and Hempel trying to explain [to] me semantics in 
relation to empiricism mentions the Goedel business. You see, I do not want to deny 
that in speaking of calculi PERHAPS something appears, which forces – let me say 
a two-level discussion or an infinite number of levels [of] discussion, but then I 
should ask, whether this level-business touches directly [on] empiricist discussions, 
or only in so far as we need these higher calculation statements within an empiricist 
argument, but not as long as we speak of cows and calves, of brown and black only. 
Please allow me to be a little puzzled by this type of answers, when I as a humble 
empiricist want to understand the semantics secrets.
Page 29 you speak of “judicial proceedings” – that is my field. And just there I 
think, we should improve our empiricist view, by introducing my proposal, which 
does present only empiricist statements, but let undecided which is “true”. Not even 
using this term or a substitute for it. Or can you show me, how “accepted” is only a 
way to be propositionally equivalent with you and Tarski but using other terms. I 
doubt that very much, because you are quoting Aristotle. His arguments, however 
we may interpret them, seem to me clear-cut metaphysics. And Kotarbinski is an 
Aristotelian, of course. You see I had a long discussion with him on the ONE world- 
system of Popper and asked him, [whether] that implies you agree with him, OF 
COURSE he answered. He agreed [o]n many points with me, but not [o]n the [sic] 
pluralism, and just this, this idea of the TRUE SYSTEM, THE TRUE WORLD, 
THE TRUE WORLD and OUR SENTENCES DIVERGENT FROM A TRUE 
WORLD etc. is the difference between pluralist empiricism, which is “monist” as it 
were in the language, but pluralist in the possibly acceptable statements. Therefore 
this Aristotelian metaphysics on the “true” is connected with the anti-pluralist view-
point, that is a reason, why I am interested in this matter from a more general view-
point in addition. Of course, that is not an ARGUMENT.
You see, as long as semantics appears as pure calculus I have nothing to say, 
assumed that your calculus is consistent, Martin Strauss is doubtful even on this 
point. But in the moment to bring any empiricist elements into the discussion, I ask 
how it affects empiricism.
You see, I am impressed by the behaviour of Hempel in social problems, Zilsel 
behaves similar[ly]. The SYSTEM assumption, excludes multiplicity of arguments, 
and does not put into account the UNPREDICTABILITY as something given IN 
PRINCIPLE. I treated this point in my monograph seriously.211 Different kinds of 
unpredictability within empiricism. I do not say, that both things belong together, 
211 See Neurath’s Foundations of the Social Sciences, (1944, Sect. 12). On Neurath’s concept of 
“unpredictability in principle,” see Reisch (2001)
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who says the one, says the other, too, but there is a certain affinity, of course. Starting 
with pluralism, unpredictability does not shock you at all. Within a clear cut system 
unpredictability hardly may be discussed. Perhaps only when speaking of various 
levels, and we get an infinite number of sayings on saying – but I doubt whether that 
may be connected with the empiricist unpredictability in a proper way.
You always tell me, you agree with Russell’s and Schlick’s remarks on my pro-
tocol statements, but my statements intended are different.212 Please, tell me first 
what you think how I should express my statements properly and then please tell 
me, why even then they are not in harmony with your opinion. I think it is important 
to come to some clearness therefore I write such a long letter, transferring to you the 
whole mood in which I treat the question, not concealing my far[-]reaching guesses, 
in as far as anti-pluralism is concerned, which I relate to Aristotelian-Platonic anti- 
pluralism, intolerance etc. etc., but that is NOT THE POINT OF OUR 
DISCUSSION. Historically only it would be remarkable, should we find out, after 
accepting the pluralism, and removing the anti-pluralist elements of semantics 
(SHOULD THERE BE SUCH ELEMENTS) that the strain in Polish-philosophy is 
an old Scholastic one. Lukasiewicz’s co-operation with New-Thomism would be 
then fully understandable, the connection of Kotarbinski’s Aristotelianism and 
Lukasiewicz free-will tendency in multi-valued logic etc. with Twardowski’s logi-
cal trends, who was a pupil of Brentano, who combined the logical trend of 
Scholasticism with the trend towards modern French and English psychology.
There is sceptic trend in Scholasticism, too, DUHEM is a representative of this 
trend, very often scepticism in science, tries to get absolutism in religion as a kind 
of substitute. Therefore both trends multiplicity in action, multiplicity in arguing 
may be connected with Scholasticism, but it is a difference, whether the absolute 
solution appears as an additional element as in DUHEM or as within the empiricist 
scheme, as in ANTI-DUHEM Popper, with his religious and Kantian strain.
Historically, we may say:
PLURALISM IN EMPIRICISM, ABSOLUTISM IN TRANSCENDENT WORLD.
PLURALISM IN EMPIRICISM, NO ABSOLUTE WORLD OF 
TRANSCENDENCE
ABSOLUTISM IN EMPIRICISM, NO ABSOLUTE WORLD OF 
TRANSCENDENCE
1, is perhaps connected with DUHEM,
2, is perhaps connected with POINCARÉ,
3, is perhaps connected with POPPER and other pseudo-rationalists. But these are 
no arguments at all, only historical remarks.
Since I think it rather dangerous to speak of the DESIGNATUM of an expression 
I suggest to speak of an ACCEPTED SENTENCE (or of an [sic] designating sen-
tence), instead of a denotatum I suggest to speak of an “acknowledged” expression 
(or of an [sic] denotating sentence). Now, it may be, that this change of terminology 
212 See Schlick (1934/1979) and Schlick (1935/1979).
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enables you to formulate semantics in my terms, too, please, do it, if possible. IT 
WOULD BE OF GREAT IMPORTANCE FOR ME, BELIEVE ME I WOULD 
LIKE TO BE IN HARMONY WITH YOU EVEN IN THIS POINT, or this termi-
nology prohibits semantics, then I should like to understand the defects of this 
terminology.
page 18, I go on in this way, I ask myself can somebody say: I see sentences, OK, 
can I say I see propositions – NO, therefore I try to eliminate the term proposition. 
In my monograph I suggest to speak of sentences propositionally equal. Have you 
any objections to that? Remains everything unaltered? or not? I know it needs some 
time to answer that. But what does not a friend perform for a friend, ….You know 
within the way of life I described above somebody may sacrifice happiness for other 
people’s happiness, but not for something over-personal… that is the point. Perhaps 
you feel a little pain thinking of my unhappiness connected with the semantics dif-
ference and you want to reduce your little pain by removing my pain ….
There are other points in your book, too, I shall discuss after your answer. Perhaps 
we should start with these primary remarks.
You answer, that all my remarks touch even Russell’s existence symbol in his 
logic. Of course, it does. I always knew that and I always looked with some suspi-
cion to that. But as long as such symbols remain within [the] calculus not much may 
happen, we should not be too pedantic, but if they did enter the empiricist sphere 
through semantics, we have to be careful. But that is another long story, connected 
with the problems of introducing symbols, an action not very properly done 
[peformed] by Russell, as you may see, where he introduces letter combinations. 
How to say that ab and ba are the same or vice versa, only ab may be used.213 
Russell’s remark is a very weak one and only an additional one – Stebbing made the 
right remark on that in her book.214 This whole symmetry business is a difficult 
problem in itself. I am not sure, what to do in detail with it. My remarks on mono-
grammatic writing touch only one point, and my remarks on symbolically equiva-
lence etc.215
I have the impression that Russell has an anti-pluralist tendency, that may be the 
main point in his “realism”. People sometimes cannot bear, that we start with many 
divergent statements, and remain with divergent statements FOREVER, as it were. 
213 Neurath had addressed this issue in two of his early papers on logic. Between 1909 and 1910, 
Neurath wrote several papers on algebraic logic while one paper with his future second wife, Olga 
Hahn-Neurath (who was the sister of Hans Hahn, the founder of the Vienna Circle) was writing her 
doctoral dissertation on the topic. They co-authored one of them “Zum Dualismus in der Logik” 
(Hahn and Neurath 1909). Neurath’s other papers are Neurath (1909a), (1909b) and (1910). 
Neurath treated the question of symbolic equality and commutativity in the last two papers. Olga 
Hahn wrote also Hahn (1909) and (1910). On a brief, critical discussion of Neurath’s logical ideas 
see Köhler (1982/1991).
214 See Stebbing (1943, Chap. XXII, §4). Stebbing addresses the relation of definition and linguistic 
analysis criticizing Russell on the very question Neurath touched on in two of his logic papers. 
This is the reason Neurath might have brought them up in the exchanges about logic and Russell.
215 See Neurath (1910).
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There HAS TO BE SOMETHING O N E. The persons in our group who deal with 
empiricist research are, as far as I can see, pluralist by habit, DUHEM, POINCARE, 
FRANK, NEURATH etc., whereas the others like HEMPEL, I think you, too, to a 
certain extent, of course TARSKI, POPPER, present a non-pluralist tendency. I 
think ZILSEL is non-pluralist on an [sic] average. Therefore the importance of the 
NEGATIVE instances in Popper. Hempel wrote [to] me as if it were something 
without doubt that general procedures of science have to be based on something like 
that, I answered, that I do not think there are general procedures, neither in induc-
tion nor in testing, but there are things you may learn. I should like to build up a kind 
of correspondence on that for publication, it is more friendly and not so systematic. 
I think you are often more systematic, than empiricism allows us to be, e.g. in your 
Meaning article,216 which I read and re-read, admiring your cunning and skill, 
pleased by common features in our arguing and a little sorry about the differences. 
Analyzing that, I see clearly some historical features, we disagreed, when you 
agreed with WITTGENSTEIN (I think him an antiscientific metaphysician, who 
helped us a lot), with POPPER (I think him anti-pluralist metaphysician, who helped 
us a lot) with TARSKI (I think him an antipluralist, too, who helped us a lot). I guess 
that the pleasant systems of logic and mathematics seduce people like you, Hempel, 
Tarski to desire systems of a comprehensive kind in empiricism, where just that is – 
I think so – a characteristic of empiricism, that there are only islands of systematiza-
tion, as above mentioned, and, in principle, some unpredictability, as long as we are 
inventing people, as long as we etc. It would be nice if we could fit into that corre-
spondence Hempel[’s] letters, Frank[’s] letter, too. Perhaps Nagel, Strauss, etc.
You speak of my intolerance – and I want to avoid any kind of intolerance. I have 
the feeling that I build up a kind of tolerance arguments within our LOGICAL 
EMPIRICISM. Of course, we shall not be pedantic and not always call other peo-
ple’s opinion metaphysical between us, of course. We often see, as Frank said the 
metaphysical dots in another person’s features but not the big spots in our own.
Perhaps you will find analogies to POPPER’s experimentum crucis, the negative 
instance, the one world system in my own arguing. I should like to learn from you 
that.
A few remarks on your kind RUSSELL[’s] remarks.217
I first wrote some pages [with] answers to each remark, but that is rather silly. The 
“T” points we should discuss full and pure, please do it. Of course I do not agree 
with the [sic] most of your “H” characteristics, because we have to look at the 
whole context and not whether a good lawyer could perhaps find a translation for 
something. The question is, whether Russell and his readers would translate [it] 
in this way. You doubt self that sometimes. But let us not discuss trifles, the main 
points is: “T” and your criticism of my standpoint, perhaps in the improved 
shape you will present to me (assumed I shall accept it).
216 See Carnap (1936–37)
217 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 19.
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15/14 of course R. discusses with the behaviourist, but he uses in principle the same 
argument, speaking of “FALLIBILITY” that implies, that he does not accept, 
that the Beh. accepts a certain statement naively as infallible, whereas RUSSELL 
wants to find out that there is fallibility, how [should it be] defined? Who takes 
the chair? Russell? The error-fallibility terminology seems to be acknowledged 
by Russell.
50/59 knowing = more or less making a statement; having an experience = more or 
less making an experimental statement, saying: we cannot repeat a statement we 
are telling of [sic], seems to be objected by you in your Syntax.
64/78 what implies “antithesis” without assertion within empiricism?
70/86 when we drop the term “fact” and use only the term “factual statement” then 
we drop the expression “facts left unexpressed”. Have you no objections to this 
latter expression?
104/128 you think one can differentiate in empiricism between THE right time and 
the chronometer time? I think empiricism has only different chronometer times 
and by convention we may call some computation “right time”, but that is not 
what Russell has in mind. What you think about that in detail? It is one of MY 
POINTS again and again.
108/135 “God” is here the hypothetical substitute for Laplace’s hypothetical spirit. 
THERE IS N[O] SUCH ANALOGY IN EMPIRICISM. physics deals with 
CONVENTIONAL unity only, which may be altered, not with SOME DEFINITE 
UNITY, as assumed in the God analogy. Otherwise I do not know, what the anal-
ogy intends to perform.
132/164 I think even the “aesthetic” test does not lead always to ONE solution. We 
may toss the coin, when not having time to try various possibilities. Just this 
aesthetic argument here, indicates (for me of course only) the tendency to find 
any “rational” way to reach ONE solution, whereas I insist that we have to think 
always of more than one solution, whatever may happen, as possible.
160/200 Russell should ask “who makes the statement”.
160/201 I think the Moore discussion is analogical to the Behaviourist discussion. I 
wanted to say, how one has to go on, by asking WHO says something, and not 
where we find the definite answer. Russell thinks one cannot speak of the abso-
lute item as such but only given to a certain degree, what involves the assumption 
that we have some absolute item, which cannot reach completely but only to a 
certain degree. That implies e.g. the one dimensional arrangement of the items 
etc. etc. You know, that is my objection to your MEANING article,218 that you 
speak of “degrees”. Not even degrees – I think so.
For me Moore and Russell are here in the same boat, because [an] absolute item and 
[an] item to a certain degree different from an absolute item makes no great dif-
ference for my argument. It seems to make a great difference for you as I infer 
from many of your writings. The DEGREE business is a very serious one. The 
PREFERENCE business could be branching and could be like the p[e]cking 
order of hens, i.e. circular. Degrees of “true” page 133.
218 See Carnap (1936–37).
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p, 218 in my edition, a possibly strange solipsistic duplication theory [of the] brain 
and phenomena.
245/307 I think that Russell is not consistent in the treating of statements as facts 
and treating differently both, when you say about page 22, where he speaks of II, 
subjective and objective side of statements…
what [do] you think about page 320 where R. speaks of [a] relation between events 
and the propositions. page 330 whether anything corresponds in the non-verbal 
world. You think that OK?
you see all these and other remarks are around the statement on page 340 on the 
perceptual whole within our head, what your reject. I do not know exactly, how 
you separate the accepted Russell from the non-accepted one. It would be inter-
esting, perhaps one of your pupils could do that, to present the REALISM struc-
ture in Russell. I think most of his arguments belong to that or can as parts of it 
be interpreted.
I hope you will speak in detail on my remarks on 133–144. We have to discuss that 
seriously. See above.
I shall see, how you define “degrees” without limes.
I think you are such a sorcerer, that something may be possible, I cannot see today.
Let us drop [the] labels unempiricist etc. when discussing with one another, but 
you allow labels like pluralist, non-pluralist for not always repeating the single 
remarks. What I needed for my Social Sciences I explained in my monograph.219 I 
think you will not like many of my attitudes – unfortunately, but your tolerance will 
overcome that and you will explain to other people, that I am not so bad as I look. I 
think, I should explain more in detail my point later on, but the main points are 
clear: unified language without dualism, asymmetry etc. from the start, pluralism 
with encyclopedism, avoiding infecting contradictions, unpredictabilities within 
empiricism.
I think I may guess what you have in mind by speaking of the language of sci-
ence and not of science, but you see, my way is trying to find the point where our 
rivers meet one another and in semantics I did not find the point, whereas in your 
Logical Syntax I found the point, even when we did not agree.220 The same about 
[the] MEANING article. I do not always agree but see, where we meet, where not. 
Nagel did not understand your viewpoint. Did somebody write about it from an 
empiricist point of view? I shall expect that some Neo-Thomists will find a way, 
how to use your and Tarski’s semantics. That does not imply, that your arguments 
are similar to Thomism.
Waismann re-wrote his book. [The] English translation made for Ogden did not 
enjoy [please] him, therefore he started with altering it.221 Ogden another day asked 
219 See Neurath (1944).
220 See Carnap (1937).
221 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 18. note 152.
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me about this business, I could not answer. I did [have] not see[n] Waismann for a 
long time. By chance I heard of his wife’s suicide. We visited him, wife and son 
another day, and felt not very happy there.222 I am always sorry when seeing people, 
who escaped from the hell and live then depressed in some way or another. It is not 
the question of guilt but of good and bad luck in all the constellations. I do not think 
that Waismann is very happy in all his intellectual relations. The break [up] with 
Wittgenstein – [a] disaster for him. The main ideas remain and therefore he seems 
to be relatively isolated. Sad experience, as he told me, with Braithwaite.223 He is 
lecturing at the University here, that is a great advantage. But that implies certain 
adapt[at]ions perhaps, I do not know. The world is so full of sadness. I heard a lec-
ture [marginal addition: by W] on geometry. I did not like it very much. A fine 
sequence of lectures on Mengenlehre in the camp. He did not like very much my 
tendency to ask about finitism in Mengenlehre as one reached it in differential cal-
culus and occasionally in probability etc. But I heard that such tendencies are now 
relatively strong. Have you [any] knowledge of that? What could I read? Or better 
look into it. Poor boy, I am. No friend, who can tell me that as many years ago. 
Perhaps that is a reason, why I now deal more with the theoretical background of the 
Social Science language.
Poor Gomperz dead. He behaved very kind[ly] to us when we arrived in Holland, 
helpful in spite of the fact, that he rather disliked my arguing. I disliked his arguing 
very much, particularly his involved moral reflections on topical subjects. Rather 
disgusting to me. Unfortunately a frequent type of arguing in middle Europe. What 
is about Gomperz’s wife? I like her very much, a brave, handsome person, who 
knows how to deal with life. I always appreciated it very much that he married her, 
a simple Viennese merchant woman, continuing her business at the “Tuchlauben”. 
Happy in travelling.
I hope you are well again and will teach Mathematics in Chicago; tell more about 
you and your life. It is a great advantage that you both together can be in [a] nice 
environment.
222 Waismann’s life was dogged by misfortune and filled with misery: he did not submit a doctoral 
dissertation until 1936, so he worked as a librarian and taught at adult education institutes, some-
times in precarious conditions. His relation to Wittgenstein was quite conflicted: according to 
Gustav Bergmann (1993, 204), Waismann became a “self-denying disciple” of Wittgenstein. Later 
Waismann moved to Oxford from Cambridge partly because of Wittgenstein’s reappearance as the 
successor to G. E. Moore’s professorship. Even though Waismann became a faculty member at 
Oxford, and later a Fellow of the British Academy, he was never able to adjust to the conditions of 
life in Britain; he became increasingly isolated, especially after the tragic suicide of his wife (1943) 
and son (1952, at the age of 16).
223 Richard Braithwaite (1900–1990) was an English philosopher of science who is known for his 
1953 book, Scientific Explanation: A Study of the Function of Theory, Probability and Law in 
Science. Braithwaite attended also some of the International Congresses for the Unity of Science.
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On average our friends reached Anglo-Saxon countries, a few others, South 
America. Some of our Polish friends I think the Soviet Union.224 But some have 
been killed, committed suicide or have been deported, or in concentration camps. 
What a sad world. What you know about Maue?225
I often ask me, to what extent we are responsible, too, for all what happened, by 
doing something or by failing to do something… I know historical analysis etc., but 
I want to imagine a little, what kinds of streams lead to the Nazidom. Direct ones, 
as the quoted chapter on exterminated Poles and the moral qualities of Victory and 
the obedience to the nation, whatever may happen, but also indirect ones, e.g. the 
supporting of totalitarian habits as such, and so on. A difficult problem, really.
Thanks for the article on planning.226 I go further than that, and think we can be 
more multifarious within a planned economy, should we try to be so, whereas com-
petition has been unifying. It is not so much the question of decentralisation, that 
too, of course, but more a question of [a] planned multiplicity [of] possibilities. Not 
even majority decisions should be overestimated. When a group of 40 likes flats and 
a group of 60 small houses, why not 4:6 flats and small houses? etc. Railroad gauges 
have to be unified. I shall ask Kaempffert to send Morris my article, he will send it 
to you.227
We have been in the Wales mountains, very happy, walking every day many 
hours, sleeping, eating, reading – not much, enjoying nice landscape and nice peo-
ple. A few hours discussion with Heinemanns – a wholly un-intellectual recreation, 
our own talks more in [like] reflections on world and life. We try to find out how 
people behave in various countries under certain circumstances. The aggregation 
[sic] in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in Holland seems to be preferable to us. And 
we think these aggregations allow the growing up of more happiness, even if more 
224 After Germany attacked the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, Leon Chwistek (1884–1944), a 
prominent member of the Lvov-Warsaw school of logic and philosophy escaped from Lvov and 
went to Tbilisi (the largest city of Georgia under the direction of the Red Army), and in 1943 to 
Moscow, where he died. Regarding South America, Neurath presumably refers to Hans 
A. Lindemann (1882–?), who regularly attended the Vienna Circle meetings during the early 1930s 
while he studied philosophy, psychology and art history at Vienna. He also wrote a dissertation 
under the direction of Schlick on behaviorism in 1932 and fled later to Argentina. Cf. Stadler 
(2001/2015, 594). See further Cordero (2010, 370–371).
225 Maue Gramm was the wife of Josef Gramm, an art historian who lectured in Munich. She and 
Carnap were lovers for some time and he fathered two children with her, Gerhard (1929–2013) and 
Birgit (1927–).
226 There is no information on what this might be. Even Carnap seemed to be puzzled about this 
remark since on the margin of the letter there is a shorthand note in German asking “What was 
that?”
227 The only place where Neurath discusses that example of flats, houses and railroad gauges is his 
manuscript “Visual Education: Humanisation versus Popularisation,” which was published only 
posthumously in 1996. Another article that might be relevant is Neurath’s “International Planning 
for Freedom” (1942/1973), which Neurath had already meant to send to Carnap.
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temperate. Less [fewer] tensions as something [is] loved and admired. Holidays, 
weekend, hobbies important, even when very restful and without excitement. Of 
course, there [are] deplorable things, too. But the whole aggregation [sic] compared 
with others is fine. We enjoy together with our British friends the victories. You 
know from Modern Man in the Making228 that I always guessed the Allies will be 
much stronger than the Axis, much stronger. I did not expect that the Axis could 
finish the whole show in a Blitz. Now the whole show is manifestly over. It may be 
up to 1945, hardly longer in Europe, perhaps shorter. The Nazis fight for their naked 
life. Even Non-Nazis are often full of obedience in abstracto and think it a duty to 
fight on. Of course there are Anti-nazis there. But the aggregation [sic] is not pre-
pared for opposition and fight against government.
The peace, I do not think, it will be a fine peace, but that the Plague will be over 
will be in any case pleasant. We should talk over all these things some day. Perhaps 
visiting you by plane will be possible in a near future. Who does know anything? 
Unpredictability teaches us, to think of our own decisions – what is called moral 
personality – as of more importance and to remain hopeful in difficult situations. 
Historical laws teach some people cowardice other[s] fanaticism. I do not like either.
How speaks Heine: Beat your march on the drum, no fear, that is my whole phi-
losophy, that is my whole science, I know, that is the result, because I am a good 
tambour. etc.229 Go oh, boy, something will happen.
I can repeat only, that we go on very well with ISOTYPE and that more and more 
people are interested in it, that we have many friends and acquaintances here and 
feel us very well sheltered. Our health is in good state, our mood, too. Paul, as Lynd 
wrote me, got a fine degree from Columbia and will be successful in his career, he 
predicts.230 Philipp and Pepi Frank safe. Some people of whom I thought they are in 
Germany, appeared to be in America or England. That is always a day of particular 
pleasure, when such an [sic] information reaches us. Many good friends from camp 
remained good friends afterwards, therefore the environment is OK.231 And we 
know we have good friends in other countries, too. Morris writes in detail on his 
paths of life.232 I like his attitude and his analyzing paths of life as patterns, but I 
cannot agree wholly with his technique in detail and some distinctions. But the 
brotherhood of mankind is more important than such details. It is some kindness in 
his attitude and much tolerance.
228 See Neurath (1939).
229 Neurath is quoting the first verse of Heine’s poem ‘Doktrin’ in Zeitgedichte: ‘Schlage die 
Trommel und fürchte dich nicht.’
230 Presumably Robert S. Lynd (1892–1970), the American sociologist, who was a friend and col-
league of Paul Lazarsfeld, who helped Paul Neurath study in New York. Lynd is mainly known for 
his systematic sociological work at Muncie, Indiana (“Middletown” studies).
231 Neurath presumably refers to his time in the internment camp on the Isle of Man.
232 See Morris (1942).
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Now, it is evening and I want to finish this letter. I hope it helps to find a way to 
Semantics, too ---- that is that. Oh boy, my dear.
What kind regards from both of us to both of you
ever yours
Otto Neurath
[Dear Carnaps
I hope very much that you have no pain and that the doctors can help you to get well 
again soon. I was very glad when I met you both in a cinema queue … it was a dream only, 
unfortunately.
Good luck! My to Ina!
Yours Mieze]233
 23. Neurath to Carnap, October 28, 1943
[October 28] 1943234
Dear Carnap,
Enclosed I am sending you Freundlich’s syllabus please return it with your 
remarks immediately.235 I suggested he should start writing, but we should like to 
make (1) and (6) more “logical”. We speak in the Foundations of the theories mainly. 
I am writing in hurry.
I hope my manuscript will be in print already and I shall read the proofs soon. I 
just signed a contract with Kegan Paul and shall write a big book on Visual 
Education.236
We hope you feel better now. I expect a letter from you. We are very well. Paul 
Dr and instructor at University college [sic]. I think he is OK now.
With good wishes and greetings
Ever yours
[Neurath]
233 Handwritten note by Marie Neurath at the end of the letter.
234 This letter was originally without exact dates in the Archive; only “1943” was indicated as a 
handwritten marginalia. But Carnap thanked Neurath in his next letter (February 4, 1944; see letter 
24) for a certain note on Freundlich’s syllabus from October 28. This letter might be that note.
235 Freundlich’s syllabus is lost/or not located in the Neurath Archive.
236 See Neurath (1996).
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 24. Carnap to Neurath, February 4, 1944.
(ASP RC 102-55-04)
Rudolf Carnap
P.O.B. 1214
Santa Fe, N.M.
February 4, 1944
Dear Neurath,
Thank you very much for your letters of July 15, the long one of September 25, 
and the note of October 28 concerning Freundlich.237 Your detailed letter raises 
many interesting problems and I shall now reply to some of them. In addition I was 
glad to get a picture of your activities, your personal life and moods etc. I should 
have written you much earlier if Ina had not developed a backache too which makes 
it hard for her to type; I hope, you will appreciate this letter all the more.
It was indeed very sad news about Stebbing’s death.238 We both like her very 
much. And now I have a tragic story to tell you, too. In the middle of January Eva 
Hempel died a few days after giving birth to a son, in consequence of a second 
operation. Now Hempel is alone with the baby, and you can imagine how terrible a 
blow it is for him. You know how dependent he was on Eva. The present plan is to 
have the baby at home, with a housekeeper-nurse but we do not yet know how well 
that will work out.
My back is still not essentially better. I expected to go this winter again to the 
Mayo Clinic, perhaps for an operation; but in the mean time I consulted two good 
specialists who came to Santa Fe’s new Army Hospital, and they both believe that it 
is not a ruptured intervertebral disk – as the Mayo people believed – therefore they 
do not consider an operation and they try instead a conservative treatment. It is still 
too early to say how much success it will have but there is some progress: I can walk 
now up to about 40 minutes as against twenty before, and I am slowly increasing it. 
Fortunately the Rockefeller grant has been renewed for another year239 – so we can 
stay here until September and the doctors give me hope that I shall be able to teach 
again at that time.
237 See Neurath to Carnap, letters 21., 22. and 23.
238 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 22.
239 Carnap had a Research Grant from Rockefeller Foundation since 1942, which was renewed for 
another academic year in the summer of 1943. During 1942 and 1943, Carnap suffered crippling 
back pains that confined him to bed. His wife Ina wrote to W. V. O. Quine about it (May 23, 1944): 
“Carnap’s back is much better – he is now up an average of six hours a day (not consecutively) 
[…]. Isn’t it maddening to think that if we had the right doctors in time there would not have been 
any need for his staying in bed so long? On the other hand, Rockefeller would not have come 
through with a second year if it had not been for his illness.” In Creath (1990, 374).
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And now let us plunge into the philosophical problems. I don’t think that it is 
very useful for us to discuss Russell’sbook much more. (By the way, I heard that he 
got a fellowship at Cambridge and that he plans to return to England in the summer.) 
I am myself very critical with respect to the book; but your many critical remarks 
about it (with which I do sometimes not quite agree and some of which I even 
regards as absurdly exaggerated in their attacks against harmless formulations), you 
push me against my will into the role of a defender of the book. It is certainly not a 
formulation of my opinions. When you sometimes criticize books by Schlick, Tarski 
or Popper, that is quite useful because I agree in the basic points with these books. 
But that is not the case with Russell’s last book. I have discussed it in our correspon-
dence only on your request. I do not know why you always come back to this book 
with which we both do not agree. I have explained my chief differences with Russell 
in a previous letter.240 I think it would not be very fruitful to go now again into all 
the details. But if you have a specific question concerning my view on some points 
I shall be glad to answer it.
On Semantics. If I see it correctly, you raise objections or doubts in two points:
1. Semantics may be a[l]right as a mere calculus, but if it is applied to the language 
of empirical science, it seems doubtful or at least an open question whether it is 
fruitful and useful.
2. Some of the chief concepts of semantics are metaphysical; therefore empiricists 
have to reject them as meaningless.
I am not quite clear how you intend to combine these two objections; they do not 
seem to me to fit well together.
On (1). I am not much interested in semantics as a mere calculus, but chiefly in 
semantics as analysis of the language of science. I believe that it will here by 
very useful and important when it will be further developed and applied. I admit 
that today we have in this direction not more than the very first beginnings. 
Therefore there is not much point in discussing the usefulness. Examples for the 
application of semantical see [I], p. 61.f241; every scientist uses these and similar 
concepts; remember e.g. that Frank says that certain statements of physicists are 
“tautological”.242 You ask whether I could perhaps show you that you yourself 
use semantical concepts without noticing it. Yes, it would indeed be easy to give 
hundreds of examples. Here some taken from a few pages of your letter of 
September 25th243: You speak of “contradictions” (p.9); you say that Weber gives 
“a descriptive story of” Franklin; you speak (p.10) about “general laws”, “area of 
240 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 19.
241 See Carnap (1942, §14).
242 Frank claimed that the law of causality was a convention, thus tautological. See Frank 
(1907/1949).
243 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 22.
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validity”, “observation statements”; you say that a certain statement “pictures the 
situation” (a synonym for “is true”); you say (p.11) that you will “deal with” 
Russell; you say (p.11) that one item “implies” another one. (In a previous letter 
I have referred to the examples on p.61f. of my book244; now you express again 
your doubts and you ask for examples (without saying a word about those exam-
ples.) Whether the applications will be really fruitful or not will be shown by 
further work in this field. A new logico-mathematical theory (e.g. set theory, 
group theory) or empirical theory (e.g. Marx’s conception of history, psycho-
analysis) usually meets first many doubts about its fruitfulness; these doubts are 
justified because the majority of newly proposed ideas are not worth much. 
However, I think if a new theory is free of metaphysics and is proposed by seri-
ous people, then those who have doubts about its fruitfulness should be tolerant 
and should wait without polemizing too much; the further development will pass 
judgment. I say “if free of metaphysics”, hence, above all, we have to decide 
question (2).
On (2). That the semantical concept of truth is not metaphysical can very easily be 
shown by the following translation: “The sentence ‘this tree is green’ is true” 
means not more and not less than “This tree is green”. (If the latter sentence does 
not occur in your strangely restricted language you may take instead any other 
sentence which you regard as meaningful.) (By the way, if the term ‘true’ were 
to occur only in connection with a direct quotation as in the example given, the 
term would indeed hardly be useful; but that is another question.) This transla-
tion shows that the concept of truth is not metaphysical but scientific. Furthermore, 
the translation makes it clear that the term ‘true’ is not at all meant in the sense 
of ‘absolutely certain’, ‘indubitable’ or anything like that as you sometimes seem 
to believe. And the translation also shows that ‘true’ has nothing to do with 
‘accepted’; you make time and again the mistake of demanding that I should 
translate my semantical sentences into sentences with the term ‘accepted’.
To your letter p.11, the last two paragraphs.245 I am in complete agreement with 
your description of the scientific procedure. I should classify this as belonging to the 
methodology of science. I do not see what it has to do with semantics. Which asser-
tion of mine concerning semantics seems to you to be in contradiction to your 
description? – Likewise p.12 you see[m] to believe that semantics intends to pro-
pose a new conception concerning scientific procedure; that is certainly not the 
case.
To p.13, “judicial proceedings”. The question is not whether you might be able by 
certain tricks to avoid the word ‘true’ in such proceedings. My point is rather that the 
word ‘true’ in its semantical sense is very frequently used in science, jud. proc., etc.
244 Carnap mentioned the application of semantical terms (though without the page numbers) in 
letter 18.
245 See letter 22, page 596 in the appendix.
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To p.14, “Sentences propositionally equal”. O.K., no objection. This is a good 
semantical concept; I use for it the term ‘logically equivalent’ or ‘L-equivalent’. If 
you wish to avoid propositions as extra-linguistic entities, you may take instead 
classes of L-equivalent sentences (this is e.g. done by Russell, Inquiry, p. 209).246 
However, in this way you do not avoid semantics! -- You seem to demand that we 
should not speak about things which we cannot see. You will hardly expect that I 
take this seriously?
On finitism. The best reading material is: Weyl, “Die heutige Erkenntnislage in 
der Mathematik”,247 Felix Kaufmann’s book,248 Bridgman’s pamphlet on set the-
ory,249 Wittgenstein’s book,250 Waismann’s “Theses” (mimeographed in Vienna).251 
With the exception of Bridgman (whose pamphlet however is rather weak) these are 
not authors which you otherwise estimate very highly. My opinion on finitism: it 
contains a sound basic idea, but none of the attempts made so far is practicable for 
the construction of a logico-mathematical system which could be used as a basis for 
the language of science.252 -- You have mentioned several times that you have objec-
tions against Russell’s symbol of existence; but you do not say what the objections 
are. Could you tell me any logician or mathematician or scientist who has made a 
proposal how to do in the language of science without the concept of existence and 
the concept of ‘every’ (which are definable by each other)?
On pluralism. I believe that in this point I am in agreement with your attitude. I 
say “I believe” and “attitude”, not “opinion” because your formulation of pluralism 
(p.9) is so vague that I am not able to see in it any clear thesis. As you formulate it 
now, nearly everybody would agree, including Schlick, Popper, Russell. Since plu-
ralism seems to you very important, and in particular also the question whether I 
agree with you in this point, please give me a more precise formulation of what is 
246 See Russell (1941).
247 Hermann Weyl (1885–1955) was a German mathematician and physicist, mainly known for his 
work on the foundations of mathematics (he was influenced by phenomenology and intuitionism) 
and space-time theories. See Weyl (1925/1998).
248 See Kaufmann (1930/1978).
249 Percy W. Bridgman (1882–1961) was an American physicist and won the 1946 Nobel Prize in 
physics. He is usually known also for his approach called “operationalism” which influenced, 
among others, Philipp Frank. Carnap is referring presumably to Bridgman (1934).
250 See Wittgenstein (1922).
251 Friedrich Waismann prepared a longer list of theses of Wittgenstein’s philosophy during the 
early 1930s for the members of the Vienna Circle. For the English translation see Waismann 
(1979).
252 On Carnap and finitism see Frost-Arnold (2013).
 Appendices
611
asserted by it. -- Perhaps the difference here is not a difference of opinion but of 
emphasis. We emphasize the importance of the task of systematization in science; 
you, on the other hand, emphasize the fact that the statements accepted by scientists 
at a certain time do not form a well[-]connected system and you point to the dangers 
involved in overlooking this fact. I think you are right in both points. I should be still 
more inclined to agree with you were it not for the impression that you exaggerate 
very much in laying more stress on the dangers of systematization than on its use-
fulness, importance and indispensability; I doubt whether your overstressed warn-
ing is fruitful. I am afraid that it may do more harm than good in the education of 
young scientists. Do you remember how all of us in Vienna, especially Menger, 
were angry about the influence of Wittgenstein-Waismann ideas concerning math-
ematics upon the young mathematicians? We might call those ideas “defeatism in 
mathematics”. They were apt to discourage the students to work in mathematics. 
Later I (together with the Warsaw people and Gödel) criticized Wittgenstein’s 
“defeatism in speaking about language”; it led the young people to the position: if it 
is not possible to speak about language in an exact way, then let’s not try to do it. 
Your warning against the dangers of an oversystematization an oversimplification, 
and schematization is quite a[l]right to some extent. But I have the impression that 
by exaggerating your warning you turn it into a new kind of defeatism. The students 
may think: if systematization, logicalisation, etc. in science is not advisable and 
even dangerous, then why take pains to eliminate contradictions and try to fit 
together the accepted statements more and more into a system. I do not say that this 
is your position, but your polemic against systematization may have this effect. -- I 
believe, if we are careful to avoid exaggerations on both sides, we shall easily be 
able to come to an agreement on this point; “we” included Popper, Tarski, etc. For, 
here there is really no serious difference of opinion; it is more a difference in tem-
perament and therefore in the direction of interests. I think, it would be best for the 
development of science if the people on the one side who see more the turbulent 
whirl of material in all its colorfulness and vagueness, and those on the other side 
who love nice structural schemata would not polemize against each other but rather 
realize that the work of both is necessary for science.
On Popper. I have explained to you my view on Popper’s position in my letter of 
Jan. 29, 1943253: It seems to me good as a first approximation. I think in the question 
of asymmetry we have to distinguish two assertions of Poppers:
 1. In testing a universal law, there is an asymmetry between favorable (confirming) 
and unfavorable (disconfirming) cases. If somebody proposes a law hypotheti-
cally then he usually has already a number of favorable cases, and he is looking 
around for further cases. The asymmetry is this: an unfavorable case has a much 
stronger influence upon our judgment concerning the law than an additional 
favorable case.
253 Carnap to Neurath, letter 18.
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 2. One single unfavorable case refutes the law.
Some objections might perhaps be raised against (2). But still I would think that it 
is acceptable as a first approximation. On the other hand, your rejection of (1) in 
your last letter is surprising to me.254 I think that all empiricists and all good scien-
tists agree in this; Who, in your opinion, does not? (The remark on this point which 
you quote from a letter of Hempels seems to me quite right255; your reply to it is 
incomprehensible to me.) -- As to the importance of negative cases: Darwin said 
that he was especially interested in all phenomena which did not seem in accor-
dance with his hypotheses of evolution. -- You remember how our opponents called 
us solipsistic because we rejected the thesis of realism as meaningless? We always 
emphasized that if a sentence is metaphysical and hence meaningless, then the same 
holds for its negation. Now Popper makes certain assertions concerning universal 
laws, negative instances etc. You deny these assertions. This is your good right. But 
then you go on to say that Popper’s assertions are metaphysical. If so, however, your 
counter-assertions are likewise metaphysical and meaningless. Seriously, I think it 
would be better if you would at long last abandon your habit of calling people who 
are empiricists and antimetaphysicians metaphysicians if you do not share their 
opinions. First, it is absurd; and second it does not help a successful discussion.
Negativistic exaggerations. Your write that you are reading just now many books 
by scientists concerning their theories and procedures. I suppose that we agree that 
when we speak about method and language of science it is important for us to see 
what good scientists do. But in cases of this kind we ought to be especially cautious. 
I think that in Vienna we sometimes were too rash in condemning something 
accepted by all or most scientists. (e.g. universal sentences); today I am inclined to 
be more cautious and to think that if a procedure or concept is accepted by the 
majority of good scientists, then it may still be that it needs some modification; but 
it is highly improbable that it is entirely wrong. Therefore I am astonished to see 
how many procedures or concepts used by the overwhelming majority of good sci-
entists are rejected by you without your offering arguments as weighty as this situ-
ation would demand. I regard the following items as examples for this:
the concept of existence (Russell),
asymmetry of negative and positive cases (see above, Popper, (1
the simple semantical concepts e.g. ‘true’, ‘designation’, ‘analytic’, ‘consequence’, 
‘contradiction’
‘error’ – ‘fallibility’ -- terminology, used from the point of view of a behavioristic observer 
(your letter p.16).
‘fact’.
‘unobserved facts’, ‘unexperienced facts’ (p.16).
‘more confirmed’ (the topological concept of degree of confirmation; I admit that the quan-
titative concept is more problematical).
254 Neurath to Carnap, letter 22.
255 Neurath to Carnap, letter 22.
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‘infinite class’ (and hence, because defined by this, the concepts of limit, differential coef-
ficient, velocity, acceleration, etc.).
terms referring to the things which we cannot see (p.14).
‘explanation’ (Feigl says that you object to this).
On Freundlich’s syllabus. I have not much to comment because first the syllabus 
is extremely short, and then you know my old doubts about the suitability of this 
topic for the first volumes.256 But I think, it will become an interesting monograph. 
Since the first two vols. are chiefly methodological it might be well if he would 
stress this point of view as far as possible. You say that we speak about theories; I 
should rather say, we speak about methods.
Your new monograph. I hope to get the proofs soon. I did not see the MS because 
Morris, in accordance with your request, gave it to the Press in order to avoid delay. 
I did not object to this because you wanted it this way. But I should have preferred 
if you had given the coeditors an opportunity to read the MS and to write comments 
to you before you finished it for the Press, as we have done with all other 
monographs.
I agree with the choice of Hogben for the biology monograph as Morris will have 
written you. When and where will his “Interglossa” appear?257 I am looking forward 
to it with great interest.
We did not know about Mrs. Waismann’s suicide. What was the reason? Do you 
know more about him now?258
I have heard from Switzerland that my children are well; one daughter has just 
married and the other is engaged. Heaven knows what the husbands will be like! 
The boy is allright; no news from or about friends.
From the snapshots you see how we live; from Spring to Fall I was out there on 
the porch (and the manuscript on probability and degree of confirmation grew well 
in this wonderful climate)259; Feigl was with us in September.
To you and Mieze our best.
Yours,
[Carnap]
256 Carnap had claimed in an earlier letter to Neurath that ‘cosmology’ should not occur in the title 
of the monographs, since it is in this form entirely incomprehensible. See Carnap to Neurath, July 
24, 1939 (ASP RC 102-53-05).
257 Seemingly Hogben planned to write a monograph on biology for the IEUS. On the biology-
monograph, see further letters 1., 25., 26. and letter 9. note 102. On “Interglossa” see letters 11, 16, 
27 and 28.
258 On Waismann see letter 22, note 221 and letter 18, note 152.
259 Presumably Carnap’s Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).
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 25. Neurath to Carnap and Morris, Copy to Hogben, March 23, 1944.
(ASP RC 115-07-64)
23rd March, 44
Dear co-editors,
I have the great pleasure to inform you, that Lancelot Hogben will write for our 
Encyclopedia:
FOUNDATIONS OF BIOLOGY, VOLUME I, Monograph 9.
The monograph will be of about 9000 words. He promised to write it before 
December 44. Let us hope he will finish it in good time. He is at the moment in a 
responsible position in the war office and therefore very busy with his activities.
I got the galley proofs of my monograph and shall return them very quickly. 
Since Frank, Freundlich and others are at work, too, we shall finish the first two 
volumes within a reasonable time – I hope so.
With the best wishes
Ever yours
[Otto Neurath]
 26. Neurath to Carnap, April 1, 1944.
(ASP RC 102-55-05)
1st April, 44
Dear Carnap,
Many thanks for your long letter, particular thanks to Ina and her efforts to per-
form the task properly to such an extent.
Eva’s death is something very terrible.260 You see we liked the Hempels as two 
extraordinary fine and decent people. There are only a few specimens of this type 
there. Poor Hempel with his baby. Both together lived on very well. He needs some 
personal care, and he got it from Eva. You see, we are depressed by many losses. A 
few weeks ago died a very fine Viennese friend of ours a young man, just over 30. 
Also an exceptional decent person …. and Susan [Stebbing]. And all the deaths in 
the concentration camps, and the suicides…. I heard from some in the last time. A 
colleague of mine in the Commercial Academy. The son of a friend came with the 
parents via Russia from Denmark to England (the Father, my friend, perhaps you 
remember him, Otto Simon interested in Esperanto, Mathematician died in USA) 
and told me of this suicide committed in Vienna, as the Nazis entered the city. Now 
these hordes will go down – but what will be then? We assume that not a few Nazis 
will hide themselves [sic] and prefer to think of the next war instead of adapting 
themselves [sic] to a new world. What a world.
260 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 24.
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I am now reading some older books, to discover the “filiation” of the Nazi argu-
ments. The main line Lagarde,261 Langbehn (Rembrandt als Erzieher)262 
Chamberlain,263 Spengler, etc. then all the typological literature, with Nohl, who 
now discovered, that Hitler implies the victory of the Platonic educational ideal. (In 
accordance with the Republic, of course – I do not object to the comparison, only 
that Nohl accept this evolution as something nice, but he supported Hans Grimm, 
Volk ohne Raum, before).264 The types are the forerunners of races, the physiog-
nomy of all kinds of race rubbish. Graphology, characterology etc. very dangerous 
spots. By the way, do you know by chance, when Br[oder] Christiansen entered 
[embraced] the Nazi ideology?265 It is manifest for me in his older writings, too, but 
later on he expresses himself very clearly. When has been the decisive step.
I knew something about him and his influence and I am always astonished, when 
people tell me of the isolated ascetic thinker in the mountains. My picture is differ-
ent. His writing is aggressive and reflects his contacts with many people. He quotes, 
of course, Nohl etc. I should like to get a vivid picture of his life, thinking and 
behaving…
What a pity, that your backbone is always troubling you. And what a situation not 
to know, what creates all the trouble. Good Nagel also complains about the doctors 
and the low stage of medical knowledge. It is tremendous this knowledge, but our 
body is very complicated and complex – that is the point. Let us hope that some-
thing will come out in the near future and the doctors can make you pain[-]free at 
least. What a [sic] good luck, that “Rockefeller” is helping you.
I am really sorry that you agree to such an extent with Schlick, Tarski and Popper 
that you feel more with them than with me. I should like to know, what Philipp 
Frank thinks on that subject. I feel that what you like, is a tendency towards 
CALCULUS, connected with some, what I would call a mixture of crude realism 
and metaphysical absolutism. You are very seldom speak[ing] of EMPIRICIST 
problems as such. I feel very uneasy. I should like to see, how we together with 
Philipp Frank and others connected with research in an empiricist field could reach 
some common field, which leads us to Semantics, as you and Tarski teach it.
261 Paul Anton de Lagarde (1827–1891) was a German orientalist.
262 August Julius Langbehn (1851–1907) was a German art historian and philosopher. He published 
“Rembrandt als Erzieher” (1890) anonymously (“Von einem Deutschen”).
263 Houston Stewart Chamberlain (1855–1927) was a British-born German philosopher, known for 
his two-volume book, The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century, which became an influential 
work in German right-wing national circles.
264 Hans Grimm (1875–1959) was a German writer, and a believer in Nazism; for the mentioned 
novel, see Grimm (1926).
265 Neurath refers presumably to Broder Christiansen (1869–1958), a philosopher of language and 
art, and old friend of Carnap. In 1933, he published a book about the foundations of graphology 
with Carnap’s first wife, Elisabeth Carnap; see Christiansen and Carnap (1933).
 Appendices
616
The two arguments fit together:
 (1) Something may form a fine and consistent calculus – I am not an expert in test-
ing calculus. Strauss has some doubts about the consistency, too. – that does not 
prohibit, that
 (2) certain “names” used, lead to a metaphysical “application” as it were. Imagine 
Cantor presenting his Mengenlehre as something on the Trinity and the unknow-
able qualities of angles etc. One could object to this “names” without criticizing 
the calculus as such.
(1) “pictures a situation” would be expressed cautiously by me “is an accepted 
observation-statement” or is an “accepted statement, because in accepted harmony 
with observation-statements”. “descriptive story” would be cautiously expressed: 
“using observation terms and accepting the statements” … to your page 61, instead 
of needs observation, I should say: need observation statements for comparison … 
My objections to “degree” of confirmation I have often explained. We do not have 
any reason to assume a one-dimensional ranking of theories.
I am not much polemizing, just I think it my “duty” at least to tell of my uneasi-
ness. Otherwise people say, who is silent, accepts. I do not accept Semantics. I feel 
wholly uneasy myself and should try to remain within the “acceptance” phraseol-
ogy, where I personally have to analyze science. More I did not in my note in my 
monograph. Very carefully. (2) I think the subject becomes so difficult, because you 
start from “this tree is green”, whereas I start from “we are using the sentence “this 
tree is green”” and do not overstep this threshold.
I think, that wherever in judicial procedures or scientific books you are using the 
term “true” a careful analysis shows you that the use leads to difficulties from [an] 
empiricist viewpoint. In a court, it is used instead of “what the court accepts” or 
something like that. Otherwise you get the situation that A says something is true, B 
says something is true, and nobody can say what is “really” true. As far as I can see, 
every person speaking carefully, would finally say “the following possibilities seem 
acceptable”. That is all. A “pluri” formulation from the start, a group of 
pluriformulations.266
I do not say we should “not speak about things we do not see” I suggest not to 
use this kind of phraseology when speaking cautiously we should not speak of a 
“thing seen by somebody”, but only “somebody says I see something” etc.
I speak of finitism in the field of observation-statements and think it is a particu-
lar question how to relate these statements to a CALCULUS, with “infinite” terms.
I am very doubtful about the term “every” within the field of experient[i]al dis-
cussions, I think it belongs to the field of calculus and very often difficulties come 
out from the scientific discussions because, I think so, the calculus terminology and 
the experiential terminology appear mixed up together.
You see the “systematization” disease, as I may call it is very dangerous. You see, 
when we assault every contradiction we cannot go on in science – the history of 
266 On “pluri-terms” and “pluri-formulations,” see Neurath (1941/1983).
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Newton’s theory is very significant. Of course I learned by heart, that any contradic-
tion in a system may “infect” each part of it. That is the logical lesson for the young-
est. But in scientific research a particular quality of a research worker is connected 
with his ability to give certain hypotheses not a comprehensive validity. Sometimes 
people apply contradictory hypotheses in different parts of their studies, avoiding 
their clash. OF COURSE WE TRY TO ELIMINATE THAT, BUT FINDING SUCH 
CONTRADICTION SHOULD NOT ALWAYS PROHIBIT US TO GO ON.
Therefore we need a teaching which stresses the two points:
 (1) how to avoid contradictions,
 (2) how to go on even when contradictions appear, if connected with “success”.
As far as I can see, the Popperism is just fighting that. One contradiction – every-
thing is lost. THAT IS OK WITHIN A CALCULUS.
More. In the Social Sciences it is epidemic to say, that one does not know at the 
moment every element needed for complete prediction, but “in principle” every-
thing is predictable, even today, if… I maintained in my EMPIRISCHE 
SOZIOLOGIE that there is a field of unpredictability “in principle”… very impor-
tant.267 Our youth did never discuss this point but maintained always the complete 
and consistent prediction scheme. You see all this talk on “unchangeable historical 
laws”, of “historical necessity” – some Marxians [sic] now are pride of that (Marx 
himself has been mainly pluralist) etc. It is important for decent decisions, to main-
tain the pluralist situation and the unpredictability.
I think what you say about [the] indispensability of systematization is not contra-
dicting my attitude, as long as one does not think
 (1) that in principle the Laplace’s Demon is the picture of the scientist in action
 (2) that one will reach the LIMIT of knowledge more and more.
But I do not see that you, Popper etc. stress this point. Just at the moment it is 
important to see, that decisions will be made based on some scientifically reached 
results, but that these decisions will be based on [i]nsufficient material, in 
principle.
One has to stress the importance of mathematics and its application to science, 
but to add that the systematization work is LIMITED TO THE CALCULUS PART 
and that the concrete predictions always have some elements of unpredictability in 
them, the predictability is some casual opportunity – that is all.
Why should we not speak about language, of course one should, but one should 
not give the impression, that the systematization of a construed language is in any 
extent transferable AS SUCH to the experiential scientific language, whereas the 
ITEMS OF SYSTEMATIZATION are of greatest importance. NO DEFAITISM 
[DEFEATISM], [o]n the contrary. I think the system fetishism of Popper is [a] 
defaitist [defeatist].268
267 See Neurath (1931/1973, 369. ff.).
268 See Carnap’s observations on defeatism in letter 24.
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I should like to read one day an application of Popper to scientific analysis as 
such. As far as I can see, he is “absolute” – as I have maintained – in the idea of the 
BEST WORLD[-]SYSTEM, compared with others and in his contradiction princi-
ple as THE LEADING PRINCIPLE, whereas we try to eliminate contradictions or 
to localize them. Just this skill, as mentioned above, characterizes the experiential 
scientist.
I do not agree with your BEHAVIOUR statement, that unfavorable cases have a 
much stronger influence than unfavorable. That depends upon situation, people etc. 
Did you check up your assumption? You see, to find some extraordinary positive 
case is so exciting, that one tries to invalidate the trivial negative ones. In the empiri-
cist sciences you are in a position to give the cases different weight and to “hope” 
that something may be eliminated afterwards.
I know relatively well the Ehrenhaft discussion.269 Where certain research work-
ers got extraordinary points outside the expected curve, they assumed “the tram has 
been disturbing the electric apparatus”. To what extent this assumption is “sound” 
or not is not so simply to say. Ehrenhaft fought such “tram” cases, of course, but the 
leading physicists did not. Further, Ehrenhaft presented dozens of count[er]-experi-
ments against the electricity elementary unit, but the others remained unshaken the 
NUMBER of positive instances seemed too big. I had a correspondence with 
Thirring270 about this point from Holland, just because I am really interested in how 
science goes on. In sociology I know that the Popper habit would kill most investi-
gations and every accepted going on in some fields, and I wanted to know whether 
physicists behave differently – not at all. I should like to find a collaborator, [so] that 
we could analyze the Ehrenhaft discussion. I convinced some people that Ehrenhafts 
remarks are more sound than they thought and nevertheless said that their opposi-
tion remains sound from point of view of the positive instances. You never entered 
this argument. A pity.
POPPER is NOT a first approximation, on the contrary. He kills the bird in the 
egg.
The same with (2). Of course any wise scientist is interested in negative cases, 
but he is particularly interested in positive ones. Predicting correctly some earth-
quakes is something and the negative results may be regarded as based on mistakes 
in assumptions, mistakes in the calculus etc. etc. The thinking of the clear cut 
scheme as THE model is dangerous.
269 Neurath possibly refers Felix Ehrenhaft (1879–1952), an Austrian physicist who worked in 
Vienna. He is mainly known for his contribution to the measurement of electrical charges. Neurath 
might refer to the debate between the “Viennese physicists” (including Ehrenhaft) and Ernest 
Rutherford who pursued physical experiments in the Cavendish Laboratory at the University of 
Cambridge. On the debate about the results and interpretation of the Cambridge-Vienna experi-
ments, see Hughes (2016).
270 Hans Thirring (1888–1976) was an Austrian theoretical physicist, who worked in Vienna as the 
head of the institute for theoretical physics. Thirring was the leading member of a committee inves-
tigating alleged cases of psychic powers; other members were Moritz Schlick and Hans Hahn.
 Appendices
619
You see, as often, you treat complexes of arguments as if they were carefully 
selected. In the case of [P]opper. SOME ELEMENTS ARE METAPHYSICAL – 
absolutism, OTHERS are not in accordance with the scientific practice. But both 
items are connected in his writings. You see the idea of THE system – optimum etc. 
seems to be metaphysically approached, but the story of the universal laws perhaps 
only an objected application of some calculus. Should he connect it with the 
WORLD system, then it would be metaphysical, too.
In your language: EITHER I give Popper the OPTIMUM-SYSTEM interpreta-
tion, where he speaks of the importance of negative instances – then I reject the 
whole approach.
OR – I speak only of the application of a calculus principle then I reject the appli-
cation only.
We know from experience, that very often the metaphysical jump starts [sic], 
where a mere CALCULUS approach has been regarded as an experiential state-
ment, a world-statement e.g.
I think Popper being metaphysician proper. You never answered my 
ERKENNTNIS article in your letters, only in general terms.271
POPPER page 6 e.g. speaks of “strengen Nachpruefungen”, as if any negative 
instance would be per se sufficiently “streng”.272 You always can assume, that the 
negative instance will be weakened afterwards as you may weaken a positive 
instance. This assumption that the [i]nequality starts here is not based on anything 
experiential.
p. 9 he fights the intention to base all scientific statements on observation- 
statements as “induction logic”….273
p. 11. ‘wir vermuten, dass wissenschaftliche Forschung psychologisch gesehen, 
ohne einen… wenn man will “metaphysischen” Glauben an manchmal hoechst 
unklare theoretische Ideen wohl gar nicht moeglich ist. WHY “GLAUBEN” C274
then
jenes System, das wir “empirische Wissenschaft” nennen, soll aber nur die eine 
“wirkliche Welt”, die “Welt” unserer Erfahrungswirklichkeit darstellen.275
271 Neurath presumably refers to his review of Popper’s Logik der Forschung; see Neurath 
(1935/1983).
272 Popper (1935/2002, 10): “severe tests.” All the quotations in the following footnotes are to the 
English translation of Popper’s book.
273 Popper (1935/2002, 13).
274 Popper (1935/2002, 16): “[…] looking at the matter from the psychological angle, I am inclined 
to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith […] which is completely unwarranted 
from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical.’” Neurath asks, 
“WHY FAITH?”
275 Popper (1935/2002, 16): “Yet the system called ‘empirical science’ is intended to represent only 
one world: the ‘real world’ or the ‘world of our experience.’”
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I AM JUST FIGHTING THAT AS A METAPHYSICAL SENTENCE.  THE 
ONE REALITY.
ausgezeichnet “unsere Erfahrungswelt” I speak of pluri-statements and therefore 
I see no way how to reach THE ONE WORLD, or THE ONE PREFERRED 
SYSTEM OF STATEMENTS.
I should like to learn from you, what you say about that. I think Philipp Frank 
fought sufficiently the ONE REAL WORLD besides the MANY POSSIBLE 
WORLDS, I myself and he and Duhem and Poincare belong together, we are only 
more consistent than Duhem and Poincare – I think so.
p. 13 Ein empirisch-wissenschaf. System muss an der Erfahrung scheitern koen-
nen.276 (since no EXACTNESS exists in experiential complexes or statements, but 
only in CALCULUS, what does this sentence intend according to your opinion?)
p. 15 Beziehung zwischen Basissaetzen und den Wahrnehmungs erlebnisse277 – 
that is Schlick’s story with all its difficulties I criticized in a particular article.278
p. 17 der die Versuchsanordnung nach Vorschrift aufbaut ALWAYS place and 
time are different, therefore the “ceteris paribus” always questionable. p. 18 inter-
subjectiv nachpruefbar….279 There are many statements, we may call “empiricist” 
because combinable with observation-statements, but not “assayable” in the way, 
Popper thinks. You agree with me, I think so, on this point.
p. 22 Methodenlehre nicht empirische Wissenschaft….280 What you say about 
that?
p. 28. spezifische und numerische Allgemeinheit.281 That belongs to the existence 
formulations and the every formulation by Russell. Why not in principle speak 
within the empiricist part of the science only of “numerische Allgemeinheit” and 
what is more put into the calculus.
276 Popper (1935/2002, 18): “[…] it must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be refuted 
by experience.” Original emphasis.
277 Popper (1935/2002, 21): “This is especially true of the relation between perceptual experiences 
and basic statements.”
278 Presumably Neurath (1934/1983).
279 Popper (1935/2002, 24): “[…] by anyone who carries out the appropriate experiment in the way 
prescribed.”
280 Popper (1935/2002, 31): “But what I call ‘methodology’ should not be taken for an empirical 
science.”
281 Popper (1935/2002, 40): “Strict and numerical universality.”
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Universelle Es-gibt-Saetze sind nicht falsifizierbar. Wir werden deshalb sie… als 
nichtempirisch (“metaphysisch”) bezeichnen muessen.282 JUST THAT IS THE 
POINT. In my notes, you find the remark “PLEASE”.
I can bring forward heaps of examples, that one starts with such predictions, 
hypotheses upon “we shall find…” and then we find, what we tried to find… just 
that seems to be extraordinary empiricist… what you think about it? Usually, like a 
lawyer you will belittle all these sentences, but then I do not know, for what purpose 
Popper wrote the whole book, if not, for maintaining just these points. He is not the 
only ANTISCIENTIFIC person, who starts from EXACTNESS, fighting common 
sense empiricism as I suggest.
p. 60 beobachtbar nicht psychologisch283 – I do not know how to make head or 
tail of that.
p. 63 fast immer die experimentelle FASIFIKATION einer als bewaehrt aner-
kannten Theorie die den Fortschritt erzwingt- also wieder die von der Theorie 
geleitete Nachpruefung.284 I think Popper made this statement without looking into 
the history of the sciences. Usually hypotheses are so vague in some points, that one 
does not even know how to “disconfirm” them. Soe [sic]  “aberrations” one just 
bears, others not…. usually NEW CORRELATIONS APPEAR, NOT COVERED 
UP TO NOW, not contradicted by the theories in action. Etc… it is a long story. Do 
you think this statement by Popper is in accordance with the history of the 
sciences?
Zufallsentdeckungen ….
p. 67 Pruefbarkeits-oder Falsifizierbarkeitsgrad.285 You know my objections to 
that. What you think about it?
p. 199. Wir betrachten also im allgemeinen eine… intersubj-nachpruefbare 
Falsifikation als endgiltig. Darin eben drueckt sich die Assymetrie zwischen Verifi. 
und Fals. aus.
p. 206. experimentum crucis ….286
What do you say about all that. Do you think it is in accordance with observation- 
statements in which scientists appear going on with scientific research with “defi-
nitely” killed theories ---- oh my dear, what a vision….
282 Popper (1935/2002, 48): “Strictly existential statements […] cannot be falsified. I shall therefore 
have to treat [them] as non-empirical or ‘metaphysical.’” German original on p. 33.
283 Popper (1935/2002, 85): ‘observable not psychological.’
284 Popper (1935/2002, 90): “What compels the theorist […] in these cases, is almost always the 
experimental falsification of a theory, so far accepted and corroborated: it is, again, the outcome of 
tests guided by theory.”
285 Popper (1935/2002, 90): “Accidental discoveries...” [German phrase on p. 64.], and p. 95: “vari-
ous degrees of testability or falsifiability.”
286 Popper (1935/2002, 267): “In general we regard an inter-subjectively testable falsification as 
final […]: this is the way in which the asymmetry between verification and falsification of theories 
makes itself felt.” For experimentum crusis, see Popper (1935/2002, 224).
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Again, as long as we remain within the negative and positive instances, I REJECT 
THE STATEMENTS, AS FAR AS HISTORY OF THE SCIENCES IS 
CONCERNED, but as far as this assumptions are connected with the ONE WORLD, 
I drop the expression as such, “isolated” – “metaphysical”.
I should appreciate it very much, if you asked Philipp Frank in a letter about the 
expressions mentioned page 5 by you, as challenged by me. Of course I should sug-
gest to avoid in CAREFUL ANALYSIS “fact”, “error”, “explanation” ----- Of 
course I am against the expression “explanation” because we – that is the Mach 
school, if you would use this term, – Philipp Frank, etc. try to avoid “explanation” 
as something besides finding correlations. You know the discussion about 
“Erklaerung” and Kirchhoff[’]s statement on “description”.287 Of course it would be 
pedantic always to avoid the term “explanation” but I personally should dislike to 
use the term as the heading of scientific analysis as such. Of course “description” 
may involve, what Stebbing calls “constructive description” or whatever,288 but it 
has been just a success, as we think, that Kirchhoff lead us away from the 
“Erklaerung” (“explanation”) to the correlation point of view. I should suggest that 
Frank discusses that with you, Morris and Feigl. I cannot think, that Feigl’s point of 
view is chained to the dangerous term “explanation” which just indicated through 
decades, what we are fighting. I think so. Occasionally using the term “explanation” 
is not of importance. I think it is SERIOUS. Of Course, if Feigl insists I should not 
prevent him going on, we are in a free republic of scientists, but I should make it a 
condition that at least Philipp Frank together with you, Morris will talk over the 
matter with Feigl. Frank knows the discussion in all details. I know many statements 
in Pearson289 and other people who mean something for us, just supporting our 
Kirchhoff.
I do not use the term “method” because it becomes often a very metaphysical 
implication, perhaps scientific technique would be better, it sounds very concrete.
Yes, the greatest pleasure would it be to have a long talk and correspondence 
about my manuscript. But, I have been a little worried by the attitude of the Press, 
and therefore I tried to avoid any delay. I did not thought [think] – I confess – of 
anything else, but the continuation of our Encyclopedia. Now the end of the war is 
coming and therefore the encyclopedia will be of educational importance now. You 
see, coming out of the internment, I had to take care of our Visual Education insti-
287 Gustav R.  Kirchhoff (1824–1887), German physicist who also coined the term “black-body 
radiation,” advocated his so-called doctrine of description, with a rejection of causal explanation 
as a goal of science, in 1875 in a series of inaugural lectures on mechanics at the University of 
Berlin; see the Preface to his Vorlesungen über Mathematische Physik. Mechanik (1875).
288 Since Susan Stebbing did not use the phrase “constructive description” (Neurath’s uncertainty 
as “‘constructive description’ or whatever” was not accidental thus), the best candidate for what 
Neurath might have in mind is Stebbing (1933), where she discussed various forms and means of 
analysis and construction.
289 Karl Pearson (1857–1936) was an English mathematician and statistician, who wrote the influ-
ential The Grammar of Science (1892).
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tute and to prepare everything for that – we succeeded completely in going on with 
our work. Then I had to lecture at Oxford University – of course helping me in mak-
ing my manuscript but nevertheless I had to look through many books not immedi-
ately necessary, the Professor invited me and attended kindly the lectures is an 
anthropologist and therefore I spoke more of anthropology as I did usually.290 I liked 
it very much, but it needs some time to see how “functionalism” goes on, and how 
the discussion stands just at the moment. Of course I know the main lines by heart. 
I had to look through the history of anthropology as you had to look another day 
through the history of philosophy. Then I had to start with reconstructing my manu-
script, in Hitler[’]s hands. That is sometimes less pleasant, than starting from 
scratch. You feel “I said it SOOOOOO fine”, and then you want to remember your 
slogans… Boy, boy. That is not always joy only. But then I started writing and 
enjoyed it very much and I think I improved many parts. I could go on in one style, 
whereas in Holland I always “mended” and “altered” already written chapters…. I 
had preferred it of course to have your remarks before. Please, look into the last 
proofs I shall get and if you think I should alter some overstatement, please tell me 
so. I like to be in harmony with you. I have the feeling to continue your Logical 
Syntax period291 before you became Tarskisized [sic] with some Aristotelian fla-
vour, which I detest. I always fear, that you, a calculatory genius, supports a kind of 
possible scholasticism who leads away from scientific empiricism. Historically it 
seems a dangerous strain, as you may judge from Lukasiewicz[’s] contacts with 
Thomism etc. I do not want to overstate this point. But, I repeat I feel uneasy.
Please, tell me, how Frank thinks of all that, he is such an empiricist common- 
sense boy.
You will get the INTERGLOSSA. I shall be interested in your remarks.292
Fine, that you and Morris agree with Hogben’s collaboration. Let us hope it will 
be some fine piece of work. He is sometimes strange in his formulations – let us 
hope the best. He is clever and an empiricist interested in language, but in a different 
way as [than] we are.
I do not know anything about Waismann, but that he teaches Philosophy. [The] 
[s]uicide[’s] reason? We only know, that certain mental difficulties appeared some 
time ago before she committed suicide.293
Thanks for the snapshot. I should like a snapshot which includes Ina. When we 
shall be together again, surrounded by fruit juice tins. Grape fruit juice etc… Now 
we have much pleasure in eating and drinking oranges and lemons. You remember 
the oranges arrived together with time bombs. Now they removed the time bombs 
290 The anthropologist is Alfred Reginald Radcliffe-Brown; see letter 13, note 124.
291 See Carnap (1937).
292 See Carnap’s letter to Neurath, letter 27.
293 See letter 22, note 222.
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and we got the oranges. Food is excellent and the British are fine. We have more and 
more acquaintances and feel wholly at home. Less [Fewer] tensions than in Austria 
or in other countries.
I should like, if you did take care in your writings on probability, degree of con-
firmation etc., of the distinction between CALCULUS and EXPERIENTIAL state-
ments. Probability seems to be a pure calculus term and the degree of confirmation 
seem perhaps only possible within the framework of a MODEL, not within a con-
crete theory. But, of course, the results may allow us some applications. Duhem 
tried to show what types of formulas cannot be applied to physics, and I think simi-
lar remarks could be made always.
We wait for the collection of photographs, you promised to send. We are in good 
health, happy and active. Everything succeeds up to now. We always wish that all 
our friends would be in a similar position. We do not like to know friends being in 
difficult situations, ill, sorry, or something like that. How limited is our power to do 
something for friends.
Now we, as Austrians, shall become sooner or later co-belligerents, we hope so. 
Kind regards from both of us to both of you
Yours ever,
Neurath
 27. Carnap to Neurath, October 7, 1944.
(ASP RC 102-55-07)
Rudolf Carnap
University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois
October 7, 1944
Dear Neurath:
We are back in Chicago after two years of absence. We are still in a Hotel, for 
weeks now, but we hope to come into an apartment next week at last, though not a 
satisfactory one. Everything is overcrowded here. My back is much improved, so 
that I have no difficulty in giving my lectures. Hempel was with us in Santa Fe for 
several weeks and we enjoyed it very much. Although the hard shock which he suf-
fered from Eva’s death is still noticeable, he seems to be over the hump by now.294
Now about your monograph.295 Last December I did not see your ms. because 
you wished to be rushed to the printer and I agreed. I expected then to get the proofs 
soon and then to have an opportunity to write to you still if necessary. In March I 
asked Morris to send me either the ms. or if it were already in print, the proofs. 
294 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 24.
295 Neurath, Foundations of the Social Sciences (1944).
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However, by some mistake I did not get the proofs before June. And then I saw they 
were already in pages. I read the monograph with great interest, there are many 
interesting and stimulating discussions in it. However, I must tell you frankly, then 
I found the formulations in many places unclear; they were apparently formulated 
in great haste. I understand your reason for this; you wanted to finish it quickly 
because the Press was already impatient. But I think it would have been much more 
important to have the monograph in good shape than to publish it as quickly as pos-
sible. On my question, Morris answered that any changes were by that time impos-
sible because they would cause too great expenses and delays. Thus I could not do 
anything more about it, although I regretted it very much. You will understand that 
I did not wish to be made responsible for something that I had not seen and that if I 
had seen it, I should not have approved. On the other hand, I did not wish to take any 
conspicuous step, as e.g. the removal of my name from the title page. Therefore I 
choose a quite non-conspicuous way which will not be noticed by most readers296; I 
asked Morris to have a note printed on the back of the title page above the copy right 
saying that because of special circumstances I do not share the editorial responsibil-
ity for this monograph. I think there is no point in going into the details which I 
disapprove because it is too late anyway. Let me only remark that these points con-
cern language and careless formulations, lack of explanations of your new terms, 
etc… but not differences between our opinions. In most points I agree with the 
general attitude which you take in the monograph. There are a few points, some old, 
some new in which we differ. Those I hope to discuss with you sometimes in the 
future. But I must say that in many points I would not know whether I agree with 
you or not because your opinion is not formulated in a sufficiently clear and under-
standable way.
Many thanks for sending me Hogben’s “Interglossa”. I read it with very great 
interest, and I own and read likewise “The Loom of Language”297 which I found 
likewise very interesting and which in some points gives more detailed explanations 
of the reasons for Hogben’s decisions. In some points this new language has made 
important improvements in comparison with the earlier projects. I am not quite sure 
whether the choice of mostly Greek word roots is the best possible. I have always 
thought that any new project should make improvements in two important respects: 
(1) to utilize the improvements made in Basic English, especially the principle of 
word economy; (2) certain improvements in the logical structure of the language 
which might be learned from symbolic logic. Hogben has done very well in the first 
point; and his construction of a very simple syntax is a great achievement. However, 
with respect to logic his language seems to me to have some weak points; e.g. the 
296 Actually one review noticed the fact that Carnap had withdrawn his name. The author was “V. C. 
A.,” presumably Virgil C. Aldrich (1945, 470).
297 On “Interglossa” see letters 11, 16 and 28. Hogben edited Frederick Bodmer’s The Loom of 
Language: A Guide to Foreign Languages for the Home Student (1944). The book was the third in 
a series that aimed at the education of masses, at interpretation of science to the layman.
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line between observable things and properties is not always drawn in the right place, 
and the whole matter of this distinction between the word classes could probably be 
simplified still more; further his treatment of “all”, “every”, “any”, “some” etc. is 
not satisfactory. The examples of translations which he gives at the end deviate in 
many points considerably from the original; thus a retranslation into English would 
lead to quite different texts. Tests of this kind made with earlier languages (e.g. 
Esperanto and Ido) had much better results.
I have worked much on the construction of a new system of inductive logic, i.e. 
a theory of the degree of confirmation. It will become a large book. Part of it is writ-
ten, but it will take a long time until it is finished. Therefore, I have now written a 
paper in which I outline the chief results.298 I hope it will appear about next winter, 
then I shall send you a reprint. I am very much interested in getting your comments 
and criticisms on it. You wrote recently that you assume that I know your reasons 
for the rejection of the concept of the degree of confirmation. However, I know only 
the fact of your rejection of it, not the reasons. I should be very glad if you could 
outline or at least briefly indicate them to me.
At present I do not have your letters with me. Therefore, I shall take an opportu-
nity of answering questions in them at a later time.
Cordially yours,
C.
[Handwritten note:
P.S. Please excuse my long silence. The reason is that Ina could not type either, 
because of sciatica.]
 28. Neurath to Carnap, November 18, 1944.
(ASP RC 102-55-06)
18th Nov. 44
Dear Carnap,
I am glad to hear that you are now relatively well and starting lecturing again. 
Poor Hempel. Very often I think of his fate and of nice Eva, too.299
On INTERGLOSSA.300 I think its word economy is sufficient, but word econ-
omy in itself is a very dangerous principle. Since we wrote a book in BASIC 
ENGLISH,301 we have some experience in handling it. You see the word economy 
298 The book is The Logical Foundations of Probability published in 1950 after all; and the paper is 
presumably “The Two Concepts of Probability,” Carnap (1945a).
299 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 24.
300 Hogben (1943), see letters 11, 16 and 27.
301 Neurath might have in mind his International Picture Language (1936).
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implies, that you are using the same word in very different, sometimes strange ways, 
that you have to think, how can we find an IDIOMATIC English expression, com-
posed of the words permitted and then something very metaphorical or allegorical 
comes out. To remember the idiomatically permitted strange combinations is much 
more depressing the beginner, than the learning of some clearcut expressions, which 
cover, what you want to say perfectly.
I did not see, that you and many other people who like [the] WORD ECONOMY 
did realize this point sufficiently. Just, where you want to be exact the word econ-
omy is preventing you from doing so very often. Of course, very often you learn to 
use a simple word combination instead of a strange term, but sometimes it is 
different.
What source of words, would you suggest? Hogben’s argument runs as follow: 
when using the Greek roots in already USED SCIENTIFIC TERMS, you either 
know the term, or when not, you are learning something useful for your scientific 
reading and writing. INTERGLOSSA is particularly thought of as a congress and 
academy language.
The other points are more important. It would be useful if you could write some-
thing about that. I like The Loom of Language – a little too large, I think at least. I 
think again of the possibility to ask the author for a paper for the encyclopedia on 
artificial languages, perhaps a paper written by him and you together. At the moment 
is a boom in artificial language discussion and we should have a great public. I did 
not suggest that to Morris und you, before asking you about your opinion. You 
remember I thought of HOGBEN as author of such a paper but now I think this new 
combination is even better than Hogben, because he would be [the] judge in his own 
case. Please think it over carefully.
I am very doubtful about your system of inductive logic i.e. a theory of the degree 
of confirmation. You see the degrees of confirmation etc. seem to anticipate that you 
are sure of ONE LIMIT OF THE SERIES, as it were, how you can say so? I do not 
know any empiricist material, which permits us to apply all this stuff on confirma-
tion. Assum[ing] that the calculus in itself is OK – which I think is not sure, – how 
should a group of protocol statements look like, that you can speak of “degree of 
confirmation”? Can you give me any example? Of course you can always make an 
utopian structure on which you can demonstrate that, but then – you will see – you 
always will speak of THE REALITY (in some or another way, more or less con-
cealed) and not of possibilities (pluralism). I should like to know, how you now look 
at Reichenbach’s attempts to create a kind of inductive logic.302 I personally see not 
even a possible way to overcome the difficulty to substitute [replace] a “decision” 
by [with] a calculus.
You never answered these points, e.g. by presenting a simple example, how you 
are using the words. Reading your papers, Kaplan’s papers,303 Hempel’s papers, 
302 See, for example, Reichenbach (1938) and (1940).
303 Presumably Kaplan (1942) and (1943).
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Morris’ papers, I always feel that they are, what I would call anti-pluralist from 
start. I know very well to what extent we agree, when removing the usual meta-
physical speculations, but I think the anti-pluralist attitude, which starts from ONE 
world[-]system as more plausible than all others  – the substitute for THE ONE 
REALITY – comes very often in the foreground. I do not deny that the calculi so 
evolved may be of great use sometimes, even I want to stress, that some of the more- 
than- one-level discussions, which form the basis of semantics are very useful, AS 
LONG AS THEY ARE USED FOR THE REALM OF STATEMENTS – therefore 
with a pluralist possibility – and not in the realm of statement-things, because one 
thing-phraseology as you use it is an anti-pluralist one. I see the scientific enterprise 
in comparing protocol statements and their derivates and in discovering some ways 
how [sic] to fit them together, as far as possible, whereby we have to select already 
ARBITRARILY certain formulations. Any protocol-statement is a pluralist one and 
therefore any selection already brings with it the other possibilities, too.
I think this antagonism between us is an old one. And perhaps something in your 
unexpected behaviour may be connected with that. I should even prefer this hypoth-
esis to the assumption that you like to insult me. You see, you write in your letter of 
October 7,304 “BY SOME MISTAKE I DID NOT GET THE PROOFS BEFORE 
JUNE (no guilt from my side, therefore)… You will understand that I did not wish 
to be made responsible for something that I had not seen und [sic] that if I had seen 
it I should not have approved.” That sounds as if we as editors had to approve 
papers. After we accepted an author (perhaps after reading his syllabus) he has only 
to send us the manuscript, we may make remarks and ask for alterations, should he 
decline that, we have to print the paper. WE ARE ONLY RESPONSIBLE FOR 
THE SELECTION OF THE AUTHOR. Remember, what difficulties we had with 
Bloomfield in inserting even that spoken and written languages may be regarded 
side by side. Assume he had declined to mention that, then we had to print it, of 
course.305 We are not a censoring body only an editing one, which forces the authors 
to read our remarks, to GIVE HIM THE OPPORTUNITY TO KNOW WHAT HE 
IS DOING, THAT IS ALL.
Then you continue with quasi-kindness: “on the other hand I did not wish to take 
any conspicuous step, as e.g. the removal of my name from the title page. Therefore 
I chose the quite non-conspicuous way which will not be noticed by most readers; I 
asked Morris to have a note printed on the back of the title page… that because of 
special circumstances (A VERY BAD FORMULA WHICH CAN IMPLY 
EVERYTHING) I do not share the editorial responsibility for this monograph.” You 
could imagine that you suggested alterations and then I declined to make them. 
Then the paper should appear without touching any editor’s scruples [sic] - or did 
you ever think differently of our rights?
304 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 27.
305 Leonard Bloomfield (1887–1949) was an American linguist who wrote a monograph on the 
Linguistic Aspects of Science (1939) for the IEUS (I-4).
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“Points concern language and careless formulations lack of explanation of your 
new terms etc.” You see without giving any examples, that sounds rather aggressive. 
Imagine, that you say together with that, that MORRIS did not do his duty in not 
mentioning that to me. You stress the point, that not “differences between our opin-
ions” did move you. I should like to know something about the defects, you 
mention.
But now about the personal side of this matter. I ask me, how can a friend grieve 
me so much and without any manifest reason. Listen, Carnap, if this were the first, 
I should look into my own behaviour, but you see, you grieved me again and again. 
It started particularly, as you wrote your article about physics as a universal lan-
guage of science.306 In spite of the fact that you used results of our discussions of my 
remarks made in the Vienna Circle, you did not even mention me, walking over me 
as a nonentitiy [sic]. You remember I protested intensely and you inserted then the 
note, which tries to state my part in the whole realm of discussions. This experience 
depressed me very much.
But that was not the first and not the last time you grieved me. One day you wrote 
me a letter, in a similar teacher[-]like tone, that you can hardly accept an article of 
mine for the ERKENNTNIS, since my style of presentation did not reach the level, 
wanted there etc., etc.307 Carnap, Carnap, when I look at the articles the 
ERKENNTNIS published usually and then look at my articles with all their defects, 
I think they do not belong to the worst there and in the literature they are sufficiently 
quoted and discussed. You are usually not very critical towards other people, but 
particularly irritated by me. And now after some smaller incidents, not so important, 
you produce this newest piece of unkindness.
You see, we are living in difficult times, we have to try to be as kind to another 
as possible, there are difficulties in making anything. One has to [be] glad, that one 
overcomes all difficulties, etc. I can hardly imagine, that a kind of feeling of “duty” 
or something like that lead you to such a decision and action. But it may be that or 
that. You grieved me, did you anticipate that, then I [would] tell you, that you 
reached your goal, did you not imagine that, then I tell you that you did it.
When I think of our movement, any such behaviour seems to me unwise. In my 
letter to Morris I touch [on] this point. I can hardly assume that the reactions by 
[from] you are fully independent of your attitude towards the problems themselves. 
I see three periods of your evolution, which always lead to a possible irritation.
It started with the Wittgenstein boom. I remember how you and Feigl pressed for 
inserting a high praise of Wittgenstein into the WIENER KREIS pamphlet.308 I 
306 See Carnap (1931/1934). The most comprehensive article on Neurath’s and Carnap’s debate 
over priority is Uebel (1995b).
307 Neurath presumably refers to Carnap’s letter from March 2, 1932 (RC 029-12-61) where he 
stated that Neurath’s “Sociology in the Framework of Physicalism” paper (1932b/1983) was 
unclear and its main points were not understood in the Circle.
308 See Carnap, Hahn and Neurath (1929/1973). On the history of the pamphlet (usually called as 
the “manifesto of the Circle”), see Uebel (2008).
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looked at Wittgenstein – and said so and wrote so – as an antiscientific thinker full 
of metaphysics, etc. I never could realize, how Schlick, Waismann, you and Hahn 
have been so impressed by him. Of course he produced many very clever and stimu-
lating ideas, but the “negative” items are very high. I had the feeling that my reso-
lute behaviour against Wittgenstein in some way or another disturbed all of you. 
When I look at the empiricist Elements of our circle I should arrange them as 
follow:
FRANK, who in my eyes is the most balanced empiricist, we have. Perhaps less 
interested in some sharp formulations than sometimes may be useful, but far from 
any kind of scholasticism. Usually in Prague.
NEURATH
HAHN
CARNAP Centre of the empiricists in Vienna.
SCHLICK Centre of all together in Vienna.
WAISMANN
KAUFMANN Two anti-empi-
NEUMANN.309 ricists.
You see this visual joke helps me to present my case clearly. You always had a 
certain inclination towards PYRAMIDISM, how [as] I call it. You want  – as I 
explained to you some day in Vienna – to have some top of a pyramid and then nice 
deductive chains leading to the bottom. You answered that you really like that and 
that you are rather astonished that I reject this ideal totally. You see, in LOGISCHER 
AUFBAU DER WELT you did even show some inclination towards the 
GEISTESWISSENSCHAFTEN etc.310 And now I appeared as something irritating 
you, because much more “strong” than others in presenting my case, perhaps 
because I did not publish regularly my ideas, as you and others did and used the 
discussion as my medium.
The next period may be characterized by your inclination towards Popper, Logik 
der Forschung311 – you preferred his attitude to mine. I think today, what I thought 
then, that you like the strong antithesis of YES and NO in his looking at positive and 
negative instances, and then his tendency to start from ONE world system, as the 
most complete one.
And then came Tarski, whose Aristotelian Metaphysics seem to you useful in 
building up semantics. What may be helpful in building up a calculus, can become 
very dangerous in preparing an instrument for empiricism. Should my guess be 
309 Presumably Robert Neumann, a high-school teacher, who was a regular attendant of the Vienna 
Circle meetings on Thursdays.
310 See Carnap (1928/1967, §§23–24). On the Aufbau and the Geisteswissenschaften, see Dewulf 
(2017) and Tuboly (2019).
311 See Popper (1935/2002).
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acceptable, that you FEEL A LITTLE THAT YOU ARE IN SOME WAY 
UNEMPIRICIST, then I should understand that I myself as your bad conscience 
irritate you enormously. That would make me more prepared to take your tendency 
to grieve me easier.
Let me come to an end. All that is guess work, but I think I should write it to you 
since I would say it to you. Of course writing and speaking are different, scripta 
litera manet, but I tried to write as peacefully [calmly] as possible, whereas in a 
conversation I should call you names, as usual.
In spite of the fact that all such events touch me very much, I usually overcome 
them and discover a way how [sic] to go on better than before. You see, your treating 
me badly by not mentioning me, induced me to start with publishing my main ideas 
regularly  – I like that now. Your letter on my articles hardly acceptable for the 
Erkenntnis immediately induced me to create the series EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT, 
where I could publish my own stuff whenever I wanted to do it, without any consent 
from my strong teacher.312 Of course I did not insult you but invited you to be with 
me and to publish there, you by me highly admired giant of Logical analysis and a 
man who unveils the secrets of so many metaphysicians …. And so life could go on 
in a rather smooth way, as far as we are concerned. Now I got my fill again – let us 
wait, what nice activity will come out from that, what new plan, which will enable 
us to co-operate better than before……. Let me assume that you will grieve me next 
time within one decade, then in the following decade – but I think there will hardly 
be more than three decades, therefore no more than three grievances – I shall pre-
pare myself for that.
I am rather an APARESH – should you know of these people – who are well 
acquainted with living peacefully together, but not with fighting one another. They 
bear any insult very intensely and hardly know how to answer… The same is with 
me. I am sad and feel myself very clumsy in writing such a letter, but I should also 
feel myself rather clumsy writing no letter at all. And I manifestly am not suffi-
ciently educated to write the letter, which “SHOULD” be written. …….
That is that. Let us hope that we shall have good time together when we shall 
meet again. I hope we shall have a good air communication after the European war 
will be over.
With our best wishes for your health, remember us to Ina,
Always yours
Otto Neurath
OTTO NEURATH, 30 Bickerton Road, Headington, OXFORD
312 The pamphlets from the series Einheitswissenschaft were translated and republished later in 
English, see McGuinnes (1987).
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 29. Carnap to Neurath, May 6, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-21)
RUDOLF CARNAP
Faculty Exchange
University of Chicago
CHICAGO, ILL.
May 6, 1945
Dear Neurath,
A short time ago, we had the pleasure of seeing Paul,313 who was in Chicago for 
a few hours. We had not seen him since the days in the The Hague in 1934. In these 
years he has developed to a very fine young man. The grave experiences he has gone 
through have not made him bitter against fate and humanity. He seems quite cheer-
ful. And although he is somewhat gloomy, like all of us, about the prospect of the 
political development in the peace time ahead, he has, like you and me, not given up 
a certain optimism about the future development “in the long run”. He has a well- 
matured and independent judgment on persons, situations, books etc. From what he 
reported about arrangements he makes to get his students into contact with institu-
tions where they can practically apply their theoretical statistical methods, he seems 
to be an excellent teacher. Also he seems very industrious and is studying in spite of 
his heavy teaching load, various things outside of but in connection with his special 
field, so that his work will gain a broader basis. I am sure he has a fine career ahead 
of him.
Now to the sad affair of your monograph and your letter of Nov.18.314 I am very 
sorry that refusal to share the editorial responsibility for your monograph, caused 
you so much grief, but I do not see how I could help it. I had not the least intention 
to insult you. You should not take the matter so tragically, and above all, you should 
not take it so personally and with so violent emotions. Everyone of us has some-
times the experience that a publication of his is regarded by some of his friends as 
rather weak. We have to bear it and not take it as a personal insult. (For instance, I 
was rather shocked to read Nagel’s extremely critical review of my “Semantics”, but 
I never thought of regarding it as a personal insult.)315 If everybody took such things 
personally and always reacted with violent moral reproaches (as you do in your let-
ter, and you did before several times towards me when I simply followed my own 
judgment as editor or author, and another time towards Schlick) how would good 
cooperation and friendship be possible? I did not let my personal relation with 
Nagel be disturbed by what he did to my book. And I wish very much that you 
313 Neurath’s son, Paul Neurath, see letter 5, note 63; letter 9, note 100; letter 16, note 146.
314 Neurath to Carnap, see letter 28.
315 See Nagel (1942).
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would take the same attitude towards me. In fact, I have waited all the time whether 
another letter might not come from you in a more conciliatory tone, so that I would 
be allowed to forget the bitter, ironical and sarcastic remarks in your last letter.
There seems to be one point which must be cleared up among the three of us;316 
that is the question of our editorial rights. I shall outline my conception of them; if 
I am mistaken, please let me know. (i) I agree with you that in questions of content 
the author has the final decision. If an editor has an opinion different from the author 
in some point, he can only make a suggestion and state his reasons; the author is free 
to accept the suggestion or to stick to his point. (Thus, e.g. Bloomfield would have 
had the right to maintain his point of view in the question of “written languages”.) 
(ii) On the other hand, the editors are the final judges in points of the following kind: 
choice of the topic (in general lines, not in all details), arrangement of the subject- 
matter, way of representation, including comprehensibility for our readers and cor-
rectness of language, and the like. These and similar points are usually regarded as 
editorial matters in a collective work like the Encycl. Therefore, if our present 
arrangement – contrary to my assumption – does not include these things among our 
editorial rights, then I suggest strongly that we change it accordingly. For, if a reader 
criticizes points of this kind, he will always make the editors responsible too, not 
only the author.
You ask what are the points of my criticism, I think you will understand them 
best from my letter to Morris (June 19, 1944), a copy of which is enclosed.317 (You 
will see from the letter also that I tried my best to find a solution which would avoid 
any offense to you.) You see that most, and perhaps all, of the points criticized 
belong to what I regard as editorial matters. The same holds for most of the points 
criticized independently of me in a letter from Nagel to Morris. The fact that Nagel 
addressed his critical remarks (which were lengthy and in detail, and much sharper 
than mine) not to the author but to an editor, shows that he likewise regards these 
things as matters of editorial responsibility. Let us suppose the case that the note on 
the back of the title page were not printed at present, but that the printing of the text 
of the monograph were finished, so that no alterations in the text were possible. 
Would you in this case actually demand that I share the editorial responsibility for 
the monograph? I must tell you that I should regard such a demand as very unfair. I 
certainly should never make a demand of this kind if I were in a similar situation. 
Please remember the fact that the monograph did not reach me before it was printed 
in pages, and that I was not guilty for this fact. (I am astonished at your ironical 
remark in this point; it seems to me clear that the responsibility for this fact rests not 
upon me, but upon you, Morris, the Press, and perhaps Wirth,318 in a proportion 
316 The “three of us” refers to the editors of the IEUS, Carnap, Neurath and Charles Morris.
317 See Carnap to Morris, copy to Neurath, letter 30.
318 Louis Wirth (1897–1952) was an American sociologist who mainly worked on the sociology of 
city, urban life, and immigration. At one point, Morris suggested to Neurath that Wirth could write 
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unknown to me.) Why then should I be required to bear innocently the blame by 
readers like Nagel and many others? (Nagel writes that his empiricist friends in N.Y. 
agree with his judgment and are “simply dismayed”.)319
I wrote you earlier that my criticism has nothing to do with our differences of 
opinion with respect to semantics, degree of confirmation, etc. Perhaps the fact of 
Nagel’s criticism will show you more clearly this independence, because in the two 
points mentioned Nagel is rather sceptical about what I am doing, and hence much 
closer to your point of view than to mine.
I think more important for us than the present particular incident is the problem 
what we could do to safeguard the quality of future publications. In this connection, 
I suppose, Morris has already taken up with you the question of a more active func-
tion of the Advisory Committee as suggested by Nagel.
My two papers on probability and degree of confirmation will probably appear 
this summer.320 I shall send you reprints as soon as they come out. My best thanks 
for the booklet on health with your charts in it, and the reprints of Plato; did your 
opponent reply?321
I just read Sheldon’s “The Varieties of Temperament”, which is very interest-
ing.322 Sh. is now here, Morris is working with him, and I hope to see him soon. I 
suggest strongly that you read this book. If you do, write me in which of his types 
you would classify yourself (and in which me).
I wish with you that some day in the future we shall meet again under a friendlier 
star. And even now, let us try as best we can to be tolerant, understanding and peace-
ful to each other personally, no matter whether one criticizes the other’s writing (as 
I do yours) or ideas (as you do mine).
With best regards,
Yours,
C.
a monograph on the sociology of science for the IEUS. See Morris’ letter to Neurath, copy to 
Carnap, Feb. 21, 1937 (ASP RC 102-51-63).
319 See Reisch (2003, 208).
320 Possibly Carnap (1945a, 1945b).
321 The booklet is possibly Health Education by Isotype, written with H.  E. Kleinschmidt. See 
Neurath and Kleinschmidt (1939). The “Plato” reference is presumably to Neurath and Lauwerys 
(1944).
322 See Sheldon (1942). William Herbert Sheldon (1898–1977) was an American psychologist and 
worked on so-called “somatotype psychology:” he tried to find correlations between body types, 
behavior and social settings. At some point, Sheldon was working Charles Morris alienated thus 
the latter from Neurath and others. For further details see Reisch (2005, Chap. 16).
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 30. Carnap to Morris, Copy to Neurath, June 19, 1944.
R. Carnap
P.O.B. 1914
Santa Fe, N. M.
June 19, 1944.
Dear Charles,
A few days ago I received at long last, the proofs of Neurath’s monograph from 
the Press.323 Since the pagination and the running titles are printed, I suppose that 
these are already the final proofs. I never got the galley proofs; I do not understand 
why the Press didn’t send them to me automatically as in earlier cases.
After reading the monograph, I must say frankly that I find it in a rather unsatis-
factory state. First, from the linguistic-stylistic point of view, it seems to me in a 
rather bad shape. I see from your letters that you made some minor changes. But I 
think it is still in need of a thoroughgoing revision. Now it will, of course, cause 
additional expenses: but I think, if the Press is not willing to bear them, we should 
cover them from the Encyclopedia royalties. A publication in the present form will 
do no good to the reputation of either the Encyclopedia or the Press. As you will 
remember, at some earlier occasion some readers expressed sharp criticism of the 
poor English. I am astonished that the editorial staff of the Press did not raise objec-
tions. I suppose they would not have accepted the ms. in its present form if it were 
a separate book; but here they probably thought that the responsibility for editing is 
not theirs but ours.
The second point is still more important. It is the way of formulation and repre-
sentation of the whole. Here I mean not linguistic questions, but certain features that 
would be the same if N. had written in German. It seems that the whole has been 
formulated in a very hasty and careless way; no care and time has been taken to 
work it over, make things clearer, and give it some coherence. It jumps from one 
idea to another, while the poor reader looks in vain for a connecting thread. N. uses 
many of his rather obscure pet terms without explaining what he means by them, 
e.g. ‘Universal Jargon’, ‘Encyclopedia’, ‘absolutistic’, ‘aggregation’, etc.; also 
quite new ones, e.g. ‘Terminological Empiricism’, where not even I have been able 
to find out what is meant by it. Especially in the first part, dealing with more general 
questions of empiricism, the representation is often not clear and sometimes quite 
confuse. Some sentences are incomprehensible to me, and how many more will be 
so for the average reader. The later part are not quite so bad, especially the discus-
sion of more specific problems of the foundations of the social sciences. On the 
whole, the monograph seems to me to below that level which so far we have suc-
ceeded in maintaining in the Encyclopedia, and the weakest thing N. has written 
(with possibly one exception, the Aristotelian Society paper).324 The motivation for 
323 See Neurath (1944).
324 See Neurath (1941/1983).
 Appendices
636
the hasty work is clear: N. wanted to hurry because the Press considered to discon-
tinue the whole. I understand very well that you, even if you felt likewise critical, 
hesitated to write to N., first because of the lack of time, and then also because of 
his sensitivity and violent emotional reactions to criticism and his obstinacy and 
unwillingness to accept suggestions for improvements from anybody. Nevertheless, 
if I had seen the ms., I should have written to N. and asked him to work it over.
Now I think, this second point is more important, but it is also more difficult, 
maybe impossible, to do anything about it. I wish I could talk over with you the 
whole matter. Please write me frankly your opinion on both points. Do you think I 
am overcritical? And then, I should like to get your advice what we or I could do 
now. I do not wish to make an issue of it if I know beforehand that no good will 
come of it. I do not wish to insist on principles and ideals standards when I see that 
thereby I endanger my friendship with Neurath the Volcanic and the continuation of 
our good cooperation for the Encyclopedia and other things. Therefore, if (as I 
assume) it is now too late to ask N. to revise the whole, without making him furious 
and the Press unwilling and impatient, then I shall not veto the publication. This is 
a compromise and a hard concession to make, because I am convinced that the 
monograph will do more harm than good for the Encyclopedia and for the move-
ment of empiricism in general. But I realize that to antagonize and offence N. now 
would possible do still more harm.
On the other hand, I think I ought not appear to be responsible for something 
which I am in fact responsible because I did not see the ms. before it was printed and 
I would not have accepted it in its present form if I had seen it. I should like to have 
your advice as to a way to release me from the editorial responsibility without, how-
ever, an explicit and public expression of my disapproval. Would it perhaps be best 
simply to omit my name from the title page of this monograph? (This would be like 
Roosevelt letting a bill become law without either signing it or voting it). Or do you 
think that this would not be right because our names are on the left-hand title page 
refers to the whole Encyclopedia and not to the monograph? Would you think it bet-
ter to put a small, inconspicuous note on the back of the right-hand title page, per-
haps above the Copyright, to the effect that, due to special circumstances (not to be 
specified or perhaps wartime circumstances or something else?) I do not share the 
editorial responsibility (or, I have not participated in the editorial function) for this 
monograph? Or something similar?
I can report good news about my back. It has continuously improved and I am 
now up about six hours daily, intermittently, with rest periods in between. This I am 
confident that I shall be able to teach in the autumn.
My work on probability proceeds well. It is growing ever more, so that it is still 
very far from being finished. How is your Theory of Signs developing?325
Cordially,
C.
325 Morris’s book on the theory of signs appeared in 1946 as Signs, Language and Behavior.
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 31. Neurath to Carnap, June 16, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-11)
16th June, 45
Dear Carnap,
....
Thanks for letter and the enclosed letter to Morris dealing with the 
FOUNDATIONS case. Let me tell you frankly and freely, that I think this letter to 
Morris is even a more serious thing than your behaviour. And since I think I should 
inform Morris of what I think about this writing of yours, I think the best is I am 
sending a copy of this letter to Morris.
You are – as far as I can see – mixing up totally different things, criticism and 
offence. You see, we human beings very often look at ourselves not in the same way 
as other people do. Therefore, of course, I am always prepared to re-adjust my opin-
ion about myself. I think that is in harmony with my pretending to promote Epicurean 
Stoicism, i.e. on the one hand to think of people’s happiness, on the other hand to 
think how to behave in harmony with the place in life we want to take. Therefore as 
far as I decided to go on as a non-conformist I have to take it easy, what comes out 
of it and as far as I decided to be a good collaborator, I have to behave as such – and 
I try. And, as far as I can judge from many examples, not without success. At least I 
am collaborating with many people, even writing together with others articles etc.326 
That implies much adaptation and preparedness to give way … Of course, I have 
certain defects. My ability to judge rightly, when other people feel bored by me, is 
[has] not very much evolved. That my attitude towards life irritates many people, 
particularly conformists, I cannot deny, but that is partly unavoidable, in spite of the 
fact, that I try to act politely, whenever possible. This I stress, that you see I am 
aware of the problems involved. I am not so sure of your preparedness to re-adjust 
your own judgement about your grieving other people at many occasions, partly 
connected with certain non-conformist habits in your way of life, which leads – as 
in my case – to some intellectual and emotional success, but partly perhaps with 
some lack in thinking of other people’s feelings. Perhaps. To add this: I myself very 
often grieve other people, I presume, but I think I should be prepared to analyze very 
carefully their pains.
What did you do? First of all your editorial remarks are absolutely sound, if 
applied with discretion and one could inform future collaborators of these princi-
ples. But, please, do not think that I even for a moment, objected to your criticising 
me. The idea that I dislike changes in my style or presentation of subjects suggested 
by other people sounds rather comic to me, since I am rather glad, to get such sug-
gestions. I really have re-written whole papers gladly under such circumstances. I 
326 Presumably Neurath and Lauwerys (1944) and (1945): the papers are about Plato, Germany’s 
education and Nazism.
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cannot remember any case in which I disliked to alter something for the sake of 
understand[a]bility, as it were etc.
But, how you are going on in the letter to Morris, you are writing as follows: “I 
understand very well, that you, even if you felt likewise critical, hesitated to write to 
N. first because of the lack of time, and then also because of his sensitivity and vio-
lent emotional reactions to criticism and his obstinacy and unwillingness to accept 
suggestions for improvements from anybody.” …… “I am convinced that the mono-
graph will do more harm than good for the Encyclopedia and for the movement of 
empiricism in general. But I realize that to antagonize and offend N. now could 
possible do still more harm” … and so you dropped your name, without contacting 
me before.327
Look, there are so many fine modern inventions, e.g. “CABLE”. You could tell 
me of that – even at my expenses [sic] – be sure I would have preferred TO PAY 
[FOR] ALL CHANGES SUGGESTED. The dropping of the name has nothing to 
do with a fair criticism but is GRIEVING. You cannot compare that with a hard 
criticism of your semantics by Nagel, because it is different.328 I SHOULD BE 
GLAD TO READ A CRITICISM OF MY POINT OF VIEW BY YOU……. Believe 
me [about] that, please.
But, what about your remarks to Morris. Please, think for a moment, that a third 
person should read it – does it not sound like a denouncement? Either Morris knows 
me as a man of a violent and obstinate character, why the description? Or, if not, 
how did you think it suitable to bring forward such a heap of accusations? Tell the 
words of the sentence and the number of hard names given to me?
I ask you, please give me verse and line for that. You see we are now friends for 
two decades, we know very well that we can trust one another, whenever we should 
be in a position to come to one another’s help, but on the other hand throughout our 
connections appears a certain strain of tension, which does not become softer up to 
now. I guess we shall be good friends the following decades, and I hope that perhaps 
with increasing wisdom, we shall be able even to reduce the tension, but how? You 
see the whole correspondence is a rather “continental” one, but we cannot go on in 
the Anglo-saxon way as long as the tension exists – unfortunately.
You see, prepared to learn from my friends, whenever possible, I searched my 
past for examples, which might induce you to formulate so condemning a  judgement. 
I searched in vain – but that is perhaps my blindness. Please inform me about myself.
Please, tell me of YOUR EXPERIENCE, not of the slander and gossip created by 
other people within and without our circle.
But to explain to you better, what I see, a few sentences: I am, of course, a man 
who puts some pep into his utterances, and like clarifying slogans and expressions. 
I am sometimes rather noisy and not always restricted in the good Anglo-saxon way 
327 Quotation from Carnap’s letter to Morris, copy to Neurath; letter 30, page 636 in the appendix.
328 See Nagel (1942).
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during discussions, interrupting other people … and so on. But I do not remember 
any case, where I behaved, as you are describing my CHARACTER, as it were, not 
only occasionally.
Since I am a sociologist and historian, I ask me, how even other people might 
have told you “stories” about me, which should prove such a character. I tried hard 
to discover cases, were I really angry pressed my case. Let me remember one ten-
sion: Hans Hahn and I have been [were] friends for many years  – since our 
Gymnasium time. He, the older, taught me a lot of things. We, Frank, and other read 
Spinoza together in the “Rahnhof” etc.329 Becoming older he had a certain inclina-
tion towards, what we call “Bonzentum”, but since I estimated highly his frank 
attitude within society, his empiricism, etc.330 I took it easy, even if he kidded me 
sometimes more, than I did.
I remember that I reacted sourly and some little clashes started. First as he sup-
ported [the] professorship of Eibl,331 whose knowledge in scholasticism was above 
doubt, but whose nationalist propaganda was a real danger. Hahn thought he should 
think of the scholar only and swore Eibl would never use his chair for propaganda, 
such a well educated, fine man etc. I thought that a real danger for our own exis-
tence. ---- How disappointed was Hahn, when Eibl became a real propagandist 
within the faculty. Next. I liked to speak contemptuously – I do not deny that – of 
Innitzer (you know the Heil-Hitler Innitzer),332 giving his names (as he deserved as 
far as his records I knew) whereas Hahn opposed in a rather irritated way and telling 
me, what an impossible fellow I am, overstating every thing. And when I warned 
him, he told me, what a cultured fine man I. was, how tolerant, how prepared to see 
everything from more than one angle etc. whereas I being really obstinate in all such 
situations and a violent grumbler through and through, not prepared to accept any 
criticism of my attitude by anybody, even my best friends, in this way I should make 
difficult contacts etc. and what “Bonzen” say at such occasions. I did not give way, 
I knew my Sudentenboy sufficiently. I have not necessary to stress, that Hahn would 
be disappointed again by Innitzer’s later deeds; but this tensions coloured partly our 
contacts in scientific fields and I can realize, that Hahn thought my whole attitude 
329 Neurath, Philipp Frank and Hans Hahn formed what was called (by Rudolf Haller) later the 
“First Vienna Circle,” a regular discussion group on Thursday evenings in the Viennese coffee 
houses between 1907 and 1912. Hahn died on July 24, 1934. On the First Circle see Uebel (2003).
330 “Bonzen” and “Bonzentum” were commonly used to mean “bosses,” “big shots,” or “bigwigs,” 
and “boss rule,” and were often directed against leaders of the socialist movement, for fear that 
they might lose contact with the members of the working class and would not fight for their cause.
331 Hans Eibl (1882–1958) taught philosophy at the University of Vienna. He was interested in the 
history of philosophy, especially in patristic and scholasticism. During the 1930s, Eibl became 
associated with Catholicism and National Socialism. On Eibl see Stadler (2001/2015, 296–297).
332 Theodor Innitzer (1875–1955) was Archbishop of Vienna. He signed the declaration endorsing 
the Anschluss as “Heil Hitler.”
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an obstinate one. That I should understand very well in connection with such ante-
cedents (there have been many of this kind as far as I can judge, my sensitiveness 
was right, his kind of professor-neutrality wrong, as far as later observation- 
statements prove). And I got the impression, that he liked to tease me, e.g. with the 
permanent repetition of the stale joke “Einheiz-Wissenschaft” (which is well done 
once a year, or twice, but not as something permanent).
Schlick liked this kind of treating me from above and even he himself, the highly 
refined man, behaved rather coarsely towards me, as particularly Philipp Frank 
remembers well and as you can judge from the paper presented in French to the 
Paris congress, where the “unesthetic name” of the Neurath brand has been 
 mentioned – but unfortunately in the French translation, which is not “unesthetic” 
at all. Do you think of stories about me from this source? I do not think that covers 
your denouncement.333
What more? I behaved sometimes noisy and intensely, when speaking of 
Wittgenstein. I regarded him from the start as a mystic and metaphysician of the 
refined type, as an antiscientific person through and through and I dared to say so as 
the admiration of Wittgenstein was the fashion in the Vienna Circle. I remember in 
the discussion meetings I made again and again the remark “metaphysics” [and] 
Hahn suggested I should reduce my remarks to “M” for shortening the interrup-
tions, then finally he suggested I should only tell, when I thought something “Non- 
M” to waste less time. He – that was my feeling – liked very much to be in harmony, 
as much as possible, with Schlick, and Schlick enjoyed his attacks on me, on 
“Einheiz-Wissenschaft” and my violent remarks on this chap Wittgenstein. I cannot 
deny that I did not give way to suggestions, I should look at Wittgenstein from a 
different angle etc., BUT NEVERTHELESS AS YOU CAN TESTIFY, I behaved 
very collaboratively as we put together the WIENER KREIS pamphlet.334 Feigl, 
[was] at the time fully occupied by [with] Wittgenstein’s greatness and Waismann 
tried to put into that pamphlet an eulogy on Wittgenstein – and there it stands, sup-
ported by you and Hahn. Of course I am “responsible” for that as one of the three 
editors, but on the other hand, I got the permission to put the 
“EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT” into the pamphlet, too. I remember, how Hahn dis-
liked such a slogan-word…. Even you tried to find excuses for Schlick’s and 
Waismann’s worshipping Wittgenstein. At this time in my behaviour evolved [devel-
oped] a certain sharpness, when Wittgenstein and his case ha[ve] been discussed. I 
do not deny that. Do you think my sensitiveness for [to] empiricism lead me astray? 
I am sure, that the Wittgensteinians gossiped a lot about my obstinacy, my unwill-
ingness to take part in the worship etc. …. but why you are [sic] continuing such 
stories about me?
333 For the English translation of the mentioned paper see Schlick (1936/1979).
334 See Carnap, Hahn, and Neurath (1929/1973).
 Appendices
641
In all these and similar cases, I never pressed MY OWN OPINIONS VIOLENTLY, 
but tried to push away things I thought dangerous. I remember, how I disliked the 
Popper admiration, whom I thought as an antiempiricist man with many empiricist 
arguments, full of clever ideas, but not reliable, when empiricism of the unified sci-
ence is at stake, he with his ONE WORLD SCHEME AS THE BEST etc. 
Antipluralist through and through. The defects of his probability arguments I felt 
strongly, but not being able to reach a real judgement on that, I behaved with restric-
tions there. I cannot deny, that I did not give way in the case of Popper, in spite of 
the friendly judgement you and Hempel found appropriate.335 But I do not remem-
ber, that may [my] own opinion on something has been at the stake, both of you did 
not criticize my anti-absolutist attitude (you stress in your letter to me, that you do 
not know sufficiently how this term should be used, you think the term “Universal 
Jargon” is not sufficiently explained, really?, and “Encyclopedia” – in spite of the 
fact, that Morris and I wrote about this in monograph one.336 I do not grasp your 
doubt, that one could understand “aggregational” attitude – as far as I explained it, 
it seems to be clear: making a statement on something today implies making a state-
ment on the cosmic aggregation today.337 Is that something strange? But that is 
another chapter, which we shall discuss, I hope so, in public some day or another, if 
be [we] both think it suitable therefore I could not behave obstinate[ly] as far as I am 
concerned. But, perhaps you know better examples for your heap of names given to 
me.
One point to the subject in question, the FOUNDATIONS, two people read the 
manuscript very carefully, one for English style, and Morris has been free to suggest 
any alteration he liked. He suggested some alterations. I did not object in the least.
To a certain extent you are making Morris responsible, because he did not sug-
gest more alterations, as he could do. You are trying to suggest, that he did so under 
the menace of the violent volcano …. oh boy, oh boy, what a story. Detective novel 
in the unity of science movement …….
You speak of the “hurry” under which I worked. I do not think that is the essen-
tial point, I wrote the whole manuscript more than once. And you make the remark 
that my Aristotelian paper338 is even worse ---- that I certainly did not write under 
pressure.
I cannot deny that I have difficulties in conveying something I think is new, when 
applying my phraseology – of course that is a funny behaviour. Let it that [sic] be. 
But PERHAPS, PERHAPS it is unavoidable in the period of growing up [learner’s] 
phraseologies and the expressions will be better later on, PERHAPS. I do not feel at 
ease with my writings [sic]. And I know one can use this argument given above for 
covering any nonsense. How to know, what is the case?
335 See Carnap’s (1935) and Hempel’s (1937) reviews of Popper.
336 See Neurath (1938b) and Morris (1938).
337 See especially Neurath (1944, Sect. 8.).
338 See Neurath (1941/1983).
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You see looking back at former writings I discovered this: one day I wrote a 
paper together with a friend,339 who thought my style could be improved (in German) 
and I thought it wonderful. I agreed with this booklet, but when now reading again 
the papers of mine and this combined paper, I have to confess, that I can accept 
more or less today my own papers, with all their defects, whereas this book, in spite 
of his better style, seems to me avoiding certain important arguments and forming 
even deviations from the main point. But that is no pro[of], of course. I only tell you 
of my experiential statements.
You see, you tell me that so many of our friends complain about my style, order 
of arguments etc. (I know that since my youth) but – unfortunately, they do not dis-
cuss my arguments, not even the new ones – should that not make me a little suspi-
cious. My kind father, when people attacked serious scholars in such a way, was 
accustomed to say: “Der Herrgott schaut nicht auf die Orthographie”.340
I am seriously thinking over [about] that. Scholars have an inclination to think 
that other scholars intentionally try to reduce their activities etc.: I do not make such 
a complain[t] because I think that for a non-conformist I am treated well, even in the 
field of education, where I am able to earn a living in spite of my being an educa-
tional non-conformist. I look at a very startling phenomenon. Take Hempel, he is 
writing on laws of history etc., he quotes a through and through metaphysician as 
his choice in discussing problems.341 Then he continues in explaining the old[-]
fashioned approach. But he does not even mention the fact that there does exist 
another opinion, too, about unpredictability IN PRINCIPLE.
What should I think of that. I selected Hempel as an example, because I am so 
sure of his kindness, his goodwill and his sincerity. Why did he not even mention 
my unpredictability approach, not even objecting to it, in spite of the fact that I 
printed that in my EMPIRISCHE SOZIOLOGIE and repeated it again and again?342 
Should I believe the story that I am not understandable by an average reader, 
assumed he reads naively my books? The “Orthography”, the “style” should be so 
bad …. What I guess is, that Hempel READING my papers LISTENING to my 
arguments, did not REMEMBER afterwards these points, BECAUSE THEY ARE 
TO[O] FOREIGN TO HIM.
339 Neurath wrote two papers in German with someone (not counting now his formal logical papers 
with Olga Hahn-Neurath), these were (1) “Der Kompensationsverkehr im zwischenstaatlichen 
Warenhandel,” with Wilhelm Heilpern in 1928; and (2) “Können wir heute sozialisieren? Eine 
Darstellung der sozialistischen Lebensordnung und ihres Werdens,” with Wolfgang Schumann in 
1919. Given that Schumann was a close friend, Neurath presumably is referring to that paper.
340 “The Lord doesn’t look at orthography.” On Neurath’s father Uebel (1993) and (1995a).
341 In his “The Function of General Laws in History,” Hempel (1942, 37. note 1) referred to Maurice 
Mandelbaum. Cf. Reisch (2001, 208).
342 See Neurath (1931/1973, 369. ff.).
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In analyzing my past, after reading your letter of May and the letter to Morris of 
June 19, 44 I discovered a very interesting instance.343 A friend of mine wrote a fine 
review of a book of mine.344 Before printing it he asked me, whether I should be 
prepared to read it to avoid any misunderstandings. And now look, in this review he 
had forgotten not only what I wrote positively, he complained also that I did not 
criticize something etc. Then I have shown him point after point in my book, and he 
said: strange, everything is here. This I thought a good opportunity to learn some-
thing about my style and asked him, what is difficult to grasp in my paper. And he, 
without hesitation, answered: everything is expressed fully and clearly ….
Is that not interesting. Of course it does not prove my case, but it explains to you, 
why I am not so sure of the criticism of my “Orthography”. I shall try to find readers 
who are relatively naïve and ask them to tell of the contents of FOUNDATIONS.
I further searched my past to find violent anger. Yes, I have sometimes expressed 
wild emotions, when people used my own ideas, without telling so and deforming 
them. In the field of Visual Education that is not unusual, but also in our field. But 
that does not belong to the field of obstinacy.
But perhaps, when I stressed certain names, as e.g. LOGICAL EMPIRICISM. I 
remember very well, how in a coffeehouse where we meet, Schlick wanted me to 
use the term RADICAL EMPIRICISM, thinking of James, and I stressed the point, 
that a James term is not advisable, because James whom we have to admire for so 
many things is full of BERGSONIANISM and to a certain extent a highly skilled 
obscurant, more or less. And I remember, that many of our circle did not like 
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM – I was the only one who tried to push forward it. The 
other argument of mine was, that we should not speak of Logical Positivism, 
because Comte was such a metaphysician, full of antiscientific approaches, later on 
full of religious phantasy and the Positivist church here is not a real bargain for posi-
tivism. But later on, that is fate, people do not remember, why I promoted LOGICAL 
EMPIRICISM, they are even accepting the term, but NEVERTHELESS 
REMEMBER PERHAPS THAT THERE IS SUCH A VOLCANIC FELLOW, 
VIOLENT, OBSTINATE etc., who always wants to promote funny names, nobody 
wants to accept etc. …. rather comic, sometimes depressing, not as far as I am con-
cerned, I am all living happily on our hill, surrounded by flowers, birds and many 
kind people, but as far as other people’s happiness is concerned, who are putting 
their whole personalities in such details, and then have to face such fate.
You think my FOUNDATIONS will do not good for our empiricist movement. 
Oh my dear, how cautiously one should make such judgements …. Looking back 
into history, it is strange how things are going on. You see, I am thinking that the 
FORMALIST strain, combined with ARISTOTELIAN duplication which seems to 
me now prevalent in many members of our movement, are real dangers, but I am 
very reluctant to bring that forward, because tensions between us might reduce the 
343 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 28.; Carnap to Morris, copy to Neurath, letter 30.
344 Neurath is presumably referring to Jan Tinbergen (1936) who reviewed his “Was bedeutet ratio-
nale Wirtschaftsbetrachtung?” in Erkenntnis.
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chances of the movement even more. You see every movement is based on 
TOLERANCE and COMPROMISE, and the ORCHESTRATION of the multiplic-
ity of activities is just the point…. I have the feeling, that you are now on a not so 
good way. A kind of “popery” speaks to me, when I am reading your letter, a certain 
tendency to reduce other people’s status, etc. …. but I am not so sure of that I ask 
you only to think of that if you are analyzing yourself.
When I am trying to stress: Protocol-statements, Logical Empiricism, 
Terminological Empiricism, Unity of Science, Pluralism of approach, 
Unpredictability as a basic item, economics-theory as a kind of organized folklore, 
etc. I am not “fighting” calculus-absolutism, etc. but I try to find a way of “orches-
tration”, otherwise we cannot build up something of importance. I get the impres-
sion, that PLURALISM, UNPREDICTABILITY etc. are something strange to you, 
in spite of the fact that you stress your harmony with my main arguments, when 
despising my style and expressions. You see your “degrees of confirmation” do not 
fit into the pluralistic and non-predictability scheme etc. Partial schematizations 
ARE NOT FORERUNNERS OF AN INCREASING TOTAL SCHEMATIZATION 
…. that is just my point of view, but that both might be expressed is important, not 
the concealing of the difference.
I assume that some day one of our members will find the time to discuss my 
FOUNDATIONS not only from point of view of higher orthography and well-order 
[sic] of arguments, but also from the point of view of EMPIRICISM.
You see I have to make pleas for myself because nobody is prepared to do it for 
me …. at the moment, it could be could be, perhaps, perhaps, that the order of argu-
ments is not so strange to people with a similar start …… there exist such examples 
in history.
I personally always fear that I do queer things and therefore I like people like 
Frank who try to reduce my overestimating protocol-statements etc. without griev-
ing me. And you see, that is the point. My letters dealt with YOUR 
UNKINDNESS. That is the main point. One has no “right” to ask for kindness, but 
one can object to unkindness. Look at the letter to Morris. You only tell of my bad 
qualities and that you drop ONLY your name, – as a concession – because he is such 
a violent boy …. No kind word about me in this letter. You see, it could e.g. come 
into your wise brain, that even strong elephants345 sometimes need much of their 
energies to overcome the obstacles of life. You see, to reach the shores in shoes only 
is not just the best start for a new life in a foreign country and an internment is also 
not the best introduction.
If you were kind, you could write e.g. “and then we should not grieve Neurath, 
he has a difficult life ahead” etc., no, only the fear, I could become violent…. oh 
boy, oh boy, what a world, a sad world. Full of unkindness.
I do not want to analyze you, as you suggest, because it is not always useful to 
do that with friends. I learned that principle from a good writer and behaviourist 
345 Neurath used to sign his letter with the drawing of an elephant.
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……. But I shall read SHELDON’S THE VARIETIES OF TEMPERAMENT.346 I 
am rather suspicious of this business. Of course there is scientific research possible, 
but we have not reached sufficient results for practical purposes. I like Morris’ idea 
to treat Paths of Life,347 but I am doubtful whether it is useful to connect them with 
characterological types. The Nazis like characterology, and all kinds of physiog-
nomics etc. … of course that is no real counter-argument, I am only sensitive in this 
field. NOT TOO MUCH OF THAT STUFF.
And what can we do with the knowledge? I remember, tested before the first 
world war by a psychologist I got such a pure visual type, that it is usually only with 
idiotic children – that is perhaps the reason why I am so adapted to visual judge-
ment, perhaps but how can one discover that? What implies having a certain mix-
ture? Overcompensation seems to be important, the st[u]tterer has more chance[s] 
to become a great orator, than the non-st[u]tterer ---- but I do not want to criticize a 
very important branch of science, I only tell you of my doubts. Often such analysis 
is FIXING your activities, because you think you e.g. in agreement with your “type” 
or “fate” etc., whereas the Epicurean Stoicism tries to FORM EVERY LIFE 
WHATEVER THE BASIC FACTS MIGHT BE …. strange, is it not? In Vienna we 
learned scepticism and used Freudian analysis, which we estimated highly, for so 
many jokes, that we never became addicts of Freudianism, we – that is people of the 
Epicurean Stoicism ….
Nice, what you tell about the “Herr Sohn”.348 I also think he has a well prepared 
future before him. I should like to meet him, and you and all the others and to talk 
about cows and calves, tricks and tracks, to kid one another ….
The world situation is bad, but the Hitlerit[e]s are away. Now we got some good 
news from people who lived through the hell and bad news of people who died. 
What about Grelling?
I am lecturing sometimes, even brain[-]trusting and making jokes to [sic] local 
groups, I have sometimes to do with education, here and there, Mary is very indus-
trious in Isotype work and as housewife. We shall now get a bigger house, every-
thing goes on well. Please remember us to all friends, particularly to Ina. We should 
like to get a vivid letter from her about you and your health. How you are now?
Thanks for the newspaper clippings, I should like to get more of that stuff. Via 
Paris we get sometimes unpleasant news, about behaviour of people during the 
occupation, cannot discover what happened really. A long story.
With kind regards, good wishes, greetings etc.
Ever yours,
N.
346 See Sheldon (1942).
347 See Morris (1942).
348 Neurath presumably refers to his son Paul, who was mentioned at the beginning of Carnap’s 
previous letter. See letter 29.
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 32. Carnap to Neurath, Aug. 23, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-09)
Rudolf Carnap
University of Chicago
Chicago 37, Illinois
August 23, 1945.
Dear Neurath,
I was very much discouraged by your letter of June 16th.349 Not only because I 
see that my attempt to explain to you the reasons for dropping my name were 
entirely without success; more important, because my assurance that no personal 
question was involved and that I had not the least intention of offending you does 
not seem to have much effect. I thought I had extended to you the hand of reconcili-
ation; instead of accepting it you continue reproaching me that I “grieve” you. Do 
you realize how distressing and disturbing your attitude towards me in these two 
letters has been to me? If you knew how many sleepless hours at night they have 
caused me, and how much inability to work in the daytime!
The remarks about you in my letter to Morris350 were not at all meant as a denun-
ciation but merely an allusion in half-facetious terms (“volcano”) to facts obvious to 
everybody. The reason I wrote these remarks was, that I felt that Morris had a share 
in the responsibility for the publication of an unsatisfactory part in our common 
work and [marginal addition: I referred to this] possible motive of his, [marginal 
addition: as an excuse for him].
I think it would be best if we dropped this whole affair now and tried to start 
anew as best we can, instead of dragging it on indefinitely. However, since you ask 
so insistently what I meant when I spoke your violent emotional reactions, I will 
mention the two occasions uppermost in my mind: your quarrel with Schlick about 
your ms., the second, your quarrel with me when I was in Prague and you sent the 
long wires from Moskow.351 I do not say that you alone were wrong on these two 
occasions; I admit that much was wrong in Schlick’s attitude in that affair, and I 
suppose on objective judge could show me wrong things in my behavior too. The 
question now is not who was right or who wrong; probably nobody was entirely 
right but everybody has some good things to say for his side. The question now is 
only in what way you handled those differences once they had occurred, and whether 
or not there occurred violent emotional explosions. For me your present blindness 
about yourself is quite amazing: you speak at great length about the relatively mild 
349 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 31.
350 See Carnap to Morris, copy to Neurath, letter 30.
351 Carnap presumably refers to those wires of Neurath that he has sent on January 28 and February 
8, 1932 (RC 029-12-68 and RC 029-12-65). In these messages he was asking for more citation of 
his works in Carnap’s papers regarding physicalism. On this issue see Uebel (1995b).
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tensions with Hahn and seem to forget entirely those two occasions which belong to 
the most depressing experiences of my life. On those earlier occasions and on the 
present one where you reacted with a furious outburst to the withdrawal of my 
name, your violent reactions seemed to me entirely out of proportion to the causes 
by taking forms which were for me (and for Schlick too) indescribably depressing. 
You will remember how dear Olga afterwards, when we met in the “Auge Gottes”, 
brought about a reconciliation between us.352 I felt greatly relieved; the reconcilia-
tion was for me, as I am sure it was for you too, not merely a diplomatic patch-work, 
but genuine and sincere. But you may also remember the serious warning I 
expressed. I said, jokingly, that you had been an elephant in a china shop; but I 
added, seriously, that I thought I should not be able to stand another time your 
method of outbursts, threats, and ultimatums. Now please don’t misunderstand me: 
I did not mind at all the demand you made in your cables for being given credit; you 
deserved credit and I was glad to give it to you. What I minded was only the violent 
emotional way with outbursts and moral pressure by which you induced me to give 
you what seemed to me an exaggerated amount of credit. I gave it for the sake of 
peace and preservation of friendship. But I resent to the present day that this one 
time in my life I was bullied by another man into saying something not in accord 
with my conviction.
Well, those were the two chief occasions. I am happy to say that no explosions 
quite of that magnitude have occurred since. But there were a number of occasions 
of minor tensions where not actual explosions occurred but where the threat, more 
or less implicit or explicit, of impending explosions compelled me or tried to com-
pel me and others to give in against our convictions. You must understand that, 
although the outside peace is preserved, such things are resented by those involved.
Let us not go any longer into details of such things. I am quite sure that my way 
of behavior likewise often annoys or hurts people. (You are quite right in saying 
this. But in another point you are not right; I assure you that I do not take these 
things lightly. Whenever I notice something of this kind -- however, you may again 
be right in saying that often I fail to notice it -- I try hard to examine myself consci-
entiously. And if I find that I was wrong I do my best to right the wrong.) Let me 
only make this general remark about how I see your role in our movement. Your 
temper and way of acting is different from most of us; it is more energetic, active, 
driving, aggressive. Consequently, it has fallen to you to be the driving force in our 
movement and all its various activities. We all are grateful and appreciative for this; 
352 There is an entry in Carnap’s diaries (March 24, 1932) claiming that he met Otto and Olga 
Neurath-Hahn at the Auge Gottes in the evening. Olga helped to clarify their debate and some 
misunderstandings: eventually she was successful by the end of the day (RC 025-75-10). “Auge 
Gottes” may refer to the building called Zum Auge Gottes, which included apartments, a sanato-
rium and a student dormitory in which Carnap may have been staying while visiting Vienna from 
Prague, where he was living and working at the time.
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we all realize where our train would still be stuck if we hadn’t had the big locomo-
tive. But then there come some occasions, mostly of a minor nature, where we suffer 
somewhat from what seems to us an overexertion of emotion, temper, energy, will- 
power. We milder and more peaceful creatures complain in those moments about 
that over-exuberance and aggressiveness. We are apt to forget in those moments that 
whoever is aggressive as a lion in tackling difficult tasks for our cause, cannot be 
mild as a lamb in personal relations. (Here however, I am happy to testify in your 
favor that you are mostly a well-tamed lion; that you often check your stubbornness 
and yield to suggestions of others, or discipline your aggressiveness into politeness 
and friendliness; in short, that the lion often whispers when everybody present feels 
with trembling how we would like to roar). But even if we may forget it on those 
occasions, the next time we see the achievements of your activity, we all are glad 
and grateful for having the lion in our midst.
In a few weeks I hope to get, after long delay, the reprints of my two papers on 
probability. I wonder how all my friends, especially you, will react. I am aware that 
here I deviate from what has been so far the general view on probability in our 
movement. But I already notice some changes in the attitude of Hempel, Feigl, 
Nagel, and others, who begin to think that the frequency interpretation is not the 
only one. I am now, during the vacations, working again all the time on the probabil-
ity book. It will become a large book, and it will take my time still for several years. 
But in writing it, I become more and more convinced by developing the conse-
quences, that my general conception of probability is fundamentally sound and 
fruitful for scientific thinking, although the technical details of the system are of 
course tentative and in need of further improvement.
We are happy about the change of the regime in England. We try not to be over-
optimistic, since the new government has to solve so enormously difficult tasks. But 
still there is good reason for a cautious hope for the future. I have read some things 
by Laski and find myself in agreement with most of his basic ideas.353 I should like 
very much to get your opinion about his views and also about his personality if you 
know him. I am disappointed that he does not seem to get an influential position in 
the new government; or do you think he has much influence even without an official 
post?
I just had the first letters from Switzerland in a long time. Walter (Dr. Emil 
J. Walter, Frohburgstr.95, Zürich 6) is asking after you – he does not even know that 
you have safely escaped. Dürr has written, likewise Tschichold.354 Tarski just wrote, 
353 Harold Laski (1893–1950) was a British political theorist and served as the chairman of the 
British Labour Party between 1945 and 1946.
354 Emil J. Walter (1897–1984) was a Swiss sociologist, interested mainly in the intersection ques-
tions of politics, science, and sociology. He also published some logical works that were reviewed 
in The Journal of Symbolic Logic during the 1930s. Karl Dürr (1888–1979) was a Swiss philoso-
pher, working mainly on the history of logic. Both Walter and Dürr participated at the International 
Congresses for the Unity of Science. Jan Tschichold (1902–1974) was teaching typography in 
Munich; he was also a close friend of Carnap and Neurath. On Tschichold, see de Jong (2008).
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saying that he knows that his wife and children are still alive. Have you heard that 
Popper has been appointed to a Readership in Logic and Scientific Method at the 
London School of Economics?355 I suppose, you have heard that Philipp Frank had 
an accident – this time, I believe, he was hit by a bus, and had to lie in bed for quite 
a while.356 But he wrote several months ago that he felt quite well again. Ina just had 
a letter from an American soldier in Vienna saying that her older brother and his 
Jewish wife are O.K. – first word from Vienna, we or anyone else of our acquain-
tances has had. Hempel wrote that he has had news from the mathematician 
Freudenthal357 a former assistant of Brouwer’s who had been in prison and in a 
camp. The Nagels are expecting a baby very shortly. --- That’s all the news which I 
can think of that may interest you.
With best greetings and wishes to you and Mary,
Yours,
[Carnap]
 33. Ina Carnap to Neurath, Aug. 24, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-10)
August 24, 1945.
Dear Neurath,
I have been following the correspondence between Carnap and you with ever 
increasing head-shaking. Now it has reached the point of sore feelings on all sides 
when I – the “of course impartial” third – feel obliged to toss in a few remarks of 
mine. It seems to me sort of tragic-comic that you two good old friends fight with 
each other rather than against the hostile world. The strange part is that each of you 
355 Karl Popper moved to Britain from New Zealand in 1946 to teach at the London School of 
Economics, and became professor at the University of London in 1949; he retired from his London 
position in 1969.
356 Frank had other accidents earlier as well. Nina Holton (2015, 71) tells the followings in her 
memoirs on Frank’s wife, Hania: “[Frank] also had a slight limp from an injury from a brief 
encounter with an autobus. For some reason, Professor Frank rarely bothered to clean his eye-
glasses. Maybe he felt that he saw enough as is. But on the other hand, every now and then, one 
does run the risk of walking in the way of a bus.” Besides his accident in Vienna before 1930, Frank 
had another accident, as it was described by Carnap in his letter to Charles Ogden, July 17, 1934: 
“Prof. Frank had the misfortunate in April in Paris to be injured by a motor-car and to break 
thereby his leg. He was compelled to remain in Paris in a hospital. Therefore he could not come to 
England. His recovery has taken very much time. But he is hoping to return to Prague in the next 
time.” (ASP RC 102-58-02)
357 Hans Freudenthal (1905–1990) was a German-born Dutch mathematician, who worked on alge-
braic topology. In 1943 Freudenthal was sent to a labor camp in the village of Havelte in the 
Netherlands, but in 1944 he escaped and went into hiding. After the war he taught at Utrecht 
University.
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feels hurt and that I am sure that none of you means to hurt the other one. Well, such 
is life! If I had you both together with me and you were to ask for my confirmation 
about your main cause of justified grievance: “Is Carnap ponderous and pedantic 
and a rubber-in-of-salt-into-sores”? I would absolutely agree with you because 
that’s what I have been telling him for 15 years. But if you were to ask me whether 
he is purposely unkind and insensitive to other peoples hurt feelings -- I would not 
agree or only to that extent that I would admit that he is not considerate when he 
thinks there is no good cause for the other’s feelings to be hurt. I can assure you that 
in a marriage of 15 years the matter has come up between us more than once and 
that’s the conclusion to which I have come: he does not respect sore spots in the 
other fellow; if he thinks what he does or says is right he will do or say it and it’s the 
other fellow’s job to overcome his soreness. And furthermore, the nearer a person is 
to him, the less consideration he will take for his weaknesses and he is absolutely 
uncomfortable in talks with people with whom he has to take special precautions as 
to his [their] sincerity. I assure you, it does not always make for an easy life, and I 
have been trying for all these years to get him to treat my weaknesses more carefully 
but with not much success. On the other hand, I do realize that most of the time 
when I feel hurt by him it is because of sore spots of mine, inferiority feelings or 
what have you. And thus, if in our imagined conversation he should appeal to me for 
confirmation of his main point – that you are extremely touchy, have rather violent 
emotional reactions, do bully people into agreeing with you, etc. – I should agree 
with him. You write that there has been a strain of tension all along through your 
relations, and that’s perfectly true; as far as I have observed his side of the matter I 
know that it comes from his feeling that he always has to be on the defensive, and 
that – though you may find it hard to believe – he always has to restrain himself in 
order not to provoke you to highly emotional reactions. I suppose you don’t know 
exactly how much aggressiveness and coercion there is in your way of doing things, 
but it’s a fact. You already physically overpower Carnap by your amazing ability to 
discuss for unlimited hours and by the sheer volume of your voice; time and again I 
have observed Carnap trying to outshout you and ending up with a sore throat. Now 
you may rightly ask how come that you are having trouble with Carnap and e.g. not 
with Morris or Frank. Well, for that too I have my explanation: Carnap is really 
emotionally more involved with you than the two others (he has much more grati-
tude towards you for certain things than you would give him credit for) and he is 
very sensitive to reproaches (justified and unjustified) for not being a good friend. 
His feelings for you personally are full of friendliness and kindness, but he feels 
(and I agree) that these feelings for a friend should not influence professional deci-
sions (of reviewers, editors, etc.), and still more he feels that nobody should have to 
be afraid that he risks personal friendship by such decisions. Morris is quite differ-
ent chap (and what I say is of course influenced by the fact that I do not like him): 
he is extremely polite, in my opinion bordering on insincerity; he has the famous 
American talent for backslapping easy relations, staying on the surface of matters, 
and being a good fellow. Philipp Frank again is none of all that: he does not have 
Carnap’s earnest righteousness and also he has a certain mellowness, half wisdom, 
half “Wurstigkeit”; it would never have occurred to him to drop his name even if he 
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had felt like Carnap did, for the simple reason that he would not have thought it 
important enough and that he would have been too lazy to write the attending let-
ters. Ah, but’s [sic] the difference between the Viennese temperament and the zeal-
ous Lutheran from Prussia! I do not try to excuse Carnap, I am just trying to point 
out the way he is made. Yes, he could be induced to treat you with greater circum-
spection but that would not improve the friendship. He does not have the saving 
grace of a light touch and of a felicitous formulation which might soften the blows 
which he is striking in the name of science, impartiality, and other suchlike gods. 
But then again, perhaps you cannot have the charm and the reliability in one per-
son! – You are quite mistaken in thinking that he grieves you lightly, without trou-
bling what your feelings will be. I saw him stewing for days, deeply unhappy, when 
suddenly the page proofs of your book came and Morris gave him to understand that 
major changes were out of the question (not only because of the problems of your 
willingness to change and expense involved, but also because of the somewhat tenu-
ous relations between the Press and the encyclopedia project which might be 
strained still further by such changes -- they were very short on paper, etc.). And you 
should see how he sits and broods whenever one of your accusing letters arrives -- 
for days he is unable to settle down to his work! If you keep in mind his good per-
sonal feelings for you and the fact that no unkindness is meant, perhaps it will ease 
the tension; and if ever again you should be grieved by a professional act of his, you 
could take it – at worst – as a misjudgement and not as a personal offence.
Our life has not changed very much during the past years, particularly now that 
Carnap is out of bed again and able to do many things which make up normal life. 
The 2  years in bed, combined with the uncertainty about an improvement were 
rather trying. But since he managed last year’s teaching without a breakdown  – 
though not without considerable strain and effort  – we feel confident about the 
future even if he should not recuperate completely. At present we are in our little 
house in the New Mexico Mountains. (I have the car fixed so that he can make the 
trip lying). For the past two years we have a big German Shepherd dog who has 
become an important member of the family – last winter we had her in Chicago, it’s 
an ordeal for her and for us but there is no other choice. Carnap is spending all his 
time on his big manuscript on probability – which he thinks is going to be his most 
important book.358 A few papers of his have appeared in the last weeks, and you will 
get reprints as soon as they are available. But the probability book will take several 
more years.
News begin to come slowly from Europe via American soldiers. Carnap had a 
letter from his oldest daughter whose husband has been killed in the war, his other 
daughter’s husband is a prisoner, they have no news about his son.359 No word as yet 
about Grelling. The sad news that Hosiasson and her husband Lindenbaum have 
358 Presumably Carnap’s Logical Foundations of Probability (1950).
359 On Carnap’s children, see letter 22, note 225.
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been killed by the Nazis,360 but Kotarbinski (of whom it is said the he has behaved 
exceedingly well with regard to Jewish colleagues and the he had refused an offer 
to come to America because he felt that he had to stay with them -- again typically 
American to offer refuge to the non-Jew rather than the Jews) is well and is active 
again. Odd bits about surviving Jewish friends: Flitner361 in Hamburg (whose wife 
is Jewish) wrote recently that they are allright, a Jewish Frenchman whose wife is a 
friend of mine has safely come back from a German prison camp though without 
teeth and emaciated -- just astray bits of news. Let us know when you hear about 
common acquaintances!
The last weeks have brought so many historic news that personal ones appear 
less significant; the atomic bomb, the election in England, the likely peace with 
Japan. Grateful though we are for the peace, we wish it had not come about through 
the atomic bomb. The existence of this terrible power in the hands of a few nations 
appears a great danger. Much of the research has been going on practically under 
our very noses: the super-hush research lab is only 18 miles away from Santa Fe and 
we have seen some of the explosions and clouds for years.
Exactly a month from today we shall be leaving again for Chicago, where classes 
begin on the first of October. We have a rather dreary apartment there (the only one 
we could find last year) and we envy you your hill. But on the other hand we have 
been unusually lucky with our long stay here in Santa Fe during the Rockefeller- 
grant years.
Give our love to Mary -- and my admiration for her doing much of the Isotype 
work in addition to being a housewife, since I am only a housewife!
With best regards and wishes,
Yours,
ina
360 Adolf Lindenbaum (1904–1941) was a Polish logician and philosopher, mainly known for the 
“Lindenbaum lemma” and for his collaboration with Alfred Tarski (Lindenbaum-Tarski lemma).
361 Wilhelm Flitner (1889–1990) was a German pedagogy professor and a close friend of Carnap 
from their student’s years in Jena before World War One. On their relation see, for example, 
Damböck (2017) and Dahms (2004).
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 34. Neurath to Carnap, September 22, 1945. Unsent.
(ASP RC 115-07-66)
22nd Sept. 45
My dear friend Carnap,
May be you felt discouraged when reading my Jun[e] letter,362 because I wrote it 
in a somewhat hopeless mood. And I confess that this hopeless mood is continuing. 
I really do not know what to do. I am sure, that both of us would help one another 
in days of danger, that we are pleased in some way when being together, that we, 
what is called: like one another, but that very often, very, very often some minor 
items disturb a soft and comfortable being together and that from time to time, per-
haps by accumulation the items become more important and sometimes lead to a 
kind of tension. In your cases characterized, please let me say so, by some grieving 
action (I do not say, that you are trying to grieve me) in my cases, characterized by 
some noisy explosion. That is that.
Since I regard friendship, love, harmonious contacts the most important joys of 
my life, I am not soon tired when making efforts to support a situation, which gives 
any chance of possible kind atmosphere within the framework of human relations. 
Perhaps I do not know much about the right way, how to make twisted things again 
straight ……… I do not know, whether it is better to go on with you and just to try 
to suppress, what I have to say and to assume it is hopeless to alter a rigid person 
like you or to speak with you in a more outspoken way. It is a pity, that the situation 
reached this point …. In principle I do not believe in the German habit “Aussprachen 
haben”, but when with Germans I often see myself pressed into “Aussprache”, 
because the more emotional little contacts, delicate spider webs and other means of 
human intercourse do not work.
I feel really helpless and somewhat hopeless. I assume, that perhaps similar feel-
ings are working in you and I interpret so that fact, that you are writing so long let-
ters and that even Ina comes down the silent goddess from Olympus to bring the 
thundering heroes together before they start sitting sulkingly in their respective 
tents. I do not think, that by partial silence one reaches much and I do not guess that 
speaking is good …. but “tossing the coin” I reach the decision that we perhaps 
come near to one another, when we tell one another a little more about us. You 
started with that and I appreciate very much your various informations [sic] about 
you and your reactions.
You see, my dear boy, it is not the question of “reconciliation”. If somebody feels 
himself “humiliated” by somebody else, “reconciliation” is not the right word for 
making the situation better. On the other hand I know from experience – I have seen 
many people and nations and their respective difficulties in coming to terms with 
one another – that it is extremely difficult to an atmosphere in which the irritation 
created by such feelings is prevalent.
362 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 31.
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I am assuming, that I do and did something, which irritated you considerably, 
without knowing it myself and as far as I am knowing it [marginal addition: I will] 
redress my attitude …. Your pedantry and rigidity is to me very often something 
strange and even hostile. I asked me sometimes, how that is, because in itself I can-
not say that it looks so bad. I think that is a very complicated thing and any hypoth-
esis is rather vague and sophisticated. But let me tell you, how I want to think about 
me, why I have the attitude of sheltering me [sic] against something I do not regard 
as directly ugly. It is not nice, but not ugly.
Since my youth I appreciated friendship, love, smooth atmospheres, where one 
never comes to clashes, etc. that is one of the reasons, why I try to live “procul 
negotiis” wherever possible363 – but well adapted to go on with masses and groups, 
when needed. I dislike the tensions in such situations, I dislike particularly any kind 
of string pulling – in spite of the fact, that I should know how to do it. I dislike any 
kind of “officialdom”, because here is a minimum of friendship and love. I prefer 
collaborators who are my friends, too – only a hard education through life, thought 
me that a certain reserved attitude is needed in a society which through and through 
is full of competition and difficulties. I finally reached a stage, which enables me to 
create organizations with a sufficiently kind atmosphere and to avoid the spheres of 
tensions. Mary and I enjoy ourselves in Oxford, because we have the nicest team of 
collaborators, we ever had before. We have almost only nice contacts and are far 
away from the centres of string pulling in London. I try to make comprehensive 
agreements for many years, which are reducing the official contacts to a minimum. 
I have mainly work-contacts (preparing something in common) and meeting con-
tacts (meetings for two days, a week, etc.) which here are of a wonderful peaceful 
character and lead, as experience teaches us, to remarkable friendly contacts, even 
with people who disagree with our opinions …. In addition we are surrounded by 
friendship and have now more of that than before. We now see, what we got in 
Holland, we got heaps of long letters, full of intimacy, friendship, and the wish to 
continue personal contact by letter. And again and again they tell us, what Mary and 
I helped them by our opinions, attitudes, etc. I tell you that, because you as many 
other people look at me too much as a kind of organizer and promoter of things, 
whereas I think in terms of possible friendships, etc. any organization I and Mary 
build up tries to enlarge the sphere of friendships and friendly contacts. We are 
 hesitating to invite collaborators, of which we think they could disturb the happiness 
of our team …. sometimes I prepare an outside post just for creating the human 
distance which helps to avoid the destruction of our harmonious social life ….
I am not very happy, when people, who should know better, look at all that as a 
mere tendency towards activity etc. It is something of that in, NEVER RULING 
THE SHOW. I try to get publishers which whom I can speak in a kind way etc. and 
I try even to educate them, if they are behaving differently. I am explaining all that 
somewhat in detail, hoping, that perhaps a slight feeling for my attitude enters your 
judgement. You see I never felt that you appreciate this side of my existence.
363 From the first verse in Latin in Epode n. 2, by the Roman poet Horace, “Beatus ille qui procul 
negotii” (“Blessed he who away from business”).
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I always think that friends try to make life one another as pleasant as possible, 
not because one has an advantage from that, but because I as a friend enjoy to see 
my friend happy. That is the reason, why I try to help them, not
 (1) I want tomorrow their help
 (2) it is a “duty” to help friends.
Both attitudes are not “bad” from my viewpoint, but they are not, what I am longing 
for.
Further I like any kind of DIRECTNESS, from human being to human being, as 
far as kindness, friendliness is concerned. Unsophisticated spontaneity, that is won-
derful …. I know how are [sic] this bird is. I know that I myself very often disturb 
kind atmospheres by being, as I am. On the other hand I do not think that my 
destructive habit is prevalent. Too often people tell me, without being asked for, that 
they expect me to be successful, when in difficulties, because I am not only able to 
do many things, but also “charming”. It is difficult to know how one behaves. But 
now I am beginning to think, that the traditional story of me as a wild man with 
some friendly grunt is very incomplete and rather a kind of “rationalization”, which 
enables people to humiliate me, instead of taking me into their circle of friendship 
and contacts. And here is the point: apparently I am far away from “Bonzentum”.364 
And I should guess, that people, who have something of that, of “snobishness” etc. 
have some aversion, when seeing how I cannot go on with that. And this differ-
ence  – I think so  – is very, very decisive in human relations. I think Schlick’s 
extraordinary uncorrect behaviour again and again is only understandable in this 
way. He felt himself endangered – AND CORRECTLY – by the very existence of a 
person who does not acknowledge this way of behaviour.
That seemed to me a rather “personal” problem. But gradually I evolved a kind 
of hypothesis, which runs as follows. I should not publish that before I did not check 
up it better:
There are two way of behaviour particularly important to me, and as I think also 
in mankind. Of course they are not exclusive, they are not a dichotomy, etc. there are 
many others etc. I do not give this description a higher dignity, just “as I see it”. My 
studies on BROTHERHOOD AND PERSECUTION lead me to that.365
One attitude tries to find HIGHEST ideals, as it were, in justice, duties, etc. 
everything regarded as something within a systematical structure, which we know 
already or at least should try to know. These people try to create a kind of scheme 
of “correctness”. They are judging themselves and other people, whether they are 
correct in this sense or not, whether they have the right duties or not, the right racial 
background or not, the right morale or not etc. ………… One has to have certain 
highest principles, and within this realm strong “convictions” and something of that 
type. The human relations have to subordinated to such HIGHEST PEAKS of 
364 On “Bonzentum” see letter 31, note 330.
365 See Neurath, “Tolerance and Persecution” in the Neurath Nachlass, 207/K.88. Wiener Kreis 
Archiv (Rijksarchief in Noord- Holland, Haarlem, The Netherlands).
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something – deity, duty, nation, leader, ascetic attitude, religion, enthusiasm, etc. 
Within this realm grows up a certain tendency towards rigid adherence to some-
thing, which often leads hardship, mercilessness etc. Everything becomes relative 
weak and unimportant, when the own “conviction”, “ideals”, etc. are on the stage – 
and they are always on the stage, as long as these people take themselves seriously. 
And they do it, by Jove. Even if such people start with “kind” ideals, this attitude as 
such is dangerous and leads to anything, as history – that is my impression – shows 
us. Just this way of behaviour enables scoundrels to use “idealists”, who are pre-
pared to be hard and merciless, as soon as their “ideals”, “convictions” are in ques-
tion  – and they are always in question. Sometimes mercy appears as a duty, 
sometimes not, it is “occasional” as it were. There are ENDS and MEANS and such 
terrible items in the picture, which rule the show. That is an attitude, which I person-
ally dislike since my youth, but now regard socially as very dangerous, too.
The other attitude is more like the following: people living together are able to 
create a friendly and kind atmosphere, to think, how they may make one another as 
happy as possible. They often are not successful and very often unhappiness appears, 
but this result is NEVER ACCEPTED AS UNAVOIDABLE WHEN CERTAIN 
“ENDS” should be reached …. there are not such “ends” within this group. 
Friendship and brotherhood are the basic attitude and NOTHING ELSE COUNTS, 
no conviction, no faith, no enthusiasm. On the contrary, after some experience col-
lected, such people of the brotherhood kind become suspicious, when people instead 
of liking hobbies and activities supporting welfare and happiness, start with promot-
ing ENTHUSIASM as such; in the realm of kindness [there] is not much space for 
“ecsta[s]y” and “enthusiasm” as such, it is a possibility to enjoy anything either 
alone or in good company, wonderful music, plays, movies, festivals, fairs, land-
scapes, etc. but without stressing the point how wonderful “enthusiasm” in itself is, 
“aufgehen in irgend etwas”, “volle Hingabe” etc. These people of the human broth-
erhood do not care much for snob[b]ism of any kind. Kind people are more wanted 
than clever people, ordinary folk who have many interests are more wanted than 
sophisticated adventurers, the big and small events count more or less on the same 
scale, a friendly afternoon with a friend may be of the same “order” as a symphony 
of highest musical impressiveness …. Not comparable, of course, but the prepared-
ness to design [assign] time for these things, energy, may be the same …. A kind 
member of a meeting, which asks for the size of my shoes for getting slippers for 
me, after hearing that I had difficulty to get them, whereas she has a friend who 
makes slippers etc. pleases me at least as much as a speaker who tells of the most 
impressive new invention, arguments etc.
The first group of the serious people with convictions, rules, duties, justice, high 
ideals, enthusiasm for something high and lofty, with consistent habits, sure of pre-
dictability at least with “probability” seems to me represented by many famous men 
and by many people in the streets, but also the other group of the people, who are 
rather gay and sociable, and not too much interested in principles, convictions, etc. 
but in a kind atmosphere. Who would avoid to do something “fine”, when grieving 
 Appendices
657
other people. There are no HIGHER ideals, for which human pain could be taken as 
not too important. Often may happiness fight with happiness, and grieving one may 
be connected with pleasing another – an often sad situation, but always the discus-
sion starts on happiness and not on anything else. Everything seems uncertain, and 
therefore the love and friendship of the living time so important.
Look, my dear and take it as attempt to come in closer contact with one another, 
when I tell you, that the first group of people has certain signs, which we find in 
Plato’s REPUBLIC, or in Rousseau or in some other people, which for me are the 
real danger, and that your habit is often to a certain degree, as I see it not so far away 
from the description I have given above. Perhaps I see you not so as I should accord-
ing to your opinion, or it is not reasonable to think the group dangerous, etc. Please, 
believe me I say all these things hesitatingly, because should I not succeed in alter-
ing your own judgement and likings a little, such an explanation makes things even 
worse.
You see, I do not think that arguments are estranging people much, but attitudes 
do it [sic]. You see I have more and more the feeling that the Platonic attitude is 
more or less connected with Nazidom. And the [sic] German Christianity – as I see 
it, perhaps I shall alter my opinion some day after studying more in detail the mat-
ter – is full of this rigidity and also the philosophy. Even people who dropped reli-
gion, who dropped metaphysics, – this cruel type of attitude represented by Kant, 
who preached many nice things in addition – could not overcome their traditional 
rigidity and puritan attitude. One of my very good friends – dead already – said that 
one day to me. All attempts to be gay, to have a well arranged home with comfort 
etc., reading, etc. did not help, it remained that “duty” played the central role. 
Helping other people not based on the intention to make other people happy, but 
because it is our duty to help, etc. If some attitude or action irritated other people, 
the answer was: I did what I could to be mild, etc. but since my conviction… sorry, 
that they others were hurt etc. I must say, that this type of behaviour is very often to 
be found in Germany, much rarer in Austria, where terrible brutality is a traditional 
thing, but not consistent rigidity, neither in kindness nor in brutality …. Easy going 
in both ways, as I explained to an English acquaintance, who thought the Austrians 
are kind and charming, I told her they are more easy going and often cruel etc. …. 
think of Franz Joseph, who ordered the hanging of the Hungarian Generals deliber-
ately, after protest made by many people from outside …. But not because he was a 
Platonist …. Whereas the killing of Jews in Germany how, was much more based on 
“Platonism”, as it were. You have to sacrifice your own mildness (“den verdammten 
Schweinehung niederringen”). In this way I try to make an hypothesis how kind 
people could bear that and even help in doing that …… And now I think, that in 
spite of all your personal charm and kindness you have many serious signs of a 
Platonic attitude. The second way of life is rather strange to you.
I cannot exclude, that you perhaps will be able to SEE that, in a similar way, and 
PERHAPS you will try to support the brotherhood elements in your attitude and to 
suppress the Platonic elements. I cannot say, that I succeeded in my own field, and I 
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cannot deny, that friends are not so bad off when saying me that some of [marginal 
addition: my] attitudes are somewhat “Boche-like”.366 I confess that they are and I try 
to alter that. I NEVER STAND TO ANYTHING LIKE THAT. I do not say, that I am 
kinder than you, perhaps I grieved more persons than you did, but I think I should 
hardly fight for a conviction or something like that knowing that it is grieving some-
body …. Mary tells me often that I grieve people in discussion about “Platonism”, 
e.g. when trying to show a Jewish refugee that his or her approach to arts and life is 
in principle a kind of Platonism and therefore connected indirectly with Nazidom …. 
The only answer I can make is: here I am not grieving people for a principle’s sake, 
BUT BECAUSE I THINK THAT NAZIDOM, PLATONISM, PURITANISM, ETC. 
as principles make masses of people UNHAPPY. It is a defence of happiness and 
here are standing happiness against happiness. In former years I fought for my own 
happiness, but now I think of my son and friends, who suffered from concentration 
camps etc. PERHAPS I AM OVERSTATING THE CONNECTIONS – please tell 
me so, I am prepared to revise my views. I should prefer to be “tolerant” in these 
cases, but against people who spread unhappiness, how should one be “tolerant”, 
without being prepared to suffer as a martyr and to tell others to do it. I heard a phi-
losopher explain that --- that is a third way of life, not even for human happiness to 
fight, but looking at brotherhood as the central point of human life, nevertheless to 
BEAR PERSECUTION. As Christ said: I said you so, I did not promise happy soci-
ety, but persecution and your pain …. But that is not my attitude. I should feel myself 
as a hero, when suffering pain for making other people happy, but I should not feel 
myself a hero if I could secure other people’s happiness (and my own happiness – 
which I think I should at least regard as so important as my neighbour’s happiness 
[marginal addition: but would prefer suffering] by making the man unhappy, who 
tries to create unhappiness …. that is happiness against happiness. A HARD 
DECISION, but NEVER CONVICTION AGAINST HAPPINESS, that is the point, 
why I think Calvin so terrible a person, or Knox.367 [A] [s]hort time ago I met a 
British socialist, who was unusual rigid and “absolute” in his political aspects. I 
wanted to ask him, whether he is connected with Puritanism, etc., but you know it is 
against custom to ask a person something intimate in this country. Therefore I was 
silent, but put forward my point, explaining something about unpredictability, kind-
ness of direct contact, danger of terror as such, etc. and stressing how the other atti-
tude looks like, finally he said with some emphasis: my own Calvinist tradition … 
And I answered: in Scotland …and he said I am Scotch. And then I said, what I 
366 The expression “Boche” was introduced by French soldiers in World War One to refer to 
Germans, especially German soldiers; it derives from the expression “tête de boche,” used after the 
mid 19th century to designate Germans and Belgians – also “alboche” combining “allemande” and 
“boche” –, and, in turn, from the expression “tête de bois” – “wooden head” – for thick or heard-
headed persons.
367 John Knox (1513–1572) was a Scottish minister, theologian, and is considered to be the founder 
of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland.
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thought of Cromwell, whom he regards as a fine, great man “we need something like 
that in modern socialism here”. “Ah,” I said “why not Knox” – “that was a fine boy, 
too” he answered. There you have the things …. That has nothing to do with Nazidom 
as a social structure, as killing Jews etc., but as hard and merciless attitude which 
thinks in terms of ENDS, CONVICTIONS, EFFICIENCY etc. and not in terms of 
brotherhood, happiness, friendship etc. which is a more Christian-Epicurean attitude, 
if one need a name for that. It is a misleading name.
If you were able to tell me, that you a little a very little only, are prepared to look 
at your attitude from this point of view, then I think perhaps we shall find a way to 
become friends who have not to [sic] fear the TENSIONS, of which you speak. If 
not – nothing will happen – we shall try to be good friends, but I should say, I should 
not be astonished to see a tension reappear, because this ATTITUDE is connected 
with tensions. I told you the tensions appear so rarely, that I should not fear them too 
much. Let us hope that the strain would not too much for you. But I should prefer, 
believe me, to have with you a serious and kind correspondence about the Platonism 
in you, as should call it, the Puritanism in you, the Prussianism in you etc. I know 
this kind of description is almost a kind of “giving [calling] names”, a very risk, like 
an operation, but I think you are to[o] grand a personality to be afraid of such a 
discussion. It only shows you that the tension is of a type, which has NOTHING TO 
DO WITH RECONCILIATION. I am not in a mood which needs reconciliation …. 
I am only in a mood which is longing for your full friendship, for your preparedness 
to readjust your attitude, be sure, that I myself am fully prepared to listen to your 
explanations and to readjust myself. Since I do not look at life as something rigid I 
can anticipate changes in my outlook …. I do not think that my desire for friendship 
and brotherhood will be dropped, I think I am too much a spoiled child and the kind-
ness is too important for me. Humiliation is irritating, not because I cannot bear 
it – I have strong bones – but because it is something destroying kindness and I have 
a sensitive skin …. I shall try to harden it, when you think it is necessary for our 
friendship, but better would be to be together soft and mild …. relativist, and not 
with any strong and rigid rules, applied at life without thinking of other people’s 
unhappiness.
You are again repeating that your remarks to Morris about me are “obvious to 
everybody” --- I speak not of the volcano, but about what you say, that this volcano 
becomes active, when criticised. I tried to analyse my behaviour in detail, I asked 
other people, and JUST [marginal addition: THAT] DOES NOT COME OUT. Would 
I see that in me, I should think a terrible quality and extirpate it with all my power. 
Astonishingly you are not GIVING ME ONE INSTANCE IN YOUR LONG 
LETTERS IN WHICH I BECAME A VOLCANO AFTER FACTUAL 
CRITICISM…. I ask you now, NOT FOR DISCUSSION’S SAKE, but for my own 
“salvation”, please, tell me of cases in which I reacted volcano-like after criticism 
of my arguments, my style, or something of this kind. Seriously I could not remem-
ber one case. I try to recollect outbursts and I usually find some ATTITUDE OF 
OTHER PEOPLE WHO CREATED MY PROTEST …. not because they criticised 
me. I dislike to be humiliated and treated with disrespect of the normal human rela-
tions ….
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What you say, that you made th[i]s remark about me to find an excuse for 
MORRIS, what is that? My dear, dear friend, think, what you say. You the man who 
wants to be so very correct, is here saying something about another person, very like 
a denounciation [sic], for “excuses sake” ……. It is so, as you say, it was also a criti-
cism of Morris, what you did, BUT YOU WERE MORE INTERESTED IN NOT 
GRIEVING HIM THAN IN NOT GRIEVING ME.  If you would tell me of my 
behaviour being so --- I should be really thankful, as I said more than once. I can 
hardly imagine, that any of my outburst were connected with criticism against my 
arguments or opinions … perhaps as an exception, but I do not know at the moment 
such an exception.
If you want to drop this talk, please drop it, but perhaps here we may find the way 
of understanding one another and perhaps adapting us to one another. Perhaps I do 
not realise, when I am volcanic, or you think the “reasons” for my being volcanic 
are others than I think they are etc. ….
I DID NOT PROTEST AGAINST YOUR SAYING THAT I HAVE VIOLENT 
REACTION – that I never denied, and I am sorry, that I have this temper, what I 
tried to bring near to you, is that the assumption I am volcanic WHEN MY 
ARGUMENTS, MY STYLE etc. are criticized …. AND YOU CAREFULLY – I 
DO NOT SAY INTENTIONALLY – ARE AVOIDING IN YOUR LETTER JUST 
THIS POINT, only speaking of the violent emotional reactions, never denied by me.
Let us speak of SCHLICK. I reacted in my way, because SCHLICK, as I saw it 
treated me as a schoolmaster and higher BONZE368 treats a schoolboy and a person 
not equal of standard. And THAT I NEVER BEAR …. and I do not think I shall 
alter this attitude. Aggressive impudence I dislike outmost. I confess that without 
remorse, I am not one of the soft people who suffer patiently, BUT I DENY THAT 
I REACTED EMOTIONALLY BECAUSE SCHLICK WANTED SOMETHING 
DIFFERENT …. I have hundreds of example, that I am altering manuscripts with-
out any complaint, when people show me mistakes, arguments, style etc. which are 
defect[ive] ……. I have too many witnesses for that, too many even in my files. But 
the case Schlick is different. It is very important to analyse such a case not to speak 
like you: “you had a quarrel”, and “The question now is not who was right or who 
wrong; probably nobody was entirely right but everybody had some good things to 
say his side.” You are bringing this whole show into the field of “rights” etc. “some 
good thing to say” --- as if it were a discussion, whereas the PERSON’S HAPPINESS 
IS IN QUESTION. How can you know, what “good things” Schlick had to say, 
when humiliating me? Philipp Frank was witness of conversations. As far as I 
remember, he never tried to conceal his opinion that Schlick treated me 
PERSONALLY BADLY.  And I reacted against that, NOT AGAINST ANY 
CRITICISM…… Please, say something about this point. Otherwise our both state-
ments are not linked up with one another ……
Please, tell me how you see the Schlick-Neurath conflict, which you regard as 
one of the most depressing experiences of your life. I really have not the slightest 
368 On “Bonze” see letter 31, note 330.
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idea, why it did depress you that a BONZE who behaved badly, as he was accus-
tomed to do, got a rebuff – a very seldom case, because usually the victims of such 
bosses are depending upon him. Therefore they EITHER “kuschen” or “transform 
the humiliation otherwise hardly to bear into admiration etc.” ………………… 
Since Schlick regarded you as co-boss you did not suffer much from him, just 
occasionally.
I have more than one case, in which Schlick behaved without ANY REASON 
aggressive[ly] and humiliating me. One day Waismann invited me to tell of my 
ideas in the Schlick circle. I said, why not, I came and Schlick STARTED, introduc-
ing me: I do not know, why Dr Neurath wants to talk to us, but he may start …. or 
something like that. There are sufficient witnesses of this scene, which all people of 
the circle regarded as at east [sic] VERY UNUSUAL AND STRANGE – NOT THE 
SLIGHTEST AGGRESSION FROM MY SIDE, also not in the months before, 
nothing.369 From the clear sky. And you remember the wholly unnecessary remark 
on the ugly word “Einheitswissenschaft” in Paris (in the paper read to the congress 
in French translation, where SCIENCE UNITAIRE is nothing ugly). Etc.370 
Wherever Schlick could he made a suffisante371 remark. If it were not printed, I 
could think that I invent such details, as many scientists do, who are inclined to the 
usual mild form of scientific persecution mania. Since I know, that scientists have 
this disease I try to control myself and others as far as the symptoms of this disease 
are concerned. I asked Neider in detail about that.372 He, who liked Schlick, DID 
NOT DENY THE DESCRIPTION, but tried to explain the case, that Schlick in his 
finer style of life, feared always I could destroy the delicacy of a mood, e.g. when 
he was sentimental at Christmas tree occasions with music etc., whereas, as you 
know, I myself like a certain sentimentality and never take it ba[dl]y, when other 
nice chaps are sentimental. I am only critical when bullying bosses, like Schlick 
behave sometimes overdelicately…. that is rather comic and remembers me of some 
delicacies of famous persecutors ……… I do not want to overstate this subject. But, 
please, tell me a little more in detail, why the case Schlick did depress you so much, 
as far as I can see you are pitying Schlick more than me, and you are not speaking 
of HUMILIATION, but of arguments, points of view and such paraphernalia, which 
interest me never so much as human relations.
369 Heinrich Neider tells the same story in an interview; see Haller and Rutte (1977).
370 Neurath later recalls this event, with a few actual quotations. See Neurath to Carnap, letter 36.
371 Here “suffisante” may correspond – given the context and his intentions – to the German word 
“süffisant,” which may be translated as “smug.”
372 Heinrich Neider (1907–1990) studied philosophy and philology at the University of Vienna 
between 1926 and 1930. He was a member of the Vienna Circle and wrote his dissertation under 
Moritz Schlick on the question of understanding (Verstehen) and the human sciences 
(Geisteswissenschaften).
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Poor Schlick, depressed by me …. such an aggressive person, full of unfriendly 
habits, depressed, when a victim answers …… Perhaps you looked at Schlick dif-
ferently ….
The second case, again HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH CRITICISM. You wrote 
to Morris, of course you did not try to influence Neurath’s manuscript, because you 
know like others, who [how] violently [marginal addition: he] reacts against criti-
cism. Now I should expect you would tell me, when I behaved so, instead of that 
you tell the Moscow story.373 Please, my dear, dear friend, put yourself for one 
moment into my way of arguing: “I say, Carnap tells people I am furious when criti-
cises, that is too bad, I never did so”, what do you tell me? That I became furious, 
of course I do not deny that.
The other case, you dropped your name. I did not become furious because you 
criticised me, but because you made, what one calls an affront. You did not drop 
your name as Bloomfield published his paper,374 which many people do not think of 
sufficient value etc. … Do you think my paper is worse? Dropping a name is a very 
serious action …. But let us analyse the Moscow case. As I said, NOTHING TO DO 
WITH CRITICISM. I remember your warning very well. I surely did not regard our 
“reconciliation” as a diplomatic affaire, but I felt, that you did not realize, what 
humiliation means to people, who want kindness and some acknowledged status 
within a circle of scientific friends in accordance with the work done and not with 
the positions one reached in the hierarchy of the world.
Please, tell me, what you even today think an “exaggerated amount of credit” 
---- you see I do not think that I asked you for a certain amount of credit (perhaps 
my memory deceives me and my files are, as you know with Hitler and his gang, i.e. 
somewhere in the [sic] hell, should they not reappear) I only wanted me properly 
quoted, otherwise my own papers would appear as a kind of Plagiarism. Please, 
believe me I am not very vain – I think rather somewhat [u]nder average. In any 
case: I do not design much energy to presenting myself, but I am much more inter-
ested in satisfying myself, discussing questions with others, etc. I dislike only that 
people are using my arguments without quoting me a little.
But that is not the point of irritation, but the feeling, that people would behave 
differently, when I were a “Bonze” a “professor” etc. Perhaps I am wrong in that. 
And that is humiliating. Not because I need being quoted --- I try to assure you that 
is not the point, but the feeling that I am treated less kindly than people in official 
positions, it is something [i]nhumane in that. Perhaps you will show me, how 
wrongly I see that. I dislike very much, when people complain that one does not 
quote that or that [sic] and therefore usually I do not make even an occasional 
remark, because it looks as if one interested too much in such little things. But per-
haps it is sometimes useful to speak of that. And perhaps I can learn something from 
you. Let me include this case, then I shall continue the main line of my letter. Some 
373 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 32. note 351.
374 On Bloomfield see letter 28, note 305.
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day I read in Russell how he wants to use the term “Protocol” and “Protocol state-
ment” etc. I said to me [myself]: strange so many people are using now this word, 
and in so different ways. How is that. One should look, how this word appears in 
various authors, since many people use it like a Schiboleth for Logical Empiricism. 
I know hardly a term of our movement so often mentioned with or without irony. 
Maybe it is only my hobby that I press this idea forward (I think it is a kind of key 
position – but that is my private matter), but IT IS HISTORICALLY USED BY 
AUTHORS WHO DISCUSS OUR MOVEMENT, even in such a little tractatus on 
modern philosophy as Laird’s booklet,375 the Protocol statements appear, of course 
in B. Russell, L. Russell, Weinberg, Popper, even – in Carnap. OK.  I open THE 
DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY,376 which I used sometimes, and seek 
PROTOCOL, PROTOCOL STATEMENT, expecting to find a list of various usages 
of the word – nothing. I try other articles about Logical Empiricism – nothing about 
that. Do you think the EXPRESSION would disappear from the stage, if it were 
used by SCHLICK?
You see, I feel almost ashamed, when mentioning such trifles. And I do not think, 
that it is the non-quoting which irritates me, but the sign, that people do not respect 
me as a member of their community. Of course you cannot force people to accept 
you, but if that is connected with a certain disrespect it is grieving and irritating. You 
see e.g. I do not think that Feigl is a very important thinker, and that I need to being 
[sic] quoted by him – really not. But I sometimes thought we could become friends, 
having scientific intercourse etc. I remember very well a long discussion, I think 
somewhere, perhaps Geneva, on INDUCTION.377 I told him about cross-induction, 
induction supporting one another etc. about logical problems etc. HE EVEN LATER 
ON, I THINK IN THE USA told me that he remembers our discussion, and how 
much it supported his thinking, how much he thinks that some remarks by 
Reichenbach are going into that direction – but Feigl never mentioned in his papers 
with one word this influence. I do not ask for telling this story – but I published suf-
ficient papers, in which I touch this case, also [i]n our congresses, the mildest way 
could be, to quote only such a statement saying, that his arguments are somewhat in 
contact with Neurath’s which he cannot accept, because etc. …. but this way of 
neglecting primitive rules of decent behaviour in the scientific society – I do not 
375 Presumably Laird (1936).
376 Neurath is referring to Dagobert D. Runes’s (1942) The Dictionary of Philosophy. Carnap wrote 
many entries for Runes’s volume: Anti-metaphysics; Basic Sentences, Protocol Sentences; 
Denotation; Formal; Intersubjective; Meaning, Kinds of; Physicalism; Science of Science; 
Scientific Empiricism, Unity of Science Movement; Semiotic, Theory of Signs; Verification, 
Confirmation.
377 Later in a historical paper about the Vienna Circle, Feigl (1969/1981, 65) mentioned that he had 
“spent a few days with Neurath in Geneva, serving as his French interpreter at a conference” in 
1929. Feigl also wrote to Schlick (July 21, 1929, Moritz Schlick Nachlass) that Neurath had sug-
gested to him to attend a pedagogy conference in Geneva, where he could meet important people.
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complain too much that, because it is usual – is grieving as long as you think of a 
person as a possible friend ……. Or another point. Feigl published a paper on 
LOGICAL EMPIRICISM.378 I think there is nothing important in the fact, that I 
pressed this expression against Schlick’s tendency to support the James term “radi-
cal empiricism” etc. and that I did not succeed very much, but I think that I, to a 
certain extent, am one of the pillars of this movement, not only its “promoter” as 
people sometimes like to treat me.
If you are reading Feigl’s paper, you will find (I discovered that, as I wanted to 
note down, where he agrees with me, where not) that he almost CAREFULLY 
avoids to mention any of my many papers on logical empiricism and its foundations 
(I may be presenting unacceptable theories – that is not the point). He mentions me 
just as a sociologist, and – strange – did not even mention that I am the editor-in- 
chief of our encyclopedia. Please, do not tell me, that all that is “just by chance” …. 
think one moment HOW A KINDLY PERSON MAY FEEL WHEN PEOPLE WHO 
ARE FRIENDS OR POTENTIAL FRIENDS apparently do not think of me, when 
writing something, where I play a part. That is grieving, …. Of course there exist 
other interpretation of this behaviour, which I try not to evolve. Not even for my 
own purpose. You see kindness and brotherhood are based on faithfulness and we 
should do, what we can, not to fe[e]d suspicion of any kind, even when based on 
well acknowledged material. Suspicion destroys brotherhood  – you see how the 
communist party destroys brotherhood by suspicion and by other things of this type. 
Therefore, please do not think I want to say something against Feigl, and to stir up 
something. Not at all. I tell you only, how it looks, when people do not like to 
acknowledge somebody, as they would acknowledge him, if he were a big boss. I 
THINK IT VERY [IM]PLAUSIBLE THAT FEIGL WOULD TREAT ME IN THE 
SAME WAY IF I WERE A PROFESSOR OR SCHLICK IN PERSON writing 
things of similar importance.
Perhaps I am “ein eingebildeter Laffe”, but I think that my scientific work, is not 
less than Schlick’s ……. But that does not interest me much. I do not speak of the 
treatment by other people, but ONLY WHAT A PERSON FEELS IF FRIENDS 
AND POTENTIAL FRIENDS DO NOT ACKNOWLEDGE HIS EXISTENCE AS 
A MEMBER OF THEIR COMMUNITY ……
You are happy in saying that no further outbursts of that order appeared, I am 
happy to say that no further neglect of my scientific personality appeared of that 
order, but of smaller order – normally I should say. That is my fate. Let it go. Only 
in the next edition of the DICTIONARY, please insert PROTOCOL STATEMENT 
…… It is not of importance, just a trifle ….
You see, when some day Feigl will do something, which is an additional disre-
gard of my person and I shall be more violent, than the moment asks for, please 
remember this my information, which is not a complaint, only a scientific analysis 
of my behaviour.
378 Neurath presumably refers to Feigl’s paper “Logical Empiricism,” see Feigl (1943, 406).
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I am not saying you are “wrong”, but you are not thinking of human contacts as 
more important than other things. When you think that your conviction presses you 
to drop your name – I should really like to know, how [sic] such a conviction looks 
like – did you really think of the pain you inflict, if not, why not? And if, do you 
mind, when I think it unbrotherly to inflict such a pain not for making other people 
happy etc. but ONLY FOR SATISFYING YOUR CONVICTION? That is him 
Hekuba379 …… I should like to know, how you see such things, perhaps here is the 
clue “von das Janze”.380 Sometimes I do not find through [sic] your attitude and your 
remarks.
I believe you, of course, when you tell me, how all these conflicts depress you, 
and how you seriously analyse yourself, but I cannot understand, why you are not 
mentioning the point, I always stress:
Do you think it proper to hurt a friend only for the conviction’s sake? What are 
your convictions, compared with brotherhood, friendship and happiness? Do you 
think it is strange, what I say? I try to find a way to you and to lead you to me ….
I do not speak of the cases in which you [u]nvoluntarily hurt other people – I do 
it very often, we are poor people, who do not sufficiently see other people’s impa-
tience and pain …. That we both have in common. But I should never say “may 
other people swallow their pain, if I had to inflict it in accordance with my princi-
ples”. Never. Perhaps I shall “rationalize” unkind actions, by seeing people’s happi-
ness increasing by my action etc., even my own – I do not pretend to be unselfish – but 
I should hardly sacrifice happiness to principles. What unhappiness could arose 
from your name remaining on the title page  – THAT AND ONLY THAT IS A 
QUESTION IN HARMONY WITH MY WAY OF LIFE …… if you think this 
question is never yours, then we know where we stand. We shall be friends, but this 
basic danger of tension remains. I think you and I will try to avoid clashes, but it 
would be nicer if you were prepared to have together with me a common approach 
to brotherhood and friendship based on happiness.
I DO NOT THINK YOU ARE MILDER THAN I AM …. AND I DO NOT 
THINK YOU ARE MORE PEACEFUL – as you think. Perhaps I shall agree with 
you after certain talks, but at the moment I only think, that I make more noise, that 
I am prepared to present emotions carelessly, etc., but I think that you are sooner 
prepared to put the pain of a situation on other people’s shoulders, IF YOU THINK 
YOU ARE IN YOUR RIGHT. I perhaps put heavy weights on people’s shoulders, 
but hardly by pretending that “I am in my right”. Perhaps occasionally, one never 
knows how one may behave, but in principle I do not have this way of arguing, but 
I guess you have it, and that is “unmild” in itself, “unpeaceful” in itself …. I think 
it very important for my happiness – I do not know, whether it is for you of the same 
379 Hecuba was a queen in Greek mythology that appeared in works by Homer, Euripides and 
Shakespeare as a symbol of vengeance and the moving power of grief.
380 The expression “von das Janze” means in Berlin dialect “from the whole” (with “Janze” instead 
of “Ganze”).
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importance – to have an opportunity to look at human actions as far as kindness I 
concerned together with you IN A SIMILAR WAY, and therefore also at us; it is not 
the question that we should agree about our judgement, but that we may find some 
compromise in applying certain attitudes towards life, particularly towards friend-
ship and community life ….
You are speaking to me in your letter a little to[o] patronizing[ly], if you permit 
me to make this criticism. I think you take all these emotional things too much as a 
kind of manner, and not as something connected with a comprehensive attitude 
towards life. You see most organizers – I have experience in that – try only to put 
something in motion, whereas I, I think some people call that sentimentality – try, 
sometimes not in vain, to create a kind atmosphere. Of course, where people react 
against that, I become unexpectedly for these people emotional. Reichenbach, to 
give an example, made me emotional, because I thought it not brotherly, how he 
treated you in the various cases, we had to discuss. And, I cannot deny, that his theo-
retical remarks looked perhaps more strange to me than they perhaps would do, if 
he were not so far away from brotherhood in a community, in principle. He is very 
often charming and I know very well how to go on with him in the nicest way …. 
but I fear him, not as a scientist or debater, but as a person, who is not interested in 
creating brotherhood in this world.
I often – perhaps not seeing clearly – think, that theoretical remarks are covering 
dangerous attitudes. I know that it is a very dangerous field, but on the other hand it 
is something in it. In our movement I sometimes have the feeling that some mem-
bers avoid discussing problems of decision, action etc. and are using logical analy-
sis as a kind of escape from life. THAT IS NOT MY APPROACH.  I am using 
Logical Empiricism as something that helps us going on more energetical [sic] than 
before, more tolerant than before etc. ….
I should like some time to learn from you how you look at my activities and my 
work, when not looking at me only as an engine or a lion …. sometimes I thought I 
had some wise arguments and important approaches to serve …. But from your let-
ter to Morris I know how low you regard my Aristotelian paper. Perhaps I shall 
agree with you when I have learned more about your arguments in detail. Not to go 
into detail people like me feel also as unkindness, when friends are involved, in 
other people’s behaviour I am not much interested. You see many people see them-
selves as member of the scientific republic, and in addition they have friends, I look 
first at friends and people who are potential friends, and then at the scientific repub-
lic ……
I shall read, what you have to say about probability, with great interest. I only 
complains that you and other hardly go into the criticism we have to make …. the 
same is with induction, semantics etc. Perhaps it is fruitful, to go on and not to dis-
cuss the problems on the border in detail …. I should prefer the latter, also from 
the movement’s point of view. Frank’s paper is fine, but I dislike how careless[ly] he 
speaks of “facts” “reality” etc.381 Of course avoiding bad consequences, but there 
are weak brothers ….
381 Philipp Frank spoke about “facts” and “reality” often in “The Philosophical Meaning of the 
Copernican Revolution,” see Frank (1944/1949).
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I am now waiting, what the various members of our movement will publish on 
the UNPREDICTABILITY problem. Some people who reacted vehemently against, 
as they started to show me, where my mistake is, did not succeed – but let us wait 
and see.
Of course Labour gives much hope and if they are able to have some success – 
e.g. less unemployment here than in the USA and get the next election again … then 
it is something in our future. But the international situation is terrible, extraordinary 
terrible. We do not know what the policy of the Russians is, but if they REALLY 
WANT, WHAT THEY DO – it is a sad thing – but if what they do, is not intended, 
it is also unpleasant, that they do now know better, how to act in accordance with 
promises, etc. Of course all governments are at the moment somewhat unpleasant as 
far as foreign policy is concerned – but the links between all the problems are dif-
ficult and often very dirty …. such is life.
Laski has many good ideas.382 I think that he does not always think how people 
take his remarks. Many difficulties come from that – unnecessary ones, as I think, 
and others. I heard him lecturing. Clever, at intense [sic], but I am not so sure that 
he always “means business”. He is too much connected with policy that he can say, 
he wants to say something only theoretically. Of course I could go into details, 
where I agree or disagree. But I do not know, what questions you have particularly 
in mind.
Glad that Tarski’s family is safe. I am very depressed by Hosiassons and 
Lindenbaum’s death.383 From Tschicholds we had some lines, Fraenzchen384 and 
wife are safe. That is all, we know. I did not hear of Popper’s Readership. That 
would be Hayek’s work, who is connected with him. He hopes apparently to get 
from him the supports he needs for his philosophical position. He is not satisfied 
with his antisocialism he wants to explain also his antilogicalempiricism [sic]. With 
Popper he agrees, as he tells me whenever he has an opportunity to do so. In my 
mild way I try to have an exchange of articles with him. I treated his book as mildly 
as possible – it is rather a scandal, that a scholar publishes such a biased paper full 
of hardly provable statements.385 But like his colleague Mises386 – the economist – 
he is against socialist planning in any case …… a sad figure on the social firma-
382 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 32, note 353.
383 See Ina Carnap to Neurath, letter 33, note 360.
384 Neurath refers perhaps to Franz Roh (1890–1965), the German art historian and photographer. 
Roh was one of the founders of the so-called Neue Sachlichkeit movement, and he introduced 
Carnap to Neurath. On the relation of Roh and Carnap, see Damböck (2017) and Dahms (2004).
385 See Neurath (1945/2004).
386 Ludwig von Mises (1881–1973) was an Austrian economist and a member of the so-called 
Austrian School. On von Mises and Neurath, see for example Uebel (2007). Ludwig was the 
brother of Richard von Mises, who participated at the meetings of the First Vienna Circle, and was 
a close associate of the Berlin Group of Reichenbach.
 Appendices
668
ment; Popper, I guess, will support him in some way or another, or at least I shall 
not astonished to see him acting in this way ….
What about Grelling’s family? It is terrible how one is hampered in all attempts 
to come in contact with people in Europe. France, Switzerland, Holland is [sic] OK, 
the British-American zones permit some information, the Russian zone is sealed off 
completely.
We are going well, as usual, enjoying life. We have to enlarge our institute – too 
much work to do. And now I am thinking of our congresses again. Ness wrote me a 
nice letter. He escaped the Gestapo, a friend died, tortured but [marginal addition: 
not] telling his hiding place. What a world.
I hope you will write me a kind and brotherly letter,
Yours ever
[Otto Neurath]
PS
Always fearing that my DEFENSIVE ACTION (as far as I can see I am in the 
defensive, first arguing SCHLICK, when ill[-]treating me, than again you [sic] – see 
Moscow case, you only are pleading, that I am overstepping self-defence) may 
again overstep according to your opinion self-defence I looked through the RUNES 
DICTIONARY. Under BASIC SENTENCES I discovered some remarks on various 
formulations, only one lacked – the NEURATH formulation, because in all the for-
mulations, you mention the verba prohibita of my language appear, I do not speak 
of observation etc. as you know. MY CHARACTERISTIC NOTE IS NOT EVEN 
MENTIONED.  If you were in a kindly mood and interested in my arguing, you 
would mention my version. And more, you would enable the reader to look into the 
now classic article on protocol statements,387 which is quoted so often in the litera-
ture. IT IS [marginal addition: a separate] QUESTION WHETHER YOU AGREE 
OR NOT. Further, how do you think a reader of the dictionary will find anything of 
my publications by means of the articles you are providing for the public?
All this trifle is not worthwhile to mention. I only want to show you what I think 
I at least not a friendly treatment. I am not even sure whether it is professionally OK, 
perhaps not even that. Since I do not assume a primarily unkind attitude, I rather 
guess that you are not much interested in me and my work ….
What a good luck, that I am not depending upon my real and my potential friends 
in our movement …. but walk on as a free and independent citizen. But, I tell you, 
it is not nice, to feel so unkindly treated just within our movement, more unkindly 
than outside in the literature. Is it not rather strange? But, let us not talk over those 
things too much. I add such things because they are illuminating.
By the way, do you think a reader, who wants to find, as I wanted to do, 
PROTOCOL, he will look under BASIC? But all that were not worthwhile of men-
tioning if it did not fit into the whole pattern of treatment ……
387 Neurath presumably refers to his famous “Protokollsätze” article; see Neurath (1932a/1983).
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I only think that life is short and that therefore one should prepare as much hap-
piness one another, I hoped that the tolerant pluralism of our movement would cre-
ate more friendship than other movements, spreading further and further. There are 
some kind contacts, some ---- but the whole cooperative mood is lacking 
somewhat.
I am thinking of some book we should publish all together for telling the world 
of the situation in the field of Logical Empiricism etc. Many people are hungry to 
know, what is what. Perhaps I shall write you about such a plan. Of course only 
short informative articles …. The whole field indicated, as far as the scientific 
research activities are concerned, directly and indirectly ….
--------------
 35. Neurath to Ina Carnap, September 24, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-13)
24th September, 45
My dear Ina,
What an extraordinary show – Ina writing a letter to the noisy man. RES AD 
TRIARIOS VENIT388 – as we learned as boys in the Grammar School. ES WIRD 
ERNST. I am very thankful for your kind intervention. I think it is very wise, that 
you try to bring us together. Impartiality is not needed, only sympathy and interest 
in our friendship.
I really felt somewhat helpless, when reading Carnap’s kind long letters in which 
he wanted to explain his and my behaviour, but hardly touching the points, which 
are important for me. I answered him today and I hope I succeeded in going on in a 
way more conform with his tendencies. You are particularly helpful, because your 
Austrian traditions give you a better start.
You are personally prepared to bear Carnap’s attitude, that when he thinks he is 
in the right that he expects the victim should bear his pain bravely. I have to tell you, 
that not only as a victim I am against this attitude but in any case. Since I do not 
think that we can speak of ‘right’ properly, I decided all problems to discuss as hap-
piness problems. If I have to isolate a person, because he or she is dangerous, then I 
should put into account the unhappiness of the person’s isolation together with the 
happiness increase of the others reached by the isolation. That the isolation is a 
‘right’ – as some people style that – should not led people to neglecting the isolated 
person’s unhappiness. You may bear that, I shall not. REASON: not because I want 
to avoid unhappiness, I should even take that, but because I think this attitude as 
388 “It comes down to the triarii,” Roman saying that referred to the legion’s elite forces as measures 
of last resort.
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such is dangerous for my human brethren and Carnap should try to see that. I tried 
to analyse human relations and I think that this habit is really dangerous.
Of course I am often unkind, grieving people, but I think I never let other people 
being unhappy, because I think I am ‘right’ (index word in my language). Discussing 
prison life etc. I often touch [on] this point. And I met many people here who are 
prepared to look at prison life and everything from this happiness point of view.
I must confess I often wanted to mention to Carnap this basic difference in our 
way-of-life attitude, but I hesitated, because it implies the assumption that Carnap’s 
point of view is partly Platonic, Prussian, Puritanic etc. – i.e. preparing the soil for 
totalitarian persecution, which often leads to terrible things e.g. Nazidom. Please, 
do not misunderstand me, I am not saying that Carnap is politically unsound, not at 
all, but that this attitude has elements, which very often lead kind people to become 
gradually merciless even cruel. In the moment, in which you are leaving the field of 
brotherhood and happiness, looking at ‘higher’ things, you speak of godlike 
instances, science, impartiality, justice etc. (describing Carnap’s attitude) you are 
entering the land of danger. Then people learn to look at these higher principles and 
disregard the happiness account.
You mention, that I bully people, when arguing – I am not sure of that, I think I 
am rather noisy, and mostly interested in creating doubts, weakening the strong 
positions of some absolutism. SHOULD I BULLYING [sic], I AM PREPARED TO 
ALTER THAT. That is what I ask from Carnap, that he should be prepared to alter 
his attitude (in general, not only as far as I am concerned).
You see I am a little doubtful, about ‘coercion’ exerted by me. Reason: when 
writing in a very conciliant [conciliatory] way (no noise, no bullying), e.g. in the 
Plato article,389 the people who answer, answer exactly in the tone of irritation, I 
know, in the cases in which people tell me they feel themselves bullied – interesting, 
is it not? Secondly there are people, who after a certain ‘education’ say to me I 
should be less noisy etc., but never felt them coerced or bullied….
How do I explain that? Hypothesis of mine: most differences in life are based on 
ATTITUDES, not on opinions and not on actions themselves, but on the PATTERN 
OF ACTIONS. Many people feel that I do not agree with their habits and attitudes. 
I think Carnap feels that, too, even when we are peacefully together. Such a 
 fundamental difference creates an atmosphere, which leads sometimes to explo-
sions. I discovered that people of different religion, even atheists and people with 
faith can go on together as long as they look at love and friendship as something 
DECISIVE.
You see there are many ways of life, let me select two of them. The one the 
‘PLATONIC’ one thinks in terms of a pyramid of principles, rules, rights, order, 
everything has it proper place, fixed by some structure, you can predict what will 
happen, rational arguing is decisive in life etc. This habit is dangerous in itself, the 
persecution of the Albigenses, Huguenots, Jews etc. is possible within such a 
framework.
389 Presumably Neurath and Lauwerys (1945).
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There is another way of life, where happiness and friendship are in the fore-
ground. Why order? Love and happiness, – sometimes supported by order, justice 
and suchlike things, but they are not always applicable, when one wants to be kind. 
Of course not only to the next neighbour or relative but also to mankind. There are 
many loyalties you have to bear in mind, not only one. Happiness here, happiness 
there, pain here, pain there. Result: much muddle. And when thinking of human 
happiness one has to bear muddle, which is also essential for any evolved 
democracy……
I think I am entitled to discuss this matter, since you indicated that Carnap is a 
zealous Prussian Lutheran (I should not think of Lutheran, but of Sect[a]rian, but I 
know, what you want to indicate) – that implies not of the second type but rather of 
the former type.
I shall tell a story which illustrates the matter, I think. Arriving with Carnap from 
Bruxelles, the ticketcollector in Paris, tells me my ticket is the Belgian one. I tell 
her, I did get this back from the Belgian official and I do not have the other part. She 
asked the man with the red cap to decide, what should be done, he needed a few 
seconds for his decision ‘OK’ he said.
Now we left the station and tried to get a taxi. In this moment I feel in my pocket 
the French ticket; polite as I am I return and give the ticket to the collector. She is 
very impressed by that and expressed her thanks vividly.
CARNAP: ‘Now I do not understand anything. She looks at the ticket, she asks 
the official in charge, he permits you to pass, and now the ticket was wrong. What 
was the intention in asking the official at all?’ I: ‘You see, he looked at me, and 
thought: that is not the attitude of a swindler and instead of bringing a form, calling 
witnesses, making a fuss, as in Germany it would be the rule, he made his decision’. 
Carnap moved calmly his wise head and did not understand the Western world. I 
did. Perhaps the story was a little different, but Carnap will tell it to you. In princi-
ple, that was the central point.
Dr. Eisenmenger the physician Franz Ferdinand’s tells a story: Egypt, Cook 
Office. A German complains intensely that he put his luggage into [sic] the ship or 
carriage and did not get a receipt (you know that is English custom) and now it 
disappeared. Long statements etc. The official thinks one moment, then asks: ‘how 
much value?’ The German wholly abashed answered: “200 po[u]nds”. “You will 
get the money, should the luggage not be here within an hour” said the official 
calmly and asked the next passenger, what he wants. Eisenmenger says, he was 
much impressed, thinking how such a problem would be solved in Germany, with 
oath, declarations, dozens of letters and counter-letters, etc. perhaps even court of 
law. Whereas this Englishman less interested in order and justice, just wanted to go 
on in some friendly way with a minimum of time designed [assigned] to that 
business.
Or. The commander of one of the internment camps saw how much depressed 
some of the people were by being not permitted to write frankly and freely to their 
wives etc. He said to them, ‘give me your letters, I shall put them into my covers and 
post them as mine.’ He did it openly, all other officers and the soldiers knew it. 
Imagine a German officer, separating ‘professional’ and ‘personal’ life, he would 
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either not do it, or if, do it in a concealed way, fearing, he could reduce obedience, 
authority etc. ashamed that he was not able to ‘bekaempfen den inneren 
Schweinehund’ which wants mercy and such nonsense, when ‘professional’ duty is 
in question etc.
I think Carnap belongs more to the people, who sympathize with the Platonic- 
Prussian attitude. I like to be in a country where the difference personal and profes-
sional attitude is very small. One thinks of other people’s happiness and tries not to 
forget of course public happiness, but also to think of the neighbours[’] happiness, 
who is just in contact with the respective official.
What do you think about all that. I am now promoting muddle, democracy and 
brotherhood and I try to weaken all tendencies which go into the Platonic direction. 
You can realize how much it touches me, when I see how friends are supporting the 
other group with order, justice, pyramid of rules etc. (I know very well, that arbi-
trary administration is bad and that the poor are often interested in written, well[-]
defined law, but nevertheless it is dangerous this rigidity) with ecsta[s]y, enthusi-
asm, etc.
I have no idea what kind of ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ of an editor pressed Carnap to 
drop his name from my monograph. I asked him, that he the ‘correct’ man should at 
least tell me that, not only in vague generalities. But I cannot see that it is increasing 
human happiness when [marginal addition: someone is] not thinking of the pain 
inflicted by executing some imagined ‘duty’. Of course I understand an argument, 
which runs so: when I, Carnap have my name there, unhappy things will come out. 
Readers believing in me will take this monograph too seriously will make bad 
research etc. or will become bad parents or bad teachers; this unhappiness is so seri-
ous that I have to inflict pain on my friend Neurath …. or something like that. 
WHAT HAPPINESS WAS ENDANGERED BY HAVING HIS NAME ON THE 
MONOGRAPH. I am really inquisitive; how he will explain that?
You say, I think you regard it as a kind of exculpation: he is a zealous Lutheran 
etc. But you apparently overlook, that that would imply to object to that attitude in 
principle, it is not only some manner like another, it is some danger in that. Luther 
preached one should persecute the Jews, one should burn their synagogues, etc. he 
suggested one should massacre the peasants, some more some less does not matter, 
etc. You see it does not reduce my resistance against Carnap’s attitude and behav-
iour when you tell me, that it belongs to the Luther group. ‘Eh scho wissen’.
Please, realize my difficult situation. I have talks with German friends, who 
almost without exception do not realize to what extent the ‘good’ German attitude 
prepared Nazidom together with other items. I try to induce them to drop certain 
peculiarities and to accept more the Anglo-Saxon peculiarities. I want they should 
[sic] drop the interest in order as such, in stressing ‘rights’ more than peace and 
happiness, in stressing ‘ideals’ (ecsta[s]y, enthusiasm, arts, etc. science etc. impar-
tiality, etc.) more than the daily happiness of the neighbours, the own happiness, the 
happiness of people more far away. As you say Carnap is inflicting pain in the name 
of ‘science, impartiality and suchlike gods’, that is just, what I try to fight, and what 
my German friends usually try to defend, whereas my English friends in most cases 
agree with my attitude, which is based on compromise, muddle, happiness and not 
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on some [i]nhuman ‘principles’. I should like to know from where Carnap got his 
statute book about the duties of an editor …… You see, when this kind of Platonic 
ideology comes into the picture I become rather embittered. My friends and son and 
others in concentration camps etc. …. for so many years, some died. And the KIND 
GERMAN BOYS who performed cruel things, inflicted cruel things, inflicted pain, 
came from an environment, in which Platonic ideals count higher than human broth-
erhood, where performing some ‘duty’ implies inflicting pain as something normal. 
THAT IS, I THINK ONE OF THE DEEPER SOURCES OF OUR DIFFERENCE 
……. The Moraltheologists [sic] and Talmudists stressed the point of the law, and 
then they sometimes reduced its hardship. Carnap first creates a law according to 
which he is forced to withdraw his name and then he reduces [sic] this action by 
making a slight remark somewhere, not too obvious. You see I should think, when 
he thought that it is creating unhappiness, when people believe in the authority of 
Carnap, when reading my book, then he should do more, not less, than he did …… 
It sounds now, as if some legal performance should be in principle executed but with 
some restrictions …… Please, realize, that without being angry I look at that with 
not much joy and find it in its best rather comic ….
I hope you will not become impatient, when reading my long description of my 
attitude and why it is not a question of good will, [marginal addition: as long as] 
Carnap IN PRINCIPLE tries to perform, what I think is dangerous. Of course I shall 
try to be with him at [in] good terms, even when he does not alter his attitude, but it 
is hard for me, to think of a friend, who does not think of brotherhood, happiness, 
humanity as more important then some godlike phantoms ……. Sorry. But perhaps 
he will understand a little the danger …. Let us hope. You see this inflicting pain 
remains, what it is, even when Carnap does it under tears …. The Kurfuerst killing 
his son under tears …. Prinz von Homburg.390 Prinz von Homburg and Goethe’s 
Iphigenie are my examples of real German lack of brotherhood and of the merci-
lessness which appears to be heroic or something like that. For me dangerous 
through and through ….
Joergensen and Ness are well. Poor friends who died. What will Lukasiewicz do 
with his nationalism? And Scholz with his preparedness to collaborate?391 The half 
collaborator will persecute the full corroborator being persecuted by the quarters 
etc. What a world. Refugees will say that the others did not go away  – what a 
shame – and these will call the refugees escapists. What a world.
Thanks for newspaper cuttings. I am very thankful for all such stuff. Our files are 
lively now, we enjoy our big library. The files are increasing, the collections of 
maps, pictures etc. People here are kind to us. Yesterday a neighbour whom we 
390 Neurath presumably refers to Heinrich von Kleist’s famous play, Der Prinz von Homburg oder 
die Schlacht bei Fehrbellin, written in 1809–10.
391 Heinrich Scholz (1884–1956) was a German logician, working especially on the history of 
logic. He had his own school of logic in Münster, whose members (like Friedrich Bachmann and 
Albrecht Becker) participated at the International Congresses for the Unity of Science.
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never met, brought a telegram eronneously [sic] put under his door, adding – as a 
consolation – a basket full of wonderful apples.
Everything is full of some muddle, everything goes on smoothly and in a rather 
humane way. There are bad things here too – but people acknowledge that and want 
to alter it.
I am waiting for your and Carnap’s letter. Perhaps it is helpful that you lead the 
discussion into the serious field of the way of life. Perhaps it is better, one says all 
that, instead of being delicate. Suppression of all these protests against Carnap’s 
habits creates perhaps the temper, which leads to outbursts, because – not without 
reason – I regard his treating me badly as an result of his general outlook. A point in 
which you agree with me.
I hope you will bring us more closely together than we have been before, and 
without Carnapian sleepless nights. I am very prepared to create a kind and heartly 
[sic] Carnap-Neurath brotherhood. With love from Mary to both of you
Ever yours
[Otto Neurath]
 36. Neurath to Carnap, September 24, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-14)
194 Divinity Rd.
OXFORD
My dear friend Carnap,
Perhaps you felt discouraged, when reading my letter, because I wrote it in a 
rather helpless mood. But let us go on and try – first of all, I have not the slightest 
doubt, that you and I would help one another when in danger, further, that we are 
pleased by our personal contact, etc. nevertheless there are manifestly some serious 
differences in outlook, which we as kind people should analyze for finding some 
compromise. Of course, should you be against compromise as such, then it becomes 
a difficult matter.
It is so, that I complain about you violating me by grieving me and you complain 
about me violating you by overstepping self-defence. Would you think I am not in 
harmony with your own stories, when saying, that you did not tell of any case in 
which I first violated you? Please think about this point, please.
And now I shall try to be analytic and to be restrained, not giving names from the 
beginning. I think, that you should tell me
 (1) which are the points in my paper, which forced you to withdraw your name. You 
did tell me about that in the most vague terms only and looking through my 
paper I cannot discover things sufficiently bad.
 (2) withdrawing a name is so serious an action, that I assume, that you can tell me 
what detrimental effects for our movement, readers, mankind as a whole you 
expected from your name being on the paper.
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 (3) if this is so serious, and your name on the paper would give too much authority 
to my bad paper that it becomes more dangerous, then why did you make the 
concession, to indicate the withdrawal to be – as you think – hardly conceiv-
able, as you wrote me [?]
 (4) do you really think that my paper is worse than all the others, e.g. Bloomfield’s 
about which many people complaint [sic] to me?392
Please, be kind enough to answer these four questions. I do not conceal, that your 
behaviour looks less like an action made for the common good of readers, mankind, 
movement but rather like an action, which has to satisfy your own conscience only, 
without being made for the common good and the common happiness. I confess, 
that up to now I looked at this ambiguous behaviour as I look at certain actions sug-
gested by Moral Theologists or Talmudists, who first give certain strong rules for 
satisfying the conscience and then tell how to make the strongness [sic] not too 
strong, again satisfying the conscience, but in both cases not telling us, how the hap-
piness of the human brethren is increased by the suggestions and actions they are 
producing.
You see, I myself do not like the continental “Aussprachen haben”, but then I see, 
that the continental atmosphere is forcing us to have them and therefore I try to 
make the best of it. The fact that you are writing long letters shows me, that you take 
the matter seriously, as I do it [sic], and that even Ina comes down from the high 
Olympus, the silent goddess to bring the thundering heroes together before they 
start sitting sulkingly in their respective tents shows me, that also she [marginal 
addition: thinks] things [sic] becoming serious and that she thinks we should take 
care of our friendship and come to some kind solution.
After answering the above questions please try to think a little about me as a 
human brother, who has his difficulties and whom to help would be a friend’s task. 
You speak of “reconciliation”, that is not the right word for making the situation 
better, when one of the partners does not feel being in a feud, but being “humili-
ated”. I have seen so many human careers that I am entitled to say it is extremely 
difficult to alter the atmosphere of humiliation.
You see, when you tell me and others, that I am terrible in my outbursts, that is 
not humiliating – EVEN IF IT WERE NOT AN ACCEPTABLE DESCRIPTION. But 
I feel, as if you put away the basic elements of my life, when you are spreading the 
legend that I become furious, when criticized in my arguments, in my style, etc., as 
you did write to Morris.
Look, all my life I have two important pillars of my behaviour; to reserve a con-
siderable part of my life to purely humane relations, kind relations, friendship, love, 
enjoying reading, looking at landscapes, etc., making people happy and becoming 
happy by being treated in a kind way. The other pillar is to take nothing for granted 
(without exception) and being prepared to alter anything which I do not regard as 
“folklore” (I should not be interested in altering trousers or ties etc.), i.e. my 
392 On Bloomfield, see letter 28, note 305.
 Appendices
676
 arguments, my style, etc. that is the reason, why so many people are astonished with 
what extraordinary preparedness I am accepting suggestions dealing with my style, 
dealing with my arguments. It is normal, – there are many witnesses of that – that I 
say to people less educated than I am, alter the wording, if you think it better under-
standable. My publishers tell me how nice I am, never being angry when a “reader” 
of the office makes suggestions. I think it just characteristic that I never have an 
outburst, when people suggest alterations. Imagine that such a mythos, propagated 
by you (perhaps other people started with that and you accepted it without taking 
care of proving it – I have no idea) inflicts pain.
I think – you know it is difficult to get a picture of the own person – that I col-
lected sufficiently data, which tell me, that I designed much energy and efforts to 
these two parts of my fabric, and succeeded. The number of friends is increasing – I 
should say rapidly, when looking at the long letters from so many people, who talk 
over private problems etc. Apparently people, who are not afraid of me and my 
“outbursts”. But – perhaps that indicates something – they are in the vast majority 
non-Germans, they are Dutch, English, etc. Further I have many examples showing 
me that people, who first felt themselves irritated by my – very often badly noisy 
behaviour dropped one day this being irritated and go on nicely with me --- AFTER 
THEY DISCOVERED WHERE THE DIFFICULTY IS.  And it is mainly in the 
feeling of humiliation, which people create in one another. Outbursts are not so bad, 
but outbursts which are originated from the humiliation feeling and outbursts which 
create humiliation feeling.
WHEN YOU ARE WRITING TO MORRIS THAT I BECOME VIOLENT 
WHEN CRITICISED I BECOME REALLY FURIOUS, because I feel it as denoun-
ciation [sic], based on NOTHING, as far as I can judge.
In your last letter you are writing that you wrote that to Morris, mainly for reduc-
ing his possible sorrow that he did not protest.393 Imagine, my dear Carnap, how that 
humiliates me. You are thinking of his pain, not in the same way of mine, (1) inflicted 
by taking away the responsibility from Morris, – I assumed he did, what was neces-
sary, I was giving him FREE HAND, as letters show – and in (2) inflicting another 
by telling him about my outbursts, when criticised. YOU DID NOT ANSWER 
THIS SERIOUS, VERY SERIOUS REMARK OF MINE, but started telling me, 
what I never denied, that I am violent in self-defence.
The way, in which you are criticizing my overstepping self-defence, is for me 
again humiliating, why? You are not much concerned with what Schlick did, but you 
speak in general of that fact, that both parties have something to say etc. THAT IS 
JUST THE WAY TO AVOID THE FRIENDLY ANALYSIS OF THE VICTIM’S 
FATE.  What comes out: YOU are the victim, because you had one of the most 
depressing experiences.
When analysing Schlick’s behaviour towards me, you would discover a contin-
ual tendency to humiliate and attack me. Whereas I, as you remember, did much for 
preparing the booklet for praising his coming back to Vienna. From my side not the 
slightest tendency to attack him.
393 Carnap to Neurath, letter 32.
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About his extraordinary rude and humiliating behaviour I have Frank as a wit-
ness, as we discussed my “SOZIOLOGIE”.394 If he did suggest far reaching changes 
as an equal to an equal I should never reacted irritatedly, but he behaved like a big 
boss who has a right to bully me and to treat me like a school boy [sic]. Perhaps I 
am an “eingebildeter Laffe”, but I do not regard my work so much less, than his and 
EVEN IF IT WERE SO, I ASK FOR THE NORMAL RESPECT BETWEEN 
SCHOLARS.
I never got such a kind of cold humiliation in my life, than from him. Scene in 
the circle: Waismann suggested to me, I should some day tell about my points of 
view, he had spoken with Schlick and a certain day agreed. Schlick introduced me – 
WITHOUT ANY CONFLICT IN THE AIR – with words of this kind: I do not 
know, what Dr. Neurath has to tell us and what he really wants, but he likes to speak 
to us, please start, etc. COLLEAGUES OF THE CIRCLE WERE REALLY 
STARTLED BY THAT AND TOLD ME SO AFTERWARDS.395
How Schlick behaved at other occasions, you know perfectly well. His last paper 
read in French at our congress in Paris, spoke of EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT – 
without any provocation – as an ugly word. Fortunately the rather stupid translator 
translated “Einheitswissenschaft” into SCIENCE UNITAIRE  – and now nobody 
knows, why that is ugly. ETC.396
Neider, who liked Schlick, did never deny all that, but only tried to explain it by 
telling me, that the overdelicate and sensitive man always feared that I could touch 
his sentiments etc. I told Neider how much I personally like to be sentimental and 
never disturb other people’s sentimentality, if not connected with brutality, as it 
sometimes is.
I do not deny that I exploded when Schlick behaved badly, I never denied that, 
but you should be a good friend and tell me, what the other side can say for 
HUMILIATING me.
The same is in your own case. The non-quoting me belongs to the humiliating 
things in many cases. The not regarding a person as sufficiently important, that his 
remarks have to be taken seriously. One may use them, but why quote them. You 
say, both sides have to tell their story. You never told me, why you thought it right 
not to quote me. Your story always starts AFTER THE ACTION, whereas I speak of 
the beginning, too.
Look, I always fear that I, like other scholars, could fall into the mean and poor 
scientific persecution mania. Therefore I suppress my anger in such cases, very 
often, saying to me – it is by chance etc. But if such cases increase in number I 
become angry. Look at the following example. Feigl wrote a paper on Logical 
394 See Neurath (1931/1973).
395 See further Neurath to Carnap, letter 34. note 369.
396 See Schlick (1936/1979).
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Empiricism.397 Do you think anybody reading this paper, will discover that I had a 
certain position in its history? I do not speak of the acceptability of my hobbies, 
protocol statements, index verborum, etc. but of the fact, that in MANY BOOKS, 
even in Laird’s398 little introduction to modern philosophy I am acknowledged as 
somebody of a certain validity within this movement. It is particularly interesting to 
note, that I fought for LOGICAL EMPIRICISM against Schlick, who wanted 
RADICAL EMPIRICISM – the term used by James. And I was against that, because 
James this half-Bergsonian boy with so much obscurantism should be treated kindly 
by us, because he taught us a lot, but never as a kind of authority, whose name [sic] 
proposals should be accepted. Please, look to the article by Feigl. He just put me 
into SOCIOLOGY – that is all. He does not even mention me as the initiator and 
editor-in-chief of the encyclopedia. DO YOU THINK HE WOULD TREAT ME SO 
IF I WERE [A] PROFESSOR, not to ask the question, what he did [sic] with all that 
if I were Schlick. Such things are normal. I analyzed some day  – I WAS NOT 
INVOLVED – the big book of an author, who indicated he would not quote others 
(in the English way) but tell his story. He was PRIVATDOZENT, and sometimes a 
name appears, and ------ believe it or not, almost all names were the names of the 
professors of his university, where he hoped to get a professorship. Nice, as I am, I 
never published that in a review or so. I never complaint about Feigl. I am not 
regarding him as very important or influential, but for a long time I regarded him as 
a potential friend. I FEEL IRRITATED AS A FRIEND. You see, many years ago I 
had with Feigl a very fundamental talk about INDUCTION, particularly about 
cross-inductions etc. inductions supporting one another etc. Feigl himself told me in 
USA about that, how much he learned from me that day and how certain remarks by 
Reichenbach, he likes, go in this direction etc. But FEIGL never quoted me in his 
induction papers. Please, believe me “Es liegt mir stagelgrien auf”399 whether he 
quotes me or not (that is not the case with CARNAP, RUSSELL, etc.), but a poten-
tial friend should not humiliate me, …. He could e.g. quote some of my many 
remarks on induction, as it were, to be kindly and perhaps ----- CORRECT, too. I 
have no idea, how you look at Feigl’s paper on Logical Empiricism as far as he 
describes my activities in this movement. Perhaps you think it is just OK. Please, 
tell me, what you think about that.
This kind of behaviour I think somewhat irritating. If some day Feigl will get an 
“outburst”, then he and others think that the [sic] Neurath is quickly irritated, 
whereas it is the outburst which covers many, many subjects …… You see I am 
fighting even that in me, and I am fighting becoming suspicious, because that dis-
turbs friendship and love. But it is not always simple to overcome this feeling. 
397 See Feigl (1943).
398 Cf. Laird (1936).
399 Adaptation of a Viennese expression popularized by the satirist Karl Krauss that may be trans-
lated as “it upsets me.”
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Imagine, some day I read in Russell, how he uses the word Protocol etc. and I 
thought strange, how many different definitions exist … And I looked into RUNES 
dictionary.400 I could not find the term PROTOCOL at all. Strange. Then later on I 
discovered that it is under BASIC. But there I found various variations, BUT NOT 
MY OWN. I never speak of observation, sensation etc., but I start from sentences 
with certain types of words in, which belong to certain classes etc. Further. Do you 
think the various articles together in RUNES enable a person to know, what I have 
to say? You are e.g. not quoting my protocol-article nor any other, except on physi-
calism. You see I should look at me as over-suspicious, if I did not have the Moscow 
affaire,401 the Feigl article etc. I should say so: my friends and potential friends do 
not regard me as much important within their circle – except as far as I act as a kind 
of manager …. OK. Let them. But it us somewhat humiliating, when on the other 
hand, OTHER PEOPLE WHO ARE NOT SO CLOSELY RELATED TO ME men-
tion my work – as I think – properly. All that is not worth wile [sic], if our atmo-
sphere were kind and homely, which it is not.
That the BONZEN ideology402 is very normal, I know, but why also within our 
movement, which I thought should try to be more free and less hard than others, the 
pluralism with its tolerant features, etc. humane and kind relations should be pos-
sible here, contacts etc. more than in other places of our planet ….
I do not think you are “milder” than I am or more “peaceful” – as you think – I 
only make more noise than you. But I am, in principle, prepared to think of other 
people’s happiness, mine included (I am not unselfish), but you, as far as I can read 
your arguments, you are thinking in terms of “right”, “correct”, “duty”, “etc.” which 
is far away from being kind and friendly, thinking of human happiness as a central 
item. You think – as far as I can see – that if you are in the right, other people’s 
unhappiness is not counting much. If you are “just” the victim may bear his pain 
with courage etc., etc. Perhaps You see yourself differently. I am really waiting, [sic] 
how you will answer question (2). What human happiness you improved by making 
me unhappy, when dropping your name. THAT IS MY QUESTION. Can you indi-
cate that you improved the happiness of mankind, some people etc. by inflicting 
unhappiness, then I shall think over the whole matter in a different way. Up to now 
I rather feel, that – SHOULD YOU BE ABLE TO SHOW THAT, I AM NOT SURE 
OF THAT – you were in the position as a “correct” man to inflict pain. Which I think 
a very sad attitude, indeed …… not only as far as friends are concerned.
This is a “Platonic” attitude, I should say. I am against this attitude, even if I did 
not appear as a victim. And differences in ATTITUDES are really dangerous, 
because they create often tensions. Please, believe me, that I am so fully prepared to 
find a living [sic] compromise, that I shall not be to[o] hard in my attitude towards 
400 See Runes (1942); cf. Neurath to Carnap, letter 34. note 376.
401 See Carnap to Neurath, letter 32. note 351.
402 See Neurath to Carnap, letter 31. note 330.
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this Platonism, which I – to be frankly – dislike enormously and which I think is 
something unpleasant in your otherwise charming habits.
Of course, I shall do what I can to avoid clashes, but please, when you writing 
[sic] me a kind letter, try also to tell me, that you are not untouched by these my 
remarks on your Platonic or Puritan or how you may call it attitude. Please. But even 
if you cannot drop that – I shall try to be as nice as possible to you …. It is only 
simpler, when you could have a similar attitude with all its muddling through….
I hope we shall now discuss within our movement also such problems of attitude 
closely connected with pluralism, unpredictability, which – I hope so – will be dis-
cussed now, after I published my opinions as bluntly, as possible, and since they are 
of some importance – even if not acceptable to some of you.
Of course, Labour gives me some hope, e.g. in housing. But the USA attitude 
makes everything difficult, and the Russian attitude, too. I do not know, what the 
Russians are driving at, but if they want to do, what they are doing ---- what a ter-
rible future before mankind. Perhaps much of that harsh behaviour is a kind of 
higher muddle, let us hope so.
Laski has many good ideas. But as a chairman of a party, he should [be] a little 
more distinguished [discriminating] between topical politics and general attitude…. 
I heard him lecture. I am not so sure, that he always “means business”. I should like 
to go into details, if you did ask me concrete questions, dealing with him.
Glad that Tarski’s family is sa[f]e. How terrible Hosiasonns and Lindenbaum’s 
death.403 I remember how they met one another and gradually became accustomed 
to one another, e.g. in Paris. I liked them and enjoyed their happiness.
No, I do not know of Popper’s Readership. Probably Hayek’s influence. He likes 
him very much indeed and I think Popper will support Hayek in his attacking 
Logical Empiricism. I, for peace and happiness, suggested to Hayek we should 
arrange a published symposium and not attack one another brutally. I wrote my 
review as restricted [restrained] as possible, but I think he is a fanatic with much 
bias….404 Some of his remarks are rather a kind of scandal – I think so. But peace is 
something of importance.
We now get letters from Holland, France etc. …. Nothing from people in the 
Russian zone, only from people outside the Russian zone, which is “sealed off”.
We are enjoying life, having many nice contacts a very nice correspondence with 
many people, enlarging our institute etc. Ness wrote me nicely, he escaped, but his 
friend died, tortured, but not telling of Ness’ hiding place. He hopes we shall have 
our next congress at OSLO. Let us hope so….
Now I am expecting a particularly nice and kind letter from you, answering the 
famous four questions and telling me about your attitude and whether it is really so 
Platonic, as I see it.
403 See Ina Carnap to Neurath, letter 33. note 360.
404 See Neurath (1945/2004).
 Appendices
681
Be sure of my intention to calm down ill feeling and to discover a pleasant way 
of a pleasant compromise, if we cannot reach a more common basis of happiness 
and humanity.
Ever yours
[Otto Neurath]
24/Sept/45
 37. Neurath to Carnap, September 28, 1945.
(ASP RC 102-55-12)
OTTO NEURATH, Dr. Phil. 194 DIVINITY ROAD, 30 DICKERTON ROAD,
Secretary, Isotype Institute OXFORD HEADINGTON, OXFORD
28th Sept.45
My dear friend Carnap,
Good Ina told me, that my remarks very often put your meditation into motion 
and even touches your sleeping capacity. I learn from that, that a friend’s remarks 
are taken seriously by you  – but please do [marginal addition: not] think that I 
behave differently. Your letters ask me to search my behaviour and life and to try to 
alter it. As I told you, well knowing the slight persecution mania very frequent in 
scholars, I try to fight any nucleus of such a behaviour in me.
Therefore I assumed, of course, that perhaps my remark, that Schlick behaved in 
a humiliating way, could be overstated and that I should look at something he said, 
as a criticism and myself as too sensitive …. I tried to remember Schlicks behaviour 
in our talks – Frank as witness – his behaviour in the circle etc., and I could not 
discover any case in which I fought criticism, always cases in which I fought arro-
gance and an attitude humiliating me, but, as you know, we should be very careful, 
where we are witnesses about ourselves. But I remembered, that I have the French 
text of Schlick’s remarks on me. I ask you and Ina, whether you think this kind of 
talking has to be regarded as ‘criticism proper’. I think criticism involves that giving 
‘names’ is not proper criticism. WHEN WITHOUT EXPLAINING THE REASON. 
I think adding esthetical judgement is usually not just criticism – it tells about the 
person’s biography, not about the work in question. But please, look at the following 
quotations: (from our department in the IXth International Congress of Philosophy, 
1937, IV.  L’ECOLE DE VIENNE ET LA PHILOSOPHIE TRADITIONELLE. 
‘Certains d’enter eux ont même une antipathie marquée contre le mot ‘philosophie’ 
(as if it where some whim, not explained in detail) qu’ils veulent proscrire au béné-
fice d’autres terms tels que ‘science unitaire’ par où ils entendent se considérer eux-
mêmes, non comme des philosophes, mais comme de chercheurs scientifiques …. 
etc.’
and then:
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‘Ce que l’homme fait par peur produit presque tojours in effet ridicule. (please, 
look into my writings, whether I am using such terms, even when objecting other 
people’s opinions) Ce n’est donc pas etonnant, si tel anti-metaphycien propose par 
example, le plus sérieusement du monde, d’établir un Index verborum prohibito-
rum, où il faudrait denouncer tous le mots qui se trouvent le plus souvent au centre 
des discussions métaphysiques, par example ‘monde’, ‘âme’, ‘être’, etc. et le mot 
‘philosophie’ lui-même, dont nous avons déjà parlé. C’est vraiment une drôle d’idée 
(Do you think this is a word of scholarly criticism? I should take even that, if com-
bined with real analysis and criticism. I started this language business as a student, 
considerably influenced by Itelson,405 and my contact with you and other people is 
partly based on that fact, that we agree about certain main points. What a strange 
situation, that Schlick fights for the ‘soul’ …… oh my dear. But I should not mind 
his OBJECTIONS, if he did mention at least one, but he only tries, without telling 
[mentioning] my name (NICHT-GENANNT SOLL ER WERDEN –, to make me a 
laughing-stock. Some crazy crank – that is all) que de vouloir conduire les hommes 
à la vérité en leur faisant peur de certains mots. etc.’ and then the [a]estheticist has 
the word, [sic] fortunately in vain, because the translator dropped 
‘Einheitswissenschaft’ ‘Einheizwissenschaft’ … le replacement par des expressions 
sans couleur et peu esthétiques telles que ‘science unitaire’. Cette attitude me parait 
reposer sur un profond malentendu ‘JUST’ malentendu’ – HE DIXIT ……406 Boy, 
boy, re-reading this I believe in Otto Neurath in the witness box, when telling that 
SCHLICK liked to humiliate Otto Neurath, not even thinking him as sufficiently 
equal that one has to explain the objections; the grand spirit gives names ---- how 
simple. And I cannot see, that you or Feigl or any other of Schlick’s friends ever 
tried to give me a kind of satisfaction, by mentioning, that Schlick’s way of criticism 
does not give sufficient credit to Neurath’s hard work, – acceptable or unacceptable, 
that is another question – who tried for about 40 and more years to alter his own 
language carefully, thinking seriously of this matter and explaining again and again, 
why dropping ‘soul’ etc. Not because it is his whim, explaining in detail, why what 
we are striving for is an EINHEITSWISSENSCHAFT, – perhaps with some unac-
ceptable details, about which we may start discussion. But how can you discuss 
with libel-like remarks without reasons?
405 On Itelson see Freudenthal and Karachentsev (2011); cf. letter 22, note 178.
406 Schlick (1936/1979, 492, 495): “Certain members even have marked antipathy to the word 
‘philosophy’, which they wish to proscribe in favour of other terms, such as ‘unitary science’, 
whereby they mean to consider themselves not as philosophers, but as exponents of scientific 
research. […] What a man does through fear nearly always produces a ridiculous effect. So it is not 
surprising if such an anti-metaphysician proposes, for example, in all seriousness, to establish an 
Index verborum prohibitorum, to which must be consigned all the words most often found at the 
centre of metaphysical discussions, such as ‘world’, ‘soul’, ‘being’, etc., and the word ‘philoso-
phy’ itself, of we have already spoken. It is truly a quaint idea to wish to lead men to truth by 
making them fearful of certain words. […] Replacing it by colourless and unlovely expressions 
such as ‘unitary science’. This attitude seems to me to rest on a profound misunderstandings.”
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You see, this very often presses me in a position to tell of my own work, because 
others sometimes go too far – as far as I can see – in deteriorating my whole work 
and sometimes humiliating me. I am for peaceful contacts, BUT I AM NOT 
PREPARED TO SWALLOW HUMILIATION. Really not. But I am wholly pre-
pared to learn, that what I think an unproper behaviour of other people is just the 
usual thing. Question: DO YOU THINK THAT THIS WAY OF SCHLICK TO 
TELL INTERNATIONAL READERS ABOUT MY POSITION WITHIN OUR 
MOVEMENT SHOULD BE CALLED PROPER?
I know DE MORTIS NIL NISI BENE407 – but that seems to be only valid, when 
writing necrologs [obituaries] …. And another quotation (from Goethe) Man sagt 
Eigenlob stinkt, was aber ungerechter Tadel fuer einen Geruch hat, darnach fragen 
die Leute nicht (I quote from memory).408
That is that. I am looking forward to a very kind, very nice, very illuminating 
couple of letters from
both of you, every yours
[Otto Neurath]
 38. Ina and Carnap to Marie Neurath, January 2, 1946.
(ASP RC 102-56-02)
January 2, 1946.
Very dear Mieze, Neurath409
We are very much distressed that this, our first letter to you, is caused by the sad 
news of Neurath’s death. It came so unexpectedly that we could hardly believe it 
when we saw it by chance in a newspaper. Felix Kaufmann wrote that he had a very 
cheerful letter from Neurath only a short while ago. Thus we assume that you too 
have been unprepared for it. We are sad with you. The last years have not been easy 
for the two of you, and we always admired how courageously you took it. Not a 
single time has Neurath mentioned hardship in the life in England. He only wrote 
about finding new friends, reconstructing his work, enjoying life with you. It is good 
that he was still able to see the downfall of the Nazis and their cause. His death is a 
407 From the Latin expression ‘De mortuis nil nisi bene dicendum’ (‘Of the dead, say nothing but 
good’).
408 Neurath refers to a passage from Goethe’s Sprüche in Prosa (1908a, 16). The exact quotation 
would be: “Eitel Eigenlob stinkt: wörtlich: «Man sagt:. Das mag sein; was aber fremder und 
ungerechter Tadel für einen Geruch habe, dafür hat das Publikum keine Nase.»” It has been trans-
lated into English as: “It is said that vain self-praise stinks in the nostrils. That may be so; but for 
the kind of smell which comes from unjust blame by others the public has no nose at all.” See 
Goethe (1908b, 81).
409 A corner of the paper is missing, thus “[---]” stands for the missing words.
 Appendices
684
tragic loss not only to you and to his friends, and to the Unity of Science Movement, 
but also to the cause of democracy, to the fight against fascism. I think, he had at 
times a hard life, but it must have been a rich life; and though his tender soul caused 
him greater anguishes th[a]n the tougher ones experience, it must also have brought 
him deeper satisfaction.
I don’t know how much you have followed the correspondence between Neurath 
and Carnap. If you have, you can imagine how deeply sorry Carnap now is when all 
the great arguments – advanced on both sides as safeguards for future occasions – 
have proven futile because there will be no future controversies. We only hope that 
both of you always knew that in spite of heated arguments Carnap always felt that 
he was a close friend of Neurath’s. Ah, but there could have been more of the kind-
ness which Neurath always considered as the most important consideration!
We wonder whether you intend to carry on the Institute, and whether you have 
enough experienced help for the work. We hope that you have good friends in 
England so that you will not be to[o] lonely; but we realize that friendships made 
later in [---] and in a new country hardly ever becomes as close as those [---] youth – 
we at least have found it that way in America. Is [---] anything we can do for you 
that might help? Will you let [---] if we can do something for you, financial or oth-
erwise? Ka[---]410 thought you might want to come to America; if so, perhaps we 
could assist you?
Please remember that we both are your friends and that we grieve with you.
Yours,
I. and C.
 39. Marie Neurath to Ina and Carnap, January 14, 1946.
(ASP RC 102-56-01)
14.1.46.
Dear Ina and dear Carnap
Very many thanks for your kind words. Yes it is difficult to believe. It was abso-
lutely sudden, even for me who was with him to the last second. We had a day which 
was full of the usual activities, in fact our first holiday after very busy weeks, and 
we were looking forward to two quiet days quite for ourselves. We returned from a 
supper and vivid conversations after all, and were sitting down for a little chat at 
Otto’s desk, and while I was reading something to him, and after he had just spoken 
a few words to me, his head sank down on the desk before him. He often looked 
very tired, and needed days of reading and rest in between, but he never complained 
about any pain – on the contrary, he stressed on his very last morning how lucky we 
were never to be ill. He rushed about so much that it was too natural that he was 
tired, and he took on more and more activities. You have a very wrong impression if 
410 The original letter is torn at this place, but given the content of Marie Neurath’s response, “Ka” 
must be the first two character of Felix or Edgar Kaufmann’s name.
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you think that just the last years were difficult for him. They were in fact the most 
successful of his life, and he stressed again and again, how much he felt at home in 
this country. He had very good friends here, and an extraordinary response.
I shall stay in this country. I am carrying on the Isotype Institute and have very 
much to do. Kaufmann wrote me too – I shall try to answer, but there is an enormous 
number of letters to write, and I should be grateful if you would thank in my name 
for the time being. All of you are most kind and helpful. Yes indeed I need your help 
to find a way to carry on the work for the Unity of Science movement. Could not 
Hempel become the organizational centre over there? And perhaps Hazebroek over 
here? Our Dutch secretary could help in Holland too. And perhaps Martin Strauss in 
this country?
Please let know soon. Fortunately I don’t need financial help, thank you so much. 
But if there are any interests to be looked after, as royalties from the Press, will you 
please see to it? I should be very grateful.
Yours ever,
Mieze
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